1. RODIS, SR. v.

SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

On May 22, 1985, petitioner Hermilo v. Rodis, Sr., former President of the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation
(PHILFINANCE) together with some other persons, was charged before the Sandiganbayan in separate informations
docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 10389, 10390, 10391, 10393 and 10394 with five (5) counts of violation of
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act. On May 31,
1985, petitioner filed a motion to quash said informations as against him on the ground of lack of preliminary
investigation, with the alternative prayer that the "issue and/or enforcement of the warrant of arrests as against him
be held in abeyance while he seeks a reinvestigation by the Tanodbayan pursuant to his right of (sic) preliminary
investigation.

In its opposition to said motion, the Prosecution cited as basis therefor Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure enumerating the grounds for a motion to quash. It argued that since lack of preliminary investigation is not
among those enumerated thereunder, the motion to quash on this ground should be denied for lack of merit and
instead, petitioner should be ordered to file his Petition for Reinvestigation and/or Motion for Reconsideration in
accordance with Section 13 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Tanodbayan. Petitioner filed a Reply to the
Opposition controverting the prosecution's claim that lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground for quashing the
information; but manifesting that he would file a petition for re-investigation with the Tanodbayan as suggested. This
he did, on June 24,1985. On July 15, 1985, while petitioner's petition for reinvestigation was pending action by the
Tanodbayan, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash for lack of
merit, stating:

... this Court is of the considered opinion that the alleged absence of preliminary investigation with
respect to the accused movant (herein petitioner) or his inability to participate in the preliminary
investigation for the reason that he was not duly served with a subpoena is not a proper ground for a
motion to quash. If the accused was not afforded due preliminary investigation, the proper remedy for
him is to file a Petition for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, pursuant to Section (13)
of Administrative Order No. 111 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Tanodbayan, promulgated on
December 1, 1979.

On the premise that no appeal or any plain and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law will prove adequate under
the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar arraignment, pre-trial and trial having been set on August 26, 27 and 28,
1985—and on the allegation that in denying his motion to quash, respondent Sandiganbayan had acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, petitioner brought the instant petition. On August 1,
1985, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondent Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
the arraignment, pre-trial and trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 10389, 10390, 10391, 10392, 10393 and 10394.

Petitioner contends that while it may be true that lack of preliminary investigation neither affects the jurisdiction of the
court nor impairs the validity of the information filed, nonetheless such lack of preliminary investigation affects the
regularity of the proceedings which led to the filing of the information, such that in several cases, the Court had ordered
the quashal of the information on said ground; and that although lack of preliminary investigation is not enumerated as
one of the grounds for a motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan can nevertheless order the quashal of the informations
pursuant to its inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

He further claims that given the chance to be heard on preliminary investigation, he will demonstrate to the Tanodbayan
that he had no participation in the transactions complained of, except in one where he merely approved for
reimbursement representation expense incurred by one subordinate to him, the Executive Vice-President, and after it
had been approved by one superior to him, the vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee and Chief Executive Officer
of the (PHILFINANCE). Respondent People of the Philippines on the other hand avers that as petitioner does not dispute
that a preliminary investigation was indeed conducted, what he is really protesting against is the lost opportunity to
participate therein due to the alleged failure of the Tanodbayan to serve a subpoena upon him. It is, however,
contended that this alleged failure did not affect the regularity of the preliminary investigation as the Tanodbayan is
justified under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure in proceeding with the preliminary
investigation after an attempt to subpoena petitioner at the latter's known address proved unavailing, and in basing its
resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
The analysis of respondent People, thru the Solicitor General, as to the real nature of the controversy at bar is correct.
It is not disputed that a preliminary investigation was conducted by the Tanodbayan prior to the filing of the
informations. Petitioner, however, was not able to participate therein as the subpoena addressed to him at
(PHILFINANCE) his last known address, was returned "unserved," petitioner having already severed his employment
with said company at the time of service. As petitioner reportedly left (PHILFINANCE) under most unfriendly
circumstances, PHILFINANCE did not give the process server his residence address on record with it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground for quashing an information,

RULING:

It is worthwhile repeating that the avowed purposes of a preliminary investigation are "to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of' a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials and while
the "absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case (n)or do they impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render it defective, but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the
defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing
the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior
court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

In this case, the Tanodbayan, has the duty to conduct the said investigation. Thus, although the Sandiganbayan was
correct in ruling that the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground for quashing an information, it should
have held the proceedings in the criminal cases in abeyance pending resolution by the Tanodbayan of petitioner's
petition for reinvestigation, as alternatively prayed for by him in his motion to quash. During the pendency of the case
at bar, petitioner manifested to the Court that in a Joint Order dated September 26, 1985, Tanodbayan Special
Prosecutors Roger C. Berbano Sr. and Eleuterio F. Guerrero had recommended that the separate petitions for
reinvestigation filed by petitioner and his co-accused be given due course by the Tanodbayan and that said special
prosecutors be given clearance and authority to conduct such reinvestigation. Although it appears that these
recommendations were approved by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez on October 14, 1985 no further report
on this matter has reached the Court. As we cannot assume that the reinvestigation was indeed conducted as would
render the instant petition moot and academic, and considering the importance of the issue involved, we deemed it
proper to decide the petition on the merits.WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of the respondent Sandiganbayan
dated July 15, 1985 in Criminal Cases Nos. 10389, 10390, 10391, 10393 and 10394 is hereby affirmed, but respondent
Sandiganbayan is ordered to hold in abeyance the proceedings therein with respect to petitioner, subject to the
outcome of the reinvestigation of the Tanodbayan of the aforesaid cases. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
the Court on August 1, 1985 is deemed superseded by this directive.

2. PADERANGA v. SANDIGAN BAYAN

FACTS:

In Oct. 1986, Felipe Galarion and 7 others were filed with multiple murder for the deaths of Bucag family. Only
Galarion was found guilty, but had escaped from detention, while the other 7 remained at large.

The information was amended on Oct. 1988, including Felizardo Roxas, and so he retained petitioner, Atty. Paderanga
as his counsel.

Petitioner filed Omnibus motion to dismiss, to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify Arraignment, but trial court
denied it and ordered city prosecutor go condict preliminary investigation again.

In the course of preliminary investigation, Roxas implicated petitioner in the commission of the crime.

City Prosecutor was prevented to conduct preliminary investigation and requested Department of Justice to continue
therewith.

In a resolution, respondent State Prosecutor Gingoyon, amended the previous information including herein petitioner.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, averrinv that preliminary invetigation was not yet completed and his right to
present counter-affidavit was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was probable cause to include petitioner in the amended information.

HELD:

Section 1, Rule 112 of Revised Rules of court provides that, preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial.

We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and
the facts obtaining therein.

Not necessary but might be useful:

Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are inadmissible as
to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination.

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the
witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.

Thus, even if petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were
presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to
cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such right was never available to him. The
admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court during the trial proper
and not in the preliminary investigation.

3. PAREDES v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 89989 January 28, 1991
On January 21, 1976, Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, applied for a free patent
for Lot No. 3097-A, PLS-67. His application was favorably acted upon by the Land Inspector, Armando Luison. On May
11, 1976, OCT No. P-8379 was issued to him.

Eight (8) years later, on March 28,1985, Civil Case No. 512, for annulment of Attorney Paredes' title, was filed by the
Republic in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Agusan del Sur because the said lot was for a school site. Later, the
Sanguniang Panlalawigan filed perjury case against him.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 512, Teofilo Gelacio, former vice-mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, filed
with the Tanodbayan on October 28, 1986, a criminal complaint charging Attorney Paredes with having violated
Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial
Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in Agusan del
Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application.

On February 23, 1987, the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) referred the case to Fiscal Ernesto Brocoy of Butuan City
(TBP Case No. 86-03368) for preliminary investigation.

Fiscal Brocoy issued summons to Attorney Paredes, Jr. to appear at the preliminary investigation of the case on August
29, 1987. However, the summons were served on November 19, 1987 upon the INP Station Commander of San
Francisco, instead of Atty. Paredes. The summons did not reach Attorney Paredes. Nevertheless, without waiting for
proof of service of the summons on the accused, Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary examination of
the complainant and his witnesses. On August 29, 1988, the fiscal issued a resolution finding a prima facie case of
violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019 committed by the accused. The Fiscal's resolution was approved by Tanodbayan
Prosecutor Josephine Fernandez on June 26, 1989

Attorney Paredes filed a motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan's resolution. He assailed the validity of the
preliminary investigation that was conducted by Fiscal Brocoy without notice to him . His motion for reconsideration
was denied.

In the local elections on January 18, 1988, Attorney Paredes was elected governor of Agusan del Sur.

On May 20, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del Sur rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 512, annulling
Governor Paredes' Free Patent No. (X-8) 1253 and his OCT No. P-8379 and restoring the land "to the mass of public
domain"

On August 28,1988, an information was filed against Governor Paredes in the Sandiganbayan and a warrant for his
arrest, fixing bail of P20,000 for his provisional liberty, was issued on August 30, 1989 and served upon him.He refused
to post bail in "protest against the injustice to him as Governor,".Consequently, he was detained in the municipal jail
of San Francisco.

On September 20, 1989, this petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife, Mrs. Eden Paredes, against the
Sandiganbayan. She alleged that the warrant for her husband's arrest was void because the preliminary investigation
was void, and, that the crime charged in the information against him had already prescribed.

In his return of the Writ, the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Sandiganbayan, agreed that lack of notice to
Governor Paredes of the preliminary investigation was "a fatal defect" invalidating not only the preliminary
investigation, but also the information prepared by the Tanodbayan, and the warrant of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan. The Solicitor General agreed with the petitioner's contention that the ten year prescriptive period of
the offense under Section 11 of R.A. 3019, assuming it was committed on January 21, 1976, expired on January 21,
1986. Although the prescriptive period was increased to fifteen (15) years under Section 4, B.P. Blg. 195 of March 16,
1982, the Solicitor General opined that the new law may not be applied retroactively to Paredes.

On the other hand, the Ombudsman argued that the Sandiganbayan was improperly made respondent in this case
because it does not have custody of Governor Paredes; that the lack of preliminary investigation did not affect the
validity of the information nor the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; and, that the crime has not yet prescribed
because the period of prescription commences to run not on the day the crime was committed but on the day it was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents (Art. 91, Revised Penal Code).

ISSUE:

Whether the arrest and detention of the petitioner after a preliminary investigation that was conducted by the
Tanodbayan without notice to him, are valid

RULING:

After careful deliberation over the petition and the comments thereon of the Solicitor General, the Special Prosecutor
and the Ombudsman/Tanodbayan, the Court finds insufficient merit in the petition. The settled rule is that the writ
of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under
a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.

The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid because the preliminary investigation
was invalid and the offense charged has already prescribed. Those circumstances do not constitute valid grounds for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective (People vs.
Casiano, L-15309, February 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1969). The remedy of the accused in such
a case is to call the attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of right,
that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information, should merely suspend the trial and order
the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation. Thus did we rule in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349.

If the detained attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no preliminary
investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion
before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules,
or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of
commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. So it is
explicitly provided for by Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Ilagan was a reiteration of this Court's ruling in People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 (1961) that:

The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If there was no preliminary
investigation and the defendant, before entering his plea, calls the attention of the court to the absence of a
preliminary investigation, the court, instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation,
order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may
be conducted.

WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition, the same is hereby denied. The accused, Ceferino Paredes, Jr. should file
a bail bond of P20,000,

4. PEOPLE v. YUTILA
Criminal Case: Rape with Homicide

FACTS:

The deceased Fidela Dema-angay de Bederio went to their farm at sitio Togop Barrio San Isidro, Gen. MacArthur,
Eastern Samar, to gather some food for her family

At about 11 o'clock the same morning, her husband, Ciriaco Bederio, who was home in bed suffering for high fever,
asked his eldest daughter, 12 year old Virginita, to go to the farm to help her mother carry the food she may have
gathered.Upon reaching the place, Virginita, looked around but could not find her. Suddenly she heard her mother's
voice saying: 'Pacio, Goyong, Pediong, Quilino, because you have (had) sexual intercourse with me, please do not kill
me.

Proceeding towards the direction of her voice, Virginita saw her mother lying near the bank of a creek in a sidewise
position and being stab by appellants and their brother Gregorio, with a knife and boloes. She hid herself among the
bushes and, after the assailants left, Virginita approach her mother end tried to talk to her but the latter did not
respond. Whereupon, she went home and told her father what she had seen(p. 27, They both repaired to the scene of
the crime and found Fidela dead.

Virginita was then sent by her father to the barrio captain in Cancuevas and later to the Chief of Police of Gen.
MacArthur, Eastern Samar, to inform them about the incident. The following morning, the Chief of Police,
accompanied by Ciriaco and his daughter Virginita, investigated the place of the incident and made a sketch of the
same.

Fidela's body was taken to the puericulture center of Gen. MacArthur where Municipal Health Officer Dr. Jose
Dequito, on April 26, 1970, performed an autopsy and later set forth his findings in a medical report.showing that the
deceased sustained multiple wounds and abrasions on different parts of her body .He also found semenal fluid in the
victim's vaginal canal, as well as a horizontal laceration at the bifurcation of the labia minora indicating that the
deceased was sexually abused

ISSUE:

WON the lack of preliminary investigation impaired the validity of the proceedings

RULING:

No. The lack of preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the proceedings. It did not affect the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance over the case. Moreover, the three defendants pleaded not guilty upon being arraigned.
The denial of the accused of his right to preliminary investigation cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

Thus, the trial court has correctly found the defendants guilty of rape with homicide and imposed the proper penalty.

5. ALISANGCO V. JUDGE TABILIRAN (1993)

FACTS:
  Alisangco bought a stolen carabao. A complaint was filed for the violation of No. 1612 (which the respondent
Judge erroneously claim to be the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1979 when in reality, it is the Anti-Fencing Law of
1979) against complainant Alisangco as one of the accused.
 Consequently, Judge Tabiliran immediately issued a warrant for Alisangco's arrest without first determining his
participation in the offense charged and set the bond at Php 200,000.00. Alisangco posted cash bond after
which he was served with a subpoena directing him to appear for arraignment and preliminary investigation.
 On such date, Alisangco no longer appeared because he had earlier filed a waiver of his right to a preliminary
investigation. In view of his non-appearance, Judge Tabiliran issued an order to arrest Alisangco and requiring
the latter to show cause why his bond should not be confiscated. Before the arrest could be effected, the latter's
counsel intervened by filing a motion to lift the order of arrest. The respondent Judge, however, had not acted
on the said motion. Hence, this complaint for grave abuse of authority, ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming of a presiding judge.

ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent Judge has authority to set the case for arraignment.

RULING:

 Considering that the MCTC of Manukan-Jose Dalman only had preliminary jurisdiction over the case, the
respondent judge did not have any authority to set the case for arraignment. All it could do was to calendar the
same for preliminary investigation. There is no law or rule requiring an arraignment during the preliminary
investigation. Under Section 1, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, the arraignment must be conducted by
the court having jurisdiction to try the case on its merits. Thus, with respect to the case filed against the
complainant, this would be the proper Regional Trial Court which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said
case by reason of the prescribed penalty.

 It was duly proven that the waiver of preliminary investigation was filed by the complainant. Respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of procedural law or plainly abused his authority when he issued a warrant for the arrest
of the complainant and ordered the latter to show cause why his bond should not be confiscated. Even if the
waiver was not seen by him because it was not attached to the expediente of the case, the most that the court
could have done from the complainant's failure to appear was to consider him as having waived his right to a
preliminary investigation or declare such preliminary investigation closed and terminated as to him. It is settled
that even if an accused had expressed his desire to be given an opportunity to be present at the preliminary
investigation, but later changed his mind and renounced his right, he cannot be compelled to be present in the
said investigation

DISPOSITION: For ignorance if the law and grave abuse of authority, respondent Judge is hereby sentenced to pay a fine
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that the commission of the same or similar acts would be dealt with
more severely.

6. People v Montesa

FACTS:

On 6 July 1993, an information was filed with the Regional Trail Court (RTC) of Bulacan charging private respondents
Apolonio Cruz and Bernarda Cruz with the crime of falsification of public document. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1469-M-93 in Branch 19 of the said court which is presided by the respondent Judge.

Arraignment was set on 19 October 1993.

On 8 October 1993, the private respondents filed with the trial court a petition for reinvestigation since they found
material and relevant evidence that would determine probable cause. Said petition was granted remanding the case to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for purposes of reinvestigation, and cancelling the scheduled arraignment on 19
October 1993.
At the reinvestigation conducted by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edsel M. Rutor, the accused presented what it
considered new material and relevant evidence which consists merely of an affidavit of Feliza Constantino who declared
that she was the one responsible for the preparation of the questioned public document. He then recommended the
dismissal of the case as manifested in his resolution (Rutor Resolution). Provincial Prosecutor Liberato Reyes
disapproved the recommendation. Despite this, Rutor proceeded in submitting his resolution to the trial court. The case
was eventually dismissed on the basis of the said resolution.

Private prosecutor Atty. Edwin P. Cerezo received a copy of the dismissal order and filed a motion for its reconsideration
alleging that the Rutor resolution was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor who, on the contrary, directed Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Rutor to proceed with the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution; and that the
unapproved resolution did not invalidate of modify the information already filed, neither did it serve as basis for the
court's order summarily dismissing the case. He further alleged that since the court had arraigned the accused, it should
have, pursuant to the Rules, scheduled the case for pre-trial and trial.

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor vehemently opposed it on the ground that the private prosecutor has no
personality to intervene in the proceedings and that the motion was a mere scrap of paper for lack of his "(Rutor's)
conformity. The respondent Judge forthwith denied the motion.

On 12 January 1994, the Provincial Prosecutor and the private prosecutor jointly filed another motion to reconsider the
dismissal order of 22 December 1993.

The respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time as a copy of
the order of dismissal was received by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor on 22 December 1993, and he declared
that the motion for reconsideration earlier filed by the private prosecutor "is of no moment as [it] does not have the
imprimatur of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and perforce does not affect the running of the prescriptive period."

Hence, this petition which was filed on 25 March 1994 by the private complainant, through the private prosecutor, with
the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Liberato L. Reyes.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 1469-M-93 immediately after the arraignment of the accused-private respondents on the
basis of the resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case despite the
disapproval of such resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor.

RULING:

YES.

The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor
retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court
is the best and the sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the
prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the
court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.

In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the
authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and
determine whether the information it had filed should stand. Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait
for a final resolution of the incident.

The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case never became final, for
it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter disapproved it. As a consequence, the final
resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal or chief state prosecutor.
Also, under Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 5180,as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911:

[N]o assistant fiscal or state prosecutor may file an information or dismiss a case except with the prior authority or
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or Chief State Prosecutor. . . .

The Provincial Prosecutor's opinion that the prosecution should present its "evidence that makes out a prima faciecase"
clearly indicate that he was convinced that there is at the very least a reasonable ground to believe that the crime of
falsification was committed and the private respondents are probably guilty thereof. The findings and conclusion of the
Provincial Prosecutor, being the final disposition on the reinvestigation, should have been the sole and only valid basis
for the respondent Judge's final action with respect to the reinvestigation in the light of the foregoing provisions of the
Rules of Court and R.A. No. 5180, as amended, and the ruling in Marcelo. The respondent Judge must have
miscomprehended or misunderstood the notation of the Provincial Prosecutor that "the court & not this office is in a
better position to resolve the issue of whether the accused are the perpetrators of the falsification" as a carte blanche to
act on the resolution and recommendation of Rutor. He closed his eyes to the Provincial Prosecutor's stand the
prosecution should present its evidence "that makes out a prima facie case and let the court decide," which simply
means that the case should not be dismissed on the basis of Rutor's recommendation.

It must be observed that, although the respondent Judge was convinced of Rutor's recommendation to dismiss the case
on the ground of want of probable cause because of the "admission" of Feliza Constantino that the accused spouses
had no participation in the preparation of the questioned document, he still ordered the arraignment of the private
respondents. He seemed to have something in mind for the protection of the interest of the private respondents.
Presumably, he thought that the arraignment which was immediately followed by the dismissal of the case would
forever foreclose, on the ground of double jeopardy, any reopening of the case.

7. PILAPIL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 1993

NOCON, J p:

FACTS:

On October 16, 1987, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) donated one ambulance (a Mitsubishi L-300)
to the Municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur. Petitioner, Eduardo P. Pilapil, Congressman of the 3rd District of
Camarines Sur, received the ambulance in behalf of the municipality. However, he did not deliver the ambulance to
said municipality.

Unaware of the donation, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality passed a Resolution requesting PCSO for an
ambulance. The mayor of the municipality, Eleanor P. Lelis, sought the intercession of Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
Francis Garchitorena, regarding said request. Thereafter, Garchitorena contacted the PCSO and learned about the
ambulance previously donated to Tigaon through petitioner. He informed Mayor Lelis that the municipality's request
cannot be acted upon in view of the previous donation.

Mayor Lelis reiterated the request for an ambulance making reference to the certification of the municipal treasurer
that no vehicle from the PCSO or from anyone has been received.
Upon verification of the whereabouts of the Mitsubishi L-300 by the PCSO from the petitioner, the latter indicated his
willingness to return the ambulance. He requested that said vehicle be donated instead to the Municipality of
Tinambac, same province. Finally, he personally returned the ambulance, then already painted to cover the logo of
the PCSO and the other markings thereon.

With the return of the Mitsubishi L-300 to the PCSO, the Municipality of Tigaon, through Mayor Lelis, finally received a
brand new Besta Kia Ambulance unit complete with all accessories.

Garchitorena then sent a letter-complaint against petitioner regarding said ambulance for appropriate action.

Deputy Ombudsman Domingo issued an order requiring petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, affidavits of his
witnesses and other controverting evidence.

In his counter-affidavit, Petitioner claimed that the vehicle was not equipped with any medical attachments or
facilities so he was constrained to request PAGCOR for assistance to finance its conversion into a medical ambulance;
that PAGCOR acted on his request, but in lieu of financial assistance, said office donated accessories, at an estimated
cost of P5,000.00.

He explained further that the logo of PCSO and the other markings on the vehicle were removed, because he acceded
to the suggestion of his staff to include the name of PAGCOR on the sides of the ambulance in view of the substantial
contribution of the latter.

Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez issued a resolution that there is no malversation but found a violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

A warrant of arrest was issued against petitioner which was recalled after his deposit P15,000.00 as bail bond.

Petitioner predicated his motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person because the same was
filed without probable cause and the fact that the information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was filed although
the complaint upon which the preliminary investigation was conducted is for malversation.

Respondent court denied the said motion to quash holding that the factual and legal issues and/or questions raised
are evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense, the validity of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown
trial on the merits. Respondent court also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.

A petition for certiorari and mandamus is then filed, wherein petitioner seeks to annul the resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash and
motion for reconsideration.

RULING:

(The instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.)

No, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to quash and motion
for reconsideration.

Under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash a
complaint or information.

In Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People and in Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, “The absence of preliminary investigation does not
affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective, but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the
attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the Information, should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary
investigation may be conducted.”

When the court has jurisdiction, as in this case, any irregularity in the exercise of that power is not a ground for a
motion to quash. Lack of jurisdiction is not waivable but absence of preliminary investigation is waivable. In fact, it is
frequently waived.

In an order, petitioner was required to answer the charges against him as stated in the affidavits-complaints and
supporting documents thereto. Petitioner fully complied with said order and filed his and his witnesses' affidavits. In
other words, petitioner was properly apprised of the act complained of and given ample opportunity to rebut the
same. In Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that preliminary investigation is nothing more than the submission
of the parties' respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to buttress their separate allegations.

As to Petitioner’s contention that the preliminary investigation conducted against him was under the title of
"malversation", the Court ruled that preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his
complaint or information. The preliminary designation of the offense in the directive to file a counter-affidavit and
affidavits of one's witnesses is not conclusive.

Even on the assumption that no preliminary investigation was conducted for the information filed, petitioner waived
his right thereto for failure to ask the Sandiganbayan or the Ombudsman for a new preliminary investigation. The right
to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and may be waived expressly or by silence. Failure of accused
to invoke his right to a preliminary investigation constituted a waiver of such right and any irregularity that attended
it.

Petitioner's argument that he could not have asked for a new preliminary investigation in the Office of the
Ombudsman since he came to know about the charge only after the information was filed in the Sandiganbayan, is
not tenable. Under the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 112 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure:

"If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary Investigation having been first conducted, the accused may
within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the
same right to adduce evidence to his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule."

Finally, with petitioner’s claim that the element of "public office in the discharge of official duties" is also absent as his
acceptance of the vehicle in question from PCSO and its non-delivery to the municipality of Tigaon was not done in
the discharge of his duty as a congressman tasked with enacting laws, the Court agreed with Sandiganbayan that the
presence or absence of the elements of the crime are evidentiary in nature and are matters of defense, the truth of
which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

In Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban, Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

At the moment, in passing on a motion to set aside an information on the ground that the accused has been charged
without probable cause, the court should not be guided by the rule that accused must be shown to be guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, but rather whether there is sufficient evidence which inclines the mind to believe, without
necessarily leaving room for doubt, that accused is guilty thereof.
8. SAMULDE V. SALVANI, JR. (1988)

FACTS:

MTC Judge Samulde of Patnoñgon, Antique, conducted a preliminary investigation of Pelayo Arangale upon a complaint
for robbery filed by Maria Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining
Arangale's land (Crim. Case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Pelayo Arangale").

After making a preliminary investigation based on the affidavits of the complainant and her witnesses and counter-
affidavits of the respondent and his witnesses, Judge Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal
Salvani with his finding that "there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charge in the complaint."

The fiscal returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records to his office was
"premature" because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest against the accused as provided in Section
5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Judge Samulde sent back the records to Fiscal Salvani. He pointed out that under Section 6, Rule 112, he may issue a
warrant of arrest if he is satisfied "that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, " implying thereby that, although he found that a
probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be immediately placed under custody so as not to
frustrate the ends of justice. Hence, he refused to issue a warrant of arrest.
A special civil action of mandamus was filed in the Antique RTC by Provincial Fiscal Salvani against Judge Samulde to
compel the latter to issue a warrant for the arrest of Arangale.

During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Fiscal Salvani was replaced by Fiscal Leopoldo Villavert, who
manifested to the Court that there is need to continue the case begun by his predecessor citing important procedural
questions are involved.

The RTC Judge Icamina ordered Judge Samulde to issue a warrant for the arrest of Arangale in Crim. Case No. 2046-B,
and to transmit the warrant to the Provincial Fiscal for appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 5,
Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. He further advised the MTC Judge "that henceforth he adheres to
the same rule in similar cases where he conducts a preliminary investigation with a finding of a prima facie or probable
cause.”

Unconvinced, Judge Samulde appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is mandatory for the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused in view of his finding, after
conducting a preliminary investigation, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused committed the crime
charged.

RULING:

No, it is NOT mandatory for the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused in view of his finding, after
conducting a preliminary investigation, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused committed the crime
charged.

The issue posed by this case necessitates an examination of the history and development of the rule on preliminary
investigation. Section 13 of General Orders No. 58 dated April 23, 1900 of the U.S. Military Governor in the Philippines
was the original source of the rule on preliminary investigation. It provided —

SEC. 13. When a complaint or information alleging the commission of a crime is laid before a magistrate, he must
examine, on oath, the informant or prosecutor and the witnesses produced, and take their depositions in writing, causing
them to be subscribed by the parties making them. If the magistrate be satisfied from the investigation that the crime
complained of has been committed, and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the party charged has committed
it, he must issue an order for his arrest. If the offense be bailable, and the defendant offers a sufficient security, he shall
be admitted to bail; otherwise he shall be committed to prison.

It was amended by Act 194 of the Public Laws enacted by the Philippine Commission with Amendments indicated, Vol.
I, p. 527, which authorized every justice of the peace to conduct such investigation and order the arrest of the accused
if he believed the complaint to be well founded.

In the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Section 2, Rule 112, the list of persons authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations grew even longer to include: (a) provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (c) National and Regional state prosecutors; and (d) other officers
authorized by law.

In both the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court, it was mandatory upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused, if he was satisfied that the offense charged was committed and that the accused probably
committed it.

However, the rule on preliminary investigation underwent some modifications in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which is the applicable rule in this case. Under Section 1 of the present rule, the definition of the purpose of a preliminary
investigation, does not contemplate the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the investigating judge or officer:

SECTION 1. Definition. — Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
The mandatory provision that the investigating judge "must issue a warrant of arrest" if he finds probable cause that
the respondent committed the crime charged, found in all previous rules of criminal procedure, from General Orders
No. 58 down to Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, is absent in Section 1 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Another significant change is that under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure there is only one (1) way of conducting
a preliminary investigation, and that is by affidavits and counter-affidavits submitted by the parties to the investigating
judge under Section 3, Rule 112. On the basis of the affidavits, the investigating judge shall "determine whether or not
there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial'. Gone is the requirement in the 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court
that "he must issue a warrant or order" for the arrest of the defendant.

SEC. 6 When warrant of arrest may issue. —

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. -If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an
examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.

As correctly argued by the petitioner Judge Samulde, three (3) conditions must concur for the issuance of the warrant
of arrest. The investigating judge must:

(a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers;

(b) be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and

(c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

It is an entirely new rule, and it is plain to see that it is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating
judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, for the determination of whether a probable cause exists
and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound
judgment or discretion.

In this particular case, since the robbery charge was the offshoot of a boundary dispute between two property owners,
the investigating judge did not believe there was any danger of the accused absconding before the filing of the
information against him by the fiscal, hence, he found no need to place him under immediate custody.

9. POSADAS V. COURT OF APPEALS [188 SCRA 288; G.R. NO. 89139; 2 AUG 1990]

Facts:

Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task
Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in
the vicinity of Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted
to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they
found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38
caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner
to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary
license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then
taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy
the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search is valid.

HELD:

In justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule
136 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof
of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the
petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

In the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri
bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated, hence the warrantless
search is valid.

10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SALANGGA (G.R. NO. 100910 JULY 25, 1994)

Ponente: Regalado, J.

Facts:

Accused-appellant Loreto Salangga, alias "Dodong," and Laureto Lopez, alias "Retoy," were haled to court as
conspirators in the rape and killing of a fifteen-year old barrio lass named Imelda Talaboc, allegedly committed in
Magsaysay, Davao del Norte on or about July 18, 1987. Both pleaded not guilty during arraignment. On February 21,
1991, the trial court found Salangga guilty of attempted rape with homicide while Lopez was acquitted for failure to
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On July 18, 1987, Imelda Talaboc was sent by her mother to fetch water from the spring or “bugac”. A certain
Ricky Monterde and Lenie Alingay testified that around 5:30 to 6:30 of the same afternoon, they saw appellant
Salangga walking ahead of Imelda while Lopez was walking behind her.

Bernardo Talaboc, Imelda’s father, reported to the barangay captain, Severino Laput, Imelda’s disappearance
and they went looking for her. At around 8:00 o'clock that same night, they found the corpse of Imelda lying in the
bushes about twenty meters away from where the water containers were earlier found. Imelda was found with her
clothes on but her panty was missing. Her face was disfigured by physical blows, she had been stabbed by a knife, and
her eyes were gouged out.
 Appellant and Lopez were arrested that same night at around 8:00 o'clock, after the corpse of Imelda had
been found, upon the orders of Barangay Captain Laput based on the information given by Ricky and Lenie implicating
the two of them. The soldiers of the 46th Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army took them into custody.

At the army detachment, said suspects were bodily searched. According to the prosecution, the soldiers
recovered from appellant a piece of lady's underwear, later identified by Talaboc to be that of his daughter, Imelda.
Afterwards, both suspects were ordered to undress. The prosecution claims that appellant's body bore what looked
like bite marks and scratches, but none was found on the body of Lopez.

The following morning, the suspects were brought to the office of Station Commander Manuel Macabutas in
the municipal hall where both were investigated by P/Sgt. Mario Gataber of the Magsaysay Police Station. Appellant
scrawled his quivery signature on an unsworn statement, handwritten by some other person, wherein he admitted
the crime charged, except that he was not able to consummate his bestial desire because Imelda fought very hard
against him.

On the other hand, the defense claims that some members of the 46th Infantry Brigade and Lopez came to his
house while he was repairing a wall in his kitchen. He was informed that Barangay Captain Laput was requesting for
their presence at his house. Both accused complied with the request and went to the residence of Laput. The latter
asked them if they were responsible for the death of Imelda and they vehemently denied any participation in the
crime.

The accused were then brought to the 46th Infantry Brigade Headquarters where they were allegedly
subjected to severe physical beatings by the soldiers. Unable to bear the maltreatment any further, they were
compelled to admit the earlier accusations against them.

The next day, a strong and painful kick in the stomach was inflicted on appellant by one of his custodians for
refusing to carry a lady's underwear and a pair of blue slippers in his pocket, which items were later identified by
Talaboc as belonging to his daughter. Consequently, he carried the same with him when they were brought to the
Magsaysay Municipal Hall where they were investigated by Sgt. Gataber. Afterwards, appellant was asked to sign a
document, explained to him as having something to do with his food, to which importing the unlettered appellant
acceded. Unfortunately, the document turned out to be his supposed statement admitting his guilt for attempting to
rape Imelda and subsequently killing her.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not there was a valid arrest.

2. Whether or not the evidence obtained was admissible in court.

3. Whether or not the accused waived their right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Ruling:

1. No, there was no valid arrest.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when (a) in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; (b) an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped.

From these provisions, it is not hard to conclude that appellant was arrested in violation of his fundamental
right against unjustified warrantless arrest. On the night he was arrested, he was in his house peacefully attending to
some domestic chores therein. It cannot be suggested that he was in any way committing a crime or attempting to
commit one. Also, the soldiers had no personal knowledge of the crime he was being charged with, nor was he a
fugitive from the law.

The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed.

2. No, the evidence obtained was inadmissible for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.

Bernardo Talaboc testified that both accused were frisked and asked to undress before him, some soldiers of
the 46th Infantry Brigade, and Barangay Captain Laput inside the Army detachment. If he is to be believed, that body
search incredibly yielded a lady's panty from the pocket of appellant and which underwear he identified as that of his
daughter. It would surely have been the height of stupidity for appellant to be keeping on his person an incriminating
piece of evidence which common sense dictates should have been destroyed or disposed of. For that matter,
according to Barangay Captain Laput before whom appellant was brought shortly after his apprehension and who was
also present therein, nothing was taken from said appellant.

In any event, the underwear allegedly taken from the accused is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called
"fruit of a poisonous tree." Likewise, there is definitely an improbability in the claim of Talaboc that he was able to
recognize the underwear of his daughter.

3. No, the accused did not validly waive his right against unreasonable search and seizure.

To constitute waiver, it must appear, firstly, that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had an actual intention
to relinquish the right.

Since appellant was not assisted by any counsel during his custodial investigation, his supposed incriminatory
statement is inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of this case. The rule, of course, is that no in-
custody investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by
any person in his behalf or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by someone in his
behalf.

While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be effected voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. Further, waiver must be with the assistance of counsel. The absence of counsel at that stage makes the
statement, in contemplation of law, involuntary, even if it was otherwise voluntary in a nontechnical sense.

Wherefore, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

11. PEOPLE v. BURGOS

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del
Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance
of Subversion.

According to the government, one Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities and pointed accused Ruben Burgos
as a member of the NPA who threatened to kill him and his family if he refused to join. The police then formed a task
force to arrest Burgos. They went to Burgos’ residence where they saw him plowing his field. They arrested him and
recovered from his house a caliber .38 revolver buried under the ground. The arrest was made without any warrant or
at least a search warrant. He was also not reminded of his constitutional rights.

However, according to accused Burgos, he was not a member of the NPA. The gun was actually buried by Masamlok
himself a few days before the arrest without the former’s knowledge since he was not in his house then. It was only
his wife who was present and she was threatened by Masamlok not to report the gun to the authorities. After his
warrantless arrest, he disclosed that he was tortured for days to admit the ownership of the recovered revolver.

Trial Court convicted Burgos.

Issue/s:

1. WON the warrantless arrest of Burgos is justified.

2. WON the exceptions in arrest with warrant can be liberally construed as in the case of Burgos’ arrest.

3. Can the Reasonableness Test be used to justify the warrantless arrest made against Burgos?

Ruling:

1. We find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail
to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real
apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the
whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required
to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of
criminal prosecution. Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of
arrest becomes even clearer. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being
unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere
incidents to a valid arrest.

2. NO, the exceptions must be literally construed.

Rule 113, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense
in his presence;

b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it;

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view.

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it
came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.

At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither
was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the
arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a
most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest
is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or
is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or
extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and
set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
3. NO. The government reasoned that the information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable
ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused was probably guilty thereof.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may
have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

12. FELICIANO VS PASICOLAN G.R. NO. L-14657

FACTS:

1. The petitioner, Pablo Feliciano, was one of the eighteen persons charged with the crime of kidnapping with
murder
2. Feliciano went into hiding because he was afraid that he might fall into the hands of irresponsible police officers,
and to avoid disgrace and humiliation consequent to an arrest and incarceration.
3. Attorney Filemon Cajator, at the instance of the petitioner's wife, filed in the case a motion asking that the
Court fix at P10,000.00 the amount of the bond for petitioner's release pending trial.
4. The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga opposed this motion, on the ground that the filing thereof was premature as
the petitioner had not yet been arrested.
5. After hearing, the respondent Judge, then presiding the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, dismissed
petitioner's motion, on the ground that "pending his arrest or surrender, Pablo Feliciano has not the right to
ask this court to admit him to bail."

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to bail.

RULING:
No.

There is no question as to the soundness of the rule invoked by petitioner. Such is the law in this jurisdiction. But, the
rule is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. Bail is defined under the Rules of Court as security "required and given for the release
of a person who is in custody of the law," Rule 110, sec. 1, Rules of Court.

In the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, the Court held that “According to this provision, the general rule is that any
person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital
offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained
or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision.”

And in the case of Manigbas vs. Luna, 52 O.G. 1405, it was held that the right to bail only accrues when a person is
arrested or deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant
bail to one who is free. Thus, `bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of
the law.' (Rule 110, section 1), and evidently the accused do not come within its purview.

Without surrendering himself, he filed the motion in which he asks that the court fix the amount of the bail bond for his
release pending trial. It is, therefore, clear that the petitioner is free man and is under the jurisprudence not entitled to
admission to bail.

13. EVANGELINE L. DINAPOL, complainant, vs. JUDGE ISMAEL O. BALDADO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bais
City, respondent

FACTS:

1. In a sworn letter dated 26 August 1992, complainant charges the respondent Judge with grave abuse of
discretion, ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench in that notwithstanding the
fact that the spouses Crozoro Palermo and Jovy Palermo, accused for murder, had not yet been arrested
pursuant to the warrant of arrest he had issued and were "freely roaming in the municipality of Guihulngan,"
said respondent Judge entertained a petition for bail and set the same for hearing despite the vigorous
opposition of the complaining witness
2. Complainant further alleges that the two accused have been "seen conspicuously after the filing of the
petition for bail; bail inside the chambers of this court [RTC] accompanied by a younger brother of a
congressman"; that it was the said congressman who supposedly "sponsored" the appointment to the
Judiciary of the respondent Judge; and that the accused spouses are "relatives of the said congressman.
3. Information for Murder so no bail was recommended for the provisional liberty of accused Crozoro Palermo
and Jovy Palermo
4. The respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
5. Before the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over their persons, accused filed through their counsel, the
Paras and Associates law office, a motion to grant and fix bail
 6. Evangeline Dinapol, the complaining witness and a sister of the victim in the murder case filed a vigorous
opposition to the motion
7. the respondent Judge issued an order (a) denying the motion to grant bail on the ground that the court "has
not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused," (b) ordering the issuance of an alias warrant of
arrest and (c) directing the PNP of Guihulngan "to exert utmost efforts for the arrest of the accused"
8. Atty. Alfonso Briones — filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration on the ground that "the accused are
forthcoming, and are willing to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Court"
9. Acting thereon, and on the basis of Atty. Briones' confirmation of "the willingness of the accused to surrender
to the custody of the court as stated in said motion,"
10. resetting the hearing of the motion to grant and fix bail subject to the condition that "the accused shall
surrender to the custody of the court." "that failure to present evidence on said date without justifiable
reason will be considered as lack of strength of its evidence"
11. Despite their commitment and Atty. Briones' confirmation on their behalf that they would voluntarily
surrender on 7 May 1992, the accused failed to appear on the set date
12. Nevertheless, "in the interest of substantial justice and to avoid delay in the administration of justice," the
respondent Judge issued on the said date an order resetting, once again,
13. the subpoena and warrant server of the Guihulngan Police Station, SPO1 Hindenburg Cabang, executed a
return of service of the 29 May 1992 warrant of arrest.
14. the Prosecution filed on 24 June 1992 a "Motion Entreating Hon. Ismael O. Baldado to Consider Whether or
Not to Continue Presiding Over the Above-Entitled Case"
15. respondent Judge inhibited himself, Judge Bulado also inhibited himself from hearing the case since
prosecution witness Alfredo Bulado is his first cousin or a relative within the fourth civil degree and decreed
the return of the case to the court of origin
16. Judge maintains that he had in fact denied in his 24 April 1992 Order the accused's motion for bail precisely
because his court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the accused.
17. He claims that he ordered the issuance of an alias warrant for their arrest and acted favorably on the motion
to reconsider the said denial (by resetting the hearing of the petition for bail) only to avoid what appeared to
him as a " 'pendulum' of procedure or a 'pingpong' of actions by both parties with the accused manifesting
their willingness to surrender and submit to the custody of the court and the prosecution objecting to the
hearing of the application for bail."
18. he cannot be charged with ignorance of law because although he was "a working student in college,
consistently endeavored to achieve excellence, and his academic efforts proved fruitful — graduated
(sic) Cum Laude in both Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Laws at Silliman University
19. Finally, respondent Judge alleges that (a) there is no clear and direct proof to support the allegation that both
accused were in his chambers for; (b) "not a single politician has made interventions or at least insinuate (sic)
to intervene, in any case pending before him"; and (c) there are parties working "behind the scene of this
malicious charge" against whom he will, in due time, undertake legal recourse
20. letter of Glenn B. Litrada, youngest sister of both Liberty Litrada — the victim in the murder case — and
Evangeline Dinapol — the complainant in instant case — informing this Court that in view of the latter's
having been pressured into signing an affidavit of desistance
21. Atty. Jose Estacion, Jr. as "the man behind, the prime mover and the active instigator, in the filing of this
case." It appears that the respondent Judge, while still in the private practice of law, represented Ruth Sison in
an administrative case (Adm. Matter No. RTJ-87-104) filed by her against Estacion who was then the Presiding
Judge. The respondent Judge attached to his Supplementary Comments the alleged true and correct copy of
complainant Evangeline Dinapol's so-called affidavit of desistance
22. respondent Judge manifested that he is submitting the instant case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings

RULING:

Office of the Court Administrator concludes that the respondent Judge has "committed a jurisdictional lapse in the
procedure he adopted in setting the case for hearing the Motion to (sic) Bail filed by the counsel of the accused on the
mere allegation that the accused are forthcoming and are willing to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court."
Section 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court that an accused can move for the granting of bail only if the court
has acquired jurisdiction over his person. It then recommends that the respondent Judge "be sternly admonished with
a warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation in the future will be dealt with more severely."

Bail is defined Section 1, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court as "the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required
under the conditions" specified in Section 2 thereof. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law(a) when he
is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant
under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities.

Since the accused in Criminal Case No. 775-G were not arrested by virtue of both the original warrant arrest and the
alias warrant of arrest, and did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they had no standing in
court to file a motion for bail. Nor did the court have any business setting the same for hearing

While he subsequently rectified his error by denying the motion in his Order of 24 April 1992, he nevertheless
backtracked by granting the motion for reconsideration and setting anew the hearing of the motion for bail this time
with a warning to the prosecution that its failure to present evidence on the scheduled date "will be considered as
lack of strength of its evidence.

According to Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, a Judge violates his duty as a minister of justice if he seeks to
do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows
it to be binding on him.

Respondent Judge had likewise betrayed impropriety by his unusual partiality in favor of one of the parties

Respondent Judge is hereby meted a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely

14. CONCERNED CITIZENS v. JUDGE ARMIE ELMA

A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 06, 1995

Background: An administrative case for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave Abuse of Discretion was filed against
Judge Armie Elma, an RTC judge, for granting bail in a non-bailable offense. (the complaint was referred to SC by the
Ombudsman for appropriate action).

Facts:

1. Records disclose that Alfredo Gatus was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa before the
sala of respondent Judge. In the information for Illegal Recruitment, no bail bond was recommended.

2. Gatus filed a motion to fix his bail in the Illegal Recruitment case. Instead of setting the motion for hearing,
respondent judge directed the prosecution to file its Comment.

3. After the filing of the prosecution’s Comment, respondent judge issued an Order setting the bail of Gatus at
P100,000. He approved the bail posted by Gatus thereafter.
 4. An administrative complaint was then filed against respondent judge for granting the bail and for granting such
without a formal hearing.

5. In his Comment, respondent judge admits that he failed to conduct a formal hearing prior to his grant of the
application for bail. However, he maintains that in ordering the prosecution to comment on the motion of
Gatus, he has substantially complied with a requirement of a formal hearing.

Issues: W/N respondent judge was correct in granting the bail without a formal hearing.

Ruling: No. Hearing of the bail application cannot be totally dispensed with.

The Constitution guarantees every person under legal custody the right to bail except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong. The Rules of Court likewise mandate that before
ruling on an application for bail, a hearing should first be conducted to determine the existence of a strong evidence
against the accused.

Respondent judge, in granting bail to Gatus, disregarded the basic rule of procedure. It is true that the weight of the
evidence adduced is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. However, such discretion may be exercised only
after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining whether or not
he should be granted provisional liberty. At the hearing, the court should assure that the prosecution is afforded the
opportunity to adduce evidence relevant to the factual issue, with the applicant having the right of cross-examination
and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.

In the case at bench, however, no formal hearing was conducted by respondent judge. He could not have assessed the
weight of the evidence against accused Gatus before granting the latter's application for bail.

In his Order granting the bail, respondent judge did not make any finding that the evidence against the accused was not
strong to justify the grant of his bail. Respondent judge merely adverts to “particular circumstances” of the case without
in any way hinting their nature and character. In receiving evidence on bail, it is true that the court is not required to try
the merits of the case nor is it called to speculate on the outcome of the trial. Nonetheless, to do away with the hearing
is to dispense with this time-tested safeguard against arbitrariness.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. Respondent
judge is hereby DISMISSED from service.

15. TUCAY VS. DOMAGAS

AM NO. RTJ-95-1286, MARCH 2 1995

FACTS:

 Ludovico, Bernardo and Melchor Ellamil are accused of murder.

 Bernardo filed a petition for bail with the prayer that he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P50,000.00.
 The petition contained the notation "No objection" of the provincial prosecutor.
 Without holding a hearing to determine whether the evidence of the prosecution was strong, Judge Domagas
issued an order on the same day, in which he granted bail and directed the release of Bernardo from
detention.
 Tucay, wife of the victim, filed a complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against Judge
Domagas charging him with ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and grave abuse of discretion. Tucay
protested the grant of bail without hearing and without notice to trial fiscal.
 The OCA finds the respondent judge grossly ignorant of the law in granting bail without a hearing in a criminal
case involving a capital offense and recommends that he be fined and given a stern warning. It likewise points
out that, in his order releasing the accused on bail, the judge did not state that he was granting the petition
for bail but simply ordered him released.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross of ignorance of law in granting bail without a hearing in a
criminal case involving a capital offense

HELD:

Yes. Although the Provincial Prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, respondent
judge should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution
whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application. He should have called a hearing for the additional
reason of taking into account the guidelines in Rule 114, Sec. 6 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, in
fixing the amount of the bail.

Only after satisfying himself that the prosecution did not wish to oppose the petition for bail for justifiable cause (e.g.,
for tactical reasons) and taking into account the factors enumerated in Rule 114, sec. 6 for fixing bail should
respondent judge have granted the petition for bail and ordered the release of the accused. In failing to observe these
rudimentary requirements, the respondent judge showed gross ignorance of the law for which he should be fined.

16. MARCOS V. RUIZ

FACTS:

On 2 August 1984, after conducting the appropriate preliminary investigation, Acting 2nd Assistant City Fiscal Lorenzo
A. Lopena of the City of Tagbilaran filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol two (2) informations against petitioner
herein for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The petitioner, knowing fully well that he did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the Far Fast Bank and Trust Company (Cebu North Proclamation Area Branch), delivered to Fulgencia
Oculam, in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry taken by petitioner’s wife Anacleta Marcos, two (2) checks drawn
against said bank in the amount of P3,000.00 each. The arraignment was set for 12 November 1984. The petitioner
appeared on that date but asked for a resetting on the ground that his lawyer had just withdrawn and he had to look
for another lawyer. The court granted his request and the arraignment was reset to 29 November 1984. 3

It turned out, however, that petitioner settled his obligation with the offended party who, on 3 November 1984,
executed an Affidavit of Desistance. At 10:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 November 1984, Acting 2nd Assistant City
Fiscal Lopena filed a Motion to Dismiss

On 23 April 1985, petitioner’s counsel filed a "Motion for Reconsideration to Order” justifying failure to appear at the
hearing. The petitioner said that pendency of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal, Lorenzo A. Lopena,
in view of complaining ‘witness’ Affidavit of Desistance, this Honorable Court would not proceed to receive the evidence
of the prosecution up to the present.
On 29 April 1985, the court issued an Order 12 denying the aforesaid motion for reconsideration on the following
grounds: that the petitioner should not assume that the motion for postponement would be granted; he is estopped
from insisting on a ruling on the motion to dismiss because he agreed to be arraigned, pleaded not guilty and did not
question the scheduling of the cases for trial; and the presentation by the Prosecution of its evidence amounted to an
abandonment of its motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or absence of jurisdiction
in:

(1) ordering the arraignment of the accused and receiving the evidence for the prosecution without first resolving the
motion to dismiss;

(2) ordering the forfeiture of the bail bond when petitioner failed to appear on 8 April 1985; allowing the Prosecution
to present its evidence ex parte and declaring the petitioner as having waived his right to present his evidence; and

(3) denying the motion to reconsider the Order of 8 April 1985 and setting the promulgation of judgment on 17 May
1985.

HELD :

Yes, the judge acted in grave of abuse of discretion. He thus blatantly ignored and disregarded Section 2(c), Rule 114
and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court which merely consider the accused’s non-appearance during trial. Having
failed to appear on 8 April 1985 despite due notice, and considering that on said date the urgent motion for resetting
had not yet been received by the court, respondent Judge could not be faulted for believing that petitioner’s non-
appearance was unjustified. Hence, a hearing in absentia was proper under the aforequoted provision of the
Constitution and Sections 2(c) and 1(c) of Rules 114 and 115, respectively, of the Rules of Court.chanrobles law library

However, respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the forfeiture of the bond and required the
bonding company to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against it for the amount of the bond. One other
condition for the granting of bail, set forth in Section 2(b), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, is that the accused shall appear
before the proper court whenever so required by the court or the rules of Court.

A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances where the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court or
the Rules of Court and, despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him before the court on a given date, the
accused fails to appear in person as so required. 21 There is no showing that the court had specifically required the
bonding company to produce the body of the petitioner on 8 and 9 April 1985. Moreover, since Criminal Cases Nos.
3890 and 3892, which involve two (2) checks with a face value of P3,000.00 each, were merely for the violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 which imposes a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one (1)
year or by a fine of not leas than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court," the presence of the
accused at the hearing on 8 and 9 April 1985 was not indispensable.

Under the Rules of Court, the accused has to be present:

(a) at the arraignment pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 116;

(b) at the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 120, or unless promulgation
in absentia is allowed under the third paragraph of said section; and

(c) when the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. 22

Before the advent of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the accused did not have to be present at the arraignment
if the charge was for a light offense triable by the then justice of the peace or any other inferior court of similar
jurisdiction. Also, his plea may be entered on his behalf by his attorney if the charge is for a misdemeanor or a minor
offense in which the penalty that may be imposed is a fine not exceeding P200.00.