(1) Tañada v. Tuvera, GR L-63915, December 29, 1986 [Per J.

Cruz,
En Banc)]
ISSUE: Can Congress dispense with publication of a law before it becomes effective? Must
publication be in full in order for the law to become effective? Do interpretative regulations need
to be published?

FACTS: Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for

Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) demands the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. Hon. Juan C.
Tuvera, Hon. Joaquin Venue, Melquiades P. Dela Cruz, et al argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. The
then Solicitor General, claimed that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of
the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; and that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette. The new Solicitor
General submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government
agency or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary
must be in full and in the Official Gazette.

RULING: Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, is the Civil
Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but “one year after such publication.” The general rule did not apply because it was
“otherwise provided”. It is not correct to say that publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts, the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement.
(2) Republic v. Pilipinas Shell, GR 173918, April 8, 2008 [Per J.
Chico Nazario, Third Division]
ISSUE: Is MOF Order 11-85 effective against a person who knew of its existence but was not
published?

FACTS: On October 10, 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under
Presidential Decree No. 1956. On December 4, 1991, the Department of Energy (DOE) notified
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) of its underpayment for OPSF foreign
exchange risk charge and its surcharge as imposed under MOF Oder 11-85. On March 24, 1992,
Pilipinas Shell paid the underpayment, but not its surcharge. Pilipinas Shell filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Office of the President where it was denied to which the Office says that despite
DOE’s inability to publish said MOF 11-85, it was right to impose surcharges. With this and
certifications released by the Office of the National Registry (ONAR), Pilipinas Shell appealed
on grounds of MOF 11-85’s non-publication, to which it was granted and reverse. To this, DOE
brings forth two key points that Pilipinas Shell had waived its right upon its payment of the
surcharge and that Pilipinas Shell knowing the existence of MOF 1-85 through its notification of
its underpayment and surcharges, its non-publication is not an excuse.

RULING: No, MOF Order 11-85 is not effective against a person who knew of its existence but
was not published. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by
a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned.
When Pilipinas Shell was notified by the DOE, such notification does not excuse the
nonpublication of an administrative code. It was explicitly stated in Sec. 3 of Chapter 2 of Book
7 of the Administrative Code that states that all rules already effective prior to the Code’s
effectivity must be published with the Office of the National Registry (ONAR) otherwise such
rule cannot be the basis of any sanction against any person or party. Hence, Pilipinas Shell
cannot be held responsible for the surcharge imposed by MOF Order 11-85.
(3) SEC v. GMA Network, GR 164026, December 23, 2008, [Per J.
Tinga, Second Division]
ISSUE: Is publication of SEC MC 2, Series of 1994 necessary before it can take effect?

FACTS: On August 19, 1995, GMA filed an application for collective approval of various
amendments of its Articles of Incorporation and By Laws with the SEC. The amendments
applied for include the change in the corporate name from “Republic Broadcasting System, Inc.”
to “GMA Network Inc.” as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50)
years. Upon filing, GMA has been assessed by SEC a separate filing fee of P1,212,200.00. On
October 20, 1996, GMA formally protested the assessment. On February 20,1996, SEC approved
the other amendments to their Articles of Incorporation. On April 18, 1996, SEC issued a ruling
upholding the validity of questioned assessment stating that GMA is directed to comply with the
required filing fee. GMA appealed but it was dismissed. GMA filed a petition for review with the
CA contending that SEC MC No. 2, series of 1994, which was used for assessing the said
amount of filing fee is not valid. The CA ruled that said memorandum is legally invalid and
ineffective for not having been published in accordance with the law. SEC argues that the
questioned memorandum pertains to the filing fee for Articles of Incorporation which, according
to them, are not for of penalty and sanction and therefore require no publication.

RULING: Yes, publication of SEC MC 2, series of 1994 is necessary before it can take effect.
Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, a law shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. The questioned memorandum
circular cannot be construed as simply interpretative of R.A. 3531. This administrative issuance
is an implementation of the mandate of R.A. 3531 which regulates fees and rates that affect the
public at large. It cannot be therefore considered as a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an
interpretation of law, but a rule which must be declared ineffective as it was neither published
nor filed with the Office of the National Register (ONAR).
(4) CIR v. Aichi, GR 184823, October 6, 2010 [Per J. Del Castillo,
First Division]
ISSUE: How is a year counted?

FACTS: Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. On September 30, 2004, Aichi filed a claim for
refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 in the total amount
of ₱3,891,123.82 with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The latter argues that Aichi’s
administrative and judicial claims for tax refund/credit were filed in violation of Sections 112(A)
and 229 of the NIRC. Since the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of tax refund was beyond
the two-year period which expired on September 29, 2004 which Aichi rebutted the same by
stating that “even if the period had already lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of equity
considering that it is not a jurisdictional requirement.”

RULING: In this case, Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
governs for being the more recent law by the virtue of Lex posteriori derogat priori. It states that
a year is composed of 12 calendar months which superseded the provisions of Article 13 of the
Civil Code which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days whether leap year or not. The
case was highly dependent in computing legal periods that were governed by two conflicting
statutes. And because of the influence of Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the A.D. Code of
1987, Aichi was on time in filing its claim for tax refund. Concurrently, the last day for filing of
tax refund was the actual day of his claim which was September 30, 2004.
(5) Bernabe v. Alejo, GR 140500, January 21, 2002 [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article
285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code

FACTS: Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo his secretary of
twenty-three years. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe.
Ernestina Bernabe became the sole surviving heir when Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993
and his wife Rosalina died on December 3, 1993. On May 16, 1994, Carolina filed a complaint
praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and should
be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir. Ernestina contends that Adrian, represented by Carolina Alejo, is barred from
filing an action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the
provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect,
since no vested right would be impaired. She even contends that the filing of an action for
recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or
arise from procedural laws.

RULING: Yes. Article 255 of the Family Code expressly provides that it shall have retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws. In Fabian v. Desierto, it was held that if the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right, it may be classified as a substantive matter.
Here, it was held that Article 285 is a substantive law as it gives Adrian a right to an action for
recognition. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair that right because it had already vested
prior to its enactment.
(6) Republic v. Miller, GR 125932, April 21, 1999 [Per J.Pardo First
Division]
ISSUE: Does the Family Code which bars aliens from adopting affect the pending petitions for
adoption filed before its effectivity?

FACTS: On July 29, 1988, spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller (Spouses Miller),
both American citizens, filed a petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. During that
time, the prevailing law is the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which allows aliens to adopt a
Filipino child. On August 3, 1988, the Family Code took effect. Under the Family Code, aliens
are prohibited to adopt a Filipino child.

RULING: No, the Family Code does not bar aliens from adopting wherein the pending petition
for adoption were filed before its effectivity. Aliens who are qualified to adopt under the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a
vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying
such persons. The enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 will not impair the right of
Spouses Miller to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing
of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force.
(7) Republic v. CA/Bobiles, GR 92326, January 24, 1992 [Per J.
Regalado, Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code which requires joint adoption affect the pending
petitions for adoption filed singly before its effectivity

FACTS: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles, singly filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat, who then was six years old and has been living with her family since he was four
months old before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City. The court, finding the
petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order setting the petition for hearing. In
compliance with the juridical requirements, having been proved at the hearing, the testimonies of
ZenaidaBobiles and her husband, DioscoroBobiles and Ma.Luz Salameno of Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) were taken and admitted in the proceedings. The trial
rendered judgement and granted petition. The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals which
was affirmed by the lower court citing errors. The Republic stated that the CA erred in ruling that
the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively and erred in affirming trial court’s decision of
granting the petition. The Republic implies that the non-inclusion of DioscoroBobiles as a
copetitioner is a jurisdictional defect.

RULING: The petition was filed when Presidential Decree No. 603 or the Child and Youth
Welfare Code was in force, that states that a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the
spouses or by both. The trial court’s decision was rendered when the Family Code took effect.
The spouses of Bobiles have acquired vested rights under PD 603, which may not be impaired by
the enactment of the Family Code. Therefore, the Family Code has no retroactive effect to
acquired rights in accordance to the Civil Code or other laws.
(8) Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, GR 138509, July 31, 2000 [Per J.
Yñares-Santiago, First Division]
ISSUE: Can Bobis be acquitted from the criminal charge of bigamy for his ignorance of the
existence of Article 40 of the Family Code?

FACTS: Bobis contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce Javier. Without the first marriage
being declared annulled, nullified or terminated, Bobis contracted a second marriage with Imelda
Marbella Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Hernandez. Marbella-Bobis
filed a case of bigamy against Bobis. She argued that Bobis should have first obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering a second marriage, thus, a case of
bigamy is of legal truism. On the other hand, Bobis contended his ignorance of Article 40 of the
Family Code requiring a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before
contracting in a new marriage. He initiated a civil action for a declaration of nullity of the first
marriage for a lack of marriage license. He then filed a motion to suspend the criminal case
proceeding invoking the pending civil case of declaration of nullity of first marriage as a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of bigamy.

RULING: Bobis cannot be acquitted from the criminal charge of bigamy for his ignorance of
Article 40 of the Family Code. Article 3 of the New Civil Code states that ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.As provided for under Article 40 of the Family Code,
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.Thus, no person should be
permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, it must be submitted to the
determination of competent courts. Here, Bobis is presumed to have a conclusive knowledge of
the requisites of a valid marriage since the Family Code is already in effect and force during the
celebration of his second marriage with Marbella-Bobis. Ignorance of the existence of Article 40
of the Family Code cannot be successfully invoked as an excuse, the legality of marriage is a
matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. In this case, Bobis cannot be
acquitted from the criminal charge of bigamy even with his ignorance of the law. Without
judicial declaration, marriage is presumed to be existing.
(9) Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, GR 166738, August 14, 2009 [Per
J. Brion, Second Division]
ISSUE: Can AM 02-11-10-SC which relaxes the OSG certification in annulment cases be given
retroactive effect?

FACTS: Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua filed a complaint to the RTC for the declaration of nullity of
marriage against Edward Rumbaua. Rowena alleged that the Edward was unable to fulfill the
obligations of marriage because of psychological incapacity. Her testimonies are as follows:
Edward did not live with her under the same roof after he promised to do so; Edward failed to
extend financial support; Edward blamed Rowena for his mother's death; Edward represented
himself as single in his transactions and pretended to work in Davao although he was living
together with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City. RTC ordered the provincial
prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no fabrication
or suppression of evidence would take place in which, it was found out that there is no collusion
between the parties. The RTC rendered the final judgment of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity. The Republic, through OSG, however appealed this decision to CA.
The Republic argued that the RTC decision was premature because it was rendered despite the
absence of the required OSG certification specified in Molina. The Republic further argued that
AM 02-11-10-SC, which took effect on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the requirements of
Molina that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.

RULING: Yes. AM 02-11-10-SC can be given retroactive effect. In the case of De Los Santos
v. Vda. de Mangubat, the court ruled that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. Here,
AM 02-11-10-SC is procedural and remedial in nature. It does not create or remove any vested
right but only operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. Thus, AM
02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature of an OSG certification and
can be given retroactive effect. The argument of Republic regarding the Molina guideline on
OSG certification lacks merit.
(10) People v. Olarte, GR L-22465, February 28, 1967 [Per J. Reyes
J.B.L., En Banc]
ISSUE: If a case is remanded by the SC after interpreting a law for the case, can the trial court
entertain another and subsequent SC ruling which interprets the law differently?

FACTS: On February 22, 1956, a complaint for libel was charged against Ascencion Olarte
(Olarte) before the Justice of the Peace Court. Subsequently, on July 3, 1956, the case was
forwarded before the Court of First Instance (CFI). Olarte argues that the action is barred by
prescription because the prescription of libel under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code is two
(2) years, commencing from the day the offended party discovered the crime. While Visitacion
Meris received the defamatory letter on February 27, 1954, the statute of limitation continuously
ran until the day it was forwarded with the CFI on July 3, 1956. The Supreme Court (SC), in its
decision that the crime has not prescribed, remanded the case to the lower court. During the trial,
SC promulgated a subsequent ruling in the case of People v. Coquia, which abandons the
doctrine laid down in Olarte’s case. Relying on People v. Coquia, Olarte filed a motion to quash
on the ground of prescription.

RULING: No. If a case is remanded by the SC after interpreting a law for the case, the trial
court cannot entertain another and subsequent SC ruling which interprets the law differently.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically,
it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court. Olarte cannot appeal again with the Supreme Court on
the ground of prescription because the issue on prescription has become the law of the case. The
subsequent ruling in People v. Coquia cannot be applied retroactively to nullify a prior final
ruling in the same proceeding.
(11) Vios v. Pantangco, GR 163103, February 6, 2009 [ Brion, J.,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Is the law of the case doctrine applicable?

FACTS: Pantangco filed a complaint for ejectment and damage against Vios and spouses
Rogelio and Antonio. Pantangco alleging that he is a co-owner of a residential land in Pasong
Tamo, Quezon City. That he gave Vios and spouses Rogelio and Antonio 1 week to vacate the
aforementioned property to which they had agreed. A week later, Vios and spouses Rogelio and
Antonio had refused to vacate the property. A copy of the decision was sent to their counsel
Atty. Sollano. Pantangco filed a motion for writ of execution that the decision is already final
and executory. Vios moved to quash the writ asserting that it was null and void because they had
not been notified of the decision Atty. Sollano had left as their counsel. Vios specifically denied
in their answer the material allegations of the complaint and pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that: (1) the disputed property belongs to the government since it forms part of the
unclassified public forest; (2) the real previous owner of the property was Alfredo Aquino, from
whom they acquired their rights through a document entitled waiver; (3) Pantangco's title is fake
as it originated from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 which was nullified in a decision in
Civil Case No. 36752 rendered a decision in Vios’ favor. It annulled the MTC decision for being
contrary to the evidence; it annulled as well the related writ of execution on the reasoning that
the decision it was implementing was not yet final and executory. The CA had rendered a
decision in favor of Pantangco to which Vios had argued that the RTC decision which was not
appealed became final; and, right or wrong; the RTC's ruling became the law of the case that
may no longer be distributed.

RULING: No, the Law of the Case applies in a situation where an appellate court has made
ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings; the question settled by the appellate court becomes the law of the case at the lower
court and in any subsequent appeal Vios' heavy reliance on the law of the case doctrine is clearly
misplaced. No opinion has been made in a former appeal that can be considered the controlling
legal rule or decision between the same parties thereafter. There is no remanded case to which a
previous ruling on appeal applies.
(12) Villanueva v. Rosqueta, GR 180764, January 19, 2010 [Per J.
Abad, Second Division]
ISSUE: Can Villanueva be exempted from liability for damages for defying a Court Order based
on a legal advice of the Office of the Solicitor General?

FACTS: Emma M. Rosqueta, formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and
Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs, resigned from her position on January 23, 2001.
Five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming she enjoyed security
of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior. On February 2002,
during the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary, the special Panorama magazine
edition which featured all the customs deputy commissioners did not include or feature
Rosqueta, instead the space where Rosqueta’s picture was supposed to be placed stated that her
position was “under litigation.” Rosqueta sought for moral and exemplary damages, claiming
that Villanueva maliciously excluded her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia, and that
she was prevented from performing her duties as a Deputy Commissioner, and also withheld her
salaries and refused to act on her leave applications. Villanueva claims that he merely acted on
an advice of the Office of the Solicitor General when he allowed Gil Valera to assume the office
as Deputy Commissioner since Rosqueta held the position merely in a temporary capacity and
since she lacked the Career Executive Service eligibility required for the job.

RULING: Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the Office of the Solicitor
General gave him. A Government Official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction
order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed. In ignoring the injunction order, Villanueva
clearly showed bad faith to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy
Commissioner. “Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a
person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he
instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers
because of such abuse of right of duty.”
(13) Cebu Country Club, Inc. v. Elizagaque, GR 160273, January
18, 2008 [Per J. Sandoval-Guttierez, First Division]
ISSUE: Can Cebu Country Club be held liable for acts committed in the exercise of its right to
admit members?

FACTS: In 1996, Elizagaque filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors,
action on Elizagaque’s application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board
meeting held on July 30, 1997, Elizagaque’s application was voted upon. Subsequently, on
August 1, 1997, Elizagaque received a letter from Julius Z Neri, CCCI’s corporate secretary,
informing him that the Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership. On
August 6, 1997, Edmundo T Misa, on behalf of Elizagaque, wrote CCCI a letter of
reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer, Elizagaque on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of
reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997, Elizagaque again sent CCCI a
letter inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI did
not reply. Elizagaque argues that CCCI committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving
his applications. CCCI explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form
due to economic reasons and CCCI wanted to use the old application form for it not to be
wasted.

RULING: Yes. Cebu Country Club can be held liable for acts committed in the exercise of its
right to admit members. In rejecting Elizagaque’s application for application for proprietary
membership, the court found that CCCI violated the rules governing human relations, by not
informing Elizagaque of the amendments of its by-laws, the basic principles to be observed for
the rightful relationship between human beings and for stability of social order. It is thus clear
that Elizagaque was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was disapproved.
Such amendment, aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or
almost 20 years before Elizagaque filed his application. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
aptly held that CCCI committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving Elizagaque’s
applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence CCCI are liable for
damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
(14) Chieng v. Sy, GR 174238, July 7, 2009 [Per J. Nachura, J.,
Third Division]
ISSUE: Is there an independent civil action in case of violation of BP22?

FACTS: Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Manila against spouses William
and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and
71860 for ₱300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against a closed account. RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed
the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime.Anita Cheng
then lodged a complaint before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila for collection of a sum of money
with damages based on the same loaned amount of ₱600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks
previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of ₱600,000.00
with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court. Cheng argues that since the BP Blg. 22
cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective
application. Cheng also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP
Blg. 22 proceedings.

RULING: None. Although Article 31 of the Civil Code states that when the civil action is based
on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Also, the filing of civil action should have been done prior to the criminal case. Rule 111 of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure also states that criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. Said rule shall
apply even if the case was already pending at the time of its promulgation because it is a
procedural law. Here the criminal action for violation of BP Blg 22 already has the
corresponding civil action to recover the amounts of checks. Thus, Chieng can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint. The only instance when separate proceedings are
allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case.
(15) Continental Steel v. Montano, GR 182836, October 13, 2009
[Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]
ISSUE: Can a child be considered dependent despite not being born?

FACTS: Rolando P. Hortillano, an employee of Continental Steel and a member of

NMCSCSUPER filed on January 9, 2006, a claim for paternity leave, bereavement leave and
death and accident insurance for dependent pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA). The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife
V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on January 05, 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy. Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for Paternity Leave but
denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of death and
accident insurance. Seeking for reversal of Continental Steel’s decision, the union argued that
Article X, Sec 2 and Article XVIII, Sec. 4.3 of the CBA did not state that the dependent should
have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent
death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The union stated other similar cases where
benefits were provided to an employee despite death of unborn child. Lastly, they invoked
Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living of the laborers.
Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate death of an
unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the
entitlement of the benefits (1) death; (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in
Hortillano’s case. Invoking Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. It also reasoned out that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
person at all, thus, the term dependent could not be applied to it since it never acquired juridical
personality.

RULING: Yes, even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the state must protect equally with the life
of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death. Likewise, the unborn child can be considered as a dependent
under CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another for
support.” Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have
reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife
for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent
may be the parent, spouse or child of a married employee, parent, brother or sister of a single
employee.
(16) Limbona v. COMELEC, GR 186006, October 16, 2009 [Per J.
Nachura, En Banc]
ISSUE: The question that must be answered in this case is “What is the domicile of the wife for
purposes of election law?”

FACTS: Before the May 14, 2007 elections, Norlaine Limbona together with her husband
Mohammad Limbona each filed certificates of candidacy to run as Mayor of Pantar, Lanao Del
Norte. Malik Alingan, who was also a candidate for the same position filed disqualification cases
against the spouses on the ground that both of them lacked the one-year residency requirement
and were not registered voters of Pantar. On April 17, 2007, Norlaine Limbona executed an
Affidavit of Withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy which was approved by the COMELEC.
She also asked the court to dismiss the disqualification case filed against her for being moot and
academic.The elections in Pantar didn’t push through on May 14, 2007 because there was no
final list of voters, so a special election was scheduled for July 23, 2007 instead.On May 24,
2007, COMELEC disqualified Mohammad as a candidate for mayor due to his failure to comply
with the one-year residency requirement. After the disqualification of her husband, Norlaine
decided to file a certificate of candidacy as a substitute for her husband which prompted Alingan
to file another disqualification case against her by using the same ground. Norlaine was
eventually disqualifiedto run for mayor. Unsatisfied with the decision, she argued that a ruling
for a previous case filed against her husband, considered him as a resident ofPantar, which would
qualify both of them to run for any elective office. Norlaine also stresses that she has been
residing and physically present in that municipality for almost 2 years prior to the May 14, 2007
elections. According to her, she associated with the residents of Pantar, found out what their
needs were and even knew the economic potential of the municipality. This, for Norlaine is
enough proof of intention to establish permanent residency and intent to abandon her domicile in
Marawi City.

RULING: The Domicile of Norlaine Limbona for purposes of election law is Rapusan, Marawi
City by virtue of marriage. COMELEC discovered that Mohammad effected his change of
domicile in favor of Pantar only on November 11, 2006. Using Articles 68 and 69 as basis it is
presumed that Norlaine and Mohammad are living together in one legal residence. Hence, her
change of domicile also took effect on November 11, 2006 which was less than a year before the
elections.
(17) San Luis v. San Luis, GR 133743, February 06, 2007 [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, Third Division]
ISSUE: How is residence distinguished from domicile?

FACTS: Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of
Laguna, contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
After the death of Virginia Sulit, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin who was an American
citizen with whom he had a son. However, on October 1971, Merry Lee Corwin filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, U.S.A.,
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974,
Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, at Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. Felicisimo had no children with her, but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Felicidad sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. She
alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of death of Felicisimo, he was
residing at San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. On February 4,
1994, Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s
place of residence prior to his death.

RULING: Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term “place of residence” refers
to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person,
while in domicile the person resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible
that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In the case, Felicisimo
was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa.
The proper venue of the case was the residence of Felicisimo. The petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the
RTC of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa
were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the RTC of Makati City.
(18) Bayot v. CA, GR 155635/163979, November 7, 2008 [Per J.
Velasco, Jr., Second Division]
ISSUE: Did the divorce decree lose its effect when Bayot was granted Filipino citizenship?

FACTS: Rebecca Bayot and Vicente Bayot were married on April 20, 1979 in Mandaluyong
City. Their marriage certificate identified Rebecca to be an American citizen born in Agaña,
Guam, USA. In 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in the Court of First Instance of the
Dominican Republic. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican Court issued Civil Decree No.
362/96, ordering the dissolution of the couple’s marriage and “leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements.” On June 8, 2000, Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of
Immigration of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, which tend to show that she has been recognized as
a Filipino citizen. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed a petition before the Muntinlupa City RTC
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix, daughter. Vicente
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred
by the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting her Filipino
citizenship, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

RULING: No, the divorce decree did not lose its effect when Bayot was granted Filipino
citizenship. The Court, in Garcia v. Recio, held that a foreign divorce can be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact, and as valid under the national law
of the alien spouse. The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the
divorce (reckoning point) and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is sufficient. Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by
Rebecca, the marital relationship between Rebecca and Vicente is severed; Vicente could no
longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the Family Code.
(19) Ty v. CA, GR 127406, November 27, 2000 [Per J. Quisumbing,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly

FACTS: In March 1977, Edgardo Reyes married Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony.
However, it was judicially declared void in August 1980. Before the decree was issued, Reyes
contracted a second marriage with Ofelia Ty in April 1979. A few years into the second
marriage, in January 1991, Reyes filed a petition to declare his second marriage to Ty null and
void. The former contended that the second marriage was celebrated without the judicial decree
nullifying his first marriage. Ofelia Ty countered that People v. Mendoza and People v. Aragon,
where it was held that no judicial decree of nullity is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage, were applicable in this case. However, the CA held that such cases no longer
control because it was decided before the enactment of the Family Code, which now requires the
judicial decree nullifying the previous marriage before a person can remarry.

RULING: Under the Civil Code, there is no express provision requiring a judicial decree
declaring a previous marriage void before a person can remarry. However, in Odayat, Mendoza
and Aragon, it was held that the second marriage was valid even without the judicial decree of
nullity of the first marriage because it was contracted before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Here, the second marriage was entered into in April 1979, before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Hence, the marriage is valid even without the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage.Further, the Family Code provides that it has retroactive effect unless there be
impairment of vested rights. To retroactively apply the Family Code in this case would prejudice
the right of the parties to the validity of the marriage.
(20) Villanueva v. CA, GR 84464, June 21, 1991 [Per J. Cruz, First
Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not a Torrens title is the best evidence of marriage

FACTS: Spouses Jaime and Teodora Villanueva claimed to have rights over the lot deeded to
them by Roberto Sanchez in 1968. However, Catalina Sanchez who claimed to be the widow of
Roberto, averred that her husband was the owner of the land which was registered without her
knowledge. Catalina invoked the report of a handwriting expert from the Philippine
Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service who found that the signature on the document was
written by another person. She prayed that the deed of sale be anulled, that the registration of the
lot in the name of the petitioners be cancelled and that the lot be reconveyed to her. Spouses
Villanueva questioned the personality of Catalina Sanchez to file the complaint.They are
contending that although she had submitted a Marriage Certificate, the same should not be
honored even if the document was dated September 21, 1964 since the Torrens certificate issued
to Roberto Sanchez over the subject land on August 25, 1965, described his civil status as
“single”. They are also claiming that Roberto was never married but had a common law wife by
whom he had two children.

RULING: No. Torrens title is not the best evidence of marriage; it is still the Marriage
Certificate. As for this case, a Torrens Certificate is the best evidence of ownership of registered
land, and not the civil status of the owner. Given this fact, Catalina Sanchez has the right to file
the complaint even if Roberto Sanchez declared himself single on the Torrens Certificate. The
court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as the widow of Roberto
Sanchez with her submission of the Marriage Certificate. That evidence rendered unnecessary
the presumption that a “man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage” and may also explain why Roberto Sanchez could not marry
the woman whom he supposedly had two illegitimate children.
(21) Vda. De Jacob vs. CA, GR 135216, August 19, 1999 [Per Judge
Panganiban, Third Division]
ISSUE: Can marriage still be proven despite the lack of a marriage contract?

FACTS: Tomasa Vda. De Jacob claimed that she was the surviving spouse of deceased Dr.
Alfredo de Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates. However,
Pedro Pilapil appealed that he was the legally adopted son of Alfredo presenting the order issued
by Judge Moya granting the petition for adoption filed by late de Jacob. Pilapil sought to
intervene in the settlement of the estate proceedings of late de Jacob claiming his share as his
sole surviving heir. He also questioned the validity of marriage between Tomasa and Alfredo as
it lacks a marriage contract. Tomasa was not able to present the original copy of the marriage
contract stating that it was lost by the solemnizing officer, Msgr. Yllana who allegedly gave it to
Mr. Jose Cetenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as a secondary
evidence a reconstructed marriage contract issued in 1978, due execution established by the
testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and de Jacob
herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit
of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana as well as de Jacob’s own declaration in court.

RULING: Yes. Marriage can still be proven despite the lack of a marriage contract. Although as
a general rule, a marriage contract is considered as the best evidence of marriage, the failure to
present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove
marriage. It is settled that if the original writing has been loss or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. In
this case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of de Jacob, herself, as a party to the event. The subsequent
loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana as
well as de Jacob’s own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible
evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by
the evidence presented, secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted
proving the fact of marriage.
(22) Republic v. CA, GR 103047, September 2, 1994 [Per J. Puno,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Can the certification of Local civil registrar be given probative value to prove the lack of
a marriage license?

FACTS: On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony. Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. The marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting
parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. When Castro discovered she was pregnant, that
the couple decided to live together. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971,
Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas in
US. Desiring to follow her daughter, she thus consulted a lawyer regarding the possible
annulment of her marriage. Her lawyer discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. Angelina Castro offered in evidence a
certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. Castro testified that she did not go
to the civil registrar of Pasig in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application
therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract. Republic of the Philippines
urges that the certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar that
marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such license was
ever issued.

RULING: The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig gives probative value. Pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate
of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage
license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. Hence, the marriage is void for lack of marriage
license.
(23) Sy v. Court of Appeals, GR 127263, April 12, 2000 [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division]
ISSUE: Is the marriage between Filipina and Fernando void for lack of marriage license?

FACTS: Filipina Y. Sy and Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the
Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City at the age 22 years old. Their union was blessed
with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14,
1978, respectively. During the subsistence of their marriage, Fernando left their conjugal
dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of
their mother. Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the Regional Trial Court,
Pampanga. Upon motion of Filipina, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of
property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause and that they have
been living separately for more than one year. They voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership. Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body while having
an altercation with her son and was allegedly choked by Fernando when their son ignored her
while she was talking to him. The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A
new action for legal separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity.
Filipina then filed for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological
incapacity which was denied by the Trial Court and Appellate Court, hence the instant case. For
the first time, Filipina Sy raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage
license at the time of its celebration. She contends that the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different
and incongruous.

RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that the marriage between Filipina and Fernando is void from
the beginning. It is admitted by both parties that the marriage was celebrated on November 15,
1973. Record evidenced that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage
license. A marriage license is a formal requirement in accordance with the Family Code and its
absence renders the marriage void ab initio. Furthermore, the marriage contract showed that the
marriage license, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, in which neither Filipina nor Fernando ever
resided. The marriage license was only issued on September 17, 1974, almost a year after the
ceremony took place. It is thus concluded that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, those solemnized without a marriage
license, save marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This is clearly applicable in
this case.
(24) Sevilla v. Cardenas, GR 167684, July 31, 2006 [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, First Division]
ISSUE: If the logbook where the issuance of a marriage license was recorded is lost, is it a
conclusive proof of the non-issuance of the marriage license?

FACTS: Sevilla is seeking to have his marriage to Cardenas annulled on the grounds that they
celebrated their marriage without a marriage license. To support this claim, Sevilla’s legal
counsel inquired with the Local Civil Registry in charge with the supposed marriage license. A
representative of the Local Civil Registry however, issued certifications that such marriage
license could not be found and that they hope the requesting party can bear with them for not
being able to apply full force in locating the marriage license because of loaded work. Another
representative also testified that they could not locate the book where the marriage license was
supposed to be recorded because the person handling said book has already retired.

RULING: No, the loss of the logbook where the issuance of the marriage license was recorded
is not a conclusive proof of the non-issuance of the marriage license. Under Section 28 Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, certifications given by representatives of the Local Civil Registry should
state that the marriage license does not exist, or such could not be found despite diligent search,
before the certifications can be considered as admissible evidence. Here, the certification and
testimony given did not satisfy the aforementioned requirements. Hence, presumption is toward
the existence of a valid marriage license.
(25) Alcantara v. Alcantara, GR 167746, August 28, 2007 [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, Third Division]
ISSUE: Will the irregularity in the issuance of the marriage license affect the validity of the
marriage?

FACTS: Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Alcantara contracted their first marriage at the Manila
City hall in 1982 and went through a church wedding in 1983 without securing a valid marriage
license in both marriages. The alleged marriage license appearing on their marriage contract is
false and that neither of Restitutonor Rosita went to Carmona, Cavite to apply for it. Hence,
Restituto filed a petition to annul their marriage. In defense, Rosita Alcantara claimed the
validity of their marriage and that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Moreover, she said that
Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Thus, he only filed the annulment of
their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.Restituto Alcantara stated that the precise
time that his marriage with Rosita was celebrated, there was no marriage license because they
just went to the Manila City hall and dealt with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.
According to him,the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite cannot be
given emphasis because the certification states that “marriage license number 7054133 was
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract
bears the number 7054033.

RULING: Article 53 of the Civil Code, which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage
of the parties states that no marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied
with: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; (2) Their consent, freely given; (3) Authority
of the person performing the marriage; and (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.The absence of a valid marriage licenseshall render the marriage void ab
initio.However, the issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that neither of the parties are
residents of the city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity. An irregularity
in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.Hence, the
typographical error does not weaken the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said
marriage license to the parties.
(26) Borja-Manzano v. Jude Sanchez, AM MTJ-00-1329, March 08,
2001 [Per C.J. Davide Jr., First Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not separation from the original spouses and cohabitation of at least seven
(7) years sever the prior marriages

FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been
married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four
children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao
before Judge Sanchez. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
“separated” thus, Judge Sanchez ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He
claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven (7) years as manifested in their joint affidavit that
they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to
constant quarrels.

RULING: No, separation from the original spouses and cohabitation of at least seven years does
not sever the prior marriages because pursuant to Article 34 of the Family Code which states that
“No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained
the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.”
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage
contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent
marriage null and void. Clearly, Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
(27) Republic v. Dayot, GR 175581, March 28, 2008 [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether it is the period of cohabitation stated or the actual period of cohabitation that is
essential to the validity of an affidavit of cohabitation

FACTS: On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the
execution of a sworn affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and
that being unmarried, they cohabitated for at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with
a certain Rufina Pascual on August 31, 1990. In 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against
Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan, Laguna. He contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties;
that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and
wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The
RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for the ground that the testimonies and
evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an
appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals did not
accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof, his central opposition was that the requisites for
the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New
Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that the man
and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before
the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by
him and Felisa was false.

RULING: It is the actual period of cohabitation that is essential to the validity of an affidavit of
cohabitation. Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute
with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. A strict
but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law
as it is plainly written. Jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence ofa
marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and
continuity that is unbroken.
(28) Carino v. Carino, GR 132529, February 2, 2001, [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, First Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not judicial declaration of nullity of Santiago and Nicdao’s first marriage
was necessary before Santiago married Yee, despite the first marriage being void ab initio

FACTS: Susan Nicdao Carino (Nicdao), first wife of Santiago Carino, whom the latter married
in 1969, seeks to reverse the decision of the CA and RTC ordering her to surrender half the
amount she was able to claim as Santiago’s death benefits to Susan Yee Carino (Yee), second
wife of Santiago whom he married in 1992. Nicdao claims that Santiago’s marriage to Yee is
void because it was celebrated while Santiago was still married to her. Yee however, counter
argues that the marriage of Santiago and Nicdao was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license,
as certified by the civil registrar of the municipality where Santiago and Nicdao’s marriage was
held.

RULING: Despite Santiago and Nicdao’s marriage being void ab initio, judicial declaration of
nullity of their marriage was still necessary before Santiago married Yee, pursuant to Art. 40 of
the Family Code. Hence, the second marriage was likewise void.
(29) Navarro v. Domagtoy, AM MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996, [Per J.
Romero, Second Division]
ISSUE: What is the status of a marriage solemnized by Judge Domagtoy?

FACTS: On September 27, 1994, Judge Hernando Domagtoy (Judge Domagtoy) solemnized the
marriage of Gaspar Tagadan (Gaspar) and Arlyn Borja despite the knowledge that Gaspar has a
subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda (Ida) and that they are merely separated. Subsequently,
on October 27, 1994, Domagtoy solemnize the marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo
(Florentino) and Gemma G. del Rosario (Gemma) at his residence in the Municipality of Dapa
despite that he holds office in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. The Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo Navarro filed a complaint
against Judge Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance
of the law. On the first marriage, Judge Domagtoy countered that that the executed Joint
Affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida’s presumptive death. With respect to the second marriage, he
argued that he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code because of the written
request of one of the parties in accordance with Article 8 of the Family Code.

RULING: The status of the marriages solemnized by Judge Domagtoy are void and valid. The
marriage between Gaspar and Arlyn is void due to lack of summary proceeding for declaration
of presumptive death of Ida. Under Article 41 par. 3 of the Family Code, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. Further,
even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the
Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law. Whereas, the marriage between Floriano and
Gemma is valid. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one of the requisites of marriage is the
authority of the solemnizing officer, and under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by “any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction” so when a judge who are
appointed on a specific jurisdiction solemnize the wedding outside there is an irregularity in the
formal requisite of marriage, while it may not invalidate the marriage, the judge may still be
subject to administrative liability.
(30) Aranes v. Judge Occiano, AM MTJ-02-1390, April 11, 2002
[Per J. Puno, First Division]
ISSUE: Can a judge solemnize a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction out of human
compassion?

FACTS: On February 17, 2000, Judge Occiano solemnized the marriage of Aranes and late
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction. After the death of Orobia, Aranes being the wife was not recognized to
inherit the vast properties left by Orobia and was deprived to receive the pension of Orobia who
was a retired Philippine Navy Commodore. Judge Occiano avers that before he started the
ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to him by Aranes. Upon discovering
that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he suggested its resetting to another
date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of
provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.
He also considered the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties
that their failure to give it would render their marriage void. The parties assured to him that they
would give the license on the afternoon of that same day but they failed to comply. Reviewing
the records of the case, it appears that the parties filed their Application for Marriage License on
January 5, 2000. It was stamped in this application that the marriage shall be issued on January
17, 2000. However, neither Aranes nor Orobia claimed it. It also appeared that the Office of the
Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly
took place on January 17, 2000. Aranes sought the assistance of Judge Occiano so the latter
could communicate with the Office of Local Civil Registrar of NabuaCamarines Sur. However,
LCR informed Judge Occiano that they cannot issue the marriage license due to the none
submission of Orobia’s Death Certificate.

RULING: No, under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to
their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. Judge Occiano’s act of solemnizing
the marriage of the parties in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is not under his territorial jurisdiction,
is contrary to law and thereby subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to
gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion
but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. He also be faulted for
solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
(31) Beso v. Judge Daguman, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, January 28,
2000 [Per J. Ynares- Santiago, First Division]
ISSUE: Can a judge lean on the side of liberality in solemnizing a marriage outside of his
court’s jurisdiction?

FACTS: On August 28, 1997, Atty. Daguman, a municipal judge of Sta. Margarita, solemnized
the marriage of Bernadito Yman and Zenaida Beso, with an existing marriage license, on his
own residence at Calbayog City. Among with them were former Undersecretary Pacifico
Manghacot and Sangguniang Panglunsod Ramon Dean with his wife, Teresita Dean as
witnesses. The couple hastily scheduled the ceremony for the reason that the latter will be
leaving the country, for employment reasons, later that day lest her unmarried status may further
interfere with her employment abroad. On the same date, Judge Daguman issued a copy of the
marriage certificate to Bernardito leaving the other three copies, which found out to be missing a
few days after, on top of his desk. Thereafter, Atty. Daguman summoned Bernardito to convey
his knowledge of the fact who then alleged that Zenaida took the other copies with her during the
wedding party. His statement however does not corroborate with the subsequent event – him
absconding his wife for another girl named Lita Danguyan. In order to confirm Bernardito’s
statements, Judge Daguman summoned Zenaida however; it is no longer possible as the latter
already left the country.

RULING: No, the law is clear in conveying the limits in solemnizing marriages. Article 8 of the
Family Code only allows a solemnizing officer to celebrate a marriage in a place other than those
places generally specified by law as long as it is consistent with the authority granted to them
and the requirements were strictly complied with. An appellate court justice has jurisdiction over
the entire country to officiate weddings, unlike a priest or a judge who were allowed only within
their area of jurisdiction. The Judge in the case at bar is a municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita,
Samar whose residence is at Calbayog City where he officiated the wedding. He acted beyond
his authority – a nonfeasance, which under Article 4 of the same Code though renders the
marriage valid, he who made the irregularity will be criminally, civilly and administratively
liable. Hence, he was fined P5,000 and subject for a more severe punishment in the future for
similar or repeated mistakes .
(32) Van Dorn v. Romillo, GR L-68470, October 8, 1985 [Per J.
Melencio-Herrera, First Division]
ISSUE: Can the divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse
be recognized as valid in the Philippines?

FACTS: Alice Reyes-Van Dorn is a Filipino Citizen, while Richard Upton is a US Citizen. The
two married in Hongkong in 1972, and after their marriage established their residence here in the
Philippines. Both parties had two children born on 1973 and 1975 respectively, but afterwards
decided to have a divorce in Nevada, United States in 1982. Alice Reyes then re-married
Theodore Van Dorn, also in Nevada. On 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against Alice Van
Dorn stating that her business in Ermita, Manila, the Galleon Shop, is conjugal property of both
of them and that Van Dorn should provide an accounting of the business and that Upton be
declared the administrator of the said property.

RULING: Yes, as to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary
to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
The divorce is likewise valid as to the Filipino citizen Alice Van Dorn. As such, pursuant to his
national law, Richard Upton is no longer the husband of Alice Van Dorn. He would have no
standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he did not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
(33) Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, GR 80116, June 30, 1989 [Per J.
Regalado, Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not foreign spouse who has divorced his Filipino spouse have legal standing
to file adultery case against the Filipino spouse

FACTS: Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to Erich Geiling, a German national, in
Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding
against Pilapil claiming that there was a failure of their marriage. The decree of divorce was
granted by the Division 20 of Schoneberg Local Court in Germany. However, after more than
five months of being divorced, Geiling filed two complaints of adultery before the City Fiscal of
Manila alleging that, while they are still married, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William
Chia and Jesus Chua. Pilapilthereafter filed a petition anchored on the main ground that the court
has no jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot
be prosecuted de officio, since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to the filing
of the criminal complaint.

RULING: Article 344 of the RPC presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. The law specifically provides that in
prosecutions of adultery, the person who can legally file must be the offended spouse and
nobody else. It necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action, and by this, it meant that he
is still married to the accused spouse at the time of the filing of the complaint. In the present
case, Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country which legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as Pilapil is concerned in view of the nationality principle which is
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages, alien spouses may obtain divorces
abroad which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided that they are valid according to
their national law. Pursuant to Geiling’s national law, he is no longer the husband of Pilapil.
Therefore he had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit.
(34) Garcia-Recio v. Recio, GR 138322, October 2, 2001 [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]
ISSUE: What kind of divorce may be considered valid in the Philippines that allows a
previously married person to remarry?

FACTS: RederickRecio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May
18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian
Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen. Grace Garcia and
Rederick were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, Rederick was declared as “single” and
“Filipino”. Starting October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.On March
3, 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court quo, on the
ground of bigamy – Rederick allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her
on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of Rederick’s marriage toEditha Samson only
in November 1997. The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended,
but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of marriage; that is,Rederick’s alleged
lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
Rederick. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union
to nullify or annul.

RULING: An absolute divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be considered valid in the
Philippine jurisdiction, provided such decree is validaccording to the national law of the
foreigner. An absolute divorce actually ends the marriage. Once a decree of absolute divorce is
entered, the parties are free to remarry. It is a formal order issued by the court to end the divorce
proceeding while a limited divorce is a legal action where a couple’s separation is supervised by
the court and does not end the marriage. It is generally used by people who do not yet have
grounds for absolute divorce; need financial relief; and are unable to settle their differences
privately. The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued
was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the Rederick is a naturalized Australian.
However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves Redericks’s legal capacity to marry Grace
though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:(1) an
official publication or(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:(a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and(b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
(35) Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, GR 167109, February 6,
2007 [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division]
ISSUE: Who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?

FACTS: Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,

Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April
1988. Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married Merope Braganza in
Calasiao, Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages against Orlando and Merope alleging that the said marriage brought
embarrassment to her and her children. Orlando and Merope filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of cause of action as Felicitas was allegedly not a real party-in-interest because
she and Orlando already obtained their divorce decree. They are free to remarry and each of the
former spouses no longer has any interest to inquire into the marriage that the other might
subsequently contract.

RULING: Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time Felicitas and Orlando
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate “proper
interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions,
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party interest and must be based on a
cause of action. Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. In fine, Felicitas’ personality to
file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of
the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. A remand of the case to the trial court for
reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same or restricts remarriage.
(36) Republic v. Iyoy, GR 152577, September 21, 2005 [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, Second Division]
ISSUE: Do abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity?

FACTS: Crasus assailed that after marrying Fely, he discovered that the latter was hot-tempered,
a nagger and extravagant. A year after Fely left to United States to work, Crasus received a
divorce paper requesting him to sign. However, he refused to sign the same. Fely got married to
an American and had a child. Fely claimed that financial problems arised since Crasus has no job
so she decided to work in United States leaving Crasus and her children. At the time Crasus filed
the complaint for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Fely, it had been 13 years since Fely
abandoned her family. On the other hand, Office of Solicitor General prays for the reversal of the
Court of Appeals decision affirming the RTC declaring the marriage between Crasus Iyoy and
Fely Ada-Rosal Iyoy null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. OSG filed for
reconsideration on the ground that abandonment and sexual infidelity of Fely Ada do not per se
constitute psychological incapacity.

RULING: The court held that psychological incapacity to be a valid ground of nullity of
marriage must possess all the three characteristics: the gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. In this case, abandonment and sexual infidelity of Fely were not established to be
grave or serious making her unable to comply with her essential marital obligations. It was not
also proven that the mental defects were already existing before or at the time of the celebration
of their marriage. Likewise, no enough evidence presented that Fely has no means to cure the
same. Hence, abandonment and sexual infidelity of Fely do not constitute psychological
incapacity provided in Article 36 of Family Code.
(37) Republic v. Obercido, GR 154380, October 5, 2005 [Per J.
Quisumbing, First Division]
ISSUE: May the divorce decree secured by a former Filipino spouse against a Filipino spouse be
given validity in the Philippines?

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter. Cipriano’s wife left for the United States together their son. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000,
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtain divorce decree and then married Stanley
and currently lives at California. Cipriano filed for authority to remarry invoking paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code, but was denied. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that
Par. 2 of art 26 is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage, that is a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. Cipriano admits
that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry. Records of the proceedings of
the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to
Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

RULING: Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to marry. The twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 both present in this case should allow
Cipriano to remarry. However, Cipriano failed to proved his allegations that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Further there is no sufficient evidence submitted on record
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained divorce decree and had
remarried. such declaration could only be made properly upon Cipriano’s submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
(38) Republic v. Manalo, GR 221029, April 24, 2018 [Per J. Peralta,
En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not a divorce decree secured by Manalo, a Filipino citizen, against an alien
spouse be given validity in the Philippines

FACTS: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, a Filipina, married a Japanese National in the Philippines.
Later, she filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree was
rendered by the Japanese Court. Manalo then filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage
in the Civil Registry of San Juan by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by Japanese Court.
The petition was afterwards amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgement. Manalo mainly asserts that there is an imperative need to
have the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, where their marriage was previously
registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her by virtue of the divorce. The
State, however, opposes and argues that the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgement
obtained by Manalo in Japan should be denied because Article 15 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the
country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country and that unless Filipinos are naturalized as
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos’
family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to
enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages.

RULING: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code speaks that if a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law. Based on a clear and
plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad.
The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. Assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the word “obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. It would be the
height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no
longer married to her. The fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential.
As mentioned, even the letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one
who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It only requires that there
be a divorce validly obtained abroad inorder for it to be valid in the Philippines provided that
they comply with all the legal requirements.
(39) Santos v. CA, GR 112019, January 04, 1995 [Per J. Vitug, En
Banc]
ISSUE: Does Julia’s lack of desire to communicate with Leouel constitute psychological
incapacity?

FACTS: Leouel Santos and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exchanged vows on September 20, 1986
in Iloilo City. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States to work as a nurse. Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone seven months after her departure.
She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but never did.
When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a military training
program from 10 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get
in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail. Having failed to get Julia to somehow
come home, Leouel filed a complaint for “Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code”. Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was Leouel who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.

RULING: No, Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support. The psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage was celebrated and must be incurable. The SC
enumerated three basic requirements of “psychological incapacity” as a ground for declaration of
nullity of marriage: 1. gravity; 2. juridical antecedents and 3. incurability. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do
not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity. Mere abandonment and lack of desire to
communicate cannot therefore qualify Julia as psychologically incapacitated.
(40) Republic v. CA, GR 108763, February 13, 1997 [Per J.
Panganiban, En Banc]
ISSUE: What are the requisites of psychological incapacity?

FACTS: A year after the marriage of Roridel and Reynaldo Molina, Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility. According to Roridel, he would spend more time with his peers
and friends, would depend on his parents for aid, and was never honest regarding their finances.
The intense quarrels led to the estrangement of their relationship. Reynaldo eventually
abandoned Roridel and their child. Reynaldo’s actions prompted Roridel to file a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. She claimed that Reynaldo showed signs of
psychological incapacity in complying with essential marital obligations and it would be to the
couple’s best interest to have their marriage declared null and void. Reynaldo, on the other hand
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to Roridel’s strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after marriage, refusal to perform
some of her marital duties and failure to run the household and handle their finances.

RULING: The altercations between Roridel and Reynaldo appeared to be more of a difficulty,
refusal, or neglect on the performance of marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity should be characterized by: 1) gravity – it must be grave and serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
2) juridical antecedence – it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; 3) incurability – it must
be incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the mean of the party. Article
36 of the Family code requires that the incapacity must be psychological in nature, not physical
although its manifestations or symptoms may be physical. The causes of Reynaldo’s actions,
however, can be accounted more on his own volition to not perform his marital duties instead of
a grave, long-standing, and incurable psychological disorder.
(41) Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz, GR 201988, October 11, 2017 [Per J. Del
Castillo, First Division]
ISSUE: Must petitions for declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity be decided
based solely on expert opinions?

FACTS: The couple married in a civil ceremony on October 21, 1986 followed by a church
wedding on February 8, 1987. The marriage produced two sons.On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. She averred that
it had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate personality disorder
related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex," while she herself
was found to be suffering from a "personality disorder of the mixed type, histrionic, narcissistic
with immaturity. In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological
incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Villegas, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Encarnacion, a clinical
psychologist. According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each other’s weaknesses
and that the incapacities of the parties are grave because they preferred to satisfy their own needs
rather than to give in to the other's needs. Dr. Villegas noted that while Nilo was not exactly a
homosexual, he covered up his weak masculine traits by being a "playboy." Dr. Encarnacion
stated that Marivi's "inflexibility" consisted in her expecting a high standard of faithfulness from
all men as exemplified by her dad, who was also very devoted to her mother. However, because
dissatisfied and frustrated by her actual marital situation, she sought attention, externalized
blame, displayed anger, mistrust, resentment, and self-indulgence.

RULING: No, petitions for declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity must not be
decided based solely on expert opinions. In Marcos v. Marcos, the Court ruled the actual medical
examination of the one claimed to have psychological incapacity is not a condition sine qua non,
for what matters is the totality of evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological incapacity.
Here, the Court found that the conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not irresistibly
point to the fact that the personality disorders which plague the spouses antedated the marriage;
that these personality disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that these personality disorders are
incurable or permanent as to render the parties psychologically incapacitated to carry out and
carry on their marital duties. In the case of Nilo, what brought about the breakdown of his
relationship with Marivi was not necessarily attributable to his socalled "psychological disorder"
but can be imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary human failings. Nor can it be
said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time for the family was caused by his "inadequate
personality disorder" or "unresolved oedipal complex." Since the Court found that Marivi and
Nilo were simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other's personality differences, and
have thus become overwhelmed by feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one
another, the petition for declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity must not be
decided based solely on expert opinions.
(42) Suazo v. Suazo, GR 164493, March 10, 2010 [Per J. Brion,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not violence standing alone constitutes psychological incapacity

FACTS: Angelito and Jocelyn met in 1985 when they were 16 years old, and got married in
1986. Both lived under the roof of Angelito’s parents. Jocelyn took odd jobs while Angelito
refused to work and was always drunk. The two experienced violent quarrels that led to Jocelyn
leaving Angelito, who then found another woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years later,
Jocelyn filed a declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code, claiming
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated on the grounds of immaturity, and the alleged
physical beating she received during their cohabitation. Witnesses corroborated Jocelyn’s
testimony claiming that Angelito was suffering from anti-social personality.

RULING: No, there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. Jocelyn’s testimony
regarding the habitual drunkenness, refusal to find a job, and physical beating, while indicative
of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these
indicate difficulty and neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations. It cannot be
considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness.
(43) Alcazar v. Alcazar, GR 174451, October 13, 2009 [Third
Division, J. Chico-Nazario]
ISSUE: Whether or not a physical incapacity of a spouse to consummate the marriage
constitutes psychological incapacity

FACTS: Rey Alcazar married Veronica Cabacungan and after their wedding, they lived for 5
days at Rey’s parent in Occidental Mindoro. The spouses went back to Manila but Rey did not
live with Veronica. After a week, Rey left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to work in a
furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, Rey did not communicate Veronica. After more than a
year, Veronica was informed by a co-teacher that Rey was about to come home, however, she
was not advised by Rey. When Rey arrived at the Philippines, he did not go home with Veronica,
instead, he went to his parent’s house. Thus, Veronica concluded that Rey was physically
incapable of consummating his marriage with Veronica, giving her grounds to file an annulment
case. Rey neither answered nor participated in the hearings.

RULING: Negative. In Santos v. CA, the court declared the “psychological incapacity” under
Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. Moreover, psychological incapacity is under Article 36 of the Family Code, not
under Article 45(5) which states that either party was incapacitated of consummating the
marriage with the other and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable. No evidence
was presented to establish the physical incapacity of Rey.
(44) Niñal v. Bayadog, GR 133778, March 14, 2000 [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, First Division]
ISSUE: May parties be exempted from securing a marriage license if during their cohabitation of
at least 5 years, one or both of them are legally incapacitated to enter into a marriage?

FACTS: On September 26, 1974, PepitoNinal married TeodulfaBellones. However, on April 24,
1985,Pepito shot Teodulfa which led to her subsequent death. On December 11, 1986, or 1 year
and 8 months later, Pepitoremarried Norma Bayadog without any marriage license, stating in an
affidavit that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, EngraceNinal and the heirs of Teodulfa filed a declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma, alleging that the marriage was void for lack of marriage
license. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that EngraceNinal and the heirs of Pepito
have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
“annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.The case was dismissed but a
petition for review was reinstated on a pure question of law. The issue pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married?

RULING: No. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void ab initio for absence of the marriage
license. The two marriages involved herein, having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, are determined as to their validity by the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58. However, there are several instances recognized by the
Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively
with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage.In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit
and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 1 year and 8 months had
elapsed. The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and
it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. A marriage that is
annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio
is considered as having never to have taken placeand cannot be the source of rights. The first can
be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never
be ratified. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
(45) De Castro v. De Castro, GR 160172, February 13, 2008 [Per J.
Tinga, Second Division]
ISSUE: Can the validity of the marriage be attacked collaterally?

FACTS: Reinel Anthony De Castro and Annabelle Assidao-De Castro met and became
sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in Septerment 1994. Subsequently their marriage
license had expired. So, in order to continue with their plan, in the absence of a marriage license,
they executed and affidavit on March 13, 1995 - attesting that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. On November 13, 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child
named Reinna Tricia De Castro, whom Annabelle supported solely through her income being a
government dentist and from her private practice. On June 1998, Annabelle charged Reinel for
support, stating that Reinel "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her"
as his wife and Reinna as his child. Reinel denied that he is married to Annabelle, and further
claimed that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit.
Reinel claimed that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor
acknowledged the child. Reinel elevated the case up to the High Court, alledging that the trial
court had properly annulled his marriage with Annabelle as shown by evidences and admissions
of the parties - the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He also claim that the
affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a false narration of facts, and the
truth was that they never lived together as husband and wife. Furthermore, Reinel claims that a
void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. And that in view of the nullity of his
marriage with Annabelle and his vigorous denail of the child's paternity and filiation, the Court
of Appeals had erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child. On the otherhand, Annabelle
contested that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. As regards to the
filiation of her child, she pointed out that Reinel strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
testing to prove paternity and filiation.

RULING: The Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked. "Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable
one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding." However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity
is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
(46) Carlos v. Sandoval, GR 179922, December 16, 2008 [Per J.
Reyes, Third Division]
ISSUE: After effectivity of the Family Code, who may file a petition to annul or declare the
nullity of marriage?

FACTS: Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval got married in 1962. Thirty years after marriage,
Teofilo died intestate leaving his wife and son Teofilo Carlos ll. In 1995, Teofilo’s brother Juan
Carlos filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of Teofilo and Felicidad’s marriage in
view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased
brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. However, Felicidad
denied Juan’s averment in the complaint by attaching the affidavit of the judge who solemnized
her marriage with Teofilo and the certificate of live birth of Teolifio II where Felicidad and
Teofilo were designated as parents.

RULING: After the effectivity of Family Code, only the husband and wife has the authority to
file a petition to annul or declare the nullity of marriage for the purpose of remarriage. However,
if the purpose is other than remarriage, the real party-in-interest may file petition for the nullity
of marriage. No judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage to its absolute nullity. In this
case the marriage took place when the applicable law was Civil Code. But the Civil Code is
silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Juan Carlos must be a real
party-ininterest. A brother is not among those considered as compulsory heir. The presence of
descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to
the estate of the decedent. Carlos must prove the status of Teofilo II and the nullity of marriage.
(47) Braza v. Civil Registrar, GR 181174, December 4, 2009 [Per J.
Carpio Morales, First Division]
ISSUE: Whether the action filed is one that seeks to declare the nullity of a marriage or one that
seeks to annul legitimacy and filiation of a child

FACTS: Ma. Christina Torres (Ma. Christina) and Pablo Sicad (Pablo) were married on January
4, 1978 and bore three children: Paolo Josef, Janelle Ann and Gian Carlo. Following the death of
Pablo on April 15, 2002, a Lucille Titular claimed that she was married to the late Pablo and that
the two had a son named Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Patrick’s birth certificate showed that it
was filed and acknowledged by her late husband.In addition to this, the birth certificate showed
that Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, rendering Patrick’s as legitimate. With
these facts, Ma. Christina filed a petition for the correction of Patrick Alvin Titular Braza records
raising three issues under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry). The three issues are: (1) the correction of Patrick’s last name in his birth certificate,
(2) sumbit Patrick for DNA testing, and (3) the nullity of Patrick’s legitimization. Ma.
Christina’s arguments were based on the assumption that the subsequent marriage contracted by
Pablo and Lucille has been a bigamous one thus, a void one.

RULING: Ma. Christina’s petition for correction of records sought to declare the nullity of a
marriage and not primarily to annul legitimacy and filiation of Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. The
action that Ma. Christina had put-forth was aimed at the nullity of Patrick’s legitimacy and
filiation however, her arguments all hinged on the necessary nullity of the alleged bigamous
marriage contracted between Pablo and Lucille. Thus, Ma. Christina’s should have filed for an
action of nullity of marriage between Pablo and Lucille under AM. 02-11-12-SC (Proposed Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages)
rather than under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry.
(48) Sermonia v. CA, GR 109454, June 14, 1994 [Per J. Bellosillo,
First Division]
ISSUE: Whether prescription commences to run on the date of actual notice or from the time the
marriage was registered with the civil registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice

FACTS: Sermonia contracted marriage with Unson on February 15, 1975 while he was still
married to his first wife Virginia, which was valid and subsisting. Upon discovery of the
commission of the crime in July 1991, a complaint for bigamy was filed on May 26, 1992,
against Sermonia. Sermonia moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal
liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription. He pointed out that the fifteen-year
prescriptive period commenced to run on the day his second marriage contract was registered
with the Civil Registrar which was in year 1975. Thus, Sermonia argued that the complaint for
bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.

RULING: Prescription should commence to run on the date of actual notice not from the time
the marriage was registered with the civil registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice.
The fifteen-year prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the crime but from
the time of discovery by the offended party which was on July 1991. However, while Sec. 52 of
P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for constructive notice there is no counterpart
provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the
Civil Code, which leads the court to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the
constructive notice rule to the documents registered in the Civil Register. In this case,
considering the concealment of the bigamous marriage by Sermonia, if the prescriptive period
for the offense of bigamy is to be counted from the date of marriage registration with the Civil
registrar, the prosecution for bigamy would be impossible. The interpretation urged by Sermonia
would encourage fearless violations of the stability of marriage as a social institution cherished
and protected by law.
(49) Mercado v. Tan, GR 137110, August 1, 2000 [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the nullity of the first marriage exonerates Vincent

FACTS: Dr. Vincent Mercado contracted two marriages. First, with Ma. Thelma Oliva on April
10, 1976 in Cebu City and bore him two children. And the second, with Ma. Consuelo Tan on
June 27, 1991 in Bacolod City and begot him a son. In October 2, 1992, a letter-complaint for
bigamy was filed by Ma. Consuelo against Dr. Mercado for not having his first marriage legally
dissolved. In November 1992, after the bigamy case, Dr. Mercado filed an action for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma in Cebu City RTC, which later declared
that his marriage with Ma. Thelma was null and void. While acknowledging the existence of two
marriages, Dr. Mercado asserted that his first marriage had been judicially declared null and void
and Ma. Consuelo had knowledge of his first marriage.

RULING: Dr. Mercado contracted the second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the petition to have the first
marriage void only after a complaint had filed charging him with bigamy. By contracting the
second marriage while his first was still subsisting, he committed the act punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier
union is characterized by the statute as ‘void’. A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. This was cast into
statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code.
(50) Tenebro v. CA, GR 150758, February 18, 2004 [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, En Banc]
ISSUE: Whether or not a marriage which is void ab initio produce legal consequences

FACTS: Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The
two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991,
when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract
between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro thereafter left the
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with
Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether
the latter was indeed married to Tenebro. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy
against Tenebro. Tenebro admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with
whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to
each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged
that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify
from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.

RULING: A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically

void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy; Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere act of contracting
a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. As a second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Pertinently, Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.”
A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. There
is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy.
(51) Armas v. Calisterio, GR 136467, April 6, 2000 [Per J. Vitug,
Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not a judicial declaration of absence was necessary before Marietta could
marry Teodorico

FACTS: Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to
James. Teodorico and Marietta were married for eleven years without court declaration that
James is presumptively dead. In April 1992, Teodorico died intestate. Calisterio, a surviving
sister of Teodorico, filed a petition entitled “In matter of Intestate Estate of
the deceased Teodorico Calisterio”, claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico
Calisterio. She declared the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta being bigamous and
thereby null and void.

RULING: A judicial declaration of absence was not necessary before Marietta could marry
Teodorico. Under the 1988 Family Code, the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding
in court to ask for that declaration which is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of
judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article
40, of the Family Code. It remained undisputed that Marietta's first husband, James, had been
absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage
in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico. This second marriage, having been contracted during the
regime of the Civil Code, is deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration
of presumptive death of James.
(52) Republic v. Nolasco, GR 94053, March 17, 1993, [Per J.
Feliciano, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Janet can be declared presumptively dead

FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He first met Janet Monica Parker, a British, in a bar in
England. After that, she lived with him on his ship for 6 months. After the expiration of his
seaman’s contract, Gregorio brought Janet to his hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got
married in January 15, 1982.After the marriage celebration, he obtained another employment
contract and left his wife with his parents in the province. In January 1983, Nolasco received a
letter from his mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son, Gerry Nolasco, Janet left.
He immediately asked permission to leave the ship to return home. He returned home in
November 1983. He exerted efforts to look for Janet, one is by securing another contract which
England is one of its port calls. He wrote several letters to the bar where he and Janet first met,
but all were returned to him. He claimed that he inquired from his friends but they too had no
news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration
of presumptive death of his wife Janet. On October 12, 1988, RTC granted the petition. The
Republic through the OSG, appealed to the CA, contending that the trial court erred in declaring
Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well-founded
belief for such declaration.

RULING: No. Gregorio failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under
the Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a “well-founded belief” that Janet is already
dead.Under Article 41 of the Family Code, the time required for the presumption to arise is four
years. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before declaring presumptive death of one
spouse. It requires a “well-founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.Gregorio failed to prove and exert more efforts
in finding Janet. He did not even ask help from the authorities to find her. He did not keep the
letters that were returned to him when he was trying to look for Janet’s whereabouts.
Considering that Janet just left without any reason and the failure of Gregorio to find Janet, it
cannot be presumed that Janet was dead.
(53) Valdez v. Republic, GR 180863, September 8, 2009 [Per J.
Nachura, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Sofio can be declared presumptively dead without a court declaration.

FACTS:Angelita Valdez married SofioPolborosa on January 11, 1971. She gave birthto a baby
girl namedNancy. The spouses argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed. The latter left
their conjugal dwelling in March 1972. Three years had passed without any word from Sofio. In
October 1975, Sofio showed up they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect
and that was the last time they saw each other. Angelita did not have any news of Sonio, even
that of his whereabouts or if he was still alive or not. Believing that Sofio was dead, she married
Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985 who was denied for the application of his naturalization in
United States because of Sofio’s subsisting marriage. On March 29, 2007, Angelita filed a
petition before the RTC seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. The RTC held
that Angelita “was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that Sofio was already dead” under
Article 41 of the Family Code. Angelita argued that Civil Code must be applied to the case since
her marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971.

RULING: Sofio can be declared presumptively dead without a court declaration. Under the
Civil Code which govern this case, the presumption of death is established by operation of law
and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise as what is intended in Article 384
and 390. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to
be presumed dead starting October 1982.Furthermore, considering the Civil Code that applies,
proof of “well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead” is not required for
purposes of declaration of presumptive death and subsequent marriage of Angelita as what is
stated in the Article 41 Family Code. Angelita could not have been expected to comply within
this requirement since the Family Code was enacted in 1988 which was not yet in effect at the
time of her marriage to Virgilio. Additionally,at the time of Angelita’s marriage to Virgilio, there
was no legal impediment to her capacity to marry as supported by Article 83 paragraph 2 of the
Civil Code.The Family Code itself provides that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied
if they will prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. In this case, it will be prejudicial to
Angelita’s second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated.
(54) Go Tan v. Tan, GR. 168852, September 30, 2008 [Per J.
Austria-Martinez, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not parents-in-law may be included in a petition for temporary protection
order

FACTS: On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan and Steven L. Tan were married. They
have two children Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into
the marriage, Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO against Steven and
her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan before the RTC alleging that
Steven, in conspiracy with her parents- in- law, were causing verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her in violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004. Sharica contends that Steven and Spouses Tan had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring
her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically; that the spouses Tan should be included as indispensable or necessary
parties for complete resolution of the case. The spouses Tan submit that they are not covered by
R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to
the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship.

RULING: Yes. The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall
be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are
necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. RPC provides that when conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. Here, it was held that the parents-in-law may
be included in a petition for temporary protection order because the act of Steven is also their act
as conspirators. And the protection order may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts
of violence against the Sharica or her child, which may include individuals other than the
offending husband.
(55) Ang v. CA, GR 182835, April 20, 2010 [Per J. Abad, Second
Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not a dating relationship exists.

FACTS: Rustan courted Irish and they became “on-and-off” sweethearts towards the end of
2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife),
whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Here, Rustan claims that, being
“romantically involved,” implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual
relations. According to him, “romance” implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive
Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word
“romance” used as a verb, i.e., “to make love; to make love to” as in “He romanced her.” Irish
said that their relationship was continuous even though they were always “away-bati” or fight
and kiss thing. That’s how she characterized her relationship with Rustan.

RULING: Yes, a dating relationship exists. “Dating relationship” refers to a situation wherein
the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Section 3(a) of R.A.
9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman
with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. - As
used in this Act, (a) “Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.An “away-bati” or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common
occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation between the two should
be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what “away-bati” meant,
Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get
angryat her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as
continuous.
(56) Ilusorio v. Bildner, GR 139789, May 12, 2000 [Per J. Pardo,
First Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not a court can compel a husband to live with his wife

FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. In 1942, he married ErlindaKalaw. They lived together for a period of
thirty (30) years until they separated from bed and board in 1972 for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio
Country Club when he was in Baguio City. Erlinda, on the other hand, lived in Antipolo City. In
1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5)
months in Antipolo City. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in Makati. Erlinda filed with the CA
a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano alleging that Sylvia and Bildner
refused her demands to see and visit Potenciano. She stated Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
and Articles 68 and 69 of the FC to support her position that as spouses, they are duty bound to
live together and care for each other. The CA saw that there was no “empathy” between their
marriage coming to a decision of allowing visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian
consideration but denied the petition for habeas corpus.

RULING: No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his
wife. A writ of Habeas Corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, however
in the present case; there was nothing evident of such thing. Potenciano stated that he was not
prevented to leave his house or see other people. With his full mental capacity, he opted to
choose not to be subjected to visitation rights against his free choice; otherwise, it would of
deprived him of his constitutional right to privacy.
(57) Ilusorio v. Bildner, GR 139789/139808, July 19, 2001 [Per J.
Pardo, First Division]
ISSUE: Can the Court issue an order to enforce consortium?

FACTS: Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was separated from her husband,
PotencianoIlusorio, filed a case for habeas corpus pursuing the desire to have custody of her
husband in consortium. The case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano and his
children ErlindaBildner and Sylvia Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to
his wife, asserting that Potenciano never refused to see his wife. Erlinda claimed that she was not
compelling Potenciano to live with her and the cause of her entire petition is to have
Potenciano’s custody alleging that their children were illegally restraining him to fraudulently
deprive her of property rights. She claimed that their children was using their sick and frail father
to sign away properties to companies controlled by them. She also highlighted that Potenciano
suffered from various ailments and did not have the capacity to decide for himself. The children
maintained that their father never refused to see her in fact he himself declared that he was not
prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife
and other children whom he loved.

RULING: The Court cannot issue an order to enforce consortium. As provided by Article 68
and 69 of the Family Code, spouses are duty bound to live together and care for each other,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.The moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the
motivating factor for making them observe the said duties and obligations which are highly
personal.However, in this case, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and
Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. Empathy is a shared feeling
between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
deep sense of spiritual communion. Spontaneous, mutual affection between the husband and the
wife is necessary to enforce consortium, and not on any legal mandate or court order. Therefore,
Erlinda cannot be given the court order for Potenciano’s custody.
(58) Ong v. CA, GR L-63025, November 29, 1991 [Per J. Paras,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon consented to Teodora’s business engagement

FACTS: Teodora Ong secured a loan from Francisco Boix amounting to P2,827.83 for her
logging business. Teodora however defaulted in her obligation. This prompted Boix to file a
complaint to collect the sum legally due plus interest against Teodora and Ramon Ong, the latter
being joined as husband of the former. The decision was in favor of Boix. After the decision
became final and executory, Boix moved to execute the judgment and a corresponding writ of
execution was grandted. Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and attached a
parcel of land declared under the sole name of Teodora B. Ong. In a notice of levy on Execution
and notice of Public Auction sale, an auction sale was held and defendant Boix was adjudged
highest bidder. A writ of possession was issued to place the execution-creditor in possession of
the land levied upon and sold on execution. A corresponding Certificate of Sale was also issued
in favor of Boix. Ramon Ong then filed a complaint against Arsenio Camino and Francisco Boix,
to annul the auction sale of said parcel of land on the grounds that it is a conjugal property which
Teodora could not legally bind. He argued that considering that the debt was contracted by her
only, she does not own the land exclusively but is owned jointly by them and is not subject for
sale.

RULING: Ramon gave his implied consent. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code, the wife may
engage in business although the husband may object. It is clear from the records that Teodora
was engaged in the logging business with Ramon's knowledge without any objection on his part.
The acts of Ramon show that he gave his implied consent to Teodora's engagement in business.
To settle the dispute on the land’s conjugality, whatever profits earned by the Teodora from her
business go to the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the obligations
contracted by the Teodora in connection with her business may be chargeable against the
conjugal property of the spouses.
(59) Go v. CA, GR 114791, May 29, 1997 [Per J. Romero, Second
Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Alex can be held solidarily liable with his wife Nancy.

FACTS: Spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong (Sps. Ong) engaged the services of Nancy Go for
the video coverage of their wedding ceremony on June 7, 1981. Sps. Ang, upon learning that the
video cannot be delivered because it was erased, filed an action for specific performance and
damages against Nancy Go and her husband, Alex Go (Sps. Go). When the Regional Trial Court
held the Sps. Go jointly and solidarily liable as to the pecuniary liabilities, Alex Go questioned it.
He argues that when his wife entered into a contract with Sps. Ang, she was acting alone for her
sole interest. Hence, only Nancy is liable.

RULING: No. Alex cannot be held solidarily liable with his wife Nancy. Under Article 117 of
the Civil Code (now 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation
or engage in business without the consent of the husband. Here, it was only Nancy Go who
entered into a contract with the Sps. Ang. Consequently, she is solely liable for the damages.
(60) Pacete v. Carriaga, G.R. L-53880, March 17, 1994 [Per J. Vitug,
Third Division]
ISSUE: Why is the government required to intervene in actions for legal separation?

FACTS: On October 29, 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one
Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete). Alanis'
averred that she was married to Pacete on April 30, 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of
Cotabato. Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion. During Alanis' marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of
large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several
pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and
other “dummies”. Carriaga and Concepcion were each served with summons on November 15,
1979. They filed a motion for an extension to which the courts granted. They then filed a second
motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days from December 20, 1979. The lower court
granted the motion but only for twenty (20) days to be counted from December 20, 1979 or until
January 9, 1980. The Order of the court was mailed to Carriaga’s counsel on January 11, 1980.
Likely still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on February 5, 1980, again filed another
motion (dated January 18, 1980) for an extension of "fifteen (15) days counted from the
expiration of the 30-day period previously sought" within which to file an answer. The following
day, or on February 6, 1980, the court denied this last motion on the ground that it was "filed
after the original period given . . . as first extension had expired."

RULING: Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off’ period. In this
interim, the court intervenes so that it can make steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The
special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are
impelled by no less than the State’s interest in the Marriage relation and its avowed intention not
to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys
in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under
Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be
made to depend upon the parties themselves. It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by
the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the
proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
(61) Sabalones v. CA, GR 106169, February 14, 1994 [Per J. Cruz,
First Division]
ISSUE: Is a preliminary injunction issued by a court allowing Remedios to continue
administering the conjugal properties violative of the joint administration provided under Article
124 of the Family Code?

FACTS: Sabalones, member of the diplomatic service left to his wife, Remedios, the
administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years. Sabalones retired as ambassador
in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. 4 years later,
Sabalones filed an action for Judicial Authorization to sell conjugal property in Greenhills, San
Juan. Sabalones claimed that, (1) he is weak and very sick, (2) living alone without income, and
(3) needs money for hospitalization. Remedios countered and filed for legal separation alleging
that, (1) the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their children and that they were
depending for support on the rentals from another conjugal property in Forbes Park, and (2)
despite husband’s retirement, he never came back to them and had a separate residence in
Quezon City with Thelma Curameng and their children. Remedios then filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the
administration of their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park, alleging that Sabalones had
harassed the tenant of the Forbes Park property by informing him that his lease would not be
renewed. She also complained that the petitioner had disposed of one of their valuable conjugal
properties in the United States in favor of his paramour, to the prejudice of his legitimate wife
and children. Sabalones argued that since the law provides for a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the
other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the
Family Code.

RULING: The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal
properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However,
Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the
trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of
the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. The primary purpose of the provisional
remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters
during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or
continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the
final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.
(62) Ong v. Ong GR 153206, October 23, 2006 [Per J. Austria-
Martinez, First Division]
ISSUE: Is a decree of legal separation proper? Has Lucita abandoned William?

FACTS: Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Article 55 par 1 of the Family Code
before the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 41, alleging that her life with William was marked by
physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. Lucita claimed that: soon
after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence
being inflicted upon her. William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his
wife and that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to
their Tondo house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995, their
laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house.

RULING: Yes. The decree of legal separation is proper, no abandonment occurred. As the court
ruled, the repeated physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct by
William gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place. Hence, William cannot argue
abandonment. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
(63) SSS v. Aguas, GR 165546, February 27, 2006 [Per J. Callejo,
Sr., J., First Division]
ISSUE: Is a wife separated de facto from her husband, a dependent of the husband entitled to
receive the husband’s SSS benefits?

FACTS: Pablo Aguas is a member of the Social Security System (SSS) and a pensioner who
died on December 8, 1996. Pablo’s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the
SSS for death benefits on December 13, 1996. Rosanna also claimed that Pablo had minor
children to receive benefits as well. In April 1997 however, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac delivered
a sworn letter to SSS claiming that Rosanna had left their family six years before and cohabited
with Romeo dela Pena on which she depended for support. Leticia also claimed that Pablo did
not have any legal children with Rosanna. According to SSS, Rosanna forfeited her right as a
dependent of Pablo when she engaged in an intimate and illicit relationship with Romeo during
her marriage to Pablo. As for the dependent children, SSS maintains that they are not entitled to
the pension because they are not the legitimate children of Pablo. Rosanna however argued that
SSS failed to prove her committed acts of adultery as well as the illegitimacy of the dependent
children.

RULING: No.Under RA No. 1161, a dependent spouse is someone who is legitimate and is a
dependent for support to his or her spouse. However, a wife who is already separated de facto
from her husband do not meet the requirement of a dependent spouse pursuant to this article.
Here, Rosanna had left the conjugal home and cohabited with Romeo dela Pena on which she
depended for support. Thus, she can no longer be considered a dependent and entitled to receive
benefits from the death of Pablo Aguas.
(64) Agapay v. Palang, GR 116688, July 28, 1997 [Per J. Romero,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Who owns the rice land and the house and lot?

FACTS: Spouses Miguel Palang and Carlina (Cornelia) Vallesterol contracted marriage on July
16, 1949 at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. Few months after the
wedding, in October 1949, the husband left to work in Hawaii. They had a child named Herminia
Palang born on May 12, 1950. There were few instances wherein Miguel would return to the
Philippines but never an instance that he stayed with Carlina and their daughter. As early as
1957, it came to the knowledge of the Trial Court that Miguel attempted to divorce Carlina in
Hawaii. When he returned to the Philippines for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina
and his daughter. On July 15, 1973, the then 63-year-old, Miguel contracted his second Marriage
with Erlinda Agapay, who was then 19-year-old. Two months earlier or May 17, 1973, Miguel
and Erlinda, as evidence by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, a transfer certificate of title was issued to them. A
house and lot in Binalonan were purchased on September 23, 1975 by Erlinda Agapay. A
transfer certificate of title was thereafter issued under her name. Their marriage was blessed with
a son named Kristoper Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage
upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later or February 5, 1981, Miguel died. On July 1981,
Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, filed a petition for the recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda. Carlina and Herminia sought to get
back the Rice land and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda.

RULING: The rice land and the house and lot will revert to the conjugal partnership property of
the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang. As stated in Article 148 of the Family Code, in cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage will only be entitled to the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property and industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their contribution. Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase
price of the riceland there are no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
While the house and lot, since Atty. Constantino Sagun revealed that the acquisitionwas made by
Miguel who paid for the purchase price and directed him to name it under Erlinda. The
transaction was properly a donation between spouses, void and inexistent by express provisions
of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
donation as stated in Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.
(65) Arcaba v. Tabancura, GR. 146683, November 22, 2001 [Per J.
Mendoza, Second Division]
ISSUE: The issue in this case is if Francisco’s donation to Cirilia is valid.

FACTS: On January 16, 1956 spouses Francisco Comille and his wife ZosimaMontalla became
registered owners of a 418 square meter lot located in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte.
Twenty four years passed, and on October 3, 1980, after the death of Zosima, Juliana Montalla
the mother of the deceased waived her share which is one fourth of the said property to
Francisco. On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Register of
Deeds.Having no children, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, Luzviminda Paghacian
(Leticia’s cousin), and a certain CirilaAcaban to take care of him since he was already old. On
January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” which gives Cirila portion of his lot consisting of 150 square meters and his house. It was
stated in the deed that the donation was given as a reward for Cirila’s 10 years of faithful service.
After Fracisco’s death on October 4, 1991, his nieces and nephews who were heirs by intestate
succession wanted to have the deed of donation inter vivos nullified on the ground that it is in
violation of Article 87 of the Family Code. According to them, Cirila was Francisco’s common
law wife and not just an ordinary employee.Cirila refutes this by claiming that she was just an
ordinary help and would only enter Francisco’s bedroom when she is asked for assistance.
Another argument made by Cirila was that he was too old for her and they never had sexual
intercourse.

RULING: Under Article 87 of the Family Code, donations of grants with gratuitous advantage
is prohibited and this is also applicable to persons living together as husband and wife without a
marriage license. Although Cirila refutes allegations that she and Francisco were lovers,
testimonies from witnesses and evidence say otherwise. Based on the testimony of
ErlindaTabancura, who was another niece of Francisco, there were documents bearing the
signature of Cirila which would support her allegation. These documents were applications for
business and sanitary permits to operate as a real estate lessor and Francisco’s death certificate
which had CirilaAcaban’ssignature as well.These evidence clearly that show she wasn’t a mere
employee but was Francisco’s common-law wife.
(66) Sunga-Chan v. CA, GR 164401, June 25, 2008 [Per J. Velasco
Jr, Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute community of property of Lilibeth and Norberto can be
made to answer for Lilibeth’s liability for damages.

FACTS: In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership to engage in the marketing of
liquefied petroleum gas. Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite), was registered as a sole
proprietorship in the name of Jacinto, albeit the partnership arrangement called for equal sharing
of the net profit. After Jacinto’s death in 1989, his widow, Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter,
Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua’s consent. Chua’s subsequent
repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting him to file a
Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery o f Sha
res and Damages wi th Wr i t o f Prel iminary Attachment. RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Chua, and found Cecilia and Sunga-Chan solidarily liable for any and all claims of Chua. Then
the sheriff levied upon and sold at public auction Sunga-Chan’s property in Paco, Manila, over
which a building leased to PNB stood. Sunga-Chan questioned the levy on execution of the
subject property on the ground that it is an absolute community property with her husband
Norberto Chan.

RULING: Yes. Parenthetically, the records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were
married on February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Withal, their absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by
either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94. of said Code pertinently provides: Art. 94. The absolute
community of property shall be liable for: (1) x x x x (2) All debts and obligations contracted
during the marriage by the designated administratorspouse for the benefit of the community, or
by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other. (3) Debts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited. Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by Sunga-Chan
of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may
reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husband’s benefit.
(67) Villanueva v. CA, GR 143286, April 14, 2004 [Per J. Carpio,
First Division]
ISSUE: Are the subject properties conjugal?

FACTS: Eusebia Retuya is the legal wife of Nicolas Retuya. During their marriage, they
acquired real properties and all improvements in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas
is a coowner of a parcel of land and also a purchaser of hereditary shares of approximately eight
(8) parcels of land in Mandaue City, some earning income from coconuts leased to a corporation.
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with Pacita Villanueva,
having Procopio Villanueva as their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who
received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage
with Nicolas, had no occupation and properties of her own from which she could derive income.
From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, Procopio is already the one who has been
receiving the income of his properties. Natividad Retuya, one of Eusebia and Nicolas’ children,
told Procopio that their father was already incapacitated, and they had to talk things over. But the
latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the matter. Settlement between parties was
asked but not met. On October 13, 1988, Eusebia filed a complaint before the trial court against
Nicolas, Pacita, and Procopio. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of
several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her conjugal properties with
Nicolas. In 1996, Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs.

RULING: Yes, the subject properties are conjugal. Pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code,
“All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.” The documents and other evidence Eusebia presented constitute “solid
evidence” which proved that the subject properties were acquired during her marriage with
Nicolas. This made the presumption in Article 116 applicable to the subject properties. The
Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas
and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the
Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships
established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the
Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal.
(68) De Leon v. De Leon, GR 185063, July 23, 2009 [Per J. Velasco,
Jr., Third Division]
ISSUE: Is the subject lot a conjugal property?

FACTS: Anita De Leon filed a reconveyance claim over the lot sold by his late husband,
Bonifacio De Leon, to Spouses Tarrosa, arguing that it was part of their conjugal property and
was sold without her consent. The Tarrosas countered that it was the exclusive property of
Bonifacio since he acquired it when he was still single, and it was registered solely in his
name.The ownership of the lot, although the contract to sell was entered by Bonifaco while he
was single in April 1968, was only transferred in June 1970 when he was already married to
Anita.

RULING: The subject lot is a conjugal property. Art. 160 of the Civil Code provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless proven
otherwise. In this case, the fact that the ownership of the subject was transferred during the
marriage raises the presumption by law that it is part of their conjugal property. The argument
that the lot was issued only in Bonifacio’s name is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of the
law. What is material is the time when the property was acquired. Here, it was acquired during
the marriage and hence, the lot is a conjugal property.
(69) Navarro v. Escobido, GR No. 153788, November 27, 2009 [Per
J. Brion, Second Division]
ISSUE: Is Kargo Enterprises a conjugal property?

FACTS: On September 12, 1998, Karen T. Go who is married to Glenn Go, doing business
under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin
and/or sum with damages against Roger Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the
RTC issued writs of replevin for the seizure of two motor vehicles in Navarro’s possession.
Navarro, on the other hand, argued that that the actual parties to the lease agreement was himself
and Glenn Go and therefore, Karen Go is not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to
state a cause of action.

RULING: Yes, Kargo Enterprises is a conjugal property. Under Article 124 of the Family Code,
it provides that the agreement of the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
shall belong to both spouses jointly. This provision, by its terms, allows Karen or Glenn Go to
speak and act with authority in managing their conjugal property, i.e.,Kargo Enterprises.
Applying as well the provisions of Article 1811, Spouses Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo
Enterprises and the properties registered under this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek
possession of these properties.
(70) Hernandez v. Mingoa, GR 146548, December 18, 2009 [Per
Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]
ISSUE: Was the alienation of the lot void?

FACTS: A parcel of a land is registered in the name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. married to
Sergia Hernandez. It was a real property awarded by the Philippine Homesite and Housing
Corporation as part of the government’s housing program in 1958. A deed of absolute sale of
property was executed by the PHHC after the Hernandez pain in full the entire amount of
P6,888.96. Hernandez, Sr. died intestate in April 1983 and it was only after his burial that his
heirs found out that TCT issued to them was already cancelled a year before and in lieu thereof,
another title was issued to the Mingoas. According to Mingoas, Hernandez failed to pay all the
installments due on the said property. Thus, afraid that he would forfeit his right to purchase the
property awarded to him, Hernandez, Sr. allegedly sold to Dolores Camisura his rights for the
sum of P6,500.00 on February 14, 1963, through a deed of transfer of rights, seemingly a printed
form from the PHHC. Simultaneous to this, Hernandez, Sr. and his spouse executed an
irrevocable special power of attorney, appointing Dolores Camisura as their attorney-in-fact with
express power to sign, execute and acknowledge all such contracts, deeds or other instruments
which may deem necessary or be required to sign, execute and acknowledge for the purpose of
selling, transferring, conveying, disposing of or alienating whatever rights she may have over
that parcel of land mentioned above.

RULING: The rights and interests of the spouses Hernandez over the subject property were
validly transferred to Camisura. Since the sale of the property by Hernandez, Sr. was without the
consent of his wife Sergia, the same is voidable; thus binding unless annulled. Considering that
Sergia failed to exercise her right to ask for the annulment of the sale within the prescribed
period, she is now barred from questioning the validity thereof. It bears stressing that the subject
matter herein involves conjugal property. Said property was awarded to Domingo Hernandez, Sr.
in 1958. The assailed SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. Title in the name of Domingo
Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property was issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the
property to Melanie Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978. Since
all these events occurred before the Family Code took effect in 1988, the provisions of the New
Civil Code govern these transactions. Under Article 173 of the New Civil Code, an action for the
annulment of any contract entered into by the husband without the wife’s consent must be filed
during marriage or within 10 years from the transaction questioned.
(71) Ching v. CA, GR 124642, February 23, 2004 [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Are the Citycorp shares conjugal? Is the conjugal partnership liable for PBMCI’s unpaid
loan?

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PMBCI) obtained two loans from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC). PBMCI Executive Vice President Alfredo Ching executed a
continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the
payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial
court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to
attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans.
Encarnacion Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a motion to set aside the levy on attachment
alleging inter alia that the 100,000.00 shares of stock levied on by sheriff were acquired by her
and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Spouses aver that the source of
funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking
the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Article 121 and that such presumption
subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses according to the
spouses, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the Alfredo Ching’s
profession or business.

RULING: Article 121 of the Family code provides that the conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by designated administrator-
spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or one of them
with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouses without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. In this case, the ABC
failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of spouses was benefited by Alfredo Ching act of
executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the ABC for and in behalf of
PBMCI. The contract of loan was between ABC and the PMBCI, solely for the benefit of the
latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when Alfredo entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited.
(72) Ferrer v. Ferrer GR 166496, November 29, 2006 [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, First Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Manuel is liable to reimburse Josefa for the improvements on the
apartment building

FACTS: Josefa alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer, a half-brother of Manuel M.
Ferrer and Ismael M. Ferrer. Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot. He
applied for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon, including a residential house and
a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan
was made using the couple’s conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, Josefa posited, they
constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, Josefa averred that Manuel occupied one door of
the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September 1991, he stopped
paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a
Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. TCT
No.67927 was cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued and registered in the names of the
spouses Ismael and Flora. According to Josefa, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at
the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the
cost of the improvements on Alfredo’s lot. She alleged that the cost of the improvements
amounted to P500, 000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by spouses as
they are now the registered owners of Alfredo’s lot. Spouses Manuel and Virgina, on the other
hand, contends that the action was barred by prior judgment.

RULING: No. Josefa was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the Manuel
and Ismael and their spouses to respect or not to violate her right. The right of the spouse as
contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the
improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the
entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in
case the property is sold by the owner-spouse. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses.
Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the
value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses
shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of
the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.
(73) MBTC v. Pascual, GR 163744, February 29, 2008 [Per J.
Velasco, Jr., Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lot is conjugal property

FACTS: 2 years after Nelson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga’s marriage was declared void, the
latter executed a mortgage on a property they bought during their marriage without the consent
of the former. After Nevalga failed to pay her obligation, MBTC foreclosed the subject property.
Pascual filed a petition to seek the nullity of the mortgage contract claiming that the property,
which was conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent. On the other hand, MBTC claimed that
the property was paraphernal. The latter added that for the presumption of conjugality to operate,
it must be proved that not only was the property acquired during the marriage but that conjugal
funds were used for its acquisition.

RULING: The subject lot is conjugal property. Art. 160 of the Civil Code provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless proven otherwise. The
Court held that the provision does not require proof that the property was acquired using the
conjugal funds. It is sufficient that the property was acquired during the marriage for the
presumption to apply. Here, it was undisputable that the property was acquired during the
marriage of the ex-spouses. Hence, the presumption of conjugality applies.
(74) Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. CA, GR 118305,
February 12, 1998 [Per J. Martinez, Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not entering into a surety agreement or an accommodation contract by the
husband in favor of his employer benefits the conjugal partnership

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the loan, Alfredo Ching, Executive
Vice President of PBM, executed surety agreements making himself jointly and severally
answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC.Unfortunately, PBM failed to pay the loan.
Therefore, AIDC filed a case for the collection of the loan against PBM and Alfredo
Ching.Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution. Theappointed deputy
sheriff began the issuance of the notice of sheriff sale on three of Ching’s conjugal
properties.Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching filed an injunction against theorderfor the auction sale
on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of their conjugal partnership.Upon
application of Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching, theRTC issued a TRO to prevent the enforcement
of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. Subsequently,
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, questioning the order of the RTC.
Accordingly, CA favored AIDC and the auction sale ensued and the certificate of sale was issued
to AIDCas the only bidder. On the other hand, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss the pending
case despite the consummation of the sale.Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching argued
thatEncarnacionwas also the owner of the propertiesattached or levied uponin which two of the
real properties were actually registeredunder her name. In defense, AIDC claimed that the
benefits the Ching family would reasonably anticipate were the following: (a) The employment
of Alfredo Ching would be prolonged and he would be entitled to his monthly salary of
P20,000.00 for an extended length of time because of the loan he guaranteed; (b) The shares of
stock of the members of his family would appreciate if the PBM could be rehabilitated through
the loan obtained; (c) His prestige in the corporation would be enhanced and his career would be
boosted shouldPBM survive because of the loan.Unfortunately, AIDC did not present any proof
to show its defense.

RULING: The surety agreement or an accommodation contract by the husband in favor of his
employer did not benefit the conjugal partnership. In Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family
Code is definite that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that
they redounded to the benefit of the family.Moreover, the burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of conjugal partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such.Here, the contract of loan was clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor
(PBM) and not for Alfredo’s family. Furthermore, the signing of a surety agreement is certainly
an exercise of an industry or profession, but only to the extent of Alfredo’s corporate
stockholdings. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM because it has a juridical personality distinct
and separate from Alfredo.
(75) Carlos v. Abelardo, GR 146504, April 09, 2002 [Per J.
Kapunan, First Division]
ISSUE: Is the loan a liability of the conjugal partnerships

FACTS: Honorio L. Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery
of the US$25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Parañaque. It was in October
1989, when Honorario Carlos issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting
their married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full
payment. In July 1991, Carlos inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him. The
spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter,
Abelardo expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against
Carlos. In 1994, Carlos made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the
obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the
complaint, hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never
intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm
and that Carlos could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. Evidently, there
was a check issued worth US$25,000 paid to the owner of the Parañaque property which became
the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan
but Abelardo did not sign.

RULING: Yes, pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code which states that “The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both
spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited; If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. A loan is a liability
of the conjugal partnership as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny
that the same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are
jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s contention that it is not a loan
rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was
part of the stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
(76) Buado v. CA, GR 145222, February 24, 2009 [Per J. Tinga,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

FACTS: Spouses Buado filed a complaint for damages against Erlina Nicol, arising from
Erlinda’s criminal offense of slander against her by the spouses. The court issued a writ of
execution commanding the Sheriff to conduct proceedings on the goods and chattels of Erlinda
or her estates or legal heirs to satisfy the petitioner’s claim. Finding that Erlinda’s personal
properties insufficient to satisfy such judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real
property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds. A notice of sheriff’s sale was issued,
and a public auction was scheduled with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale
was issued in favor of the spouses which Romulo Nicol (Erlinda’s husband and herein private
respondent) sought to annul. A year after the sale, Romulo Nicol, husband of Erlinda Nicole,
filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction
against petitioners and the department sheriff, alleging that the property was directly levied upon
without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda.

RULING: No, Erlinda Nicol’s liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. Article 122
of the Family Code provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community
where liabilities incurred by either spouse byreason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the
absolute community of property, in theabsence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the
debtor-spouse, the same advantageis not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains.
The conjugal partnership ofgains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil
obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted byone spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued
to the conjugal partnership.
(77) Roxas v. CA, R 92245, June 26, 2991, [Per J. Paras, Second
Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not a husband, as administrator of the conjugal partnership, may legally
enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent
of the wife

FACTS: Melania Roxas is seeking to reverse the decision of the CA which dismissed her
petition to cancel the lease contract entered into by her estranged husband in relation to their
conjugal property. Roxas argues that pursuant to Art. 166 of the New Civil Code, her consent as
the wife is required before the husband can alienate or encumber any conjugal property. Such
alienation and encumbrance, being acts of ownership and not of administration, is beyond the
husband’s authority as administrator of the conjugal property. The husband counter argues
however, that Roxas does not have a cause of action since a lease is not an alienation nor an
encumbrance; Therefore, the lease falls under acts of administration which do not require the
consent of the wife. Decision: The husband, as the administrator of the conjugal property, cannot
legally enter into a lease contract involving conjugal property without the knowledge and
consent of the wife. Since a contract of lease involves the conveyance of the right to use by the
lessor, it falls under alienation and encumbrance as contemplated in Art. 166 of the New Civil
Code.
(78) Guiang v. CA, GR 125172, June 26, 1998, [Per J. Panganiban,
First Division]
ISSUE: Whether the sale of conjugal property is void or voidable without the wife’s consent

FACTS: Gilda Corpuz (Gilda) and Judie Corpuz (Judie) got married on December 24, 1986.
Gilda therefter left for abroad to work. In her absence, Judie sold one half of their conjugal
property, consisting of their house and the lot on which it stood to Luzviminda Guiang (Guiang).
When Gilda returned, she gathered her children together and stayed at their house, and thereafter
filed a complaint for trespassing against Luviminda and her husband Antonio. On March 16,
1990, the parties entered into an amicable settlement. Gilda, believing that she had received the
shorter end of the bargain, she sought for the nullification of the deed of sale, which was
executed without her consent, hence, void. Luzviminda Guiang, however, insists that the absence
of Gilda’s consent merely rendered the deed voidable, and it was later ratified when Gilda
entered into an amicable settlement.

RULING: Yes, the sale of conjugal property is void without the wife’s consent. Article 124
provides that in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. As for the ratification, a
void contract cannot be ratified. Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a
continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of
Article 124.
(79) Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, GR 147978, January 23, 2002 [Per,
J. Katipunan]
ISSUE: Whether or not the husband may validly dispose a conjugal property without the wife’s
consent

FACTS: Thelma A. Jader-Manalo allegedly came across an advertisement placed by the spouses
Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa, in the Classified Ads Section of the
newspaper BULLETIN TODAY in its April 29, 1992 issue, for the sale of their ten-door
apartment in Makati, as well as that in Taytay, Rizal. Thelma met with the vendors, Norma and
Edilberto thru a real estate broker for she was interested in buying the two properties. She also
made a definite offer to buy the properties to Edilberto, with t he knowledge and conformity of
his wife Norma. After some bargaining, they have agreed that the property is to be paid in an
installment basis. This agreement was handwritten by Thelma and signed by Edilberto. When
Thelma pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of Norma’s
conformity and consent to sale. The contracts prepared by Thelma was given to Edilberto for the
formal affixing of Norma’s signature. Days after, Thelma and Edilberto together with the broker
met again, but Thelma was surprised when Edilberto informed her that they were backing out of
the agreement because they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration. Thelma
reminded the spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma’s
refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice her. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts
prompting her to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against the spouses
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 163 on Apr il 29, 1992, to compel Norma to
sign the contracts to sell.

RULING: No, by express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)
authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence,
for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Norma admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that she actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, Thelma admits that Norma
refused to sign the contracts to sell. Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale
of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not a consent.
Therefore, the Edilberto is not allowed to dispose their conjugal property without the consent of
his wife Norma.
(80) Jardeleza v. Jardeleza, GR 112014, December 05, 2000 [Per J.
Pardo, First Division]
ISSUE: Whether Article 124 of FC renders superfluous the appointment of a judicial guardian
over the person and the estate of an incompetent married person.

FACTS: Dr. Enesto Jardeleza Sr. and Mrs. Gilda Jardeleza have been married a long time before
the FC took effect. Out of their union, five children were born named Teodoro, Ernesto Jr.,
Melecio, Glenda and Rolando. On March 25, 1991, Dr. Jardeleza Sr., suffered a stroke
exacerbated by a comatose condition. His son Teodoro, in the administration of his estate and the
action for representation, filed the petition for the issuance of letters of guardianship to himself,
which his mother, along with his siblings, assailed the same. Moreover, the trial court decided
the petition as unnecessary due to the express provision of Article 124 of FC assigning the sole
powers of administration to the other spouse. Consequently, Teodoro questions the superfluity of
appointing a judicial guardian over the person and estate of an incompetent married peron.

RULING: The case at bar cannot be held under Article 124 of the FC due to representation as
being sought by Teodoro and not mere administration of the conjugal properties. The dispositive
portion of Article 124 of the FC states: “In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. “ Thus, Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court
should govern the foregoing and the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
(81) Docena v. Lapesura, GR 140153, March 28, 2001 [Per J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not both spouses are required to sign the CNFS

FACTS: Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his
lessees, spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses claimed ownership of the land based
on occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. The
RTC rendered judgment in favour of the spouses. CA reversed the decision and ordering the
spouses Docena to vacate the land they have leased excluding the portions reclaimed by the
Docena Spouses and which form part of the seashore. Pursuant to the Resolution, the sheriff
issued an alias Writ of Demolition. The spouses Docena argue that since they are spouses with
joint or indivisible interest over the alleged conjugal property subject of the original action which
gave rise to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, the signing of the certificate of non-forum
shopping by only one of them would suffice, especially considering the long distance they had to
travel just to sign the said certificate. Moreover, there is substantial compliance with the Rules of
Court where the certification was signed by the husband who is the statutory administrator of the
conjugal property.

RULING: Yes. It has been in the previous rulings of the Supreme Court that the certificate of
non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the
signing by only one of them is insufficient. Here, however, the SC held that the subject
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to
constitute substantial compliance with the rules. Under the Family Code, the administration of
the conjugal property belongs to the husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of
alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or
administration does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may
validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in
proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code.
(82) Villanueva v. Chiong, GR 159889, June 5, 2008 [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether the subject lot is an exclusive or conjugal property; Whether or not the sale of
the lot without Elisera’s consent was valid.

FACTS: Florentino Chiong and Elisera Chiong were married and during their marriage acquired
a lot at Poblacion, DipologCity. Sometime in 1985, after being separated, Florentino sold the
one-half western portion of the said lot to Alter Villanuva and Aurora Villanueva for Php 8,000
payable by installment. They were allowed to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop and a
house, theron. After full payment of the lot, they demanded a Deed of Sale from Florentino and
Elisera. However, Elisera refused to sign the deed of sale. She contends that the sale of the lot
without her consent is void because it is a conjugal property. Villanueva, on the other hand,
averred that the part of the lot sold to them is the share and already an exclusive property of
Florentino because of his separation in fact with his wife at the time of the sale.

RULING: Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife
without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. Likewise, under Article 160 of
the Civil Code, all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife. In the present case, the lot retains its conjugal nature.Villanueva’s mere insistence
that the lot is an exclusive property of Florentino because of his separation with his wife at the
time of sale is insufficient to overcome such presumption when taken against the evidence of
Elisera who presented not just a certificate of title but also a real property tax declaration,
memorandum of agreement acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot and executing
such lot as conjugal property. Also, Florentino admitted that the lot is a conjugal property in the
Deed of Absolute sale he executed in favor of Villanueva, but then rendered by the court as
void.Moreover, applying in the present case, Article 166 which states that the husband cannot
alienate and encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent
and Article 172 which states that the wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of contracts entered into by the husband
without her consent. The consent of Elisera was not obtained by Florentino during the sale of the
lot. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the saleon July 5, 1991, perfectly within the ten years
from the date of sale and execution of deed. The sale is therefore voidable.
(83) Dela Cruz v. Segovia, GR 149801, June 26, 2008 [Per J.
Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the September 9, 1991 Agreement between Florinda and Leonila
involves a disposition of property

FACTS: In July 1985, Florinda dela Cruz wanted to purchase two (2) parcels of land located at
Sta. Mesa, Manila, Lot 503 and Lot 505. The two lots were being sold together for ₱180,000.00.
Florinda had only ₱144,000.00 at hand. Short of fund,she asked her sister Leonila to take the Lot
503 for ₱80,000.00. ButLeonila with only ₱36,000.00 hard-earned savings, Florinda advanced
her ₱64,000.00 for the full payment of the said lot. The parties, however, verbally agreed that
Leonila and her family would stay at Lot 505 until she had fully paid for Lot 503.Desiring to
reduce the verbal agreement into writing, the parties executed and signed a handwritten covenant
entitled Note of Agreement dated April 28, 1990. It was only onSeptember 9, 1991, did these
sisters entered a payment schemeagreement. Leonila continued paying the balance she owed
Florinda. Particularly, she paid the amount of ₱10,000.00 in September 1990 and ₱7,555.44 on
May 16, 1995. Finally, in October 1995, Leonila attempted to pay the remaining balance of
₱26,444.56 in full satisfaction of her obligation but Florinda refused to accept the same on the
ground that, the ten-year period for the payment of the balance, reckoned from July 1985, the
alleged date of the verbal agreement between them, had already expired. Florinda filed with RTC
on March 1996, acomplaint annulling September 9, 1991 agreement on the ground, among
othersthat since her husband, Renato did not sign, it is void.

RULING: The September 9, 1991 Agreement between the two sisters involves a disposition of
property to transfer the ownership of Lot 503. The ruling that the absence of Renato’s signature
in the September 9, 1991 Agreement bears little significance to its validity. Article 124 of the
Family Code relied upon by spouses Dela Cruz provides that the administration of the conjugal
partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse
is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. Renato’s consent to the
Agreement was drawn from the fact that he was present at the time it was signed by the sisters
and their witnesses; he had knowledge of the Agreement as it was presented to him for his
signature, although he did not sign the same because his wife Florinda insisted that her signature
already carried that of her husband; Renato witnessed the fact that Leonila contributed her hard
earned savings in the amount of ₱36,000.00 to complete their share in the purchase price of the
properties in question in the total amount of ₱180,000.00.However, the power of administration
does not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal
partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically requires the written consent of the other
spouse, or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership
property without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
(84) Ravina v. Villa Abrille, GR 160708, October 16, 2009 [Per
Acting C.J. Quisumbing, Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for annulment of sale is timely filed; whether or not the action
for annulment covers the entire property sold

FACTS: Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife.In 1982,
the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located at
Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro
acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-
26471.Through their joint effortsthe spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house
was finished in the early 1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a
poultry house and an annex. In 1991, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to
Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the Ravina spouses of her
objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent,
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann
did not sign on top of her name. Mary Ann then filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against Pedro and the Ravina’s. Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money.
Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband,
Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property.

RULING: Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, “All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.” The rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without
knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with
the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such
sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract
implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. Mary Ann timely filed the action
for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not
include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and
which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.
(85) Maquilan v. Maquilan, GR 155409, June 08, 2007 [Per J.
Austria-Martinez, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid

FACTS: Virgilio Maquilan and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once had a blissful marriage of
which were blessed with one son. However, Virgilio caught Dita having an illicit sexual affair
with her paramour resulted to them being convicted of adultery and were sentenced with
imprisonment for a minimum of 1 year and 8 months to a maximum penalty of 3 years, 6 months
and 21 days prison correccional. Thereafter, Dita through her counsel filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains
and damages on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Virgilio. During the
pendency of the annulment case, Virgilio and Dita entered into a partial Compromise
Agreement. Virgilio Maquilan contended that the proceedings pertaining to Compromise
Agreement is void because of the absence of participation of the prosecutor during the pendency
of the case.

RULING: The court held that the purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or
the Solicitor General is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. In this case, there is no demand
for the presence of the Solicitor General and/or State Prosecutor because nothing in the
Compromise Agreement is meritorious to the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the
court to be wary of any possible collusion between the parties. The Compromise Agreement
pertains merely to an agreement between the parties to separate their conjugal properties partially
without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
However, the court must take measures on protecting the rights of all creditors and other persons
with pecuniary interest in accordance with Article 136 of the Family Code. Therefore, the partial
voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage is valid.
(86) Mercado-Fehr v. Bruno Fehr, GR 152716, October 23, 2003
[Per J. Puno, Third Division]
ISSUE: Is the condominium unit common property?

FACTS: In March 1983, Elna left Cebu and moved in with Bruno in Manila. They purchased a
condominium unit (Suite 204) at LGC condominium by a contract to sell dated July 26, 1983.
They got married in March 1985. In 1998, The marriage between Elna D. Mercado and Bruno F.
Fehr was declared null an void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Bruno to
perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered
the dissolution of their conjugal properties. Custody over the two minor children was awarded to
Elna, being innocent spouse and the properties were divided into three (3): 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for
Bruno and 1/3 for the children. Further, Suite 204, LCG Condominium was declared exclusive
property of Bruno. Accordingly, Elna was directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the
name of Bruno, being Bruno’s exclusive property, acquire prior his marriage. Elna filed a motion
for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG
Condominium and the support of the children. She also alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on
installment basis at the time when Elna and Bruno were living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. The court held that the marriage between Elna
and Bruno was void ab initio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation and
partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
However, the court noted that the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the properties
and/or from the sale proportionately among them.

RULING: Yes. Under Article 147 of the Family Code, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a
common property of Elna and Bruno and the property regime of the parties should be divided in
accordance with the law on co-ownership. Article 147 applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void. Here, Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other when they acquired
the Condominium unit. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However,
their marriage was void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
(87) Saguid v. CA, GR 150611, June 10, 2003 [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, First Division]
ISSUE: What is the property regime of Gina and Jacinto?

FACTS: Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband,
when she met Jacinto Saguid sometime in 1987 and cohabited with him. In 1996, the couple
decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. Gina filed a complaint for partition and
recovery of personal property with receivership against Jacinto. She alleged that she was able to
contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house and was able to acquire and
accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of
P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that
the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be
reimbursed to her.

RULING: It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other
because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the
latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which
applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of
the same married man. Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions…” Proof of actual contribution is
required. Even if cohabitation commenced before Family Code, Article 148 applies because this
provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. The fact
that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is
not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of
the property. Here, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of the parties.
Gina alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house.
However, nowhere in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears
in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials. While there is
no question that both parties contributed in their joint account deposit, there is, however, no
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of
the Family Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their
share shall be presumed to be equal.
(88) Acre v. Yuttikki, GR 153029, September 27, 2007 [Per J.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, First Division]
ISSUE: Who owns the disputed properties?

FACTS: Sofronio Acre, Jr. married Evangeline Yuttikki while his prior marriage with Beatriz
Acre was still subsisting. Sofronio died after more than 24 years of union with Evangeline.
During Evangeline’s marriage with Sofronio, they acquired properties such as motor vehicle and
two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 116740 in the name of Evangeline Acre, married to
Sofronio Acre, Jr. and TCT No. 100087 registered in the names of Evangeline Acre, married to
Sofronio Acre, Jr. and Nellie Del Mar, married to Jose Del Mar. Beatriz Et. Al. filed a complaint
for reconveyance and recovery of properties and/or partition with damages. They alleged that
Sofronio alone acquired the subject properties with his funds. Evangeline asserted that she
owned the motor vehicle and the land covered by TCT No. 116740 while she co-owned the land
covered by TCT No. 100087 with her sister.

RULING: Evangeline Yuttikki is the exclusive owner of the contested properties. The marriage
between Evangeline and Sofronio is bigamous considering that their union was celebrated while
he was still married to Beatriz. Their property regime is covered by Article 148 of the Family
Code which provides that all properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Hence, if there is no contribution from either or both of the spouses, there can be no co-
ownership. Beatriz Et. Al. failed to present any evidence to establish that Sofronio made an
actual contribution in acquiring the contested properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not exist
here. The certificate of title on its face show that one of the properties was exclusively owned by
Evangeline, and the other land was co-owned by her with her sister. The rule is well-settled that
the words “married to” preceding Sofronio Acre, Jr are merely descriptive of the civil status of
Evangeline.
(89) Hontiveros v. RTC, GR 125465, June 29, 1999 [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the complaint proper?

FACTS: Due to a land registration case, spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a
complaint for damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. Augusto and Maria
alleged that they were deprived of income from a parcel of land they rightfully owned because
Gregorio and Teodora withheld it from them in bad faith. The Regional Trial Court declared that
Gregorio was a possessor in good faith and Teodora had nothing to do with the case as she was
not married to Gregorio. Gregorio prayed for an order against Augusto and Maria to pay
damages by way of counterclaim as well as the reconveyance of the subject land. As a response,
Augusto and Maria contended that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made between
the parties but the same were unsuccessful – a claim that Gregorio and Teodora denied. The RTC
dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of
the Family Code, and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at
a compromise.

RULING: The RTC erred in dismissing the case on the ground that no compromise was made
between the parties. Article 151 states that “No suit between family members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.” While Augusto and Gregorio are indeed
brothers, the inclusion of Maria and Teodora as petitioner and respondent takes the case out of
the ambit of Article 151 of the Family Code. It is important to note that Article 150 of the Family
Code defines family relations to be existing between immediate family members only: husband
and wife, parents and children, among ascendants and descendants, and among brothers and
sisters, whether full of half-blood. Maria as a sister-in-law and Teodora are considered strangers
to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151. Whenever a stranger is a party in a case
involving family members, the requisite showing an earnest effort toward a compromise is no
longer mandatory.
(90) Manacop v. CA, GR 97898, August 11, 1997 [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]
ISSUE: May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity
of the FC be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of the
FC?

FACTS: Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential
lot. In 1986, E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against Manacop and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. to collect indebtedness. When Manacop and his company failed to paid
their indebtedness, E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a motion for execution on the house and lot of
Manacop. It alleged that the property could not be considered a family home on the grounds that
Manacop was already living abroad and that the property, having been acquired in 1972, should
have been judicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution.In his motion for
reconsideration, Manacop contends that there was no need for him to constitute his house and lot
as a family home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a resident of the same
property from the time it was levied upon.

RULING: Yes, a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the
effectivity of the Family Code may be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home
under the provision of the Family Code.Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need
to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Here, the
residential house and lot of Manacop was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under
Article 153 of the Family Code effective August 3, 1988. Such provision does not mean that said
article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Codeand are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since Manacop incurred debt in 1987 or prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code, his property is therefore not exempt from execution.
(91) Taneo v. CA, GR 108532, March 09, 1999 [Per J. Kapunan,
First Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not a family home can be exempted from execution, forced sale or
attachment

FACTS: Pablo Taneo had two properties, a parcel of land and a family home, that was to be
levied to satisfy judgment in 1964. The properties were sold to Abdon Gilig, and became
lawfully his in 1966 after the execution of the final deed of conveyance, and failure of Pablo to
redeem the same within the reglementary period. After Pablo’s death, his heirs alleged that the
auction sale of the properties fell within the five year prohibited period for encumbrance or sale,
and alleged that the instrument extra judicially constituting the house as their family home was
registered in 1966, making it exempt from execution, forced sale, and attachment, pursuant to
Article 153 of the Family Code. They also alleged that the property land was acquired through
free patent, not subject to alienation and encumbrance for payment of debt, pursuant to Com. Act
No. 141. However, Gilig claimed that the house in question was erected on a land not registered
to Taneo, but to a Plutarco Vacalares. He also alleged that the claimed date of constitution of the
heirs of Pablo was a few years after the money judgment was given to him, not exempting the
said extra judicially formed family home from execution, forced sale, or attachment, pursuant to
Article 243 of the Civil Code.

RULING: Yes, a family home can be exempted from execution, given that none of the
circumstances under Article 243 of the Civil Code are present. In the present case, Taneo
incurred a money judgment in 1964 before the constitution of his family home in 1966;
therefore, it was not exempted from execution. Also, his claim that the family home was
governed by the Family Code, allowing the occupation of such deems the home constituted, is of
no value since it does not have any retroactive effect because the family home was constituted in
1966, governed by the Civil Code which requires the registration for constitution.
(92) Honrado v. CA, GR 166333, November 25, 2005, [Per J. Calledo
Jr., Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for the Family Home exception was proved within a
reasonable time

FACTS: Premium filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money against
Honrado. Premium sought to collect the amount of veterinary products purchased on credit by
Honrado on December 11, 2007. Spouses Honrado filed a petition for the judicial constitution of
the parcel of land in Honrado’s name located in Calamba, Laguna before the RTC of Calamba,
as their Family Home. Premium was not declared as one of his creditors and the value of the
property was not more than 240,000 pesos. On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Quezon City ruled
in favour of Premium. Honrado filed an appeal however, it was dismissed for his failure to file
his brief. Premium filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The motion was granted and
was issued. The Sheriff levied on the parcel of land and set the sale of the property at a public
auction. Honrado was given with a copy of the notice of sale but he opposed the same. The
property was sold to Premium and the Certificate of Sale was issued and Honrado failed to
redeem the property. The RTC of Calamba rendered a decision declaring the property a Family
Home on April 29, 2002. Honrado filed a motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution
under Article 155 of the Family Code. Premium opposed the motion on the grounds the Honrado
was already estopped from claiming the exemption and the redemption period to redeem the
property had lapsed.

RULING: Negative. Article 153 of the Family Code that “The family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The family
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.” It means that it cannot be
seized by creditors except in special cases. While it is true that the family home is exempt from
execution or forced sale, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later
claiming the exemption. The claim for exemption must be presented before its sale on execution
of the sheriff in which Honrado failed to do so.Hence, Honrado did not assert their claim of
exemption within a reasonable time.
(93) Arriola v. Arriola, GR 177703, January 28, 2008 [Per J.
Austria-Martinez, Third Division]
ISSUE: Can the family home be partitioned?

FACTS: On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering thepartition of the parcel
of land left by decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs JohnNabor C. Arriola, Vilma G.
Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola inequal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice
to therights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.However, the parties failed to agree on
how to divide the abovementioned property and so John Naborproposed to sell itthrough public
auction. Vilma and Anthony initially agreed but refusedto include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land because the house is considered accessory to the land on which it is
built is in effect to add to the right which has never been considered or passed upon during the
trial on the merits. The RTC excluded the subject house because John Nabor never allege its
existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof. The CA, on the
other hand, held that the deceased owned the subject land, and that he also owned the subject
house which is a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part of the estate of the
deceased and are held in co-ownership by his heirs and hence, that any decision in the action for
partition of said estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject house.

RULING: No. The subject house is covered bythe judgment of partition but in view of the
suspendedproscription imposed under Article 159 of the Family Code, thesubject house is
immediately partitioned to the heirs. Article 152 states that “The family home, constituted jointly
by the husbandand the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwellinghouse where
they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated” while Article 153 states
that”The family home isdeemed constituted on ahouse and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence”. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family homecontinues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale orattachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by
law. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as thespecific portion of the subject
land on which it stands are deemedconstituted as a family home by the deceased and Vilma from
the moment they began occupying the same as afamily residence 20 years back.According to
Article 159, the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons
therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home. The right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the
owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the house were not alleged in
the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following
the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case includes
the house which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the
principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is permanently attached thereto.
(94) Kelley v. Planters Products, Inc., GR 172263, July 9, 2008 [Per
J. Corona, First Division]
ISSUE: When does the family home exemption start to become effective?

FACTS: Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from
respondent Planters Products, Inc. in 1989. Due to Auther's failure to pay despite demand, PPI
filed an action for sum of money against him in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
57. RTC Makati City decided in favor of PPI and issued a writ of execution. Jorge A. Ragutana,
sheriff of RTC Branch 57 and a respondent in the instant case, sold on execution real property
covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga City. Kelley's party filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of levy and sale of the alleged family home with damages against Ragutana and PPI in
the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19, however, was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. Kelley's party elevated the case to the High Court in a
petition for review on certiorari contending that the real property under TCT No. 15079 is the
Kelley family home. And as such, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it
ws duly constituted as such.

RULING: Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3,
1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3,
1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution
of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged
family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant
to the Civil Code. The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly
provides for the following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred
prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises
before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
(95) Josef v. Santos, GR 165060, November 27, 2008 [Per J.Ynares-
Santiago, Third Division]
ISSUE: What is the court procedure when a family home is claimed to be exempted from
execution?

FACTS: Otelio Santos filed a case for collection of sum of money where Albino Josef failed to
pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit fromSantos on various dates in 1994. After
trial, Josef was found liable. Santos moved for issuance of a writ of execution which was
opposed by Josef but was granted by trial court. Certain personal properties subject of the writ of
execution were auctioned off. Thereafter, a real property was sold by way of public auction to
fully satisfy the judgment credit. Josef filed a petition for certiorari with CA questioning the
sheriff’s levy and sale and claimed that the personal properties did not belong to him but to his
children; and that the real property was his family home thus exempt from execution.

RULING: The Family home is a real right. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain
special cases. The trial court shouldmake an inquiry into the veracity of Josef’s claim that the
property was his family home, conduct an ocular inspection of the premises, an examination of
the title and interview of members of the community where the alleged family home is located in
order to determine if petitioner actually resided within the premises of the claimed family home.
He should also order a submission of photographs of the premises, depositions, and/or affidavits
of proper individuals/parties or a solemn examination of the petitioner, his children and other
witnesses. At the same time, Santos is given the opportunity to cross-examine and present
evidence to the contrary. If the property is accordingly found to constitute Josef’s family home,
the court should determine: a) If the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or
after, the effectivity of the Family Code; b) If petitioner’s spouse is still alive, as well as if there
are other beneficiaries of the family home; c) If the petitioner has more than one residence for
the purpose of determining which of them, if any, is his family home; and d) Its actual location
and value, for the purpose of applying the provisions of Articles 157and 160 of the Family Code.
(96) Cabang v. Basay, GR 180587, March 20, 2009 [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, Third Division]
ISSUE: Does the subject property qualify as a family home?

FACTS: Mr. and Mrs. Guillermo Basay (Basay) have been occupying Lot No. 7777,
Zamboanga Del Sur, thinking that they had been occupying Lot No. 7778 from 1956 to present.
Lot No. 7777, on the other hand, rightfully belonged to Simeon and Virginia Cabang (Cabang).
In 1992, Cabang sought legal action by filing a complaint of Recovery of Property but was
denied. Basay’s contention towards the case uses Article 153 of the Family Code that states,
“The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt as hereinafter provided and
to the extent of the value allowed by law.” The Cabang’s argument is that they are the legal
owners of Lot No. 7777 while Basay’s argue that they had been living on the said lot even before
the Cabang’s had purchased it from its original owner and had established a family home on the
property which exempts them from execution, forced sale or attachment.

RULING: No, Lot No. 7777 does not qualify as a family home. The Basay spouses had indeed
occupied the said Lot as a family residence as defined by Article 153 of the Family Code of what
constitutes as a home. However, it is stated in Article 156 (1) of the Family Code that “the family
home must be part of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive
properties of either spouse with the latter’s consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried
head of a family on his or her own property.” Lot No. 7777 is not a property of either spouse
thus, they are mere tenants that reside on the said Lot out of the Cabang’s tolerance.
(97) Benitez-Badua v. CA, GR 105625, January 24, 1994 [Per J.
Puno, Second Division]
ISSUE: Can Marissa’s filiation be impugned despite the death of Vicente?

FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties. Isabel died in 1982
while Vicente died in 1989 intestate. The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued.
Victoria and Feodor (Vicente's sister and nephew) filed for issuance of letters of administration
in favor of Feodor. They alleged that the Vicente is survived by no other heirs or relatives.
Marissa opposed the petition, claiming that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente and
capable of administering the estate. To attest that she is the only legitimate child of spouses
Vicente and Isabel, Marissa submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her Certificate
of Live Birth, (2) Baptismal Certificate, (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for
Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter and (4) School
Records. The relatives of Vicente proved through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the
biological child of the spouses who were unable to physically procreate. In fact, there is a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel executed by Vicente and Dr.
Nilo, a brother of Isabel. In this notarized document, Vicente and Dr. Nilo stated that they are the
sole heirs of Isabel because she died without descendants or ascendants.

RULING: Yes. Marissa’s affiliation can be impugned despite the death of Vicente. Article 171
of FC provides that the heirs of the husband (Vicente) may impugn the filiation of the child.
However, in this case Art. 171 of FC is inapplicable because this is not an action to impugn
legitimacy of a child (Marissa), but an action to claim the inheritance as legal heirs of the
childless Isabel and Vicente. The totality of contrary evidence presented by Vicente's sister and
nephew showed that Isabel did not become pregnant, as also testified by the witnesses and prior
to Vicente’s death, he effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of Marissa, in which he
appeared to be Marissa’s father, when he executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Isabel which did not recognize Marissa as one of the heirs. Marissa is not
the decedent's child at all, not a legal heir of Vicente. Under the law, the mere registration of a
child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Therefore,
Marissa cannot become the legal sole heir of Vicente.
(98) Mariategui v. CA, GR 57062, January 24, 1992 [Per J. Bidin,
Third Division]
ISSUE: What is the status of filiation of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina?

FACTS: Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. First, with Eusebia and
bore him four children. After Euseba’s death, Lupo contracted a second marriage with Flaviana
and begot a daughter. Lupo contracted a third marriage with Felipa and begot three chidren
namely, Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Lupo died in June 1953 without a will, leaving properties he
acquired when he was still unmarried. After Lupo’s death, his descendants from the first and
second marriage executed a deed of extrajudicial partition for themselves a certain lot of Lupo’s
estate and later the title was issued. Lupo’s children in his third marriage filed a complaint in the
lower court that they were deprived of their respective shares in Lupo’s estate although they
were co-heirs. Descendants from the first and second marriages specifically contended that the
complaint was one for the recognition of natural children with respect to the status of Lupo’s
children in his third marriage, who belatedly filed the action for recognition to prove their
successional rights over the said estate.

RULING: Children in Lupo’s third marriage are legitimate. The Civil Code provides for the
manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However, considering the effectivity of
the Family Code of the Philippines, this instant case must be decided under a new set of rules
because the parties have been overtaken by events. Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code,
there are only two classes of children, legitimate and illegitimate. Article 172 of the said Code
provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgement or by the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the legitimate affiliation of Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina. Jacinto’s birth certificate is a record of birth. In case of Julian and Paulina,
they may not have presented any evidence as required by Article 172 but they continuously
enjoyed the status of children of Lupo in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
(99) Babiera v. Catotal, GR 138493, June 15, 2000 [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division]
ISSUE: Does the action involve impugning Teofista’s legitimacy?

FACTS: Presentation B. Catotal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch
II, Iligan City, a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil
Registry of Iligan City. Presentation asserted ‘that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by ‘hilot’ in the house of
spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said spouses, Flora
Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the
child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made
Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature and that the birth certificate
contained false entries, to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/forged; c) The family name BABIERA is false and
unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother being single; d) Her real mother
was Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child; The natural father, the carpenter, did not
sign it. Teofista filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that ‘the petition states no cause of
action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of Teofista as the child of the spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa Babiera; that Presentation has no legal capacity to file the
instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.

RULING: No. Article 171 of the Family Code applies to instances in which the father impugns
the legitimacy of his wife’s child, i.e., to declare that such child is an illegitimate child, but not to
an action to establish that such child is not the wife’s child at all. Article 171 of the Family Code
is not applicable in the case of Presentation and Teofila. This provision shows that it applies to
instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges
and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to Teofista. In other words, the prayer herein is not
to declare that Teofista is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the Teofista is
not Hermogena’s child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn Teofista’s legitimacy or
filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first place. In addition to answer the motion of Teofista, an action to cancel a
person’s Birth Certificate for being allegedly void ab initio does not prescribe, and the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. The action
involves the cancellation of Teofista’s Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus,
the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the
action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
(100) Labagala v. Santiago, GR 132305, December 4, 2001 [Per J.
Quisumbing, Second Division]
ISSUE: Is Ida the daughter of Jose?

FACTS: Jose Santiago owned a property in Sta. Cruz, Manila. His sisters, Nicolasa and
Amanda, later sued him for recovery of 2/3 share of the property alleging that he had
fraudulently registered it in his name. The trial court decided in favor of his two sisters, including
their names in the certificate of title. Jose died intestate in February 1984. His sisters then filed a
complaint before the RTC for the recovery of Jose’s 1/3 share of the said property but which
came into possession of Ida Labagala. The two sisters claimed that it belongs to them by
operation of law considering that they are the only heirs of their brother and insisted that the
deed of sale as presented by Ida was forged, that Jose never put his thumbmark on documents but
always signed his name in full. On the other hand, Ida Labagala claimed that her true name is Ida
Santiago, the daughter of Jose and entitled to his share in the property. The two sisters contended
that per Ida’s birth certificate her parents are Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas. Ida asserted
that the two sisters cannot impugn her affiliation collaterally, citing that the legitimacy of a child
can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose. Ida also cited Article 263 of the
Civil Code in support of this contention that the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
shall be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Registrar, if the
husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.

RULING: Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove
that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
Ida’s legitimacy. The two sisters are not merely asserting that Ida is not a legitimate child of
Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. The present action is one for recovery of title and
possession and outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods. The Certificate of
Record of Birth plainly states that Ida was the child of spouses Leo Labagala and Cornelia
Cabrigas and is a proof of filiation of Ida. The Court of Appeals took into account that Ida was
born of different parents, as she opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her claim that
she is the daughter of Jose. Not being the child of Jose, it follows that she cannot inherit and it
now remains to be seen whether the property was validly transferred to Ida through sale or
donation.
(101) Liyao, Jr. V. Tanhoti-Liyao, GR 138961, March 7, 2002, [Per
J. de Leon, Jr., Second Division]
ISSUE: May William Liyao, Jr. impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
his supposed father, William Liyao?

FACTS: Corazon Garcia is legally married but living separately to Ramon Yulo. She alleged
that she cohabited with late William Liyao from 1965 up to William’s untimely death on
December 2, 1975. William Liyao was legally married to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao at the time of
hiscohabitation with Corazon. Corazon and deceased lived together with thecompany of
Corazon’s two children from her subsisting marriage- EnriqueYuloand Bernadette Yulo. In June
9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to a child, WilliamLiyao, Jr. It was alleged and testified by the
witnesses that William Liyao paid for all the expenses for thesubsistence of William Jr. and also
that of Corazon and her two childrenfrom her subsisting marriage during their cohabitation.
William Jr. was saidto be in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child
ofsaid William Liyao, having been recognized and acknowledged as such childby the decedent
during his lifetime. Upon the death of his alleged father,William Jr. prays that he be recognized
as an illegitimate child and an heirby the family of the deceased from his subsisting marriage.
William Liyao’slegitimate children on their part, allege that the deceased could not havefathered
Wiliam Jr. for their father and mother have never been separated.

RULING: No, William Liyao Jr. cannot impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the
estate of his supposed father. The Court cannot allow William Jr. to maintain his present petition
and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances,
his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The
child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot
choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of
legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully
defeated the presumption.
(102) Rodriguez v. CA, GR 85723, June 19, 1995 [Per J. Quiason,
First Division]
ISSUE: Can a mother testify about the identity of the putative father?

FACTS:On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought
before the Regional Trial Court by Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez. At
the trial, the Alarito presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course
of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the Alarito’s father
but Bienvenido’s counsel raised a timely objection which the court sustained.The dispute was
created because Rodriguez contented that Felicitas should not be allowed to reveal the name of
the father of Clarito because such was prohibited by Article 280 of the Civil Code. Clarito
argued that his mother should be allowed to testify on the identity of his father pursuant to
Paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code and Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rule of
Court.

RULING: Yes, a mother can testify about the identity of the putative father as provided in the
Article 172 of the Family Code which now allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in
the same way on the same evidence as legitimate children. The said article adopts the rule in
Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that filiation may be proven by “any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father.”
(103) Solinap v. Locsin, GR 146737, December 4, 2001 [Per J.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not photographs can constitute proof of filiation

FACTS: Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters
of Administration praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late
Juan Locsin Sr, who died intestate on December 11, 1990. He alleged that that he is the only
surviving legal heir of the deceased. To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of the intestate estate,
Juan, Jr submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 and also offered in
evidence a photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, Juan, Jr claims, shows that he and his
mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased.

RULING: No. Photograph of any person near the coffin of the deceased cannot and will not
constitute proof of filiation. If it can, then we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that
would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while
standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the
deceased. Here, Juan Jr’s photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation.
(104) Heirs of Cabais v. CA, GR 106314-15, October 8, 1999 [Per J.
Purisima Third Division]
ISSUE: Can a baptismal certificate serve as proof of filiation?

FACTS: Pedro Cabais (Pedro) inherited a property from his grandmother Eustaquia Cañeta
(Eustaquia) by right of representation. Because his mother Felipa Cañeta Buesa (Felipa), who
was the only daughter of Eustaquia, predeceased the latter, he became the only legal heir of
Eustaquia. When Pedro adjudicated the property, the Heirs of Cañeta, who claim to be co-owners
of the property, filed a complaint for partition and accounting against him. When Pedro later died
during the pendency of the case, a civil action between his legal heirs (Heirs of Cabais) and the
Heirs of Cañeta ensued. The Heirs of Cañeta assailed the filiation of Felipa to Eustaquia.
According to them, the baptismal certificate of Felipa states that she was born on September 13,
1899, while the baptismal certificate of Gregoria Cañeta, the supposed mother of Felipa,
indicated that Gregoria was born on May 9, 1898, or only a little more than one year ahead of her
alleged daughter. The Heirs of Cabais countered that the reliance on the Baptismal Certificate of
Felipa C. Buesa to establish the parentage and filiation of Pedro Cabais is incorrect and has no
legal basis.

RULING: A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation
and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such
public document. On the contrary, a baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being
hearsay, is not a conclusive proof of filiation. It does not have the same probative value as a
record of birth, an official or public document. In Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this
Court declared that a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein
statedwith respect to his kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism administered,
according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but itdoes
not prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate concerning
the relationship of the person baptized. It is indispensable that such declarations and statements
are shown by proof recognized by law.
(105) Cenido v. Apacionado, GR 132474, November 19, 1999 [Per J.
Puno, First Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Cenido is the son of Bonifacio

FACTS: Spouses AmadeoApacionado and Herminia Sta. Ana filed with the Rizal RTC a
complaint against Renato Cenido for, “Declaration of Ownership, Nullity, with Damages” for a
parcel of land in Binangonan, Rizal which the spouses allegedly owned by purchase from its
previous owner, BonifacioAparato, whom they took care until death. Cenido, who filed an earlier
ejectment case against the spouses which was dismissed, claims that he is the illegitimate son of
the deceased owner of the property and as the sole surviving heir, he became the owner of the
property. This is evidenced by the tax declaration in his name and was confirmed by the
Binangonan MTC in a compromise agreement between him and the deceased’s brother as co -
heirs. The spouses replied that: (1) Cenido is not the illegitimate son of Bonifacio, Cenido’s
claim of paternity being spurious; (2) the ownership of the property was not the proper subject in
the case before the MTC, nor were the spouses parties in said case. The trial court upheld
Cenido’s ownership over the property by virtue of the recognition made by Bonifacio’s then
surviving brother, Gavino, in the compromise judgment of the MTC. The court also did not
sustain the deed of sale between Bonifacio and the spouses because it was neither notarized nor
signed by Bonifacio and was intrinsically defective. The CA reversed the decision of the trial
court and held among others that the recognition of Cenido’s filiation by Gavino, Bonifacio’s
brother, did not comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the Family Code.

RULING: No, Renato Cenido is not the son of Bonifacio. Cenido did not present any record of
birth, will or any authentic writing to show he was voluntarily recognized by Bonifacio as his
illegitimate son. In fact, Cedino admitted on the witness stand that he had no document to prove
Bonifacio’s recognition, much less his filiation. The voluntary recognition of Cedino’s filiation
by Bonifacio’s brother before the MTC does not qualify as a “statement in a court of record”.
Under the law, this statement must be made personally by the parent himself or herself, not by
any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary
declaration by the parent, or if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity
or maternity of children born outside wedlock.
(106) Tijing v. CA, GR 125901, July 19, 2001 [Per J. Quisumbing,
Second Division]
ISSUE: To whom does the boy belong to?

FACTS: On August 1989, Angelita Diamante allegedly went to the house of Bienvenida Tijing
to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida had another errand to make, she asked
Angelita to wait for her return and leaving her 4-month old son, Edgardo Jr., under the care of
Angelita. When Bienvenida returned, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr. were gone. Bienvenida, together
with her husband, Edgardo Tijing Sr., made serious efforts locating their child for four (4) years
but saw no traces of his whereabouts. In October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid the death of
Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita, whose remains were lying in Bulacan. She
immediately went to the wake where she saw her son, Edgardo Jr., who was now renamed as
John Thomas Lopez. Spouses Tijingfiled a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their
son from Angelita. They also presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. According to
Benjamin, the brother of the late Tomas Lopez, Tomas admitted that the boy was only an
adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children. Angelita, on the other hand,
maintained that she is the natural mother of the boy and asserted that she gave birth to him at a
clinic in Manila and the said birth of Thomas Lopez was registered by her common-law husband,
Tomas Lopez.

RULING: The boy, Edgardo Jr. who was later renamed as John Thomas Lopez, belongs to the
spouses Tijing. There was an evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children as she
admitted that in 1970, she underwent ligation. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child
and clinical records were not presented. Also, it was unusual that the birth certificate of the boy
was registered by Tomas Lopez where in fact, under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry
Law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration. It
was observed that Bienvenida and the boy had strong facial similarities. Resemblance between a
minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lourdes
Vasquez who assisted in Bienvenida’s giving birth to the boy, gave testimony and presented
clinical records. Therefore, it was clear that Edgardo Jr. is indeed the son of the spouses Tijing.
(107) Estate of Ong v. Diaz, GR 171713, December 17, 2007 [Per
J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]
ISSUE: Will Rogelio’s death bar the conduct of DNA testing?

FACTS: In the initial case filed by minor Joanne Diaz, represented by her mother Jinky Diaz,
the Trial Court declared the former as the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong. Said decision was
appealed by Ong with the CA; However, while the case was on appeal, Ong died and was
substituted by his Estate. The CA later on ruled to have the case remanded and ordered to subject
Joanne to DNA testing in order to prove her Filiation with Ong. This order is being attacked by
the Estate, on the grounds that DNA testing is not anymore possible because Rogelio is already
deceased. Joanne did not argue against being subjected to the DNA testing.

RULING: No, Rogelio’s death will not bar the conduct of DNA testing. Section 4(a) of the New
Rules of Court provides that any appropriate Court may order a DNA testing once it is shown
that a biological sample exists that is relevant to the case. Here, the Court believes that
appropriate biological sample from Rogelio is still available. Hence, the Court ruled to push
through with the DNA testing.
(108) Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., GR 177066, September 11, 2009[Per J.
Nachura, Third Division]
ISSUE: Is Joselito son of Carlos?

FACTS: Carlos Puno (Carlos), who was an incorporator of Puno Enterprises, Inc. (PEI) died
intestate. Joselito Puno (Joselito), who claims to be the heir of Carlos, filed a complaint for
specific performance against PEI. He demands that PEI should allow him to inspect its corporate
book, render an accounting of all transaction, and give all the profits, earnings, dividends, or
income relating to Carlos’ shares. PEI, however, questions Joselito’s legal personality to sue
because his surname in the birth certificate appears as “Muno” instead of “Puno.”Joselito later on
presented the corrected certificate. But the Court of Appeals held that Carlos was not able to
establish the paternity and filiation to Carlos because the birth certificate he presented was
prepared without the intervention and participatory acknowledgment of Carlos.

RULING: No, Joselito failed to prove his filiation to Carlos. A certificate of live birth
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar
has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third
person. As for the baptismal certificate, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s
paternity.
(109) Tonog v. CA, G.R. 122906, February 7, 2002 [Per J. De Leon,
Second Division]
ISSUE: May the father be given custody of a child below 7 years of age?

FACTS: Gardin Faith is the illegitimate child of Dinah B. Tonog and Edgar V. Daguimol who
was born on September 23, 1989. A year after the child’s birth, Tonog left for abroad leaving
Gardin Faith in the care of her father, Daguimol and paternal grandparents. On January 10, 1992,
Daguimol filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith and was appointed guardian of the
child. When Tonog filed a petition for relief from judgment, the RTC set aside its original
judgment and allowed Tonog to file her opposition. Tonog moved to remand custody of Gardin
Faith to her. The same was granted by the RTC. In a petition for certiorari filed by Daguimol, the
CA gave custody of Gardin Faith to him with whom the said child had been living since birth.
Tonog contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of
law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the
mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she
had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears
that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.

RULING: Yes, here in this case, the topic being discussed is the temporary custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith, as to who should have final custody. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the
said minor as the controlling factor, it was held that the appellate court did not err in allowing her
father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. It was also stated that the child should
not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings and thrust into a strange environment away from
the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. In deciding over
custody towards minors, the most important factor is the welfare and well-being of the child.
Although it is stated in Article 213 of the Family code that no child should be separated from the
mother, a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age
for compelling reasons.
(110) Aruego v. CA, GR 112193, March 13, 1996 [Per J.
Hermosisima, Jr., First Division]
ISSUE: Can Antonia file for compulsory recognition despite the death of the putative father?

FACTS: The late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M.
Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born
Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963,
respectively. The complaint filed sought for an Order praying that Antonia and Evelyn be
declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr; that Jose E. Aruego, Jr.
and the children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres be compelled to recognize and acknowledge
them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation
in the estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. Jose M.
Aruego, Sr., acknowledged and recognized Antonia and Evelyn as his children verbally among
them and their mother’s family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, such as,
regular support and educational expenses; allowance to use his surname; payment of maternal
bills; payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein; taking them to restaurants and
department stores on occasions of family rejoicing; attendance to school problems of Antonia’s
party; calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then; introducing them as such
children to family friends.

RULING: The action brought by Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement
of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed
by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The
present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its
application will prejudice the vested right of Antonia to have her case decided under Article 285
of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the
regime of the Civil Code. The action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was
brought when the putative father was already deceased, since Antonia was then still a minor
when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint,
never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the
Family Code of the Philippines.
(111) Dela Cruz v. Gracia, GR 177728, July 31, 2009 [Per J. Carpio-
Morales, Second Division]
ISSUE: Can the unsigned autobiography establish proof of filiation?

FACTS: Jenie was denied the registration of her child’s birth because the document attached to
the Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled Autobiography “did not include
the signature of the deceased father”, and because the child was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity
to the child. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the
unsigned handwritten biography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.

RULING: Yes. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate
child to use the surname of his or her father if the latter had previously recognized him or her as
his offspring through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. However,
there are special circumstances existing to hold that Dominique’s autobiography, though
unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. First, Dominique died about
two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial
evidence Jenie offered. Third, Jenies testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgement of Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph
Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the registration of the questioned
recognition of the child. These circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give
life to his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is MY WIFE as WE FELL
IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER. It is thus the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on investigation of the
paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children. In view of the
pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: 1)
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and 2) Where private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have
been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence. The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. In the eyes of society, a child
with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to the minor child’s best interests to
allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth
certificate.
(112) Uy v. Chua, GR 183965, September 18, 2009 [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, J., Third Division]
ISSUE: Is Compromise Agreement entered into by Joanie and Jose valid?

FACTS: A compromise agreement was entered into by Joanie SurposaUy and Jose Chua
intended to settle the question of Joanie’s status and filiation, whether or not she is an
illegitimate child of Jose Chua. In exchange for Joanie’s and her brother Allan acknowledging
that they are not the children of Jose, Jose would pay them PhP 2,000,000 each. It also
mentioned in the agreement that the siblings should waive away their rights for future support
and legitimates as an illegitimate child of Jose. RTC, Branch 9, approved said agreement.
However, Uy, filed a petition to oppose the approved agreement and argued that questions on the
civil status, future support and future legitime cannot be subject to compromise. Chua however
argued that the decision of Branch 9, having attained finality, is beyond review, reversal or
alteration by another Regional Trial Court.

RULING: No. Under Article 2035 of the Civil Code, there shall be no compromise upon the
questions of civil status of persons. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Also, in the
jurisprudence of Advincula v Advincula case, the court ruled that a person’s civil status is not
subject for compromise. Here, the Compromise Agreement between Uy and Chua, intended to
settle the question of status and filiation, whether she is an illegitimate child of Jose Chua. The
Compromise Agreement is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the compromise agreement is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no
obligations.
(113) Republic v. Vergara, GR 95551, March 20, 1997 [Per J.
Romero, Second Division]
ISSUE: Are Samuel and Rosalina qualified to adopt Maricel and Alvin?

FACTS: Spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr, American citizen, and Rosalina Due Dye, a naturalized
American citizen wanted to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old,
respectively, who are younger siblings of Rosalina. The natural parents of Maricel and Alvin
consented to the adoption. The adoption was affirmed by the RTC of Angeles City disregarding
the sixteen-years age gap requirement of the law and the spouses were granted the right to adopt
the two because it will promote the welfare of the child. The court also found the spouses are
mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial capability
and love and affection for the adoptees. However, the Republic filed a petition questioning the
validity of the adoption. The Republic stated that under Article 184 of the Family Code, aliens
cannot adopt Filipino citizens.

RULING: No, Samuel and Rosalina are not qualified to adopt Maricel and Alvin since as per
Article 184 of the Family Code, aliens cannot adopt Filipino Citizens. Pursuant to this article of
the Family Code which states that, an alien cannot adopt Filipino Citizens except, (1) Former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (2) One who seeks to adopt the
legitimate child of his or her Filipino Spouse; (3) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not
mentioned in the exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
intercountry adoption as may be provided by law. Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an alien is
disqualified because he does not fall under the three exceptions laid down by law. On the other
hand, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by
husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of the Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child
and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may jointly
adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint adaption
and made the joint character mandatory. Article 185 of the Family Code provides for the
exceptions to the joint adoption rule as mentioned in the following cases, (1) When one spouse
seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of the other. None of the exceptions mentioned applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did
not petition to adopt the latter’s child but her brother and sister.
(114) Republic v. Toledano GR 94147, June 8, 1994 [Per J. Puno,
Second Division]
ISSUE: The question that must be answered in this case is “Can Alvin and Evelyn adopt
Joseph?”

FACTS: On February 21, 1990 spouses Alvin Clouse who is a natural born US citizen and
Evelyn Clouse a former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen on August 9, 1988 filed a
petition in the RTC of IbaZambales to adopt a minor named Joseph Alcala.He is Evelyn’s
younger brother, and since 1981, to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 to 1994, Joseph had been
under the care of the adopting spouses. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, consented to the
adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. On June 20, 1990, the court
allowed spouses Alvin Clouse and Evelyn Clouse to adopt Joseph Alcala. The state, through the
Office of the Solicitor General claimed that the adoption shouldn’t have been allowed to take
place.Using Articles 184 and 185 of the Family Code as basis, the OSG contended that the
petition for adoption should not have been granted, because Alvin and Evelyn Clouse were not
qualified to adopt under Philippine law. Furthermore, Alvin Clouse was a natural born US
citizen, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of
his spouse, hence Alvin is not qualified to make the adoption. Evelyn Clouse, on the otherhand,
though a former Filipino citizen, needs her husband to qualify in order for them to jointly adopt
Joseph Alcala.

RULING: Under Art. 184 of the Family Code, paragraph 3 enumerates the exceptions in which
an alien would be able to adopt a Filipino minor. Alvin Clouse who is a natural born US citizen
doesn’t belong to any of the three exceptions, although Evelyn on the other hand qualifies to the
exception as a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Allowing
them to adopt Joseph Alcala would be in violation of Art. 185 of the same code which mandates
a joint adoption between the husband and wife.
(115) Republic v. CA and Bobiles, GR 92326, January 24, 1992 [Per
J. Regalado, Second Division]
ISSUE: Can Zenaida adopt without being joined by her husband?

FACTS: Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living
with her family since 4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker
assigned was served with copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and
substance. The copy was also posted on the bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to
oppose the petition. The judgment declared that surname of the Jason to be changed to
“Bobiles”. The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and
Youth Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them.
After the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in
Court of Appeals, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory.

RULING: Yes. The petition for adoption of Zenaida was filed when the law applicable was PD
603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or
both of them. After the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending
on appeal in CA, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory.
Nonjoinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family
Code will have retroactive application if it will prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida
filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force
at that time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be dismissed by
reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time. Furthermore, the
affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting
Jason. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to
make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings.
(116) Republic v. CA, GR 97906, May 21, 1992 [Per J. Regalado,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Can Maximo use the surname of his biological parents after being adopted?

FACTS: Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr., and Segundina Y. Alcala.
When he was two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister
Margaret Alcala, was then 9 years old, they were – with the consent of their natural parents and
by order of the court – adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both
naturalized Filipinos. Thenceforth, Maximo Alcala, Jr. acquired Wong as his family name. Upon
reaching the age of 22, Maximo filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was
averred that his use of the surname Wong (1) embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives
and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim
Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and (2) he wants to erase any implication whatsoever
of alien nationality; that (3) he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering
his business and social life; and that (4) his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert
to his former surname. The Republic, through the Solicitor General, contends that Maximo’s
allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated; that it was
crass ingratitude to the memory of his adoptive father and to his adoptive mother who is still
alive, despite her consent.

RULING: Yes, Maximo can use the surname of his biological parents after being adopted.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that
the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of
adoption proceedings. The Court decision in Calderon v. Republic must be upheld as it states
that, “The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name as contemplated by the provisions of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and
to provide his best interest.” Furthermore, in Uy v. Republic, it is held that, “It has been held that
in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only hamper(s) social and business life, is
a proper and reasonable cause for change of name.” It bears stressing at this point that to justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.” In the case
above, it is sufficing to say that Maximo qualifies to change his family name by virtue of his
reasons.
(117) Cang v. CA, GR 105308, September 25, 1998 [Per J. Romero,
Third Division]
ISSUE: Is Herbert’s consent required before the adoption can proceed?

FACTS: Spouses Clavano was granted the petition to adopt the children of Herbert and Anna
Marie Cang. The petition was filed with the written consent of the mother who has custody of the
children by virtue of the legal separation the Cangs’ obtained. Further, it was alleged that Herbert
had already abandoned his children when he went abroad and secured a divorce decree
therein.Subsequently, Herbert opposed the grant of adoption of his children to Spouses Clavano
claiming it was granted without his consent. Herbert denied the allegation that he had abandoned
his children, claiming he had been sending monthly support and regularly communicated with
his children.

RULING: Yes. Under Art. 31 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the written consent of the
natural parents is required for the validity of the adoption. Although such requirement is not
absolute, as it may be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or such parent is
insane or hopelessly intemperate. In such a case, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case
even without the written consent of the parents.In adoption cases, abandonment connotes any
conduct on the part of the parent to forego parental duties and relinquish parental claims to the
child, or the neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations which parents owe
their children, or the withholding of the parents presence, his care and the opportunity to display
voluntary affection. In this case, abandonment was not proven as Herbert was regularly
communicating with his children and still provided support even when he was abroad. Further,
the transfer of custody to the mother did not deprive Herbert parental authority for purposes of
placing the children for adoption. Hence, as the natural father of the children, his consent is
required before the adoption can proceed.
(118) Lahom v. Sibulo, GR 143989, July 14, 2003 [Per J. Vitug, First
Division]
ISSUE: Can the adopters rescind Melvin’s adoption?

FACTS: Spouses Dr. DiosdadoLahom and IsabelitaLahom took into their care and brought up as
their own, Melvin Sibulo. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and
support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to
file a petition for adoption. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. A sad turn of events came many
years later. Eventually, in December 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption before the RTC of Naga City. In Mrs. Lahom’s petition, she averred that
despite their pleadings, Melvin refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom. Melvin
continued using Sibulo in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice of his
profession. Aside from this, Mrs. Lahom yearned for the care and show of concern from a son,
but Melvin remained indifferent and would only come home to Naga to see her once a year. On
the other hand, Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a)
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that Ms. Lahom had no cause of
action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. 8552.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the
law governing at the time the petition was filed. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. 8552
that Mrs. Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the
new law, had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the
Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the
Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated
by petitioner after R.A. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. It is still,
noteworthy however, that an adopter while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can
always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child.
(119) In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle and Michael Jide P.
Lim, GR 168992-93, May 21, 2009
ISSUE: Whether or not Monina, who has remarried, can singly adopt

FACTS: Monina Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Michelle P. Lim and Michael Lim, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by certain Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have
a child, Monina and Primo registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s
parents. The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately,
on November 28, 1998, Primo died. On December 27, 2000, Monica married Angel Olario, an
American citizen, thereafter, Monina decided to adopt the children by availing if the amnesty
given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on April 24,
2002, Monina filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael. Monina contends
that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to
protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. She argues that joint
parental authority is not necessary in the case since, at the time the petition were filed, Michelle
was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental
authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of
majority.

RULING: No. The Supreme Court ruled that at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
Monina had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. The Family Code explicitly states that the husband and wife shall jointly adopt
except: (I) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son or daughter of the other or (II) if one
spouse seeks to adopt his or her own illegitimate son or daughter. Provided, however, that the
other spouse has signified his or her consent thereto; or (III) if the spouses are legally separated
from each other. The use of the word “shall” in the provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority
over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The law is clear. Monina,
having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Neither
does Monina fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to
be adopted are not the legitimate children of Monina or husband Olario. Second, the children are
not the illegitimate children of Monina. And third, Monina and Olario are not legally separated
from each other. Monina contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since
the children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well- being.
The father and mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. Even the remarriage of surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of
the children.
(120) David v. CA. GR 111180, November 16, 1995 [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Can Ramon condition the grant of support on the award of custody to him?

FACTS: Ramon Villar, a married businessman, had three children with her secretary, Daisie
David. Their relationship developed into an intimate one, as a result, Christopher was born on
March 9, 1985. Christopher was by two more children, Christine and Cathy Mae. During the
Summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher, six years of age, to go with his family
to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he
had enrolled Christopher at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30,
1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher. Ramon had observed his
son to be physically weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and
amenities he was accustomed to. He prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he
can provide him with the proper care and education.

RULING: No, Ramon should not use the conditioned to grant the support to his children with
Daisie unless he has the award of custody over Christopher. Under Article 204 of the Family
Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance
fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is
entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto." Here it is
justified by the fact that Ramon has expressed willingness to support the minor child. Hence,
order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the
child.
(121) Gan v. Reyes, GR 145527, May 28, 2002 [Bellosillo, J., Second
Division]
ISSUE: If the birth certificates that the father is “unknown”, will it be a bar to a claim for
support? If the defendant denies paternity, can the court order support pendent elite?

FACTS: In order to support an alleged love child, Augustus Caezar C. Gan is demanded by
Bernadette Pondevida for support. Gan denied paternity and moved to dismiss the petition for
having no cause of action. His motion was denied by Trial Court. Gan filed an answer after the
reglementary period in which RTC rendered judgment ordering Gan to recognize the daughter of
Bernadette as his illegitimate child and support her. Trial court issued a writ of execution for
immediate need of schooling. Gan appealed to the CA with prohibition and certiorari because the
judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality. He averred that the writ of execution
was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Augustus Gan
insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an
exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further argued that he shouldn’t immediately
provide for the child because “in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the
child’s mother would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of adulterous relations
for, in such case, it would not be the child of the defendant and therefore not entitled to support”.
He further argued that DNA testing should be allowed to prove paternity

RULING: No. In this case, the Court applied the legal maxim of Absoluta Sententia Expositore
Non Indiget and reminded Augustus Gan that the plain words of the statute does not need further
explanation. The court cannot wait for the result of the paternity in all cases involving a child, his
interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns because if it had to wait the final
judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have
missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. It will not bar to a claim for support for
Francheska. Furthermore, the court can still order support pendente lite. Section 4, Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for
support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the
general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgement and
that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid
provision peremptorily calls for the immediate execution of all judgements for support and
makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not.
To consider Augustus’ argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of
a judgement would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate
execution.
(122) De Asis v. CA, GR 127578, February 15, 1999 [Per J.
Purisima, Second Division]
ISSUE: Does the dismissal of the prior complaint for maintenance and support filed by Glen’s
mother bar Glen from claiming for support?

FACTS: Vircel Andres, as legal guardian of the minor, Glen de Asis, filed an action for
maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis. Both parties agreed to move for the dismissal
of the complaint after Manuel denied his paternity over the minor and stipulated that he will not
pursue a counterclaim. After the complaint was dismissed, another one was brought against
Manuel. The latter moved for its dismissal on the ground of res judicata, claiming that such
complaint is barred by the judgment dismissing the prior case. The CA ruled that res judicata is
inapplicable in an action for support because waiver of future support is prohibited by law.

RULING: No, the dismissal of the prior complaint did not bar Glen from claiming for support.
Art. 301 and 2035 of the Civil Code prohibits the renunciation or waiver of future support. The
Court held that the agreement between Vircel and Manuel for the dismissal of the complaint
conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which
cannot be countenanced. Here, the agreement between the parties in the first case violates the
prohibition on any kind of compromise for future support. Hence, the second action for support
may prosper.
(123) People v. Magtibay, GR 142985, August 6, 2002 [Per J.
Ynares-Santiago, First Division]
ISSUE: Can a person convicted of rape be ordered to support the victim’s child?

FACTS: On September 15, 1997 in the province of Oriental Mindoro, Rachel Recto was buying
some ice and cigarette from a sari-sari store when Raymundo Magtibay who is just standing at
the store has kept staring at her. On her way home, Magtibay approached her, covered her
mouth, pulled her hand and brought her on a grassy place and eventually raped her. However,
she was unable to resist the sexual advances because of fear for her life. Out of fear to be killed,
she concealed the incident but only revealed it when she was already eight months pregnant. In
defense, Magtibay asserts that he was sick and bedridden due to influenza from September 14 to
September 19 of the same year. Merlyn Magtibay, wife of Raymundo Magtibay corroborated his
testimony that he was ill at the time of the alleged rape and could hardly stand due to
influenza,and recovered only on September 19. Moreover, Remuel Gallos also testified that
Magtibay was his tricycle driver since 1996 and on September 15 he went to his house to ask
him to drive his tricyclebut he found him lying in his bed and suffering from influenza. Magtibay
also appealed that Recto had an implausible and rehearsed testimony where her answers were
coached and supplied by her counsel and mother. However, there was no evidence that Recto’s
vision of her rapist was obstructed or that she was unconscious at the time of the rape and
according to her mother she was never romantically involved with any man before the crime
took place. In fact, Recto knew Magtibay as her barriomate whom she often sees. Thus, the
identification of her rapist becomes quite an easy task. Therefore, Magtibay was still found guilty
of rape.

RULING: A person convicted of rape can be ordered to support his victim’s child.In the
acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a)
Indemnification; b) Acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from
so doing; c) And in every case to support the offspring. Since the parental authority is vested by
Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that the accused who is guilty
of the crime of rape, and was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua, the accused shall automatically
loses parental authority over his son. Hence, he should only be ordered to indemnify and support
his victim’s child born out of rape. However, the amount and terms of support shall be
determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the
Family Code which shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the
necessities of the recipient.
(124) Sy v. CA, G.R. No. 124518, December 27, 2007 [Per J. Tinga,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not support can be awarded despite not being pleaded in the complaint

FACTS: On January 19, 1994, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against
Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial Court. Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering
Wilson to produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court and that after
hearing, their case and custody be awarded to her as their mother. In his answer, Wilson prayed
that the custody of the minors be awarded to him instead. Sy maintained that Mercedes was unfit
to take custody of the minors. Wilson adduced the following reasons: first, Wilson abandoned
Mercedes and their family in 1992; second, Mercedes is mentally unstable; and third, Mercedes
cannot provide proper care to the children. He was questioned about his sources of income for
the purpose of determining his ability to give support. Neither did he produce income tax returns
or other competent evidence, although within his power to do so, to provide a fair indication of
his resources. The Court further orders the respondent to pay by way of monthly support for the
minors, the amount of ₱50,000.00 payable to petitioner from date of judgment for failure on the
part of respondent to show by preponderance of evidence that the petitioner is unfit to the
custody of the minor children who are only 6 and 4 years old.

RULING: Yes, support can be awarded despite not being pleaded in the complaint because
pursuant to Section 5 (Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence) under
Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that “when issues not raised by the
pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, but failure to amend does not effect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and
shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of
substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
amendment to be made.” Since the issue of support was tried with the implied consent of the
parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And since
there was implied consent, even if no motion had been filed and no amendment had been
ordered, the Court holds that the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the issue.
(125) Lacson v. Lacson, GR 150644, August 28, 2006 [Per J. Garcia,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Is Edward liable to support the arrears?

FACTS: Edward Lacson (Edward) and Lea Lacson (Lea) are the parents of Maowee Daban
Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson. For unknown reason, Edward left their conjugal home
thereby leaving Lea to fend for their children. Lea did not badger Edward for support, relying
initially on his commitment in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters.
However, aside from occasional giving of some amount, Edward failed to fulfill his promise. In
1995, Lea instituted an action for support in behalf of their daughters. In the complaint, they
averred that Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable
lands, has not provided them support since 1976. The court granted support in arrears from 1976
to 1994. Edward, relying in Article 203, argues that he should not be made liable to support in
arrears from 1976 to 1994 because Lea did not formally demand support from him. The support
should only start in 1995 when the case was filed.

RULING: Yes, Edward is liable to support the arrears. Edward cannot evade his responsibility
to give support to his daughters simply because Lea did not make a formal demand from him.
The requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that
Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the
imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would
pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to
support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a
request or a plea.
(126) Mangonon v. CA, GR 125041, June 30, 2006, [Per J. Chico-
Nazario, First Division]
ISSUE: Is Francisco liable to pay support for Rica and Rina even though Belen and Federico are
still alive?

FACTS: Belen Mangonon seeks to modify the decisions of the RTC and CA granting support
pendente lite to her twin daughters, Rica and Rina, the amount of P 5,000 each to be given by
their father, Federico. Mangonon initially filed the claim with the RTC in order to support her
daughters’ college studies in the US, which would amount to around $22,000 USD each.
Mangonon claims that since she and her ex-husband Federico does not have the financial
capacity to provide such amount, the twins’ grandfather, Francisco, should help in providing
financial support to the twins pursuant to Art. 199 of the Family Code. Francisco however,
counter argues that the responsibility to provide support under Art. 199 initially falls to the
spouse. As such, the decisions of the RTC and CA in ordering Federico to pay P 5,000 each to
support Rica and Rina is only proper and relieves Francisco from liability.

RULING: Francisco is liable to pay support for Rica and Rina, despite their parents being alive
pursuant to Art. 199 of the Family Code. Such article provides that when two or more persons
are obliged to give support, the liability will fall in the order provided: the spouse, the
descendants to the nearest degree, the ascendants to the nearest degree, and the brothers and
sisters. The purpose of the enumeration provided in Art. 199 is to call upon the remote relatives
to provide support in case those more closely related to the recipients do not have the means to
do so. In this case, it has been proven before the Court that Mangonon and Federico do not have
the financial capacity to support the twins’ studies. Thus, Francisco, having been proven as the
twins’ paternal grandfather, and with enough capacity to provide financial support, was ordered
to shoulder half the educational expenses of both Rica and Rina.
(127) Lim v. Lim, GR 163209, October 30, 2009 [Per J. Carpio,
Third Division]
ISSUE: Can the grandparents elect to maintain Cheryl and the children at their Makati
residence?

FACTS: In 1979, Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward) son of Prudencio and
Filomena Lim. Cheryl and Edward have three children, namely, Lester, Candice and Mariano.
They resided at the house in Forbes Park. Edwards family business provided him with a monthly
salary of P6,000, and shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl has no steady source of income.
On October 14, 1990, Cheryl abandoned their residence bringing her children, after a violent
confrontation whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak, the ailing grandmother
of Edward. Cheryl filed a petition in the court suing for support. The trial court rendered
judgement ordering Edward and his grandparents to jointly provide P40,000 monthly support to
Cheryl and children. The grandparents protested that they have no obligation to give support to
their grandchildren that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, that
Cheryl and Edward are still alive. But the court ruled that the inability of Edward and Cheryl to
provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligations to the ascendants in the neared
degree. With this decision they want to avail the option on Article 204 provides that “ the person
obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfil the obligations either by paying the
allowance fixed or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a
right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case a moral or legal
obstacle thereto”.

RULING: No. The grandparents cannot avail the option to maintain Cheryl and children at their
Makati residence due to the acts of Edward. Living together with Edward and his grandparent is
not morally acceptable for Cheryl. Under Article 204, “The latter alternative cannot be availed of
in case a moral or legal obstacle thereto”. Hence, in this case the option is not available for it will
force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity. While
not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl’s charge against Edward for
concubinage did not prosper for insufficient cause, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence
amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of
Article 204 precluding its application.
(128) Santos, Sr. v. CA, GR 113054, March 16, 1995 [Per J. Romero,
Third Division]
ISSUE: Does being a soldier bar the father from having custody of Leouel?

FACTS: Leouel Santos, Sr. an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession were
married in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born on July 18,
1987. From the time their son was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had
been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Julia left
for the United States to work while Leuoel Dr. was deployed in different places to work as a
soldier. Thereafter, Leouel Sr, is not aware of his wife’s whereabouts and his efforts to locate her
in the United States proved futile but the spouses Bedia claimed that though their daughter is in
abroad, she has been sending financial support to them for her son. Sometime in 1990, Leuoel Sr.
along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where his son was staying. The spouses
Bedia contend that through deceit and false pretentions, Leouel Sr. abducted his son and
clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in, Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses
Bedia then filed a “Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.,”
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City and the petition was awarded. The spouses Bedia
aver that they can provide an air-conditioned room for the boy and that Leouel Sr. as a father
would not be in a position to take care of his son since he has to be assigned to different places.
They also alleged that Leouel Sr. did not give even a single centavo for support and maintenance
of his son. When the boy was about to be released from the hospital, they were the ones who
paid the fees because their daughter entrusted the boy to them before she left for the United
States. They also argue that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his child’s
custody, ultimately the primary consideration is what is best for the happiness and welfare of the
latter. As maternal grandparents who have amply demonstrated their love and affection for the
boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the best position to promote the child’s welfare.

RULING: NO, under 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents
is proper when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. So many men in uniform who are
assigns to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians
of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody over their
children, merely because of the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as
temporary separation from their families. And awarding to father the custody would help
enhance the bond between parent and son, It would also give the father a chance to prove his
love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a father can give. In
this case, Leouel Sr. is still alive andhis being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him
custody over his son. The grandparents failed to prove and showed no evidence that Leouel Sr. is
unfit and unsuitable to be allowed to have custody of his son Leouel Santos, Jr..
(129) Perez v. CA, GR 118870, March 29, 1996 [Per J. Romero,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Is Nerissa capable to have custody of Ray II?

FACTS: Nerissa Perez, a nurse and a mother of a newborn baby boy, Ray Perez II, arrived from
the US a few months after giving birth. After her five-week vacation ended, she went back again
to New York in pursuit of her career as a nurse leaving alone the toddler on his husband’s care.
Her absence soured the relationship with her husband Ray, which has worsened as time goes by.
With the intention of taking her son in the US, Nerissa came back few days before her son’s first
birthday. Unfortunately, her husband opposes the idea and insists on the custody of the child.
Nerissa was left with no other choice but to seek the help of the court. Thereafter, she filed a
petition for habeas corpus against her husband requiring him to surrender their child, Ray II to
her that was granted in consonance with Article 213 of the FC granting the custody of a child of
having less than 7 years of age to the mother unless she is unfit. Unconvinced, Ray appealed to
CA, which decided in favor of Ray in the grounds that Nerissa has no permanent place of work
in the USA, values her career more than her family and her long shifts at work interfere towards
her adequate attendance with her son.

RULING: Yes, Nerissa is qualified as a custodian. The court is correct in citing Article 213 of
the FC as basis of the decision. Furthermore, the court recognized the contentions of the CA as
unreasonable and unwarranted. First, her profession as a nurse is very much in demand in the
USA thus employment difficulty is not an issue. Second, her twelvehour shift is not a grave issue
as she can avail the services of a babysitter, her mother or entrust her son to a daycare center,
which is a common practice for working moms abroad. Through experience, the practice does
not deter the mother from raising her family well. Lastly, the intentions of Nerissa in deciding to
work abroad is to provide her family a better life as supported by the constructed family house in
Mandaue. Thus, the custody was awarded to Nerissa as rightful custodian.
(130) Silva v. CA, G.R. 114742, July 17, 1997 [Per J. Vitug, First
Division]

ISSUE: Is Carlitos entitled to custodial rights over Ramon and Rica?

FACTS: Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local
actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began,
according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
Gonzales refused to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have
the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the
children before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales
who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could
affect the moral and social values of the children. The Trial Court judgment is rendered directing
respondent to allow Carlitos visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but
in no case should he take out the children without the written consent of the mother or
respondent herein. Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales
interposed an appeal from the RTCs order to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Gonzales
got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds immigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and
Rica Natalia. On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales. The RTC
decision had been reversed and Carlitos petition for visitorial rights is denied as the children
concerned are still in their early formative years of life.

HELD: Yes. The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his
or her child or children. The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in
view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children).
This right is personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for
him. The court reiterated that all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has
recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by Carlitos with the children,
however, could not all be that detrimental to the children. The SC appreciates the apprehensions
of Suzanne Gonzales and their well-meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems
unlikely that Carlitos Silva would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parent’s
natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial
court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in
no case (can Silva) take out the children without the written consent of the mother."
(131) Vancil v. Belmes, GR 132223, June 19, 2001 [Per J. Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Third Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not Bonifacia is qualified to become Vincent’s guardian

FACTS:Bonifacia Vancil is the mother of Redeer Vancil. When her son died, she commenced
before the RTC of Cebu City guardianship over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and
Vincent Vancil, her grandchildren. At the time, Valerie was just six years old while Vincent is
two years old. On July 15, 1967, she was appointed as the legal and judicial guardian of the
minors and their properties. However, after a month, Helen Belmes, the natural mother and in
actual custody exercising parental authority over the subject minors, filed an opposition with
motion to remove the guardianship of Vancilasserting that there is no reason for her to be
deprived of her legal right as a natural guardian to her minor children and that Vancil is a
resident of Colorado, USA being a naturalized American citizen. Vancil alleged that under the
custody of Belmes, Valerie was raped multiple times by Belmes’ live in partner. Belmes,
however, stressed that Valerie is already of major age, and petition has become moot in respect
to her. The subject of proper guardianship has become solely Vincent. Vancil claimed that she is
more qualified as guardian to Vincent and that it could only be realized by substitute parental
authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code.

RULING: Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the mother, as natural
guardian of their minor children. The law on parental authority under the Civil Code or now
Article 225 of the Family Code ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93
of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of
their minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good reason may another
person be named. It is also supported by Art. 211 of the Family Code which states that the father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary. In the present case, Belmes, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, has
the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. The right of parents to the custody of
their minor children is one of the natural rights incidents to parenthood, a right supported by law
and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or
decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. Vancil, as the
surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of respondent as stated in Article 214 of the Family Code. Considering that Belmes
is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to
prove the unsuitability of Belmes. However, she has not showed convincing evidence to it. It is
also a jurisprudence that the courts cannot appoint persons as guardians who are not within the
jurisdiction for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. Vancil, as an American citizen and
a resident of Colorado,cannot perform the responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian.Her old age and previous conviction of libel in Cebu willgive her second thoughts of
staying here. Indeed, her coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a guardian to
Vincent for only two years is uncertain.
(132) Laxamana v. Laxamana, GR 144763, September 3, 2002 [Per
J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]
ISSUE: Is a father with history of drug dependence fit to have custody of his minor children?

FACTS: ReymondLaxamana and Ma. Lourdes Laxamana met in 1983. Reymond, who came
from a wellto- do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while Lourdes, a holder of a
degree in banking and finance, worked in a bank. Reymond, 31 years old and Lourdes, 33, got
married on June 6, 1984. All went well until Raymond became a drug dependent. Upon petition
of Lourdes, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, ordered Reymond’s
confinement at the NARCOM-DRC for treatment and rehabilitation. Again, on October 30,
1996, the trial court granted Reymond’s voluntary confinement for treatment and rehabilitation
at the National Bureau of Investigation. Reymond allegedly became violent and irritable. On
some occasions, he even physically assaulted Lourdes. Thus, on June 17, 1999, Lourdes and her
3 children abandoned Reymond and transferred to the house of her relatives. On August 31,
1999, Reymond filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, the instant
petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children. Lourdes opposed the
petition, citing his drug dependence. Meanwhile, on September 24, 1999, Lourdes filed a petition
for annulment of marriage. On September 27, 1999, Reymond filed in the habeas corpus case, a
motion seeking visitation rights over his children.

RULING: On January 14, 2000, the trial court awarded the custody of the three children to
Lourdes and giving visitation rights to Reymond. The child if over seven years of age may be
permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by such
choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the
respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the opposing parents. The nature of
the case at bar, the court a quo has conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties
to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito.
The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet “completely cured” may
render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that Reymondis
unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual
training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the
time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which
parent they want to live with. “The children were asked as to whether they would like to be with
Reymond but there are indications that they entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that
their father is no longer a drug dependent.”
(133) Madriñan v. Madriñan, GR 159374, July 12, 2007 [Per J.
Corona, First Division]
ISSUE: Does the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving
the custody of minors?

FACTS: Felipe and Francisca Madriñan’s marriage was blessed with three sons and a daughter:
Ronnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo, and Krizia Ann. After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, Felipe
allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and
subsequently to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Franciscabrought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in
their barangay but this proved futile, thus she filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick,
Phillip and Francis Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that Felipe’s act of leaving the
conjugal dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their
children and deprived them of their mother’s care. She prayed that Felipe be ordered to appear
and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they should not be returned to her
custody. The spouses appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They initially agreed that
Felipe would return the custody of their three sons to Francisca. But Felipe had a change of heart
and decided to file a memorandum alleging that his wife was unfit to take custody of their three
sons andneglected her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002,
it was Francisca who left, taking their daughter with her. He also questioned the jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the
“Family Courts Act of 1997”) family courtshave exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by Francisca.

RULING: RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. The Court of Appeals
should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. A careful reading of Section
5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in
custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued
exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that
may be availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the custody case
pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of
jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial instability.The
petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its
members and if granted the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may
be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
(134) St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, GR 143363, February 06,
2002 [Per J. Pardo, First Division]
ISSUE: Is St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of its student?

FACTS: St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. In
the said activity, an accident happened resulted to the death of its student, Sherwin Carpitanos,
the only son of spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos. The jeep used in the activity
was driven by James Daniel II who’s only 15 years old and allegedly drove in a reckless manner.
The Carpitanos couple filed a suit against the school before the court wherein St. Mary’s
Academy was held liable for damages in accordance with Articles 218 and 219 of the Family
Code, because it negligently allowed the minor to drive and did not assign a teacher to
accompany the minor students in the jeep. On the other hand, St. Mary’s Academy argued that
there was no evidence that it allowed the minor, James Daniel II to drive the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva. As per the school, it was Ched Villanueva, the grandson of Vivencio who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving and then allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to
drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

RULING: The court held that for St. Mary’s Academy to be liable, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. In this case, Carpitanos failed to show that the
negligence of the school was the proximate cause of the death of Sherwin. Instead, they admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep which is the school had no control of. Therefore, St. Mary’s Academy is not liable for the
death of its student.
(135) Obedencio v. Murillo, AM RTJ-03-1753, February 5, 2004
[Per J. Puno, Third Division]
ISSUE: Was it proper for Judge Murillo to dismiss the case based on Licel’s affidavit of
desistance without the concurrence of Licel’s parents?

FACTS: Capistrano Obedencio Jr. (Capistrano) and his wife assisted their 14 years old daughter
Licel in filing a criminal complaint for rape allegedly committed when she was 11 years old by
her uncle, Dexter Z. Acenas. On May 25, 2001, Capistrano sought to secure a copy of warrant of
arrest against Dexter, but Judge Murillo told him that the case had been dismissed 3 days earlier
on May 22, 2001. According to Judge Murillo, Licel had come to court accompanied by her
maternal grandparents and Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Hallazgo and presented to
affirm her affidavit of desistance. Capistrano claims that the dismissal was marred by serious
irregularities, but Judge Murillo asserts that the filing of the affidavit of desistance, that court had
no other recourse but to dismiss the case.

RULING: No. Article 220 (6) of the Family Code gives to Capistrano and to his wife the right
and duty to represent Licel in all matters affecting her interest. Judge Murillo should have
exercised more prudence and caution instead of perfunctorily dismissing the case. He ought to
remember that Dexter Z. Acenas is Licel’s maternal uncle, and Licel came to court with his
maternal grandparents and not her parents. Under the Rule of Examination of a Child Witness, in
the absence of or incapacity of the parents to be the guardian, the court may appoint guardian ad
litem to promote the best interests of the child which Judge Murillo is failed to do. Thus, Judge
Murillo is Liable for gross ignorance of the law in connection with the unjust dismissal of
criminal case.
(136) Lindain v. CA, GR 95305, August 20, 1992 [Per J. Griño-
Aquino, First Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the status of the sale of the minor children’s property by the mother
without judicial authority is valid

FACTS: Elena, Oscar, Celia, Teresita and Virgilio as minors, owned a parcel of registered land
which their mother, Dolores, as guardian, sold for P2, 000.00 under a deed of absolute sale to the
spouses Apolonia and Federico. The latter knew that the sale was without judicial approval but
still proceeded with the transaction. The children who become of age now contend that the sale is
null and void as it was without the court’s approval. Spouses Apolonia and Federico, on the other
hand, contend that the sale was valid, as the value of the property was less than P2, 000, and
considering the ages of the minors now, the youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing
of the complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should have been exercised four (4)
years after reaching the age of majority, has already prescribed.

RULING: Under Article 320 of the New Civil Code, a parent acting merely as a legal
administrator of the property of his minor children does not have the power to dispose of or
alienate the property of the said child without judicial approval. Moreover, under Rule 84 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor
children’s property are merely powers of possession and management. Hence, the power to sell,
mortgage, encumber or dispose must proceed from the court. Besides, Spouses Apolonia and
Federico are not purchasers in good faith as they knew right from the beginning that the
transaction was without judicial approval. Further, the minors’ action for reconveyance has not
yet prescribed because “real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years” (Art. 1141,
Civil Code). Since the sale took place in 1966, the action to recover the property has not yet
prescribed when the then minors/owners sued in 1987.
(137) Cabales v. CA, GR 162421, August 31, 2007 [Per C. J. Puno,
First Division]
ISSUE: What is the status of the sale of the property entered into by Saturnina for Rito?

FACTS: Sometime in 1964, Rufino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern
Leyte to his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino,
Lenora, and Rito. In 1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the
property to Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. Alberto died
leaving his wife and son, Nelson. In 1975, within the redemption period, Bonifacio, Albino and
Saturnina, in lieu of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido. Subsequently,
Saturnina, and her four children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to
Spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano. It was provided in the deed of sale that the shares of
Rito, being minor at the time of the sale, will be held in trust by the vendee and will paid upon
him after reaching the age of 21. In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses
Feliano representing his share from the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988,
that Nelson learned of the sale from his uncle, Rito. On January 12, 1995, contending that they
could not have sold their respective shares in subject property when they were minors, Nelson
and Rito filed a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus damages. The Spouses Feliano
averred that Nelson and Rito are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito already received
his share and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the redemption price.

RULING: With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid. Under Section 1, Rule
96 (General Powers and Duties of Guardians) of the Rules of Court “A guardian shall have the
care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management
of the estate only. x x x” Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration
of the minor’s property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial
authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of Rito, sold the latter’s pro indiviso share in
subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so. Accordingly, the contract as to the
share of Rito was unenforceable. However, when Rito received the proceeds of the sale
amounting to 1,143 pesos, he effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid
and binding as to him.
(138) Bondagjy v. Bondagjy, GR 140817, December 7, 2001 [Per J.
Pardo, First Division]
ISSUE: Is a wife, a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and
converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bound by the moral laws of Islam in
the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of her children?

FACTS: Sabrina Bondagjy, a Christian, became a Muslim by conversion and married under
Islamic rites Fouzi Bondagjy, a Muslim. They later separated and their two children lived with
Sabrina. Sabrina converted back to Catholicism and had their children baptized as Christians as
well. Fouzi filed with the Shari’a District Court an action to obtain custody of his two minor
children Abdulazis, 10, and Amouaje, 9. Fouzi claimed that on various occasions, Sabrina was
seen with different men at odd hours in Manila and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless
blouses, and bathing suits. Such clothing, are detestable under Islamic law on customs. Sabrina
argued that she was no longer covered by Muslim Laws or PD 1083 since she was no longer a
Muslim. Fouzi contended that PD 1083 is applicable to all cases of Muslims involving custody
since they were both Muslims at the inception of the case. The Shari’a District Court held that
Sabrina was unworthy to care for her children because Sabrina failed to observe what is expected
of a married woman and a mother. Under the Muslim law, the Muslim mother may be legally
dissented to the custody of her minor children by reason of wickedness such as when she
engages in ‘zina’ or illicit sexual relations.

RULING: The Family Code shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether a non-Muslim
woman is incompetent. What determines her capacity is the standard laid down by the Family
Code now that she is not a Muslim. What determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see
to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children and the ability to give them
a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support. Sabrina was proven to be
financially able to support her children since she was able to send them to school at De La Salle
Zobel School. Additionally, civil law is applied in the best interest of the children. Instead of
religion, the welfare of the minors is the controlling consideration on the issue. In parental
authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereign
but a sacred trust to the welfare of the minor.
(139) Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, GR 169202, March 5,
2010 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired
passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage

FACTS: Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was
then expiring on 27 October 2000. Maria Virginia being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the
following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria Virginia" as her
given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport,
Maria Virginia, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The DFA denied the request stating that the use of maiden
name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous
application. Maria Virginia argued that no law prohibits her from using her maiden name.

RULING: The wife, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, cannot
revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her
marriage. Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband's surname in her passport, she may
not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA
8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of
marriage. Significantly, Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
8239 provides: The passport can be amended only in the following cases: a) Amendment of
woman's name due to marriage; b) Amendment of woman's name due to death of spouse,
annulment of marriage or divorce initiated by a foreign spouse; or c) Change of surname of a
child who is legitimated by virtue of a subsequent marriage of his parents.Since Maria Virginia's
marriage to her husband subsists and she opted to adopt her husband's surname in her passport,
she may not revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport.
(140) Republic v. Bolante, GR 160597, July 20, 2006 [Per J. Garcia,
Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the registered name can be changed to conform to the name that was
actually carried and used

FACTS: Roselie Eloisa Bringas Bolante, as indicated in her Birth Certificate, but more known
as Maria Eloisa Bringas Bolante, a name that she has used in her scholastic records from the start
of her school days, as well as her government records, including her Driver’s License, Marriage
License, Professional License as a CPA issued by the PRC, and the “Quick Count” document of
the COMELEC, filed to change her registered name to the latter to prevent confusion, especially
for her application for passport and for avoidance of complication upon her retirement. However,
the Republic contended that her substantial compliance to Sec. 3, of the Rules of Court is
insufficient to give jurisdiction to the trial court because of the publication of hearing notice
beyond the 4 month limitation, and that her bare testimony, without presentation of a NBI or
Police Clearance as evidence to prove change of name is not for any evil motive, is insufficient
to prove her petition is not resorted to illegal purposes.

RULING: A person can be authorized to change his name in the Civil Registry or Certificate of
Birth based not only on a reasonable cause or justifiable reason, but if it is also unfair to the
person to use his official name. Under previous jurisprudence, Bolante’s reason falls under the
second of the justifying grounds to warrant change of name, namely: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change will
avoid confusion; (c) when one has been continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; and (d) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose. The injunction to do such will prejudice her, and will cause confusion, chiefly because
all her records, including scholastic and government records contain Maria Eloisa. Her cause of
action does not pursue any illegal purpose, but only stems from her desire for clarity. This was
proven from her testimony, which the court deemed sufficient.
(141) Republic v. Kho, GR 170340, June 29, 2007, [Second Division,
J. Carpio Morales]
ISSUE: Whether or not the change in the civil register of Kho et. al can be made under Rule 108

FACTS: Carlito and his siblings filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective Birth
Certificates. He also asked the Court, in behalf of two of his minor children to order the
correction of some entries in their birth certificate. The changes to be effected are the following:
In Carlito’s birth certificate, the citizenship of his mother from “Chinese” to “Filipino”, deletion
of the word “married” opposite the phrase “Date of marriage of parents” these deletions were
requested to have effect to the birth certificate of his siblings. With respect to the birth certificate
of Carlito’s children, he asked the date of his and his wife’s marriage be changed from April 27,
1989 to January 21, 2000 as reflected in their marriage certificate. It was also prayed that
Carlito’s second name “John” be deleted and that the name and citizenship of his father in his
marriage contract be change to “John” to “Juan” and “Filipino” to “Chinese” respectively.
During the hearing, an additional request in the birth certificate of Carlito’s children with regards
to their mother’s name be changed from “Maribel” to “Marivel”.As required, the petition was
published for three consecutive weeks in Mindanao Daily Patrol – CARAGA, a newspaper of
general circulation, after which it was set for hearing. The City Registrar of Butuan, thru the
OSG contended that the petition for correction of entries in the subject documents should not be
granted because they failed to implead the minor’s mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party
and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regards to the questioned
“married” of Carlito and their parents, and the latter’s citizenship.

RULING: Affirmative. According to Section 4 of Rule 108, upon filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
therof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive week in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province. In Barco v CA, it was held that publication of the order of the hearing under
Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party. In this case, the
petition was published for three consecutive weeks in Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, which
is a general circulation in the province. Thus the petition in the civil registry of Kho et. al. can be
made under Rule 108.Also, failure of Carlito to comply with the requirements of Section 2 of
Rule 103, nonetheless, had been complied with the jurisdictional requirements for correction of
entries in the civil registry under enumeration “o” of Section 2 of Rule 108.
(142) Silverio v. Republic, GR 174689, October 19, 2007 [Per J.
Corona, First Division]
ISSUE: May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

FACTS: Rommel Jacinto DantesSilverio, born and registered as a male, underwent sex
reassignment in Bangkok, Thailand, the fact of which was certified here in the Philippines by
virtue of a medical certificate issued by oneDr. MarcelinoReysio-Cruz. He then lived his life as a
woman. On November 26, 2002, Rommel filed a petitionfor the change of his first name and sex
and there having no opposition, the court proceeded with the hearing whereRommel presented
his American Fiancé as witness.RTC gave due course to his petition, rulingbased on equity, that
“petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in aman’s body is not his own doing and should not be
taken against him” and that “no harm, injury or prejudice willbe caused to anybody” if the
petition were to be granted. His name was thus changed toMely, and sex to “female”. The
Republic, thru the OSG, then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which reversed the decision
of the RTC, citing that the decision lacked legal basis because before a person can legally change
his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying
such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as
a result of using his true and official name.

RULING: No. No law allows the change of entry in the Birth Certificate as to sex on the ground
of sex reassignment. By virtue of RA 9048, Rule 108 now applies only tosubstantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register, excluding the clerical or typographical error. Section 2
of RA9048 provides expressly that nocorrection must involve the change of nationality, age,
statusor sexof the petitioner.RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may
beallowed and these are the following: 1) petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2) The new first
name or nickname has been habitually andcontinuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname inthe community; or 3) The change will avoid
confusion. Furthermore, the entries conceived in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code. No reasonable interpretation of the provision said provisions can justify the conclusionthat
it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.The birth certificate of Silverio
appears to contain no error, thus no correction was necessary. Article 407 of the Civil Code
authorizes the entry in thecivil registry of certainacts, events, andjudicial decrees. These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legalconsequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status
and nationality of a person. Their effectsare expressly sanctioned by the laws. Sex reassignment
is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
(143) Republic v. Cagandahan, GR 166676, September 12, 2008 [Per
J. Quisumbing, Second Division]
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court can order the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
Jennifer to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court

FACTS: On December 11, 2003, Jennifer Cagandahan (Cagandahan) filed a petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court. In her petition, she
alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of
Live Birth. But while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is a condition where persons
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate
be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff. The RTC granted the correction of entries. But OSG contends that the
petition failed to comply with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. According to OSG, she
she failed to implead the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna, and to state that she is a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the
date of such filing under Rule 103. OSG further argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of
sex or gender in the birth certificate and Cagandahan’s claimed medical condition known as
CAH does not make her a male.

RULING: The Court considered compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. Cagandahan is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness
and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
Cagandahan is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
Cagandahan as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the Cagandahan's position and his personal
judgment of being a male. As for Cagandahan’s change of name under Rule 103, a change of
name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of Cagandahan’s change
of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that Cagandahan’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, the Court finds merit in Cagandahan’s change of name. Such a change will conform with
the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
(144) Uy v. CA, GR 109557, November 29, 2000 [Per J. Pardo, First
Division]
ISSUE: Whether the summary proceeding under FC or ROC applies to Ernesto’s incapacity

FACTS: Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the
latter, filed a petition to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be
authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contested that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that
would require her to sell their property and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled
in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the
proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings. The son of the spouses,
Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was
essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it
cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it
should follow the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring
procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. During the
pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to spouses Uy, her daughter and son-in-law.

RULING: The procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family
Code are not applicable, because he was unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal
property due to illness that had rendered him comatose. In such case, the proper remedy is a
judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. The law
provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as
a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the
conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of
judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC.