STOP & FRISK

186. SUSAN ESQUILLO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 182010, August 25, 2010
FACTS:

Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the time of the arrest, two
police officers came to Esquillo and another person while they were transacting. While the officers were
coming, one of the officers saw Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag with white substance in it. When asked,
she fled but was eventually caught.

Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that the officers planted evidence against her.

The lower cause said that the officers had probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-and-frisk doctrine.

ISSUE: Whether the arrest was valid.

RULING:

The SC denied the appeal.

Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was waived by the petitioner when she did not quash it before
arraignment. The issue was only raised the first time during appeal on the appellate court.

On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the white substance from a distance, the plain view doctrine was
imposed. When searched the officers followed the definition and requirements of a valid stop-and-frisk as
stated in People v. Chua - that he should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and
restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing
for possibly concealed weapons.

187. PEOPLE VS. POSADAS, 188 SCRA 288

On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the
premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to
be acting suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee
but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson
revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun 2 a smoke (tear gas)
grenade,3 and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They brought the petitioner to the police station
for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or
authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then
taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to
M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in
the Regional Trial Court of Davao

Issue: whether or not the lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the
possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.

Held: At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag.
They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or
police checkpoints

between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat
in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the
former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only
after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless,
futile and much too late.

he petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.

188. MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997

FACTS: At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City conducted
surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This was done after receiving
information that drug addicts were roaming around said area. Upon reaching the cemetery, the
policemen chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on
drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. Petitioner was trying to
avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce themselves and asked him what he was
holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted. Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner
had in his hands. The petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman
Espiritu found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents
and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated. The suspected marijuana was sent to the
NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and hence
inadmissible as evidence.
HELD: The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge. Any evidence obtained
in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is legally inadmissible in any proceeding. The
exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable
cause. Probable cause being at best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by is in the place to be searched. Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as
another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In the present case, petitioner
effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or
object thereto during the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the respondent court.

 In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation
of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s)

189. MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159

Facts:

On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo
Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3,
Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking
men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of “stop and frisk,”
where a “warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is
either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information”; and that
the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of
the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he was
appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CR
15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.

Quezon Boulevard - near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with “their eyes moving very
fast.” Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30
minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the
policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch
as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt
to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter’s “front
waist line.” Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark at the
bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he
allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential
Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police
officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found
on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but
promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin
to a

Issue:

Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk.”

Held:

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the
same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section
5(a) has been denominated as one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot
pursuit” arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search
of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest;
and (6) a “stop and frisk.” The concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be
confused. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may
be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit
arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an
overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or
was going to be committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” it nevertheless holds
that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop and frisk.” A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even
without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the
“stop-and-frisk” was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu’s claim that Malacat was a member of the group
which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record
nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group. Second, there was nothing in Malacat’s
behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were “moving
very fast” — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and
it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and
were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that
Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
“discovered” “inside the front waistline” of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat’s rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of
Article III of the Constitution.
READ ALSO
190. EDDIE GUAZON, ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, ET AL., GR NO.
80508, January 30, 1990

Facts:
This case is a petition for prohibition for public respondents from conducting "Areal Target
Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila. The Areal target zonings or saturation drives are
in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding.
Areal target or saturation drivers- is a special operation conducted by the police and the military
on pusuing, leftist groups, howeve. Petitioners claim that, such raid is contrary to human rights,
because:
a. These raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and
windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the
process), and then ordering the residents within to come out of their respective
residences.
b. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are subjected to mental
and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information.

Held:
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the
duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the
state may not encroach upon the rights of the individual. It is the duty of the court to take
remedial action even in cases such as the present petition where the petitioners do not complain
that they were victims of the police actions, where no names of any of the thousands of alleged
victims are given, and where the prayer is a general one to stop all police "saturation drives," as
long as the Court is convinced that the event actually happened.
However, in this case no evidence was proved that those policemen in patrol are actually
depriving the people of their right to life and liberty. It was in this manner that the court
remanded the case to the RTC where the respondents can present their evidences for further
disciplinary actions.

191. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA UMIL and NICANOR
 DURAL, FELICITAS SESE VS. FIDEL RAMOS, ET AL. and companion cases, G.R. No.
81567, July 9, 1990

FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and
searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the “confidential
information” that the authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was
charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New People’s Army.
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since
subversion is a form of a continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior
to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in -depth surveillance
of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA. The right to preliminary
investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be
considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is
not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from
error.
If the judge finds that there's probable cause, must he issue a warrant of arrest as a
matter of course? Read:
192. SAMULDE VS. SALVANI, September 26, 1988

Facts:

Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery
filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly
adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal
Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal
Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was
“premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused.
Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable
cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case
against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the
fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the
judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Nevertheless, Judge Samulde was ordered
to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his
finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused committed the
crime charged.

Ruling:
THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOTCONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY
THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OROFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis
of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial.
To determine whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and
under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied
that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should,
instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused.

In this particular case, since the robbery charge was the offshoot of a boundary dispute between two
property owners, the investigating judge did not believe there was any danger of the accused absconding
before the filing of the information against him by the fiscal, hence, he found no need to place him under
immediate custody.

The provincial fiscal anchored his action for mandamus on Section 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Canal
Procedure which provides that upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating
judge should transmit to the provincial fiscal (instead of the clerk of Court of the CFI as provided in the
1940 and 1964 Rules of Court) the warrant of arrest and other records of the preliminary investigation.
From that he deduced that the investigating judge must issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused
upon the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. That inference is not correct. The provision of
Section 5, Rule 112 simply means that the warrant of arrest, if one was issued, shall be transmitted to the
fiscal with the records of the preliminary investigation. If the investigating judge, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, decides not to issue a warrant of arrest, then none need be transmitted to the fiscal,
and he may not be compelled by mandamus to issue it (Vda. de Crisologo vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA
231; Pio vs. Marcos, 56 SCRA 725; PAL Employees Assn. vs. PAL, Inc., III SCRA 215). The fiscal's speedy and
adequate remedy, if he believes that the accused should be immediately placed under custody so as not
to frustrate the ends of justice, is not to file a mandamus action (which may take two years or more to
finally resolve, as happened in this case), but as sensibly indicated by the petitioner, to immediately file
the information so that the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused (Sec. 6,
par. a, Rule 112,1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).

193. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265

Blanco, Pedro Castillo, Sulit, Atienza, and Ildefonso Castillo represented by Oscar Gozos were
charged with murder for killing Gilbert Dyogi. They filed a Motion to Hold Issuance of Warrant
and Motion to Quash with Motion to Set Incidents for Hearing.Edna Dyogi moved for a
reconsideration, arguing that the crime committed was murder, and not homicide, and that
there was probable cause to believe that private respondents Blanco, Pedro Castillo, Sulit,
Atienza, and Ildefonso Castillo were guilty of the offense. In his order, dated November 22, 1995,
respondent judge Tac-an partially reconsidered his order by directing the inclusion of
respondent Pedro Castillo in the information, not as principal but only as an accomplice.
Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in conducting another
preliminary investigation in a proceeding to determine probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest.

Ruling: The determination of a probable cause or also known as preliminary examination for the
issuance of the warrant of arrest is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the
only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonable charged with a crime, to enable
the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof; and it does not
place the persons against whom it is taken in jeopardy.

The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.

Hence, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the judge regarding the designation of the
offense committed, for as long as he finds probable cause for the offense charged, he should issue
a warrant of arrest against the accused for the crime charged in the information.
Place to searched indicated in the warrant is different what the police had in mind
when applied for a warrant:
194. PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400

FACTS: A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed
search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under
the warrant.
An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had
allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay
Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan.
The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at
Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals
and the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms.
ISSUE: WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private respondents
were then actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically
described in the warrant.
HELD: In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first four (4) separate
apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search.
The same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT
WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.
As such, any evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that indicated in the
search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place
to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that
the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done.
It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant
on the claim that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly
what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting
evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself,
not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the
court issuing the warrant.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’ own
personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the
warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.
It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that
delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to
officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from
them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by
the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search.

Searching questions
Read:
195. DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M.
DAYRIT, RTC 33, Manila & People of the Philippines, GR No. 82870, December 14,
1989 (En Banc)

FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila,
Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession
of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of
“result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from verified
sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed to possess
said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not
student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions
which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office
of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
1. Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
2. The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and answers
3. Search warrant was a general warrant
4. Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under
oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD: Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the
Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The
probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing
Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing and under
oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach
to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
– This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant and
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
*For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree punishes several
offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase illegal possession of firearms etc. –
– Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific
offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to
mention the particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the
invalidation of this case.
196. HUBERT WEBB VS. DE LEON, 247 SCRA 650

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice
a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and
six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother
Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.
Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica
Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28,
1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel
when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita
Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of
their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is
probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to
charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

HELD:

1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to
be heard.
4. NO.

REASONS:

1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable
cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases,
there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information,
the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent Judges should have conducted “searching examination
of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel
to study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom
to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are
faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators
(See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes
that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were
deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and
content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness
and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity
on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

Read also:
197. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33

Facts:
The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso
Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in
violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal
knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering
the search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents
namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized
was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the
Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued
was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles
seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC
and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody
be declared null and void.

Issue:

Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath
the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of
the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered
reliable.

Ruling:

Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not
only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an
application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath
includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully
and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince
the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether
it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.
The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason
of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the
books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of
at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant
in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the
depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter.
The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing
magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient,
the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because
his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of
one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and
direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the
facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent
who had no personal knowledge of the facts
198. Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 313

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of CFI Surigao del Sur dismissing the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by herein petitioner-appellant Simon LUNA who was charged with murder. This petition
stemmed from a criminal action commenced by the Phil. Constabulary investigator of Tandag, Surigao del
Sur when he filed with respondent MTC Judge Lorenzo PLAZA a criminal case charging LUNA with the crime
of murder.
Supporting the complaint/information were sworn statements of the witnesses for the
prosecution, subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge at the time of the filing of the
complaint, Judge PLAZA examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the
questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before said
Judge that the averments contained in their affidavits were made by them. They also swore to the truth
thereof. Thereafter, they signed their respective affidavits in the presence of Judge PLAZA, who also signed
after the usual procedure of administering the oath.
Considering the averments in these affidavits, the stipulation in the complaint/information and on
the strength of other documentary evidence submitted to him, Judge PLAZA found probable cause and
issued the warrant of arrest, specifying therein that no bail is fixed for the provisional release of the
accused. However, upon motion from LUNA, Judge PLAZA granted bail at P30,000, which, however was
later revoked, in effect again denying LUNA bail. Thereafter, LUNA waived his right to PI. Hence, the case
was remanded to the CFI of Surigao del Sur for hearing after the Provincial Fiscal filed the necessary
information charging LUNA with the crime of murder.
On April 1967, LUNA filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the CFI of Surigao del Sur,
claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without the due process of law, on the ground that the
imprisonment and detention was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge in violation
of RA 3828, and praying for the annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from confinement.
Herein respondents (Judge PLAZA, the jail warden and the city fiscal) all answered said petition and alleged
that the provisions of RA 3828 (Amendment to the Judiciary Act) have been complied with.
As stated, the CFI ruled against LUNA and rendered herein assailed decision denying his petition
for habeas corpus, hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON CFI erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus
HELD:
NO! LUNA’s appeal is devoid of merit. Perforce, the decision of the CFI of Surigao del Sur is AFFIRMED. In
this appeal, LUNA assails the conduct of the “preliminary examination” by Judge PLAZA as being irregular
as far as RA 3828 is concerned, hence, the warrant of arrest which issued therefrom is also irregular.
According to RA 3828 (Judiciary Act), judges doing preliminary examination for purposes of issuing warrants
of arrests are required to personally “examine” (i.e. ask searching questions) the complainant and her
witnesses under oath; and then reduce the same into writing (i.e. to make part of the records such
examination).
On the other hand, Art III, Sec 1 (3) of the 1935 Const. provides that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. A perusal of the records of the case would lead to the
conclusion that Judge PLAZA substantially complied with the preceding requirements of the Constitution
and the law.
No Denial of Due Process and Waiver of Rights
Preliminary examination/investigation is not an essential part of due process of law. This is evidenced by
the fact that our rules of criminal procedure allow its waiver. Therefore, when it is forgone for the reason
thus stated, the same does not constitute a denial of due process. It is merely a statutory right. As borne
by the records, LUNA waived his right to the preliminary examination when he filed a petition for bail.
Consequently, this conduct of LUNA indicates that he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any,
in the preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge PLAZA prior to the issuance of the warrant
of arrest. Also, no substantial right of LUNA had been violated precisely because he has waived his right to
preliminary investigation after he was arrested, and that he took the step of applying for bail before
respondent Municipal Judge constitute an implied admission on his part that here was a probable cause
for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. Those acts of the petitioner constitute a waiver of
whatever irregularity, if any there was, that attended his arrest.
Quashal and not Habeas Corpus is the Proper Remedy
The remedy available to the petitioner LUNA, under the circumstances of this case, is not a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the
case by the respondent Municipal Judge PLAZA or by the Provincial Fiscal.

199. De Mulata vs. Irizari, 62 SCRA 210

FACTS:
Judge Elias Irizari is charged with grave abuse of discretion, favouritism and bias for
conducting the preliminary examination without giving De Mulata opportunity to be heard. The
Chief of Police of Hinatuan filed a case of Assault upon a person in authority with physical
injuries. The judge issue the order for arrest after conducting the preliminary examination.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest warrant is valid
HELD:
The warrant is valid. The purpose of the preliminary examination is to determine whether
or not there is sufficient reason to issue a warrant of arrest. Section 6 of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Court requires that the warrant of arrest shall be issued only when the judge conducting
the preliminary examination is satisfied that the offense has in fact been committed and that
there is a reasonable ground to believe that the accused committed the same. This is in
conformity with the constitutional requirement that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

200. Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423

The present controversy arose out of the issuance by the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, of a Writ of
Execution in Civil Case No. 938 for Ejectment, entitled Jose C. Zulueta vs. Gregorio Atienza. On December
13, 1965, petitioner Antonio Marinas, Deputy Sheriff of Rizal, with his co-petitioners Antonio Montano
and Gregorio Rupisan enforced said Writ of Execution by levying upon the personal properties and
chattels of private respondents Victoria Lasin Vda. de Atienza and] Rosario L. Atienza, and taking out said
properties from their (respondents') rented house at #23 General Malvar St., Antonio Village, Pasig, Rizal.
Respondents were also ejected from said house. On the same date, respondent Victoria Lasin Vda, de
Atienza reported to the police authorities of Pasig that her jewelry worth P590.00 had been taken by
petitioners without issuing any receipt therefor, 1 and in connection therewith, she executed a written
Statement which was sworn to before Special Counsel Lucila P. Alcoba. 2

On January 28, 1966, respondents re-entered the house they had been ejected from after securing a
Court Order for that purpose. Respondent Rosario L. Atienza then discovered that several pieces of her
jewelry and other personal items, with a total value of P1,018.00, were missing. She reported the loss to
the authorities on February 2, 1966, and her Statement was taken. She subscribed and swore to the same
before respondent Municipal Judge Andres S. Siochi. 3

On February 3, 1966, respondents, armed with a Court Order authorizing them to enter the premises of
the said house, did so again to get their remaining unlevied properties. They claimed, however, that on
the said date petitioners and their companions forcibly compelled them to deliver the unlevied personal
properties found therein, hauled said articles into a truck and left. Private respondents reported the
incident to the police authorities at Pasig. 4 Victoria Lasin executed a Statement 5alleging that the
personal properties forcibly taken from them by petitioners, amounting to P2,645.00, were not included
in the levy. Her son, Tranquilino Atienza, also executed an Affidavit corroborating her declaration. 6 Both
Statements were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge.

On February 7, 1966, two separate charges for Theft, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and 12945,
were filed against petitioners and Carlos Quintana before the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, respondent
Judge, presiding. 7 A Complaint for Grave Coercion Crime Case No. 12944) was also lodged against
petitioners and three Does on the same date.8 The three Complaints were filed by Lt. Jose S. Lontoc, Chief
of the Criminal Investigation Section of the Police Department of Pasig, Rizal, for and on behalf of the
Chief of Police. These Complaints contained an annotation on the lower left hand corner reading:
"APPROVED AFTER PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION: (SGD) Lucila P. Alcoba, Special Counsel." The Complaints
in Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and 12944 for Theft and Grave Coercion, respectively, were subscribed and
sworn to by Lt. Jose S. Lontoc before respondent Judge. The Complaint in Criminal Case No. 12945 for
Theft does not show the jurat on its face, but respondents state that it was also attested to by Lt. Lontoc
before respondent Judge and that this appears on the dorsal side of the Complaint. On February 8, 1966,
warrants for the arrest of petitioners were issued by respondent Judge in all three cases 9after
preliminary examination conducted by him in Criminal Cases Nos. 12943 and 12944, and by Special
Counsel Lucila P. Alcoba in Criminal Case No. 12945.

ISSUE:

whether or not an accused is entitled to appear and present evidence in a preliminary investigation

whether or not probable cause exists or not depends upon the judgment and discretion of the Judge
issuing the warrant of arrest

HELD:

what has been stated in this opinion is certainly not intended to sanction the return to the former
practice of municipal judges of simply relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to
accompany the complaints that are filed before them, in determining whether there is a probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. That practice is precisely what is sought to be voided by the
amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a
municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by
examining the witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under oath and reduced to writing
in the form of searching questions and answers. It is obvious that the purpose of this amendment is to
prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses
who made, and swore to, their statements before a person or persons other than the judge before whom
the criminal complaint is filed. We wish to emphasize strict compliance by municipal or city judges of the
provision of Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act 3828, in order to avoid
malicious and/or unfounded criminal prosecution of person.

What was conducted by the respondent Judge in these cases is the preliminary examinationbefore the
issuance of a warrant of arrest pursuant to section 1, Rule 112. The 1935 Constitution, in section l (3),
Article III provides that no warrant shall be issued but upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge after examination of witnesses under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he
may produce. Conformably thereto, Section 87, paragraph 3, of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic
Act No. 3828, provides that: before a Municipal Judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following
conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witness or witnesses personally; (2) the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers.

These requirements have been met in the three criminal cases involved herein.
201. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 687

FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The
petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum
revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against
the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search
warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by
Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, he
proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew
and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before him.
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure in issuing the Search
Warrant.
HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach
them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken
considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the
witnesses whose depositions had already been taken by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere
hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence.

202. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388

Facts :

The contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on application for Search
Warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully allegedly subscribed, and sworn to before
the Clerk of Court. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of the respondent Judge to attach the
necessary papers pertinently under PD 810, as amended by PD1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano
Mata offered, took, and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets knows as Masiao tickets without
any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.
Issue: Whether or not Search Warrant is valid?

Ruling:

No. The Search Warrant is declared as illegal. Deposition, sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written
statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to
written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral
examination. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to property determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving if it will be found later his declarations are
false.

203. Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541

Corro is the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, whose offices were subjected to search and seizure of items and articles
that were used and being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of inciting to sedition.

Facts:

1. Petitioner (Rommel Corro) is publisher and editor of the Philippine Times.

2. Upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the PC-Criminal Investigation Service, respondent (RTC Judge Esteban
Lising) issued a search warrant on September 29, 1983, authorizing the search and seizure of: (a) printed copies of
Philippine Times, (b) manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times, (c) newspaper dummies of
the Philippine Times, (d) subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and (e)
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes. Said
items/articles were used and being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of inciting to sedition
(Article 142).
3. On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents/personal
properties alleging, among others that said seized properties were not in any way connected with the offense of
inciting to sedition and that the documents/papers seized has been rendered moot and academic due to the findings of
the Agrava Board – having exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts and circumstances behind the killing of Ninoy
Aquino – that a military conspiracy was responsible for Ninoy Aquino’s slaying. Said motion was denied by respondent.

Ruling:

1. Probable cause, as defined in Burton v. St. Paul, M&M. Ry. Co., is constituted by “such reasons, supported by facts and
circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are
legally just and proper.” Thus, an application for search warrant must state with particularity the alleged subversive
materials published or intended to be published by the petitioner.
2. A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described
in the search warrant – to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles should they should
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed.
3. The statement of Col. Castillo in his affidavit state that they have “found that the said publication in fact foments
distrust and hatred against the government of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities,” together with Lt.
Ignacio’s statement that said periodical “contains articles tending to incite distrust and hatred for the Philippine
Government,” is a mere conclusion of law and would not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
204. Nolasco vs Pano, 147 SCRA 509
FACTS:
The case at bar is for the motion for partial reconsideration of both petitioners and respondents of
the SC’s decision that the questioned search warrant by petitioners is null and void, that respondents are
enjoined from introducing evidence using such search warrant, but such personalities
obtained would still be retained, without prejudice to petitioner Aguilar-Roque. Respondents contend
that the search warrant is valid and that it
should be considered in the context of the crime of rebellion, where the warrant was
based. Petitioners on the other hand, on the part of petitioner Aguilar-
Roque, contend that a lawful search would be justified only by a
lawful arrest. And since there was illegal arrest of Aguilar-Roque, the
search was unlawful and that the personalities seized during the illegal search should be returned to
the petitioner. The respondents, in defense, concede that the search warrants were null and void but the
arrests were not.
HELD:
"Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the
exclusionary rule has proved by historical
experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and
thereby removing the incentive on the part of
state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution
mandates is beyond the power of the courts to
change or modify. All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly
and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners.

FACTS FROM THE FULL CASE (147 SCRA 509):

In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, public respondents maintain that the subject Search Warrant
meets the standards for validity and that it should be considered in the context of the criminal offense of
Rebellion for which the Warrant was issued, the documents to establish which are less susceptible of
particularization since the offense does not involve an isolated act or transaction.

In their own Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners assail that portion of the Decision holding that,
in so far as petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque is concerned, the search made in her premises was incident to
her arrest and could be made without a search warrant. Petitioners submit that a warrantless search can
be justified only if it is an incident to a lawful arrest and that since Mila Aguilar was not lawfully arrested a
search without warrant could not be made.

On April 10, 1986, the parties were required to MOVE in the premises considering the supervening events,
including the change of administration that have transpired, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 18
of Rule 3 in so far as the public respondents are concerned (which requires the successor official to state
whether or not he maintains the action and position taken by his predecessor-in-office).
In their Compliance, petitioners maintain that the arrest of petitioners and the search of their premises
thereafter are both illegal and that the personalties seized should be ordered returned to their owners.

The Solicitor General on behalf of public respondents, "in deference to the dissenting opinion of then
Supreme Court Justice (now Chief Justice) Claudio Teehankee," now offer no further objection to a
declaration that the subject search is illegal and to the return of the seized items to the petitioners.
Respondents state, however, that they cannot agree to having the arrest of petitioners declared illegal.

The pertinent portion of the dissenting opinion referred to reads:

... The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's
decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that
'the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects aqainst
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be
violated' (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally
obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate
expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive
on the part of state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain
language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or
modify.

All the articles thus seized fag under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and
cannot be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent
case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). ...

ACCORDINGLY, considering the respective positions now taken by the parties, petitioners' Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of this Court's Decision of October 8, 1985 is GRANTED, and the dispositive portion
thereof is hereby revised to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents
from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents Case
hereby made permanent. The personalities seized by virtue of the illegal Search Warrant are hereby
ordered returned to petitioners.

*FACTS FROM THE CASE (132 SCRA 152):

Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group
(CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m.
of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable
typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s leased
residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized,
charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her
and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a
general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search
and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions
propounded to the applicant’s witness.

205. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

G.R. No L-64261 December 26, 1984

Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive
activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for
the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as
evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued
indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties.
Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Held: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was evident
in the issuance of the two warrant.
As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case
of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized
when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted
to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs.
State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized
did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

206. P. vs. Burgos, September 14,1986

Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion

(tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members)
and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police
authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit
into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently,
certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of
the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims
that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged
extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person
and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial
court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial
court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs
6and 7.
Issue: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a
firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.
Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon
the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them—in
wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin,
the state, however powerful, doesn’t have access to a man’s home, his haven of refuge where his
individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around
him. In the traditional formulation, a man’s house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government. The trial court justified the warrantless
arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC: a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; b) When an offense has in
fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it; c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another and the
confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12: A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
the offense. However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is
under the ambit of aforementioned. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—
he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest.

207. P. vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni, July 6,1988

Facts:
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was
identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him as
he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
Issue:
Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is
violated
Ruling:
The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of
court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be
committed or had just been committed.
A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the
customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that
they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the information they have received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of
a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine on his own authority that a
search warrant was not necessary.
The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law
enforcement agents.
208. Ponsica vs. lgnalaga, July 31,1987

FACTS:
The chief issue raised by the petitioners in this case is whether or not Section 143 of the Local
Government Code1 granting power to the municipal mayor to conduct preliminary investigations
and order the arrest of the accused, was repealed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
promulgated by this Court; and is, in addition, unconstitutional as vesting the power to conduct
preliminary investigations in an official who cannot be deemed a "neutral and detached
magistrate" within the contemplation of Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. The issue
is hereby resolved adversely to the petitioners, with the stressed qualification that the mayor's
power to order arrest ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when the new Constitution was
ratified by the Filipino people, and that, in any event, the investigation actually conducted by
respondent mayor in the case at bar was fatally defective.

RULING:
While it is true that the mayors do "exercise general supervision over units and elements of the
INP stationed or assigned in their respective jurisdictions," they are not themselves directly
involved in police work and cannot in any sense be described, as the petitioners do, as being
deeply involved in law enforcement functions. And even if that "deep involvement" be
conceded, it does not follow that this would necessarily preclude their assuming "the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge" in conducting preliminary investigations of persons suspected of
crimes.

As the law now stands, the mayor may no longer conduct preliminary investigation, the authority
to do so being limited under Section 2, Rule 1 1 2 of the Rules of Court to (1) provincial or city
fiscals and their assistants; (2) judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; (3) national and regional state prosecutors; and (d) such other officers as may be
authorized by law. But only "the judge" may issue search and arrest warrants after due
determination of probable cause.