1.
Worcester vs Ocampo
Syllabus: LIABILITY OF JOINT TORT FEASORS. — Joint tort feasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured
may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole
damage caused by all, and all together are liable for the whole damage. It is
not defense, for one sued alone, that the others, who participated in the
wrongful act, are not joint with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him
that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the
others.
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned
among them, except by themselves. They can not insist upon apportionment,
for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally
liable for the whole amount
DISCHARGE OF LIABILITY. — A payment in full, by one of the joint tort
feasors, of all the damage done, satisfies any claim which may exist against
the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The release of one of the joint
tort feasors, by agreement, generally operates to discharge all.
JOINT TORT FEASORS DEFINED. — As a general rule, the term "joint tort
feasors" includes all persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it, after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed
the wrongful act themselves.
Facts: Defendants were the owners, directors, writers, and administrators of a
certain daily newspaper known as 'El Renacimiento' and 'Muling Pagsilang,'
which newspaper during all the time mentioned in this complaint was published
and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila,
having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands. On the 30th of
October, 1908, with the malicious intention of injuring the plaintiff, Dean C.
Worcester, a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary
of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the honesty
and reviled the fame of the plaintiff, not only as a private person but also as an
oficial of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and with the object of
exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, printed, wrote,
and published in said newspaper, a malicious defamation and false libel.
Said defendants charged said plaintiff with the prostitution of his office as
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as Secretary of the
Interior of said Islands, for personal ends; with wasting public funds for the
purpose of promoting his personal welfare; with the violation of the laws of the
Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in
illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing the people; with the object of
gain for himself and for others; and lastly with being 'a bird of prey ;' and that
said defamation should be understood, as in effect it was understood, by the
public officials of the Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in
general, as charging the said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things
above specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and conduct
of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are false and without any
foundation whatsoever.
Plaintiff filed a case for damages and indemnity for the additional work to which
he has been put, by the said defendants, in the compliance of his duties, both
in the past and the future, as well as for the injuries to his reputation and
feelings, in the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, and
besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from the defendants the
additional sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, in the
way of punitive damages, as a warning to the defendants.
The court further finds that every essential or material allegation of the
complaint is true substantially as therein stated, with the exception noted as to
Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, and Leoncio G. Liquete, and as may be
hereinafter indicated. The case is therefore dismissed as to these three
defendants.
The court finds that plaintiff has sustained damages on account of wounded
feelings and mental suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the
sum of thirty-five thousand (P35,000) pesos, and that he is entitled to recover
this sum of the nine defendants named, as being responsible for having
written, printed, and published said libel; and that the plaintiff is entitled to
recover of them the further sum of twenty-five thousand (P25,000) pesos, as
punitive damages, which the court thinks will be a just punishment to these
nine libelers and an example to others.
Issues: Whether or not the court erred in sentencing the defendants jointly 'and
severally' to pay to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, the sum of P60,000.
Held: No. The appellants discussed the eighth and ninth assignments of error
together, and claim that the lower court committed an error in rendering a
judgment jointly and severally against the defendants and in allowing an
execution against the individual property of said owners, and cite provisions of
the Civil and Commercial Codes in support of their contention. The di􀁅culty in
the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of
the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that
each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he
participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The defendants might
have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have
been sued jointly and severally, as they were. If several persons jointly commit
a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the
parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the tort is in its nature a
separate act of each individual. It is not necessary that the cooperation should
be a direct, corporeal act, for, to give an example, in a case of assault and
battery committed by various persons, under the common law all are
principals. So also is the person who counsels, aids or assists in any way the
commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or assisted or
counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as
he who inflicted or committed the actual tort.
It may be stated as a general rule, that joint tort feasors are all the persons
who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance,
cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it
is done, if done for their bene􀁅t. They are each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves.
2. Chapman vs Underwood
SYLLABUS: 1. MASTER AND SERVANT; NEGLIGENCE OF AUTOMOBILE
DRIVER. — The owner of an automobile, present in the vehicle, is not liable
for the negligent acts of a competent driver unless such acts are continued for
such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe
them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom, and to fail to do so.
2. ID.; ID. — If a competent driver of an automobile in which the owner thereof
is at the time present, by a sudden act of negligence, without the owner having
a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, violates the law,
the owner of the automobile is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the
owner for such a length of time that he, by acquiescence, makes his driver's
act his own.
3. ID.; ID. — Quaere. Whether the owner of an automobile would be
responsible for the acts of a competent driver, whether present or not, where
the automobile causing the injury is a part of a business enterprise and is being
driven in furtherance of the owner's business at the time the injury complained
of is caused.
Facts: J.H. Chapman visited a friend in Santa Ana and while he was about to
ride a vehicle to take him home he was struck by a car owned by James
Underwood and driven by his chauffeur. Chapman was on the correct lane.
Underwood was riding in the car when the incident happened. Apparently, the
chauffeur, coming from the opposite direction and was driving straight ahead
and when the automobile about to be boarded by Chapman was in front of
him, he [the chauffeur] instead of swerving left he suddenly swerved right to
the direction of Chapman thereby hitting and running over him.
Issues: Whether or not the owner is also liable.
Held: No. The general rule is that an owner who sits in his automobile, or other
vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself
responsible for such acts.
If the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person
or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present
therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or
criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence
of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence,
makes his driver's act his own.
From the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the
commission of the injury, there was insufficient time for the defendant an
opportunity to correct the act of his driver. The interval between the turning out
to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so small
as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.
3. CAEDO VS YU KHE THAI
Facts:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of
March 24, 1958 along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San
LorenzoVillage bound for the airport. Several members of his family were in
the car. Coming from the opposite direction was
the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael
Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a moderate speed with their
headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendant’s driver did not
notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down
behind the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with the intention of
passing by the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of
thecaretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to
the other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff
and members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against
both the driver and owner of the Cadillac car. There was no question that
defendant’s driver was negligent and liable. There is no doubt that the
collission was directly traceable on Raphael Bernardo’s negligence.
Issue: Whether or not Yu Khe Thai as the owner of Cadillac, is solidarily
liable with the driver under the provision of Art 2184 of the Civil Code.
Held:
No. "ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with
his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of
due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that driver
was negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or" violating
traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.”
If the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the
mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in
civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of pater
familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known
to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own
negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had
been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed
by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During
that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No
negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master.
The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed.
The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There
was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had
reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of
the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it,
but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was
not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at the distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass
the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that
there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly. It was a thought that, wise or not,
connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the
misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is,
to a great degree, necessarily subjective. The law does not require that a
person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own
a motor vehicle. The test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article
2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as
perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a
maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may
appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to
require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional
drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of
drivers' services, would be effectively prescribed.
4. RODRIGUEZ LUNA VS IAC
Facts:
The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto Luna who was killed in a vehicular
collision. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased and a
toyota car driven by Luis Dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver’s
license. The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when
required to explain they said that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this
Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the attempt of
the special sheriff to enter the private respondent's premises so that he could
make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted by guards and this
Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in
enforcing the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal
amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two
children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually
employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his
family. He has no assets of his own as yet."The private respondents
invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May 26, 1977; 77 SCRA 98, where it was
held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied. to Atty. Marvin Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but
since Reginald had attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty.
Hill had become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
Issue: Whether or not as a matter of equity, Luis Dela Rosa’s father should
be subsidiary only.
Held:
No. Equity not applied when ends of justice not served. Luis dela Rosa is is imposed with the damages that will be caused by the minor children who live
abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not with them
have any property either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings
are insufficient to support his family.

5. Exconde vs Capuno

Facts:
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide
through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado
Ticzon. After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged and,
on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only
15 years old when he committed the crime.

Sabina Exconde filed the present action against Delfin Capuno and his son
Dante Capuno asking for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for
the death of her son Isidoro Caperina.

Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held liable for the
death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin
because at the time of the accident, the former was not under the control,
supervision and custody, of the latter. The defense was sustained by the lower
court and they only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in
the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidora
Caperina caused by the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.

Held:
Yes. Lower court erred in relieving the father from liability because the court
case came under Art 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code paragraph 1 and 5, which
provides:

The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them. xxx Finally,
teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

The law above only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution, which Dante Capuno’s school is. The law
also provides that the father (or the mother, in case of his incapacity or death)
 6. Salen vs Balce
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds
caused by Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then
single, 18 yrs old and was living with defendant. As a result of Carlos Salen's
death, Gumersindo Balce was accused and convicted of homicide and was
sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs
brought this action against defendant before CFI to recover the sum of
P2,000.00, with legal interest. Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense
that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their right to recover does not here
apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to criminal cases.
CFI sustained the theory of defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in
accordance with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
Held:
Art 2180 of the Civil Code applies in this case.
It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made
civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile,
an insane, under 9 years of age, over 9 but under 15 years of age, who act
without discernment, unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on
his part. This is because a son who commits the act under any of those
conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2
and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the
deliquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who
acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the
Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand
convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our
Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion
of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived
in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case
because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity
that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother
may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.
7. Fuellas vs Cadano
Facts:
Pepito and Rico are both minor. Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok
and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked
Rico to return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which
angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor.
When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico,
still in angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands.
Pepito extended his hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the proffer to shake
hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of
balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his
right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico
was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out "My arm is broken. That
same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for
treatment Exh. 4). An X-Ray taken showed that there was a complete
fracture of the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster
casting.
Petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury
caused by his son; that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to
par. 2, of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same
Code; that according to the last article, the act of the minor must be one
wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and that there being no fault or
negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but deliberate
intent, the above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the existence of
deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault
or negligence in its commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that the
appellate court erred in holding him liable for damages for the deliberate
criminal act of his minor son.
Issue:
Whether or not Rico’s father is liable for damages.
Held:
Yes. The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed by Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code covers obligations arising
from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The subsidiary liability of parents
arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acts with discernment
is determined under the provisions of Art. 2180, N. C. C. and under Article 101
of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes, the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for
the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damages
is caused with criminal intent.
8. Gutierrez vs Gutierrez
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; MASTER AND SERVANT; MOTOR VEHICLES; LIABILITY OF
HEAD OF HOUSE FOR ACTS OF DRIVER WHO IS HIS MINOR CHILD. —
The head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the
general use of his family, is liable for its negligent operation by one of his
children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where the car is occupied
and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of
the owner's family than the child driving it.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — One G, a passenger in a truck, recovers
damages in the amount of P5,000 from the owner of a private automobile not
in the car, the machine being operated by a son 18 years of age, with other
members of the family accommodated therein, and from the chauffeur and
owner of the truck which collided with the private automobile on a bridge,
causing physical injuries to G as a result of the automobile accident.
Facts: On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private
ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on a bridge. The truck
was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by saturnine
Cortez. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18
years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio’s father and mother, Mr. and Mrs.
Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but
the mother, together with several other members of the Gutierrez family were
accommodated therein.
The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso Gutierrez
suffering a fractured right leg which required medical attendance for a
considerable period of time.
Issues: Whether or not both the driver of the truck and automobile are liable
for damages and indemnification due to their negligence.
Held: Bonifacio Gutierrez’s obligation arises from culpa aquiliana. On the other
hand, Saturnino Cortez’s and his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco’s obligation rise
from culpa contractual.
The youth Bonifacio was an incompetent chauffeur. He was driving at an
excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he
lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. The
guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to
operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son.
Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of Art. 1903 of the Civil Code,
the father alone and not the minor or the mother would be liable for the
damages caused by the minor. The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of
the truck, and his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis,
namely, that of contract.
9. RODRIGUEZ LUNA VS IAC
Facts:
The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto Luna who was killed in a vehicular
collision. Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased and a
toyota car driven by Luis Dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver’s
license. The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when
required to explain they said that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this
Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the attempt of
the special sheriff to enter the private respondent's premises so that he could
make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted by guards and this
Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in
enforcing the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal
amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two
children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually
employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his
family. He has no assets of his own as yet."The private respondents
invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May 26, 1977; 77 SCRA 98, where it was
held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied. to Atty. Marvin Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but
since Reginald had attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty.
Hill had become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
Issue: Whether or not as a matter of equity, Luis Dela Rosa’s father should
be subsidiary only.
Held:
No. Equity not applied when ends of justice not served. Luis dela Rosa is
abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not
have any property either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings
are insufficient to support his family.
 10. Libi vs IAC
Facts:
Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found
him to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the
former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed
in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso. Julie Ann and Wendell died,
each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and
Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private
respondents. Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the
circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are
the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from
their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents
and evidence of physical facts.
Petitioners' defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father
of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed by
their minor son. Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that
her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box
inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the
safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in her bag, all of which facts
were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or
using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was
no longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but entertain
serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence
of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could
not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box
was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother
where the other key was.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable under Art. 2180.
Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the parents are and should be held primarily liable
for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor
children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over
9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard
to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment,
or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be
imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected
against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother. This was
amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same
shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the
mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability
may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful
offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without
such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who
exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising
from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was
caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi,
respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising
therefrom.
11. Tarmago vs CA
Facts:
Jennifer Tamargo, an adopted child of Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, had killed
by Adelberto Bundoc (10 years old) with an air rifle. Prior to incident, the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor
Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was granted on 18 November
1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.| Spouses Celso and
Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents, filed a case for damages against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case
for damages, a criminal information for Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the
ground that he had acted without discernment.|| In their Answer, respondent
spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners in
their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents
the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child,
for acts committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged with the
biological parents.
Held:
No. We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as
to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the
adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child.
Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold
that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses
so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time
in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto)
would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental
dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could
have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time
the tort was committed.
12. Cuadra vs Monfort
Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in
Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher assigned
the class to weed the school premises. While they were doing so, MT Monfort
found a headband. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm
and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at MT Cuadra who
was hit in her eye. MT Cuadra’s eye got infected. She was brought to the
hospital; her eyes were attempted to be surgically repaired but she
nevertheless got blind in her right eye.
MT Cuadra’s parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monfort’s dad) based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay
for actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorney’s
fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father is liable under Article 2176 and 2180.
HELD: No. The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the
fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no
willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. Article 2180 provides that the
father, in case of his incapacity or death, the mother, is responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis
of this vicarious, although primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is
presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The
presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the
clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article
2180, which states “that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that Alfonso
Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or
that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing
to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child
was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he
had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher.
And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an
innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent,
however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the
child’s character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for
which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
JUSTICE BARREDO Dissenting;
MT Monfort is already 13 years old and should have known that by jokingly
saying “aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the
Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her,” it was likely that something would happen
to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt. There is nothing in the record that would
indicate that Alfonso had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and
not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to show
that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage caused
upon by his child.
 13. Mercado vs CA
Facts:
Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As
a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of razor.
The evidence of record shows that the child suffered moral damages by reason
of the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado.
Issue:
Whether or not the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible
Held:
No, the teacher or head of the school should not be held responsible.
The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, upon which petitioner
rests his claim that the school where his son was studying should be made
liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
It would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher,
such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of
the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct
and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher;
and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does
not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school
hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The
situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply,
nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible
for the damages caused by their minor children
14. Palisoc vs Brillantes
Facts:
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive
mechanics students at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of
March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation transpired between the deceased
and the defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was sixteen years
old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with
Dominador looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that
Dominador was acting like a foreman. As a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio
on the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon Dominador’s
stomach, which caused the latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint.
The latter died, the cause of death being “shock due to traumatic fracture of
the ribs”. The parents of Dominador filed an action for damages against (1)
Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who was the
teacher in charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a member
of the board of directors and former sole proprietor of MTI.
The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-officials. It
stated that the clause “so long as they remain in their custody” contained in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only where the pupil lives and boards
with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents., and such control and responsibility for the pupil’s actions
would pass from the father and mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion
was based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA, which in turn based its decision in
Exconde v. Capuno. The trial court held that Article 2180 was not applicable
in this case, as defendant Virgilio did not live with the defendants-officials at
the time of the incident. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Who should be liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with
the defendant?
Held:
The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively)
were held liable jointly and severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability
attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the MTI board of directors.
Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly impleaded
as party defendant.
The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their
custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they
are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the
law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who
commits the tortuous act must live and board in the school. The dicta in the
cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on which it relied are
deemed to have been set aside. The rationale of such liability of school heads
and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they
remain in their custody, is that they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent
to their pupils and students and are called upon to “exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the child.” In this case, The unfortunate death
resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been
avoided, had said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate
supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect
their students from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule failed to prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, they
cannot likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the
appellate court was modified, while claim for compensatory damages was
increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim for exemplary
damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on the part of the said
defendants
15. Amadora vs CA
Facts:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a
gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of
homicide through reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein
petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher
together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students
were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and
reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school
was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2.
That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has
already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In
any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement
of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other
hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school
to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).
Issue:
Whether or not Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
Held:
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of
the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident
happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his
physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of
boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge
as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over
the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed
in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held
liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a
student and later returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting
the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his
part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision
because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made
responsible for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts
disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with
Alfredo resulting to his death.
16. Pasco vs CFI
FACTS: Petitioner, together with two companions, while walking inside the
campus of the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes
in said university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led
by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students
of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and
as a consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central University
Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his life. Thereafter, petitioner,
assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against
Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta
University. The school was impleaded as a party defendant based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The school then filed for a motion to dismiss on the
following grounds:
a. The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
under which it was sued applies only to vocational schools and not to
academic institutions;
b. That every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the civil liability
in this case arises from a criminal action which the defendant university
has not committed;
 c. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have been made by the
plaintiff, hence, it would be premature to bring an action for
damages against defendant University.
ISSUE: Whether the provision of the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code which states:
“Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”,
is equally applicable to academic institutions.
HELD: The court granted the motion to dismiss of the private respondent
herein. We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the Article to
educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the issue
in this petition is actually whether or not, under the article, the school or the
university itself (as distinguished from the teachers or heads) is liable. We find
the answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned speaks only of
"teachers or heads."
17. Ylarde vs Aquino
FACTS: Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the
Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution wherein private
respondent Aquino teaches. At that time, the school was fittered with several
concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was
destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious
hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez
started burying them one by one as early as 1962. In fact, he was able to bury
ten of these blocks all by himself. Deciding to help his colleague, Aquino
gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, and as the teacher-
in-charge ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make
a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The
following day, private respondent Aquino called four of the original eighteen
pupils to continue the digging. When the depth was right enough to
accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and the four pupils got out of the
hole. Thereafter, Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went get some rope. Before leaving, Aquino allegedly told the
children "not to touch the stone.” A few minutes after private respondent left,
three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the
pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of
the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and
Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but
unfortunately for Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get
out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde
sustained several injuries. Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.
Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both
private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The trial court, however dismissed
the case on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in
line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde
was due to his own reckless imprudence. The CA affirmed upon appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents herein can be held liable under
Articles 2176 & 2180.
HELD: As regards Soriano, we hold that he cannot be made responsible for
the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and
not a school of arts and trades. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only
the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students.
As regards Aquino, it can be easily seen that private respondent can be held
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the
children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take
the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.
The acts and omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino amounted to
fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil
Ylarde. It is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross
negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual
laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an
excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very
hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after
they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and
could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to
the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when
it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a
place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left
the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a
dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde.
Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around. Tired
from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with whatever
they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing
the risk they were facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other
one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose
from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall
into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its
heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of
the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child
Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by
private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned
to real danger. Hence, Aquino is liable for damages.
18. Salvosa vs IAC
FACTS: Baguio Colleges Foundation is an academic institution. It is likewise
an institution of arts and trade. BCF offer courses which divest itself of the
nature or character of being purely or exclusively an academic institution.
Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, which is under the fifth control
of the AFP. Said ROTC unit is provided by the BCF an office and an armory
located at the basement of its main building. The Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of
the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not
being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as
well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio
Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC
units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP. Jimmy B. Abon was also
a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B.
Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of
the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was
prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide. Subsequently, the
heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon,
Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant), Benjamin Salvosa (President and
Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of
BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and Executive
Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
The trial court rendered a decision sentencing Abon, Salvosa and BCF jointly
and severally liable and absolved the others.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarity hable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of
the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
HELD: The rationale of liability under Article 2180 is that so long as the student
remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in
loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the [student]." Furthermore, the phrase used
'so long as (the students) remain in their custody’ means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school.
In this case, the court held that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have
been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot
Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
resulting from his acts. Moreover, record shows that before the shooting
incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had instructed
Abon "not to leave the office and [to keep the armory] well guarded.” Such
negates the finding that Abon was under the custody of the school when he
committed the act. It is clearly shown that Abon was supposed to be working
in the armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Wherefore Abon not being under the custody of BCF, the latter cannot be held
liable.
19. St. Francis vs CA
FACTS: The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman
student at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic. He was
however not allowed by his parents, respondent sps. Castillo due to short
notice. They merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic,
with the directive that he should go back home after doing so. However,
because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the
beach. During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in
the water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the
students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was
Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to
resuscitate him ashore failed. He was then brought to the Mt. Carmel General
Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Respondent spouses then filed a complaint against the St. Francis High
School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula,
Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Chaves, Vinas, Arquio,
Aragones, Jaro, and Cadiz, for Damages which respondents allegedly incurred
from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that
the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the
proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's
drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
RTC RULING: The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against
petitioners-teachers. The court ruled that the defendant-teachers had failed to
exercise the diligence required of them by law under the circumstances to
guard against the harm they had foreseen. On the other hand, the trial court
dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and
Aurora Cadorna.
CA RULING: Considering that the court a quo found negligence on the part of
the six defendants-teachers who, as such, were charged with the supervision
of the children during the picnic, the St. Francis High School and the school
principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article 2176 taken together with
the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. They cannot
escape liability on the mere excuse that the picnic was not an 'extra-curricular
activity of the St. Francis High School.' We find from the evidence that, as
claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had knowledge of the
picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited to attend the
affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against undertaking the
picnic, nor did he prescribe any precautionary measures to be adopted during
the picnic.
Upon appeal, defendants-appellants' main argument is that the parents of the
victim Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to prove by their evidence that they
did not give their son consent to join the picnic in question.
However, the court held that whether or not the victim's parents had given such
permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the existence of
liability on the part of the defendants for the damage incurred by the plaintiffs-
appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is material to such a
determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of defendants
vis-a-vis the supervision of the victim's group during the picnic.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable pursuant to Article 2180, in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
HELD: Petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the
negligence of those under them. Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty
at all of any negligence. Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages
of any kind.
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of
the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's
son. Under paragraph 4 of Article 2180, it is clear that before an employer may
be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in
the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance
of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises,
not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were
holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the
incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High
School were having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from
the school head or its principal, thus, it is not a school sanctioned activity
neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity. In addition, mere
knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the
students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show
acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same.
Likewise, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to
warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. Petitioners Connie
Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her
best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any
untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
Wherefore, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence,no moral
damages can be assessed against them.
20. PSBA vs CA
FACTS: A stabbing incident occured in the premises of the Philippine School
of Business Administration causing the death of Carlitos Bautista, who was
studying at the said school. Thereafter, the parents of the deceased filed an
action against Regina Ordoñez- Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA
and its corporate officers. The assailants were found to be not members of the
schools academic community but were elements from outside the school.
The suit specifically impleaded PSBA and the several of its school authorities.
Substantially, the plaintiffs, private respondents herein, sought to adjudge
them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before,
during and after the attack on the victim. Defendants (now petitioners) sought
to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against
them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions,
such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore- stated article.
RTC Ruling: Denied motion to dismiss.
CA Ruling: Affirmed. Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable
unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph
of Article 2180 by 'proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent
damage.' This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case."
ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable.
HELD: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip
him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation
between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a
contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause
to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. In the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between
the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
Wherefore, the present petition was denied and the case was remanded to the
court of origin.
21. Soliman vs. Tuazon
Facts:
On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages
against private respondent Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L.
Security Agency Inc. and one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as
defendants. The complaint alleged that petitioner was shot by the defendant
using a .38 Caliber Revolver within school premises where petitioner was a
student.
WON the private respondent is liable
Held:
Acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent trial
judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no
cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but
rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts
constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of
respondent Colleges.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide
the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with
the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On
the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations. Institutions of learning
must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students
with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts
and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or
where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and
limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof.

Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the

complaint stated no cause of action against it. Private respondent argued that
it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the
reason that private respondent school was not the employer of the security
guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any
wrongful act of Solomon. Private respondent school further argued that Article
2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph
holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, while security
guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
Respondent Judge granted private respondent school's motion to dismiss.

Issue:
 22. St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
Facts:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos,
spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case
against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-
appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive
for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the
campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other
high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan,
Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless
manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of
the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused
by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James
Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession
and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James
Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor
driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must
be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St.
Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote
cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.

Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the

accident.

Issue:

WON Petitioner is liable

Held:

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental
authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual,
entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and
responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils
and students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school
or its teachers. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.

Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless
 23. Philippine Rabbit vs. Phil. American
Facts:
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan
against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged
that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was
owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be
used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting
to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that
Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that
the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him. The
lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver
appealed.
Issue:
WON the manager of a corporation falls under Article 2180
Held:
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a
corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term
"manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of
"employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual
liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he
himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.
24. Philtranco vs. CA
Facts:
[I]n the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00 o'clock, the victim Ramon
A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle (Exhibit O), along the Gomez
Street of Calbayog City. On the Magsaysay Blvd., also in Calbayog City,
defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No.
4025 with plate No. EVA-725 driven by defendant Rogasiones Manilhig y
Dolira was being pushed by some persons in order to start its engine. As the
bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus continued on its running
motion and it occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding
on his bicycle was directly in front of the said bus. As the engine of the
Philtranco bus started abruptly and suddenly, its running motion was also
enhanced by the said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus bumped on
the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and, thereafter, was
run over by the said bus. The bus did not stop although it had already bumped
and ran [sic] over the victim; instead, it proceeded running towards the
direction of the Rosales Bridge which is located at one side of the Nijaga Park
and towards one end of the Gomez St., to which direction the victim was then
heading when he was riding on his bicycle.
Private respondents filled a case against petitioner and alleged that the
petitioners were guilty of gross negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic
rules and regulations, abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape from a
crime.
Petitioners filed an Answer wherein they alleged that petitioner Philtranco
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees, including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent
record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training before he was
hired.
Issue:
WON petitioner is liable
Held:
Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-delict[15] under
Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code against petitioner Manilhig and his
employer, petitioner Philtranco, respectively. The responsibility treated of in
this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. We
have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public
service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious
acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the
driver.
However, damages must be reduced. The trial court erroneously fixed the
"death indemnity" at P200,000. The private respondents defended the award
in their Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration by saying that "[i]n the
case of Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 110, our
Supreme Court held that the award of damages for death is computed on the
basis of the life expectancy of the deceased." In that case, the "death
indemnity" was computed by multiplying the victim's gross annual income by
his life expectancy, less his yearly living expenses. Clearly then, the "death
indemnity" referred to was the additional indemnity for the loss of earning
capacity mentioned in Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, and not the basic
indemnity for death mentioned in the first paragraph thereof.
25. Castilex vs. Vasquez
Facts:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So
Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda.
He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but
without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Students
Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a]
manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner [of] a
Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time,
Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going
around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic
in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided
with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle
and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu
Doctors Hospital. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors
Hospital. It was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible
Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and
other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. The present action for damages
was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of
the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex
Industrial Corporation.
Issue:
WON petitioner is liable
Held:
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter’s
personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the
employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive
use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly assigned motor
vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business purposes
and there is some incidental benefit to the employer.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was
carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured
in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way
beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his
overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as
petitioner put it, was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers
and addicts, had no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any
relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for
personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached
to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of
the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that
it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a
service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of
vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its
vehicle.
Case No. 26
Filamer Christian Institute v. Kapunan
G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992
FACTS: Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time Janitor and a
scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee
(janitor) even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2)
hours in the morning of each school day.
Allan Masa was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the
petitioner-school. He further said that after driving the students home at 5:00
in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using
the same vehicle. Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school
president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the
interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the
school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school
day.

Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the Allan Masa and was
allowed to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late
afternoon. According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights
nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon
swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle,
but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the
pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction
against vehicular traffic, and hit him.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner employer is liable for the damage caused by
the student-employee Funtencha.
HELD: YES. The Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in
taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer
for which act the petitioner school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing
that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within
the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of
liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance
of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time
of the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving
the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive
liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or
not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It
invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently
negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer.
Hence, the reliance on Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing
the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, to disregard the
primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as
a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from
the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of
evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious
liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is,
under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to
the heirs of the plaintiff.
Case No. 27
NPC v. CA
G.R. No. 119121 August 14, 1998
FACTS: A convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power
Corporation (NPC) left Marawi City bound for Iligan City. While enroute to its
destination, one of the trucks driven by one Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-
on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three
persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to
seventeen other passengers. A complaint for damages against NPC and
PHESCO was filed by the heirs of the victims with the Regional Trial Court. In
its answer, PHESCO contended that it was not the owner of the dump truck
which collided with the Toyota Tamaraw but the NPC. It asserted that it was
merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers and
technicians for the latter's projects. On the other hand, NPC denied any liability
and countered that the driver of the dump truck was the employee of PHESCO.
NPC maintains that even assuming that a "labor only" contract exists between
it and PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due
to the tortious acts of the employee of the "labor-only" contractor. Stated
otherwise, its liability shall only be limited to violations of the Labor Code and
not quasi-delicts.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner-employer is liable.
HELD: YES. There is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only"
contracting vis-a-vis NPC and as such, it is considered merely an agent of the
latter. In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship between
the principal employer and the employees of the "labor-only" contractor is
created. Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the employees
of the "labor only" contractor as if such employees had been directly employed
by the principal employer. Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the
workers it supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be
considered as employees of NPC.
It is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will
determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured
person for any negligent act of the employees of the "labor only" contractor.
This is consistent with the ruling that a finding that a contractor was a "labor-
only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the "labor-
only" contractor, including the latter's workers.
With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article 2180 of the
Civil Code explicitly provides:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry."
In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and
the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall
have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence
which gave rise to the action.
Finally, NPC, even if it truly believed that it was not the employer of the driver,
could still have disclaimed any liability had it raised the defense of due
diligence in the selection or supervision of PHESCO and Ilumba. However, for
some reason or another, NPC did not invoke said defense. Hence, by opting
not to present any evidence that it exercised due diligence in the supervision
of the activities of PHESCO and Ilumba, NPC has foreclosed its right to
interpose the same on appeal in conformity with the rule that points of law,
theories, issues of facts and arguments not raised in the proceedings below
cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal. Consequently, its liability
stands.
28. Light Rail Transit vs. Navidad
On Oct. 14, 1993, about half an hour past 7 in the evening, Nicanor Navidad,
then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token". While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin,
the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that
led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight
started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later
fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by
the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
The widow of Nicanor, respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children,
filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit and Prudent for the death of her husband.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs actual, compensatory, moral damages, indemnity for the
death of Nicanor Navidad, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
CA rendered its decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death
of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, hold LRTA and Roman jointly and severally
liable.
Issues:
a. WON LRTA is liable for the death of Navidad.
b. WON Prudent is liable.
c. WON Roman is liable.
Held:
a. Yes. The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long
as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a
common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the
negligence or willful acts of its employees or b) on account of willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier's
employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury,
the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of
the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove
that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence
of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the
presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general
rule that negligence must be proved.
The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation
to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its
failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider
or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common
carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Note: The liability of the common carrier and an independent contractor is
solidary. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes
a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-
delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can
be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply
b. No. If there is any liability that could be attributed to Prudent, it could only
be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the
employer's liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once
such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis
of the presumption that the employer failed to exercise diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability
is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection
and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.
Prudent cannot be held liable for the to death of Navidad, for the reason that
the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven.
c. No. There is no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman (employee of Metro
Transit and not of the LRTA) is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must
also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between
the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and
Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
Case No. 29
Mckee v. IAC
G.R. No. 68102 July 16, 1992
FACTS: In the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along Mac
Arthur Highway, between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a
head-on collision took place between an International cargo truck, Loadstar
owned by private respondents George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, and
driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The
collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee
and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. Immediately before
the collision, the cargo truck was traveling southward from Angeles City to San
Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other
hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the
northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the
bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the
lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to
cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the
car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on
the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return
to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision
occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge. On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the
accused Ruben Galang in the criminal case. Upon the other hand, Judge Mario
Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two civil cases and awarded the private
respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the conviction of Galang. The decision is anchored
principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's
inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The
appellate court further said that the law presumes negligence on the part of
the defendants (private respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection
and supervision of the latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did
not allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting and supervising the said employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner-employers are liable for the death and
injuries caused by their employee.
HELD: Yes. The Court rule that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to
exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate
cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents
are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the
resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
negligence of their employee. He himself said that his truck was running at 30
miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed
allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185
of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Even if Jose Koh
was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds application
here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for
damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable
care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid
the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
thereof.
It is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable
and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys
by swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean
entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural
course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be
several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the side of the
road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the
emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence."
30. Valenzuela vs. CA
An action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical
injuries sustained in a vehicular accident was filed by Lourdes Valenzuela
against Richard Li.
Valenzuela alleged that around 2:00 in the morning she was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant to her home. Subsequently, she noticed
something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there
were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that
she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the
sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from
the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left
side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix
the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard
Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Because of the impact, plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car
of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was
pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the
middle of her thigh, with only some skin and muscle connected to the rest of
the body.
Plaintiff prayed for moral, exemplary damages and other medical and related
expenses.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. According to him, he was
on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility
was affected and the road was wet. He was suddenly confronted with a car
coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights."
Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with
the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because
it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device,
and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that plaintiff's car
was improperly parked, almost at the center of the road.
RTC sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li
guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's
employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC that Li was liable for the injuries sustained by
the plaintiff but absolved Li’s employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any
liability towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela. According to CA, to impose
liability upon the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, there must be
a showing that the damage was caused by their employees in the service of
the employer or on the occasion of their functions. There is no evidence that
Richard Li, at the time of the accident, was performing any act in furtherance
of the company's business or its interests, or at least for its benefit. Before an
employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage must have occurred while an employee was
in the actual performance of his assigned tasks or duties. The imposition of
solidary liability against defendant Alexander Commercial Corporation must
therefore fail.
Valenzuela assails the respondent court's decision insofar as it absolves
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the owner of the car driven by
Richard Li.
Issue: WON Alexander Commercial, Inc. is solidarily liable with Li.
Held: Yes. We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question
is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master
liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It
is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends.
Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial,
Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by Li.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned
tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to
exercise supervision over either the employee's private activities or during the
performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the
employee's tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their
employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in
all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the
unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and
goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the
individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company
sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or
for the purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees
to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to
use the company issue capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial,
Inc. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that his functions as
Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office
hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting
prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in
entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or
not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a
company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating
that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly
and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Valenzuela
during the accident.
Other issue: WON Valenzuela was likewise guilty of contributory negligence in
parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is
a no parking zone.
No. Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is
confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct
normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. Under the
"emergency rule”, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means
that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence
if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will
not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so
and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the
entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley
where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her
not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of
Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would
be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. Under the circumstances
described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the
emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate
circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower
extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in
Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had
taken all reasonable precautions.
 31. Merrit vs. Government
Merrit, who was riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of
Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to
twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet
from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital
ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south,
after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said
avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned
suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street,
into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn,
by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the
southwestern point or from the post placed there. By reason of the resulting
collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured.
RTC held that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the
chauffeur.
Issue: WON the government is liable for the negligent act of its agent or
employee.
Held: By virtue of Act No. 2457, E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the
Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of
said collision.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted act, simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state
where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract, the rule is that:
"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does
not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his
favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.”
It must be conceded that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from
the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute
assuming such liability.
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the civil Code reads:
“The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.”
"'That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to
another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law
3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or
negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who caused the
damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law,
is not responsible for the damage suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the
public service and in the appointment of its agents.”
"That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the
principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a
damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts
through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to
the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to
a public official charge with some administrative or technical office who can be
held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility.”
It is, therefore, evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they
act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra,
and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such
an agent.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of
damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the
negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by
appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine.
This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
32. Rosete vs. Auditor General
Insular Auditor denied the claim of Inocencio Rosete and others against the
Government for damages caused to buildings belonging to the claimant, which
according to the appellant's claim were destroyed by fire that came from the
contiguous warehouse of the Emergency Control Administration, due to the
negligence of a certain Jose Frayno in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter
near a five gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained, and of the
officers of the said ECA, which is an office or agency of the Government, in
storing gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of
the City of Manila.
Rosete appealed from the decision of the Insular Auditor. He contends that the
Auditor General erred in not finding that the government agency or
instrumentality known as the Emergency Control Administration of the officers
thereof, were guilty of negligence in storing a highly combustible and
inflammable substance in its warehouse on bodega in Manila in violation of
City Ordinances, and therefore the government is liable for the damages
sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code, which in its
pertinent part reads as follows:
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is enforceable not
only for personal acts and omissions but also for those persons for whom
another is responsible.
Issue: WON the government can be held liable for the negligence of ECA
officials.
Held: No. The state is liable only when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom it properly
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable.
According to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code, in a damage case,
the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a
special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held
to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility.
There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the
Emergency Control Administration or its officers, was done by a special agent,
because the officers of the Emergency Control Administration did not act as
special agents of the government in storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA,
the government is not responsible for the damages caused through such
negligence.
Act No. 327, in authorizing the filing of claims against the Government with the
Insular Auditor, and appeal by private persons or entities from the latter's
decision to the Supreme Court, does not make any and all claims against the
Government allowable, and the latter responsible for all claims which may be
filed with the Insular Auditor under the provisions of said Act.
 33. Mendoza vs. De Leon
An action for damages was filed against the individual members of the
municipal council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation
of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege awarded to the plaintiff under the
provisions of Act. No. 1634 of the Philippine Commission. After one year, the
plaintiff was forcibly ejected and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the
herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.
Act No. 1634 provides that the use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry,
stable, market, slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or township shall
be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longer period not exceeding
five years as may have been previously approved by the provincial board of
the province in which the municipality or township is located.
Issue: WON the individual councilors are liable for the damages sustained by
Mendoza.
Held: No.
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal Code
have both governmental and corporate or business functions.
Two kinds of duties are imposed on municipal corporations, one is
governmental and a branch of the general administration of the state, the other
is quasi private or corporate. In the exercise of the latter duties, the municipality
is liable for the acts of its officers and agents, while in the former it is not. Within
the sphere of the former, it enjoys the exemption of the government, from
responsibility for its own acts, and for the acts of those who are independent
corporate officers, deriving their rights and duties from the sovereign power.
But in regard to the latter, it is responsible for the acts of those who are in law
its agents, though they may not be appointed by itself.
It is the well-settled rule that the state is not liable to private persons who suffer
injuries through negligence of its officers — and the rule extends to townships
and cities — while in the performance of state functions, imposed upon them
by the law.
Cities are governmental agencies, and that their 'officers are in no such sense
municipal agents; that their negligence is the neglect of the municipality; nor
will their misconduct be chargeable against them, unless the act complained
of be either authorized or ratified.' And in a large number of cases it has been
held that there is no such liability on the part of such governmental agency
unless it has been imposed by statute, and in such case it is necessarily limited
by the statute.
Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of
governmental duties which are in their nature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable
for the consequences of their official acts, unless it be shown that they act
willfully and maliciously, and with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon
the plaintiff. If they exercise their honest judgment in the performance of their
duties, their errors cannot be charged against them.
So it may be said that in so far as its governmental functions are concerned, a
municipality is not liable at all, unless expressly made by statute; nor are its
officers, so long as they perform their duties honestly and in good faith.
From what has already been said, it should be clear that a municipality is not
exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or
proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial
property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its
liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, valid
entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the
torts of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely
the same manner and to the same extent as those of private corporations or
individuals. As to such matters the principles respondeat superior applies. It is
for these purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest
bidder for a specified period of time is not a governmental but corporate
function. Such a lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with
the lessee which the municipality is bound to respect.
Under the provisions of the Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, the plaintiff had
a vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period
of his lease. If it is the municipality which is the party to this action, it would be
patent that a judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the contract
would be proper. But the present action is against the members of the
municipal council personally, and the question arise: Are they liable? In
administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal council
occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of directors of a private
corporation. In disposing of the local public utilities, if the term may be used,
such as the fishing and ferry rights, etc., they must exercise considerable
judgment.
We do not think the councilors could have been personally held liable for their
error in resorting to forcible eviction of the lessee. Theirs was an error of
judgment, and honest mistake on their part as to the rights of the municipality
in the premises. We think the rule of personal liability should be with municipal
councilors in such matters as it is with the directors or managers of an ordinary
private corporation.
Under the rule that directors are not liable for mistakes of judgment, it follows
naturally that they are not liable for the mismanagement of the corporate affairs
where such mismanagement is a mistake of judgment. The wisdom of this rule
is not only approved by common experience but by law writers and all courts.
A rule so rigid as to hold directors personally liable for honest mistakes in
corporate management would deter all prudent business men from accepting
such positions.
In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any
justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the plaintiff from the ferry which he had
leased. On the contrary, the defendant councilors attempted to justify their
action on the ground that the ferry which he was operating was not the one
leased to him; this in spite of the fact the vice-president had personally placed
him in possession of it more than a year before, and the fact that he had
operated this ferry for over a year, evidently with the knowledge of the
defendants. The evidence is so clear that the ferry of which the plaintiff was
dispossessed was the one which he had leased that no reasonable man would
entertain any doubt whatever upon the question. Hence, we cannot say that in
rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby making the municipality liable
to an action for damages for no valid reason at all, the defendant councilors
were honestly acting for the interests of the municipality. We are, therefore, of
the opinion that the defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages
sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry
privilege in question.
34. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman
Facts:
on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pick-up owned and operated by
respondent National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing
Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said
agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla,
son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along
the Maharlika Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and
Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency
Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan
Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation
Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional
driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent
after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and
maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration
authorities. prLL
The within petition is thus an offshot of the action instituted by petitioners-
spouses against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the
death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment which directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses
to petitioners.
Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said decision which respondent trial court denied.
Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to
the Court of Appeals where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its
position.
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case,
petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.
Issue:
Whether or not, NIA must not be held liable, being a government agency
performing its governmental functions.
Held:
No. NIA must be liable as an ordinary employer.
Art. 2176 thus provides:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter."
The National Irrigation Administration is a government corporation with juridical
personality and not a mere agency of the government. It is an agency of the
government exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act
No. 3601 which tasked the same to do the following:
1. collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by
it such fees as may be necessary to finance the continuous
operation of the system and reimburse within a certain period
not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof;
and

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 2180 read as follows:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry."
2. do all such other things and to transact all such business as
are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to
the attainment of the above objectives."
Therefore, it must be liable as an ordinary employer provided that there is an
existence of negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.

"The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through
a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused
by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in
which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be
applicable."
The liability of the State has two aspects, namely:
In the case presented, the fact that Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a
distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was
thrown a little bit further away and that the vehicle suffered dents on the right
side of the radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as
shown by the investigation report, indicate that driver Garcia was driving at a
high speed. This circumstances show negligence on the part of NIA in
supervision over its employees.

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious

acts of special agents only.

2 Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private

enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer.

In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused
by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.

Under the aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily
assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State's agent, if a
public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task
but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental
functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to
perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an
ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the
government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task,
it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.
 35. City of Manila vs. Teotico
Facts:
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the
corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading
and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After
waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along
to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took
a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole
on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole
breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left
eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons
came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them
brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were
treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound
in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left
upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip, apart from an abrasion on the right
infra-patella region. These injuries and the allergic eruptions caused by anti-
tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required further
medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a
businessman and a professor at the University of the East. He held
responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine
Merchandising Co., the A. U. Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan
Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also
associated with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf
Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men
Club of Manila and the Knight's of Rizal.||
Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which
was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its
mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.
Both the trial court and Court of Appeals dismissed the amended complaint
of the plaintiff, hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not, the City of Manila must be held liable in this case.
Held:
Yes.
It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law and
that, Republic Act No. 409 or the charter of Manila, is a special law while the
Civil Code is a general law. Hence, from the above assertions, Republic Act
No. 409 must governed. However, looking at the particular provisions of
each law concerned, the Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 establishes a
general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for “damages or injury
to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers to enforce the
provisions of the said Act or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence
of the city Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions.” In such case, there is no particular
exemption but merely a general exemption.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, provides a particular
prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for
damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason —
specifically — of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision."
In other words, said Section 4 of the charter of Manila refers to liability arising
from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article
2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the
present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said
Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only
raised for the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court
of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it
is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not
the road is national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the
City’s control and supervision, it shall be responsible for damages by reason
of the defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they
have control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City
alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the city’s
roads, P. Burgos included.
 36. Republic vs. Palacio
Facts:
On April 2, 1960, Ildefonso Ortiz instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur Civil Case No. 4886, against the Handong Irrigation
Association, Inc., a corporation with principal place of business in Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, and the Irrigation Service Unit, an office or agency under the
Department of Public Works and Communications, to recover possession with
damages, of 958-square meter-lot located in Handong, San Juan, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and
occupied, at the instance of its co-defendant (Handong Irrigation Association).
On June 3, 1960, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, moved for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming that defendant
Irrigation Service Unit has no juridical personality to sue and be sued. This
motion was denied, on the ground that the said defendant although a mere
agency of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in the private business
of selling irrigation pumps and construction materials on installment plan. The
Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also
denied. No appeal appears to have been taken.
On January 29, 1962, the Solicitor General was served with copy of the writ of
execution issued by the court against the defendants in the above-mentioned
civil case. An order of garnishment was served by the Sheriff of Manila against
the deposits and/or pump irrigation trust fund in the account of the Irrigation
Service Unit at the Philippine National Bank, Manila, to cover the sum of
P14,874.40.
On March 8, 1962, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, filed with the lower court an urgent motion to lift the order of
garnishment, for the reason that the funds subject matter thereof are public
funds and exempt from attachment or execution. Upon denial of this motion,
as well as of the motion for reconsideration of said denial, the Solicitor General
commenced the present certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of garnishment on deposit and pump irrigation trust
fund is proper.
Held:
No.
The answer to the petition lies in the determination of the function of ISU as
a government agency. The office of the ISU was originally created under the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources by virtue of a
Memorandum Agreement between the governments of the Philippines and
the United States. It was later transferred to the Department of Public Works
and Communications as an office directly under the Office of the Secretary,
"to prosecute to completion the rehabilitation of pump systems transferred
from the former Irrigation Pump Administration of the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the settlement of the
obligations of said administration.
It is clear from the foregoing that the ISU is not only an office in the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, created to promote a specific
economic policy of said government, but also that its activity (of selling
irrigation pumps to farmers on installment basis) is not intended to earn profit
or financial gain to its operator. The mere fact that interests are being
collected on the balance of the unpaid cost of the purchased pumps does
not convert this economic project of the government into a corporate activity.
As previously pointed out, the installment payments and interests receivable
from the farmers are to be used to replenish the counterpart funds utilized in
furtherance of the operation of the project.
The confusion arises from the Stat's waiver to be sued. The CA assumed
that because the State has waived its immunity, its property and funds
become liable to seizure under the legal process. This emphatically is not
the law, as held in Meritt vs. Insular government:
"Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed,
the power of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered.
Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the
state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment
or not, and execution can not issue on a judgment against the state.
Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
judgments recovered, and only convey implication that the
legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provision
for the satisfaction thereof.
Judgments against a state, in cases where it has consented to be
sued, generally operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's
claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise they can not
be enforced by processes of law; and it is for the legislature to
provide for their payment in such manner as it sees fit."
It needs no stressing that to allow the levying under execution of the ISU
funds would amount to diverting them from the purpose originally
contemplated by the Bilateral Agreement, and would amount to a HELD: YES. The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned payroll
disbursement without any proper appropriation as required by law. checks in good faith has not been substantiated, he in particular not having
testified or offered testimony to prove such claim. Upon the contrary, in spite
of his being a vice-president and director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner
remained passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad, concerning
the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds for the latter. This plus the
Case No. 37 fact that he even approved thrice payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's
Araneta v. De Joya salary, demonstrate quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his
G.R. No. L-25172 May 24, 1974 duties properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. The fact
that he was occupying a contractual position at the Ace Advertising is of no
FACTS: Sometime in November 1952 respondent De Joya, then general moment. The existence of a contract between the parties, as has been
manager of the Ace Advertising, proposed to the board of directors that an repeatedly held by this Court, constitutes no bar to the commission of a tort by
employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages.
studies in television. The board, however, failed to act on the proposal.
Nevertheless, in September 1953 the respondent sent Taylor abroad. J.
Antonio Araneta, a company director, inquired about the trip and was assured
by the respondent that Taylor's expenses would be defrayed not by the
company but by other
parties. While abroad, from September 1, 1953 to March 15, 1954, Taylor
continued to receive his salaries. The Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043 20,
all told, on account of Taylor's travel and studies. On August 23, 1954 the Ace
Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first instance of Manila against
the respondent for recovery of the total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that
the trip was made without its knowledge, authority or ratification. The
respondent, in his answer, denied the charge and claimed that the trip was
nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors, and that in any event
under the by-laws he had the discretion, as general manager, to authorize the
trip which was for the company's benefit.

A 3rd-party complaint was also filed by the respondent against Vicente

Araneta, the petitioner and Ricardo Taylor. The respondent proved that
Vicente Araneta, as treasurer of the firm, signed a check representing the
company's share of the transportation expense of Taylor to the United States,
and that a series of payroll checks from September 15, 1953 to December 31,
1953, inclusive, which included the salaries of Taylor, was signed by Vicente
Araneta and the petitioner who is a vice-president of the company. Both
Aranetas disowned any personal liability, claiming that they signed the checks
in good faith as they were approved by the respondent.

Both the Trial Court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Ace Advertising.
The appellate court found as a fact that Taylor's trip had been neither
authorized nor ratified by the company.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is guilty of a quasi-delict.

 Case No. 38
Lanuzo v. Ping and Mendoza
G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980
FACTS: On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was instituted in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against
Sy Bon Ping, the owner and operator of a freight truck, and his driver, Salvador
Mendoza. As alleged therein, at about five o clock in the afternoon of July 24,
1969, while Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national
highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur, and because of
his reckless negligence, he rammed into the residential house and store of
plaintiff. As a result, the house and store were completely razed to the ground
causing damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff averred
that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost his means of livelihood
from the store which used to give him a monthly income of P300.00.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another action, Criminal
Case for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in
the Municipal Court of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties for
the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the dismissal stressing that he had made
an express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil action for
damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit. The lower Court denied
the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court Appeals they urged
that the civil action was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3,
providing in part that "after the criminal action has been commenced the civil
action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action." Additionally, they contended that even assuming their liability,
the lower Court nevertheless committed an error in holding them jointly and
severally liable.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendants are jointly and severally liable.
HELD: Yes. For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and
operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, the liability of his
employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the
same Code, which explicitly provides:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry."
For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his
negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, he is likewise
responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee
(driver) Salvador Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.
But although the employer is solidarily liable with the employee for damages,
the employer may demand reimbursement from his employee (driver) for
whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended party to satisfy
the latter's claim.
39. Malipol vs. Tan
Facts:
In the evening of February 6, 1965, at about 8:35 o'clock, Pantaleon Malijan,
who was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante on the shoulder of the
road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was hit by a gasoline tanker
and was thrown to the ground. While he was sprawling on the ground Malijan
was run over by the tanker's right wheel that got detached from its axle.
Malijan's companion, with the aid of the barrio captain, brought Malijan to the
San Pablo City Hospital where he died that same night, the cause of death
being "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular accident."
The gasoline tanker with Plate No. T-52573, series of 1964, driven at the time
of the accident by herein appellant Ernesto Labsan, was being used in
connection with the gasoline business of the owner, the herein appellant Lily
Lim Tan.
Since representations and demands for payment of damages were being
ignored by appellants, appellees, who are the mother and the minor brothers
and sisters of the deceased Pantaleon Malijan, filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, praying that appellants be condemned to pay,
jointly and severally, the damages as specified in said complaint.
Appellants were duly served with summons but failed to answer within the
reglementary period. Upon appellees' motion, the trial court declared the
appellants in default, and appellees were permitted to present their evidence
in the absence of the appellants. The trial court rendered a decision, ordering
defendant driver, Ernesto Labsan, to pay the following:
(1) the sum of P2,100.00 to the plaintiffs for expenses for hospitalization,
medical treatment, vigil and burial of Pantaleon Malijan;
(2) the sum of P6,000.00 to the plaintiffs for the death of said victim;
(3) the sum of P20,000.00 to the plaintiffs for the loss of earnings of said
deceased for a period of five years;
(4) the sum of P5,000.00 to the plaintiffs for moral damages;
(5) the sum of P2,000.00 to the plaintiffs for attorney's fees and P500.00 for
incidental and litigation expenses; and
(6) the costs of the suit.
Should Ernesto Labsan not be able to pay the foregoing damages, they shall
be paid for by defendant Lily Lim Tan, who by law, being the owner and
operator of the gasoline tanker that featured in the accident, is subsidiarily
liable.
A motion for execution was filed by appellees but the trial court held its
resolution in abeyance until the judgment would become final.
Subsequently, appellants filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and
for a new trial, alleging that they were deprived of their day in court when the
order of default was issued and a decision rendered thereafter; that they had
good and valid defenses, namely: (a) that the accident which gave rise to the
case was due to force majeure; (b) that appellant Ernesto Labsan was without
fault in the accident that gave rise to the case; and (c) that appellant Lily
Lim Tan had exercised the due diligence required of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. The trial court denied motion. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not, the trial court is correct in holding Lily Lim Tan subsidiarily
liable and Ernesto Labsan primarily liable, being the owner and the driver of
the gas tanker respectively.
Held:
No. Lily Lim Tan must be held solidarily liable with Ernesto Labsan
It is stated in the decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto Labsan, was
primarily liable for the payment of damages adjudged therein, and the
appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker
that figured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only in case
Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay. This is not correct. The action in the
instant case was brought not to demand civil liability arising from a crime. The
complaint makes no mention of a crime having been committed, much less of
the driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a crime. But there is an
allegation in the complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized driver of
the truck that figured in the accident, which truck was operated by appellant
Lily Lim Tan in connection with her gasoline business. The prayer in the
complaint, furthermore, sought to hold appellants jointly and solidarily liable for
damages. The instant action, therefore, was based, as the complaint shows,
on quasi delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi
delicts, the liability of the owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and direct, not
subsidiary. The employer, however, can demand from his employee
reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his liability. The employer,
appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily,
liable for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court. This is, of
course, without prejudice to the right of appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from
her co-appellant Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the damages that she
would have to pay to appellees.
40. Viluan vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in Bangar, La
Union, on February 16, 1958, when a passenger bus on which they were
riding caught fire after hitting a post and crashing against a tree. The bus,
owned by petitioner and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino, came from San
Fernando, La Union and was on its way to Candon, Ilocos Sur. It appears
that, as the bus neared the gate of the Gabaldon school building in the
municipality of Bangar, another passenger bus owned by Patricio Hufana
and driven by Gregorio Hufana tried to overtake it but that instead of giving
way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus and raced with the overtaking
bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post, crashed
against a tree and then burst into flames. Among those who perished were
Timoteo Mapanao, Francisca Lacsamana, Narcisa Mendoza and Gregorio
Sibayan.
The heirs of the deceased sued petitioner and the latter's driver,
Hermenegildo Aquino, breach of contract of carriage and damages. Carolina
Sabado, one of those injured, also sued petitioner and the driver for
damages. The complaints were filed in the Court of First Instance of La
Union.
In their answer, petitioner and her driver blamed respondent Gregorio
Hufana for the accident. With leave of court, they filed third party complaints
against Hufana and the latter's employer, Patricio Hufana.
After trial, the court found that the accident was due to the concurrent
negligence of the drivers of the two buses and held both, together with their
respective employers, jointly and severally liable for damages.
The petitioner, her driver, and the respondents herein appealed to the Court
of Appeals who affirmed the decision of the lower court but claimed that only
petitioner, Francisco Viuan, is liable for breach of contract of carriage as
operator of the bus. Hermenegildo Aquino, being the driver, cannot be made
jointly and severally liable with petitioner because he is merely the latter's
employee and is in no way a party to the contract of carriage. The latter may,
nevertheless, be held criminally and civilly liable under Articles 100 and 103
of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner is also entitled to recover from
Aquino, any damages which he may have suffered by reason of the latter’s
negligence.
Neither can respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana be held liable
in the opinion of the appellate court because the plaintiffs did not amend
complaints in the main action so as to assert a claim against respondents as
third party defendants.
Procedurally, it should make no difference whether the respondents were
brought in as principal defendants or as third-party defendants. Since the
liability of the third-party defendant is already asserted in the third-party
complaint, the amendment of the complaint to assert such liability is merely
a matter of form, to insist on which would not be in keeping with the liberal
spirit of the Rules of Court.|||
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense that
petitioner as well as respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana are
jointly and severally liable for the damages awarded by the trial court. The
disallowance of moral damages in the amount of P1,000.00 is correct and
should be affirmed. No costs.

The appellate court likewise disallowed the award of moral damages for
P1,000.00 to Carolina Sabado, there being no showing that the common
carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith in the performance of her obligation.

From this judgment petitioner brought this appeal. In brief, her position is
that since the proximate cause of the accident was found to be the
concurrent negligence of the drivers of the two buses, then she and
respondents Patricio and Gregorio Hufana should have been held equally
liable to the plaintiffs in the damage suits.

Issue:

Whether or not, petitioner and respondents must be equally liable in this

case.

Held.

Yes. In fact, they must be held solidarily liable.

Substantively, it should not make any difference that the liability of petitioner
springs from contract while that of respondents arises from quasi-delict. As
early as 1931, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil., 177, that
in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus
on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as
well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for
damages. Some members of the Court, though are of the view that under
the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.

(In response to the opinion of the appellate court)