PEDRO T. ACOSTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID FLOR, Defendant-Appellee.

W .A. Kincaid, for Appellant.

Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, for Appellee.

FACTS: The Plaintiff and the Defendant were candidates for the Office of the Municipal President of Laoag,
Ilocos Norte. Plaintiff alleged that he was duly elected to said office and that the Defendant had usurped and
unlawfully held the same. However, not a single witness presented by Plaintiff confirmed the latter’s allegations
that he had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election. Nor can it be inferred from the evidence
introduced by the Plaintiff that he, as a result of said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office
of Municipal President of Laoag, now held by Defendant.

ISSUE: Can the Plaintiff maintain an action for the purpose of excluding the Defendant from the exercise of
said office?

HELD: No. Art. 199, 200, and 201 of the Code of Civil Procedure has reserved to the Attorney-General and to
the provincial fiscals, as the case may be, the right to bring such action. If the legislative had intended to give all
citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of public office, it would have plainly said so in the
law in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance.

*** the Court held that if the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to maintain an action
for usurpation of public office, he would have plainly said so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-
reaching importance. A simple provision would have sufficed for this purpose. Far from it, the legislator has on
the contrary especially and specifically provided in sections 199, 200, and 201 who must and who may bring
such actions; and it is very clear that it was his intention to give such right to those expressly mentioned in the
above-cited sections and to no other, following the well-known rule of law "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."
It has been noticed that the above referred to three sections only mention the Attorney-General, the provincial
fiscal, and the individual claiming to be entitled to the office unlawfully held and exercised by another. It is to
be inferred from this last provision that the individual who does not claim to have such a right cannot bring an
action for usurpation of public office****

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), Petitioner,

vs.
THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, represented by JOSE MARIO BUNAG, in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, who are
Promulgated: persons acting for, in behalf or under the authority of respondent, Respondents.

PAGCOR is subject to income tax only with respect to its operation of related services. Accordingly, the
income tax exemption ordained under Section 27(c) of R.A. No. 8424 clearly pertains only to petitioner’s
income from operation of related services.For clarity, it is worthy to note that under P.D. 1869, as amended,
PAGCOR’s income is classified into two: (1) income from its operations conducted under its Franchise,
pursuant to Section 13(2) (b) thereof (income from gaming operations); and (2) income from its operation of
necessary and related services under Section 14(5) thereof (income from other related services).
Facts: Under P.D. 1869, as amended, PAGCOR is subject to income tax only with respect to its operation of
related services. Accordingly, the income tax exemption ordained under Section 27(c) of R.A. No. 8424 clearly
pertains only to petitioner’s income from operation of related services. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
issued a Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 33-2013 on April 17, 2013 pursuant to a decision
regarding the present parties dated March 15, 2011 and the Resolution dated May 31, 2011, which clarifies the
income tax and franchise tax Due from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), its
Contractees and Licensees. The RMC stated that PAGCOR is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it
has been effectively omitted from the list of government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) that are
exempt from income tax. Accordingly, PAGCOR’s income from its operations and licensing of gambling
casinos, gaming clubs and other similar recreation or amusement places, gaming pools, and other related
operations, are subject to corporate income tax under the NIRC. Further, PAGCOR is also subjected to a
franchise tax of five percent (5%) of the gross revenue or earnings it derives from its operations and licensing of
gambling casinos. PAGCOR filed a Motion for Clarification alleging that RMC No. 33-2013 is an erroneous
interpretation and application of the aforesaid decision.

ISSUE: Is the RMC issued by the BIR constitutional?

RULING: No, in our Decision dated March 15, 2011, the Court have already declared PAGCOR’s income tax
liability in view of the withdrawal of its tax privilege under R.A. No. 9337. However, the Court made no
distinction as to which income is subject to corporate income tax, considering that the issue raised therein was
only the constitutionality of Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, which excluded PAGCOR from the enumeration of
GOCCs exempted from corporate income tax. For clarity, it is worthy to note that under P.D. 1869, as amended,
PAGCOR’s income is classified into two: (1) income from its operations conducted under its Franchise,
pursuant to Section 13(2) (b) thereof (income from gaming operations); and (2) income from its operation of
necessary and related services under Section 14(5) thereof (income from other related services). In the RMC,
BIR further classified the aforesaid income. Under P.D. 1869, as amended, PAGCOR is subject to income tax
only with respect to its operation of related services. Accordingly, the income tax exemption ordained under
Section 27(c) of R.A. No. 8424 clearly pertains only to petitioner’s income from operation of related services.
Such income tax exemption could not have been applicable to petitioner’s income from gaming operations as it
is already exempt therefrom under P.D. 1869. There was no need for Congress to grant tax exemption to
petitioner with respect to its income from gaming operations as the same is already exempted from all taxes of
any kind or form, income or otherwise, whether national or local, under its Charter, save only for the five
percent (5%) franchise tax. The exemption attached to the income from gaming operations exists independently
from the enactment of R.A. No. 8424. To adopt an assumption otherwise would be downright ridiculous, if not
deleterious, since petitioner would be in a worse position if the exemption was granted (then withdrawn) than
when it was not granted at all in the first place.

*** the Court held that the legislative intent, as shown by the discussions in the Bicameral Conference Meeting,
is to require PAGCOR to pay corporate income tax; hence, the omission or removal of PAGCOR from
exemption from the payment of corporate income tax. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Thus, the express mention of the GOCCs exempted from payment
of corporate income tax excludes all others. Not being excepted, petitioner PAGCOR must be regarded as
coming within the purview of the general rule that GOCCs shall pay corporate income tax. ***
 GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. and FRUTO SAYSON, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
NISSIN-UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts: On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation ( URC) owned
figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.’ s (Green Star) passenger bus, resulting
in the death of the van’s driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged with the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent
NissinUniversal Robina Corporation (NURC) for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to ₱567, 070.68.
NURC denied any liability therefore and argued that the criminal case shall determine the ultimate liabilities of
the parties. Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without prejudice, due to insufficiency of evidence.
Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against NURC before the R TC of San Pedro,
Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC’s employees, was the one who received the summons. On February 6,
2004, NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service.

Issue: Whether or not there is valid service of summons.

Held: No. It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private juridical
entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant.

NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the summons was received by its cost
accountant, Francis Tinio. It argues that under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides
the rule on service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is a domestic corporation
like NURC, summons may be served only through its officers. Thus:

Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.

In the past, the Court upheld service of summons upon a construction project manager, a corporation‘s assistant
manager, and ordinary clerk of a corporation, private secretary of corporate executives, retained counsel, and
officials who had control over the operations of the corporation like the assistant general manager or the
corporation‘s Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. The Court then considered said persons as “agent”
within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of
the corporation is no longer authorized, The rule now likewise states “general manager” instead of “manager”;
“corporate secretary” instead of merely “secretary”; and “treasure” instead of “cashier.” It has now become
restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision, following the
rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person excludes all others, or expression unions
est exclusion alterius. Service must, therefore, be made only on the person expressly listed in the rules. If the
revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear
and concise language.