FOR ARTICLE 11-12

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of
the street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was
attached came along the street in the opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into the
carromata and wounded Martinez servely. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero
was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied
the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon
to unload the stuff to be delivered. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver
cracked a whip and made some noises which frightened the horses and which made it ran away.
The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable to stop the horses. The
horses collided with the carromata.

ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero

HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It
has been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to
leave horses in the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all
cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.

Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun Yen, petitioners, versus Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo Sy, and Honorable Court of Appeals, respondents.
No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

Facts:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing,
leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or
less.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition
alleging among others that:

a) They are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;

b) To their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate;
c) They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him;
and
d) They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratriz of the intestate estate of
the deceased.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged
that:

a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat who he married on January 19, 1931 in China;
b) The other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased Yao Kee; and
c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become
the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.

Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she
does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree
upon the bethrotal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into an agreement with the parents of her husband; that she and her
husband have been living in Fookien, China before he went to the Philippines; that in China, the
custom is that there is a go-between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who
would talk to the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son-in-law, then
they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on the wedding day, the document would be
signed by the parents of both parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is known in the
Philippines; that the parties do not sign the document themselves; and that she and Sy Kiat were
married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if that document
can still be found now.

The testimony of Gan Ching, the younger brother of Yao Kee, that he attended the marriage of
his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a
document signed by the parents and elders of the parties being sufficient. Statements were made
by Asuncion Gillego when she testified that a) Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee according to a
Chinese custom.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China is valid.

Held:

The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A
local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact.

Article 71 of the Civil Code states that: “All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.

The testimonies of Yao Kee and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China’s law or custom
on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no
showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. The marriage of Yao Kee and
Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact.

As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of
China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only of acknowledged
natural children.

FOR ARTICLE 13

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO, petitioners,vs.

PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155. August 28,2007.

Facts:

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, the Vice President of Primetown (respondent), applied for
refund of the income tax which they have paid on 1997. According to Yap, the company accrued
losses amounting to P/ 71,879,228. These losses enabled them to be exempt from paying income
tax, which respondent paid diligently. Respondent was therefore claiming a refund. Respondents
submitted requirements but the petitioners ignored their claim. On April 14, 2000, respondents
filed a review in the Court of Tax Appeals. The said Court, however, denied the petition stating
that the petition was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing judicial claim for tax
refund.

According to Sec 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code, “no suit or proceedings shall be filed
after the expiration of 2-yearsfrom the date of the payment of the tax regardless of any
supervening cause that may arise after payment. Respondents paid the last income tax return on
April 14, 1998. Article 13 of the New Civil Code states that a year is considered 365 days; months
30 days; days 24-hours; and night from sunset to sunrise. Therefore, according to CTA, the date
of filing a petition fell on the 731st day, which is beyond the prescriptive period.

Issues:

Whether the two-year/730-day prescriptive period ends on April 13, 2000 or April 14, 2000
considering that the last payment of tax was on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap
year.

Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 Chap 8 Book 1 of
the Administrative Code of 1987.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that when a subsequent law impliedly repeals a prior law, the new law
shall apply. In the case at bar, Art 13 of the New Civil Code, which states that a year shall compose
365 days, shall be repealed by EO 292 Sec 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which states
that a year shall be composed of 12 months regardless of the number of days in a month.
Therefore, the two-year prescriptive period ends on April 14, 2000. Respondents filed petition
on April 14, 2000 (which is the last day prescribed to file a petition.

Garvida vs. Sales G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997 Election Law
NOVEMBER 28, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of
a certain barangay. However the Board of election tellers denied her application on the ground
that she is already 21 years and 10 months old. She already exceeded the age limit for
membership as laid down in Sec 3(b) of COMELEC resolution no. 2824.

The municipal circuit trial court found her to be qualified and ordered her registration as member
and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC, but
the presiding judge inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with
petitioner.

However, private respondent Sales a rival candidate, filed with the COMELEC en banc a “Petition
of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against Garvida for falsely representing
her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. He claimed that Garvida is disqualified to
become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be more than twenty-one
(21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her
birth certificate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Garvida can assume office as the elected SK official

RULING:
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and
nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old.
When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was
merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK
officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2824.

Thus, she is ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.

FOR ARTICLE 15-17

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3)
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of
said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the
failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish
laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession

as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be
situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges
it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that
he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition
until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an
error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was
granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on
the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the
national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in
question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant
as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken
into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will,
which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality
 and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish
that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons
who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the
laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as
the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the
civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as
not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even
should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and
the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even
as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it,
and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid
and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this
estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all
other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON,
respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.

Facts:

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is
a citizen of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in
Nevada, United States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.

On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared with right to
manage the conjugalproperty. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before Nevada Court where
respondent acknowledged that they had no community property. The lower court denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree abroad cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on conjugal properties.

Held:

As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorce the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private
respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
 IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON LUIS C.
VICTOR AND ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.

Facts:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and respondent and
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at Federal Republic of
Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The local
court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouse.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila.

After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for adultery
before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William Chia and Jesus
Chua while they were still married.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed against her
and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further
proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of
the complaints against petitioner.

Issue:

Is the action tenable?

Ruling:

Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted
except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence since the raison d’etre of said provision
of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of
the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status
and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, such
status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce
decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the Civil Code on the matter
of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no
legal standing to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is
dismissed.
THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK
G. R. No. 2935
March 23, 1909
FACTS: In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered into a contract for a period of 2
years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer in the service
of the said Plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in
traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of
travel.

Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of Frank,
he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary paid during such
period.

Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and was paid half-salary from the date
until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with
the terms of the contract.

The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to recover from Frank the sum of money,
which amount the Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses incurred in traveling
from Chicago to Manila, and as half-salary for the period consumed in travel.

It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224
should constitute a part of said contract.

The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had
thereby materially altered the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible
under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of
265. 90 dollars

ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of the contract entered into between
Plaintiff and Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?

HELD: the judgment of the lower court is affirmed

1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the Government of
the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040
did not have the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant. The legislative department of the Government is expressly prohibited by section
5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of a contract. The right
which the Defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed
in any respect by the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms
of the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and were enforceable in favor of the
Defendant.

2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the
contract could not be enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the time the contract
was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and had
full authority to contract. Frank claims that, by reason of the fact that, under that laws of the
Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, made persons in said Islands did not reach
their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract,
contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.

It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is admitted — that at the time and place of the
making of the contract in question the Defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is
better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity
of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought.

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN v. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN +

DECISION

106 Phil. 997

LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Ramon San Jose,
presiding, dismissing the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward
Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.
On April 24, 1950, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Rafael Amparo, presiding,
admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23,
1944 in Manila. In the said order, the court made the following findings:
"According to the evidence of the opponents the testator was born in Nebraska and therefore a
citizen of that state, or at least a citizen of California where some of his properties are located.
This contention is untenable. Notwithstanding the long residence of the decedent in the
Philippines, his stay here was merely temporary, and he continued and remained to be a citizen
of the United States and of the state of his particular choice, which is Nevada, as stated in his
will. He had planned to spend the rest of his days in that state. His permanent residence or
domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected
Nevada as his domicile and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.
Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent residence for him. That is his exclusive personal
right.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen
of the United States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit
A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.
Accordingly, the Philippine Trust Company, named as the executor of the will, is hereby
appointed to such executor and upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, let letters
testamentary be issued and after taking the prescribed oath, it may enter upon the execution
and performance of its trust." (pp. 26-27, R.O.A.)
It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questioned on appeal. The
executor filed a project of partition dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the
provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1) one-half of the residuary estate, to the
Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in trust only for the
benefit of testator's grandson Edward George Bohanan, which consists of P90,819.67 in cash
and one-half in shares of stock of several mining companies; (2) the other half of the residuary
estate to the testator's brother, F. L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs. M. B. Galbraith, share and
share alike. This consists in the same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock similar to
those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward
Gilbert Bohanan, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be paid in three yearly installments;
(4) legacies to Clara Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward, P2,000; Beulah
Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings, P2,000;
It will be seen from the above that out of the total estate (after deducting administration
expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all
shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To
his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.
The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary
provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been
deprived of the legitime that the laws of the forum concede to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan,
should be entitled to receive. The will has not given her any share in the estate left by the
testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce
secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that said divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction, citing the cases of Querubin vs.Querubin, 87
Phil., 124, 47 Off. Gaz., (Sup, 12) 315, Cousins Hiz vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, Ramirez vs. Gmur,
42 Phil., 855 and Gorayeb vs. Hashim, 50 Phil., 22. The court below refused to recognize the
claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen,
allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his
estate to his wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides:
"Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his
or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's
debts."
Besides, the right of the former wife of the testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, to a share in the
testator's estate had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order dated June 18,
1955, (pp. 155-159, Vol. II Records, Court of First Instance), which had become final, as
Magdalena C. Bohanan does not appear to have appealed therefrom to question its validity. On
December 16, 1953, the said former wife filed a motion to withdraw the sum of P20,000 from
the funds of the estate, chargeable against her share in the conjugal property, (See pp. 294-297,
Vol. I, Record, Court of First Instance), and the court in its said order found that there exists no
community property owned by the decedent and his former wife at the time the decree of
divorce was issued. As already adverted to, the decision of the court had become final and
Magdalena C. Bohanan may no longer question the fact contained therein, i.e. that there was
no community property acquired by the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan during their
coverture.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were
married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that
sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting
at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a
divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that
there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can
now have no legal claim to any portion of the estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who
had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given
their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds
of the estate left by the testator. Is the failure of the testator to give his children two-thirds of
the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the laws of the forum valid?
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly
provides that successional rights to personal property are to be governed by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
"Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well
as to the extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property and the country in which it is found." (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code,
which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the
testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and
his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is
whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the
legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the
laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at the time of the hearing of the project of
partition, the above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it was the executor's duty
to do. The law of Nevada, being a foreign law, can only be proved in our courts in the form and
manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:
"Sec. 41. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody." * * * (Rule 123).
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found
that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for
withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada
Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79,
Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by
the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the
case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol.
1). .
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, specially Section 9905 of the Compiled
Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions
are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not
disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated
above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case
at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the
testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., concurs in the result.
 TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE’S
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA
BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.

FACTS:

Amos Bellis was a citizen of the state of Texas of the United States. In his first wife whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and
the other disposing his Philippine Properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given
anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived
of their legitimes to which they should be entitled if Philippine law were to apply.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the sucessional rights of the
illegitimate children.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitims. Under the Texas
Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitims. Further, even if the deceased
had given them share, such would be invalid because the law governing the deceased does not
allow such.

AZNAR VS. GARCIA 7 S 95

Facts:

Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he

resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913.
He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However,
during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a
citizen of California.
 In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared
as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of
the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of
domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased
in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand,
counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code,
the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the
matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should
dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion.

Issue:

Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:

The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen
Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter.

1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the California, and

2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in califronia.

The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that “if
there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”

Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is
ought to be followed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court
with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides.
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR v. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, GR No. 142820, 2003-06-20
Facts:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their
marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.[4] Out of
their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25,
1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition[5] for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss,[6] but it was... denied by the trial court in its order[7] dated May 28, 1997.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997
]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van
Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
The parental custody for the children
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987... is granted to the father.
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a
decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and...
private respondent.
Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner's motion to dismiss
Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case
proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the... distribution
of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
n Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner on the
ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between
petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had... already been
severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg,
Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already
been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation... of the
mandate of Article 26 of the Family Code... espondent judge issued the assailed order partially
setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property
relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children
Issues:
There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody
of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr
There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody
of the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg, Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,[19] Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,[20] and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[21] we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our...
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[22] where this Court
specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German... citizen in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of... persons.
Ruling:
n Garcia v. Recio,[19] Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,[20] and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[21] we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our...
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[22] where this Court
specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German... citizen in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of... persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not
been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the
trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private...
respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award
of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children,
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.[23] Before... our courts can give the effect of res
judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court,
it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity
to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,... Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,... collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order
for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules
of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam,... as distinguished from
actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.[
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment
as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of... their two
children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of
private respondent's participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain
unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the...
proceedings[25] nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.[26] Unlike
petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to assist
her in said proceedings.[27] More... importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner
by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately
for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the
issue as to who the offending... spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit
to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to
determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best
interests of the children.
This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child's
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.
[28]
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the
custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent.
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the
issue between the parties as to who has... parental custody, including the care, support and
education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of
this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings