1) https://www.dawn.

com/news/1499265/the-kashmir-challenge

THE KASHMIR CHALLENGE

YET another intifada is on the cards in India-held Kashmir (IHK),

which many believe would have a far-reaching impact on the
geopolitical landscape of the region. While the international
community is still assessing the probable responses by India and
Pakistan, non-state actors are also closely monitoring the situation
and exploring the spaces to exploit.

The Indian revocation of the special status of occupied Jammu & Kashmir has
shut down almost all prospects for it to resolve the issue through dialogue,
either with the Kashmiri leadership or with Pakistan. One wonders if India did
not have any alternatives other than what it has already demonstrated in the
form of strict security measures, communication blackouts, and draconian
administrative measures to run the affairs of J&K.

The use of some counter-violent extremism, or CVE, terms like ‘reintegration’

and ‘mainstreaming’ by India’s policymakers and political circles suggest they
consider the entire IHK population to be radical. Apparently, India is missing
the mega blueprint to absorb the shocks of the measures it has taken to ‘fix’
the Kashmir issue once and for all.

Obviously in the absence of such plans, an intifada would be blamed on

Pakistan. This would be an easy way out for India, but would come at a cost.
Not prepared to counter the Indian move to revoke the special status of IHK,
Pakistan is also confronted with a delicate challenge. However, an even more
critical question for Pakistan is how to respond to the emerging intifada.

The dynamics of the insurgency in India-held Kashmir

will be different this time.
The new intifada will have different characteristics from earlier movements.
While it will mainly comprise nonviolent political expression, violent emotions
will also be there. Emotions are running equally high amongst pro-
independent, pro-Pakistan and ultra-radical segments of the resistance
movements in occupied Kashmir. They can resort to violent actions separately
or form an alliance to increase the impact of the intifada.

It is not certain how many members of the banned Jaish-e-Mohammad and

Lashkar-e-Taiba are present in IHK and what the level of their operational
capacity is. But groups like Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, an affiliate of Al Qaeda in
the Indian Subcontinent, are gradually making inroads into the ultra-radical
militant movements in Kashmir. The AGH is also against Pakistan. The group
is trying to convince other armed groups to form an independent jihad alliance
against India. Recently, Al Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri had endorsed this
idea. In this context, Kashmir-based armed groups like Hizbul Mujahideen
will also be under intense pressure to reorganise their operational structures.

These groups can trigger a long-term resistance movement in IHK. Pakistan is

morally and politically bound to support the Kashmiris. However, supporting
the resistance movement will have serious consequences for Pakistan. The
poor state of Pakistan’s economy, internal political crises and struggling
diplomacy are factors which will limit active support to the resistance
movement in IHK.

The IMF and FATF swords are hovering over the country’s economy. The
world at large, including friends and foes of Pakistan, are least receptive to
violent resistance movements. India knows this, and its media and opinion
makers are highlighting this point continuously. India has chosen the best
time for revoking the IHK special status when Pakistan is facing multiple
challenges and trying to regain its geopolitical importance through facilitating
the peace process in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has remained a scapegoat for US failures in Afghanistan. Similarly,

India has always blamed Pakistan for its own failures in IHK. But the situation
is different now, and it could be difficult to keep the escalation of tension at
the LoC and Working Boundary to manageable levels.

Meanwhile, the dynamics of the insurgency in Kashmir will be different this

time, where Pakistan will not be in a position to influence the resistance
movement. As a result, Pakistan-India tensions could at anytime turn into
conventional warfare; Prime Minister Imran Khan has already indicated this
in his parliamentary speech. How can Pakistan avoid this situation?

Pakistani and Indian diplomatic confrontation has remained confined to two

unrelated domains: Pakistan has focused on internationalising the Kashmir
issue, while India exploits the militancy aspect. While India has played its
cards effectively during the last several years, Pakistan is just on its way to
regaining its diplomatic strength, not only through facilitating the Afghan
peace process but also by acting against all shades of militant groups. There
are apprehensions of a turnaround, although it seems complicated this time
because of all the factors mentioned.
The leaders of sectarian and militant groups are trying to establish their
relevance in the changing situation. Some audio, video and text messages are
circulating in social media groups in which they are declaring their support for
the Kashmir cause. They have not yet received a response from the state and
media. Even the reactivation of forums like the Difa-i-Pakistan Council is not
apparent; this was an alliance of small radical religious and political parties
that could bring the people to the streets on such critical regional issues.

Pakistan’s changed approach can become its strength. The international

community can see that despite the presence of extremist groups in the
country and an emotionally charged environment, Pakistan has not allowed
the radicals to hijack the issue and create spaces for themselves. This
approach will help Pakistan win the trust of the international community and
internationalise the Kashmir issue.

India will certainly have to face the consequences of the emerging intifada. But
Pakistan should evolve a political and diplomatic strategy to stop India from
holding it responsible for the uprising, and to prevent Delhi from resorting to
‘infiltration’ and ‘terrorism’ mantras to discredit the intifada. It will not be an
easy task as India has already made inroads and gained support among allies
of Pakistan over the last decade. The ‘militancy’ card has caused considerable
damage to Pakistan’s economy and diplomacy, but India has now provided it
with an opportunity to reverse the process.

It is an opportunity and demands unity from all segments of society, and from
the political and security leaderships. It is time to put political vendettas aside
and concentrate on the Kashmir cause. A protracted political crisis will only
spoil the opportunity.

The writer is a security analyst.

2) https://www.dawn.com/news/1487040/pakistan-sino-us-cold-war

PAKISTAN & Sino US COLD WAR

AFTER the secretive Bilderberg meetings in Switzerland last week,

Martin Wolf, the respected Financial Times economic columnist,
wrote an op-ed entitled: ‘The 100 year fight facing the US and
China’. Wolf’s conclusions are significant:

“...[R]ivalry with China is becoming an organising principle of US economic,

foreign and security policies”; “The aim is US domination. This means control
over China, or separation from China”. This effort is bound to fail. “This is the
most important geopolitical development of our era. ...[I]t will increasingly
force everybody else to take sides or fight hard for neutrality”; “ Anybody who
believes that a rules-based multilateral order, our globalised economy, or even
harmonious international relations, are likely to survive this conflict is
deluded”.

Pakistan is near if not in the eye of the brewing Sino-US storm. Neutrality is
not an option for Pakistan. The US has already chosen India as its strategic
partner to counter China across the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and South Asia. The
announced US South Asia policy is based on Indian domination of the
subcontinent. Notwithstanding India’s trade squabbles with Donald Trump,
the US establishment is committed to building up India militarily to counter
China.

On the other hand, strategic partnership with China is the bedrock of

Pakistan’s security and foreign policy. The Indo-US alliance will compel
further intensification of the Pakistan-China partnership. Pakistan is the
biggest impediment to Indian hegemony over South Asia and the success of
the Indo-US grand strategy. Ergo, they will try to remove or neutralise this
‘impediment’.

The US is arming India with the latest weapons and technologies whose
immediate and greatest impact will be on Pakistan. India’s military buildup is
further exacerbating the arms imbalance against Pakistan, encouraging Indian
aggression and lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in a
Pakistan-India conflict. Washington has joined India in depicting the
legitimate Kashmiri freedom struggle as ‘Islamist terrorism’.

The China-US confrontation is likely to escalate further in

the foreseeable future.
A hybrid war is being waged against Pakistan. Apart from the arms buildup,
ceasefire violations across the LoC and opposition to Kashmiri freedom, ethnic
agitation in ex-Fata and TTP and BLA terrorism has been openly sponsored by
India, along with a hostile media campaign with Western characteristics.
FATF’s threats to put Pakistan on its black list and the opposition to CPEC are
being orchestrated by the US and India. The US has also delayed the IMF
package for Pakistan by objecting to repayment of Chinese loans from the
bailout.
Although the US has moderated its public antipathy towards Pakistan while it
extracts Pakistan’s cooperation to persuade the Taliban to be ‘reasonable’, it is
likely to revert to its coercive stance once a settlement is reached in
Afghanistan, or if the negotiations with the Taliban break down.

The Sino-US confrontation is likely to escalate further in the foreseeable

future. US pressure on smaller states to fall in line will become more intense
under the direction of US hawks. Under Xi Jinping, China will not “hide its
strength or bide its time”. Beijing has retaliated against Washington’s trade
restrictions. It will “defend every inch” of Chinese territory.

Likewise Narendra Modi in his second term is unlikely to become more pliant
towards Pakistan. He has been elected on a plank of extreme Hindu
nationalism and hostility towards Muslims, Kashmiris and particularly
Pakistan. Modi will not shift from this posture since he needs to keep his
people’s attention away from the BJP’s failure to create jobs and improve
living conditions for anyone apart from India’s elite. India’s economy is facing
headwinds and growth has slowed. There are multiple insurgencies across the
country, apart from the popular and sustained revolt in disputed Kashmir
against India’s brutal occupation.

The Pulwama crisis has confirmed the imminent danger posed by the Kashmir
dispute. In their resistance to Indian occupation, Kashmiris groups will at
times respond violently to India’s gross and systematic violations of human
rights. India will blame Pakistan for such violence and its failure to put down
the Kashmiri resistance. The next Pakistan-India confrontation could lead to
general hostilities. These could escalate rapidly to the nuclear level.

The most dangerous scenario for Pakistan would be an Indian conventional

attack under a US nuclear ‘umbrella’. Pakistan’s second strike capability is the
only certain counter to this catastrophic scenario.

Some in Pakistan may be sufficiently disheartened by its imposing challenges

to advocate peace with India at any cost. But, for Pakistan, “surrender is not
an option” (to quote the title of John Bolton’s book about the UN).

Accepting Indian domination over South Asia will compromise the very raison
d’être for the creation of Pakistan. The current plight of India’s trapped
Muslims should be an object lesson to those who believe that displays of
goodwill will buy India’s friendship. A thousand years of history refutes that
thesis.
In any event, irrespective of what Pakistan does, the Kashmiris will persist in
their struggle. They have survived periods of Pakistani indifference. If Modi’s
government attempts to fulfil its campaign pledge to abrogate Jammu &
Kashmir’s special, autonomous status, the Kashmiri resistance will further
intensify. Islamabad will then face a choice of supporting the just Kashmiri
struggle or cooperating with the Indians to suppress it (just as the Arab states
are being pressed to do to the Palestinian struggle for statehood.)

Even as it seeks to stabilise the economy and revive growth, Pakistan’s civil
and military leadership must remain focused on preserving Pakistan’s security
and strategic independence. The alternative is to become an Indo-American
satrap.

A better future is possible. But it is not visible on the horizon.

Against all odds, presidents Trump and Xi may resolve their differences over
trade and technology at the forthcoming G20 Summit or thereafter. Or,
Trump may be defeated in 2020 by a reasonable Democrat who renounces the
cold war with China. Alternately, Modi may be persuaded by Putin, Xi and
national pride not to play America’s cat’s-paw and join a cooperative Asian
order, including the normalisation of ties with Pakistan. Yet, Pakistan cannot
base its security and survival on such optimistic future scenarios. It must plan
for the worst while hoping for the best.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

3) https://www.dawn.com/news/1499112/modis-final-solution

MODI’S FINAL SOLUTION

INDIAN Prime Minister Narendra Modi says his actions in India-
held Kashmir will end “terrorism and separatism”. Pakistan’s
prime minister calls this “changing the demographics”. This is
ethnic cleansing, which if applied to the majority of a population
is tantamount to genocide. The Supreme Court of India can
nullify the Indian president’s proclamation removing Article 370
from the Indian constitution. If it does, how will Modi react? If it
does not, what will be the reaction in IHK? The UN secretary
general has called for the restoration of the special status of IHK
pending a final settlement according to the UN Charter. UN
resolutions zindabad!
Prime Minister Imran Khan has warned the world the Kashmir crisis could
lead to conventional war which could escalate to a level of conflict which
“no one would win”. He said in such a situation he would respond like Tipu
Sultan not Bahadur Shah Zafar! Accordingly, Pakistan will “hope for the
best and prepare for the worst”. The Pakistan Army said “it will go to any
length in support of the Kashmir freedom struggle”. The National Security
Council has taken a set of initial measures downgrading diplomatic
relations.

The Indian foreign minister has asked Pakistan to reconsider its decision to
downgrade and limit relations with India. The Pakistani foreign minister
has said Pakistan is willing to review its decision if India reconsiders
changing the status of IHK. Straws in the wind? Is the crisis moving
towards escalation or de-escalation? The next few days are critical.

Is the crisis moving towards escalation or de-

escalation? The next few days are critical.
According to the renowned author and human rights activist,
Arundhati Roy, removal of Article 370 and the division of IHK violates the
Indian constitution, UNSC Resolution 122 which rejected the alleged
accession of Kashmir to India, the UN Charter and UN resolutions, the
Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, and thereby eliminates the
LoC as a legal entity.

Experts estimate a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could

eventually lead to the death of nearly a quarter of the world’s population.
The major powers will never permit such a possibility. Neither India nor
Pakistan has a first-strike nuclear capability against each other. Whoever
strikes first will not escape an equally deadly retaliatory nuclear response.

The prime minister has to credibly convey his message to the world: he will
bend every effort to defuse the situation including attempting to engage
with Modi to avert the prospect of genocide in IHK. However, if the Indian
prime minister rebuffs him and remains implacably determined to
physically eliminate Kashmiri resistance and ‘separatism’, he will find
Pakistan equally implacable in its resolve to stop him. Accordingly, the
international community needs to play its role.

This message would seek to counter Modi’s message to the people of the
Valley that beyond futile gestures, empty rhetoric and theatrical diplomacy,
Pakistan will inevitably abandon them to their fate once again, as it has for
more than 70 years.

Many Pakistanis do in fact strongly believe that Pakistan must do all it can
but it cannot risk its own existence for Kashmiris even if they are
threatened with ethnic cleansing, mass murder and genocide. They insist
Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capability must be exclusively aimed at
deterring Indian aggression against Pakistan, not possible or even likely
Indian genocide against the people of IHK.

They hope the display of aggressive, hectic and high-profile diplomacy,

vociferous public protests, high-level statements of extreme resolve, the
ratcheting up of reversible tensions on the ground, international leaders
urging or even demanding a review of Indian policies, and a possible UNSG
reference to the UNSC under Article 99 of the UN Charter will suffice. They
may well be right. All these avenues must be systematically and thoroughly
explored.

But given the resolve and resilience of the Kashmiri resistance which has
lost all fear of punishment, torture and death; the immediate and massive
change of attitude of erstwhile pro-India ministers and officials in the
Valley; and the insane historical hatred and political vengeance of
Hindutva Nazis, ironically aided by Israel, Modi may well have irreversibly
embarked on a path towards a ‘final solution’. A former Indian foreign
secretary once told me “great powers cannot be bound by laws and
principles that apply to lesser nations” and “Kashmir is a test case of India’s
great power aspirations”.

A US delegation was recently in Islamabad to ensure Pakistan’s

cooperation regarding Afghanistan and to warn it that actions against
banned outfits on Pakistan or AJK are “key to exiting the FATF list”. The
timing is brilliant. The message is loud and clear: do not harbour illusions
about the US supporting Pakistan even in the event India perpetrates
massive pogroms in Kashmir. Stuff happens! The US may, however, try to
calm India if Pakistan obliges it in Afghanistan.

FATF is determined not just to keep Pakistan on the grey list but to
respond to any attempt to stop Indian atrocities in Kashmir with an
immediate threat of placing it on the black list with all its economic and
stability consequences. The IMF has said if Pakistan cannot get off the
FATF grey list the flow of monies to Pakistan will be affected.
In these wretched circumstances, the prime minister must do whatever it
takes to get off the FATF grey list as soon as possible without undermining
the credibility of his response to the situation in IHK. If Pakistan cannot
deliver on its several commitments to FATF it can have no national, foreign
or even Kashmir policy. Pakistan has to bat out the day on a very sticky
wicket!

After all the ‘aggressive diplomacy’, inescapable questions remain: can

Pakistan stop potential genocide in IHK without the full backing of the
international community? Is such support likely? Is Pakistan ready to
shoulder the inevitable costs and sacrifices of credibly supporting the
Kashmiri freedom struggle which may become an existential struggle? Can
a ‘soft state’ choose ‘hard options’ to avoid calamitous outcomes? Can
Pakistan tell the US there is no deal on Afghanistan if it does not restrain
India in Kashmir? Can our governing elites give public and honest
answers?

Hopefully, Modi has bitten off more than he can chew.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and head
of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan.

4) https://www.dawn.com/news/1379649

PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY

FOREIGN policy is an aspect of national policy. If national governance is
dysfunctional foreign policy cannot deliver. This is because no coherent
political framework for a successful foreign policy will be available. This is
the norm in Pakistan.

As long as Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex (the ‘deep state’)

overwhelms civil and political society in terms of per-capita resource
allocations, strategic perceptions, and policy influence, the national
perspective will remain distorted. This negatively impacts on foreign policy.

Those who see this state of affairs as a given that cannot be changed are
wrong. Those who regard mere national survival as national resilience are
equally wrong. Low expectations are a national curse. The prevalence of
institutional agendas over national agendas has ensured national
humiliation and isolation.
Elections alone can never transform bad governance into good governance.
Without the rule of law, political accountability, and a sufficiently informed
and minimally educated public opinion there can be no working
democracy, including a credible foreign policy. Talking strategy becomes
meaningless.

The importance of Pakistan is a function of its size, potential and location.

The success of its foreign policy is a function of how it utilises these assets.
Pakistan has a population of over 200 million which makes it a significant
country. But its economy is externally dependent and its social indices are
woeful.

Accordingly, Pakistan is a less than sovereign country. This excludes the

possibility of an independent foreign policy whatever postures are adopted.
The blame game substitutes for policy while extremism threatens to
capture an increasingly soft state. India has a field day!

The success of the country’s foreign policy is a

function of how it utilises its assets.
The potential of Pakistan is enormous. But it has been consistently wasted
and is becoming irrelevant. Similarly, Pakistan’s location is strategically
important. But if this is not made an asset it becomes a liability.

Pakistan has five neighbours: China, India, Iran, Afghanistan and the US
which is a global neighbour. Except for China, Pakistan has relations
ranging from unsatisfactory to dangerous with the other four. This places
an enormous burden on the China-Pakistan relationship — a burden that,
unless addressed, a globally emerging China could find too distracting,
onerous and risky to sustain.

Pakistan is an important strategic partner for China. But an ungovernable

Pakistan will not be able to maintain this partnership. CPEC is seen as a
‘soft option’ to industrialise and modernise without the leadership having
to provide good governance, human resource development, political reform
and capacity building.

India is the perennial enemy. But Pakistan seems to believe that merely
blaming a blameworthy India, instead of maximising its longer-term
foreign policy options through development, is good enough policy. Both
India and Kashmir are inherently longer-term challenges for Pakistan.
There are no short-term solutions. Moreover, there are no zero-sum
solutions that favour Pakistan.
However, a corrupt and dishonest leadership will never speak this truth
because it has not got the moral standing to inform the people about
diplomatic, economic and military realities. It prefers to deceive them
rather than develop the country to a point where it can negotiate with India
and solicit international support for its stand on a more equal and effective
basis. Should India remain arrogant and obdurate towards a more
internationally credible Pakistan the world would increasingly take note of
it.

But this requires an order of commitment and confidence that the

leadership of Pakistan does not have. Next year being an election year a
decrepit political system is unlikely to produce any leadership or policy
improvement.

Afghanistan is a foreign policy embarrassment. President Ashraf Ghani

made a courageous and even visionary attempt in 2014 to reorient Pak-
Afghan relations in a positive direction. He was vulnerable at home. He
needed a sustained positive response from Pakistan to overcome deep
domestic opposition to Pakistan. India — a long-standing friend of the
Kabul regime — was appalled at Ghani’s initiative towards Pakistan, which
included initiating security and political cooperation.

But Pakistan was unable or unwilling to fulfil its promises to Ghani leaving
him totally exposed to the fierce criticism of his bitter rivals who are in an
unstable political and governmental alliance with him. He has never
forgiven Pakistan for his humiliation, and a full-blown blame game now
rages between Kabul and Islamabad. The prime beneficiary is India which
is now more firmly entrenched in Kabul than ever.

Pakistan seems completely unable or unwilling to learn that the Afghan

Taliban can never be a policy asset for it. Or maybe power centres have
become too involved with them to allow a realistic Afghanistan policy.
Today, there is an alliance of the US, Afghanistan and India against
Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan’s standing throughout Afghanistan is at its
lowest ebb ever. Pakistan, whatever its reservations, has no option but to
substantially improve its relations with Kabul for peace in Afghanistan.

The stand-off with Trump’s America is also pretty much the worst ever. The
Modi-Trump joint statement of last June, the Trump Afghanistan and
South Asia policy statement in August and his December National Security
Strategy specifically target Pakistan and elevate India in the strategic
calculus of the US. There is no countervailing pro-Pakistan constituency in
 the US. A viable non-strategic relationship with the US is an imperative.
Rhetorical defiance is mere deception.

Pakistan’s fragile economy, the falling rupee and rising external debt will
require it to stand again, cap in hand, at the doors of US-dominated
international financial institutions. Can CPEC deliver Pakistan from this
beggary? It can help to a great extent provided Pakistan can help itself
through decent governance and an independent and balanced foreign
policy.

Iran sees Pakistan as directly and indirectly under the thumb of its
enemies: Saudi Arabia and the US. It views Pakistan as an untrustworthy
neighbour and a rival in Afghanistan. Accordingly, it is providing India
access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. Developing
confidence and cooperation between Iran and Pakistan is essential.

Saudi Arabia is more master than friend. It has both helped and harmed
Pakistan.

Any foreign policy improvement in 2018 will be a pleasant surprise.

The writer is a former ambassador to the US, India and China and head
of UN missions in Iraq and Sudan.
5) https://www.dawn.com/news/1438918

THE NEW COLD WAR

US Vice President Pence last week declared a new Cold War against
China. America has now decisively stepped into the Thucydides
Trap — the Ancient Greek historian’s thesis that a confrontation
between an established and a rising power is almost always
inevitable.

China was accused by Pence of multiple wrongs: unfair trade, technology theft,
targeted tariffs, interference in the US electoral process, a military buildup,
militarisation of the South China Sea islands (to keep the US out), ‘debt
diplomacy’, anti-US propaganda and internal oppression. Pence declared that
the US “will not stand down” in opposing these alleged Chinese policies.

Some believe that the US salvo was mainly designed to divert attention from
the ongoing investigation into Trump’s possible collusion with Russia in the
2016 presidential elections and/or to mobilise votes for next month’s mid-
term elections.
 The confrontation between the US and China is likely to
escalate in words and deeds.
Yet, a deeper analysis indicates that Pence’s broad anti-China indictment
reflects the American ‘establishment’s’ considered policy. The speech was
preceded by national strategy papers describing China and Russia as
America’s adversaries, trade tariffs and investment restrictions, sanctions on
Chinese military entities, renewed weapons sales to Taiwan and expanding US
Freedom of Navigation operations in the South China Sea.

Chinese efforts to build a so-called ‘win-win’ relationship through trade

concessions and cooperation on Korea and Afghanistan have clearly failed.

Chinese anger was visible during US State Secretary Pompeo’s Korea-related

visit to Beijing a few days ago, when Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly
demanded that the US stop its confrontational ‘behaviour’. The confrontation
is likely to escalate in words and deeds. It will become increasingly difficult for
either side to ‘stand down’.

Apart from the raves of right-wing Americans, the Trump administration is

unlikely to get much joy from the open confrontation with China.

The trade tariffs Trump has imposed are unlikely to return many
manufacturing jobs to America since most Chinese goods will continue to be
cheaper than their alternatives. US consumers will pay higher prices. The
China-located supply chains of many US corporations will be disrupted, while
China’s supply chains are mostly outside of the US. Nor will technology
restraints significantly dent China’s 2025 technology programme, since it has
already achieved considerable technological autonomy.

The Sino-US economic confrontation will have extensive consequences for the
global economy. The IMF estimates that the US and China may lose one per
cent and two per cent of growth respectively, while global growth would be
trimmed by around half a percentage point. There are fears of another global
recession as other economies become infected by the Sino-US trade war.

The prospects of the US “containing” China in the Indo-Pacific are also

marginal. This is China’s front yard. The US allies and friends in East Asia —
even Japan, Australia and South Korea — are economically intertwined with
China and will be reluctant to confront it. US Freedom of Navigation
operations could lead to accidental conflict, as almost happened recently.
Short of war, the US cannot wrest the South China Sea islands from China. A
reckless US decision to discard the One-China policy could unleash a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan.

Despite US objections, and Western propaganda, China’s Belt and Road

Initiative is unlikely to be derailed. Developing countries will not forego the
opportunity to build infrastructure with Chinese financing. The ‘debt trap’
argument is misleading. Infrastructure investment rarely offers commercial
returns. But no country can industrialise without adequate infrastructure. The
US, with its parsimonious outlays on development cooperation, cannot offer
an alternative to China’s BRI.

The new Cold War will change the structures of global interaction and
governance. Cooperation among the major powers on global issues (non-
proliferation, climate change, terrorism) and in regions of tension (North
Korea, Afghanistan, the Middle East) may be frozen. China, Russia and the
countries in the Eurasian ‘heartland’ will draw closer together. Alternative
trade, finance and development organisations will emerge to circumvent US
domination of existing institutions.

The strategic dynamics of South Asia could also be transformed. Although

India is attracted to America’s overtures for an anti-China alliance, it also
wishes to avoid the ‘cost’ of confrontation (Doklam) and to secure the benefits
of trade and investment with China (the ‘Wuhan spirit’) as well as to maintain
its arms supply relationship with Russia. The escalating Sino-US
confrontation will compress the time and space for India to get off the fence
and make a strategic choice between America and Russia-China.

Unlike India, Pakistan’s choice is clear. Its strategic partnership with China is
critical for its national security and socioeconomic development. This choice
automatically implies a strategic divergence with the US. The only question is
whether Pakistan can maintain a modicum of cooperation with the US despite
the strategic divergence. Pakistan has some room for manoeuvre so long as the
US remains in Afghanistan, with or without a political settlement there.

If India chooses to remain aloof from an alliance with US, and moves closer to
China and Russia, it could radically alter the calculus of the political and
economic relationships in the entire region. A Sino-Indian rapprochement
would increase the prospects of Pakistan-India normalisation and a
compromise ‘solution’ for Kashmir. The visions of regional ‘connectivity’
would become reality. However, this scenario is highly unlikely until after the
2019 Indian elections.
Although the new Cold War is wider and more complex than the old one, there
is hope that it may not be as prolonged. US public opinion will soon see that
confrontation with China (and Russia) is costly and counterproductive. A
post-Trump Democratic administration may well decide to opt for the ‘win-
win’ relationship proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.