Nos. L-36662-63. July 30, 1982.

*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FILOMENO
CAMANO, defendant-appellant.
Ponente: CONCEPCION JR., J
FACTS:
In the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province of Camarines Sur, between the hours
of four and five o'clock in the afternoon, after the accused had been drinking liquor, he
stabbed twice the victim Godofredo Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular Bicol "palas"
which is a sharp bladed and pointed instrument while the latter was walking alone along the
barrio street almost infront of the store of one Socorro Buates. The victim, Godofredo Pascua,
sustained two mortal wounds for which he died instantaneously.
After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused proceeded to the seashore
of the barrio, and on finding Mariano Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house,
in a kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping down hacked
the latter with the same bolo, first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the
ground, after said blow, he continued hacking him, until he lay prostrate on the ground, face
up, when the accused gave him a final thrust of the bolo at the left side of the chest above the
nipple causing instant death.
Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this incident, the two victims had
a misunderstanding with the accused while fishing along Sagnay River. During this occasion
it appears that the accused requested Godofredo Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor
boat owned by Mariano Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This refusal greatly
offended and embittered the accused against the victims. From this time on, the accused
begrudged the two, and entertained personal resentment against them. And although on
several occasions, the accused was seen at the game table with Godofredo Pascual drinking
liquor, the friendly attitude towards Pascua, seems to be merely artificial than real, more so,
with respect to Mariano Buenaflor whom he openly detested. He consistently refused to
associate since then with the two victim especially, Mariano Buenaflor. In fact, no less than
ten attempts were made by Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation
with the victims but were refused. Instead, defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to
challenge Mariano Buenaflor to a fight and announce his evil intention to kill them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not alternative circumstance of intoxication was erroneously appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance.
RULING:
YES. As to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it is respectfully submitted that there
was no proof that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the killing other than the bare
testimony of Payago that from his house he allegedly saw the accused drinking in his house
which is about 30 meters away. The prosecution did not present any police report or doctor's
certification that accused was found to be intoxicated at the time of the killing. Moreover, it
was not shown by competent evidence that accused purposedly became drunk to facilitate the
commission of the offense.
If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because it
affected accused's mental facilities such that it diminished his capacity to know the injustice
of his acts and to comprehend fully the consequences of his acts.
Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is,
not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional.
15 To be mitigating, it must be indubitably proved. A habitual drunkard is one given to
intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and
confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual
resistance to evil thought and undermines will-power making its victim a potential evildoer.
The records of these cases do not show that the appellant was given to excessive use of
intoxicating drinks although he used to get drunk every now and then.
The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual and considering that the said appellant
was in a state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the felony, the alternative
circumstance of intoxication should be considered as a mitigating circumstance.
 [No. 34917. September 7, 1931]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. LUA
CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants and appellants.
(Ponente: Villa-rea, J)
FACTS:
The accused Uy Se Tieng, an agent of the real owners of the Shipments of Opium, wrote to
his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium. This opium had been in
Hongkong for sometime, awaiting a ship that would go directly to Cebu. The Collector of
Customs of Cebu received information that the accused was intending to land opium in the
port. Juan Samson, a secret serviceman, pretended to smooth the way for the introduction of
the prohibited drug. Samson then promised the accused that he would remove all the
difficulties in the way, and for this purpose agreed to receive in exchange P6,000: P2,000 for
Juan Samson, P2,000 for Joaquin Natividad, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed
among certain employees in the customhouse. Upon arrival of the shipment of opium in the
ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng, informed Samson that the former consulted the real owners on
how to proceed with the payment of P6,000 and will come over to Samson’s house on to inform
the decision of the owners. On the same day Samson informed the Constabulary headed by
Colonel Francisco who instructed the provincial commander, Captain Buencosejo to discuss
the capture of the opium owners. Jumapao, a stenographer, through the provincial fiscal and
in the presence of Captain Buencosejo, was asked to take the down the conversation Samson
would have with Uy Se Tieng. Upon the rendezvous, Captain Buencosejo and Jumapao hid
themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson to witness the conversation between
Samson, Uy Se Tieng, and Lua Chu. The following morning, Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay, a
companion, presented papers to Samson. Captain Buencosejo showed up and arrested the
two Chinese. The Constabulary arrested Lua Chu and seized the 3,252 tins of opium worth
P50,000. The agents of the law had the accused prosecuted.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in excluding Juan Samson as one of the accused moreso an
instigator.
RULING:
It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug,
but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered for said drug.
Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the accused to import the opium in question but
pretended to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs, who had promised them
that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the customs
house was concerned. This is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a
crime merely to prosecute him, but it is simply a trap set to catch a criminal. Therefore, the
mere fact that the chief of customs secret service pretended to agree to a plan for smuggling
illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order to better the seizure of said
opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the
accused.
Entrapment
 1. The practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal
prosecutions.
2. It is a scheme or technique ensuring the apprehension of the criminals by being in the
actual crime scene.
3. The law officers shall not be guilty to the crime if he have done the following:
a. He does not induce a person to commit a crime for personal gain or is not
involved in the planning of the crime.
b. Does take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest
the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind.

Instigation
This is the involvement of a law officer in the crime itself in the following manners:
1. He induces a person to commit a crime for personal gain.
2. Doesn’t take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the
offenders before he obtained the profits in mind.
3. He obtained the profits in mind even through afterwards does take the necessary steps
seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders.
 [No. 5728. August 11, 1910.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. JAMES O. PHELPS (alias
PHILLIPS), defendant and appellant.
Ponente: Trent
FACTS
While in international saloon in Jolo, Homer G. Smith (the lone prosecution witness) heard
James O. Phelps (the accused) smokes opium in some occasions. Smith asked the accused if
Phelps smoke opium. Phelps answered yes. Smith said that he wanted to smoke opium. On
the first invitation by the accused Phelps, he was not able to prepare a room for smoking.
They made another agreement and went together at a certain house in Tulay. A Chinaman
prepared the room and the pipe for smoking. Smith gave the Chinaman P2.00. The Chinaman
gave the pipe to Smith. Smith then left, with the pipe, and reported the accused to the Justice
of peace. Phelps was later arrested.
The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused that Smith visits him (Phelps)
seeking where he (Smith) can smoke opium. Also, the attending doctor testified that Phelps
was a strong, robust man and presents no appearance of an opium smoker.
The Court of First Instance convicted Phelps of violating Act. No. 1761.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Is Phelps liable?
RULING
No, because the commission of the crime was intended by Smith and Phelps was only induced
in its commission.
Phelps is only charged with having smoked opium this one time in the house of the
Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of the witness Smith,
who was an employee of Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in Jolo.
Smith stated to the accused that he (Smith) was desirous of smoking. He urged the accused
to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they both could smoke.
If he had, by those means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession
either opium or any of the prohibited paraphernalia, Smith’s testimony would be more
reasonable, since the mere possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a
violation of the law itself. It is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of
these things.
Smith only suggested the commission of this crime but he (Smith) stated that he desired to
commit the same offense and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission
of the prohibited act.
When an employee of the government, as in this case, and according to his own testimony,
encourages or induces the persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct
is reprehensible.
Appellant Phelps is found not guilty. Lower court judgment reversed and the appellant
acquitted.
 G.R. No. 183652. February 25, 2015.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL
OPORTO, and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, respondents.
Ponente: PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with her friends, went to Alson’s
Palace for a drinking session to celebrate their graduation. During such session, they
shared their problems with each other. AAA became emotional and started crying,
prompting her to take her first shot of Emperador Brandy. After consuming more or less
five glasses of drinks, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then
started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she
told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. The group just laughed at
her and still made her drink more. She fell asleep but was woken up so that she could drink
the remaining liquor inside the Brandy bottle. She refused but they insisted so she drank.
Again, AAA fell asleep.

When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging
House. She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter
fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she
saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse
with her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her
private organ. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell
unconscious.

Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged with the crime of
rape of a 16-year old girl. The RTC convicted Carampatana and Oporto guilty as principals
and Alquizola as an accomplice while the CA acquitted them of the crime charged, hence,
this present appeal, alleging that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting
respondents.

Private respondents aver that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory
and that the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.

The OSG stated the following error:

“The appellate decision of acquittal is null and void for having been rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, an exception to the principle
of double jeopardy.”

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the private
respondents?
HELD:
YES. The trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his
participation in the crime was uncertain,66 citing People v. Jabonero.67 It found that his
participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.68 The
Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola’s liability is not of a
conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that
there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the
malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Conspiracy is proved
if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense
in furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.69 Proof of conspiracy need not even
rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties
before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
In Jabonero, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio’s and
Dominador’s participation in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons
during the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by more than
just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they
did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary. In
this case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio
and Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation in the crime is
uncertain.71 (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was
conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on the
testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her
private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled
her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial acts of
Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and mutually helped one
another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and
spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked jeep,
molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him
a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the
commission of the crime
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Jabonero, Alquizola’s participation in the crime is
not at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a
room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise
inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused
AAA. He did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even
admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there
was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA.
Hence, the act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is
equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty
as mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, he waived
the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to
the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as
law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant.
 [No. 8578. November 17, 1913.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ANSELMO DIRIS, EUSTAQUIO
SIAGA, and TOMAS OLEA, defendants. ANSELMO DIRIS and EUSTAQUIO
SIAGA, appellants.

Ponente: CARSON, J

FACTS:

Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, received from the
railroad company, more than P400 in payment of certain land expropriated by that company,
and that the defendant Tomas Olea, a nephew of Fugencio Seal, was present when the money
was counted and paid over to his uncle. Thereafter, after Fulgencio Seal left the house leaving
his wife in charge of their tienda, the three defendants appeared at the tienda and Eustaquio
Siaga engaged the woman in conversation while the other two defendants went upstairs,
broke open the trunk, and took the money, amounting to P353, and a receipt for P100. After
the discovery of the commission of the crime, The nephew when found admitted the theft of
the money and promised that if the uncle would not make any trouble about it he would try
and recover it from the other defendants.

At the trial the defendants denied that they were the authors of the crime; Olea and Diris
denied that they were present at the house on the morning in question. However, they were
convicted for the crime of robbery. On appeal, defendant Eustaquio Siaga, who remained
below in the tienda and engaged the woman in conversation while the other defendants went
up into the house, should only be held as a complice (accessary before the fact) as defined in
the Penal Code, and not as a principal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Eustaquio Siaga should only be held liable as accomplice?

HELD:

The defendant Siaga acted concurrently with the other defendants, and must be held to have
been present with them aiding and abetting them in the commission of the crime by
remaining below and talking with the woman in order to distract her attention from what
was going on upstairs. In doing so he was evidently serving as a guard to warn his
companions in case there should arise any necessity for giving an alarm. When the other
defendants came down out of the house he went away with them.

This court has repeatedly held that one who shares the guilty purpose and aids and abets the
commission of a crime by his presence at the time of its perpetration, even though he may
not have taken an active part in its material execution, is guilty as a principal. We have also
held that one who stands as guard near the place where a crime is committed to keep others
away or to warn his companions and fellow conspirators of danger of discovery, takes a direct
part in the commission of the crime and is therefore guilty as a principal under article 13 of
the Penal Code
 [No. 39086. October 26, 1934]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. ONG CHIAT
LAY ET AL., defendants. ONG CHIAT LAY, appellant.
Ponente: Abad-Santos, J.

FACTS:

Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were jointly informed against by the
provincial fiscal of Zamboanga, charging them with having feloniously burned a building in
which was located a store belonging to the appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant
and his codefendants were tried jointly upon said information; and, after trial, while Ong Ban
Hua and Kua Sing were acquitted, appellant was found guilty of the crime of arson

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant is criminally liable as principal by direct participation?

HELD

In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it must be shown

either (1) that he took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act; (2) that he directly
forced or induced another or others to commit it; or (3) that he cooperated in the commission
of the offense by an act without which it would not have been accomplished. (Revised Penal
Code, article 17.) They take direct part in the execution of a criminal act who, participating
in the criminal design, proceed to carry out their plan and personally take part in its
execution by acts which directly tend to the same end. (Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1,
p. 341; Albert's Revised Penal Code Ann., 144.)

In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken a direct part in the burning of
the building. In fact, the prosecution lays stress on appellant's absence from the scene of the
fire as one of the suspicious circumstances indicating his guilt.
 [No. 8187. January 29, 1913.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant and
appellant.
Ponente: Moreland, J.

FACTS:

 Panglima Indanan, accussed is the headman of Parang.

 On Mar. 24, 1912, Indanan ordered the killing of Sariol to his men Akiran, Kalyakan
& Suhuri in the Chinese Cemetery asserting that Indanan had an order to that effect
from the governor.
 The CFI found Indanan guilty of the crime of murder & sentencing him to be hanged.

ISSUES: WON Indanan is guilty of murder by inducement?

HELD:

YES. A13(2), of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime "who directly force
or induce others to commit it."

Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:

 They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear, for
example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening means, oblige another to
commit the crime. In our commentary on par. 9 of A8 (page 28), we have already said
that he who suffers violence acts w/o will & against his will, is no more than an
instrument, & therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only
guilty persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other to commit
the crime.
 One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration,
or by any other similar act w/c constitutes the real & moving cause of the crime & w/c
was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act & was sufficient for that
purpose. We‘ve already seen in our commentary on par. 12 of A8 that the 1 who
physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he
acted w/ due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls
entirely upon the 1 who orders, i.e., upon him who by his commands has directly
induced the other to commit the act. But in case the obedience of the inferior isn‘t due
to the superior & thus not necessary, & doesn‘t, thus, exempt him from criminal
responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command,
directly induced him to the criminal act is considered by the law also as principal in
the crime.
 The pacto by virtue of w/c 1 purchases for a consideration the hand w/c commits the
crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the
crime by direct inducement, because w/o such offer or promise the criminal act would
never have been committed. But this doesn‘t mean that the 1 who actually commits
the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from
criminal responsibility; on the contrary, such circumstance constitutes an aggravation
of his crime.
We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto & the pacto there are similar means
by w/c another may be induced to commit a crime w/c also make the 1 who offers the
inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of A13(2). But it must be
borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given
before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the act was committed.
Such advice & such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by
the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered
direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have a great dominance &
great influence over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious,
as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.
 [No. 42476. July 24, 1935]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee, vs. KIICHI
OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, Luis LADION, and AGAPITO CORTESANO,
defendants and appellants.

Ponente: Vickers, J.

FACTS:

Defendants Autor, Ladio, and Cortesano were working on the hemp plantation of Angel
Pulido under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who was the overseer or
manager, with a compensation of 10% of the receipts.

Omine asked Pulido for permission to open a new road through the plantation, but there was
a misunderstanding because Pulido contends that he refused to grant this request because
there was already an unfinished road. On the other hand, Omine contends that Pulido gave
him the permission.

When Pulido, with his son Hilario, accompanied by Saito Paton and a moro named
Barabadan, were returning home from a cockpit they noticed that a considerable number of
hemp plants had been destroyed for the purpose of opening a new road.

Angered by the destruction of hemp plants, Pulido and his party went to the house of the
defendants where the crime happened.

According to the prosecution:

While offended part was talking with Omine, Autor attempted to intervene but was
prevented by Hilario and so he attacked him with a bolo but wounded him only on the left
thumb. Ladion and Coretesano then held Pulido by the arms and Autor struck Pulido in the
breast with his bolo.

According to the defendants:

First to arrive was Hilario, who after applying to Omine an offensive epithet, struck him in
the breast with brass knuckles. When Autor attempted to intervene, Pulido and his son
attacked him with their fists, HIlario striking him on the right cheek. Ladion and Cortesano
ran away before Pulido was wounded by Autor.

ISSUE:
W.O.N. appellant is liable as a principal by inducement
HELD:
No, under the circumstances of this case, even if it were satisfactorily proved that
the accused uttered the words in question, we are of the opinion that they would not be
sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it does not appear that the words
uttered by Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. His co-accused had
already other reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have uttered the
words of inducement and the words in question were not in this particular case sufficient to
cause him to strike the offended party with his bolo. It does not appear that appellant had
any particular influence over Eduardo Autor other than he was being payed by him as a
worker. In order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered direct
inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have great dominance and great
influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious,
as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself.
Principal by indispensable cooperation
 No. L-67948. May 31, 1988.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NAPOLEON
MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant
Ponente: Cruz J.

Facts:

Edmundo Abadilla was eating in a resto when he detected the smell of marijuana smoke
coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw
Pfc. Renato Camantigue. Camantigue joined Abadilla in the resto and they both smelled
the marijuana smoke from the table of Vicente Capalad and Napoleon Montealegre.
Camantigue collared the 2 & said “Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?” He forced them up,
holding 1 in each hand but Capalad pulled out a knife & started stabbing Camantigue at
the back. Camantigue let go of Montealegre to get his gun but Montealegre restrained
Camantigue’s hand to prevent the latter from defending himself. They grappled & fell on
the floor. Capalac fled and Camantigue pursued him firing some shots. Then he stopped
and asked to be brought to a hospital. Capalac was found slumped in the street, with a
bullet to his chest. Both he and Camantigue died the next day. Montealegre on the other
hand, escaped through the confusion. He was later apprehended.

Issue/Held:

WON Montealegre was rightly considered a co-principal for having corroborated with
Capalad in the killing of the police officer.

YES. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue 7 times and
Montealegre holding on to victim’s hands to prevent him from drawing the pistol and
defending himseld, as Abadilla had testified. While it is true that Montealegre did not
himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having
prevented Camantigue for resisting the attack against him.

Montealegre was a principal by indispensable cooperation under A17(3), RPC. The

requisites of this provision

 Participating in the criminal resolution, i.e., there’s either anterior conspiracy or

unity of criminal purpose & intention immediately before the commission of the
crime charged;
 & Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act w/o w/c it
would not have been accomplished.
 Although there was no evidence of prior agreement between Capalad &
Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the presence of such conspiracy.
The Court has consistently upheld such view in previous cases (People v. Laganson,
People v. Cercano, People v. Garcia Cabarse, Dacanay v. People). Montealegre was
correctly convicted of the complex crime of murder, qualified by treachery, w/ assault
upon a person of authority.