Freedom of Religion Full Text Cases

1
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of
Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.a
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in
the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of
the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United
States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are
blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations
are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though
the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to
be prevented by the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While,
generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ."
(Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with
reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the
challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because
alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction."
The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined
exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of
justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner,
or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions
of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as
follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system
of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our
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Article III – Freedom of Religion
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country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught
us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the
estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their
recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional
development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of
December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine
Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the
Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil
freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to
support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should
be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious
toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence

for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of
Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve
and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves
and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In
fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and
denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to
religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec.
4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid
is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such
is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13,
subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public
schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in
relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day,
Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the
secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows
divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are
considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised
Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT
OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE
STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature

assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
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SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount
herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to
the Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the
Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates
and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and
authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often
as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage
stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the
Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as
Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if
the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the
postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps
worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by
any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On
the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on
page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was
"to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned
merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to
the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and
Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It
is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of
showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and
the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself
but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the
issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event
of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the
Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more
or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S.,
295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain
inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by
indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious
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intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development
nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government
is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious
reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have
come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No.
4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made
use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the
petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the
unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in
setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981
ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and
JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners,
vs.
Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc
City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C.
VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO
NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA
BALTAZAR, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia,
Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in
the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to
whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image.
On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional
socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer,
the patron saint of Valencia".
That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976
festivity. lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2) the
construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be
obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations " (Exh A or 6).
On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in
accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or
hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that
the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as
chairman of the next feast day.
It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic
parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day (Exh. B or 7).
Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly ratified by the barangay
general assembly on March 26, 1976. Two hundred seventy-two voters ratified the two
resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5).
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Funds were raised by means of solicitations0 and cash donations of the barangay residents and
those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed
and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council
for four hundred pesos (Exh. F-l, 3 and 4).
On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of
Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta.
A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña
refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the
church because church funds were used for its acquisition.
Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass,
Father Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C.
Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file
against Father Osmeña in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.
Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's
office and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of
immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law.
Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia.
Because Father Osmeña did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the
image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12,
1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father
Osmeña for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the barangay council
passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or
9).
The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmeña and Bishop
Cipriano Urgel (Exh. F). After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred
pesos, Father Osmeña turned over the image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). ln his answer to the
complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions (Exh. F-1).
Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two
Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its
members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City,
praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0).
The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the resolutions. The petitioners
appealed under Republic Act No. 5440. The petitioners contend that the barangay council was
not duly constituted because lsidoro M. Mañago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay,
was not allowed to participate in its sessions.
Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A).
Presidential Decree No. 557, which took effect on September 21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed
that all barrios should be known as barangays and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the
Barangay Charter.
Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated. They are
quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such powers" as are provided by law "for the
performance of particular government functions, to be exercised by and through their respective
barrio governments in conformity with law" (Sec. 2, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590).
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The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least six
months, eighteen years of age or over and Filipino citizens duly registered in the list kept by the
barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).
The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and six
councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which took effect on April 15,
1975, provides that "the barangay youth chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay
council", having the same powers and functions as a barangay councilman.
In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay
council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions
because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d] Exh.
1).
Mañago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions
void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed.
The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional
provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public
money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 8,
Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).
That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or
indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or
property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private
funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
Manifestly puerile and flimsy is Petitioners argument that the barangay council favored the
Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the
patron saint's wooden image and making the image available to the Catholic church.
The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel
advanced that argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmeña the parish priest.
The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta
honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the
highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be
placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.
If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the
acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.
As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an
ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the
lives of the masses.
The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to
forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that
arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made
available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.
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The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces
swore that the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar
and Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the
image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J).
We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion annd
the use of public money to favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case even
remotely or indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case on those issues.
This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the
parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of
causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image
of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.
There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father
Osmeña claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the
image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof.
If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church. that action
would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its
private property.
The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting
Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.
Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has
some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and
state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty
thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs.
Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department Head and the President
of the Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of
the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church.
The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The design of the
stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about the Catholic Church. No religious
purpose was intended.
Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought
to enjoin the sale of those commemorative postage stamps.
It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a religious
character, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit
was dismissed.
The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil., 627 and 55 Phil.
307, where a religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for
the purpose of raising funds to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy
Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it held
as trustee. 0
Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay
resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed. No costs.
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SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CITY OF MANILA, Defendant-Appellee.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Juan Nabong for appellant.

Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Na�awa for appellee.
FELIX, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly

registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in
Manila in November, 1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral in said City. The defendant
appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation) throughout the
Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. On May 29 1953, the acting
City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of
general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's
permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances
Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding
permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of
1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex
A).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded that plaintiff deposit
and pay under protest the sum of P5,891.45, if suit was to be taken in court regarding the same
(Annex B). To avoid the closing of its business as well as further fines and penalties in the
premises on October 24, 1953, plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and
license fees in the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time notice to the City Treasurer
that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which, the said
fees were being collected (Annex C), which was done on the same date by filing the complaint
that gave rise to this action. In its complaint plaintiff prays that judgment be rendered declaring
the said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364
illegal and unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the sum of
P5,891.45 paid under protest, together with legal interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further
praying for such other relief and remedy as the court may deem just
equitable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Defendant answered the complaint, maintaining in turn that said ordinances were enacted by the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila by virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444,
subsection (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, 1949, by section
18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila,
and praying that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. This answer was replied
by the plaintiff reiterating the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated
ordinances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Before trial the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
COME NOW the parties in the above-entitled case, thru their undersigned attorneys and
respectfully submit the following stipulation of facts:chanrobles virtual law library
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1. That the plaintiff sold for the use of the purchasers at its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral,
Manila, Bibles, New Testaments, bible portions and bible concordance in English and other
foreign languages imported by it from the United States as well as Bibles, New Testaments and
bible portions in the local dialects imported and/or purchased locally; that from the fourth quarter
of 1945 to the first quarter of 1953 inclusive the sales made by the plaintiff were as
follows:chanrobles virtual law library
Quarter
Amount of Sales
4th quarter 1945
P1,244.21
1st quarter 1946
2,206.85
2nd quarter 1946
1,950.38
3rd quarter 1946
2,235.99
4th quarter 1946
3,256.04
1st quarter 1947
13,241.07
2nd quarter 1947
15,774.55
3rd quarter 1947
14,654.13
4th quarter 1947
12,590.94
1st quarter 1948
11,143.90
2nd quarter 1948
14,715.26
3rd quarter 1948

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38,333.83
4th quarter 1948
16,179.90
1st quarter 1949
23,975.10
2nd quarter 1949
17,802.08
3rd quarter 1949
16,640.79
4th quarter 1949
15,961.38
1st quarter 1950
18,562.46
2nd quarter 1950
21,816.32
3rd quarter 1950
25,004.55
4th quarter 1950
45,287.92
1st quarter 1951
37,841.21
2nd quarter 1951
29,103.98
3rd quarter 1951
20,181.10
4th quarter 1951
22,968.91
1st quarter 1952

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23,002.65
2nd quarter 1952
17,626.96
3rd quarter 1952
17,921.01
4th quarter 1952
24,180.72
1st quarter 1953
29,516.21
2. That the parties hereby reserve the right to present evidence of other facts not herein
stipulated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be set for hearing so that the parties may
present further evidence on their behalf. (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-16).
When the case was set for hearing, plaintiff proved, among other things, that it has been in
existence in the Philippines since 1899, and that its parent society is in New York, United States
of America; that its, contiguous real properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate
taxes; and that it was never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor
does the American Bible Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for the sale
of bible therein. Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the sale of its
bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its
operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York office and voluntary
contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in the United States and in the Philippines,
which are interested in its missionary work. Regarding plaintiff's contention of lack of profit in the
sale of bibles, defendant retorts that the admissions of plaintiff-appellant's lone witness who
testified on cross-examination that bibles bearing the price of 70 cents each from plaintiff-
appellant's New York office are sold here by plaintiff-appellant at P1.30 each; those bearing the
price of $4.50 each are sold here at P10 each; those bearing the price of $7 each are sold here
at P15 each; and those bearing the price of $11 each are sold here at P22 each, clearly show
that plaintiff's contention that it never makes any profit from the sale of its bible, is evidently
untenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After hearing the Court rendered judgment, the last part of which is as follows:
As may be seen from the repealed section (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and the
repealing portions (o) of section 18 of Republic Act No. 409, although they seemingly differ in the
way the legislative intent is expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the purpose
of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said legal provisions, and that the taxes to be levied by
said ordinances is in the nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of Ordinance No. 3000,
as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinance No.
3364).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court is of the opinion and so holds
that this case should be dismissed, as it is hereby dismissed, for lack of merits, with costs
against the plaintiff.
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Not satisfied with this verdict plaintiff took up the matter to the Court of Appeals which certified
the case to Us for the reason that the errors assigned to the lower Court involved only questions
of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant contends that the lower Court erred:
1. In holding that Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not
unconstitutional;chanrobles virtual law library
2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code under
which Ordinances Nos. 2592 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section 18 of
Republic Act No. 409;chanrobles virtual law library
3. In not holding that an ordinance providing for taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order
to be valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be approved by the President of
the Philippines; andchanrobles virtual law library
4. In holding that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed commercial
proportions, it cannot escape from the operation of said municipal ordinances under the cloak of
religious privilege.
The issues. - As may be seen from the proceeding statement of the case, the issues involved in
the present controversy may be reduced to the following: (1) whether or not the ordinances of the
City of Manila, Nos. 3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and valid;
and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not to the case at
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Predicated on this constitutional mandate, plaintiff-appellant contends that Ordinances Nos. 2529
and 3000, as respectively amended, are unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is
concerned, because they provide for religious censorship and restrain the free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious
literature to the people of the Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Before entering into a discussion of the constitutional aspect of the case, We shall first consider
the provisions of the questioned ordinances in relation to their application to the sale of bibles,
etc. by appellant. The records, show that by letter of May 29, 1953 (Annex A), the City Treasurer
required plaintiff to secure a Mayor's permit in connection with the society's alleged business of
distributing and selling bibles, etc. and to pay permit dues in the sum of P35 for the period
covered in this litigation, plus the sum of P35 for compromise on account of plaintiff's failure to
secure the permit required by Ordinance No. 3000 of the City of Manila, as amended. This
Ordinance is of general application and not particularly directed against institutions like the
plaintiff, and it does not contain any provisions whatever prescribing religious censorship nor
restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession. Section 1 of Ordinance
No. 3000 reads as follows:
SEC. 1. PERMITS NECESSARY. - It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to conduct or
engage in any of the businesses, trades, or occupations enumerated in Section 3 of this
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Ordinance or other businesses, trades, or occupations for which a permit is required for the
proper supervision and enforcement of existing laws and ordinances governing the sanitation,
security, and welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged in the business
specified in said section 3 hereof, WITHOUT FIRST HAVING OBTAINED A PERMIT
THEREFOR FROM THE MAYOR AND THE NECESSARY LICENSE FROM THE CITY
TREASURER.
The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff involved in this case is not particularly
mentioned in Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not show that a permit is required
therefor under existing laws and ordinances for the proper supervision and enforcement of their
provisions governing the sanitation, security and welfare of the public and the health of the
employees engaged in the business of the plaintiff. However, sections 3 of Ordinance 3000
contains item No. 79, which reads as follows:
79. All other businesses, trades or occupations not

mentioned in this Ordinance, except those upon which the
City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00
Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or
tax said business, trade or occupation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As to the license fees that the Treasurer of the City of Manila required the society to pay from the
4th quarter of 1945 to the 1st quarter of 1953 in the sum of P5,821.45, including the sum of P50
as compromise, Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028
prescribes the following:
SEC. 1. FEES. - Subject to the provisions of section 578 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila, as amended, there shall be paid to the City Treasurer for engaging in any of the
businesses or occupations below enumerated, quarterly, license fees based on gross sales or
receipts realized during the preceding quarter in accordance with the rates herein prescribed:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That a person engaged in any businesses or occupation for the first
time shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable gross sales or receipts for the first
quarter beginning from the date of the opening of the business as indicated herein for the
corresponding business or occupation.
xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library
GROUP 2. - Retail dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject
to the payment of any municipal tax, such as (1) retail dealers in general merchandise; (2) retail
dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of . . . books, including stationery.
xxx xxx xxx
As may be seen, the license fees required to be paid quarterly in Section 1 of said Ordinance No.
2529, as amended, are not imposed directly upon any religious institution but upon those
engaged in any of the business or occupations therein enumerated, such as retail "dealers in
general merchandise" which, it is alleged, cover the business or occupation of selling bibles,
books, etc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code which includes section 2444, subsection (m-2) of
said legal body, as amended by Act No. 3659, approved on December 8, 1929, empowers the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila:
(M-2) To tax and fix the license fee on (a) dealers in new automobiles or accessories or both,
and (b) retail dealers in new (not yet used) merchandise, which dealers are not yet subject to the
payment of any municipal tax.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
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For the purpose of taxation, these retail dealers shall be classified as (1) retail dealers in general
merchandise, and (2) retail dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of (a) textiles . . . (e) books,
including stationery, paper and office supplies, . . .: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the combined
total tax of any debtor or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under these subsections (m-1) and
(m-2), whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned herein, SHALL NOT BE IN
EXCESS OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS PER ANNUM.
and appellee's counsel maintains that City Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, were
enacted in virtue of the power that said Act No. 3669 conferred upon the City of Manila.
Appellant, however, contends that said ordinances are longer in force and effect as the law under
which they were promulgated has been expressly repealed by Section 102 of Republic Act No.
409 passed on June 18, 1949, known as the Revised Manila Charter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
Passing upon this point the lower Court categorically stated that Republic Act No. 409 expressly
repealed the provisions of Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code but in the opinion of
the trial Judge, although Section 2444 (m-2) of the former Manila Charter and section 18 (o) of
the new seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent was expressed, yet their meaning is
practically the same for the purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in both legal provisions
and, consequently, Ordinances Nos. 2529 and 3000, as amended, are to be considered as still in
full force and effect uninterruptedly up to the present.
Often the legislature, instead of simply amending the pre-existing statute, will repeal the old
statute in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enact all or certain portions of the preexisting
law. Of course, the problem created by this sort of legislative action involves mainly the effect of
the repeal upon rights and liabilities which accrued under the original statute. Are those rights
and liabilities destroyed or preserved? The authorities are divided as to the effect of
simultaneous repeals and re-enactments. Some adhere to the view that the rights and liabilities
accrued under the repealed act are destroyed, since the statutes from which they sprang are
actually terminated, even though for only a very short period of time. Others, and they seem to
be in the majority, refuse to accept this view of the situation, and consequently maintain that all
rights an liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be
enforced, since the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore, continuing the law in force
without interruption. (Crawford-Statutory Construction, Sec. 322).
Appellant's counsel states that section 18 (o) of Republic Act No, 409 introduces a new and
wider concept of taxation and is different from the provisions of Section 2444(m-2) that the
former cannot be considered as a substantial re-enactment of the provisions of the latter. We
have quoted above the provisions of section 2444(m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and
We shall now copy hereunder the provisions of Section 18, subdivision (o) of Republic Act No.
409, which reads as follows:
(o) To tax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers and
indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other
municipal tax under the provisions of this section.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail
dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into
four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities,
and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but where
commodities of different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not be compulsory
for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax
prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be
provided by ordinance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
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For purposes of this section, the term "General merchandise" shall include poultry and livestock,
agricultural products, fish and other allied products.
The only essential difference that We find between these two provisions that may have any
bearing on the case at bar, is that, while subsection (m-2) prescribes that the combined total tax
of any dealer or manufacturer, or both, enumerated under subsections (m-1) and (m-2), whether
dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned therein, shall not be in excess of P500 per annum,
the corresponding section 18, subsection (o) of Republic Act No. 409, does not contain any
limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annum.
Hence, and in accordance with the weight of the authorities above referred to that maintain that
"all rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be
enforced, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force
without interruption", We hold that the questioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in
force and effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff, however, argues that the questioned ordinances, to be valid, must first be approved by
the President of the Philippines as per section 18, subsection (ii) of Republic Act No. 409, which
reads as follows:
(ii) To tax, license and regulate any business, trade or occupation being conducted within the
City of Manila, not otherwise enumerated in the preceding subsections, including percentage
taxes based on gross sales or receipts, subject to the approval of the PRESIDENT, except
amusement taxes.
but this requirement of the President's approval was not contained in section 2444 of the former
Charter of the City of Manila under which Ordinance No. 2529 was promulgated. Anyway, as
stated by appellee's counsel, the business of "retail dealers in general merchandise" is expressly
enumerated in subsection (o), section 18 of Republic Act No. 409; hence, an ordinance
prescribing a municipal tax on said business does not have to be approved by the President to
be effective, as it is not among those referred to in said subsection (ii). Moreover, the questioned
ordinances are still in force, having been promulgated by the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila under the authority granted to it by law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The question that now remains to be determined is whether said ordinances are inapplicable,
invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged business of distribution and sale of bibles to
the people of the Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible Society, plaintiff
herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With regard to Ordinance No. 2529, as amended by Ordinances Nos. 2779, 2821 and 3028,
appellant contends that it is unconstitutional and illegal because it restrains the free exercise and
enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines aforequoted, guarantees the
freedom of religious profession and worship. "Religion has been spoken of as a profession of
faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to its Creator" (Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil.,
201).It has reference to one's views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they
impose of reverence to His being and character, and obedience to His Will (Davis vs. Beason,
133 U.S., 342). The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints
of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds
that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent". (Ta�ada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p. 297).
POLIREV
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In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its distribution
and sale of bibles and other religious literature:
In the case of Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, it was held that an ordinance requiring that a license be
obtained before a person could canvass or solicit orders for goods, paintings, pictures, wares or
merchandise cannot be made to apply to members of Jehovah's Witnesses who went about from
door to door distributing literature and soliciting people to "purchase" certain religious books and
pamphlets, all published by the Watch Tower Bible & Tract Society. The "price" of the books was
twenty-five cents each, the "price" of the pamphlets five cents each. It was shown that in making
the solicitations there was a request for additional "contribution" of twenty-five cents each for the
books and five cents each for the pamphlets. Lesser sum were accepted, however, and books
were even donated in case interested persons were without funds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On the above facts the Supreme Court held that it could not be said that petitioners were
engaged in commercial rather than a religious venture. Their activities could not be described as
embraced in the occupation of selling books and pamphlets. Then the Court
continued:chanrobles virtual law library
"We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of
government. See Grosjean vs. American Press Co., 297 U.S., 233, 250, 80 L. ed. 660, 668, 56
S. Ct. 444. We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one
who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with
activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite
another to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the
City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these
constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or
suppress its enjoyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make
its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who
can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to
all those who do not have a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable
manner would thus be denied the needy. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is
unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax - a
flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights . . . The power to
impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedom is indeed as potent as the power of
censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal fee imposed as a
regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way
apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities
whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably
tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and
evil of this flat license tax."chanrobles virtual law library
Nor could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon the approval of an official or
manager even if the town were owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh vs. State of
Alabama (326 U.S. 501), or by the United States itself as held in the case of Tucker vs. Texas
(326 U.S. 517). In the former case the Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the right to
enjoy freedom of the press and religion occupies a preferred position as against the
constitutional right of property owners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
"When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people to
enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter
occupy a preferred position. . . . In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the
premises where the deprivation of property here involved, took place, were held by others than
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the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a community of
citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the
application of a State statute." (Ta�ada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol.
1, 4th ed., p. 304-306).
Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue
Code, provides:
SEC. 27. EXEMPTIONS FROM TAX ON CORPORATIONS. - The following organizations shall
not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as such - chanrobles virtual
law library
(e) Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . .
or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and
character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit,
regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this
Code;
Appellant's counsel claims that the Collector of Internal Revenue has exempted the plaintiff from
this tax and says that such exemption clearly indicates that the act of distributing and selling
bibles, etc. is purely religious and does not fall under the above legal
provisions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean
that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit.
For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious
beliefs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention the Mayor's
permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations
enumerated therein, We do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right
granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. In the case of Coleman
vs. City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427, this point was elucidated as follows:
An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that the practice of distributing either by hand or
otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are
being delivered free, or whether same are being sold within the city limits of the City of Griffin,
without first obtaining written permission from the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be
deemed a nuisance and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin, does not deprive
defendant of his constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose
which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious system.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if
applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not
applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the
business of plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to
the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is also
inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
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Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision
appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected
from it. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent Court of
Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board for Moving Pictures and Television which x-
rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program
entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every
Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner’s religious beliefs, doctrines and
practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992, petitioner submitted to the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program
Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public
viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner pursued two (2) courses of action against the respondent Board. On November 28,
1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128. It
succeeded in its appeal for on December 18, 1992, the Office of the President reversed the
decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly
telecast.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner also filed against the respondent Board Civil Case No. Q-92-
14280, with the RTC, NCR, Quezon City. 1 Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR
tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121
and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code.
On January 4, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on petitioner’s prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. The parties orally argued and then marked their documentary evidence. Petitioner
submitted the following as its exhibits, viz.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Exhibit "A," respondent Board’s Voting Slip for Television showing its September 9, 1992
action on petitioner’s Series No. 115 as follows: 2
REMARKS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
There are some inconsistencies in the particular program as it is very surprising for this program
to show series of Catholic ceremonies and also some religious sects and using it in their
discussion about the bible. There are remarks which are direct criticism which affect other
religions.
Need more opinions for this particular program. Please subject to more opinions.
(2) Exhibit "A-1," respondent Board’s Voting Slip for Television showing its September 11, 1992
subsequent action on petitioner’s Series No. 115 as follows: 3
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This program is criticizing different religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible.
We suggest that the program should delve on explaining their own faith and beliefs and avoid
attacks on other faith.
(3) Exhibit "B," respondent Board’s Voting Slip for Television showing its October 9, 1992 action
on petitioner’s Series No. 119, as follows: 4
The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic)
veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that
we should do so.
This is intolerance and robs off all sects of freedom of choice, worship and decision.
(4) Exhibit "C," respondent Board’s Voting Slip for Television showing its October 20, 1992 action
on petitioner’s Series No. 121 as follows: 5
I refuse to approve the telecast of this episode for reasons of the attacks, they do on, specifically,
the Catholic religion.
I refuse to admit that they can tell, dictate any other religion that they are right and the rest are
wrong, which they clearly present in this episode.
(5) Exhibit "D," respondent Board’s Voting Slip for Television showing its November 20, 1992
action on petitioner’s Series No. 128 as follows: 6
The episode presented criticizes the religious beliefs of the Catholic and Protestant’s beliefs.
We suggest a second review.
(6) Exhibits "E," "E-1," petitioner’s block time contract with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
dated September 1, 1992. 7
(7) Exhibit "F," petitioner’s Airtime Contract with Island Broadcasting Corporation. 8
(8) Exhibit "G," letter dated December 18, 1992 of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A.
Amante, Sr., addressed to Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board
which x-rated the showing of petitioner’s Series No. 129. The letter reads in
part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
The television episode in question is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and
expression under Article III, section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
We have viewed a tape of the television episode in question, as well as studied the passages
found by MTRCB to be objectionable and we find no indication that the episode poses any clear
POLIREV
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20
and present danger sufficient to limit the said constitutional guarantee."cralaw virtua1aw library
(9) Exhibits "H," "H-1," letter dated November 26, 1992 of Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., addressed to
President Fidel V. Ramos appealing the action of the respondent Board x-rating petitioner’s
Series No. 128.
On its part, respondent Board submitted the following exhibits, viz.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Exhibit "1," Permit Certificate for Television Exhibition No. 15181 dated December 18, 1992
allowing the showing of Series No. 128 under parental guidance.
(2) Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit "G" of petitioner.
(3) Exhibit "3," letter dated October 12, 1992 of Henrietta S. Mendez, addressed to the Christian
Era Broadcasting Service which reads in part:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
In the matter of your television show "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" Series No. 119, please be informed
that the Board was constrained to deny your show a permit to exhibit. The material involved
constitute an attack against another religion which is expressly prohibited by law. Please be
guided in the submission of future shows.
After evaluating the evidence of the parties, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
on petitioner’s bond of P10,000.00.
The trial court set the pre-trial of the case and the parties submitted their pre-trial briefs. 9 The
pre-trial briefs show that the parties’ evidence is basically the evidence they submitted in the
hearing of the issue of preliminary injunction. The trial of the case was set and reset several
times as the parties tried to reach an amicable accord. Their efforts failed and the records show
that after submission of memoranda, the trial court rendered a Judgment, 10 on December 15,
1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Board of Review for Moving
Pictures and Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for all
the series of ‘Ang Iglesia ni Cristo’ program.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain from offending and attacking other
existing religions in showing ‘Ang Iglesia ni Cristo’ program.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner moved for reconsideration 11 praying: (a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of
the dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the Board to be perpetually enjoined from
requiring petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent Board opposed
the motion. 12 On March 7, 1993, the trial court granted petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
It ordered: 13
"x x x
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The second portion of the Court’s
Order dated December 15, 1993, directing petitioner to refrain from offending and attacking other
existing religions in showing ‘Ang Iglesia ni Cristo’ program is hereby deleted and set aside.
Respondents are further prohibited from requiring petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review
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VTR tapes of its religious program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." ‘
Respondent Board appealed to the Court of Appeals after its motion for reconsideration was
denied. 14
On March 5, 1995, the respondent Court of Appeals 15 reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1)
the respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo," and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied
permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" on the ground that the
materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series "indecent, contrary
to law and contrary to good customs."cralaw virtua1aw library
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner raises the following
issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE ‘ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO’ PROGRAM IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS A
FORM OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISE AND EXPRESSION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING

THAT BEING AN EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, THE ‘ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO’
PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE ONLY IN THE EXTREME
CASE THAT IT POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER.
III

THE MTRCB IS VESTED WITH THE POWER TO CENSOR RELIGIOUS PROGRAMS.
IV

THE ‘ANG IGLESIA NI CRISTO,’ A PURELY RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IS INDECENT AND
CONTRARY TO LAW AND GOOD CUSTOMS.
The basic issues can be reduced into two: (1) first, whether the respondent Board has the power
to review petitioner’s TV program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and (2) second, assuming it has the
power, whether it gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s
religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they constitute an attack
against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and good customs.
The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under PD No. 1986. Its
section 3 pertinently provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 3 Powers and Functions. — The BOARD shall have the following functions, powers and
duties:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein defined, television programs,
including publicity materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion
pictures and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical distribution for television
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broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced in the Philippines and in the latter case,
whether they be for local viewing or for export.
c) To approve, delete objectionable portion from and/or prohibit the importation, exportation,
production, copying, distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of the motion
pictures, television programs and publicity materials, subject of the preceding paragraph, which,
in the judgment of the BOARD applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard, are
objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime, such as but not limited
to:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection, rebellion or sedition against the State, or
otherwise threaten the economic and/or political stability of the State;
ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and confidence of the people, their government
and/or duly constituted authorities.
iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence or pornography;
v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good name and reputation of any person,
whether living or dead;
vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of any quasi-judicial tribunal, or pertain to
matters which are sub-judice in nature (Emphasis ours).
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all "television programs." By
the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to "approve, delete . . . and/or prohibit the . . .
exhibition and/or television broadcast of . . . television programs . . ." The law also directs the
Board to apply "contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard" to determine those which are
objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the
prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong or crime."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner contends that the term "television program" should not include religious programs like
its program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5,
Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed."cralaw virtua1aw library
We reject petitioner’s submission which need not set us adrift in a constitutional voyage towards
an uncharted sea. Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it
is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe
as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live,
consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 16 We have also laboriously
defined in our jurisprudence the intersecting umbras and penumbras of the right to religious
profession and worship. To quote the summation of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, our well-known
constitutionalist: 17
Religious Profession and Worship

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The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the
realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare.
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may
indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all;
embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to
his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul — in fact, cherish any religious
conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they
be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not
be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after
all, is a matter of faith.’Men may believe what they cannot prove.’ Every one has a right to his
beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his
freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be,
religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only
with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of
religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general
welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to
society. And this is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and
not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: ‘The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence
is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma.
Accordingly, while one has full freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his
piety a human sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical
command to "go forth and multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages in
violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground that it
would be against his religious tenets to recognize any authority except that of God alone. An
atheist cannot express his disbelief in acts of derision that wound the feelings of the faithful. The
police power can be validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee born of deep
religious conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate herself at the funeral pile of her husband.
We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom
of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The
Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when
it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty
bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public
morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the
liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues
to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the
bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious differences.
Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife considering our warring
religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and claw to these beliefs. Even
now, we have yet to settle the near century old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which have been
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nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding between our Christian and Muslim brothers and
sisters. The bewildering rise of weird religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also
proves the wisdom of our rule rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For
sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a
heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For
when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
It is also petitioner’s submission that the respondent appellate court gravely erred when it
affirmed the ruling of the respondent Board x-rating its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121
and 128. The records show that the respondent Board disallowed the program series for
"attacking" other religions. Thus, Exhibits "A," "A-1," (respondent Board’s Voting Slip for
Television) reveal that its reviewing members x-rated Series 115 for." . . criticizing different
religions, based on their own interpretation of the Bible." They suggested that the program
should only explain petitioner’s." . . own faith and beliefs and avoid attacks on other faiths."
Exhibit "B" shows that Series No. 119 was x-rated because "the Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the
literal translation of the bible and says that our Catholic veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be
condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible that we should do so. This is intolerance . . ."
Exhibit "C" shows that Series No. 121 was x-rated." . . for reasons of the attacks, they do on,
specifically, the Catholic religion. . . . (T)hey can not tell, dictate any other religion that they are
right and the rest are wrong . . ." Exhibit "D" also shows that Series No. 128 was not favorably
recommended because it." . . outrages Catholic and Protestant’s beliefs." On second review, it
was x-rated because of its "unbalanced interpretations of some parts of the bible." 18 In sum, the
respondent Board x-rated petitioner’s TV program series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128 because of
petitioner’s controversial biblical interpretations and its "attacks" against contrary religious beliefs.
The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the said "attacks" are indecent,
contrary to law and good customs.
We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on
speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. 19 It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for
"attacking" other religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence,
especially Exhibits "A," "A-1," "B, "C," and "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were
not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were
considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can
be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner’s freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. It
misappreciates the essence of freedom to differ as delineated in the benchmark case of Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 20 viz.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields,
the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his
own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of
men who have been, or are prominent in church or state or even to false statements. But the
people of this nation have ordained in the light of history that inspite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and
right conduct on the part of the citizens of democracy.
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The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against
an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve
peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of
religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences, the
State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine,
respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it
attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our
country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality
of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of
freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of
dueling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech
should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas
that can fan the embers of truth.
Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground "attacks against another religion" in x-
rating the religious program of petitioner. Even a side-glance at section 3 of PD No. 1986 will
reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of petitioner’s
television program. The ground "attack against another religion" was merely added by the
respondent Board in its Rules. 21 This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine
that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek
to enforce.
It is opined that the respondent board can still utilize "attack against any religion" as a ground
allegedly." . . because section 3 (c) of PD No. 1986 prohibits the showing of motion pictures,
television programs and publicity materials which are contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of
the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone who exhibits "shows which offend any race or
religion." We respectfully disagree for it is plain that the word "attack" is not synonymous with the
word "offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to
justify the subsequent punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to
justify prior censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986,
included "attack against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not, however,
carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it. There can be no other intent.
Indeed, even the Executive Department espouses this view. Thus, in an Opinion dated
November 28, 1985 then Minister of Justice, now President of the Senate, Neptali Gonzales
explained:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
"However, the question whether the BRMPT (now MTRCB) may preview and censor the subject
television program of INC should be viewed in the light of the provision of Section 3, paragraph
(c) of PD 1986, which is substantially the same as the provision of Section 3, paragraph (c) of
E.O. No. 876-A, which prescribes the standards of censorship, to wit: ‘immoral, indecent,
contrary to law and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines
or its people or with dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence, or of a
wrong’ as determined by the Board, ‘applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard.’
As stated, the intention of the Board to subject the INC’s television program to ‘previewing and
censorship is prompted by the fact that its religious program’ makes mention of beliefs and
practices of other religion.’ On the face of the law itself, there can conceivably be no basis for
censorship of said program by the Board as much as the alleged reason cited by the Board does
not appear to be within the contemplation of the standards of censorship set by law." (Emphasis
supplied)
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and
present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 22 this Court held: "The
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constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries
with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified
like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent." In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers Union, 23 we further ruled that." . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to
prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to
avoid the danger."cralaw virtua1aw library
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject
video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of
the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground.
It is suggested that we re-examine the application of clear and present danger rule to the case at
bar. In the United States, it is true that the clear and present danger test has undergone
permutations. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who formulated the test in Schenck v. US, 24 as follows:
". . . the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Admittedly, the test was originally
designed to determine the latitude which should be given to speech that espouses anti-
government action. Bannered by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, the test attained its full flowering
in the decade of the forties, when its umbrella was used to protect speech other than subversive
speech. 25 Thus, for instance, the test was applied to annul a total ban on labor picketing. 26
The use of the test took a downswing in the 1950’s when the US Supreme Court decided Dennis
v. United States involving communist conspiracy. 27 In Dennis, the components of the test were
altered as the High Court adopted Judge Learned Hand’s formulation that." . . in each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." The imminence requirement of the
test was thus diminished and to that extent, the protection of the rule was weakened. In 1969,
however, the strength of the test was reinstated in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 28 when the High Court
restored in the test the imminence requirement, and even added an intent requirement which
according to a noted commentator ensured that only speech directed at inciting lawlessness
could be punished. 29 Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not
applied to protect low value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and
defamation. Be that as it may, the test is still applied to four types of speech: speech that
advocates dangerous ideas, speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction, out of court
contempt and release of information that endangers a fair trial. 30 Hence, even following the drift
of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the clear and present danger test to the case
at bar which concerns speech that attacks other religions and could readily provoke hostile
audience reaction. It cannot be doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.
It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at
bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of
speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the
causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The
contention overlooks the fact that the case at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped and
hence, their speech content is known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the
speech, it is not unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can
determine whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law.
Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that . . . the determination of the question as to
whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the
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boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by

an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior restraint
may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies." The same
submission is made by Mr. Justice Mendoza.
This thoughtful thesis is an attempt to transplant another American rule in our jurisdiction. Its
seedbed was laid down by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in the 1962 case of
Manual Enterprise v. Day. 31 By 1965, the US Supreme Court in Freedman v. Maryland 32 was
ready to hold that "the teaching of cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an
adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint." 33
While the thesis has a lot to commend itself, we are not ready to hold that it is unconstitutional for
Congress to grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV
programs and enforce its decision subject to review by our courts. As far back as 1921, we
upheld this set-up in Sotto v. Ruiz, 34 viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The use of the mails by private persons is in the nature of a privilege which can be regulated in
order to avoid its abuse. Persons posses no absolute right to put into the mail anything they
please, regardless of its character.
On the other hand, the exclusion of newspaper and other publications from the mails, in the
exercise of executive power, is extremely delicate in nature and can only be justified where the
statute is unequivocably applicable to the supposed objectionable publication. In excluding any
publication for the mails, the object should be not to interfere with the freedom of the press or
with any other fundamental right of the people. This is the more true with reference to articles
supposedly libelous than to other particulars of the law, since whether an article is or is not
libelous, is fundamentally a legal question. In order for there to be due process of law, the action
of the Director of Posts must be subject to revision by the courts in case he had abused his
discretion or exceeded his authority. (Ex parte Jackson [1878], 96 U.S., 727; Public Clearing
House v. Coyne [1903], 194 U.S., 497; Post Publishing Co. v. Murray [1916]. 23-Fed., 773)
As has been said, the performance of the duty of determining whether a publication contains
printed matter of a libelous character rests with the Director of Posts and involves the exercise of
his judgment and discretion. Every intendment of the law is in favor of the correctness of his
action. The rule is (and we go only to those cases coming from the United States Supreme Court
and pertaining to the United States Postmaster-General), that the courts will not interfere with the
decision of the Director of Posts unless clearly of opinion that it was wrong. (Bates & Guilid Co. v.
Payne [1904], 194 U.S., 106; Smith v. Hitchcock [1912], 226 U.S., 63; Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten
[1917], 246 Fed., 24. But see David v. Brown [1900], 103 Fed., 909, announcing a somewhat
different doctrine and relied upon by the Attorney-General).
To be sure, legal scholars in the United States are still debating the proposition whether or not
courts alone are competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protected. 35 The issue
involves highly arguable policy considerations and can be better addressed by our legislators.
IN VIEW WHEREOF , the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is
affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner’s
TV program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo," and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained
the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115,119, and
121. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EBRALINAG vs. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU
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GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
These two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were consolidated
because they raise essentially the same issue: whether school children who are members or a
religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and
private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which
includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag
and reciting the patriotic pledge.
In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and
Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and
elementary school students in the towns of Daan Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Carcar, and Taburan
Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group
known as Jehovah's Witnesses which claims some 100,000 "baptized publishers" in the
Philippines.
In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and
Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in
public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were
prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8
dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Republic Act No. 1265 provides:
Sec. 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth observe daily flag ceremony,
which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the
Philippine National anthem.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or

cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag
ceremony herein provided.
Sec. 3. Failure or refusal to observe the flag ceremony provided by this Act and in
accordance with rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Education, after
proper notice and hearing, shall subject the educational institution concerned and
its head to public censure as an administrative punishment which shall be
published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
In case of failure to observe for the second time the flag-ceremony provided by
this Act, the Secretary of Education, after proper notice and hearing, shall cause
the cancellation of the recognition or permit of the private educational institution
responsible for such failure.
The implementing rules and regulations in Department Order No. 8 provide:
RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR CONDUCTING THE FLAG CEREMONY IN

ALL EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.
1. The Filipino Flag shall be displayed by all educational institutions, public and
private, every school day throughout the year. It shall be raised at sunrise and
lowered at sunset. The flag-staff must be straight, slightly and gently tapering at
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the end, and of such height as would give the Flag a commanding position in
front of the building or within the compound.
2. Every public and private educational institution shall hold a flag-raising

ceremony every morning except when it is raining, in which event the ceremony
may be conducted indoors in the best way possible. A retreat shall be held in the
afternoon of the same day. The flag-raising ceremony in the morning shall be
conducted in the following manner:
a. Pupils and teachers or students and faculty members who are

in school and its premises shall assemble in formation facing the
flag. At command, books shall be put away or held in the left hand
and everybody shall come to attention. Those with hats shall
uncover. No one shall enter or leave the school grounds during
the ceremony.
b. The assembly shall sing the Philippine National

Anthem accompanied by the school band or without the
accompaniment if it has none; or the anthem may be played by
the school band alone. At the first note of the Anthem, the flag
shall be raised briskly. While the flag is being raised, all persons
present shall stand at attention and execute a salute. Boys and
men with hats shall salute by placing the hat over the heart.
Those without hat may stand with their arms and hands down and
straight at the sides. Those in military or Boy Scout uniform shall
give the salute prescribed by their regulations. The salute shall be
started as the Flag rises, and completed upon last note of the
anthem.
c. Immediately following the singing of the Anthem, the assembly

shall recite in unison the following patriotic pledge (English or
vernacular version), which may bring the ceremony to a close.
This is required of all public schools and of private schools which
are intended for Filipino students or whose population is
predominantly Filipino.
English Version
I love the Philippines.

It is the land of my birth;
It is the home of my people.
It protects me and helps me to be, strong, happy and useful.
In return, I will heed the counsel of my parents;
I will obey the rules of my school;
I will perform the duties of a patriotic, law-abiding citizen;
I will serve my country unselfishly and faithfully;
I will be a true, Filipino in thought, in word, in deed.
xxx xxx xxx
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or
"religious devotion" (p. 10, Rollo) which they "cannot conscientiously give . . . to anyone or
anything except God" (p. 8, Rollo). They feel bound by the Bible's command to "guard ourselves
from
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idols — 1 John 5:21" (p. 9, Rollo). They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the
State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the
intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control (p. 10, Rollo).
This is not the first time that the question, of whether the children of Jehovah's Witnesses may be
expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8, series of
1955, has been raised before this Court.
The same issue was raised in 1959 in Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil.
2 (1959) and Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960). This Court in the
Gerona case upheld the expulsion of the students, thus:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom
and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system
of complete separation of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly
devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any
religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more a religious ceremony than the
taking of an oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to
the bar.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the
Secretary of Education is not imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious
test on said students. It is merely enforcing a
non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian,
Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness. The State is merely carrying out the
duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charges it with supervision over
and regulation of all educational institutions, to establish and maintain a complete
and adequate system of public education, and see to it that all schools aim to
develop, among other things, civic conscience and teach the duties of citizenship.
The children of Jehovah's Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in

the flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover,
exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the
rest of the school population which by far constitutes the great majority.
The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and
cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-
discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.
(pp. 2-3).
Gerona was reiterated in Balbuna, as follows:
The Secretary of Education was duly authorized by the Legislature thru Republic
Act 1265 to promulgate said Department Order, and its provisions requiring the
observance of the flag salute, not being a religious ceremony but an act and
profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the
flag stands for, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of
religion. (Balbuna, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150).
Republic Act No. 1265 and the ruling in Gerona have been incorporated in Section 28, Title VI,
Chapter 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which took effect on
September 21, 1988 (one year after its publication in the Official Gazette, Vol. 63, No. 38 of
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31
September 21, 1987). Paragraph 5 of Section 28 gives legislative cachet to the ruling in Gerona,
thus:
5. Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag
ceremony may be dismissed after due investigation.
However, the petitioners herein have not raised in issue the constitutionality of the above
provision of the new Administrative Code of 1987. They have targeted only Republic Act No.
1265 and the implementing orders of the DECS.
In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils
belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who
refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic
pledge. Division Superintendent of Schools, Susana B. Cabahug of the Cebu Division of DECS,
and Dr. Atty. Marcelo M. Bacalso, Assistant Division Superintendent, recalling this Court's
decision in Gerona, issued Division Memorandum No. 108, dated November 17, 1989 (pp. 147-
148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770) directing District Supervisors, High School Principals and Heads of
Private Educational institutions as follows:
1. Reports reaching this Office disclose that there are a number of teachers,
pupils, students, and school employees in public schools who refuse to salute the
Philippine flag or participate in the daily flag ceremony because of some religious
belief.
2. Such refusal not only undermines Republic Act No. 1265 and the DECS
Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955 (Implementing Rules and Regulations)
but also strikes at the heart of the DECS sustained effort to inculcate patriotism
and nationalism.
3. Let it be stressed that any belief that considers the flag as an image is not in
any manner whatever a justification for not saluting the Philippine flag or not
participating in flag ceremony. Thus, the Supreme Court of the Philippine says:
The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the

Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity
and cohesion and freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of
Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)
4. As regards the claim for freedom of belief, which an objectionist may advance,
the Supreme Court asserts:
But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief,
there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said
religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society
and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the
latter. (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 11.)
5. Accordingly, teachers and school employees who choose not to participate in

the daily flag ceremony or to obey the flag salute regulation spelled out in
Department Order No. 8, Series of 1955, shall be considered removed from the
service after due process.
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6. In strong language about pupils and students who do the same the Supreme
Court has this to say:
If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely
lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the
expense of their fellow Citizens, nothing more. According to a
popular expression, they could take it or leave it! Having elected
not to comply with the regulation about the flag salute they
forfeited their right to attend public schools. (Gerona, et al. vs.
Sec. of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 15.)
7. School administrators shall therefore submit to this Office a report on those

who choose not to participate in flag ceremony or salute the Philippine flag. (pp.
147-148, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770; Emphasis supplied).
Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the children of Jehovah's
Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School, the children were
asked to sign an Agreement (Kasabutan) in the Cebuano dialect promising to sing the national
anthem, place their right hand on their breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of
allegiance to the flag (Annex D, p. 46, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770 and p. 48, Rollo of G.R. No.
95887), but they refused to sign the "Kasabutan" (p. 20, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770).
In Tubigmanok Elementary School, the Teacher-In-Charge, Antonio A. Sangutan, met with the
Jehovah's Witnesses' parents, as disclosed in his letter of October 17, 1990, excerpts from which
reveal the following:
After two (2) fruitless confrontation meetings with the Jehovah's Witnesses'
parents on October 2, 1990 and yesterday due to their firm stand not to salute the
flag of the Republic of the Philippines during Flag Ceremony and other
occasions, as mandated by law specifically Republic Act No. 1265, this Office
hereby orders the dropping from the list in the School Register (BPS Form I) of all
teachers, all Jehovah Witness pupils from Grade I up to Grade VI effective today.
xxx xxx xxx
This order is in compliance with Division Memorandum No. 108 s. 1989 dated
November 17, 1989 by virtue of Department Order No. 8 s. 1955 dated July 21,
1955 in accordance with Republic Act No. 1265 and Supreme Court Decision of a
case "Genaro Gerona, et al., Petitioners and Appellants vs. The Honorable
Secretary of Education, et al., Respondents and Appellees' dated August 12,
1959 against their favor. (p. 149, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor, Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the
"dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted to follow their religious belief which is against the
Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right to attend public schools." (p.
47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
1st Indorsement
DAANBANTAYAN DISTRICT II
Daanbantayan, Cebu, July 24, 1990.
Respectfully returned to Mrs. Alicia A. Diaz, School In Charge [sic], Agujo

Elementary School with the information that this office is sad to order the
dropping of Jeremias Diamos and Jeaneth Diamos, Grades III and IV pupils
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33
respectively from the roll since they opted to follow their religious belief which is
against the Flag Salute Law (R.A. 1265) and DECS Order No. 8, series of 1955,
having elected not to comply with the regulation about the flag salute they
forfeited their right to attend public schools (Gerona, et al. vs. Sec. of Education,
et al., 106 Philippines 15). However, should they change their mind to respect
and follow the Flag Salute Law they may be re-accepted.
(Sgd.) MANUEL F. BIONGCOG

District Supervisor
(p. 47, Rollo of G.R. No. 95770.)
The expulsion as of October 23, 1990 of the 43 petitioning students of the Daanbantayan
National High School, Agujo Elementary School, Calape Barangay National High School,
Pinamungajan Provincial High School, Tabuelan Central School, Canasojan Elementary School,
Liboron Elementary School, Tagaytay Primary School, San Juan Primary School and Northern
Central Elementary School of San Fernando, Cebu, upon order of then Acting Division
Superintendent Marcelo Bacalso, prompted some Jehovah's Witnesses in Cebu to appeal to the
Secretary of Education Isidro Cariño but the latter did not answer their letter. (p. 21, Rollo.)
The petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr.
Pablo Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would
not recall the expulsion orders of his predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of
some more children of Jehovah's Witnesses.
On October 31, 1990, the students and their parents filed these special civil actions
for Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion
without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free
public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship (p. 23, Rollo). The
petitioners pray that:
c. Judgment be rendered:
i. declaring null and void the expulsion or dropping from the rolls
of herein petitioners from their respective schools;
ii. prohibiting and enjoining respondent from further barring the

petitioners from their classes or otherwise implementing the
expulsion ordered on petitioners; and
iii. compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to
admit and order the re-admission of petitioners to their respective
schools. (p. 41, Rollo.)
and that pending the determination of the merits of these cases, a temporary restraining order be
issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the expulsion of the petitioners and to re-admit
them to their respective classes.
On November 27, 1990, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction commanding the respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to
their respective classes until further orders from this Court (p. 57, Rollo).
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The Court also ordered the Secretary of Education and Cebu District Supervisor Manuel F.
Biongcog to be impleaded as respondents in these cases.
On May 13, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the petitions (p.
98, Rollo) defending the expulsion orders issued by the public respondents on the grounds that:
1. Bizarre religious practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses produce rebellious and

anti-social school children and consequently disloyal and mutant Filipino citizens.
2. There are no new and valid grounds to sustain the charges of the Jehovah's
Witnesses that the DECS' rules and regulations on the flag salute ceremonies are
violative of their freedom of religion and worship.
3. The flag salute is devoid of any religious significance; instead, it inculcates

respect and love of country, for which the flag stands.
4. The State's compelling interests being pursued by the DECS' lawful regulations
in question do not warrant exemption of the school children of the Jehovah's
Witnesses from the flag salute ceremonies on the basis of their own self-
perceived religious convictions.
5. The issue is not freedom of speech but enforcement of law and jurisprudence.
6. State's power to regulate repressive and unlawful religious practices justified,

besides having scriptural basis.
7. The penalty of expulsion is legal and valid, more so with the enactment of
Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987).
Our task here is extremely difficult, for the 30-year old decision of this court in Gerona upholding
the flag salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is not lightly to
be trifled with.
It is somewhat ironic however, that after the Gerona ruling had received legislative cachet by its
in corporation in the Administrative Code of 1987, the present Court believes that the time has
come to re-examine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from
one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of
Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free
speech ** and the free exercise of religious profession and worship (Sec. 5, Article III, 1987
Constitution; Article IV, Section 8, 1973 Constitution; Article III, Section 1[7], 1935 Constitution).
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator (Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando's separate opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 530-
531).
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom
to believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare (J.
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 176-177).
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35
Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony,
they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe
in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings (Annex F, Rollo of G.R. No. 95887, p. 50
and Rollo of G.R. No. 95770, p. 48). Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no
warrant for their expulsion.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom (according to the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting
opinion in German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517) is the existence of a grave
and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest,
that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public
safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.
The situation that the Court directly predicted in Gerona that:
The flag ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with
very few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens
untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love
of country, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism — a pathetic, even
tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school population imposed
its will, demanded and was granted an exemption. (Gerona, p. 24.)
has not come to pass. We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from
saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group
which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of
the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with
reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs.
Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the
flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the
democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine
history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues
of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of
citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the
curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very
situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron
hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.
As Mr. Justice Jackson remarked in West Virginia vs. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943):
. . . To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary
and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering
estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. . . . When they [diversity]
are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is
not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, . . .
— assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is
not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A
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desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.)
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are
enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free
education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education . . . and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the exemption of
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their
employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to join any labor
group:
. . . It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws
of the land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience,
exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interests"
intervenes. (Sherbert vs. Berner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct.
1790.)
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those
beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does
not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this
Court in Non vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be afforded their
right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that school authorities
are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace by actions that
offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may possibly
disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to
prevent (German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
Before we close this decision, it is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our country in
1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted
the Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier. Perhaps, if petitioners had lived
through that dark period of our history, they would not quibble now about saluting the Philippine
flag. For when liberation came in 1944 and our own flag was proudly hoisted aloft again, it was a
beautiful sight to behold that made our hearts pound with pride and joy over the newly-regained
freedom and sovereignty of our nation.
Although the Court upholds in this decision the petitioners' right under our Constitution to refuse
to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs, we hope, nevertheless, that
another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to
appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The expulsion orders
issued by the public respondents against the petitioners are hereby ANNULLED AND SET
ASIDE. The temporary restraining order which was issued by this Court is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR
IMBONG vs. OCHOA
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1

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CITY OF MANILA, Defendant-Appellee.

City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Juan Nabong for appellant.

Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly

Before trial the parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

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Appellant contends that the lower Court erred:

79. All other businesses, trades or occupations not

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We suggest a second review.

(2) Exhibit "2," which is Exhibit "G" of petitioner.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

VTR tapes of its religious program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo." ‘

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;

Religious Profession and Worship

(1) Freedom to Believe

(2) Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs

We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.

boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by