Adi-British Relations

Adi-British relations reflect one-to-one correspondence. In other words, both had their roles
to play in building up the fabric of the relations. Perspectives and interests of both the parties
together determined their roles. The British was primarily guided by colonial ideology of
domination, command over resources, expansion and protection of territorial boundary,
application of colonial jurisprudence and economic system, and displaying a sense of
superiority. Contrarily, the Adis did not have any expansionary ideology of colonial nature.
Their relations depended on the drive to protect their customary claims over Mishings and
gold washers, their trade interests, and of course, on their cautious move while dealing with
the British cunningness. Events leading to disruption of the relations, however, led to
conflicts and expeditions.

It is to be mentioned that the nomenclature Adi is a post colonial construct. During colonial
and Ahom periods, the groups were known as Abor. The nomenclature Abor was more
comprehensive than the label Adi, for the former also included Duba Abors who are the
present Galos and some other groups. About the Adis and their habitat, Shakespear has
given the following account: ‘The Abors are divided into four clans, Menyong, Panghi,
Padam, and Shimong, the two former dwelling between the Yamne and Dihang rivers and
west of the latter river; the Padam east of the Yamne; and the Shimong to the north up the
left bank of the Dihang’ (Shakespeare,1814.:111). In short the Adi gorups occupied ‘the
mountainous regions between the Dibong (Tsan Po) and the Dibqang rivers’ during British
contact (ibid.:109). Duba Abor, though was mentioned within the generic Abor designation
it was treated separately as it did not figure in the four divisions of the Abors. Even the Pasi
group which was often mentioned was not within the four divisions. Obviously the Abor
word is loosely used. However, at present the Adi includes Minyong, Padam, Pasi, Karko,
Shimong, Bori, Bokar, Ashing,Tangam, Milang, Komkar, Ramos, Pailibos and Pangge groups
(Mibang, 2017:1).

Mishings of the present time were known as Miris during the Ahom and colonial period.
However, Miri term was indiscriminately used to designate present Apatani tribe as Ankha
Miris and also to a section of Nyishis as Hill Miris. In the present essay the terms Adi and
Mishing have replaced Abor and Miri words except in citations. For example Pasi name is in
substitutionof Pasial or Pasu names. Minyong has replaced such words as Mayong or
Meyong. Wherever possible, excising names of places and communities have been used,
often alongside old names.

Background of Initial Adi-British Relations

The British occupied Assam in 1826 when the Burmese ceded Assam to the British under the
provisions of the Treaty of Yandabo. The Adis came in contact with the British, first in 1825-
26 when Bedford and Wilcox visited Adi areas and second when Assam came under British
administration in 1826. Initial relation of the Adis with the British was in fact a continuity of
Adi-Ahom relations based on the policy of conciliation through acknowledgement of
customary claim of Adis. Evidently, during first phase fairly friendly terms existed between
the Adis and the British officials at Sadiya.

Undoubtedly, the initial Adi-British relations stood on the foundation of preceding Adi-Ahom
relations. The latter, as we shall discuss, mainly includes Ahom government’s policy of
conciliation and Adi’s reciprocation. The elements in policy were (i) acknowledging to
customary rights of the Adis over the Mishings and Beeahs and (ii) granting the Adis some
privileges that showed their ownership claim.

An overview of relationship

Assam Buranji does not make any direct reference to Adi-Ahom relationship. Whatever
relationship existed was thorugh the Mishings and Sonowals (Beeahs or Beheeas- the
traditional gold washers). An account of this relationship is available from the reign of king
Pratap Singha (1603-41). Lakshmi Devi (1992:200) gives an account of privileges granted by
the Ahom government to the Adis during the rule of the king Pratap Singh. These included
some villages (paiks) in the plains and beels (pond or lake with stagnant water). The
inhabitants of the villages were required to cultivate paddy for their Adi overlords. Some
beeahs were employed as fishermen who were required to supply fish to the Adis and their
cultivators in the paiks. As Osik (1992:24) recounts, the Adis were given right to realise a
certain quantity of cereals, cloth, iron, and salt as posa as well as manual labour. Posa was an
arrangement made by the Ahom government with the Akas, Nyishis, Hill Miris, Bhutias, etc.
in which all the above mentioned items and few others were given. But whether the
arrangement made with the Adis was posa or not is a debatable issue.

Lakhim Devi (1992:199) recounts that a posa ordinarily means a collection of subscription
for a common purpose. But in its specific sense, the term posa refers to a particular type of
arrangement of payment between a hill tribe and villages in plains of Assam during Ahom
rule. As hill men often raided and plundered villages in Ahom territory and carried away men
women as slaves, this arrangement was made to protect the villagers and their assets from
plundering tribesmen. In a way such a payment was a black mail by the tribesmen and made
when they visited the villages.

On the other hand, the Adis did not plunder the Mishings of the plains. Rather they claimed
them as their dependents and run way slaves. According to Mackanzie (1994:34), the Adis
claimed ‘an absolute sovereignty over’ the Mishings of the plains and ‘an inalienable right
to all the fish and gold found in Dihong river’. Mackenzie (ibid.) makes a distinction
between the claims of the Adis and of the Akas, Bhutias, Hill Miris, etc. and recounts the
rights ‘they had of a somewhat different kind, which were more difficult to settle even than
those arising out of the posa’.

Obviously, the situation for which posa was given to some tribes by the Ahom ruler was
different in Adi-Mishing relations. The claim of Adis was a customary right over the
Mishings or fish and gold, whereas payment of posa was not based on such claims. The Akas
and other tribes who raided the people and villages did not have claim of rights over them
like the Adis over the Mishings.

Customary claims of the Adis

Adi-Ahom relations therefore were based on the claims of the Adis over the Mishings and
resources like fish and gold. Early colonial writers were aware of a type of common
relationship between the Adis and the Mishings and so placed them in one ethnic bracket.
Mackenzie (1994:33) mentioned that the Adis and the Mishings were originally from the
same habitat; they were so alike as to their material aspects of life that they could be
considered as earlier and later migrations of the same tribe- the Mishings were followed by
the Adis. Therefore, the intercourse between them was constant and intimate, which
seemingly did not exist between the others (also see Shakespear,1914:109).The conjecture of
similarity between the two tribes made by earlier writers, however, is proved true by later
ethnographers. Ethnographers, drawing on oral sources, have concluded that the Adis and
Mishings along with some other tribes share common ancestry in Tani. Native scholars also
attest to their common origin.

Though earlier writers recognised the similarities between the Adis and the Mishings, and
noted the claims of the former over the latter, but were silent why the Adis claimed lordship
over the Mishings. Obviously, the neither had any understanding of traditional social
relations between the two groups, nor their history. It is clear from Shakespear’s confession.
He states,

‘That all own some sort of subordination to the more remote races living further into
the Himalayas to the north of them seems certain, but who these are and where their
different boundaries lie we have no definite knowledge; nor is any knowledge
forthcoming as to when they settled in these hills…’ (Shakespear,1914:109). Osik
(1992):23-24) has tried to explain the relations pertaining to the claim of Adis on the
basis of oral sources. He recounts:

‘In the 16th century, the Minyongs and Padams attacked the Tayu-Taye of Riga and
Dangga-Naroh Mishings of Damroh for some treacheries committed by them (the
Mishings). In the engagements, the Mishings were defeated and put to flight to the
plains (Assam) beyond the reach of warlike Adi brothers. Unfortunately, many of the
Adi slaves joined the large-scale Mishing flight. This compelled the Adis to pursue
the fugitives and demand the runaway slaves and Mishings to return to their old
haunts’.

As already mentioned, the customary claims of Adis were not confined to the Mishings and
the runaway slaves. The claim of right extended to a type of compensation for all the fish and
gold which came in the rivers flowing from the hills. The claim was made from the Beeahs,
the Hindu gold washers and fishermen, who were wont to frequent the Dihong, Dibang and
other tributaries of the Brahmaputra in pursuit of their avocation. Though the Adis compelled
them for the compensation, the payment was not a type of regular black mail; rather it was
conciliatory offerings and acknowledgements of superiority (see Devi, 1992:199 and
Mackenzie,1994:36).

Ahom Measures of Conciliation

The claims of Adis over the Mishings, run away salves, fish and gold was at the backdrop of
Adi-Ahom relations. The Ahom government recognised the claims for which it had its own
reasons and for which it took up conciliatory measures.

As mentioned earlier, the Ahom government allotted villages and beels in the name of the
Adis. The inhabitant of the villages cultivated for and fishermen supplied fish to the Adi
masters. In lieu of their service to the Adi overlords, the Mishing cultivators and fishermen
were exempted from paying taxes to the Ahom government. The measure was, with all
probability, an incentive to the cultivators and the fishermen so as to ensure better and regular
service to the Adis.

Osik (1992:25) drawing on oral sources maintains that the Adis were given hunting rights in
Dibrugarh, Tinsukia and Digboi areas of Assam. Citing Barpujari he further recounts that the
Ahom government facilitated barter exchange between the Adis and the Ahom traders by
establishing trading marts, important among them was Rongdoi market (ibid). The Mishings
used to collect ginger, pepper, manjit, (madder) and wax from the hill people to exchange
with the people of Assam for salt, cloth, tobacco, etc. which were in great demand in the hills,
particularly by the Adis (see Wilcox:1832:329 &333).

As has been mentioned, the intercourse between the Adis and the Mishings were constant
and intimate. The Ahom government acknowledged this relationship, particularly the
subjugation of the Mishings to the Adis. The government took advantage of this relationship
by officially recognising the Mishings as go-between or interpreters between the Adis and the
traders of Assam (Mackanziie,1994:35 and Devi,1999).

The Ahom government also recognised the claims of rights of the Adis over all the fish and
gold found in the rivers flowing from the hills through their territories. As a result, the Adis
continued compulsory collection from the beeahs, the gold washers and fishermen. The
Ahom government seemingly did not intervene to stop frequent black mailing of the beeahs
by the Adis (see Mackenzie,1994:35-36).

The main objective of acknowledging the claims and granting concessions to the Adis by the
Ahom Government was, what Mackenzie would like to inform, ‘to conciliate their highland
neighbours’ (Mackenzie, 1994:35). The decision shows political prudency of the Ahom
rulers. of course the Ahom kings realised the futility of taking up arms against tribes like the
Mishings .So Edward Gait has recounted that in 1615 when the Ahom government attempted
reprisals after a raid perpetrated by the hill men, ‘the Ahom forces were obliged to beat a
retreat’ (Gait, 1963:122).
It was difficult to control hill men like the Mishings who migrated to the plains but were
expert in fighting in difficult terrains. Osik (1992:24) citing R.Rahul recounts that though
‘equipped only with primitive arms like bows and arrows the tribes had the advantage of the
wilderness of the terrain of their hills. Often the Ahoms ignored those advantages and
marched on to the Northern hills. In spite of their superior forces and weapons, they had to
suffer heavy causalities and even defeat’. It was not the Mishing alone,, the Ahom
government had to deal with other frontier tribes like the Nagas, Bhutias, Kacharis, Coches,
etc. along with powerful Muhammadans. The policy of conciliation was the pragmatic
strategy adopted by the Ahom government for it would not have been possible to fight on all
fronts. Posa system was a strategy of maintaining conciliatory relations, an alternative to
control through coercive means whose result is not always definite. But the problem of the
Mishings was different. They migrated to settle in the plains within the Ahom territory.

In view of the policy of conciliation, the Ahom government permitted the Mihsings to settle
down in Ahom territory. But the problem was not as simple as it appeared. The Adis claimed
an ‘absolute sovereignty over the Miris (Mishings) of the plains, and an inalienable right to
all the fish and gold found in the Dihong river’ (Mackenzie:34). To avoid trouble from the
Adis for the Missings and the Beehas, who were already permitted to settle in Ahom territory,
the government extended the policy of conciliation to the former by acknowledging their
claims.

Reciprocation

The Adis reciprocated the conciliation policy in different ways. They did not trouble the
Mishings or the Beeahs unless they defaulted. In return of the concessions and privileges
granted by the Ahom rulers, the Adis had to pay annual tributes to the Ahom government
(Devi, 1992:200).

A friendship relation was established between the Adis and the Ahoms whom the former gave
the name of ‘mitur’ (Osik,1992: 25), literally meaning friend friendly relationship was
marked by the absence of conflict between the two groups. This is evident from the fact the
Ahom Burnajis are silent about any Ahom-Adi conflict (Devi,1992:299).

On the other hand, there are records which show that the Adis assisted the Ahom rulers in
wars. Osik (1992:25) drawing on oral sources, recounts that the Padams had fought against
the Bongals at Guwahati-Lingkok by the side of Lachit Borphukan, the Ahom General.
Though the year of the war is not remembered by the Padams, Osik (ibid.) believes it to be
the famous battle of Saraighat in 1670.

As has been said, the Ahoms did not have direct contact with the Adis for which they had to
conciliate with them. Osik (1992:25) reports that the Nagas, Mishings and Mishmis were
recruited in Ahom army. He includes Padams in Mishing bracket. This could be a possibility,
for in Kanri Khels (archery sections) of Ahom army, as Devi (1992:203) reports, Abor-Miri
was one of the Khels.
It seems that , the Adis assisted the Ahoms in wars probably under the banner of the Mishing
soldiers. But Bhawanananda Buragohain (1983; cited in Osik,1992:26) categorically
mentions of the Adis, Idus and the Mishings who fought under Sadiya-Khowa Gohain against
the Muhammadans at Gargaon and Guwahati.

Similarly, quoting W.Robinson, Michell (1973:53 &55) reports that the Adis were always
looked upon as allies of the Ahom government and not surprisingly, as it is said, ‘a large
body of them, to the amount of 20,000 or 30,000 came down to assist the Bura Gohain in
repelling the Moamarias, who were devastating all the country east of Jorhat’. Osik (1992:26)
puts the number of Adis around 17,000 who joined Purnananda Buragohain, the then Ahom
Prime Minister, during the Muttack rebellion (1740-94). The figure however seems inflated 1,
and it is in all probability that the figure included Adis, Galos (Abors then), Missings and Hill
Miris.

During the time of weak Ahom government the Adis did not cut off tie of friendship; rather
they came to the aid of the Ahom subjects when they needed protection. In 1794 the
Khamptis took over the Ahom outpost at Sadiya by defeating Sadiya Khowa Gohain. The
Khampti chief himself assumed the title of Sadiya Khowa Gohain (see Gait,1963:220). At the
same time, the Khamptis also kidnapped some Mishings. As the Mishings owed allegiance to
the Adis, the latter came to the aid of the former and defeated the Khamptis (Gait,1963:226).
Osik (1992:26) recounts that the Khamptis were defeated second time in 1790 when they
renewed the war with the aid of the Singphos. However, it is not clear in which year the first
war took place. In all possibility over the issue of kidnapping the Khamptis after defeat
strengthened themselves with the aid of the Singphos and renewed the attack. In this battle
also the Khamptis were defeated. Osik (ibid) drawing on oral sources informs that the Padam
warriors pushed the Khampti and the Singpho warriors as far as Lotong-Adi (Lotong hill) and
Lopa-Baring (a place full of bamoos) in the present Lohit.

The Adis always stood by the side of the Ahoms all through their relations. In a battle in
1800 between the Ahoms and the Khamptis the Ahoms defeated the Khamptis aided by
other Shan tribes and also by the Adis (ibid.). Even when the Burmese plundered the
Mishings of North Lakhimpur of Assam while chasing Hao Sagar Bara of the Ahom army,
the Adis came to the aid of the Mishings. They chased the Burmese soldiers up to Dibrugarh
(Osik,1992:26-27).

Evidently, the Adi-Ahom relations were founded on two pillars.

1. The Ahom ruler acknowledged customary claims of the Adis over the Mishings and
over gold and fish in the rivers, thereby over the gold washers, and by granting
concessions to the Adis as a measure of conciliation.

1 Shakespear (1914: 110) puts Adi fighting men somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000.
 2. The Adis reciprocated the concessions granted to them by maintaining friendly
relations, paying tributes and aiding the Ahoms in wars.

Adi-British Relations

The Adi British relations roughly can be placed under three phases as follows:

Phase I: This phase is known as the period of conciliatory relations expending from 1826 to
1847.

Phase II: This phase spreads over a long period from 1848 to 1911 and is marked by conflicts
and wars between the Adis and the British.

Phase III: The third phase, covering the period from 1912 to 1947, is characterised by British
rule in Adi areas.

Phase I: Period of Conciliation (1826 to 1847)

In colonial history, the first phase of Adi-British relations is generally known as the period of
conciliation. The mediating role played by the British government following the footsteps of
its predecessor, the Ahom government, between the Adis and their ‘hereditary subjects’ such
as the Mishings, runaway slaves and gold washers is a crucial factor in designating the
period. However, unlike the Ahom government, the British government did not rest there. It
had its own interest for which it adopted the policy of conciliation. On the other hand, the
Adis who were satisfied with the acknowledgement of their traditional claims 2 by the Ahom
rulers expected more from the British administration. They wanted direct trade relations, not
through the Mishings as they did during Ahom rule. Moreover, they also did not approve of
the British penetration into interior Adi areas.

As interests of the Adis and the British were behind the policy of conciliation, it differed
from the one that existed during Ahom rule. Each group tried to work towards fulfilment of
its interest during the first phase of relations. When it was not successful to their mutual
benefit they entered into the second phase of relations marked by conflicts and wars.

The primary interest of the British was to open up a trade route to China through present
territory of Arunachal Pradesh. This brought their survey to Adi area. The official pretext,
however, was to find the source of the Brahmaputra (see Wilcox,1832:315-316, 352, etc.) and

2 The Adis used to keep captives from Assam. So they had claims over the runaway captives and the
Mishings with whom they ran away. The claim reflected in annual collections. An idea about relation of the
Adis with the Mishings and a few others in plains can be formed from the recounts of Wilcox based on
Bedford’s report. He writes: ‘The Abors seem to have been in the habit of levying contributions on their low-
land and less martial neighbours of Asam, and to have resented any irregularity in their payment, by predatory
incursions, carrying off the people prisoners; several Asamese captives were found amongst the Abors of
Pasial; some of whom had been so long amongst them, as to have become completely reconciled to their
condition’ (Wilcox,1832:334).
collect information on topography of the region. The political situation was such that no
neighbouring country, whether Nepal, Myanmar or Bhutan allowed the merchants of the East
India Company to trade with China and Tibet through their territories. The British had fought
a number of wars with these countries. Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814 and Anglo-Burmese
wars of 1824-26 embittered relations with these countries. Relation with Bhutan was not
cordial either even after the treaty of 1774 which led to Anglo-Bhutanese War of 1864-65.
The only option was the territory of present Arunachal Pradesh thorough which trade route
could be explored.

An alternative trade route to China and Tibet became crucial as the British government was
not in friendly terms with other countries as has been mentioned above. Moreover, the
merchants of the East India Company were too eager to command monopoly over opium
trade in China. Undoubtedly, the early phase of conciliatory relations between the Adis and
the British was based on the possibility of finding trade route through their territory (see
Osik,1992:29-30). In addition, the British were apprehensive of armed clashes with the tribes
if foot hills were annexed to their Assam territory. They felt such an adventure not only futile
but also disastrous. Perhaps like the Ahoms they also anticipated simultaneous fight in many
fronts which are not strategically advisable. So, they preferred to maintain the status quo, the
pattern of relations which prevailed between the Ahoms and the tribes. In view of this, they
maintained the status quo at two fronts; first as regards the customary claims of the tribes in
general and the Adis in particular, and second, their own political relations with the latter (see
Oshik,1992:32).

The British interest is clear from friendly tours to Adi areas (Mackenzie1994:34) at the time
of British conquest of Assam. There were also other visits, but such visits were made after
1847. For example, Father N.M.Krick visited Padam village of Mebo in 1853 and Dalton the
same village in 1855. During the first phase, in 1825-26, the Adis were visited by Bedford
and Wilcox in a friendly way (Mackenzie, ibid. and Shakespeare, 1914:111-112) Wilcox
(1832:332) reports that on November 22,1825, Bedford arrived in the evening ‘near
Pasial, an Abor village’, which is ‘half a day's journey inland from the river, on the right
bank’. Osik (1992:30) identifies the village as present Balek.

In 1825 Captain Neufville visited border areas and thus had mentioned about the Mishings
and the Adis for the first time (see Shakespear,1914:110). In the same year, before
commencing his survey on November 29, 1825 to Subansiri, Wilcox met some Adi chiefs.
The chiefs had come for their annual collections from their hereditary subjects 3. But he
actually made his journey to Adi territory next year in January 1826 and reached Sigarughat
where he was stopped by the villagers of Mebo. The Morom-Pasis of Pasighat side appeared
at Sigarughat. The Adis and Wilcox had a discussion on trade and commerce. The Padams (of
3 Wilcox writes: ‘They claim the whole of those plains as their domain, but whether this claim is the origin of
their exactions, or whether the imbecile government of Asam had allowed to grow into a confirmed custom, an
evil which they could not counteract, does not appear; however, from the Bứri Lohit to the banks of the Dihog,
the whole of the hill tribes pretend to similar rights, and have never been interfered with, when, at the
accustomed season, they have descended from their strong holds and peaceably taken their dues from each
separate dwelling’ (Wilcox,1832:327-328)..
village Mebo and Damroh) demanded restoration of the Mishings, who had fled to the
British territory to their old settlements. No conclusion was arrived at and Wilcox had to
return from there (see Wilcox:327-329 &334).

As already mentioned earlier, the Adis had customary claims over the Mishings as their
hereditary subjects. The Ahom government recognised the claim and tried to conciliate with
the Adis. But during Burmese invasion, Ahom’s decline and subsequent annexation of Assam
by the British, the Mishings found the trouble situation to their advantage. So, some of them
moved away from the vicinity of their Adi lords (Mackenzie, 1994:35). The trade and
commerce carried out by the Adis with the people of Assam through the Mishings suffered
as the Mishings moved away. The Adis often made the demand that the Mishings would be
sent back to their old settlement.

After unsuccessful attempt in 1926, Wilcox got another opportunity of a friendly visit to
Mebo. In 1827, he visited Mebo on the invitation of villagers. He was accompanied by Lt.
Burlton with gifts for the villagers (see Wilcox,1832: 395). On reaching Mebo, Wilcox
expressed his desire to visit interior Adi areas. But the villagers categorically refused to
permit him despite the bribes given to them (Wilcox,1832:4000). They repeated their
demand of restoration of Sadiya Mishings to their original settlements as a pre-condition of
permission to Wilcox to visit interior Adi villages (Wilcox, 1832:343, also see Michell;55).
The demand was made many a times and by different groups. Mackenzie (1994:35) informs
that in February 1830, ‘Duba’ group of Bor Abors4 demanded that a village of Mishings who
had moved away from their vicinity to the detriment of the trade should be sent back to their
old settlements.

This demand of the Adis was raised when any British officer visited their territory. Non-
fulfilment of the demand was the reason for which the concerned officer was denied
permission to visit upper Adis. As mentioned, Wilcox was not successful to persuade the
villagers of Mebo to permit him to visit villages in hills. So he planned to make his way
through Minyong areas. However, he was not successful in his effort. The people opposed his
onward journey on the ground of possible incurrence of vengeance on them by the tribes
should they permit the British to advance. (Wilcox,1832:406; also see Michell, op.cit.).
Finding no other way, Wilcox returned to Sigarghat, but formulated another strategy. He sent
for village heads of present Padu (earlier known as Dukku) and Damroh village. Though
they respected Wilcox’s invitation and came down to Sigarghat, they did not oblige his
request to visit their villages. They repeated the demand of restoration of Mishings and
expressed their inability to take the party to their villages without having prepared the people
for reception, as a very hostile feeling existed, owing to supposed detention of the Miris by

4 The present Galos were designated as Duba or Doba Abors in British records. But Mackenzie’s reference to
‘Duba tribe of Bor Abors’ is confusing , for Padams were designated as Bor Abors. However, from among the
Adis it seems that Padams had the claim over the Mishings. During a field study in 2004 at Damroh, the
informants showed the settlement area of the Mishings before their migration to the plains. They migrated to
the plains fearing retribution from the Padmas for an act of treachery committed to the latter (cf. Osik’s
remarks in this regard).
the British (Wilcox,1832:409).They revealed that they had no influence with tribes in the
north and that Wilcox would certainly experience much difficulty in treating with the people
of Riga or Shimong area. Finding no way out, Wilcox terminated his plan to visit interior
Adi villages (ibid.).

By not allowing the British to enter interior territory, the Adis of lower areas were cautious
about keeping remote villages away from the former. The first reason is to save interior
villages from the possible problem that might arise from the contact. The second, but the
important reason is to protect trade interest by denying the upper Adis relations with the
British. The Adis of the upper hills had trade relations with Tibet and of lower hills with
Assam. However, there was trade relation between lower and upper Adis though the former
did not allow the latter trade relations with Assam and vice versa. Naturally, when the
British showed interest in upper Adi areas the lower Adis put conditions or made pretexts. As
Wilcox reports, Bedford could not advance further from Balek, as the Adis of the area, on
various pretexts, opposed his further progress. They pleaded that any one, having met them
on friendly terms, would be very ill received by the upper Adis, with whom they were at
enmity (Wilcox,1832:332). Balek was the limit of his excursion.

Needless to say, primary concern of the Adis was to protect trade interest. It is evident in thier
demand over restoration of the Mishings to their old settlements and refusal of entry of the
British into upper hills. Their customary claim over the Mishings also displayed trade
interest as the Mishings were go-between the Adis and the Ahoms. It is the trade interest
which brought the Adis in 1836 to Sadiya. A group of 200 Adis came down and made a
proposal to settle down on the Dibang. If permitted to settle, the Adis declared that they
would submit to the criminal jurisdiction of the British government. However, they decline to
pay taxes (Mackenzie,1994:36). They also sought permission to construct a short cut from
Dibang to Sadiya (Michell,1973 :56).

The local officers however, objected to the proposal as they feared that the Adis might prove
dangerous neighbours. The Governor General’s Agent, on the other hand, overruled the
opposition and later urged upon the Government for the deputation4 of a special officer to
conciliate the Hill Miris and the Adis. Unfortunately, He was not successful in his efforts
(Mackenzie,1994:35).

Despite favourable response from the Governor General’s Agent, the condition laid down by
the British authority was not acceptable to the Adis. So they returned to their hills and settled
at Bomjir and Dambuk (Michel1,1973:56).

It is evident that the British tried to listen to the demands of the Adis. While the British
authority tried to address the grievances of the Adis, it was cautious about its own interest and
interest of its subjects. It did not try to please the Adis unconditionally. The Adis were made
to feel the presence of the British government throughout unless the Ahom government that
was not so tenacious after a step was taken. In this context Mackenzie (1994:35) recounts that
the British government did not coerce the Mishings to return to their old settlements.
However, keeping the interest of both the Adis and Mishings in view it took the following
steps:

1. The British persuaded, but not coerced the Mishings into returning.
2. The government sanctioned certain expenditure with a view to induce the Mishings to
settle in a place where they would be able to monitor the demands of trade by the
Adis.
The inducement eventually led to the Mishings to return to the old settlement.
3. The British authority induced the Adis to leave the Mishings free of exaction for two
years. Two chiefs of the lower Adis were kept security to ensure that the Adis
complied the terms and conditions.

But this did not happen in early endeavour of Captain Neufville when sometimes in 1826 he
tried to send back the Mishmis with their chiefs to the old settlements in the mouth of Dihang
and Silani Mor (present Silapathar). The Adis also had trade relations with the Mishmis.
Particularly they used to procure Lama Swords and Lama Coats, etc. from the latter. Their
emigration had caused great dissatisfaction to the Adis. Captain Neufville’s attempt was
unsuccessful because of the consideration that the ‘Mishmis were, of course, to be protected
against any retaliatory practices of the Abors’ (Wilcox,1832:394). It is difficult to say,
whether it was humanitarian ground or some other hidden agenda, for which the Mishmis
were not compelled to their old hunt. The doubt arises from the fact that Wilcox used the
opportunity to draw the attention of the Adis towards the British. he believed that ‘as the
Abors were aware of the presence of the Mishmis in Sadiya, they might now be better
inclined towards us, and that at least so good an opportunity might not occur again for some
years’ (Wilcox;1832:395). A similar attempt to send back the Mishings to their old
settlements on the demand of the Adis also failed in 1827 (see Osik,1992:33).

The Adis were clear about their demand and the conditions they would follow. When their
condition of exemption from the payment of tax was not considered, they returned to hills.
The Adis had their own interest to settle down on the Dibang. They had the intention of
ousting the Mishmis (Idu) and capture the Sadiya market for themselves. It is to be mentioned
that the Adis were struggling against the scarcity of items which resulted from moving away
of the Mishings from their old settlement to Assam (see Michell,1973:56). The British also
had their own interest while cultivating friendly relations with the Adis. As Mackenzie
(1994:35) informs. The Adis were expected by the British officers at Sadiya to act as counter
force to the Khamptis, Sinphos and Mishimis, who at that time were cause of anxiety for
them.

In fact some sections of the Adis assisted the British in their fight against the Khamptis and
Singphos in 1838-39, with whom the Mishmis were in alliance at that time
(Shakespear,1914;362). In 1840 also the Adis took the side of the British when the Khamptis
in alliance with the Mishmis fought against the Government (Mackenzie,1994:35).
Friendly gesture of Adis was reported in 1847 by Captain Vetch, the Political Agent. He
visited Adi padams who to please him voluntarily released all the captives they had taken. At
that time, in recognition to their good gesture, the British government negotiated with the
Adis for the establishment of trading centre of the Dibang (Mackenzie,1994:36).

It is difficult to say whether the British really wanted good of the tribes or was just a pretext
to keep them in good humour as long as possible. The doubt arises because some of the
officers doubted the intention of the Adis. However, the general impression was not negative,
as the Adis were ‘never known to commit an act of unprovoked ravage or outrage on the
villages of the plains’ (cited in Mackenzie,1994:35). Nevertheless, the Mishmis and Mishings
could not be sent back anticipating vengeance from the Adis. At the same time, as they
induced the Mishings to return to their old settlements and also induced the Adis to leave
them free of exaction for two years.

On the other hand, the recommendations of the British officers to the Government for some
definite measures did not materialise. The Political Agent’s recommendation for deputation of
special officer to conciliate the Adis and Hill Miris, as has been mentioned, was not
considered. Similarly, in 1930, Captain Neufville’s proposal to David Scott to erect buildings
for setting up guard houses was dropped considering the fact that the Adis best disposed
(Osik,1992:35). Obviously, the British relation with the Adis was something a mixture of
beliefs and non-beliefs based on how much the British interest is served.

Phase II: Conflicts and Expeditions (1848 to 1911)

The Expedition 1893-94

The Expedition 1893-94 was not an event of pride for the British Government in Assam. It
was undertaken as a fall out of two incidents of murder, but led to massacre of at least 35
men. The punishment to the villages alleged of committing or instigating offence was not
effectively complete as Damroh could not be reached.

Incidents at the background of the Expedition

The two incidents that triggered the expedition were

1. Murder of three sepoys: On 27th November 1893, three sepoys were ambushed and
murdered. The incident took place near the Bomjur outpost on the left bank of the
Dibong river. The suspects were men of Bomjur who, it was also suspected, with the
assistance from Dambuk and Silluk villages carried out the action.
2. Murder of another sepoy: On 23rd December 1893 a sepoy was killed and a rifle
carried off (see Reid 1997:193).
Scope and Objectives

Officially, the expedition was declared as non-military, though detachment of regular infantry
formed part of the force. The Commander-in-Chief did not have any responsibility for the
plan or the conduct of the operations. The force composed of different groups under different
in charges and an overall commander. The Political Officer was practically leading the
operation (see Reid 1997:193-194).

The scope and object of the expedition was clearly evident in the letter/telegram written by
the Chief Commissioner to the local authority on 19 th March, 1894. These can be presented as
follows:
 to punish the offending villages and any village that might offer resistance to the
force;
 to insist villagers to deliver sepoy’s riffles and actual murderers;
 not to create any misunderstanding about the purpose of the expedition by explaining
that the British Government did not have any intention to annex their territory except
punishing the offending villages;
 not to penetrate too far into the inland of Adi territory until and unless such an action
was absolutely necessary; and
 not to take up traditional complaints of the Adis about Miri slaves and claims to
territory (see Reid 1997:193).

Organisation/Composition of the Expedition Team

In this expedition Captain R.M.Maxwell, Commandant of Lakhimpur Military Policy was in

command of the four groups of the force and Mr. Francis Jack Needham was appointed as the
Political Officer. Obviously, the expedition was led by both military and civil officers without
any overall Commander-in-Chief. In addition to four military groups, the team consisted of a
Medical officer, Surgeon Lieutenant Birdwood; Major E.H. Molesworth of 44 th Gurkha
Rifles and Captain W. Prior of 13 th Bengal Infantry. The last two officers took over the
charge of Military Police outposts and were in-charge of the line of communications.
However, they did not take part in actual operations.

The force that took part in the operations consisted of three groups as follows:

1. 100 men of the 44th Gurkha Rifles with Lieutenant J. A.Wilson and Lieutenant G.L.S
Ward, son of the Chief Commissioner, of the same regiment as in-charge;
2. 300 men from Lakhimpur Military Policy under Captain G. Row of 44 th Gurkha
Rifles, Lieutenant J.M. Camilleri of 13th Bengal Infantry, and Mr. E. Musparatt,
Superintendent of Police;
3. 100 men of the Naga Hills Military Police under Captain W.R. Little, Commandant of
the 21st Punjabis; and
 4. Two 7-pounder guns under Lieutenant L. W. P. East and Sergent Loweth, a British
non-Commissioned Officer, and manned by men of 44th Gurkha Rifles (see Reid
1997:1993-94).
Course of Expedition

The expedition to punish the villages involved in the murder of sepoys started on 14 th January
1894. It first moved against Bomjur, reached there next day, i.e. on 15 th January1894 to find
the village deserted. Obviously, it was a strategy adopted by the villagers to elude the
punitive action.

From Bomjur, the expedition marched against Dambuk and reached there on 20 th January
1894. It encountered a strong resistance. The villagers had built a strong stockade which was
quite impervious to shell fire. Nevertheless, the force penetrated it; thanks to indomitable
courage of Lieutenant East who first climbed over the 10 ft. high stockade. In this encounter
the British lost 3 men and 22 got wounded. After punishing Dambuk the expedition team
returned to Bomjur, from where they moved west ward, crossed Sesseri river on 18 th January
1894, reached Mimasipu and Silluk and burned the two villages.

After the defeat of Silluk, the opposition ceased. But the force halted at Silluk from 29 th
January to 8th February 1894. Mr. Needham used this stay to his opportunity by making
negotiations and making enquiries about the involvement of villages. While enquiring he got
convinced that Damroh, the original village of the Padams was deeply involved in the
operation to thwart the advance of the expedition. So he decided to punish Damroh, as he was
authorised by the Chief Commissioner to punish any village which might offer resistance to
the force. Being convinced that Damroh was behind the screen of the opposition, he decided
to march against the village and for this he wrote to the Chief Commissioner seeking his
approval.The Chief Commissioner, Mr. Ward had great reliance on Mr. Needham’s
experience, knowledge and judgement on tribal matters of the region. So without any delay
he approved the proposal of Mr. Needham to punish Damroh in a telegram of 9 th February
1894. Subsequently in another telegram of 11th February 1894 the Chief Commissioner
instructed to cease all operations against Adis after punishing Damroh and to return to Sadiya
not later than 10th March 1894. This also defined spatial and temporal dimension of the
operation subsequent to punishment of villages involved in the murder of sepoys.

March Against Damroh: Damroh was a long way north up the river Yamne and its rout and
strength were also unknown to Mr. Needham and his force. Zealous nature and mere spirit of
adventure triggered their decision to advance to the unknown land. Though route was not
known, still Mr. Needham tried to plan the advance. He estimated the distance to be for
marches from Bordak, a village situated on the left bank of the Dihong. So he decided to
march via Bordak.

The expedition team had shortage of load carriers. It was therefore decided to leave extra
rations, heavy baggage, all unneeded sepoys and followers at Bordak camp. Sepoys and
followers were 60 in numbers. Subadar Enyet Ali Khan of Naga Hills Police remained in
charge of the camp.

The party left Bordak on 22 nd February 1894, arrived at Dukku on 23 rd , halted next day and
left the village on 25th February 1894. Same day in the evening the expedition team had a
conflict with the Adis. A poisoned arrow from an Adi warrior hit and wounded Lieutenant
East.

Next day, on 26th February 1894, Mr. Needham and his party resumed the march, but with
little progress. Again they faced opposition. The Adis kept engaging Lieutenant J.M.
Camilleri and his company for some hours. Rations ran short; it was raining heavily and
Lieutenant East suffered from dysentery. Obviously, he was left in the camp. Mr. E.
Musparatt, Superintendent of Police also remained in the camp with 100 men.

On 27th February 1894, Mr. Needham and Captain Maxwell started with the rest of the force.
But they could not reach Damroh and had to return to the camp. On 28 th February they halted
in the camp. One of the reasons of halt was that the Damroh gams had sent word to meet
them and make terms. Disappointingly the gams did not turn up.

The party had marched from Bordak with 3 days’ food with them. But they had already spent
six days with that food from 23rd to 28th of February. They had expected rations from Bordak
which also did not arrive. Shortage of food, heavy rain and illness of some members made
their life miserable. Even Mr. Needham remained in bed and the condition of Lieutenant
worsened. So, on 1st March 1894 they wound up their Damroh plan and began their return
journey to Bordak.

Bordak Massacre: After cancelling their Damro plan, the expedition marched back towards
Bordak on 1st March 1894. At Bordak they had a type of base camp where they had left
rations, heavy baggage and some sepoys and followers. On their way back journey to Bordak,
on 2nd March the expedition party heard about the attack on Bordak camp. They got the
information that Adis had attacked the camp, destroyed the rations and killed the sepoys and
others. After hearing this news, Mr. Needham and his party continued their journey till they
reached Silli in the night at 11 p.m. But next day they halted at Silli and on 4 th March they
resumed their journey and reached Bordak camp to find it ransacked and deserted.

On 5th March 1894, two survivors of the massacre, one a Khasi cooly and the other a Dhobi
of the 44th Gurkha Rifles, turned up. About 35 men in all were reported of being killed.
Rations, clothes, etc. were damaged. The attackers had taken away 14 riffles and many
rounds of ammunitions. Though it was not clear who were the attackers and what was the
reason of the attack; with all certainty the attackers were Adis. Of course in later days the
villages involved were identified. The reasons could be resentment against the British
penetration into their territory and refusal to recognise their traditional claims over the Miris
and the territory.
 Punitive measures after massacre: On 6th March 1894 the expedition left Bordak via Padu
and on 9th March they attacked and punished Mebu. As rivers were in spate Mr. Needham
postponed their march against other villages and returned to Sadiya. The force reached there
by 14th March 1894. A few days later the force marched against Bomjur, and on 20th March
1894, the village was evacuated and burnt. During onward journey of the expedition,
Bomjur could not be punished as the village was deserted before the arrival of the force.

The expedition started with the aim of punishing Bomjur, Dambuk and Silluk, allegedly
involved in the murder of sepoys on 27 th November6 1893 and 23rd December 1893. Mebo
and Bomjur were punished during return journey. It was also understood that Padu and Mebo
were involved in the massacre at Bordak.

But Damroh could not be punished as the expedition was called off in view of heavy rain,
shortage of food and illness. So after Bordak massacre Mr. Needham was determined to
punish Damroh fearing that it might stir up villages to fight against the British.

Results of Expedition 1893-94

The Expedition 1893-94 produced mixed results, a partial success. For Mr. Needham the
expedition was a success because (i) it punished villages involved in the killing of sepoys; (ii)
as Mr. Needham believed, the Adis understood that the British force is able to march through
their villages with ease, destroying their property and crops, and burning their houses; and
(iii) according to Mr. Needham, they knew the way to Damroh and the nature of opposition
they might expect in any future expedition. Needless to say, the expedition provided the
British government the opportunity for self evaluation.

The expedition was not completely successful, and a terrible incident took place during the
expedition. Undoubtedly, the Bordak massacre overshadowed whatever accomplishments
achieved. The reasons of attack could not be ascertained for definite. Even the villages
involved were suspected lately. Damroh, known to be the instigator of all the oppositions,
was also again in the list of suspicion. The word sent to Mr. Needham by the gams of Damroh
was obviously a ploy to detain them and allow time for the attack on the camp at Bordak. But
the expedition could not reach Damroh.

The massacre put the government on a back foot on further expedition. It was evident when
Mr. Ward, the Chief Commissioner sounded caution in his decision about expedition in
immediate future. Finance factor emerged as a crucial issue with regard to organisation of
expedition. A policy for a ‘strike at once’ instead of recurring expenditure on expedition
corresponding to every outrage was envisioned.

The expedition created the need of making a scrutiny of the works of officers working in the
frontiers of Assam. Mr. Ward placed main responsibility for the massacre with Political
Officer Mr. Needham. The Government of India also fixed responsibility on Mr. Needham
and Captain Maxwell. Mr. Needham was accused of showing want of judgement and political
foresight. His faith in the Adis was considered as a ‘grave error of judgement’, for he did not
take note of ‘the habitual treachery of the hill tribes’ of the frontiers of Assam. Captain
Maxwell, Officer Commanding was accused of neglecting necessary military precautions
and blamed of over-confidence, failure to appreciate military situation and leaving the camp
insufficiently protected.

Similar accusation was labelled against Mr. Ward, the Chief Commissioner. Governor
General in Council made it clear that Mr. Ward had exceeded his authority and committed a
grave error of judgement by sanctioning the advance on Damroh.

The error of judgement in case of Chief Commissioner and Captain Maxwell arose because
of their confidence in the knowledge and experience of Mr. Needham on tribes. Mr.
Needham’s error of judgment was his overconfidence about his knowledge on tribes and their
temperament. He was so over sure that he did not require a guard as, according to him, the
place was ‘perfectly safe’.

The way expedition was organised also exposed the nature of working of officers in the
frontiers of Assam. While authorising Needham to attack Damroh Mr. Ward did not consult
the General Officer Commanding in Assam. He also even did not intimate the process of
operations from 31st December 1893 to 4th March 1894 to the Government of India. It seems
the coordination among officers was weak. Captain Maxwell believed in Mr. Needham about
his knowledge on tribes but not his training about military precautions. Local officers
depended much on their situational experience rather than instructions of the Government.

It is also noted that the British Government was not revengeful at a fault of the officer.
Overall performance was considered while analysing the mistakes. Though Mr. Ward’s action
was found wrong, he was not penalised because his confession was considered important. Mr.
Ward in a letter regretted his action as omission, but not intentional while he went beyond
the order of the Government of India. Similarity, sincerity, commitment to purpose and past
performance of Mr. Needham stood in favour of him.

Other results

The following actions were also initiated after the massacre and punitive measures:
 blockaded all tribes north of Sadiya and on the left bank of Dihong;
 withdrew payment of posa to Adi villages on the left bank of the Dihong; and
 rebuilding Bomjur on the old site was prohibited.

The Chief Commissioner had recommended to impose fine of Rs. 5,000 on Damroh;
Rs.2,000 each on Mebu and Padu and blockade in case of non-payment. It had also
recommended deporting arrested gams of Silluk and Dambuk to Tezpur or Calcutta (Kolkata)
and to keep them as hostages. However, the Government of India declined these two
recommendations. In case of non-payment of fine it would have been obligatory to despatch
expedition, which the Government did not consider at that time. So, the Government declined
the suggestion of any further action against Damroh.

 In case of the officers it was made obligatory that the Government of India must be
kept informed of every decision/action/plan.

Phase III: British Rule in Adi Areas Scope and Nature ( 1911-
12 to 1947)

The Adi Expedition 1911-12

The Adi-Expedition1911-12 is a post-colonial construct of the colonial phraseology of The

Abor Expedition 1911-12, because the term Abor is an exonym and people have discarded its
use. The Constitution of India in its list of STs has replaced Abor for Adi. The exigency of
the expedition was the immediate reaction over the murder of Mr. Noel Williamson, Dr. J.D
Gregorson, and several members of the team on 30 th and 31st March, 1911 during a tour in
Adi villages. Though the murder was the immediate cause, several policy issues also entered
into the expedition objectives.

Objectives of the Expedition

The intention of the expedition can be expressed in terms of three main objectives. These are:
1. Punishing the murderers of Mr. Noel Williamson and Dr. J.D Gregorson, 2. Dealing with
Chinese encroachment and Tibetan exactions, and 3. Corollary to 1 & 2, bringing Adi areas
under control. With respect to 1, it meant to punish the murderer and thus, establish the
military superiority in the estimation of the Adis, and with respect to 2, to bring them to the
British administration and to keep them away from the influence of Tibet (see Reid
1997:224) so that boundary issue could be dealt with eventually. The third objective
envisaged establishment of friendly relations with the Adis and to achieve this objective the
following instructions were prescribed:
(a) tour in the hills bordering our frontier,
(b) improve the trade routes to the principal villages so far as they lie within our
recognised borders and further, if not opposed, and
(c) give presents to our neighbours for friendly services and information (see Reid
1997:222).

The objective of establishing friendly relations was practically a continuity of British policy
approach envisaged as early as 1882. Mr. Elliott, the Chief Commissioner in a letter of 18 th
May,1882 expressed his desire that the officer to be posted at Sadiya, among other things ,
‘use any opportunities that may occur of opening friendly communications and convincing
the Abors not only of our strength to resist and our unwillingness to attack, but also of the
advantages they may gain by the markets we can open to their produce’ (see Reid 1997:182).
 On the issue of Chinese encroachment it was also envisaged to obtain information about the
country beyond the outer line without risk of complications. To deal with Chinese the British
authority considered pushing forward outposts situated within inner line up to outer line.
However, the authority also realised its possibility either with the establishment of control
or consent of the inhabited hill people of the locality (see Reid 1997:221-222). In view of this
survey of the territory was also an objective of the expedition 1911-12. In this regard, it is
useful to mention the intention of the Government of India.

‘It is of prime importance that we should take advantage of the opportunity afforded
by the expedition to carry out such surveys and explorations as may be possible, in
order that we may obtain the knowledge requisite for the determination of a suitable
boundary between India and China in this locality, as to which at present we know
practically nothing’ (cited in Reid 1997:224).

The Government of India on 8th August 1911 outlined policy guidelines in its approach
towards China and Tibet and the tribes inhabiting between lines. The objectives of the
Expedition 1911-12 on the matter of the boundary issues reflected the guidelines to a greater
extent. The guidelines also suggested the actions to be considered after the expedition. The
guidelines can be summarised as follows:

1. The existing outer line should be advanced up to the boundary indicated in a

concerned communication.
2. Administrative frontier should not be advanced and no intermediate between
existing “Inner Line” and the new external boundary should be drawn.
3. The policy towards the tribes inhabiting between lines should be minimum
interference, and thus a loose political control. However, they should be
protected from unprovoked acts of oppression. The responsibility should be
fixed on them not to violate either the British administered territory or Chinese
territory.
4. Effective steps should be taken, after knowing more of the ground situation, to
prevent the Chinese violating new boundary after expedition and missions
retire. The steps could be establishment of outposts or arrangement with
tribals depending on the situation.
5. Temporary boundary should be demarcated by erecting cairns’ at suitable
places subject to sanction of His Majesty’s Government (see Reid 1997:229).

It is to be mentioned that a countable number of people and a few villages were involved in
the ghastly murder. The expedition, however, intended to fix responsibility in every village of
the Pasi- Minyongs. In this regard the recommendation of the Government of East Bengal
and Assam, dated 16th May 1911 is noteworthy. It reads;
‘Certain villages are principally concerned and … have taken a leading part, but the
blow was, as all the evidence goes to show, a deliberate blow given by the whole
community in council and every village of the Pasi Minyongs is concerned and must
share in the reparation’ (cited in Reid 1997;223).
 The overall objectives of the expedition were diverse by encompassing greater policy issues,
though the immediate purpose was to punish the murderers of Mr. Williamson and his party.
The general objectives may be outlined as follows:

1. to exact severe punishment and reparation for the murder of Mr. Williamson,
Dr.Gregorson and their party;
2. to establish British military superiority in the estimation of the Adis;
3. to attempt to compel the Minyongs to surrender the chief instigators and murderers;
4. to visit as many as Minyong villages as possible;
5. to make the Adis understand that they would be under the control of the British in
future, though the control at that time was of loose political nature;
6. to visit Damroh, and the visit should not be of punitive nature if the people behaved
properly;
7. to endeavour to maintain cordial relations with the Chinese officials or troops if met
in course of the expedition. But if met within the territory of the tribes south of
recognised Tibetan-Chinese they should be asked to go back, and if necessary should
be compelled to do so;
8. to explore and survey as much of the territory as possible;
9. to endeavour to settle the identity of the Tsangpo and Brhmaputra rivers; and
10. to submit proposal for a suitable frontier line between India and Tibet. (see Reid
1997:225-226).

Organisation of the Expedition

The Expedition, as is evident from the objectives, had two main purposes- the first one
military in nature and the second one relating to political and civil issues. Accordingly, the
Expedition composed of both military and police units including civil officers. The military
unit comprised 1/8th Gurkhas, the 32nd Sikh Pioneers, a company of the 1st King George’s
Own Bengal Sappers and Miners, and a detachment of 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles. They were
accompanied by two 87-pounder guns.

The police unit consisted of 25 officers and men drawn from the then Naga Hills, Lushai
Hills, Lakhimpur and Dacca Military Policy Battalions. The unit was placed under the
command of Major C.Bliss who was then Commandant of the Naga Hills Battalion. Civil
officers came from police, military and civil service backgrounds. Mr. A.H.W.Bentinck, I.C.S
who had been the Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur was appointed as Assistant Political
Officer of the Expedition. There was also a second Assistant Political Officer, Mr. W.C.M.
Dundas from Imperial Police. Major General H. Bower was appointed as Chief Political
Officer was in command of the Expedition (see Reid 1997:229).

Course of Expedition

The expedition started on 28th October,1911 and marched towards Kebang. On the way no
serious opposition was encountered, probably because the gams of the Passi, Minyong and
Padam were contacted and their services utilised (Reid 1997:229-230). Kebang fell on 9 th
December,1911.

After the defeat of Kebang, the active opposition of the tribe came to an end. The murderers
and people involved in the murder were captured. A few also surrendered before the
completion of the expedition. All were tried and punished in a Military Court.

The military operation was followed by survey and explorations. The team visited different
villages and acquired knowledge of the territory for defining future relation with China. The
purpose of such tours, as was outlined in the objectives, was to establish friendly relations
with the Adis, impress upon them the power of the British, bring them under British influence
and to gather information about the area, tribe and the influence of China and Tibet. In course
of their expedition they also solved problems of trade blocks and settled disputes. The tours
were conducted under different groups. They visited villages of different Adi groups situated
on both left and right banks of the Siang River and both in low and upper reaches of the
valley.

At the end of December, Mr. Bentick, with 5 British officers and a party of nearly 300
members set out to visit as many Minyong villages as possible within 26 days. The team
visited most of the Minong villages except a few small ones. In Komsing they found some of
Mr. Williamson’s remains which the people of Komsing had buried. Thereafter they visited
the important villages of Riu, Geku, Riga, and Simong. From Simong they continued
northwards towards Tibet. Their farthest point was Singging which they reached on 31sr
January, 1912. From there they returned and reached Simong where they stayed till the 23 rd
February. People were hospitable. ‘Bentinck took the opportunity to hold a representative
gathering of gams at Komkar which was attended by men form from Simong, Damro, Riu,
Panggi and Komkar. At this he explained to them the necessity of behaving properly as
subjects of the Queen, and that all were entitle to trade where they liked’ (see Reid 1997:223)

Between December, 1911 and February,1912, Colonel D.C.F. McIntyre, with a party, visited
villages up the Yamne river. The party visited many Padam villages including Damroh.
Another party headed by Captain Molesworth of 1/8th Gurkha Rifles and accompanied by Mr.
Needham visited Minyong villages on the right bank as far as Parong. The above two officers
also headed a Survey party and led them up to Shimang Valley. The party visited Dosing,
Pareng and Yingku villages of present Boleng sub-division. Captain Dunbar visited Kombo
which is a Galo village (see Reid 1997:233).

Results of Expedition

This expedition had far reaching consequences. The relationship between the Adis and the
British was redefined. For the British it was successful on many counts. However, its
ultimate impact on Adis was their acceptance to the British authority. It cannot be a complete
submission as their socio-political institutions governed their life ways. There were some
points of interaction with the British such as seeking arbitrary role of the British officers,
trading in British territory, friendly behaviour with the British and their people and so on. Of
course in such interactions the Adis and the British had agreed upon terms and conditions
which were dictations of the latter.

On the foundation of the Adi-British relationship, political relation with Tibet and China was
contemplated. Its implication was crucial, as Mr Bentinck’s Political Report states not only
‘from the political point of view’, but also from the fact that the expedition furnished
‘proposals as to the future of these tracts’ (Reid 1997:233). One of the future actions was
definitely relation with Tibet and China which was contemplated as early as 1908. As pre-
requisite to define this relation, it was expedient that ‘the country should be surveyed as far as
possible before a definite scheme for its future administration is adopted’ (Reid 1997:214).
The purpose of the survey was to ascertain the actual position of affairs without any risk of
collision with the tribes. Undoubtedly, good relation with the Adis was a strategic necessity to
protect the tract between the inner and out lines effectively (see Reid 1997:214). The
Expedition 1911-12 provided the opportunity to act upon the strategy contemplated earlier.

The impacts may be viewed as immediate and subsequent. The changes introduced and
actions taken during the Expedition 1911-12 may be viewed as immediate impacts. There
were also changes introduced subsequent to the expedition- subsequent impacts. A few of
these impacts have been discussed below:

1. Recognition to non-compliance of standing orders by officers at outpost

The Governor General in Councils realised that a gap existed between the orders and their
compliance. Mr. Willlaimson was found guilty of breaching the standing orders that
prohibited crossing of the Outer Line without permission. So a directive was issued to ensure
enforcement of standing order regarding the crossing of the frontier and relations with the
tribes with an immediate effect (see Reid 1997:220).

2. Effects of Military Operation: Punishment of guilty and Recovery of property

The expedition was the immediate reaction to the murder of Mr. Noel Williamson, Dr. J.D.
Gregorson and other members of Mr. Williamson’s team. The first and foremost task was to
punish the culprit. Actual murderers of Mr. Williamson were recognised as Mr. Manmur
Jamho of Yagrung, Mr. Tamu (Namu) of Bosing and Mr. Lunnung of Pangi. These three
culprits were captured but only first two were tried and found guilty by a Military Court. Mr.
Lunnung (later known as Mr. Tarung Tamuk and was the gam of Pangi) became the
intermediary to bring other the culprits on the promise of protection. As a result no action was
taken against him. Mr. Manmur Jamoh was sentenced to transportation to life (life
imprisonment in Andamans) and Mr. Tamu was sentenced for 10 years imprisonment (Reid
1997:232).

The murderers of Dr. Gregorson, Mr. Lamlaw and Mr. Bapuk of Kebang village,
surrendered in course of expedition. They were tried and sentenced to death. But later their
sentence was commuted to transportation of life. Three other men- Mr. Buissong of Bosing
village, Mr. Lutiang and Mr. Popiom from Yagrung village were found guilty of murdering
Dr. Gregorson. They were sentenced to ‘terms of imprisonment’ (Reid 1997:232).

It was also the objective of the expedition to punish the concerned villages involved directly
or indirectly in the murder. To punish the villages, a contact was established with the gams of
the Padama, Passi and Minyongs. With their help, the main column advanced to Kebang on
28th October 1911. There was no serious opposition and at Kekar Monying the Kebang
fighters were defeated. But the present villagers of Kebang claim that their men put up a
strong fight but got defeated because of the firearm of the British. However, ultimately
Kebang was defeated on 9th December 1911. With the fall of Kebang the active opposition of
the tribes came to an end. The British administration realised that it had earlier overrated the
power of the Adis owing to the reverses suffered by former expeditions (Reid 1997:229-30).

Not only the British defeated the villagers where opposition was encountered, but also burnt
their houses and crops. Strict orders were issued to all the villages to return the property
looted. Mr. Bentinck reports that the expedition ‘resulted in the punishment of all the hostile
villages… and practically all looted property was restored (Reid 1997:230). Among the
villages, Kebang was the worst hit village. Kebang returned all the stolen property and paid a
fine of mithun (bosfrontalis) and war equipment. It assured of good behaviour in future and
obedience to all orders of the Government. It also agreed to condition of not taking any action
to prevent other villages from trading in the plains. Needless to say, the power of Kebang was
broken and its reputation shattered. In the battle the village also lost a large number of its
fighting men. But in general, the Minyong tribe was crushed and its villages brought to
submission at that point (see Reid 1997:230-31).

Though many fighter men of Kebang died and the Minyong supremacy crushed in Kekar
Monying battle, there was not severe causalities from the British side. The total casualties
were 1 officer wounded, 2 other ranks killed and 2 wounded and 3 followers killed and 3
wounded (Reid 1997:231). Total cost involved in the expedition is not accurately available,
though it would mean a huge expenditure.

3. Re-organisation of administration

Under the provisions of The Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation (Regulation2), 1880 the
North-East Frontier Tract was created. The hills inhabited or frequented by Adis, Mishmis,
Miris, Singphos, Nagas, Khamptis, Akas, Nyishis and Bhutias formed this tract. These hill
areas were under the administrative jurisdiction of the then Darrang and Lakhimpur Districts
of Assam. The tract which was separated from the then Darrang and Lakhimpur Districts
of Assam consisted of the following three administrative units by notifications of 1914:
(1) The Central and Eastern Sections, North-East Frontier Tracts,
(2) The Lakhimpur Frontier Tract, and
(3) The Western Section, North-East Frontier Tract. (see Luthra 1971;53-65).
 Before the notifications, the above three administrative units were operational. The First
Frontier Tract called the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract came into being in 1882. However, it
continued to be in the charge of the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur. The Adis inhabited
mainly the Central Section of the North-East Frontier Tract. Undoubtedly, the Deputy
Commissioner, Dibrugarh had the responsibility of maintaining relations with the Adis, and
in discharging his duty he was assisted by Assistant Political Officer/ Political Officer with
headquarters at Sadiya. From 1882 to 1905, Mr. Francis Jack Needham from Bengal Police
was the Assistant Political officer who was succeeded by Mr. Noel Williamson; I.P. Mr.
Williamson discharged his duty as Assistant Political Officer since 1906 till his murder in
1911. The expedition, mainly punitive in nature, was undertaken subsequent to his murder,
though there were other objectives.

Subsequent to the Expedition of 1911-12, the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract ceased to exist and
the Central and Eastern Sections became two separate administrative units. The changes were
however, introduced by the notifications of 1914. But the Central Section was designated as
Sadiya Frontier Tract in 1919 and placed under the charge of a Political Officer (PO). The PO
worked directly under the Chief Commissioner. The Abor (Adi) Hills district was created as
a constituent unit of Sadiya Frontier Tract with its headquarters at Pasighat under the
administrative responsibility of Assistant Political Officer (APO). The APO worked under
the PO, Sadiya. However, initially the headquarters of the Central Section, also called the
Abor (Adi) Section was proposed at Rotung (Reid 1997:181 &240).

Though the notifications came later, the administrative units had started working after the
expedition. Before the re-organisation of the administrative set up on the basis of the
notifications in 1914 the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract ceased to exist ‘and the district of Sadiya
became a separate entity’… ‘The administrative changes thus brought about in 1912 are
described in the first annual report (1912-13) for ‘the district of Sadiya’ (Reid 1997:181).
Moreover, T.E.Furze, I.P. was appointed as the first APO at Pasighat who worked from 1912
to 1917. Mr. W. C. M. Dundas, I.P. was the PO at Sadiya for Central and Eastern Sections
from 1912 to 1919 (Reid 1997:265-66).

Administrative network proposed

While Rotung was proposed as the headquarters of the Central (Adi) Section posting of two
officers was recommended. In addition, establishment of garrisons at Rotung (with 200
rifles), Pasighat (with 100 rifles) and Kobo (with men) were planned. It was also suggested
two APOs would be stationed at Sadiya under the Political Officer at Rotung. In order to
provide for the permanent posts in Adi and Eastern (Mishmi) Sections together with their
reliefs formation of a second Lakhimpur battalion with strength of 750 men was
recommended (Reid 1997:240-41).

Later Rotung proposal was abandoned. Garrisons for Adi section was maintained at Pasighat
(with 75 military police), Balek (100) and Kobo (25). Pasighat became the headquarters
with the posting of one APO in 1912 (see Reid 1997:244 & 266).
Need for the change

The need for the change in administrative set up resulted from two counts. The first one
related to murder of Mr. William and the second one to the emerging political scenario
concerning Tibet, China, Burma (now Myanmar). The first one necessitated to re-look
relations with the Adis and the second one to demarcate international boundary. The second
one also necessitated a stable relationship with the tribes.

Earlier practice, according to the policy of the British Government, was to send punitive
expeditions to the Adi villages consequent upon unprovoked trouble/murder created in their
territory. The expedition meant to inflict punishment. After punishing the wrong doers, the
force withdrew. So the action did not have permanent impact. The concerned tribe/village
misunderstood the British strength and fresh trouble ensued. A permanent solution was
envisaged through the change in the administrative set up (see Reid 1997: 241).

The presence of the China and Tibet in the Adi villages of the north was noticed. Their
influence also increased. As a result reconsideration of the whole position with regard to
frontiers became necessary to debar the influence of the intriguing neighbours on the people
of hills. The government strongly felt the need to review the whole frontier from Bhutan to
the Hkhampti country and the unadministered regions north of Burma (Myanmar)(see Reid
1997:241).

4. Consolidation of administration and territory

The British was not so serious in its administration of tribal areas prior to the Expedition
1911. Though it claimed its territory as far as the foot hills, it had not effectively enforced its
claim. After this expedition effective measures were taken and tribes were assesses to poll-
tax. The report of W.C.M.Dundas for the year 1917 -18 states: ‘The plains as far as the foot
hills have always been claimed as British territory. It was not however, expedient to enforce
this claim until recent years…’(cited in Reid,1997:252). In 1915-16 Mr. Dundas brought
Bomjur, Dambuk, Silluk, Mimasipo, Mebo and Aying under the British administration by
assessing them to poll-tax. Following year the process was extended to the Passi and
Minyong villages near Pasighat. In 1917-18 remaining few Adi villages were also brought
under administration and assessed to poll-tax. In this way, the district was completely formed
as far as Simen river (see Reid 1997:252).

Inner and outer lines shifted towards north and redefined. The Control Area was extended in
1941 that distinguished the British territory in Adi areas from Tibet/China (see Reid 1997:
226, 228, &263).

Outposts were created in the interiors. Posts which were abandoned re-started. For example,
in 1941 posts at Riga and Karko were opened afresh (Reid 1997:262). Additional outposts
were also envisaged further up the Siang Valley in the event of continuance of incursions
from north of the McMahon Line (see Reid 1997:264).
 It should be made clear that out posts had two crucial roles to play. First it envisaged to
control the tribes and avoid any further trouble. Secondly and most importantly, outposts
were considered necessary as an alternative to considerable military force in connection with
eventual demarcation of the boundary with China (Reid 1997:242).

5. Removal of trade blockade

For long powerful villages like the Kebang prevented their weaker neighbours from trading
in plains. The Panggis and other tribes inhabiting the north of their territory were main
sufferers from the highhandedness of Kebang and other powerful villages like Rotung,
Babuk, Pangi, Yemsing, Rengging, etc. These villages almost shared adjacent territory and
formed a cluster in between the northern and southern villages. These villages were allegedly
the source of trouble for the people of the north who desired to trade with plains.

During expedition, the villages of the north expressed their wish to trade with the plains. Due
to highhandedness of powerful villages to their south they carried on trade with Tibet with
much difficulty. With protection from the British they would rather prefer trading in the
plains. To this effect Mr. Bentinck and General Bower assured them open and un-restricted
trade in plains. This was the condition with Kebang village when it was defeated, that they
would not prevent people from trading in plains (see Reid 1997; 231-32, 233, 245 -246).

Whenever the officers found any trade blocks during their tour, they tried to remove it.
During his tour in 1939 Mr R.W Godfrey frond trade blocks in a few villages in the upper
reaches of the Siang valley. He found Riga preventing trade passing through them from south
or north. Karko and Shimong prevented any trade going from south to north through their
villages. Komkar and Damorh prevented trade from the north to the south. Mr. Godfrey
ordered these blocks to remove though he had some problem with the Shimong (Reid
1997:261).

6. Creation of enabling Infrastructure

Before colonial contact, a section of the Adis had trade relations with the plains of Assam.
Owing to the British policy the relation was stalemated time and again. Adi villages of the
north were trading in Tibet, though with difficulties. It was strategically important to wean
away them from trade relations with Tibet. It was not directly possible as middle and
powerful villages created trade blocks (see Reid 1997:232). The British authority realised this
problem. In view of this the administration initiated two steps. It assured open and
unrestricted trade in plains (see Reid 1997 233 & 245-46). Second, it established a trade post
at Rotung, a place suitable for the Adis from different villages.

Rotung also had other advantages. It had suitable building sites and received comparative less
heavy rains than the surrounding areas. Rotung also commanded many of the important
paths. It was considered that the trade post at Rotung would ensure an out let to the Pangi
clan who were then cut off from the plains by the Minyongs. Importantly, it was near Kebang
which used to block trading of northern villages in south. Being nearer to Kebang, the trade
post at Rotung could prevent that village from giving further trouble. So, to ensure safety and
check the dominant Kebang village from preventing trade of weaker and disadvantageous
villages, a temporary garrison was stationed in the area during trading days. The trade post
remained open only for some months in a year and as long as it remained open a guard of 100
rifles was posted.

Routung had other advantages also. It was easily accessible to the Minyongs, the Panggis,the
Padams and the Galos. It suitably placed for the maintenance of the mule road constructed at
that time up to Yambung-a village below Kebang. The path was constructed to facilitate
movement along with trading. The responsibility of the guard of 100 rifles was to keep the
road open and undisturbed. Undoubtedly, the British administration created physical
infrastructure and safety network to promote trade (see Reid 1997:241-247).

Earlier, the Adis purchased their necessities from the plains. Needless to say, those items were
to be made available at the trading centre in Adi territory. Transport of these items required
the service of porters when the provisions would be made by the British administration. In
addition, there were various needs and occasions, of both the Government and the people, for
which transportation of materials to the Adi areas needed assured transport service. In view
of this a Coolie Corps at Sadiya, of a strength of not less than 600 was planned, as a
permanent nucleus of transport (see Reid 1997:246).

Evidently, establishment of trading centre had the objective of facilitating trade of the Adis. It
was a policy intended apparently to bring about ‘material prosperity’. Importantly, it was also
an arrangement to protect small villages and groups constrained by trade blocks. Politically,
the underlying objective of trade and establishment of trading centre in Adi territory was to
use them as media to establish friendly relations with the Adis (Reid 1997:245-46).

The British policy had two main objectives in this area- to control the Adis and to fix
boundary with China. The Expedition 1911-12 provided the opportunity to achieve the
objective of controlling the Adis and to lay down the foundation of demarcation of boundary
line with China. Establishment of trade centre, police posts, arbitration of disputes, measures
to wean away people from Tibetan influence all meant to achieve the above two objectives.
Obviously, the expedition resulted in putting the policy perspective into practice.

7. Frequent Contact and Large Coverage

Before Expedition 1911, tours, visits and surveys by British officials were not very regular. In
1909 for the first time Mr. Noel Williamson visited Kebang. He was the first Europen officer
to penetrate so far. Before him, in 1858 the expedition did not reach Kebang (Reid 1997:216).
Though Mr. J.F Needham made tours, these were not to this part of the territory of the Adis.
He led expedition in Padam territory but could not reach Damroh. His tours to Pasi and
Minyong Adi areas were mostly confined to Pasighat and lower areas. Noel Williamson
served as an Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya from 1906 to 1911 till his murder. During
this period he toured in 1907-08 towards Rima in Lohit; in 1908 around Pasighat covering
Pasi, Minyong and Galo areas; and Rangpung Naga territory; in 1909 repeated his tour to
Kebang, in 1909-10 repeated his tour of 1907-08 to Lohit, in 1911 to Mishmi Hills up to
Walong and finally in 2011 and for first time by a European officer, attempted to Adi territory
beyond Kebang. Unfortunately he was killed. (see Reid,1997:210-218).

Subsequent to his murder, the expedition became more regular to this area and covered large
territory. In the said expedition, the team visited as many Minyong villages as possible
except a few small ones. In Komsing they found some of Mr. Williamson’s remains which the
people of Komsing had buried. Thereafter they visited the important villages of Riu, Geku,,
Riga, and Simong. from Simong they continued northwards towards Tibet their farthest point
was Singging. From there they returned and reached Simong where they stayed till the 23 rd
February (Reid 1997:233).

With the establishment of administrative headquarters at Pasighat in 1912 the activities and
interactions increased. Dunda’s report as mentioned earlier informs about assessment of poll-
tax and extension of the administration to several Adi villages during the period from 1915-
16 to1917-18. In addition to interaction required for the purpose administration and
demarcation of control line, officers of high positions also visited the area.

In 1913 Sir Archdale Earle when Chief Commissioner toured the Adi area.254. From various
annual reports such as of the years 1936-37, 1937-38 mention of the tours of officers to
several villages of the Adis. In the report of 1936-37, it is recorded that Mr. W.H.Calvert, the
Political Officer and his team made three weeks tour to unadministered territory of the Adis
and visited Yembung, Komsing, Yeksing, Pangin, and Riu. In another tour in 1937-38 he
toured Adi villages of the upper reaches of the Siang ad of the Shimang and Siyom Valleys.
Mr. R.W Godfrey toured the Minyong villages up the Siang Valley from Pasighat 32 days
from 26th February 1939 to 31st March 1939. In 1940 Mr. Godfrey also toured up the Siyom
valley on its right bank covering Minyong and Galo villages. In the following year the
Governor of Assam toured up to Pangin. In fact tours and visits to Adi villages became
almost a routine work (Reid 1997:259-264).

Tour and contact had acquainted the British officers with social problems. They played the
role of arbiter to settle the disputes. There were some issues like slavery which were
associated with the social practices and whose forcible abolition would have invoked strong
resentment. Mention may be made that interference of the British with the traditional claims
of the Adis had invoked resentment leading to raids in the British territory. Past experience,
and the intention of abolishing social evils taught them to be tactful. So in the matter of
slavery the touring officers created awareness through persuasion. Later they envisioned
administrative measures for the abolition of slavery in unadministered areas (see
Reid,1997:260).
 8. Gaining Confidence

Reverses suffered in earlier expeditions were somewhat depressing to the British officers.
After the Anglo-Adi battle, and defeat and the submission of Adi villages they restored their
confidence. They could not hide their feelings. The official account of the general effect of
the military operations reads:
‘The disgrace and memory of our former defeat was wiped out and the tribes were
shown that, while resistance to the British was useless, we could with ease visit any
part of their country’ (Reid 1997:231).

That the feeling of failures was weighing upon them is clear from the above expression. Not
only they celebrated their achievements but also made arrogant remarks by stating that they
could visit any part of the Adi territory with ease and that the Adis were ‘quite incapable of
combination’. (Reid 1997:230). It is to be mentioned the British authority had boasted of in
the same way after 1884.

‘We have now proved to the Abors for the first time that we can march through their
country from one end to the other with the greatest ease, and destroy every village,
they have, their cattle, their household goods, and their crops. They are not likely to
forget this, however much they may boast that they succeeded by treachery in
preventing the force from reaching Damroh (Reid 1997:197).

Obviously, a sense of frustration and anger looms large in their feelings. As a result they
compared their revenge with the successful strategy of the Adis. In following years they were
not successful in their expeditions. Their claim to march through every village they liked got
defeated. Under such a situation, the achievement made during Expedition 1911-12 raised
their spirit high.

The gain of confidence became their strength which they used to control any resistance from
the Adi villages. They openly declared it and practised in their dealings with the tribes. In this
context the following remark is useful:

‘The tribes who had not proved themselves openly hostile, were visited by friendly
missions… while the hand of the British was heavy in dealing with aggression or
avenging insult…’(Reid 1997:231).

9. Change in attitude toward the Adis

The British officers did not have respect for the tribes in general and Adis in particular. So
they often used derogatory words for them. As early as 1908 the attitude of the British is
evident in a reply of the Lieutenant-Governor. It stated:
 ‘ … the fact that over half a century of proximity to civilization has failed in any way
to redeem the tribes from their native savagery is in itself a condemnation of the policy of
non-interference’ (see Reid 1917:213).

Generally, the Adis were characterised by the British as ‘dirty, sullen, lazy, and treacherous’.
Even an Indian British officer Mr. Rai Lahmon Bahadur Das was recorded, as early as 1881-
82, having shown dislike and distrust for them. But after the Expedition 1911-12 a change in
attitude of the British officer, at least of Mr. Bentick was noticed. He tried to appreciate the
differences despite his bias. It is useful to quote him in this context.

‘I grant also a certain surliness, but only when their fears or suspicions are aroused; it
must be remembered that to the vast bulk of the people whom we visited we were
utter and mysterious strangers, and that our appearance, our habits, our methods, and
our designs were alike new and unintelligible to them. the strong force which
accompanied all parties might have produced a more or less reluctant acquiescence,
but not the genial welcome, the ready and often generous hospitality, the tolerance of
our strange ways, and the interest in our doings and belongings which we found at
almost every village we entered; of the fearless confidence with which they
approached us, I have already spoken’ (Reid 1997: 234).

Further he also stated,

‘… what has been attributed to Abor treachery has always been the outcome of an
assumption on our parts… I don’t mean to hold up the Abors as Bayards, but they
have a code and recognise the obligations which it imposes’ (Reid 1997: 234).

Perhaps it is the British whose attitude changed in course of their interaction with Adis.
Three implications can be drawn. First, the British officers might have realised to appreciate
the differences. Second, it is the Adis who reconciled with the British, and it is
reconciliation, that induced the British to have a different opinion. In this context, Mr.
O’Callaghan, Political Officer, remarks in his Administration Report for 1921-22 that ‘the
Abor responds to signs of thoroughness and strict fairness in our administration’ (cited in
Reid 1997:255).

10. Persuasive Strategy and reconciliation of the Adis

After punishing the guilty of murder of Mr. Williamson and members of his party, the
expedition team tried to win the people through persuasion. Of course, the people were
warned of consequences of disobedience or hostile relations with the British. The remark of
Mr. Bentinck on an occasion during 1911-12 expedition is noteworthy. During his tour, he
held a representative gathering of the gams at Komkar. It was attended by men from Simong,
Damroh, Riu, Panggi and Komakar villages. He ‘explained the gathering the necessity of
behaving properly with the British administration as subjects of the Queen. He also assured
the people to carry out trade any where they would like. (Reid 1997:233). Mr R.W Godfrey
also had ordered, while on tour, to remove the trade blocks created by Riga, Damroh, and
other villages.

During his visit in 1941, the Governor of the then Assam impressed upon the large gathering
of 75 villages on various issues. He dwelt on the necessity of abolishing slavery, refraining
from mithun raiding and of not practising trade blocks. He further informed them that they
were in no way obliged to accede the demand of the Tibetan officers (see Reid 1997:264).

The persuasive strategy brought the Adis under the British control, though not in strict sense.
The Adis in response to the good gesture shown by the British through persuasion reconciled.
Of course, there might have been realisation of the futility of enmity with the British who had
superior military power. Moreover, the Adis had the interest of trading in plains to which the
British assured with access and safety. A few Adi villages/groups were freed from the
highhandedness of some powerful villages like Kebang. Removal of trade blocks also won
some Adi villages. More importantly, only a few villages tried to oppose the British while
others assisted them in their expeditions. Not only Adi gams, but gams of the Khamptis and
Singphos assisted the British officers on different occasions during tour in Mishmi Hills (see
Reid 1997:192,210 and 229-230). While the British extended their control and brought big
villages under poll-tax, small villages followed suit without any opposition. It was not the
Adis, but the Khamptis, the Singphos and the Mishmis also assessed to poll tax (see Reid
1997: 252), it was not wise on the part of a section of the Adis to protest the move.
Reconciliation was the prudency which the Adis in general and warring villages in particular
showed after Expedition of 1911-12.

As a mark of reconciliation, the Adis not only stopped attacking the British and people in
their territory, but also approached the officers on their tour to settle their disputes. Mr.
Dundas, in a report for the year 1917-18 writes,

‘The people have since the Abor Expedition and the establishment of a post at
Pasighat been very friendly, bringing all their disputes to us for decision’ (cited in
Reid 1997:253).

In addition when the officers toured in different villages, people brought village disputes,
inter-group/village disputes (between Padam, Pangi, Minyong and Karko, inter-tribe
(between Minyong and Galo villages) disputes for settlement. In fact people gathered in large
numbers to renew acquaintance with the touring officer and his party and took the
opportunity of discussing disputes relating to land, mithun, and other property (see Reid 1997
259-262).

The villagers provided assistance to the survey party when required. Their assistance was
sought in track repairing and at the time of construction of memorials of Mr. Williamson and
Dr. Gregorson. Moreover, the villagers of Komsing and Pangi took the charge of the
concerned memorials (see Reid 1997: 245&254).
 11. Geographical effects

Expedition, 1911 had paved the way for the British officers to survey the whole Adi territory
which was contemplated since long. Of course there were attempts, but the survey team or
the touring officers had not gone beyond Kebang. It is only in 1911 that the party reached
Komsing, but the tragedy of the murder of Mr. Williamson and his party took place. The
expedition subsequent to the murder envisaged a large scale survey into the Adi territory. The
survey results were not as expected. It was not possible to determine accurately the natural
boundary between the Adi territory and Tibet. Bu the achievements made were not
insignificant either. The whole Adi territory was approximately surveyed as far as latitude 28 0
40’ N. The Yamne River valley was surveyed upto the snow ranges, the Shimang river was
mapped throughout its entire length; the course of Siyom was roughly traced and the valley
of Dihang was followed as far as Singginging (latitude 28 052’ roughly). However, the identity
of Dihang with the Tsampo could not be absolutely proved, though practically established.

The survey provided a rough idea of the nature and position of Adi territory. Points on the
great snow range to the north of Adi area were fixed. This paved the way for subsequent
demarcation of the boundary (Reid 1997:231).

An Appraisal

Murder of Mr. Williamson and several of his team members and subsequent expedition
expose colonial nature of the administration.

1. The field or local officers utilised their individual judgement rather than standing
orders of the Government. Obviously, a gap existed between the Government and its
local officers with regard to rules and their compliance. In the report of the
Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 22 nd April 1911, it was recorded that Mr.
Williamson acted contrary to standing orders with regard to crossing the Outer Line.

2. The colonial administration valued the works of the officers undertaken in the
interest of the Government rather than their faults if it meant to serve the purpose.
Despite non-compliance of standing orders by Mr. Williamson and subsequent
tragedy, the Government found it ‘undesirable to record a formal expression of
disapproval’ of his behaviour. Rather, his action was justified on the ground that he
was ‘a zealous officer anxious to obtain information which he believed would be
valuable’ to the Government. Colonial Government did not bother about the violation
of its order by its officers as far as it served their interest. The risk that involved by
acting contrary to the order was given no importance (see Reid 1997:220).

3. The incident gave the opportunity to apply ‘wolf and lamb logic’ to control entire Adi
territory, even of loose political nature in some areas. It should be kept in mind that
neither all Adi groups nor all the villages in Adi territory were involved in the murder.
 But the colonial government got the plea to extend its administration not only to Adi
villages but also to territories of other tribes (see Reid 1997).

4. There were incidents before the murder of Mr. Williamson that showed the
dissatisfaction of the Adis against the British rule. Mr. Williamson himself did not
take the route thorough Kebang because of doubtful friendliness. He was aware of the
dissatisfaction of at least some people or villages. The British Government did not try
to understand the grievances of the people, rather it tried to impose its ways on them
and any reaction to it was considered hostility. Colonial administration did not have
the sense of appreciation to differences.

Nature of Relations after Expedition

1. Tour
2. Extension of administration and poll-tax
3. Boundary issue
4. Trade
5. Friendly relations
6. All groups brought under one umbrella

Murder of Mr. Williamson

Murder of Mr. Noel Williamson, Dr. J. D. Gregorson and several members of the team is a
landmark in the history of Adi-British relationships. In Adi-British relationships raids in the
British territory, and kidnappings or murders of the British subjects, sepoys, coolies, etc. by
the Adis were known events before the murder of Mr.Williamson. Bordak massacre in
February 1894, in which as many as 35 sepoys, coolies and followers were killed, was a
major attack on the British camp. It had overshadowed the otherwise success history of the
British till then. But it was the murder of Williamson which was taken very seriously by the
British Government. This incident also marked a turning point in colonial policy and its
approach to Adi-Britsh relations.

So far, no colonial officer of his stature and repute was killed. Mr. Noel Williamson was
Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya who succeeded Mr. Needham in 1906. He was from
Imperial Police Service and was known as an able administrator. His main purpose was to do
the needful to establish good relations with the frontier tribes and to explore hitherto
unknown relations. He was devotedly working in his direction. After his joining till his last
tour to Adi villages in March 1911 he had made the following tours:

1907-08: toured up the Lohit towards Rima without any escort

March 1908: from Pasighat through Ledum and Djimur to Laimekuri, no
escort
November-December 1908: visited Rangpung Naga country (with escort)
February 1909: up to Kebang in Adi area
1909-10:` repeated his Lohit tour of 1907-08
January-February 1911: Mishmi hills as far as Walong
March 1911: Adi villages and was killed in Komsing (see Reid 1997,
210-218).

During his tours he gained deep knowledge about the tribes and tried to establish friendship
and explain the intention of the British Government. His presentation of the Adis was
different from their predecessors. Mr. Bentinck’s Political Report presents Mr. Williamson as
a successful officer. His death was a loss to the British administration as his works remained
incomplete. Mr. Bentinck reports;

‘What Mr. Williamson might have done single-handed in opening this county had his
life been spared, can be estimated from the brilliant success of his five years at
Sadiya, which I cannot help thinking that sufficient justice has not yet been done. He
had at least shown that the Abor is not the truculent, intractable savage, which
previous accounts generally made him, but there had not been time for this view to get
general acceptance’ (Reid 1997:234).

Obviously, this tells why the British took his murder so seriously. It is to be mentioned that
Mr. Williamson did not die in a fight, his murder was cold blooded as he was unarmed and on
a friendly tour. After his murder an expedition was sent which was punitive in nature on one
hand and politico-administrative on the other. This expedition marked a shift in the approach
of the British administration and Adis’ attitude towards the British. No doubt, the incident
was a turning point in the history of Adi-British relationships.

The Murder

As has been mentioned earlier, Mr. Noel Williamson, Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya,
was murdered with several members of his team while he was on tour with a team. The
primary purpose of his tour, which was planned for about six weeks, was to ascertain Tibetan
influence in the Adi territory. His team consisted of Dr. J.D.Gregorson, three servants, two
orderlies 10 Miris (interpreters from present Mishing tribe) and 34 Gurkhali coolies. There
were also Adi load carriers to supplement the Gurkhalis. Dr. Gregorson was a doctor with a
large practice in tea gardens around Tinsukia. The events of the tour and murder were
reported by Mr. A.H.W Bentinck which was reproduced by Sir Robert Reid (1997:218-220).
The course of the event can be presented as below:
1. Assembled at Pasighat
2. Left Pasighat on 8th march 1911
3. Reached Rotung on 20th march 1911
4. Rations and la case of liquor were allegedly stolen by Adi carriers at Rotung.
5. Mr. Williamson reacted and demanded ‘satisfaction on his return’. In other words, he
wanted recovery of stolen goods and the culprits.
6. This created anxiety and it was decided in their village council (also called Kebang) to
murder Mr. Williamson.
7. After this event, next day Mr. Williamson continued his journey. He had the
information about the plan of his murder which he did not take seriously. He had the
conviction that the Adis were ‘stronger in council than in action’. But he was cautious
enough to avoid the route through Kebang village on two grounds. First one was
doubtful friendliness of the people of Kebang and second the village was infected
with small-pox.
8. The party crossed the Siang River at Yambung, below the Kebang village and
camped at Pangi.
9. On 28th March 1911, a Miri, by name Manpur was sent back from Pangi with three
sick coolies and some letters.
10. On that day he reached Rotung and made false claims that the letters contained orders
to send up sepoys and guns to punish Rotung and Kebang.
11. This information, along with the reflection of Mr. Williamson’s warning when he left
Rotung, created alarm about their safety. So they planned killing of Mr. Williamson
and members of the party.
12. They carried out their plan next day, on 29th march,1911, by killing Manpur and
coolies when they halted for their mid-day meal on their way to Sadiya.
13. After killing them they proceeded to kill Mr. Williamson and others. On their way
they collected villagers from Kebang and Babuk. Their strength grew to about 100 in
number.
14. On 30th March 1911, the Adi party reached Pangi where Dr. Gregorson was present
along with one interpreter and three or four sick coolies. In the morning of the same
day Mr. Williamson with other members of the team moved towards Komsing and
camped on the bank of the Ribung river at the foot of the hill on which Komsing
village is situated.
15. On 30th March 1911, the Adi party killed Dr. Gregoson, interpreter and coolies at
about 1 p.m. on the spot at Pangi.
16. The information of murder had reached the camp in the afternoon of the same day but
was deliberately kept from Mr. Williamson.
17. On 31st March 1911, Mr. Williamson and his party moved up to Komsing and camped
in the village. At about 10 am, the coolies were cooking their food and Mr.
Williamson left for the house of the Lomben, the gam.
18. On his way he was misled by three persons- Mr. Manmur (Matmur) Jamoh of
Yagrung, Lunung gam of Pangi and Tamu of Bosing. Mr. Williamson was taken
down a side path out of the sight of other members of his party and was killed.
It is not clear from the report how Mr. Manmur and Mr. Tamu from Yagrung and
Bosing near Yagrung took leading part in the murder. The villages are about 14 kms
from Pasighat town and from Pasighat to Rotung it was two days march then.
19. The Adis who had crossed the river fell upon the coolies and other members and
killed them except five.
20. Out of the five one was Mr. Williamson’s servant who reached the Pangi village of
Pogging and was kindly received. Mullina, the principal interpreter, while crossed the
river was taken by Babuk men and killed. Three other survivors reached an Adi
 village near the mouth of Dihong and from there the message of massacre was sent in
to Sadiya.
21. It is also reported that two members, other than the five as mentioned above, of the
team had reached Pasighat whom the Passi gams handed over to Captain Hutchins.

From Sadiya, the news arrived at Dibrugarh on 5th April, 1911. Immediate step was taken on
hearing the news. On the same day Mr. Bentinck with a detachment of Military Police under
Captain Dunbar travelled by train to Saikhowa. They were received by Captain Hutchins,
Assistant Commandant, Lakhimpur Military Police with boats. Within 100 hours of the
receipt of the news they reached Pasighat and constructed a defensive post.

Causes of Murder

The report prepared by Mr. Bentinck gives the version of the British about the reason of
murder. One version is related to stealing of rations and liquor at Rotung and boasting of
Manpur, the interpreter who carried letters to the headquarters.

A second reason is also given in the above report. A deliberate intention has been reported. It
states:
‘the attack on Mr. Williamson’s party, for so it must be considered since the Pasi
Minyong sought for the quarrel by asking his into their country with the deliberate
intention of killing him, probably due to sheer bravado and devilment due to want of
appreciation of our power arising from the fact that the only force which had
penetrated into their hills was driven back and compelled to retreat, fighting hard for
existence.’…it is as much a deliberate attack upon us as if the Abors had come into
our country, for Mr. Williamson’s was a wholly unarmed and peaceful entry solicited
by them’ (see Reid 1997:223).

The Adi Version of the cause of murder

Changing Adi-British Relations after the Expedition of 1911-12

This expedition had far reaching consequences. The relationship between the Adis and the
British was redefined. For the British it was successful on many counts. However, its
ultimate impact on Adis was their acceptance to the British authority. It cannot be a complete
submission as their socio-political institutions governed their life ways. There were some
points of interaction with the British such as seeking arbitrary role of the British officers,
trading in British territory, friendly behaviour with the British and their people and so on. Of
course in such interactions the Adis and the British had agreed upon terms and conditions
which were dictations of the latter.

On the foundation of the Adi-British relationship, political relation with Tibet and China was
contemplated. Its implication was crucial, as Mr Bentinck’s Political Report states not only
‘from the political point of view’, but also from the fact that the expedition furnished
‘proposals as to the future of these tracts’ (Reid 1997:233). One of the future actions was
definitely relation with Tibet and China which was contemplated as early as 1908. As pre-
requisite to define this relation, it was expedient that ‘the country should be surveyed as far as
possible before a definite scheme for its future administration is adopted’ (Reid 1997:214).
The purpose of the survey was to ascertain the actual position of affairs without any risk of
collision with the tribes. Undoubtedly, good relation with the Adis was a strategic necessity to
protect the tract between the inner and out lines effectively (see Reid 1997:214). The
Expedition 1911-12 provided the opportunity to act upon the strategy contemplated earlier.

The impacts may be viewed as immediate and subsequent. The changes introduced and
actions taken during the Expedition 1911-12 may be viewed as immediate impacts. There
were also changes introduced subsequent to the expedition- subsequent impacts. A few of
these impacts have been discussed below:

1. Effects of Military Operation: Punishment of guilty and Recovery of property

The expedition was the immediate reaction to the murder of Mr. Noel Williamson, Dr. J.D.
Gregorson and other members of Mr. Williamson’s team. The first and foremost task was to
punish the culprit. Actual murderers of Mr. Williamson were recognised as Mr. Manmur
Jamho of Yagrung, Mr. Tamu (Namu) of Bosing and Mr. Lunnung of Pangi. These three
culprits were captured but only first two were tried and found guilty by a Military Court. Mr.
Lunnung (later known as Mr. Tarung Tamuk and was the gam of Pangi) became the
intermediary to bring other the culprits on the promise of protection. As a result no action was
taken against him. Mr. Manmur Jamoh was sentenced to transportation to life (life
imprisonment in Andamans) and Mr. Tamu was sentenced for 10 years imprisonment (Reid
1997:232).

The murderers of Dr. Gregorson, Mr. Lamlaw and Mr. Bapuk of Kebang village,
surrendered in course of expedition. They were tried and sentenced to death. But later their
sentence was commuted to transportation of life. Three other men- Mr. Buissong of Bosing
village, Mr. Lutiang and Mr. Popiom from Yagrung village were found guilty of murdering
Dr. Gregorson. They were sentenced to ‘terms of imprisonment’ (Reid 1997:232).

It was also the objective of the expedition to punish the concerned villages involved directly
or indirectly in the murder. To punish the villages, a contact was established with the gams of
the Padama, Passi and Minyongs. With their help, the main column advanced to Kebang on
28th October 1911. There was no serious opposition and at Kekar Monying the Kebang
fighters were defeated. But the present villagers of Kebang claim that their men put up a
strong fight but got defeated because of the firearm of the British. However, ultimately
Kebang was defeated on 9th December 1911. With the fall of Kebang the active opposition of
the tribes came to an end. The British administration realised that it had earlier overrated the
power of the Adis owing to the reverses suffered by former expeditions (Reid 1997:229-30).
Not only the British defeated the villagers where opposition was encountered, but also burnt
their houses and crops. Strict orders were issued to all the villages to return the property
looted. Mr. Bentinck reports that the expedition ‘resulted in the punishment of all the hostile
villages… and practically all looted property was restored (Reid 1997:230). Among the
villages, Kebang was the worst hit village. Kebang returned all the stolen property and paid a
fine of mithun (bosfrontalis) and war equipment. It assured of good behaviour in future and
obedience to all orders of the Government. It also agreed to condition of not taking any action
to prevent other villages from trading in the plains. Needless to say, the power of Kebang was
broken and its reputation shattered. In the battle the village also lost a large number of its
fighting men. But in general, the Minyong tribe was crushed and its villages brought to
submission at that point (see Reid 1997:230-31).

Though many fighter men of Kebang died and the Minyong supremacy crushed in Kekar
Monying battle, there was not severe causalities from the British side. The total casualties
were 1 officer wounded, 2 other ranks killed and 2 wounded and 3 followers killed and 3
wounded (Reid 1997:231). Total cost involved in the expedition is not accurately available,
though it would mean a huge expenditure.

2. Re-organisation of administration

Under the provisions of The Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation (Regulation2), 1880 the
North-East Frontier Tract was created. The hills inhabited or frequented by Adis, Mishmis,
Miris, Singphos, Nagas, Khamptis, Akas, Nyishis and Bhutias formed this tract. These hill
areas were under the administrative jurisdiction of the then Darrang and Lakhimpur Districts
of Assam. The tract which was separated from the then Darrang and Lakhimpur Districts
of Assam consisted of the following three administrative units by notifications of 1914:

(1) The Central and Eastern Sections, North-East Frontier Tracts,

(2) The Lakhimpur Frontier Tract, and
(3) The Western Section, North-East Frontier Tract. (see Luthra 1971;53-65).

Before the notifications, the above three administrative units were operational. The First
Frontier Tract called the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract came into being in 1882. However, it
continued to be in the charge of the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur. The Adis inhabited
mainly the Central Section of the North-East Frontier Tract. Undoubtedly, the Deputy
Commissioner, Dibrugarh had the responsibility of maintaining relations with the Adis, and
in discharging his duty he was assisted by Assistant Political Officer/ Political Officer with
headquarters at Sadiya. From 1882 to 1905, Mr. Francis Jack Needham from Bengal Police
was the Assistant Political officer who was succeeded by Mr. Noel Williamson; I.P. Mr.
Williamson discharged his duty as Assistant Political Officer since 1906 till his murder in
1911. The expedition, mainly punitive in nature, was undertaken subsequent to his murder,
though there were other objectives.
 Subsequent to the Expedition of 1911-12, the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract ceased to exist and
the Central and Eastern Sections became two separate administrative units. The changes were
however, introduced by the notifications of 1914. But the Central Section was designated as
Sadiya Frontier Tract in 1919 and placed under the charge of a Political Officer (PO). The PO
worked directly under the Chief Commissioner. The Abor (Adi) Hills district was created as
a constituent unit of Sadiya Frontier Tract with its headquarters at Pasighat under the
administrative responsibility of Assistant Political Officer (APO). The APO worked under
the PO, Sadiya. However, initially the headquarters of the Central Section, also called the
Abor (Adi) Section was proposed at Rotung (Reid 1997:181 &240).

Though the notifications came later, the administrative units had started working after the
expedition. Before the re-organisation of the administrative set up on the basis of the
notifications in 1914 the Dibrugarh Frontier Tract ceased to exist ‘and the district of Sadiya
became a separate entity’… ‘The administrative changes thus brought about in 1912 are
described in the first annual report (1912-13) for ‘the district of Sadiya’ (Reid 1997:181).
Moreover, T.E.Furze, I.P. was appointed as the first APO at Pasighat who worked from 1912
to 1917. Mr. W. C. M. Dundas, I.P. was the PO at Sadiya for Central and Eastern Sections
from 1912 to 1919 (Reid 1997:265-66).

Administrative network proposed

While Rotung was proposed as the headquarters of the Central (Adi) Section posting of two
officers was recommended. In addition, establishment of garrisons at Rotung (with 200
rifles), Pasighat (with 100 rifles) and Kobo (with men) were planned. It was also suggested
two APOs would be stationed at Sadiya under the Political Officer at Rotung. In order to
provide for the permanent posts in Adi and Eastern (Mishmi) Sections together with their
reliefs formation of a second Lakhimpur battalion with strength of 750 men was
recommended (Reid 1997:240-41).

Later Rotung proposal was abandoned. Garrisons for Adi section was maintained at Pasighat
(with 75 military police), Balek (100) and Kobo (25). Pasighat became the headquarters
with the posting of one APO in 1912 (see Reid 1997:244 & 266).

Need for the change

The need for the change in administrative set up resulted from two counts. The first one
related to murder of Mr. William and the second one to the emerging political scenario
concerning Tibet, China, Burma (now Myanmar). The first one necessitated to re-look
relations with the Adis and the second one to demarcate international boundary. The second
one also necessitated a stable relationship with the tribes.

Earlier practice, according to the policy of the British Government, was to send punitive
expeditions to the Adi villages consequent upon unprovoked trouble/murder created in their
territory. The expedition meant to inflict punishment. After punishing the wrong doers, the
force withdrew. So the action did not have permanent impact. The concerned tribe/village
misunderstood the British strength and fresh trouble ensued. A permanent solution was
envisaged through the change in the administrative set up (see Reid 1997: 241).

The presence of the China and Tibet in the Adi villages of the north was noticed. Their
influence also increased. As a result reconsideration of the whole position with regard to
frontiers became necessary to debar the influence of the intriguing neighbours on the people
of hills. The government strongly felt the need to review the whole frontier from Bhutan to
the Hkhampti country and the unadministered regions north of Burma (Myanmar)(see Reid
1997:241).

3. Consolidation of administration and territory

The British was not so serious in its administration of tribal areas prior to the Expedition
1911. Though it claimed its territory as far as the foot hills, it had not effectively enforced its
claim. After this expedition effective measures were taken and tribes were assesses to poll-
tax. The report of W.C.M.Dundas for the year 1917 -18 states: ‘The plains as far as the foot
hills have always been claimed as British territory. It was not however, expedient to enforce
this claim until recent years…’(cited in Reid,1997:252). In 1915-16 Mr. Dundas brought
Bomjur, Dambuk, Silluk, Mimasipo, Mebo and Aying under the British administration by
assessing them to poll-tax. Following year the process was extended to the Passi and
Minyong villages near Pasighat. In 1917-18 remaining few Adi villages were also brought
under administration and assessed to poll-tax. In this way, the district was completely formed
as far as Simen river (see Reid 1997:252).

Inner and outer lines shifted towards north and redefined. The Control Area was extended in
1941 that distinguished the British territory in Adi areas from Tibet/China 9see Reid
1997:263).

Outposts were created in the interiors. Posts which were abandoned re-started. For example,
in 1941 posts at Riga and Karko were opened afresh (Reid 1997:262). Additional outposts
were also envisaged further up the Siang Valley in the event of continuance of incursions
from north of the McMahon Line (see Reid 1997:264).

It should be made clear that out posts had two crucial roles to play. First it envisaged to
control the tribes and avoid any further trouble. Secondly and most importantly, outposts
were considered necessary as an alternative to considerable military force in connection with
eventual demarcation of the boundary with China (Reid 1997:242).

4. Removal of trade blockade

For long powerful villages like the Kebang prevented their weaker neighbours from trading
in plains. The Panggis and other tribes inhabiting the north of their territory were main
sufferers from the highhandedness of Kebang and other powerful villages like Rotung,
Babuk, Pangi, Yemsing, Rengging, etc. These villages almost shared adjacent territory and
formed a cluster in between the northern and southern villages. These villages were allegedly
the source of trouble for the people of the north who desired to trade with plains.

During expedition, the villages of the north expressed their wish to trade with the plains. Due
to highhandedness of powerful villages to their south they carried on trade with Tibet with
much difficulty. With protection from the British they would rather prefer trading in the
plains. To this effect Mr. Bentinck and General Bower assured them open and un-restricted
trade in plains. This was the condition with Kebang village when it was defeated, that they
would not prevent people from trading in plains (see Reid 1997; 231-32, 233, 245 -246).

Whenever the officers found any trade blocks during their tour, they tried to remove it.
During his tour in 1939 Mr R.W Godfrey frond trade blocks in a few villages in the upper
reaches of the Siang valley. He found Riga preventing trade passing through them from south
or north. Karko and Shimong prevented any trade going from south to north through their
villages. Komkar and Damorh prevented trade from the north to the south. Mr. Godfrey
ordered these blocks to remove though he had some problem with the Shimong (Reid
1997:261).

5. Creation of enabling Infrastructure

Before colonial contact, a section of the Adis had trade relations with the plains of Assam.
Owing to the British policy the relation was stalemated time and again. Adi villages of the
north were trading in Tibet, though with difficulties. It was strategically important to wean
away them from trade relations with Tibet. It was not directly possible as middle and
powerful villages created trade blocks (see Reid 1997:232). The British authority realised this
problem. In view of this the administration initiated two steps. It assured open and
unrestricted trade in plains (see Reid 1997 233 & 245-46). Second, it established a trade post
at Rotung, a place suitable for the Adis from different villages.

Rotung also had other advantages. It had suitable building sites and received comparative less
heavy rains than the surrounding areas. Rotung also commanded many of the important
paths. It was considered that the trade post at Rotung would ensure an out let to the Pangi
clan who were then cut off from the plains by the Minyongs. Importantly, it was near Kebang
which used to block trading of northern villages in south. Being nearer to Kebang, the trade
post at Rotung could prevent that village from giving further trouble. So, to ensure safety and
check the dominant Kebang village from preventing trade of weaker and disadvantageous
villages, a temporary garrison was stationed in the area during trading days. The trade post
remained open only for some months in a year and as long as it remained open a guard of 100
rifles was posted.

Routung had other advantages also. It was easily accessible to the Minyongs, the Panggis, the
Padams and the Galos. It suitably placed for the maintenance of the mule road constructed at
that time up to Yambung-a village below Kebang. The path was constructed to facilitate
movement along with trading. The responsibility of the guard of 100 rifles was to keep the
road open and undisturbed. Undoubtedly, the British administration created physical
infrastructure and safety network to promote trade (see Reid 1997:241-247).

Earlier, the Adis purchased their necessities from the plains. Needless to say, those items were
to be made available at the trading centre in Adi territory. Transport of these items required
the service of porters when the provisions would be made by the British administration. In
addition, there were various needs and occasions, of both the Government and the people, for
which transportation of materials to the Adi areas needed assured transport service. In view
of this a Coolie Corps at Sadiya, of a strength of not less than 600 was planned, as a
permanent nucleus of transport (see Reid 1997:246).

Evidently, establishment of trading centre had the objective of facilitating trade of the Adis. It
was a policy intended apparently to bring about ‘material prosperity’. Importantly, it was also
an arrangement to protect small villages and groups constrained by trade blocks. Politically,
the underlying objective of trade and establishment of trading centre in Adi territory was to
use them as media to establish friendly relations with the Adis (Reid 1997:245-46).

The British policy had two main objectives in this area- to control the Adis and to fix
boundary with China. The Expedition 1911-12 provided the opportunity to achieve the
objective of controlling the Adis and to lay down the foundation of demarcation of boundary
line with China. Establishment of trade centre, police posts, arbitration of disputes, measures
to wean away people from Tibetan influence all meant to achieve the above two objectives.
Obviously, the expedition resulted in putting the policy perspective into practice.

6. Frequent Contact and Large Coverage

Before Expedition 1911, tours, visits and surveys by British officials were not very regular. In
1909 for the first time Mr. Noel Williamson visited Kebang. He was the first Europen officer
to penetrate so far. Before him, in 1858 the expedition did not reach Kebang (Reid 1997:216).
Though Mr. J.F Needham made tours, these were not to this part of the territory of the Adis.
He led expedition in Padam territory but could not reach Damroh. His tours to Pasi and
Minyong Adi areas were mostly confined to Pasighat and lower areas. Noel Williamson
served as an Assistant Political Officer at Sadiya from 1906 to 1911 till his murder. During
this period he toured in 1907-08 towards Rima in Lohit; in 1908 around Pasighat covering
Pasi, Minyong and Galo areas; and Rangpung Naga territory; in 1909 repeated his tour to
Kebang, in 1909-10 repeated his tour of 1907-08 to Lohit, in 1911 to Mishmi Hills up to
Walong and finally in 2011 and for first time by a European officer, attempted to Adi territory
beyond Kebang. Unfortunately he was killed. (see Reid,1997:210-218).

Subsequent to his murder, the expedition became more regular to this area and covered large
territory. In the said expedition, the team visited as many Minyong villages as possible
except a few small ones. In Komsing they found some of Mr. Williamson’s remains which the
people of Komsing had buried. Thereafter they visited the important villages of Riu, Geku,,
Riga, and Simong. from Simong they continued northwards towards Tibet their farthest point
was Singging. From there they returned and reached Simong where they stayed till the 23 rd
February (Reid 1997:233).

With the establishment of administrative headquarters at Pasighat in 1912 the activities and
interactions increased. Dunda’s report as mentioned earlier informs about assessment of poll-
tax and extension of the administration to several Adi villages during the period from 1915-
16 to1917-18. In addition to interaction required for the purpose administration and
demarcation of control line, officers of high positions also visited the area.

In 1913 Sir Archdale Earle when Chief Commissioner toured the Adi area.254. From various
annual reports such as of the years 1936-37, 1937-38 mention of the tours of officers to
several villages of the Adis. In the report of 1936-37, it is recorded that Mr. W.H.Calvert, the
Political Officer and his team made three weeks tour to unadministered territory of the Adis
and visited Yembung, Komsing, Yeksing, Pangin, and Riu. In another tour in 1937-38 he
toured Adi villages of the upper reaches of the Siang ad of the Shimang and Siyom Valleys.
Mr. R.W Godfrey toured the Minyong villages up the Siang Valley from Pasighat 32 days
from 26th February 1939 to 31st March 1939. In 1940 Mr. Godfrey also toured up the Siyom
valley on its right bank covering Minyong and Galo villages. In the following year the
Governor of Assam toured up to Pangin. In fact tours and visits to Adi villages became
almost a routine work (Reid 1997:259-264).

Tour and contact had acquainted the British officers with social problems. They played the
role of arbiter to settle the disputes. There were some issues like slavery which were
associated with the social practices and whose forcible abolition would have invoked strong
resentment. Mention may be made that interference of the British with the traditional claims
of the Adis had invoked resentment leading to raids in the British territory. Past experience,
and the intention of abolishing social evils taught them to be tactful. So in the matter of
slavery the touring officers created awareness through persuasion. Later they envisioned
administrative measures for the abolition of slavery in unadministered areas (see
Reid,1997:260).

7. Gaining Confidence
Reverses suffered in earlier expeditions were somewhat depressing to the British officers.
After the Anglo-Adi battle, and defeat and the submission of Adi villages they restored their
confidence. They could not hide their feelings. The official account of the general effect of
the military operations reads:

‘The disgrace and memory of our former defeat was wiped out and the tribes were
shown that, while resistance to the British was useless, we could with ease visit any
part of their country’ (Reid 1997:231).

That the feeling of failures was weighing upon them is clear from the above expression. Not
only they celebrated their achievements but also made arrogant remarks by stating that they
could visit any part of the Adi territory with ease and that the Adis were ‘quite incapable of
combination’. (Reid 1997:230). It is to be mentioned the British authority had boasted of in
the same way after 1884.

‘We have now proved to the Abors for the first time that we can march through their
country from one end to the other with the greatest ease, and destroy every village,
they have, their cattle, their household goods, and their crops. They are not likely to
forget this, however much they may boast that they succeeded by treachery in
preventing the force from reaching Damroh (Reid 1997:197).

Obviously, a sense of frustration and anger looms large in their feelings. As a result they
compared their revenge with the successful strategy of the Adis. In following years they were
not successful in their expeditions. Their claim to march through every village they liked got
defeated. Under such a situation, the achievement made during Expedition 1911-12 raised
their spirit high.

The gain of confidence became their strength which they used to control any resistance from
the Adi villages. They openly declared it and practised in their dealings with the tribes. In this
context the following remark is useful:

‘The tribes who had not proved themselves openly hostile, were visited by friendly
missions… while the hand of the British was heavy in dealing with aggression or
avenging insult…’(Reid 1997:231).

8. Change in attitude toward the Adis

The British officers did not have respect for the tribes in general and Adis in particular. So
they often used derogatory words for them. As early as 1908 the attitude of the British is
evident in a reply of the Lieutenant-Governor. It stated:

‘ … the fact that over half a century of proximity to civilization has failed in any way
to redeem the tribes from their native savagery is in itself a condemnation of the
policy of non-interference’ (see Reid 1917:213).

Generally, the Adis were characterised by the British as ‘dirty, sullen, lazy, and treacherous’.
Even an Indian British officer Mr. Rai Lahmon Bahadur Das was recorded, as early as 1881-
82, having shown dislike and distrust for them. But after the Expedition 1911-12 a change in
attitude of the British officer, at least of Mr. Bentick was noticed. He tried to appreciate the
differences despite his bias. It is useful to quote him in this context.

‘I grant also a certain surliness, but only when their fears or suspicions are aroused; it must be
remembered that to the vast bulk of the people whom we visited we were utter and
mysterious strangers, and that our appearance, our habits, our methods, and our designs were
alike new and unintelligible to them. the strong force which accompanied all parties might
have produced a more or less reluctant acquiescence, but not the genial welcome, the ready
and often generous hospitality, the tolerance of our strange ways, and the interest in our
doings and belongings which we found at almost every village we entered; of the fearless
confidence with which they approached us, I have already spoken’ (Reid 1997: 234).
Further he also stated,

‘… what has been attributed to Abor treachery has always been the outcome of an
assumption on our parts… I don’t mean to hold up the Abors as Bayards, but they
have a code and recognise the obligations which it imposes’ (Reid 1997: 234).

Perhaps it is the British whose attitude changed in course of their interaction with Adis.
Three implications can be drawn. First, the British officers might have realised to appreciate
the differences. Second, it is the Adis who reconciled with the British, and it is
reconciliation, that induced the British to have a different opinion. In this context, Mr.
O’Callaghan, Political Officer, remarks in his Administration Report for 1921-22 that ‘the
Abor responds to signs of thoroughness and strict fairness in our administration’ (cited in
Reid 1997:255).

9. Persuasive Strategy and reconciliation of the Adis

After punishing the guilty of murder of Mr. Williamson and members of his party, the
expedition team tried to win the people through persuasion. Of course, the people were
warned of consequences of disobedience or hostile relations with the British. The remark of
Mr. Bentinck on an occasion during 1911-12 expedition is noteworthy. During his tour, he
held a representative gathering of the gams at Komkar. It was attended by men from Simong,
Damroh, Riu, Panggi and Komakar villages. He ‘explained the gathering the necessity of
behaving properly with the British administration as subjects of the Queen. He also assured
the people to carry out trade any where they would like. (Reid 1997:233). Mr R.W Godfrey
also had ordered, while on tour, to remove the trade blocks created by Riga, Damroh, and
other villages.

During his visit in 1941, the Governor of the then Assam impressed upon the large gathering
of 75 villages on various issues. He dwelt on the necessity of abolishing slavery, refraining
from mithun raiding and of not practising trade blocks. He further informed them that they
were in no way obliged to accede the demand of the Tibetan officers (see Reid 1997:264).

The persuasive strategy brought the Adis under the British control, though not in strict sense.
The Adis in response to the good gesture shown by the British through persuasion reconciled.
Of course, there might have been realisation of the futility of enmity with the British who had
superior military power. Moreover, the Adis had the interest of trading in plains to which the
British assured with access and safety. A few Adi villages/groups were freed from the
highhandedness of some powerful villages like Kebang. Removal of trade blocks also won
some Adi villages. More importantly, only a few villages tried to oppose the British while
others assisted them in their expeditions. Not only Adi gams, but gams of the Khamptis and
Singphos assisted the British officers on different occasions during tour in Mishmi Hills (see
Reid 1997:192,210 and 229-230). While the British extended their control and brought big
villages under poll-tax, small villages followed suit without any opposition. It was not the
Adis, but the Khamptis, the Singphos and the Mishmis also assessed to poll tax (see Reid
1997: 252), it was not wise on the part of a section of the Adis to protest the move.
Reconciliation was the prudency which the Adis in general and warring villages in particular
showed after Expedition of 1911-12.

As a mark of reconciliation, the Adis not only stopped attacking the British and people in
their territory, but also approached the officers on their tour to settle their disputes. Mr.
Dundas, in a report for the year 1917-18 writes,

‘The people have since the Abor Expedition and the establishment of a post at
Pasighat been very friendly, bringing all their disputes to us for decision’ (cited in
Reid 1997:253). In addition when the officers toured in different villages, people
brought village disputes, inter-group/village disputes (between Padam, Pangi,
Minyong and Karko, inter-tribe (between Minyong and Galo villages) disputes for
settlement. In fact people gathered in large numbers to renew acquaintance with the
touring officer and his party and took the opportunity of discussing disputes relating
to land, mithun, and other property (see Reid 1997 259-262).

The villagers provided assistance to the survey party when required. Their assistance was
sought in track repairing and at the time of construction of memorials of Mr. Williamson and
Dr. Gregorson (see Reid 1997: 245&254).

10. Geographical effects

Expedition, 1911 had paved the way for the British officers to survey the whole Adi territory
which was contemplated since long. Of course there were attempts, but the survey team or
the touring officers had not gone beyond Kebang. It is only in 1911 that the party reached
Komsing, but the tragedy of the murder of Mr. Williamson and his party took place. The
expedition subsequent to the murder envisaged a large scale survey into the Adi territory. The
survey results were not as expected. It was not possible to determine accurately the natural
boundary between the Adi territory and Tibet. Bu the achievements made were not
insignificant either. The whole Adi territory was approximately surveyed as far as latitude 28 0
40’ N. The Yamne River valley was surveyed upto the snow ranges, the Shimang river was
mapped throughout its entire length; the course of Siyom was roughly traced and the valley
of Dihang was followed as far as Singginging (latitude 28 052’ roughly). However, the identity
of Dihang with the Tsampo could not be absolutely proved, though practically established.

The survey provided a rough idea of the nature and position of Adi territory. Points on the
great snow range to the north of Adi area were fixed. This paved the way for subsequent
demarcation of the boundary (Reid 1997:231).