136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-44570. May 30, 1986.*
MANUEL GUERRERO and MARIA GUERRERO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, and APOLINARIO BENITEZ, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; “Share tenancy” defined.—The law defines
“agricultural tenancy” as the physical possession by a person of land devoted
to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose
of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable,
either in produce or in money, or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The
Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended.)
Same; Same.—With petitioner reference to this case, “share tenancy”
exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
137
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 137
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the
other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the
items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce
thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion
to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).
Same; “Farmhand” or “Agricultural worker” defined.—In contrast, a
farmhand or agricultural laborer is “any agricultural salary or piece worker
but is not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this
Code expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has
ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute
or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially
1
equivalent and regular employment” (Sec.
Reform Code).
Same; Statutes; Contracts; An agreement which states that the rights
and obligations of a person allowed by the landowner to cultivate and take
care of his coconut farm, shall be governed by R.A. 1199, is not abrogated by
the subsequent repeal of said law by R.A. 3844, which abolished share tenancy
and which does not include coconut lands, inasmuch as the vested rights of a
share tenant to security of tenure would be adversely affected thereby.—On
August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and
put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971,
Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy
relationships as contrary to public policy. On the basis of this national policy,
the petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the case at bar and the
lower court’s committed grave error in upholding the respondent’s status as
share tenant in the petitioners’ landholding. The petitioners’ arguments are
regressive and, if followed, would turn back the advances in agrarian reform
law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land
Reform Code mark the movement not only towards the leasehold system but
towards eventual ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing out of share
tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere
farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—It is important to note that the
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform
Code (RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian
Reform (RA 6389) even if the same have been substantially modified by the
latter. However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that
the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute
is a mere general principle. Among the established exceptions are when
vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. (Aisporna
v. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 481).
Same; Mere fact that a person was not the one who seeded the land
with coconuts does not mean that he could not be a tenant thereof.—
Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of
tenancy relationships. It is admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan,
with others, who had originally cleared the land in question and planted the
coconut trees, with the respondent coming to work in the landholding only
after the same were already fruit bearing. The mere fact that it was not
respondent Benitez who had actually seeded the land does not mean that he
is not a tenant of the land. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely
to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion of
growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the
products of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique
agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not
need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of
sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the
surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every
thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when
the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging
or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer,
weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that
respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of farmwork
from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times
with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a
tenant, not a mere farm laborer.
Same; Added indication of share tenancy is sharing in the harvest.—
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between
petitioners and respondent is their agreement to share the produce or
harvest on a “tercio basis” that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the
petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive indication of the existence of
tenancy relations per se, the sharing of harvests,
139
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 139
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be
present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed,
he is a tenant.
Same; Contracts; Use of the word “tenant” in the contract to cultivate a
coconut farm indicates that the cultivator is a “share tenant” and not a
“farmhand” or “worker”.—The petitioners, however, contend that the word
“tenant” in the aforequoted agreement was used to mean a hired laborer or
farm employee as understood and agreed upon by the parties. The fact that
2
their relationship would be guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or
the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines militates against such an
assertion. It would be an absurdity for Republic Act 1199 to govern an
employeremployee relationship. If as the petitioners insist a meaning other
than its general acceptation had been given the word “tenant”, the
instrument should have so stated. Aided by a lawyer, the petitioners, nor the
respondent could not be said to have misconstrued the same. In clear and
categorical terms, the private respondent appears to be nothing else but a
tenant.
Same; Statutory abolition of share tenancy did not end the rights of
share tenants in coconut and sugar lands even if leasehold tenancy in these
types of lands has not yet been installed.—Before we close this case, it is
pertinent to reiterate that the respondent’s right as share tenant do not end
with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to “uplift the farmers
from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make them dignified, self-reliant,
strong and responsible citizens x x x active participants in nation-building”,
agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first
step towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be
achieved by the government program of land reform. It is true that leasehold
tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not yet been implemented.
The policy makers of government are still studying the feasibility of its
application and the consequences of its implementation. Legislation still has
to be enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it may be implemented, the eventual
goal of having strong and independent farmers working on lands which they
own remains. The petitioners’ arguments which would use the enactment of
the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting back or eliminating the
tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit.
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
A.D. Guerrero for petitioners.
Bureau of Legal Assistance for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties Manuel
Guerrero, et al and Apolinario Benitez, et al as to determine their respective
rights and obligations to one another is the issue in this petition to review the
decision of the then Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court,
which affirmed in toto the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR
Case No. 6793-NE (SA-Q) ’73, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. “(1)ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to
reinstate plaintiff Apolinario Benitez to the 10-hectare portion of
the 16-hectare coconut holding in question, located at Bo. San
Joaquin, Maria Aurora Subprovince Quezon and to maintain said
plaintiff in the peaceful possession and cultivation thereof, with all
the rights accorded and obligations imposed upon him by law;
2. “(2)ordering defendants Paulino and Rogelio both surnamed Latigay,
to vacate the said ten-hectare portion and deliver possession
thereof to plaintiff Apolinario Benitez;
3. (3)ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay
damages to plaintiffs in the amount of P14,911.20 beginning from
July, 1973 and to pay the same amount every year thereafter until
plaintiff is effectively reinstated to the ten-hectare portion;
4. (4)denying plaintiff-tenants’ prayer for reconstruction of the copra-
cottage; and
5. (5)ordering defendants-spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to pay
plaintiff the amount of P200.00 by way of litigation expenses.
“All other claims of the parties are denied. With costs against defendants-
spouses.”
The petitioners adopt the respondent court’s findings of fact excepting,
however, to its conclusion that tenancy relations exist between the
petitioners and the respondents, thus:
“In 1969, plaintiff Apolinario Benitez was taken by defendants-
141
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 141
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
3
spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows
which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at Bo.
San Joaquin, Maria Aurora, Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was
allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation where he and
his family stayed. In addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean
the already fruitbearing coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do
such other similar chores. During harvest time which usually comes every
three months, he was also made to pick coconuts and gather the fallen ones
from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare plantation. He had to husk and
split the nuts and then process its meat into copra in defendants’ copra kiln.
For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the proceeds from the
copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the cows he was
paid P500 a year.
“Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from
gathering nuts from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the
plantation from where he used to gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts
of defendants and he brought the matter to the attention of the Office of
Special Unit in the Office of the President in Malacañang, Manila. This led to
an execution of an agreement, now marked as Exh. D, whereby defendants
agreed, among others, to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of the
plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the
Philip-pines.
“Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the
10-hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists
to gather fruits therefrom. Defendant spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned
defendants Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and
the processing thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused to be
demolished a part of the cottage where plaintiff and his family lived, thus,
making plaintiffs feel that they (defendants) meant business. Hence, this case
for reinstatement with damages.
“The lower court formulated four (4) issues by which it was guided in the
resolution of the questions raised by the pleadings and evidence and we
pertinently quote as follows:
1. “(1)Whether or not plaintiff is the tenant on the coconut land-holding
in question consisting of sixteen (16) hectares;
 2. “(2)In the affirmative, whether or not he was unlawfully dispossessed
of ten (10) hectares thereof;
142
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
1. (3)Whether or not the parties are entitled to actual and moral
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.”
This petition for review poses the following questions of law:
I With petitioner reference to this case, “share tenancy” exists whenever
“Whether or not with the passage of Presidential Decree 1038 only last
October 21, 1976, Republic Act 6389 otherwise known as the Code of
Agrarian Reforms has repealed in their entirety the Agricultural Tenancy Act
(Republic Act 1199) and the Agricultural Reform Code (Republic Act 3844)
abrogating or nullifying therefore all agricultural share tenancy agreements
over all kinds of lands, as the one involved in the case at bar—over coconut
plantation—and hence, the complaint below as well as the challenged
decision by the courts below, based as they are on such share tenancy
agreements, have lost their validity cessante ratio legis, cessat ipsa lex.
II
“Assuming arguendo that said laws have not thus been repealed, is
respondent Benitez here-under the undisputed fact of the case as found by
the courts below a share tenant within the purview of the said laws, i.e.,
Republic Acts 1199 and 3844, or a mere farmhand or farm worker as such
relationship were extensively discussed in Delos Reyes v. Espinelli, 30 SCRA
574.” (Copied verbatim from Petition, p. 31—rollo)
Petitioner insists in this petition that Benitez was a mere farmhand or laborer
who was dismissed as an employee from the landholding in question and not
ousted therefrom as tenant. Whether a person is a tenant or not is basically
a question of fact and the findings of the respondent court and the trial court
are, generally, entitled to respect and non-disturbance.
4
The law defines “agricultural tenancy” as the physical possession by a
person of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by
another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of
the members of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the
former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or
ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or
143
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 143
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural Tenancy Act, as
amended.)
two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein
one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant
cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his
immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between
the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions
(Sec 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is “any agricultural salary
or piece worker but is not limited to a farm-worker of a particular farm
employer unless this Code expressly provides otherwise, and any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current
agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a
substantially equivalent and regular employment” (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).
The petitioners contend that the two courts below applied erroneous
definitions of “tenancy” found in repealed laws. They assert that the
Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code have been
superseded by the Code of Agrarian Reforms, Rep. Act 6389, which the trial
court and the Court of Appeals failed to cite and apply.
There is no question that the latest law on land and tenancy reforms seeks
to abolish agricultural share tenancy as the basic relationship governing
farmers and landowners in the country.
On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share
tenancy and put in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. On September
10, 1971, Republic Act 6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share
tenancy relationships as contrary to public policy. On the basis of this national
policy, the petitioner asserts that no cause of action exists in the case at bar
and the lower court’s committed grave error in upholding the respondent’s
status as share tenant in the petitioners’ landholding.
144
144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
The petitioners’ arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back
the advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy
Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the movement not only
towards the leasehold system but towards eventual ownership of land by its
tillers. The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a
reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or hired laborers with no tenurial
rights whatsoever.
It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by
the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the same have been
substantially modified by the latter.
However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the rule that the
repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute is a
mere general principle. Among the established exceptions are when vested
rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired. (Aisporna v.
Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 481).
The records establish the private respondents’ status as agricultural
tenants under the legal definitions.
Respondent Benitez has physically possessed the land-holding
continuously from 1969 until he was ejected from it. Such possession of
longstanding is an essential distinction between a mere agricultural laborer
and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law (Moreno, Philippine
Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition), a tenant being one who has the temporary use
and occupation of land or tenements belonging to another (Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary, Vol. II, p. 3254) for the purpose of production (Sec. 3, Republic Act
1199; delos Reyes v. Espinelli, 30 SCRA 574). Respondent Benitez lives on the
landholding. He built his house as an annex to the petitioner’s copra kiln. A
hired laborer would not build his own house at his expense at the risk of losing
the same upon his dismissal or termination any time. Such conduct is more
consistent with that of an agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure
under the law.
5
Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of
tenancy relationships. It is admitted that it had
145
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 145
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who had originally cleared the land
in question and planted the coconut trees, with the respondent coming to
work in the landholding only after the same were already fruit bearing. The
mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually seeded the
land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition of
cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the
land. It includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or
husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general
industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike
rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing.
Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the
seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some
coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major
work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit-
bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking
care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby
increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his
family, handles all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the
processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby
cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer. (delos
Reyes v. Espinelli, supra; Marcelo v. de Leon, 105 Phil. 1175).
Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between
petitioners and respondent is their agreement to share the produce or
harvest on a “tercio basis” that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the
petitioner-landowners. Though not a positive indication of the existence of
tenancy relations per se, the sharing of harvests, taken together with other
factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar,
strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a tenant. The case
of delos Reyes v. Espinelli (supra) clearly explains the matter thus:
“The agricultural laborer works for the employer, and for his labor he receives
a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the
other hand, the share tenant par-
 146
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
ticipates in the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on
the amount of harvest.”
Hence, the lower court’s computation of damages in favor of respondent
based on the number of normal harvests. In most cases, we have considered
the system of sharing produce as convincing evidence of tenancy relations.
The petitioners entered into an agreement on May 2, 1973 which in clear
and categorical terms establishes respondent as a tenant, to wit:
AGREEMENT
“This agreement entered into by and between Manuel Guerrero hereinafter
referred to as the landowner and Apolinario Benitez hereinafter referred to
as tenant.”
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners, however, contend that the word “tenant” in the aforequoted
agreement was used to mean a hird laborer or farm employee as understood
and agreed upon by the parties. The fact that their relationship would be
guided by the provisions of Republic Act 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the Philippines militates against such an assertion. It would be an absurdity
for Republic Act 1199 to govern an employer-employee relationship. If as the
petitioners insist a meaning other than its general acceptation had been given
the word “tenant”, the instrument should have so stated. Aided by a lawyer,
the petitioners, nor the respondent could not be said to have misconstrued
the same. In clear and categorical terms, the private respondent appears to
be nothing else but a tenant.
Finally, comes the admission by the petitioners’ counsel of the
respondent’s status as tenant:
“ATTY. ESTEBAN:
“Q You said you are living at San Joaquin, who cause the sowing of the
lumber you made as annex in the house?
“ATTY. NALUNDASAN:
“Please remember that under the law, tenant is given the
147
6
VOL. 142, MAY 30, 1986 147
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
right to live in the holding in question. We admit him as tenant.
xxx xxx xxx
(Apolinario Benitez on Redirect, TSN, June 25, 1974, pp. 49-50).
The respondent’s status as agricultural tenant should be without question.
Once a tenancy relationship is established, the tenant has the right to
continue working until such relationship is extinguished according to law.
The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (Republic Act 1199), the Agricultural
Land Reform Code of 1963 (Republic Act 3844), the Code of Agrarian Reforms
(Republic Act 6389) and Presidential Decree 1038 (Strengthening the Security
of Tenure of Tenant Tillers in Non-Rice/Corn Producing Agricultural Lands) all
provide for the security of tenure of agricultural tenants. Ejectment may be
effected only for causes provided by law, to wit:
1. “1)Violation or failure of the tenant to comply with any of the terms
and conditions of the tenancy contract or any of the provisions of
the Agricultural Tenancy Act;
2. “2)The tenant’s failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the
landholder’s share unless the tenant’s failure is caused by a
fortuitous event or force majeure;
3. “3)Use by the tenant of the land for purposes other than that
specified by the agreement of the parties;
4. “4)Failure of the tenant to follow proven farm practices;
5. “5)Serious injury to the land caused by the negligence of the tenant;
6. “6)Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his
immediate family or farm household of a crime against the
landholder or a member of his immediate family.” (Section 50, Rep.
Act 1199).
None of the above causes exists in the case at bar. The respondent has been
unlawfully deprived of his right to security of tenure and the Court of Agrarian
Reforms did not err in ordering the reinstatement of respondent as tenant
and grant-
148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals
ing him damages therefor.
Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondent’s
right as share tenant do not end with the abolition of share tenancy. As the
law seeks to “uplift the farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to
make them dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens x x x active
participants in nation-building”, agricultural share tenants are given the right
to leasehold tenancy as a first step towards the ultimate status of owner-
cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by the government program of land
reform.
It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar lands has not
yet been implemented. The policy makers of government are still studying
the feasibility of its application and the consequences of its implementation.
Legislation still has to be enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it may be
implemented, the eventual goal of having strong and independent farmers
working on lands which they own remains. The petitioners’ arguments which
would use the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting
back or eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the appellate court is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Adillo
No. L-23785. November 27, 1975.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs. ELIAS ADILLO,
defendant-appellee.
Agrarian law; Sharehold and leasehold systems in agriculture are
distinct from each other.—The two tenancy systems are distinct and different
from each other. In sharehold, the tenant may choose to
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
91
VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975 91
People vs. Adillo
7
shoulder, in addition to labor, any one or more of the items of
contributions (such as farm implements, work animals, final harrowing,
transplanting), while in leasehold, the tenant or lessee always shoulders all
items of production except the land. Under the sharehold system, the tenant
and the landholder are co-managers, whereas in leasehold system, the tenant
is the sole manager of the farmholding. Finally, in sharehold tenancy, the
tenant and the landholder divide the harvest in proportion to their
contributions, while in leasehold tenancy, the tenant or lessee gets the whole
produce with the mere obligation to pay a fixed rental.
Same; Notice of reaping or threshing not required under a leasehold
system.—There is thus justification for the view that notice for reaping or
threshing is not required by the Act in leasehold system, because the lessee’s
principal obligation is to pay the rental, which is to deliver a generic thing in
the absence of any specific agreement to the contrary, and that the rental is
supposed to be a specific amount, as fixed and limited in Section 45 of the
Act, Without any legal obligation imposed on the lessee to give such notice,
the lessor should take it upon himself to verify from the tenant-lessee the
date of reaping and threshing.
Same; Omission in R.A. 3844 of provision in Section 89 of R.A. 1199
penalizing the reaping or threshing of produce previous to dale net therefor
operates as an implied repeal of said provision.—It will be noted that Section
39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (R.A. 1199) which prohibits either
the tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion
of the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing and penalizing
any violation thereof by either party is no longer found in the Agricultural
Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6389) for the obvious
reason that agricultural share tenancy provided in the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of 1954 has already been abolished by the new Code. The omission of
such provision as Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 in the
new Code operates as an implied repeal of said provision.
Same; Reaping of threshing of palay without notice to landowner by a
share tenant is no longer an offense.—Specifically Section 39 of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act (R.A. 1199), upon which the accusatory pleading
against defendant-appellee is predicted, is no longer carried in the
subsequent agrarian laws and decrees and its violation thereof considered no
longer an offense. As a result it would be illogical to prosecute or sentence
defendant-appellee for sack offense which no longer exists.
 Same; Courts hare no jurisdiction to try and convict persons charged
with pre-reaping or pre-threshing under Agricultural
92
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Adillo
Tenancy Act of 1954.—The whole failure of the laws and decrees
subsequent to the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 to penalize the acts of
pre-reaping and pre-threshing which constituted the offense defined and
penalized under the said Section 39 carries with it the deprivation of the
courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with its
violations.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. Alberto J.
Francisco, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Padfico P.
de Castro and Solicitor Alejandro B. Afurong for plaintiff-appellant.
Ernesto S. Tengco for defendant-appellee.
MARTIN, J.:
The decisive question presented to Us in this direct appeal from the dismissal
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna in its Criminal Case SC-663
is whether or not the penal liability of a share-tenant for pre-reaping or pre-
threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199, enacted
on August 30, 1954) has been obliterated by the Agricultural Land Reform
Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) and the subsequent
agrarian laws.
The defendant-appellee Elias Adillo was a share-tenant of one Saturnino
L. Rebong on a parcel of riceland situated at Victoria, Laguna. On January 4,
1962, he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Laguna for
violation of Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act in that:
“(O)n or about October 3, 1960 in the Municipality of Victoria, Province of
Laguna, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused above-named being then the tenant of a piece
of land owned by Saturnino L. Rebong under a share system, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously reap and thresh a portion of
8
palay planted on said piece of land without the knowledge and consent of
Saturnino Rebong and even before a date has been fixed for the reaping and
threshing of the palay, to the damage and prejudice of Saturnino Rebong,”
On August 24, 1964, the counsel for the defendant-appellee1 moved for the
quashal of the information on the submission
_______________
1
Defendant-appellee was never arraigned, because his whereabouts
were unknown, Brief, plaintiff-appellant, p. 2.
93
VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975 93
People vs. Adillo
that the Agricultural Tenancy Act, on which the accusatory pleading against
defendant-appellee was based, has been repealed or abrogated by the new
Agricultural Land Reform Code, thereby resulting in the extinction of
defendant-appellee’s criminal responsibility for pre-reaping and pre-
threshing under the former law. The lower court favorably resolved the
motion and ordered the dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present appeal interposed by the State.
The particular provision of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, subject of this
litigation, provides:
“SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing.—It shall be unlawful for either the
tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of
the crop at any time previous to the date set for its threshing; * * * Any
violation of this section by either party shall be treated and penalized in
accordance with this Act and/or under the general provisions of law
applicable to the act committed,”
In Beltran v. Cruz2 the Court expressed that although the tenant is given the
right under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to determine when to reap the
harvest, it is likewise provided under the Act that the reaping “shall be after
due notice to the landholder” (Section 36, paragraph 1). Pre-reaping or
prethreshing is considered a serious violation, subject to the sanction of
dispossession of the tenant (Section 50, subsection b) and the penalty of a
“fine not exceeding Two Thousand Pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both, in the discretion of the court” (Section 57). The “moving idea
behind the requirement of the advance notice of the reaping, and the
prohibition of doing it in advance of the date set,” said the Court, “is to enable
the landholder to witness, personally or by representative, the reaping and
threshing operations. Prereaping in the absence of one party, due to
unilateral advancing of the date of the harvest, inevitably generates ill feeling
and strains relations between landholder and tenant due to the suspicion
aroused that part of the harvest may have been illegally diverted. Such
suspicion tends to poison the tenancy relation and is inimical to agricultural
peace and progress; wherefore, strict compliance with the legal and
contractual prescriptions as to the date of reaping and threshing are of the
essence of the statutory policy.” This applies particularly to rice share tenancy
and may not be extended to embrace the
_______________
2
L-20973, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 611, 612.
94
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Adillo
agricultural leasehold. The two tenancy systems are distinct and different
from each other. In sharehold, the tenant may choose to shoulder, in addition
to labor, any one or more of the items of contributions (such as farm
implements, work animals, final harrowing, transplanting), while in leasehold,
the tenant or lessee always shoulders all items of production except the land.
Under the sharehold system, the tenant and the landholder are co-managers,
whereas in leasehold system, the tenant is the sole manager of the
farmholding. Finally, in sharehold tenancy, the tenant and the landholder
divide the harvest in proportion to their contributions, while in leasehold
tenancy, the tenant or lessee gets the whole produce with the mere
obligation to pay a fixed rental.3 There is thus justification for the view that
notice for reaping or threshing is not required by the Act in leasehold system,
because the lessee’s principal obligation is to pay the rental, which is to
deliver a generic thing in the absence of any specific agreement to the
contrary, and that the rental is supposed to be a specific amount, as fixed and
limited in Section 45 of the Act. Without any legal obligation imposed on the
lessee to give such notice, the lessor should take it upon himself to verify from
the tenant-lessee the date of reaping and threshing,4
On August 8, 1961, the Tenancy Act of 19-54 was amended by the
Agricultural Land Reform Code. Agricultural share tenancy was declared “to
be contrary to public policy and shall be abolished.”5 Nonetheless, based on
9
transitory provision in the first proviso of Section 4 of the Code, existing share
tenancy
_______________
3
See Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation, Vol. 2, 1964
ed., p. 208.
4
Manubay v. Martin, L-25846, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 733-735, citing Vol.
3, Montemayor, 2d., pp. 133-135.
5
“Sec. 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy.—Agricultural share
tenancy, as herein defined, is hereby declared to be contrary to public policy
and shall be ‘abolished: Provided, That existing share tenancy contracts may
continue in force and effect in any region or locality, to be governed in the
meantime by the pertinent provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, until the end of the agricultural year
when the National Land Reform Council proclaims that all the government
machineries and agencies in that region or locality relating to leasehold
envisioned in this Code are operating, unless such contracts provide for a
shorter period or the tenant sooner exercises his option to elect the leasehold
system; * * *.”
95
VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975 95
People vs. Adillo
contracts were allowed to continue temporarily in force and effect,
notwithstanding their express abolition, until whichever or the following
events occurs earlier: (a) the end of the agricultural year when the National
Land Reform Council makes the proclamation declaring the region or locality
a land reform area; or (b) the shorter period provided in the share tenancy
contracts express; or (c) the share tenant sooner exercises his option to elect
the leasehold system.6
In the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Republic Act No. 6389), which took
effect on September 10, 1971 agricultural share tenancy throughout the
country was declared contrary to public policy and was automatically
converted to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of Section 4 thereof
although existing share tenancy contracts were again allowed to continue
temporarily in force and effect in any region or locality, to be governed in the
meantime by the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, ‘‘until the end of the agricultural year when the President of the
Philippines shall have organized by executive order the Department of
Agrarian Reform in accordance with the provisions of this amendatory Act,
unless such contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant sooner
exercises his option to elect the leasehold system.”7
Immediately after the declaration of martial law, the President of the
Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 2 on September 26, 1972,
proclaiming the entire country “as a land reform area.” The proclamation of
the entire country “as a land reform area” in accordance with the first proviso
of Section 4 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, as
amended, unqualifiedly abolished the sharehold system in the Philippine
agricultural life. To the extreme, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 was
withdrawn from the mass of living agrarian laws specifically in rice and corn
tenancy. On October 21, 1972 the President issued Presidential Decree No.
27 emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil. To safeguard this
new right of the tenancy, Presidential Decree No. 316 of October 22, 1973,
was promulgated, interdicting the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer
from his farmholding until the promulgation of the rules and regulations
implementing the said Presidential
_______________
6
Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo, L-25326, 25327, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 110, 111.
7
Section 1, RA 6389, 68 OG No. 5, 915, January 31, 1972.
96
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Adillo
Decree No. 27. 8 VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975
It will, be noted that Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954
(Republic Act No. 1199) which prohibited either the tenant or landholder,
without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time
previous to the date set for its threshing and penalized any violation thereof
by either party is no longer found in the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389) for the obvious
reason that agricultural share tenancy provided in the Agricultural Tenancy
Act of 1954 has already been abolished by the new Code. The omission of
such provision as Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 in the
new Code operates as an implied repeal of said provision. It is a well settled
principle of statutory construction that when
10
“An act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain, operates
as repeal of (my thing omitted which was contained in the old act. and not
included in the amendatory act.” (Construction of Statutes, Crawford, p. 621,
citing State v. Mac Cafferty, 25 Okla. 2, 105 Pac. 992).
Also,
“Where the language of the statute as amended is set out in full in an act the
old law is not repealed except as to those parts omitted which are
inconsistent with the amendment, the remainder of the act being a
continuation of the original law. (Idem, citing People v. Montgomery County,
67 N. Y. 109; Reid v. Smoulter, 128 Pa. St. 324, 18 Atl. 445, 5 A.L.R. 517)
Likewise,
“When the legislature declares that an existing statute shall be amended, the
legislature thereby evinces the intention to make the new statute a substitute
for the amended statute exclusively and only those portions of the amended
statute repeated in the new one are retained (Idem, at p. 620, citing State ex
rel Nagle v. Leader Co., 97 Mont. 586, 37 Pac. (2) 561).
Thus confronted with the issue as to whether or not the penal liability of a
share tenancy for pie-reaping or pre-threshing under the Agricultural Tenancy
Act (Republic Act No. 1199) enacted on August 30, 1954 has been obliterated
by the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389) and the subsequent
_______________
8
Section 1, PD 316.
97
97
People vs. Adillo
Presidential Decrees and Proclamations, the solution to the issue seems to be
clear that the injunction against pre-reaping and pre-threshing under the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 has lost its operative force and effect, and
the penal sanction therein subdued. Specifically, Section 39 of the Act, upon
which the accusatory pleading against defendant-appellee is predicted, is no
longer carried in the subsequent agrarian laws and decrees and its violation
thereof considered no longer an offense. As a result it would be illogical to
prosecute or sentence defendant-appellee for such offense which no longer
exists.9
 The whole failure of the laws and decrees subsequent to the Agricultural
Tenancy Act of 1954 to penalize the acts of prereaping and pre-threshing
which constituted the offense defined and penalized under the said Section
39 carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict,
and sentence persons charged with its violations.10
ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the information against
defendant-appellee for violation of Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act
(Republic Act No. 1199) is hereby affirmed without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Castro (Chairman), Esguerra and Munoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., in the result.
Mukmiar, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
MAKASIAR, J., Concurring:
The basic reason for this concurrence is that the penal provision in Section 57
in relation to Sections 39 and 50 (b) of Republic Act No. 1199 does violence
to the constitutional guarantee of social justice enshrined in Section 6 of
Article II of the Declaration of Principles of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
as well as Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 9 of
Article II of the 1973 Constitution on the duty of the State to afford protection
to labor. The challenged penal provision, although not directly impugned as
unconstitutional by the pleadings, should not escape condemnation by this
Court, which has the function to enforce the constitutional guarantees
_______________
9
People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225.
10
People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil, 1008 (1947).
98
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Adillo
of social justice and protection to labor, including the lowly tenants,
whenever the occasion demands. The constitutional issue remains
inescapable despite the enactment of the 1963 Agricultural Law Reform Code
(R.A. No. 3844), which merely raises a doubt as to the continued effectivity of
the questioned penal provision of Republic Act No. 1199. Said penal provision
11
is apparently land-owner oriented. It is cruel for the State to punish a hungry
tenant for pre-threshing or pre-harvesting without prior notice to the
landowner. Pre-threshing or pre-harvesting in order to enable himself and his
family to eat, strikes at the very lives of the tenant and his family, thus at their
basic human right to survive. On the other hand, the risk on the part of the
landowner when his tenant does not give him prior advice as to threshing or
harvesting, involves merely loss at most of a couple of sacks or cavans of palay
or rice, which to the landowner is merely a loss of property rights, which does
not impinge upon his right to live. It has been axiomatic and sanctified by
decisions of this Court that human right must always prevail over property
right.
A penalty of a “fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the Court” for pre-threshing
or pre-reaping without prior notice to the landowner (Sec. 57, R.A. 1199), is
greater than the penalty for theft of not exceeding P200.00 under paragraphs
3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Certainly, a tenant
cannot be convicted of theft for such pre-threshing or pre-reaping for his
family consumption a portion of the palay produced by him because the same
is merely chargeable against his share under Republic Act No. 1199.
As aforestated, the penalty thus prescribed by Republic Act No. 1199 for
pre-threshing or pre-reaping without prior notice to the landlord can be
characterized as a cruel and unjust punishment when applied to an
impoverished tenant for whose welfare the constitutional provision on social
justice has been designed in order to remove ancient inequities which have
spawned violent and bloody internecine strife in our country for decades.
Hence, my vote for the acquittal of the accused herein, since the penal
provision in Republic Act No. 1199 nullifies his right to live.
Order affirmed.
99
VOL. 68, NOVEMBER 27, 1975 99
Evangelista vs. Jarencio
Notes.—Section 36 of the Land Reform Code, R.A. 3844, created in favor
of an agricultural lessee a substantive right to continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by a court judgment that is final and executory. (Quilantang vs.
Court of Appeals, 48 SCRA 294).
The principle of social justice underlying the Agricultural Tenancy Act is to
translate into reality the dream envisioned by the late President Ramon
Magsaysay that he who has less in life should have more in law. The right of
the tenant to change from one crop sharing arrangement to another is
guaranteed to him by Section 14 of R.A. 1199, as amended, and the initiative
and decision to effect that change lies with him. Any desire of the agricultural
tenant to effect a change so as to improve his economic condition and lighten
his financial burden is to be given all the encouragement possible under the
law and in this retard the judicial branch of the government has its bounden
duty not to permit technicalities to stand as roadblocks to the enjoyment of
the tenant’s rights. (Andres vs. De Santos, 55 SCRA 624).
——o0o——
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
No. L-27797. August 26, 1974.*
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-
appellant.
Civil law; Lease; Agricultural Tenancy Act; Civil law lease distinguished
from agricultural tenancy.—There are important differences between a
leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The subject matter of leasehold
tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either
rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the
leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land,
whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing
leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other
lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by
the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
Agricultural Tenancy Act; A fishpond is an agricultural land.—There is no
doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to “agricultural land”, specifically
mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof.
Thus Section 46 (c) of said Act provides that “the consideration for the use of
sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising of
livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties.” This Court
has already ruled that “land in which fish is produced is classified as
agricultural land.”
12
Same; Words and phrases; Meaning of phrase “immediate farm
household."—Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other
persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him
for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are
included in the term “immediate farm household.”
Same; To fall under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, land must be worked
by tenant or immediate farm household.—The law is explicit in requiring the
tenant and his immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of
Republic Act 1199, as amended, defines a “tenant” as a person who, himself
and with the aid available from
________________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
591
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 591
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of
production sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or
both, under the leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limits
the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land
and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor
available from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the
same Act requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and
his immediate farm household work the land.
Same; A person who hires others to do work ceases to be a tenant.—A
person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid
available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons,
therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants;
and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land,
ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned, the land as tenant
within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act 1199, and ceases to
enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.
Pasicolan, J.
The f acts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Mariano Manahan, Jr. for plaintiff-appellee.
Virgilio M. Pablo for defendant-appellant.
Armando M. Laki for movant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified to this Court by
the Court of Appeals for the reason that the jurisdiction of an inferior court is
involved.
During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29,
1972, Atty. Virgilio M. Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan,
gave notice to this Court that said appellant died on April 3, 1964, and was
survived by his children, who are his legal heirs, namely: Salvador Pangilinan,
Santos Pangilinan, Mariano Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and Pilar Pangilinan
de Avante. For the purposes of this case the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan,
therefore, is substituted by his heirs herein named. 591
592
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with
this Court advising that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and
was survived by her heirs and successors-in-interest, namely: Corazon O.
Gabriel, married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O. Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel,
married to Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel and
Pablo O. Gabriel, and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted by
her heirs herein named. By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer
for substitution was granted.
In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the
Court of Appeals made the following findings, which We adopt:
“On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga against Eusebio Pangilinan alleging that she is the
owner of a fishpond situated in barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and
measuring about 169,507 square meters; that sometime during the last war
she entered into an oral contract of lease thereof with the defendant on a
year to year basis, i.e., from January 1 to December 31, at a rental of P1,200,
plus the amount of real estate taxes, payable in advance in the month of
13
January; that desiring to develop and cultivate the fishpond by herself, she
notified the defendant in a letter dated June 26, 1957 that she was
terminating the contract as of December 31, 1957; that upon request of the
defendant, she extended the lease for another year; that on November 19,
1958 she again wrote the defendant that he should surrender possession of
the fishpond on January 1, 1959, which demand he however ignored. Plaintiff
accordingly prayed that the defendant be ordered to restore the possession
of the fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200, plus the amount of real estate
taxes, a year from 1959, attorney’s fees and costs.
“The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains
to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold
tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by the plaintiff,
the motion was denied. The defendant thereafter filed his answer with
counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that the land in question was originally
leased to him, also verbally, by the plaintiff’s father, Potenciano Gabriel, in
1923 for as long as the defendant wanted subject to the condition that he
would convert the major portion into a fishpond and the part which was
already a fishpond be improved at his expense which would be reimbursed
by
593
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 593
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease for whatever
cause; that when the plaintiff became the owner of the property through
inheritance, she told the defendant that she would honor her father’s
contract with the defendant, and likewise assured him that he could continue
leasing the property, whose original rental of P400.00 a year had been
progressively increased to P1,200.00, for as long as he wanted since she was
not in a position to attend to it personally. As a special defense, the defendant
reiterated the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to take cognizance
of the case.
“On February 12,1962 the trial court issued an order hereinbelow quoted
in full:
‘The plaintiff seeks to eject the defendant from the fishpond described in the
complaint which is under lease to the said defendant, who, however, refuses
to vacate. Instead, he has impugned the jurisdiction of this Court contending
that the action should have been filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations,
which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of
leasehold tenancy.
‘After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the allegations of
the complaint, the parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose
of determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
‘It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the
defendant, who originally leased it from the father of the plaintiff, Upon the
death of the said father, the fishpond was inherited by the plaintiff. It is now
covered by T.C.T. No. 1634 and is registered in her name. It contains an area
of 169,507.00 square meters. The rental is on a yearly basis.
‘It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the
aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 he became ill and
incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over. She testified that she
helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his
instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano
Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned
as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan,
a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived separately since
he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing near the fishpond,
the other children of the defendant are all professionals; a lawyer, an
engineer, and a priest—all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been
seen working on the fishpond.
‘The above are the material and pertinent facts upon which we enter this
order.
‘After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions
594
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
of the Tenancy Law, Republic Act No. 1199, particularly Sections 4 and 9, as
amended, it seems clear that his case does not fall within the purview of said
Act. The lease contract is manifestly a civil lease governed by the New Civil
Code. Considering the area of the fishpond, 16 hectares, more or less, the fact
that neither the defendant, who is physically incapacitated, or his daughter is
personally cultivating the fishpond or through the employment of mechanical
farm implements, and the further fact that the persons named above are not
members of the immediate farm household of the defendant, the conclusion
is that no tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant
as defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended.
14
‘We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this Court is vested
with jurisdiction to try and decide this case. After this order has become final,
the plaintiff may request for the setting of the initial trial.’
The defendant does not contest the findings of facts therein made by the
trial court.
“After the parties adduced their respective evidence on the merits,
decision was rendered wherein the trial court, pursuant to Article 1197 of the
Civil Code, fixed the period of the lease up to June 30, 1964, the defendant
on said date to surrender possession of the fishpond to the plaintiff and to
pay the rentals due the latter. The plaintiff, on her part, was required upon
surrender of possession to her, to pay the defendant the sum of P1,000.00 as
reimbursement of the expenses he incurred in improving the fishpond, and
upon failure by either party to pay the amount due the other, the same would
bear interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
“A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he appealed to
this Court and assigned the following errors:
1. 1.The lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee
and appellant as that of a civil lease, in accordance with the Civil
Code of the Philippines and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act
No. 1199 as amended.
2. 2.The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance
is without jurisdiction, the case being that of an agrarian relation in
nature pursuant to Rep. Act. No. 1199 as amended.
3. 3.The lower court erred in appreciating the evidence of the appellant
particularly the basis for the expenditure for the development of the
fishpond in question.
4. 4.The lower court erred in rendering judgment in favor of
595
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 595
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
1. the appellant in the measely amount of one thousand pesos for
reimbursement and for seven hundred pesos for the cost of the
floodgate.
 “Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that plaintiff
leased the fishpond to the defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the annual
rental payable at the end of the year (Exhibit C, Deposition of plaintiff, Dec.
13, 1962, pp. 2 and 3). It is likewise undisputed that the work in the fishpond
consisted in letting out the water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae
would not grow, getting some from the river and putting them in the
fishpond, changing the dirty water with fresh water, repairing leaks in the
dikes, and planting of fingerlings and attending to them; that these were done
by defendant, with some help; that he personally attended to the fishpond
until 1956 when he became ill; that thereafter his nephew Bernardo Cayanan,
who was living with him, helped in the work to be done in the fishpond and
his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped in the management, conveying his
instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4–8, Magat).
“Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship
between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act
No. 3844, and the present case is therefore within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand,
maintains in effect that since defendant has ceased to work the fishpond
personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household
(Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the
parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and
therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
“It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for
the interpretation of cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally
or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household."1
Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of Appeals
which, as a general rule, bind this Court.2
1. 1.Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First,
________________
1 Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?
Record, pages 63–68.
2 There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a
Tolentino vs. De Jesus, L-32797, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 167, 171–
172; Evangelista & Co. vs. Abad Santos, L-31684, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 416,
423; Chan vs. Court of Appeals, L-27488, June 30. 1970, 33 SCRA 737,
15
743; Ramirez Telephone Corp. vs. Bank of America, L-22614, August 29,
1969, 29 SCRA 191,198.
596
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
1. was the relationship between the appellee and appellant a leasehold
tenancy or a civil law lease?
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law
lease. The subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land;
that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention
and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to,
and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not
personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding
in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the
purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the
civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is
governed by special laws.3
In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may
exist, the following requisites must concur:
1. 1.That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. 2.That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person
together with members of his immediate farm household;
3. 3.That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or
with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household;
4. 4.That the land belongs to another; and
5. 5.That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a
fixed amount in money or in produce or in both.4
fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to “agricultural land”,
specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use
thereof. Thus Section 46 (c) of said Act provides that “the consideration for
the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising
of livestock shall be governed by stipulation
________________
3
Crisolito Pascual, Labor and Tenancy Relations Law, 3rd edition, page
492; Jeremias U. Montemayor, Labor Agrarian and Social Legislation, 2nd
edition, Vol. III, pages 534–535; Guillermo S. Santos and Artemio C.
Macalino, The Agricultural Land Reform Code, 1963 edition, page 300.
4
Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263.
597
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 597
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
between the parties”. This Court has already ruled that “land in which fish is
produced is classified as agricultural land."5 The mere fact, however, that a
person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold
tenant within the purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still
be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are
complied with.
Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question
has an area of 169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond.
The question of whether such a big parcel of land is susceptible of being
worked by the appellant’s family or not has not been raised, and We see no
need of tarrying on this point. So, We pass to the third requisite, to wit,
whether the tenant himself personally or with the aid of his immediate family
worked the land.
Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an
agreement of leasehold tenancy with Potenciano Gabriel, appellee’s father,
such tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the
fishpond personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did
the members of appellant’s immediate farm household work the land in
question. Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other
persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him
for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are
included in the term “immediate farm household"6 The record shows who
helped work the land in question, and We quote:
“It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the
aid of helpers the aforecited fishpond since 1956 when he became ill and
16
incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan took over. She testified that she
helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his
instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano
Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned
as the laborers who were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan,
a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has lived separately since
he
_________________
5
Tawatao vs. Garcia, L-17649, July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 566, 571,
citing Molina vs. Rafferty, 36 Phil., 167 and Banaag vs. Singson Encarnacion,
46 O.G. 4895.
6
Section 5 (o), Republic Act No. 1199.
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing near the fishpond, the
other children of the defendant are all professionals: a lawyer, an engineer,
and a priest—all residing in Manila. None of those persons has been seen
working on the fishpond."7
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work
the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a
“tenant” as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by,
another, with the latter’s consent for purposes of production sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to
the landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limits the relation of
landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes the land and to the person
who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from
within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act
requires for the existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his
immediate farm household work the land. It provides that leasehold tenancy
exists when a person, who either personally or with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a
piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together
with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to, or legally
possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produce or in both.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the
aid available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons,
therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered
tenants;8 and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of
the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as
tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act No. 1199, and
ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo
_________________
7
Order of the lower court of February 12, 1962, Record on Appeal, pages
37–38.
8
De Guzman vs. Ungson, 93 Phil., 645, 647; Omega, et al. vs. Solidum, et
al., 93 Phil. 457, 460.
599
VOL. 58, AUGUST 26, 1974 599
Gabriel vs. Pangilinan
that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant
Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199.
Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Agrarian Relations.9
1. 2.Regarding the second assignment of error, We accordingly rule that
the Court of First Instance correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
case at bar, this being a case of civil law lease.
2. 3.We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and fourth assigned
errors as these are issues involving findings of facts which have been
settled by the lower court, and unless there is grave abuse of
discretion, which we do not find in the record of the case, We shall
not venture to discuss the merits of the factual findings of the
court a quo.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs
against the appellants.
17
This decision should apply to the heirs and successors-in-interest of the
original parties, as named in this decision. In consonance with the decision of
the lower court, the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio
Pangilinan should deliver the possession of the fishpond in question to the
heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and said heirs
and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should pay the
heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel the accrued
rentals from January 1, 1960, at the rate of Pl,200.00 a year, until the actual
delivery of the possession of the fishpond as herein ordered, with interest at
the legal rate until full payment is made.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Nos. L-46281-83. August 19, 1988.*
COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC. (COCOMA),
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO COSICO, HERMOGENES COSICO
and LUCAS COSICO, respondents.
Agrarian Reform; Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199); Concept of Share
Tenancy.—In determining the nature of the relationship of the parties in the
instant case, it would be well to review the concept of a share tenant as
against that of an agricultural worker. Share tenancy or agricultural tenancy
is defined as: “x x x the physical possession by a person of land devoted to
agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of
production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable,
either in produce or in money or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended).” “x x x share tenancy exists whenever
two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein
one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant
cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from members of his
immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be divided between
the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective contributions.
(Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166 (25), RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).”
Same; Agricultural Land Reform Code; Agricultural Worker, defined;
Employer-employee relationship must exist between a farm employer and a
farm worker.”—x x x. A ‘farm worker’ is any agricultural wage, salary or piece
worker but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer
unless this Code (Agricultural Land Reform Code, supplied) explicitly states
otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of,
or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice
and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular
employment. The term includes ‘farm laborer and/or farm employer.’ An
‘agricultural worker’ is not a whit different from a farm worker. “From the
definition of a ‘farm worker ‘thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that there
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
569
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 569
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs.
Court of Appeals
should be an employer-employee relationship between the farm
employer and the farm worker. In determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the
following: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer’s power
to control the employee’s conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the
most important index of the existence of relationship.”
Same; Same; Share Tenant and Agricultural worker, distin-guished.—
Further, in one case, the Court compared an agricultural worker with a share
tenant, and set out the following distinctions, among others, between the
two: “x x x. The agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his
labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes
a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural
produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest.
“Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is
that of employer and employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised
by the former over the latter. On the other hand, the landholder has the ‘right
to require the tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have been
found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and to use
fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted
to the requirements of the land.’ This is but the right of a partner to protect
his interest, not the control exercised by employer. x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; From the evidence adduced, it is clear that the
private respondents are not mere agricultural workers, but are share tenants
18
of petitioners.—The record of this case is bare of evidence to support the
conclusion that the private respondents are mere agricultural workers. Unlike
ordinary laborers, respondents did not observe regular hours of work. They
did not work in shifts. Petitioner COCOMA could not even remember the
number of days that private respondents worked on the land for each
agricultural year. While petitioner kept a record of the full amount paid to
respondents for each agricultural season, it did not keep an accurate record
of the actual number of days respondents reported for work. The petitioner
did not lay down regulations under which respondents were supposed to do
their work. Neither did petitioner prescribe the manner by which the private
respondents were to perform their duties as farmworkers. We do not find
that degree of control and
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs.
Court of Appeals
supervision essential to the presence of an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and respondents and before that, between
Fule or Escudero, on the one hand and respondent, on the other.
Same; Same; Cultivation is an important factor to determine the
existence of share tenancy. Cultivation, defined.—Now well-settled is the rule
that cultivation is an important factor in determining the existence of a share
tenancy relationship. As to the meaning of cultivation, this Court has already
held that: “x x x. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the
tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion to growth
and the care of the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products
of the earth by general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique
agricultural enterprise. Unlike the rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does
not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of
sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the
surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every
thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when
the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging
or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut trees applying fertilizer,
weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that
respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of farm work
from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at times
with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a
tenant, not a mere farm laborer.”
Same; Same; Same; Sharing of harvests, if taken together with the other
factors characteristic of tenancy, strengthens respondents’ claim that they
are share tenants of petitioners.—Further supportive of the existence of a
share tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents is their
agreement to share the produce or harvest on a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of
the petitioner COCOMA. Though not a decisive indication per se of the
existence of tenancy relationship, such sharing of the harvests, taken
together with the other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present
in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondents that, indeed, they are
tenants.
Same; RA 3844; Procedure; Sec. 155 of RA No. 3844 provides that,
except expropriation cases, the Court of Agrarian Relations shall not be bound
strictly by technical rules.—In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg,
571
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 571
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs.
Court of Appeals
this Court ruled: “Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not
‘restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to
the dispute, but may include in the order or decision any matter or
determination which may be deemed necessary and expedient for the
purpose of settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said
matter for determination has been established by competent evidence
during the hearing.’ ” Further, R.A. 3844, Section 155, provides: “SEC. 155.
Powers of the Court; Rules of Procedure. x x x The Courts of Agrarian Relations
shall be governed by the Rules of Court: Provided, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy pending
before them, the Courts without impairing substantial rights, shall not be
bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence and procedure, except in
expropriation cases.”
Same; Words and Phrases; Landholder, defined.—Thus, assuming,
without conceding, that respondents Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico are
considered tenants of the land, petitioner COCOMA submits that, being only
an agent of defendants Fule and Escudero, it can not be held liable for the
acts of its principals. Petitioner’s contention is not in accordance with
19
applicable laws, because—“A landholder shall mean a person, natural or
juridical, who, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or
grants to another the use or cultivation of his land for a consideration either
in shares under the share tenancy system, or a price certain or ascertainable
under the leasehold system.” In accordance with the above provision,
petitioner COCOMA is the landholder of the subject landholdings for (a) it is
a “juridical person” being a domestic corporation established under the laws
of the Philippines; (b) it is the “legal possessor” of the land for it has the sole
management and administration thereof; (c) it has authorized or retained the
private respondents to cultivate the land; and (d) it has shared the harvest
with the latter, albeit unlawfully, making it appear that they are laborers
instead of tenants.
Same; Same; Same; A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even
in case of transfer of legal possession of the subject property.—Further, in
several cases, this Court sustained the preservation of the landholder-tenant
relationship, in cases of transfer of legal possession: “x x x in case of transfer
or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between
the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the well-
being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the
trans-
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs.
Court of Appeals
feree or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law
in question is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and
cultivation of the land or afford them protection against unjustified dismissal
from their holdings.” (Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil. 675); “x x x that the tenant
may proceed against the transferee of the land to enforce obligation incurred
by the former landholder in relation to said land, for the reason that ‘such
obligation . . . falls upon the assignee or transferee of the land’ pursuant to
Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since respondents are in turn free to proceed against
the former landholder for reimbursement, it is not iniquitous to hold them
responsible to the tenant for said obligations. Moreover, it is the purposes of
Republic Act 1199, particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that the right of the
tenant to receive his lawful share of the produce of the land is unhampered
by the transfer of said land from one landholder to another.” (Almarinez v.
Potenciano, 120 Phil. 1154). Therefore, petitioner, being a landholder, can be
held liable to private respondents for their shares in the coconuts harvested
from the landholding in question.
Same; Evidence; Substantial evidence is all that is required in agrarian
cases.—As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private
respondents’ thirty percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975,
made by the Court of Agrarian Relations and affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
is erroneous, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from such
computation, as it is a part of the findings of fact and conclusions drawn
therefrom by the respondent appellate court. Such findings and conclusions
should not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of proof that they are
unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court of Appeals had
failed to consider important evidence to the contrary. In Bagsican v. Court of
Appeals, it was held that: “x x x in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere
substantial evidence.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Gancayco, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
F.M. Poonin & Associates, for petitioner.
Manuel A. Cordero, for respondents.
573
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 573
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
PADILLA, J.:
Petition to review on certiorari the decision** of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated 19 May 1977, in CA G.R. No. SP-05096-R entitled “Pedro Cosico,
Hermogenes Cosico, and Lucas Cos-ico, plaintiffs-appellees versus Rosario
Vda. de Fule, et al., defendants, and Coconut Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. defendants-appellants,” which affirmed the decision*** of
the Court of Agrarian Relations, dated 26 January 1976, in CAR Case Nos.
2236, 2237 and 2238, finding private respondents Pedro Cosico and
Hermogenes Cosico to be share tenants of the coconut landholdings of the
petitioner.
20
The facts of the case:
The owners of the coconut land in question located in Bo. Imok, Calauan,
Laguna, consisting of fifteen (15) hectares, more or less, are the spouses
Pedro Rulloda and Salud Sanchez. Prior to, and including the years 1964 up to
1971, Rosario Paraiso Vda. de Fule (Fule, hereafter) obtained legal possession
of the land by virtue of a yearly contract of sale (pakyaw) of all the coconut
produce and other fruits from said land. In 1972, Fule did not renew the
contract but spouses (Pedro Rulloda and Salud Sanchez) executed a similar
contract with Eddie A. Escudero, which was renewed every year until 1975.1
During the period prior to 1964, Fule had utilized the services of Pedro,
Hermogenes and Lucas Cosico as caretakers over four (4) hectares each of the
land in question, paying them for their services in cash, which was equivalent
to 1/7 of the proceeds of the sale of coconuts harvested from the land they
each caretook. As caretakers, the Cosicos would check or visit said plantation
to see whether there was stealing in the plantation, and they would report to
her (Fule). They lived in a place about 2 and 1/2 kms. away from the land in
question. They had no work animals to cultivate the land with; they used
bolos to clean and clear the land by cutting grass and
_______________
**
Penned by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco with the concurrence of Justices
Venicio Escolin and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
***
Penned by Judge Alberto A. Reyes.
1
Rollo at 7-10.
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
burning them. Private respondents (Cosicos) alleged that they also planted
coconut trees and other permanent trees in the land, for which they have not
allegedly been paid. The tasks of harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling
coconuts were performed by laborers hired and paid by Fule or her coconut
buyer. And when respondent Pedro Cosico was hired to gather coconuts in
the land, he was paid for his labor. The payment for his labor was separate
from his 1/7 share received as caretaker.2
Defendant Fule became a member of the petitioner COCOMA from 1964
to 1972, while Eddie A. Escudero became a member of the same cooperative-
corporation from 1972 to 1975. During the time that the land was under
contract with these persons, petitioner COCOMA claims to have acted as their
agent in providing management and marketing services.3
Consequently, from 1964 up to 1975, petitioner COCOMA hired allegedly
for and on behalf of Fule and Eddie A. Escudero, the necessary laborers to
harvest and transport the coconut produce from the land. Among these
workers were respondents Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico who were
recommendees of Fule, and who were hired to clean the land of grass, shrubs,
dried coconut leaves and husks. The work done in the land and the expenses
incurred therefor were approved and paid by Fule and Eddie A. Escudero,
through petitioner COCOMA. And all the cleaning and planting expenses were
covered with receipts duly signed by the laborers.4
During all the time that petitioner COCOMA was rendering management
and marketing services in the land in question, all the proceeds from the sale
of the coconut produce thereof, less the necessary expenses mentioned
above, were paid and delivered, after every harvest season, to said Fule and
Eddie A. Escudero, respectively, in compliance with the terms of their
marketing agreements with petitioner COCOMA.5
_______________
2
Id. at 71.
3
Id. at 8.
4
Id. at 71.
5
Ibid.
575
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 575
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
On 9 October 1971, or after seven (7) years from 1964 that all the workers
had been receiving their wages as hired workers in said land from Fule and
later from Eddie A. Escudero, through the petitioner COCOMA, the
respondents Pedro, Hermogenes and Lucas, all surnamed Cosico, started to
claim to be the tenants in three (3) separate portions of said land-holding,
consisting of about four (4) hectares each, more or less. They instituted
individually CAR Cases Nos. 2236, 2237 and 2238 against defendants Rosario
Paraiso Vda. de Fule and Villa Escudero Corporation (VESCO). Respondents
21
later amended their complaint in said cases by including, petitioner COCOMA
as defendant.6
On 26 January 1976 the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) rendered a joint
decision in the three (3) cases, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. 1.Declaring plaintiffs Pedro Cosico (CAR CASE No. 2236) and
Hermogenes Cosico (CAR CASE No. 2237), as true and lawful tenants
of the Coconut Marketing Association (COCOMA), its duly
authorized representatives, successors in interest and/or assigns,
over four (4) hectares each of coconut land described in their
respective complaints;
2. 2.Declaring, furthermore, plaintiff Hermogenes Cosico as the true
and lawful tenant of defendant COCOMA, its duly authorized
representatives, successors in interest and/or assigns, over that
four (4) hectares of coconut land described in CAR CASE No. 2238,
which is contiguous to that referred to in CAR CASE No. 2237;
3. 3.Declaring that no tenancy relations exists between defendant
COCOMA and Lucas Cosico, plaintiff in CAR CASE No. 2238;
4. 4.Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in
interest and/or assigns, to immediately reinstate plaintiffs Pedro
Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico to the landholdings mentioned in
the next preceding paragraphs and to maintain them in peaceful
possession and tenancy thereof, on a sharing arrangement of 70-30
in favor of the defendant COCOMA on the proceeds of the net
harvest until such time as said parties shall have mutually agreed on
fixed rentals;
_______________
6
Ibid.
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
 1. 5.Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in
interest and/or assigns to deliver to plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and
Hermogenes Cosico the amount of P28,994.00 representing the
30% share of the said plaintiffs from the coconuts harvested from
the land in question for the period covering November 12, 1971 up
to June 4, 1975;
2. 6.Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in
interest and/or assigns to render an accounting of the harvests of
the land for the period starting June 5, 1975, up to the present and
to deposit to the Court, the equivalent of the 30% share of the
aforementioned plaintiffs, for delivery to said plaintiffs;
3. 7.Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in
interest and/or assigns, to pay plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and
Hermogenes Cosico the amount of Four Thousand Pesos
(P4,000.00) or Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) each, as expenses
of litigation and other incidental expenses; and
4. 8.Denying the claim for damages of all three defendants; All other
claim and counterclaims are denied for lack of merit.”7
On 19 February 1976, petitioner COCOMA appealed the CAR decision to the
Court of Appeals. On 19 May 1977, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated,
rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law
and supported by substantial evidence, the same is hereby affirmed in toto
without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.”8
Hence, the instant petition of COCOMA.
The four (4) issues raised by the petitioner are: (1) whether or not the
private respondents are share tenants in the coconut land in question; (2)
whether or not private respondent Hermogenes Cosico can be adjudged a
share tenant and the COCOMA ordered the reinstate him in the land involved
in CAR Case No. 2238 when Hermogenes Cosico is not even a plaintiff in said
Case No. 2238, but one Lucas Cosico; (3) whether or not
_______________
7
Court of Agrarian Relations Decision, January 26, 1976; Rollo, pp. 23-24.
8
Court of Appeals Decision, May 19, 1977, p. 8; Rollo, p. 29.
577
22
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 577
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
COCOMA, contending to be a mere marketing agent which provides
management and marketing services to the members of the cooperative, can
be held directly liable to the private respondents-tenants for their share in
the coconuts harvested; and (4) whether or not the computation of the
alleged shares due the respondents Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico,
made by the trial court is patently erroneous because the same was based on
a wrong number of coconuts harvested and on conjectured prices.
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that private respondents were
merely caretakers, of Fule and, later, Eddie Escudero, whose task included
clearing the land by cutting grass and burning them to smudge the coconut
trees to make them bear fruits,9 planting of coconuts, and other fruit bearing
trees,10 and harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling coconuts,11 and that,
as caretakers, private respondents were paid separately in cash.12 Hence, the
petitioner would like this Court to believe that since private respondents
were mere caretakers who were paid in cash for their services, they were
therefore, hired laborers, not share tenants.
Petitioner’s contention is without merit.
In determining the nature of the relationship of the parties in the instant
case, it would be well to review the concept of a share tenant as against that
of an agricultural worker.
Share tenancy or agricultural tenancy is defined as:
“x x x the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture,
belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm
household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest
with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or
in money or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy
Act, as amended).”
_______________
9
Brief for Petitioner, p. 18.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., p. 11.
12
Ibid., p. 18.

578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
“x x x share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land
and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of
the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce
thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion
to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166 (25), RA 3844,
Agricultural Land Reform Code).13
On the other hand, the Court has defined an agricultural worker as follows:
“x x x. A ‘farm worker’ is any ‘agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is
not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code
(Agricultural Land Reform Code, supplied) explicitly states otherwise, and any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not
obtained a substantially equivalent and regular employment.’ The term
includes ‘farm laborer and/or farm employer.’ An ‘agricultural worker’ is not
a whit different from a farm worker.
“From the definition of a ‘farm worker’ thus fashioned, it is quite apparent
that there should be an employer-employee relationship between the farm
employer and the farm worker. In determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the
following: (1) selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of
wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the employer’s power to control
the employee’s conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most
important index of the existence of relationship.”14
The above-mentioned characteristics of an agricultural worker or farm
worker do not exist in share tenancy.
Further, in one case, the Court compared an agricultural worker with a
share tenant, and set out the following distinctions, among others, between
the two:
_______________
23
13
Manuel Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44570, May 30,
1986, 142 SCRA 136.
14
De Los Reyes vs. Espineli, G.R. No. L-28280-81, November 28, 1969, 30
SCRA 574.
579
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 579
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
“x x x. The agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor
he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a
profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural
produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest.
“Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is
that of employer and employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised
by the former over the latter. On the other hand, the landholder has the ‘right
to require the tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have been
found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and to use
fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices adapted to the
requirements of the land.” This is but the right of a partner to protect his
interest, not the control exercised by an employer. x x x”15
The record of this case is bare of evidence to support the conclusion that the
private respondents are mere agricultural workers. Unlike ordinary laborers,
respondents did not observe regular hours of work. They did not work in
shifts. Petitioner COCOMA could not even remember the number of days that
private respondents worked on the land for each agricultural year. While
petitioner kept a record of the full amount paid to respondents for each
agricultural season, it did not keep an accurate record of the actual number
of days respondents reported for work.16 The petitioner did not lay down
regulations under which respondents were supposed to do their work.
Neither did petitioner prescribe the manner by which the private
respondents were to perform their duties as farmworkers. We do not find
that degree of control and supervision essential to the presence of an
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondents and
before that, between Fule or Escudero, on the one hand and respondents, on
the other.
Petitioner, in an attempt to support its pretense that private respondents
are only hired laborers, not share tenants, claims that private respondents
are mere caretakers who paid for their services as such, and whose work
consists of clearing and
_______________
15
Ibid.
16
t.s.n., July 31, 1974, pp. 93-106.
580
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
cleaning the land, planting the coconut and other fruit-bearing trees, and
harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling coconuts.
We do not sustain the petitioner’s pretense.
Now well-settled is the rule that cultivation is an important factor in
determining the existence of a share tenancy relationship.17 As to the
meaning of cultivation, this Court has already held that:
“x x x. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing
or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion to growth and the care of
the plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by
general industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise.
Unlike rice, the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and
plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance,
the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil.
Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The
major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already
fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation,
taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering,
thereby increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together
with his family, handles all phases of farm work from clearing the landholding
to the processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers,
thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm
laborer.”18
It may thus be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be
considered the cultivator of the land.19
In Marcelo v. De Leon, plaintiff therein argued that the defendant was not
a tenant inasmuch as the latter did not till or cultivate the land in order to
grow the fruit-bearing trees because they were already full-grown; that he
24
did not do the actual gathering of the fruits but merely supervised the
gathering; that after deducting the expenses, he gave one-half of the fruits to
the plaintiff all in consideration of the land.
_______________
17
Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra.
18
Ibid.
19
Latag v. Banog, G.R. No. 20098, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 88.
581
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 581
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
Ruling in the above-mentioned case, this Court held:
“Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard, will disagree with the above
description of the relationship. He knows the caretaker must water the trees,
even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and turn the soil,
sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc. Those chores obviously
mean ‘working or cultivating’ the land. Besides, it seems that defendant
planted other crops, (i.e. cultivated the lot) giving the landowner his
corresponding share.20
Applying the foregoing precedents to the case at bar, and given the kind of
work performed by respondents on the land-holding in question, the Court
holds that respondents are share tenants, not hired workers, of the
petitioner.
Further supportive of the existence of a share tenancy relationship
between petitioner and respondents is their agreement to share the produce
or harvest on a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of the petitioner COCOMA. Though
not a decisive indication per se of the existence of tenancy relationship, such
sharing of the harvests, taken together with the other factors characteristic
of tenancy shown to be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of
respondents that, indeed, they are tenants.
To prove petitioner’s claim that the private respondents are hired workers
and not its tenants, petitioner would rely mainly on the receipts signed by
respondents and other persons tending to show that they were paid by
petitioner for services rendered especially for cutting grass.21
This Court cannot re-examine the facts as found by the Court of Appeals,
except for unusual and urgent reasons which however do not exist in this
case. “Whether a person is a tenant or not is basically a question of fact and
the findings of the respondent court and the trial court are, generally, entitled
to respect and non-disturbance.22
The conclusion then, anent the first issue, as borne out by the evidence
on record, is that private respondents Pedro and
_______________
20
105 Phil. 1175, G.R. No. L-12902, July 29, 1959.
21
Exh. “9” to “9www”.
22
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
582
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
Hermogenes, both surnamed Cosico, are share tenants of the land in dispute.
On the second issue, petitioner questions the recognition by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals of respondent Hermogenes Cosico as tenant in the
landholding where his co-respondent Lucas Cosico claims to be the tenant,
when the former is not even a party to the separate case filed by the latter
and he (Hermogenes Cosico) did not allege such tenancy in his own amended
complaint. In other words, it is petitioner’s submission that even if
respondent Hermogenes Cosico were to be considered a tenant in the
landholding described in his amended complaint, the court had no legal basis,
however, in declaring him also a tenant of a landholding described and
claimed by another person in another case in which he (Hermogenes) is not
a party and which he did not claim to be a tenant of, in his own complaint.23
Petitioner’s contention is without merit.
It should be noted that the three (3) cases filed by the three (3) private
respondents were jointly tried and their common evidence showed that,
although Hermogenes and Lucas Cosico were supposed to have separate
holdings, from 1956, of four (4) hectares each, both of them worked the two
(2) holdings jointly in their entirety, but it was only Hermogenes Cosico who
received the tenant’s share from the whole. In other words, it was
Hermogenes Cosico who acted as sole tenant of the two (2) holdings. Hence,
the latter’s recognition by the Court of Agrarian Relations and the Court of
Appeals; as the tenant in the holding also claimed by Lucas Cosico. The facts,
25
therefore, warranted Hermogenes Cosico’s recognition as the tenant in both
landholdings.24
In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, this Court ruled:
“Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not ‘restricted to the specific
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the dispute, but may
include in the order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary and expedient for the
_______________
23
Rollo at 57.
24
Ibid.
583
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 583
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
purpose of settling the dispute or preventing further disputes, provided said
matter for determination has been established by competent evidence
during the hearing.’ ”25
Further, R.A. 3844, Section 155, provides:
“SEC. 155. Powers of the Court; Rules of Procedure. x x x
The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court:
Provided, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy pending before them the Courts without impairing
substantial rights, shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of
evidence and procedure, except in expropriation cases.”
We now move to the third issue.
It is contended by the petitioner COCOMA that it has never been a
landholder of the land in question, since it was, at no time, owner, lessee or
sub-lessee of the land, or buyer of the coconut produce thereof, or
usufructuary or legal possessor of the same, or even an assignee of any right
affecting it. Thus, assuming, without conceding, that respondents Pedro and
Hermogenes Cosico are considered tenants of the land, petitioner COCOMA
submits that, being only an agent of defendants Fule and Escudero, it can not
be held liable for the acts of its principals. Petitioner’s contention is not in
accordance with applicable laws, because—
“A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who, either as owner,
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the use or
cultivation of his land for a consideration either in shares under the share
tenancy system, or a price certain or ascertainable under the leasehold
system.”26
In accordance with the above provision, petitioner COCOMA is the landholder
of the subject landholdings for (a) it is “juridical person” being a domestic
corporation established under the laws of the Philippines; (b) it is the “legal
possessor” of the land
_______________
25
27 SCRA 7, G.R. No. L-20700, February 27, 1969.
26
Sec. 5(b) of RA 1199.
584
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
for it has the sole management and administration thereof;27 (c) it has
authorized or retained the private respondents to cultivate the land; and (d)
it has shared the harvest with the latter, albeit unlawfully, making it appear
that they are laborers instead of tenants.28
Petitioner, being a landholder, as defined by law, is therefore subject to
the rights, obligations, and limitations provided for under the agrarian laws.
There is also no question that, in this case, there was a transfer of the legal
possession of the land from one landholder to another (Fule to petitioner
COCOMA). In connection therewith, Republic Act 3844, Sec. 10 states:
“SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of
Period, etc.—The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract
nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the
legal possession of the landholdings, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor.”
Further, in several cases, this Court sustained the preservation of the
landholder-tenant relationship, in cases of transfer of legal possession:
“x x x in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy
relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in
order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being
26
unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in other
words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the
peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection
against unjustified dismissal from their holdings.” (Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil.
675);
“It is our considered judgment, since the return by the lessee of the leased
property to the lessor upon the expiration of the contract
_______________
27
t.s.n. of July 31, 1974, pp. 110-111, inter alia.
28
Court of Agrarian Relations Decision, pp. 10-12.
585
VOL. 164, AUGUST 19, 1988 585
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
involves also a transfer of legal possession, and taking into account the
manifest intent of the lawmaking body in amending the law, i.e., to provide
the tenant with security of tenure in all cases of transfer of legal possession,
that the instant case falls within and is governed by the provisions of Section
9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended by Republic Act 2263.” (Joya v.
Pareja, 106 Phil. 645)
“x x x that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of the land to
enforce obligation incurred by the former landholder in relation to said land,
for the reason that ‘such obligation. . . falls upon the assignee or transferee
of the land’ pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since respondents are in
turn free to proceed against the former landholder for reimbursement, it is
not iniquitous to hold them responsible to the tenant for said obligations.
Moreover, it is the purposes of Republic Act 1199, particularly Sec. 9 thereof,
to insure that the right of the tenant to receive his lawful share of the produce
of the land is unhampered by the transfer of said land from one landholder
to another.” (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil. 1154.)
Therefore, petitioner, being a landholder, can be held liable to private
respondents for their shares in the coconuts harvested from the landholding
in question.
As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private
respondents’ thirty percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975,
made by the Court of Agrarian Relations and affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
is erroneous, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from such
computation, as it is a part of the findings of fact and conclusions drawn
therefrom by the respondent appellate court. Such findings and conclusions
should not be disturbed on appeal, in the absence of proof that they are
unfounded or were arbitrarily arrived at or that the Court of Appeals had
failed to consider important evidence to the contrary.
In Bagsican v. Court of Appeals, it was held that:
“x x x in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence.
“x x x x x x x x x
“Under this rule, all that the appellate court has to do, insofar as the
evidence is concerned, is to find out if the decision is supported by substantial
evidence. So much so that the findings of fact of the Court
586
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) vs. Court of
Appeals
of Agrarian Relations, if supported by such evidence, are conclusive on the
appellate tribunal.”29
The respondent appellate court, in the case at bar, acted correctly when it
ruled:
“On the whole, we are not at liberty to reverse the foregoing findings of fact
of the Agrarian Court in the absence of any proof that are unfounded or
where arbitrarily arrived at or that the court had failed to consider important
evidence to the contrary. It is well-established that so long as the findings of
fact of the Agrarian Court attain the minimum, evidentiary support
demanded by law, that is, supported by substantial evidence, such findings
cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunals. In the present case, We do not
find any cogent reason to adopt a conclusion different from that reached by
the court a quo.30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

27