Fisher vs.

Bell
Relevant Facts: On December 14, 1959, an information was preferred by Chief Inspector George
Fisher, of the Bristol Constabulary, against James Charles Bell, the defendant, alleging that the
defendant, at his premises unlawfully did offer for sale a flick knife contrary to section 1 of the
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 19591. The defendant had displayed this knife on the shop
window amongst other articles, behind which was an attached price ticket.
Procedural History: The justices were of opinion that in the absence of a definition in the Act of
1959, the words "offer for sale" ought to be construed as they were in the law of contract, so that, in
this instance, the defendant's action was but an invitation to treat, and not a firm offer which needed
but a customer's acceptance to make a binding contract of sale. They accordingly dismissed the
information. The prosecutor appealed.
Legal Issue: Whether this knife exhibited in the shop window with the price ticket behind it was an
offer for sale within the meaning of section 1 (1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959?
OR
Does displaying a flick knife amount to offer for sale amount to a violation under section 1(1) of the
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act, 1959?
Arguments:
Prosecution: Having regard to the context in which the words are found and the mischief at which the
Act is aimed, the words "offer for sale" should be construed to cover circumstances such as the
present. An offer can exist without its actually being communicated to the offeree. The Act of 1959 is
clearly intended to affect a complete ban on flick knives, and therefore the words "offer for sale" in
section 1(1) should be given a meaning wide enough to prevent such goods being placed in shop
windows with price tickets behind them.2 The act aims at preventing people from getting possession
of flick knives and its object is to prevent trafficking in such articles. It is not necessary that the words
of a statute have to be construed as in the law of contracts.
Defendant: The Act upon its face prohibits the manufacture, disposition and marketing of flick knives,
but it is not aimed against possession. Mere possession of such a knife, even if it is in a shop window,
is not an offence within the Act. The expression "offer for sale" is not defined by the Act and
therefore it can only be interpreted by reference to the general law. Displaying goods in a shop
window does not amount to an offer for sale; it is merely an invitation to treat.3
Reasoning: Court observed that it is very common when it is so desired to insert the words “offering
or exposing for sale,” “exposing for sale” would cover the display of goods in a shop window. When
the parliament desired to enlarge the ordinary meaning of those words, includes a definition section
enlarging the ordinary meaning of offer for sale to cover other matters.4
Decision: Display of articles on the shop window was exposure for sale and did not qualify to be an
offer for sale. The court dismissed the appeal and reserved the previous decision.

1
S1(a) : (1)Any person who manufactures, sells or hires or offers for sale or hire, or exposes or has in his
possession for the purpose of sale or hire] or lends or gives to any other person—
(a)any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other
device in or attached to the handle of the knife, sometimes known as a “flick knife” or “flick gun”
2
Wiles v. Maddison, Keating v. Horwood
3
Timothy v. Simpson.
4
Pg 3 - Last pr
NOTES

 As to Keating v. Horwood, there was there an obvious exposure for sale, so that it was
unnecessary for the court to decide whether there was an offer for sale or not. No authorities
on this point were cited in that case, nor was this point argued in Wiles v. Maddison, the
whole basis of which was that the prosecution only proved an intention to commit an offence
the following day. It would be wrong to attach importance to the incidental words of Viscount
Caldecote C.J. on which the appellant relies.
 Keating v. Horwood - The first is that the order plainly contained the words "expose for
sale," and on any view there was an exposing for sale. Therefore, the question whether there
was an offer for sale was unnecessary for decision. Secondly, the principles of general
contract law were never referred to, and thirdly, albeit all part of the second ground. The
respondent was not represented and there was in fact no argument. Court cannot take that as
an authority for the proposition that the display here in a shop window was an offer for sale.
 Wiles v. Maddison - Lord Chief Justice does refer to the making of an offer by putting it in
the shop window, before the sentence is closed he has in fact turned the phrase to one
of exposing the article. Court cannot get any assistance in favour of the prosecutor from that
passage.
 Parliament is assumed to know the technical meaning of offer for sale. Words like ‘display
for sale’ have not been used in the statute.
 While deciding upon issue, judges either take the lay meaning or presume that the parliament
knew the technical meaning. Judgement has to be justified with the statute.
 TECHNICAL VS LAYMAN’S UNDERSTANDING, OFFER VS DISPLAY