G.R. No.

160258 January 19, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987. Out of this marriage, she begot
three (3) children, namely: Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima. Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that
her husband was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with
friends to the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work.

Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent
character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful
work.

Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to go back to her
parents together with her children. In order to support them, Gloria was compelled to work abroad. Since she left, she
has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his relatives.

On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, she filed a verified petition for presumptive death with the
RTC of San Mateo, Rizal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a juridical declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code were duly established in this case.

RULING:

Yes. After nine (9) years, there was absolutely no news about him and she believes that he is already dead and is now
seeking through this petition for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of
remarriage.

The evidence in support of the summary judicial proceeding are: the order of publication dated August 28, 2000 (Exhibit
"A"); affidavit of publication dated September 16, 2000 (Exhibit "B"); copies of the newspapers where the order
appeared (Exhibits "C" to "E-1"); a deposition dated September 4, 2000 of Gloria taken in Hong Kong (Exhibit "G") ;
Gloria’s affidavit dated October 21, 1999, also executed in Hong Kong (Exhibit "G-1"); and a certification by Department
of Foreign Affairs Authentication Officer, Catalina C. Gonzalez, dated November 3, 1999, therein certifying that the
signature of Vice Consul Adriane Bernie C. Candolada, appearing below the jurat in Gloria’s affidavit of October 21, 1999,
is authentic (Exhibit "G-2").

The RTC granted the petition and rendered the decision final and executory. Nevertheless, the CA studied the case upon
appeal of the Solicitor General representing the republic, but affirmed the decision of the RTC.
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children.
In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family code. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations
and ordered the liquidation of their common properties as defined in Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply with
the provisions of Article 50, 51, 52 of the Family Code. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and
asserted that the Family Code did not have provisions for the liquidation of common property in “unions without
marriage”

In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:

Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home"
and all their properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common
by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.

Valdez moved for reconsideration of the order which was denied. Valdez appealed, in arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the
Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated.(2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 in
relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the
spouses. (3) Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 147 of Family Code is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at bar

RULING:

Yes, Article 147 provides that “When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.”

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family. Hence, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 137110 August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.

FACTS:

The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10,
1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City. Despite the prior marriage he got married to complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibañez. On October 5, 1992, a letter-
complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually
resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993
in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in
the Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br.
22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
declared null and void. Despite this, the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at
the time he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The petitioner then
filed a case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage necessary for remarriage?

RULING:

Yes, a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent
marriage. It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy
charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting
the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that “the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” The
Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void,
even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowed to marry again

Petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In
fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of
bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.

G.R. No. L-9762 August 3, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
VICTORIANO JOANINO, defendant and appellant.

FACTS:

On or about the 22d day of May, 1890, the defendant Victoriano Juanino was joined in the bonds of holy matrimony to
one Hipolita Rosario; that he continued to live with the said Rosario as her husband until the year 1896, or 1897, when
he was deported by the Spanish Government from the Philippine Islands to the island of Guam; that he remained in the
island of Guam until the year 1901 or 1902.

When Victoriano Juanino returned to the Philippine Islands he found that his wife, Hipolita Rosario, had been living and
cohabiting with one Gregorio Malinit, and that as a result of such illicit cohabitation the said Hipolita Rosario had given
birth to two children during the absence of the defendant; that within a short period after the return of the defendant
from the island of Guam, he, being informed of the illicit relations of his wife with the said Gregorio Malinit, commenced
proceedings to be divorced from his wife, Hipolita Rosario, in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan;
that after the trial of the said divorce proceedings, the court found that the facts justified the petition of the the
defendant, Victoriano Joanino, and granted the divorce prayed for. That thereafter, on the 9th day of May, 1908, he was
joined in wedlock with one Maria Roque; that at the time of the second marriage the said Hipolita Rosario was still living.
The defendant was charged with the crime of bigamy.

During the trial of the cause the defendant admitted all of the foregoing facts. He attempted, however to justify his
second marriage upon the ground that he believed that when a divorce had been granted him he had a right to remarry.
He alleged that while he was in the island of Guam he had known some cases in which a divorce had been granted and
the where the parties had remarried. He admitted, however, that at the time he was granted a divorce from his wife,
Hipolita Rosario, he had been informed by the court that the divorce which he had been granted him did not permit him
to remarry; that the divorce which had been granted him amounted to nothing more or less than a decree of separation
-— a decree of separation from bed and board simply.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant should be charged with a crime of bigamy?

RULING:

Yes. Under the laws in force of the Philippine Islands at that time, the granting of a divorce does in no way annul the
marriage. In addition, the court informed the defendant that the divorce which he had been granted to him did not
permit him to remarry; that the divorce which had been granted amounted to nothing more or less than a decree of
separation — a decree of separation from bed and board simply. Hence, he is not allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage. His wedlock with Maria Roque is a considered a bigamy. The defendant is sentenced by the judge of the Court
of First Instance of the Province of Nueva Ecija to be imprisoned for a period of eight years and one day of prision mayor,
with the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs.

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

ELISEA LAPERAL, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

FACTS:

On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition which reads: (1) That petitioner
has been a bona fide resident of the City of Baguio for the last three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition;
(2) That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision
entered on this Honorable Court, entitled 'Enrique R. Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was
given a decree of legal separation from her; that the said partial decision is now final; (3) That during her marriage to
Enrique R. Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside from her
legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many years now; (4) That in view of
the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for
many years, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden
name, to wit: ELISEA LAPERAL.

Petitioner prayed she be allowed to resume using her maiden name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner be allowed to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal?

RULING:

the court denied the petition for the reason that Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed
legally separated from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal separation.

The provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code reads:

Article 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, a wife, even after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. A legal separation decree involves nothing more than a bed-and-board separation.
Wherefore, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960, granting the petition, is hereby set aside and the petition
dismissed. Without costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995

HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Zamboanga City, respondent.

FACTS:

On 5 May 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of
maiden name.” The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance
in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not
properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known.
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103
of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of
her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former
husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the
petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.

ISSUE:

In case the marriage ties no longer exist (as in death, divorce, annulment) does women need to seek judicial
confirmation of the change in their civil status in order to revert to their maiden name

RULING:

When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing
the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law
grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of
death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial
confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's
name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner
married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial
authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it.

In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner
before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former
husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim
laws. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July 4, 1990 and August 10, 1990
are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her maiden name and surname.

G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.

FACTS:

Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000.
Petitioner being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her
surname, "Maria Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to expiry of her passport, the
petitioner (marriage still subsists) applied for renewal in DFA Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. with a request to revert to her
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. Petitioner’s request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph
R. Bretana III, representing petitioner, wrote on the Secretary of DFA expressing a similar request. On August 28, 2000,
DFA through Asst. Sec. Belen F. Anota, denied the request, stating:

“…it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husband’s name. Use of maiden name is allowed in
passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules
and Regulations for Philippines Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly defines the conditions when a woman may
revert to her maiden name, that is, of only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband.
Ms. Remo’s case does not meet any of these conditions.”

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution was denied in a letter dated 13 October 2000. On
15 November 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President. On July 27, 2004, the Office of the
President dismissed the appeal with the same argument as the Asst. Secretary of DFA (RA 8239). On 27 July 2004, the
Office of the President dismissed the appeal and ruled that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996. The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a general and
special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a
general law, it should yield to RA 8239. The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration and on October 28, 2004, the
Office of the President denied the motion. Petitioner filed with the court of Appeals for a petition for review and on May
27, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied (#6) the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated August 2, 2005.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use
of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

RULING:

No. Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her
maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2)
divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not
resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her
maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

FACTS:

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted
serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became a US Citizen. Upon his
visitation of his wife, he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship with his
brother. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. . Lorenzo returned to the United
States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County
of San Diego. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot
3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. He filed a
petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be
terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in favor of
Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired.
Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry.
2. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

RULING:

1. Yes, the divorce obtained by Lorenzo is vald. In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same
case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo H.
Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Such was also
the situation when he married Alicia and executed his will.

2. Intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.”

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that
the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this
jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. “Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed. Will is valid. SC reversed the decision.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986,
Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son, Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Innocent Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

RULING:

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission
of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

Accordingly, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is granted.

G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

FACTS:

Marivic Genosa has been married with Ben Genosa. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But
apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent. On November 15,
after futile search for her husband Ben Genos, Marivic Genosa, who was 8 months pregnant, together with her cousin
(Ecel),found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosa’s house. The cousin went home despite Marivic’s request for her
to sleep in their house. Ben nagged Marivic for following him and challenged her to a fight; when she ignored him, Ben
switched off the light and with the use of a chopping knife, cut thetelevision antenna to keep her from watching
television. Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around.
She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. Marivic wanted him to leave so she packed his clothes.
Seeing his packed clothes upon his return, Ben flew into a rage, dragged Marivic outside the bedroom towards a drawer
holding her neck and told her, “You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.” Aware that there was a gun inside
the drawer, but since Ben did not have any key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. Marivic
smashed Ben’s arm with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade cutter from his wallet. She then smashed his nape with
the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom. She distorted the
drawer where the gun was and shot Ben, which resulted to the latter’s death. The cadaver of Ben was discovered 3 days
from the incident after an investigation of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa Residence.

Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a
habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and
sometimes beat her. These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben
would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she would be
beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the
injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he
was drunk, at least three times a week.

ISSUE:

If Marivic Genosa did not killed Ben Genosa, can Marivic Genosa file a legal separation against Ben Genosa?

RULING:

Yes, Marivic Genosa can file a legal separation on the grounds of repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
and habitual alcoholism of Ben Genosa in respect of the Article 55 of the Family Code. Marivic testified that after the first
year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She also testified that he slaps her several times,
sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.

Article 55 paragraph 1 and 5 of the Family Code of the Philippine reads:

Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner.
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent.

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In
1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime
later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer. Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On August
16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this
time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Instead of giving their
marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to
California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet
completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family. On December 8, 1992, Teresita returned to the Philippines and filed the petition of writ
of habeaus corpus to gain custody over her children. The trial court favored Reynaldo for the custody of their children.
However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner filed for review to the Supreme Court
contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court and awarded the custody of the
children to the mother through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso that children below seven (7) shall
not be separated from their mothers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the two (2) children should be awarded to the mother?

RULING:

In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account
all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven,
his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen
parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.

Article 363 of the Civil Code reads:

In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure.

and of Article 213 of the Family Code provides:

In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court.
The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age
unless the parent chosen is unfit.

In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. They understand the difference
between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an
environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. The illicit or immoral
activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting
moral values against the children. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been
affected in their emotional growth by her behavior. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear
from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an
"unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. Hence, the petition is granted.The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding
custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.

G.R. No. 154994 June 28, 2005

JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner,
vs.
CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent

FACTS:

Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn with
an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away with her
from their conjugal home and his school when she left him. During the hearing on the custody pendente lite, the private
investigator hired by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn testified that Joycelyn was having lesbian relations with
a certain Noreen in Cebu City. This was corroborated by the househelper of the spouses who stated that Joycelyn often
leaves the house and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slap the child. The trial court awarded the custody of the minor
pendente lite to Crisanto. After hearing, the trial court awarded the custody Crisanto, but it was reversed later, awarding
the custody to Joycelyn. The CA reversed the Order of the trial court and awarded custody to the father pendente lite.
Hence, the petitions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

RULING:

Yes, Article 213 of the Family Code provides:

"ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise."

The Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the
custody of their child.

Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody.
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a
mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.
To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on
the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care. Based on the
above jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also
demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or
under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. Such a fact has not been shown here.
There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and
psychological development suffered as a result. Hence, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is granted. The court awarded the
custody of the minor to its mother Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto.

G.R. No. L-64982 October 23, 1984

ALEJANDRO B. HONTIVEROS, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, Third Special Cases Division, HON. WILFREDO G. CAINGLET in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch CLVIII, RTC and BRENDA M. HERNANDO, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros, Jr. and Private respondent Brenda M. Hernandez are the parents of a child born on
November 27, 1981 and given the name Margaux H. Hontiveros. On May 24, 1983, Alejandro filed an urgent ex parte
petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent Brenda from bringing the minor child
outside the country, specifically the United States of American where she was allegedly bound for. On May 30, 1983, the
counsel for private respondent moved for the withdrawal of the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that said
petition has become moot and academic upon the production of the body of Margaux Hontiveros before Judge Rafiada.
and in view of the order of September 9, 1982. Respondent Judge Wilfredo Cainglet (presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch CLVIII) granted the motion for the withdrawal of the petition for
habeas corpus. Since the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is but an ancillary action, the same
was denied by the respondent Judge in his order dated May 30, 1983. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was
likewise denied for lack of factual and legal justification. On June 3, 1983, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
application for preliminary injunction with the Intermediate Appellate Court but the respondent Court dismissed the
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Alejandro Hontiveros is entitled to the custody of his minor child Margaux H. Hontiveros.

RULING:

No, Article 363 of the Civil Code provides:

In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount.
No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for
such measure.

The Code Commission observed that the rule in Article 363 of the Civil Code is necessary "in order to avoid many a
tragedy when a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age. In addition, it is also provided in Article 17 of the Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child
and Youth Welfare Code) that:

In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to do so.

Clearly in this case, the mother has a clear legal right to the custody of her minor child, there beingno compelling reason
to the contrary. The petition is hereby denied with cost against petitioner.

G.R. No. L-52242 November 17, 1980

MIGUEL R. UNSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO AND EDITA N. ARANETA, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were married on April 19, 1971 and out of that marriage the child in question, Maria
Teresa Unson, was born on December 1, 1971. However, on July 13, 1974 they executed an agreement for the separation
of their properties and to live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June 1972. The agreement was
approved by the Court. No specific provision on custody of their child Maria Teresa was contained in the separation
agreement.

In the early part of 1978, the petitioner personally acquired knowledge the following information: (1) that his wife Edita
Araneta has been living with her brother-in-law Agustin F. Reyes, (2) that Agustin F. Reyes was being treated for "Manic
Depressive" disorder, (3) that the illicit affair produced 2 children, and (4) that Edita and Agustin embraced a protestant
sect.

Petition for certiorari to have the order of respondent judge of December 28, 1979 ordering petitioner to produce the
child, Maria Teresa Unson, his daughter barely eight years of age, with private respondent Edita N. Araneta and return
her to the custody of the later, further obliging petitioner to "continue his support of said daughter by providing for her
education and medical needs," allegedly issued without a "hearing" and the reception of testimony in violation of
Section 6 of Rule 99.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edita Araneta is entitled to the custody of her child Maria Teresa Unson given the immoral relationship
the mother entered to?

RULING:

No. The Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the
obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself,
as admitted by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most
impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the
past when she was still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or
notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's
mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life. No respectable father,
properly concerned with the moral well-being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different attitude
than petitioner's in this case. Under the circumstances thus shown in the record, the Court finds no alternative than to
grant private respondent no more than visitorial rights over the child in question.

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner,
vs.
MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents

FACTS:

Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel, Francisca Pineda
Miguel and Loreta MIguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. Petitioner alleges that the minor
Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17,
1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is
presently residing in Japan. The petitioner further alleges that on November 4, 1998 he caused the minor child to be
brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. The petitioner prays that the
custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and as he has demonstrated his capability
to support and educate him.

Respondent Loreta P. Miguel denies the allegation of the petitioner that he was the one who brought their child to the
Philippines and stated that she was the one who brought him here pursuant to their agreement.She also likewise stated
that her marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in Japan to
pursue her work so she could be able to send money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She further stated that she
has no intention of staying permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the Philippines every six (6) months or as
often as she could. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes
Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article 363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The petition was
dismissed. Respondent Loreta P. Miguel shall have custody over the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he reaches ten (10)
years of age. Once the said child is beyond ten (10) years of age, the Court allows him to choose which parent he prefers
to live with pursuant to Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Joey Briones raised a petition to review
before the court to reverse and set aside the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not he, as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care over an illegitimate son?

RULING:

All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate
status. Obviously, Michael is a natural illegitimate child, under the Family Code. David v. Court of Appeals held that the
recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not
custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows
that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may
adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the
minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that
right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it "except in the cases authorized by law."

Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise. Only the most compelling of
reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
authority and the award of custody to someone else.

In addition, we also found that the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision
contemplates a situation in which the parents of the minor are married to each other, but are separated either by virtue
of a decree of legal separation or because they are living separately de facto. In the present case, it has also been
established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing
the child to choose which parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support
the child. Wherefore, the petition is denied and the assailed decision affirmed with the modification that the disposition
allowing the child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to choose which parent to live with is deleted for lack of legal
basis.

G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where
Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In
1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime
later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer. Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife. On August
16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this
time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Instead of giving their
marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to
California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet
completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family. On December 8, 1992, Teresita returned to the Philippines and filed the petition of writ
of habeaus corpus to gain custody over her children. The trial court favored Reynaldo for the custody of their children.
However, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision. Petitioner filed for review to the Supreme Court
contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court and awarded the custody of the
children to the mother through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso that children below seven (7) shall
not be separated from their mothers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of the two (2) children should be awarded to the mother?

RULING:

In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account
all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven,
his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen
parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.

Article 363 of the Civil Code reads:

In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount.
No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for
such measure.

and of Article 213 of the Family Code provides:

In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The
Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age
unless the parent chosen is unfit.

In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. They understand the difference
between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be better served in an
environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. The illicit or immoral
activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting
moral values against the children. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been
affected in their emotional growth by her behavior. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear
from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an
"unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code. Hence, the petition is granted.The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding
custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

FACTS:

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her
mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is
now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to
"Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.

RULING:

Yes. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by
law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname
of the father. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as
her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at
390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with
her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.

FACTS:

A couple. Dr. Diosdado and Isabelita Lahom decided to adopt Isabelita’s nephew, Jose Melvin Sibulo to bring him up as
their own child. They filed an adoption decree on the civil registrar of Naga City which was granted and changed the
name of Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. In a sad turn of events, on December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom being a
widow and suffering for a leg ailment filed a petition to the lower court of Naga to rescind the adoption decree on the
ground that the attitude of her adopted son was not expected of him and he does not care for her health and welfare.
The latter also refused to use the name of Lahom and instead continue using Sibulo in connection to his practice of
profession. It was also found out that the only motive to respondent’s adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights
over the properties of the spouses of Lahom. Prior to the institution of the case, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known
as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption. Melvin Sibulo opposing and moved for the dismissal of the petition filed by his mother was granted
by the lower court by dismissing the petition of the petitioner. Insisting on her rights, Mrs. Lahom filed a petition for a
review in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the decree of adoption could still be revoked/annulled by the adopter even after the effectivity of R.A. 8552
and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed.

RULING:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, the
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from
the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. It was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom
filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and
repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be
pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under
Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of
that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a
vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not
naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by
the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to
adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State
regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been
exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.

FACTS:

The petition for adoption was filed by Zenaida Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential
Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either spouses or
by both of them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the
Court of Appeals, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the new law, joint adoption by the husband and
wife is mandatory. The petitioner Republic of the Philippines contends that the petitioner for adoption should be
dismissed as it was filed solely by the private respondent. It argues that the Family Code must be applied retroactively to
the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of
her petition for adoption.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition
for adoption

2. Whether or not Court of Appeal erred in affirming the decision w/c granted the petition in favor of the spouses
Dioscoro and Zeneida Bobiles

RULING:

1. No, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of action. Mrs. Bobiles filed at the time when the law effective was the Child and Youth Welfare.
Under said law, the private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself. Upon her filing, her
right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in
force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudice or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

Article 246 of the Family Code also provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof,
subject to the qualification that such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

2. No, Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his
wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof,
shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The subsequent confirmatory testimony in open
court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. The future of the child must not be compromised by insistence of
rigid adherence to procedural rules. The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition
for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society
and family in the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural
parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.

Wherefore, the instant petition is hereby denied.