1. SERANA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO.

162059, JANUARY 22, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana, a senior student, of the University of the Philippines
Diliman was appointed by then President Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one -
year term. Petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the
projects of OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzon’s Hall Annex in UP Diliman. Pres.
Estrada gave P15 million to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation,
sourced from the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De
Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. Serana and her
brother were indicted for Estafa. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person,
in her capacity as UP student regent, as she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held the position in an ex officio
capacity. Petitioner also claimed that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. She claimed such p ower was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole.
Hence, since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the
same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also posited that Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over
which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime o f estafa. It
only has jurisdiction over crimes Crimes Committed by Public Officer; Estafa falling under
Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. The Ombudsman opposed the motion. It d isputed petitioner’s
interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
the catch -all phrase “in relation to office,” thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
charges against petitioner. The Sandiganba yan dismissed the Motion filed by Serana. She then
filed a petition to the SC.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crime charged of a student of
UP.

Held:

1. YES, Contrary to Petitioner’s claims, it is P.D. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. “Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in re lation to their office.” Evidently, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to
their office. There is no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses .

2. GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. NO. 165835 JUNE 22, 2005

Facts:

The Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint against petitioner for violation of Sec. 8 in
relation to Republic Act (RA) 6713 and violation of RA 1379. Petitioner’s wife and children
were impleaded in the compla int for violation of RA 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirator,
 conduits, dummies, and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using, and disposing
of his ill-gotten wealth. The office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan a
petition with verified urgent ex parte application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties. The Sandiganbayan
issued the questioned resolution granting the relief. Petitioner field a motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 1379.

Held:

YES. The SB is vested with jurisdiction over violations of RA 1379. It is logically congruent
that violations of RA 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the SB even though the
proceeding is civil in nature since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property amounts to
a penalty.

The soundness of this r easoning becomes even more obvious considering that the respondent
is a public officer and the violation of RA 1379 was committed during the respondent officer ’s
incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line with the purpose behind the creatio n
of the SB as anti -graft court, to address the urgent problem of dishonesty in public service.

3. Escobal v. Garchitorena, 422 SCRA

FACTS:

Arnel Escobal filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction see king the nullification of the remand of the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan of the records of a Criminal Case to the RTC of Naga City.

Escobal was involved in a shooting incident resulting in the death of Rafael N. Nueca while
conducting surveillance operations . Escobal was arrested. During arraignment, he pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the C ourt Marshall,
not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and Officer. Escobal
filed a petition for a motion to dismiss arguing that since he committed the crime in the
performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

The RTC held that the Escobal committ ed the crime while not in the performance of his
official function stating that the enactment of RA 7975. However, the RTC reversed the Order
declaring that based on the petitioner’s evidence, he was on official mission when the shooting
occurred after considering Luz Nacario Nuecas’s admission that Escobal was on official mission
when the shooting happened. The entire proceedings were ordered to be transmitted to the
Sandiganbayan for appropriate proceedings.

The presiding Justice of Sandiganbayan ordered to return the records of this case to the RTC
of origin for the reason that the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case considering that Escobal
had a salary grade of 23 and hence the petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the presiding Justice of the Sandig anbayan committed a grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the
RTC.

RULING:
 No. The Court rule that i n cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said RA 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper RTC, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in
relation to his office but oc cupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below 27, the proper
Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over the case.

In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23. He was
charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

4. People v. Henry T. Go, March 25, 2014

FACTS:

Henry T. Go is the Chairman and president of Philippine air Terminals Co. Inc. (PIATCO.
PIATCO was awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) for the
construction, operation, and mainten ance of the NAIA Terminal 3. A certain Cecilia L. Pe Suyco
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals including
respondent for alleged violation of RA 3019. The Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause to
indict respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019. The information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Respondent filed a Motion to Quash contending that a respondent who is not a
public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government age nt, may not be
prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019. The Sandiganbayan hereby ordered quashed
and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner filed a petition before the SC.

ISSUES:

WON a private person may be indicted for conspir acy in violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. 3019
even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing
of the information.

RULING:

YES. Private persons when acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted . If found
guilty, private person may be held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, ho wever, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is
already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, with public officers death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to
indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his
death, he should have been charged.
 The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy
with a public officer. The law, ho wever, does not require that such perso n must, in all instances,
be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may
no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the
private person may be indicted alone.

5. Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, 630 SCRA

FACTS:

Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal filed a petition for Certiorari for the nullification of the
Resolution of Sandiganbayan (4 t h Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 28022 and 28023, as well as its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

In 1998, the senate committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation and on
National Defense and Security carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the “coup rumors and the
alleged anomalies” in the Armed Forces of the Philippines -Philippine Retirement Benefits
Systems (AFP-RSBS). In its report, the Senate Blue Ribbon committee outlined the anomalies in
the acquisition of lots. The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the sam e
transactions with two deed s of sale - one signed by the seller only (unilateral), and another signed
by the seller and buyer (bilateral).

To avoid paying correct taxes to the government, only the unilateral deeds, which recorded
lower consideration paid by the System into the buyer were the ones register ed with the registrar
of deeds.

The Ombudsman Investigators executed a Joint Affidavit – Complaint stating that based on
their findings Ramiscal among other respondents may be charged with estafa throug h falsification
of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No 3019. The information for both
offenses were initially filed with the Sandiganbayan.

Ramiscal avers that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the crimes charged insisting
that AFP -RSBS is not a government -owned or controlled corporation and that he does not fall
under salary grade 27 . Hence the Petition.

ISSUES:

WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in finding pr obable cause against Ramiscal for estafa through falsification of public
document and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

RULING:

No. The Court ruled that as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned,
the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for
that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is
empo wered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether probable cause exist s, and to
charge the person believed to have committed the crime as defined by law. Whether or not the
Ombudsman has correctly discharged his function, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
assessment of the evidence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court may not be
compelled to pass upon.

In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to charge
him with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for estafa through falsification of a
public document. In the light of the forgoing, the petition is denied.

6. People v. Benipayo, 586 SCRA

FACTS:

On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, t hen Chairman of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and
Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, Univer sity of the Philippines -Diliman.
The speech was subsequently published at the Manila Bulletin. Petitioner corporation, believing
that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that filed, through its
authorized representative, an Affidavit -Complaint for libel. Arguing that he was an impeachable
officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
(OCP-QC), The City Prosecutor filed an Information for libel against the respondent, with the
RTC of Quezon City.

Respondent, for his part, moved for the di smissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could not be
criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be
criminally pro secuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the
case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.

The trial court issued the challenged Order dismissing the Criminal Case. It was the
Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case. While the RTC found that respondent was no
longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled
that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was
committed by respondent in relation to his office --he delivered the speech in his official capacity
as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to
the exclusion of all other courts.

On motion for reconsideration, the tria l court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with
jurisdiction to hear the libel case.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the crime of libel was committed by respondent in
relation to his office, which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

The Ruling of the Court

YES. Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without
qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is
committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent
committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and
deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error.
The foremost concern which the parties and even the trial court failed to identify is exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao,[36]
where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous
act is committed "by similar means,"[37] and despite the fact that the phrase "by similar means" is
not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360.[38] In these cases, and in those that follo wed, the
Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal
trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,[39] we
explained at length that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides
that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).

As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Br. 32,[41] Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the
law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of
written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately wit h the RTC to the exclusion of
all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot
simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the
RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar
means.[42] The grant to the Sandiganbayan[43] of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation
to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC
of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the
offense is committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4,
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic A ct No. 8249,[44] cannot be construed to
have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC.[45]

Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it
is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to
office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged
libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, an d deprives it of jurisdiction to
try the case, is, follo wing the above disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore, orders the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q -02-109406 and Q -02-109407 and their remand to the
respective Regional Trial Courts fo r further proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds
unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.

7. Lacson v. Executive Secretary, 301 SCRA

FACTS: On May 18, 1995 , at around 4:00 A.M., eleven (11) known members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang (KBG) figured in a shootout with the police forces during an operation conducted
by the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) near the fly -over along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. All of the 11 perished that fateful day. Later, two
members of the police team alleged that the killing was in reality a summary execution, or, in
popular parlance, a rubout.

In 1995, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) informations for murder
against Senator Panfilo Lacson who was, at the time the alleged murders took place, Chief
Superintendent and head of the Presidential Anti -Crime Commission (PACC). He was charged,
along with 25 other accused, for the wrongful killing of the 11 members of the KBG. Upon mot ion
of Lacson, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. Subsequently,
his participation in the crime was downgraded from principal to a ccessory. He pleaded not guilty
when arraigned. On account of the downgrading of his crimin al liability, Lacson consequently
questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases against him,
considering that, as stated in the amended information, none of the principal accused was a
government official with a salary grade ( SG) of 27 or higher, as required by Section 2 of Republic
Act No. 7975 which was then in force.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sanduganbayan has jurisdiction to hear Lacso n’s criminal case.

HELD: Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, it’s mode of appeal and other procedu ral matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes
rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. For
failure to show in the amended informa tion that the charge of murder was intimately connected
with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the
subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

8. Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA

FACTS:

Sanchez has brought this petition for certiorari and prohibition to challenge the order of
the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the information for rape with homicide filed
against him and six other persons.

The Presidential Anti -Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges
against several petitioner against several persons, including Sanchez, in connection with the rape
slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on this request, the Panel of
State Prosecutors DOJ conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Sanchez was
placed under “arrest status” and taken to DOJ Manila after he was positively id entified by Aurelio
Centeno and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan as a principal in the rape – slay of Sarmenta and the
killing of Gomez.

On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the RTC Court of Calamba,
Laguna, seven information charging Anto nio L. Sanchez among others with the rape and killin of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta. The petitioner then filed a motion to quash to the said information, on the
basis that: 1) he was denied the right to preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the
competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has
therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him; 4) and as a public officer, he can be tried for the
offense only by the Sandiganbayan. Demetriou denied the motion. H ence, the petition.

ISSUES:

WON Sanchez as a public officer can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.

RULING:

No. The Court ruled that t here is no direct relation between the commission of the crime
of rape with homicide and the petition er's office as municipal mayor because public office is not
an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office.
Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was
intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall
under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo.

In the case at bar there is no allegation that the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the
petitioner was connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an
"intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It follo ws that the said crime, being an
ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganba yan. Wherefore, the
petition is dismissed.

9. Hanna Serana v. Sandiganbayan, 542 SCRA

Facts:

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana, a senior student, of the University of the Philippines
Diliman was appointed by then President Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one -
year term. Petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the
projects of OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzon’s Hall Annex in UP Diliman. Pres.
Estrada gave P15 million to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation,
sourced from the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De
Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. Serana and her
brother were indicted for Estafa. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person,
in her capacity as UP student regent, as she was not a public officer since she merely
represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held the position in an ex officio
capacity. Petitioner also claimed that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. She claimed such p ower was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole.
Hence, since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the
same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also posited that Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over
which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime o f estafa. It
only has jurisdiction over crimes Crimes Committed by Public Officer; Estafa falling under
Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. The Ombudsman opposed the motion. It d isputed petitioner’s
interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
the catch -all phrase “in relation to office,” thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
charges against petitioner. The Sandiganba yan dismissed the Motion filed by Serana. She then
filed a petition to the SC.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crime charged of a student of
UP.

Held:

1. YES, Contrary to Petitioner’s claims, it is P.D. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. “Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B. Other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
 mentioned in subsection a of this section in re lation to their office.” Evidently, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to
their office. There is no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses .

10. Disini Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, Feb. 18, 2014, 716 SCRA

Facts: These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (RA)
10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a
boon to the need of a current generation for greater information and facility of communication.
But all is not well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who
would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance,
avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting
defamatory statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communication from others, the ill -
motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing
his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false representations.
The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to
pornography guileless children who have access to the internet.
For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and
contain and punish wrongdoings. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent
these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention
Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime la w for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013, the
Court extended the original 120 -day temporary restraining o rder (TRO) that it earlier issued on
October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime
law until further orders

Issues: The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard
required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people. Is Section 4(a)(1) on
Illegal Access unconstitutional?
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while is seeks to
discourage data interference, it intrude s into the area of protected speech and expression, creating
a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber -squatting violates the equal protection clause in
that, not being narro wly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as
those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to
privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual abuse of a
16-year old is not criminally liable for producing child pornography but one who formulates the
idea on his laptop would be.
Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission of unsolicited commercial
communications?
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as
Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who
wilfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as
cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected
expression.
Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher co nstitutional?
Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA 10175
constitutional?
Is Section 8 valid and constitutional?
Is Section 12 on Real -Time collection of traffic data valid and constitutional?
Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and constitutional?
Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and constitutional?
Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data valid and constitutional?
Is Section 17 on destruction of computer d ata valid and constitutional?
Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data valid and constitutional?
Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional?
Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CI CC) valid and
constitutional?
Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and constitutional?

Ruling: No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is useful in
determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to targ et a class of things or persons.
According to this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. T he Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the
application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved
in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act – accessing the computer system of another
without right. It is a universally condemnable act.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby
invading the area of protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all.
It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully destroying without
right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data , electronic document, or
electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no
freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. All penal laws, like
the cybercrime law, have of course an inh erent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect, or the fear of
possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the
boundaries of what is proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they
instil such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and penalizing socially
harmful conduct.
No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is reasonable in
penalizing the act of acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation,
or deprive others who are not ill -motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. It
is the evil purpose for which one uses the name that the law condemns.
No. In assessing the challenge t hat the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of
privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government
intrusion. The law punishes those who acquire or use identifying information without right,
implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail to show how government effort to curb computer -
related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due
process. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal right. The Court has defined
intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through overt acts of the offender, and it
may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether
in the quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special
circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.
The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that
makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, o r operating,
directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of
a computer system as Congress has intended.
The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The law makes the penalt y
higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since
the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for
such higher penalty.
Yes, because to prohibit the transmissi on of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read
his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate
category of speech which us not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State
cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Thus, unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expre ssion.
Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private
persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party i s a public figure. The elements of
libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication
of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.There is actual
malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the kno wledge
that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard
standard used here required a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must b e
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to
establish actual malice. The defense of absence of actua l malice, even when the statement turns
out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure. But,
where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of
actual malice. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of cyberspace communication technology
to protect a person’s reputation a nd peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and
broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self -inhibition
borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise rob ust
discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws
should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts,
comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or
abetting” libel on the cyber space is a nullity.
Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use o f
information and communication technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In
using the technology in question, the offender o ften evades identification and is able to reach far
more victims or cause greater harm.
The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175
to actual cases, with the exception of the crimes of:

Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175
and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy; as well as
Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti -Child Pornography Act of 2009
also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and
unconstitutional.
Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as
a rule a legislative prerogative.
Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 d oes not permit law enforcement authorities to look
into the contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient. Thus,
the authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint.
Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a copy of that data when it crossed
his computer if he was so minded. There was no undue deprivation of property since the data that
service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to
users by reasons of the issuance of such orders.
Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly
issued court warrant. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement
authorities that would ensure proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data
that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant.
Valid and constit utional, because it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the
service provider to have that copy of data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system.
Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes any judicial in tervention but it
also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on
speech.
Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck
down by the Court.
and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the
CICC to formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. The law gave sufficient standards
for the CICC to follo w when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.

11. Jimenez vs. Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151

FACTS:

Jimenez (Petitioner) is the president of Unlad Shipping and Management Corporation a local
manning agency, while Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and Avgoustis are the respondents herein and
are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services Inc, a local manning agency. In
Aug. 19, 2003, Petitioner filed a complaint -affidavit with the office of the prosecutor of
Mandaluyong city against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.
Respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter -affidavit and denying the complaint.
Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter affidavit. An Information for the said crime was
filed before the RTC -Mandaluyong.

On Dec. 4, 2004, the prosecu tor filed a motion to withdraw the information and respondents
Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their comment to the opposition; however, the judge denied the motion
as it found existence of probable cause and issued warrants against the respondents. Respondent
Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause to defer the enforcement of the
warrants or arrest. Petitioner filed his opposition with the motion to expunge, contending that
Alamil being a fugitive from justice had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC found
probable cause. Respondent filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Umali for being biased or
partial. The said judge voluntarily inhibit herself and the case was re -raffled to Judge Sorongon.
On April 3, 2006, the peti tioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable
cause to prosecute the respondents. On April 26, 2006, Alamil moved to expunge the motion for
being prohibited pleading since the motion did not have any conformity from the city prosecu tor.
In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, finding
that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided.
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitione r’s notice of appeal since the
public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case.
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the
offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents’
fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.
ISSUE: WON the Petitioner has the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the case
HELD:
No. It is well settled that the real party in interest is the People of the Philippines and is
represented by the prosecutors. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal
cases before the Court of Appeals and before this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General is the
appellate counsel of the People; The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only
the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the Peop le in criminal proceedings pending in the
Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court.

12. People vs. Valdez, 663 SCRA 272

FACTS:

That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, PO2 Eduardo Valdez
and Edwin Valdez, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior st rength did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the
person of one FERDINAND SAYSON Y DABOCOL shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his
head, MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL, and JOSELITO S AYSON Y DABOCOL. That at
about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, Eduardo and Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front
of the jai alai fronton asked the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan
was then attending to customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and
Edwin and tried to reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried
to prevent Moises from going near Edwin and Eduardo. He went out and advised Eduardo and
Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Successive shots were thereafter heard.
Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand
immediately approached the scene to help his brother. However was shot on his head and back
while running. Joselito fell on a burger machine. After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and
Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
RULING:
It cannot be other wise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from
the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the
facts in the complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated: For complaint
or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complai nt, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as
to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumpt ion is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation a nd abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and
employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting
[them]” on various parts of their bodies “which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their]
death[s]” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery
attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a
person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not sho w how the execution of the crime
was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim
might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there
are other instruments that co uld serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term
treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances
constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.

The State must specify in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that
aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to
inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to
which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is
being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of
which he stands charged and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense
and with the requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court fittingly said in United States v. Lim
San: A practical consequence of the non -allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to
prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused o f evidence that tends to establish
that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when
there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the
offense as charged is includ ed in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged
included in the offense proved.[31] In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes th e
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved
when the essential ingredients of the former constitut e or form part of those constituting the
latter.[32]

13. Miguel vs. Sandigan Bayan, 675 SCRA 560

FACTS: Vice Mayor Lucido and other local officials of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a
letter-complaint with Ombudsman -Mindanao, charging petitioner Mayor , violation of RA 3019.
He allegedly took advantage of his official position by conspiring and confederating with private
individuals and gave advantages by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of
consultants to provide the Architectural an d Engineering Design and Construction of the
Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of
general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from participating. After receipt of
petitioner’s counter -affidavit, Ombudsman found probable cause against Miguel. Sandiganbayan
ordered the Office of Special Prosecutor to reinvestigate. Petitioner repeatedly requested
extension for his counter -affidavit but still did not submit one, until he was declared to have
waived his right to submit countervailing evidence. His motions to quash wereI likewise denied.
Petitioner was later on arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. OSP filed Motion to Suspend the
petitioner pendent lite but petitioner filed his opposition based on obvious and fatal defect on the
information in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. He alleges that
“evident bad faith” and “man ifest partiality” refers to his co -accused, not to him.
ISSUE: Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019
is valid.
HELD: In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the
standard of a “person of common understanding” in appreciating the import of the phrase “acting
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality”. A reading in the i nformation clearly reveals that
this phrase we merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner. This is
what a plain and non -legalistic reading of the information would yield. The petitioner actually
disputes merely the clarity of the phrase’s position, in relation with the other averments in the
information. This is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of then
information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged. Petition dismiss ed.

14. People vs. Soria, 685 SCRA 483

FACTS:

On November 14, 2012, the Court found Benjamin Soria y Gomez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape by sexual assault which was supposedly became final and executory on
December 20, 2012. In the said decision, the accused is sentenced to suffer 12 years to 20 years
imprisonment and was ordered to pay civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages.
Subsequently, ho wever, the Court was informed about the death of the accused by the Bureau of
Corrections sub mitted on November 11, 2013.

Since Soria’s demise on August 16, 2012 transpired before the promulgation of the Court’s
Decision on November 14, 2012 or before its finality on December 20, 2012. Therefore, when the
Soria died, his appeal before the Court was still pending resolution.

ISSUES:

WON the Court erred in setting aside its Decision in dismissing the criminal case against
Soria by reason of his death?

RULING:

No. The Court held that the November 14, 2012 Dec ision of this Court finding Soria guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of
his death on August 16, 2012. Consequently, the same must be set aside and the case against
accused-appellant must consequently be dismissed.

In People v. Amistoso, this Court encountered a similar situation wherein the accused-
appellant died before his appeal could be resolved. The Court explained the implications of the
accused-appellant's demise as follows:

Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the
criminal action is extinguished in as much as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.

15. Union Bank vs. People, 667 SCRA 113

FACTS:

Tomas was charged for perjury for making a false narration on a Certificate against Forum
shopping. It was alleged that Tomas stated under oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has
not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same in an other tribunal or agency
aside from the that is filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum
of money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John
Doe. Tomas filed a motion to Quash arg uing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does
not have jurisdiction over the case as, though it was notarized in Makati, Certificate against forum
shopping was used or submitted before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or Not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at bar?

HELD:

Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that the Metropolitan Trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide
the case at bar. Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown and
she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum shopping before a notary public
in Makati City despite her kno wledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to
were not true. Thus Makati City is the proper venue and it is the proper court to try the perjury
case against Tomas, pursuant to Sec. 15(a) Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as all the essential
elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
Makati and not Pasay.

16. Solidum vs. People, 718 SCRA 263

Facts: Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 2 with an imperforate anus. Two
days after his birth, Gerald under went colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the
large intestine out through the abdominal wall, 3 enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag
attached to the side of his body. 4 On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at
the Ospital ng Maynila for a pul l-through operation.5 Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the
surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph
Tibio. The ane sthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr.
Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). 6 During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia ,7 and
went into a coma.8 His coma lasted for two weeks, 9 but he regained consciousness only after a
month.10 He could no longer see, hear or move.11 Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected
condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians. 12
Judgment of the RTC: On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding D r. Solidum
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries,
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability, 18 the
RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the damages, modifying its decision
Decision of the CA: On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.
Issues: Whether or not the Ospital ng Mayni la is civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr.
Solidum
Ruling: Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to
address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng
Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and
in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. 48 It is
puzzling, therefore, ho w the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and
severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng
Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lo wer courts
thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng
Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA
overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the following observations fo r the instruction
of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right
to be heard was not respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this
fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be
properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far -fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng
Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry." The
term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that
employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. 49 Ho wever, Ospital ng Maynila, being a
public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work.50 Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for
profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown t o be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the
discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee
but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against
Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was
unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.

17. Castillo vs. Salvador, July 2014

FACTS:
Respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of t he
Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted him of the same
but the civil aspect of the case remained. Respondent Salvador then filed a petition for review on
Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Cristina B. Ca stillo is a businesswoman engaged in real estate business, educational
institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by Salvador and his brother,
Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance business.
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she trusted him very
much as he even acted as a father to her children when her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to
embark on the remittance business. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit d erived
from the business would be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in charge
of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while Ramon would take charge of the operations of
business in the Philippines and she would be financing the busin ess.
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as
capital for the actual operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to
respondent Salvador which was witnessed by her disabled ha lf-brother Enrico B. Tan. Ho wever,
the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days.
When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money
was deposited in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the
money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.

ISSUE: WON award of damages may be retained despite acquittal of the criminal case.

HELD:

The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability,
for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out
of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Ci vil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for
the same act or omission.
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, "that a person is
innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove tha t all the
elements of estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not even establish
clearly and precisely how appellant committed the al leged fraud. She failed to convince us that
she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a
remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in this case indicate the
weakness of her submissions.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National
Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the
evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evi dence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence.
In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the
CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a sho rt
period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed
to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no
plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand -carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim
of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she
conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud
perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been swindled.

The petition for the award of damages is denied.

18. Lim vs. Kou Co Ping, 679 SCRA 114

FACTS:
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), o wner/operator of a cement manufac turing
plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil -
Cement Center and Tigerbilt. Fil -Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative
manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities c overing 50,000 bags of cement to
Co. On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of
P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million. Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the
cement bags from FRCC on a stagge red basis. Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim
to withdraw the remaining bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter
with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only
release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of
cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject
to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for C o to resolve the problem
with the plant or for the return of her money had failed. An Information for Estafa through
Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. On November 19, 2003, the RTC of P asig City, rendered its Order acquitting Co of the
estafa charge for insufficiency of evidence. After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case,
the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim. Lim sought a reconsideration of the
Order, arguing that she has presented preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against her.
The trial court denied the motion in its Order. On March 14, 2005, Lim filed her notice of appeal
on the civil aspect of the criminal case.
Issue
Whether or not civil action is suspended once the accused is acquitted and pending until final
outcome of the criminal action.

Our Ruling
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender. (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability
arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2)
independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on “an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code
(such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based o n an act or omission that may
constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific
provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”).

The civil liability arising fr om the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that
constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action.
For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the crimi nal offense. If
the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The
civil liability based on delict is ex tinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares
that “the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.”

Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are
authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue
hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they
can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmat ive.

19. Casupanan vs. Laroya, 388 SCRA 28

FACTS: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent and the other driven by petitioner figured in an
accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas,
Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya
for quasi-delict.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at it s preliminary investigation
stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of
forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in
the Order and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the
motion, so they filed petition on certiorari to RTC but likewise dismissed.
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that civil case which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of
forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. They argue that if the accused in
a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim
in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi -delict is
different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a
criminal case can be an ag grieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident.

ISSUE: Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi -delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.

HELD: Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages
based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or
omission, they have different causes of action. Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles
provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the
fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate
civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private
complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
The civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.

20. Caterpillar, Inc. vs. Samson, 808 SCRA 309, Nov. 9, 2016

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases of G.R. No. 205972 and G.R. No. 164352 between
Caterpillar, Inc. (Caterpillar) and Manolo P. Samson.

G.R. No. 164352

Caterpillar commenced a civil action against Samson and his business entities (Itti Shoes
Corporation, Kolm’s Manufacturing Corporation and Caterpillar Boutique and Merchandise), with
the Intellectual Prop erty Office (IPO) as a nominal party for Unfair Competition, Damages, and
Cancellation of Trademark with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. However, because Samson and his affiliate entities continued to sell and
distribute products with the general appearance of Caterpillar’s products, the latter filed 26
criminal complaints for unfair competition. Samson filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment citing
that there exist prejudicial questions pending litigation be fore the RTC of Quezon City. The
motion was granted by the RTC and suspended arraignment all proceedings in the Criminal Cases
until the Civil Case was resolved.

Caterpillar elevated the matter to CA by petition for certiorari. The petition was dismissed
by the CA Caterpillar failed to overcome the burden of sho wing how Samson acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the Samson’s motion and denying its own motion for
reconsideration. Hence Caterpillar appealed this decision.

G.R. No. 205972

Caterpillar requested the assistance of Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division of

the National Region Public Police (RIID -NCRPO) upon receiving information that Samson and his
affiliate entities continuously sold and distributed Caterpillar’s Cor e Marks without Caterpillar’s
consent. After Caterpillar’s Core Marks were seized and confiscated from Samson, the former
instituted criminal complaints in DOJ for violation of the IP Code.
The DOJ dismissed the complaint after the preliminary investigat ion upon finding that there was
no probable cause to charge samson with unfair competition. Caterpillar appealed to CA through a
petition for review, but was denied for lack of merit. Hence Caterpillar commenced G.R. No.
205972.

ISSUES:

Whether the CA erred in not holding that a criminal complaint for unfair competition can
proceed independently of, and simultaneously with, the civil case for the same.

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that the appeal in G.R. No. 164352 is meritorious. The Court noted
that Civil Case No. Q -00-41446, the civil case filed by Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City,
was for unfair competition, damages and cancellation of trademark, while Criminal Cases Nos. Q -
02-108043-44 were the criminal prosecution of Samson for unfair compe tition. A common element
of all such cases for unfair competition – civil and criminal – was fraud. Under Article 33 of the
Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought
by the injured party in cases of f raud, and such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution. In view of its being an independent civil action, Civil Case No. Q -00-41446
did not operate as a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. Q -02-108043-44.

The common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No.
8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action f or damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q -00-41446, which as
admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.

21. People vs. Romero, 306 SCRA 90

FACTS:

Complainant Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator from Butuan City. He came to know the
business of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation (SAIDECOR), when he
interviewed accused Martin Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez regarding the SAIDECOR’s
investment operations in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte. Romero w as the president and
general manager of SAIDECOR, while Rodriguez was the operations manager. SAIDECOR was
engaged in soliciting funds and investments from the public. Investors were given coupons
containing the capital and the return on the capital collec tible on the date agreed upon.

Ruiz went to SAIDECOR office to make an investment. After handing over the amount of his
investment to Rodriguez, Ruiz received a postdated Butuan City Rural Bank check instead of the
usual redeemable coupon. When the check was presented to the bank for payment, it was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Both Romero and Rodriguez could not be located and
demand for payment was made during the preliminary investigation of this case. Accused
responded that they had no money.

The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced each of them accordingly. They appealed.
During the pendency of the appeal, accused Rodriguez died.
ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the death of accused Rodriguez during the pendency of the criminal action
extinguishes his civil liability arising from the delict .

HELD:

Yes. The death of accused Rodriguez during the pendency of the criminal action extinguished his
civil liability arising from the delict.

Pursuant to the Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 4 which states that:

“The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall
extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict”

The doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict.

22. Magistrado vs. People, 527 SCRA 125

Facts: That on or about the 27th day of December, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and knowingly make an
untruthful statement under oath upon a material matter before a competent officer authorized to
receive and administer oath and which the law so require, to wit: the said accused subscribe and
swore to an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City, per Doc.
No. 168, Page No. 35, Book No. CLXXIV of her notarial registry, falsely alleging that he lost
Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N -173163, which document was used in support of a
Petition For Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title an d filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as LRC# Q -10052 (98) on January 28, 1998 and
assigned to Branch 99 of the said court, to which said Francisco M. Magistrado signed and swore
on its verification, per Doc. 413 Page 84 Book No. C LXXV Series of 1998 of Notary Public
Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City; the said accused kno wing fully well that the allegations in the
said affidavit and petition are false. the truth of the matter being that the property subject of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N -173163 was mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as
collateral for a loan in the amount of ₱ 758,134.42 and as a consequence of which said title to the
property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by virtue of said loan, thus, m aking
untruthful and deliberate assertions of falsehoods, to the damage and prejudice of the said Elena
M. Librojo.4
On 30 June 1999, petitioner filed a motion 5 for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial
question. Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q -98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of
money pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case
No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal C ase No.
90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the
issues raised in the criminal action.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or i n excess of her jurisdiction in denying the Petition for petitioner’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration on the ground of a prejudicial question pursuant to the
Rules on Criminal Procedure and the prevailing jurisprudence.
Ruling: MeTC-Branch 43, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil Case No. Q -98-34308
for cancellation of mortgage before the RTC -Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q -98-34349 for
collection of a sum of money before RTC -Branch 84, do not pose a prejudicial question in the
determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal Case No. 90721. RTC -Branch
83, likewise, did not err in ruling that MeTC -Branch 43 did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner’s motion for suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90721.
A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Case No. Q -98-34308 pending
before RTC-Branch 77, and Civil Case No. Q -98-34349, pending before RTC -Branch 84, are
principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtai ned by petitioner from private
respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered
by TCT No. N-173163. On the other hand, Criminal Case No. 90721 before MeTC -Branch 43,
involves the determination of whether pet itioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of
loss to support his request for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. N -173163
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other.
Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution
of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on wh ether petitioner knowingly and
fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N -173163.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension
of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution o f the civil case, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction
to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 29

23. Pimentel vs. Pimentel, 630 SCRA 436

FACTS:
On October 2004, private respondent Maria Pimentel filed a case for frustrated parricide against
Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC of Quezon City. On February 2005, petitioner
received summons ordering him to atte nd the pre-trial and trial of the civil case for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity before the RTC of
Antipolo. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceedings before the
RTC of Quezon City, on the ground that there exists a prejudicial question, and that the outcome
of the civil case would have a bearing, and is material to the resolution of the criminal case.
The RTC held that the pending civil case before the RTC of Antipolo does n ot pose a prejudicial
question, and that the criminal case can proceed despite the pendency of the civil case. On appeal
to the CA, the same was dismissed. The CA ruled that even if the civil case was resolved, and that
marriage between petitioner and resp ondent was declared void, this would be immaterial to the
criminal case of parricide, marriage not being an essential element of the crime.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case (for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage) constitutes a pre judicial
question that would warrant a suspension of the criminal case of frustrated parricide
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
First, the Court ruled that, to constitute a prejudicial question, the civil case must first be
instituted before the criminal action in accordance with Sec. 7 of Rule 111. In the present case,
the civil case was filed only after the criminal case.
Second, the annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question in a criminal case for parricide.
The relationship between the offend er and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder or homicide. However, the issue of annulment of marriage is not similar or so intimately
related to the criminal case. Further, such relationship is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. It is important to note that, at the time of the
commission of the crime of parricide, petitioner and respondent were still married. The
subsequent dissolution of marriage will have no effect whatsoever on the alleg ed crime that was
committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage.

24. J.M. Dominguez vs. Liclican, 764 SCRA 338 (7/28/15)

The Facts

During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc.
(JMD) held on December 2 9, 2007 at the Baguio City Country Club, the election for its new set of
directors was conducted. This event was presided by then company president, and herein
respondent, Cecilia Liclican (Liclican), and attended by her co -respondents Norma Isip (Isip) an d
Purita Rodriguez, and by petitioners Helen Dagdagan (Dagdagan), Patrick Pacis, Kenneth Pacis,
and Shirley Dominguez (Dominguez) as well. Conflict ensued when petitioners Patrick and
Kenneth Pacis were allegedly not allo wed to vote on the ground that they are not registered
stockholders of JMD. As pointed out, it was their mother and grandmother, both deceased, who
are the stockholders, and there is still no settlement of their respective estates to effectively
transfer their shares to Patrick and Kenneth Pacis. Tensions rose and respondents, allegedly,
walked out of the meeting. But since the remaining stockholders with outstanding shares
constituted a quorum, the election of officers still proceeded. After staging the walk -out,
respondents, on even date, executed a Board Resolution certifying that in the stockholders
meeting, the following were elected directors and officers of JMD.

Board of Directors:
1. Cecilia D. Liclican – Chairman and Presiding Officer
2. Norma D. Isip
3. Purita C. Dominguez
4. Tessie C. Dominguez, and
5. Shirley C. Dominguez
Officers:
1. Cecilia D. Liclican as President and Presiding Officer
2. Norma D. Isip as Vice -President
3. Gerald B. Cabrera as Corporate Se cretary/Treasurer and
4. Oscar Aquino – Financial Consultant Auditor

In reaction to the foregoing developments, petitioners Dagdagan, Patrick and Kenneth Pacis, and
Dominguez filed a Complaint against respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
(RTC) for nullification of meetings, election and acts of directors and officers, injunction and
other reliefs. The case, after a failed mediation, was referred for appropriate Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR) to Branch 7 of the RTC. Meanwh ile, petitioner stockholders immediately took
hold of corporate properties, represented themselves to JMD’s tenants as the true and lawful
directors of the company, and collected and deposited rents due the company to its bank account.

Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners Dagdagan and Patrick Pacis, executed an

Affidavit-Complaint dated December 15, 2008 charging respondents Liclican and Isip with
qualified theft. Petitioners alleged in the complaint, with the Office of the City Prosecutor in
Baguio City, that on January 2, 2008, Liclican and Isip, without any authority whatsoever,
conspired to withdraw from the corporation’s savings account with the Equitable -PCI Bank; and
that the follo wing day, they issued Check payable to cash, and to be drawn against JMD’s account
with Robinson’s Savings Bank. In a separate complaint, the corporation claimed that respondents
Liclican and Isip likewise issued Equitable -PCI Bank Check No. 320953 payable to one Atty.
Francisco Lava, Jr. to be debited from the corp oration’s account.
Consequently, the corresponding warrants were issued for the arrests of Isip and Liclican. In due
time, respondents lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, to annul and set aside the two (2)
Orders by the RTC Branch 7, anchored, among others, on the alleged existence of a prejudicial
question. According to respondents, petitioner stockholders, by filing the complaint -affidavit, are
already assuming that they are the legitimate directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the
intra-corporate dispute pending in the RTC, Branch 59.

The Issue

whether or not there exists a prejudicial question that could affect the criminal proceedings for
qualified theft against respondents.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of posi tive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word “capricious,” usually used in
tandem with the ter m “arbitrary,” conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus,
when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion is imperative.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson -Tabora acted with grave abuse of
discretion when she ordered the arr ests of respondents despite the existence of a prejudicial
question.

As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil

action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue t hat must be
pre-emptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because ho wsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting
decisions, and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case. To be sure, Civil Case
involves the same parties herein, and is for nullification of JMD’s meetings, election and acts of
its directors and officers, among others. Court intervention was sought to ascertain who between
the two contesting group of officers should rightfully be seated at the company’s helm. Without
Civil Case resolution, petitioners’ author ity to commence and prosecute Criminal Case against
respondents for qualified theft in JMD’s behalf remained questionable, warranting the suspension
of the criminal proceedings.

25. Fenequito vs. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113

FACTS: This is a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents filed by respondent
against petitioners with the City Prosecutor of Manila. Information was filed with the MeTC of Manila;
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case based on Absence of Probable Cause which MeTC
affirmed. Respondent appealed to RTC of Manila and set aside MeTC’s decision directing court to
proceed to trial. Petitioners elevated the case to CA but it was dismissed. CA ruled that the decision
of the RTC is interlocutory in nature and is not appealable. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in dismissing the petition for review on the ground that the remedy
availed of by petitioners is improper and whether the assistant city prosecutor had the authority to
appeal the case to the RTC.

HELD: The Court notes that the dismissal relied on petitioner’s failure to submit copies of pleadings
and relevant documents as required in Sec. 2 Rule 42 of RoC. They likewise, did not mention
anything about the Motion in accordance with Sec. 3 of the said Rule, which states that failure of
petitioner to comply with the requirements regarding the payment of docket and other lawful fees,
the deposit of costs, proof of service of petition, and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for dismissal thereof. The right to appeal is exercised only in a
manner in accordance with the provisions of the law. Deviations from the Rule cannot be tolerated.
RTC Decision is not final, but interlocutory in nature.

Prosecutor shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or
municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties
incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions." In consonance with the above-quoted provision, it
has been held by this Court that the fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution
of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal
circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts. Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with
the RTC of Manila, it is clear that the City Prosecutor or his assistant (in this case, the Assistant City
Prosecutor) had authority to file the same.

26. Burgundy Realty Corporations Vs. Reyes, 687 SCRA 524

FACTS:

Burgundy Realty Corporation filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari which seeks to
annul and set aside the Decision a nd Resolution of the CA.

Josefa “Jing” Reyes offered her services to Burgundy Realty Corporation as the latter’s
real estate agent in buying parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna which are to be converted into a
golf course. Reyes received an amount of PhP 23,423,327.50 after she informed the petitioner that
more or less 10 owners are willing to sell their properties. Reyes misappropriated this amount and
as a result, the petitioner sent a formal demand to Reyes to return the said amount. The petitioner
filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant City Prosecutor’s
Office of Makati.

Reyes denied having converted or misappropriated the involved amount of money. She
claimed that the said amount was used solely for the intended purpose and it was the petitioner
who requested her services in procuring the lots.

After the preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes, the Assistant Prosecutor
of Makati issued a resolution which recommends Reyes’s indictment of the crime of Estafa, an
information for the said crime was raffled before the RTC, Branch 149, Makati, City. Reyes filed
a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the Secretary of Justice through a resolution,
that directs the City Prosecutor of Makati to with draw the information for Estafa filed against
Reyes. Eventually, the Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with the CA, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and hence the petition.

ISSUES:

Whether the CA erred in not finding that the DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez, capriciously,
arbitrarily and whimsically disregarded the evidence on record sho wing the existence of probable
cause against private respondent for Estafa under Article 315 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that a review of the records would show that the investigating
prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes
did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven
by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels of land. Petitioner wrote a
demand letter for Reyes to return the same amount but was not heeded. Hence, the failure of
Reyes to deliver the titles or to return the entrusted money, despite demand and the duty to do so,
constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation. The words convert and misappropriate
connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's ow n, or of devoting
it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one's own use
includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right. In proving t he element of conversion or misappropriation, a
legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the
sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts. Thus, the
mere presumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude that a probable cause
exists for the indictment of Reyes for Estafa. As to whether the presumption can be rebutted by
Reyes is already a matter of defense that can be best presented or offered during a full -blo wn
trial.

To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable
cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a
state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does
not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

27. Abanado vs. Bayona, 677 SCRA 595

FACTS:

This case sprang from a Criminal Case entitled People of
City Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado filed the information
Bacolod City, which was eventually raffled to Branch 7
Abraham Bayona. Respondent ordered the office of the
evidence, relevant records, and documents to enable the
existence of probable cause.
the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr.
in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
thereof presided by respondent Judge
City Prosecutor to adduce additional
Court to evaluate and determine the
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted a copy of the Memorandum of the
Preliminary Investigation and informed respondent that the documents submitted by the parties for
preliminary investigation were already appended to the complaint. Co mplainant, then, explained
that there was no memorandum of transfer of the case from the investigating prosecutor to him.
Complainant discussed that the case was initially handled by ACP Jarder who found no probable
cause against Cresencio Palo, Sr., accus ed in Criminal Case No. 09 -03-16474. However,
complainant, upon review found that there was probable cause against Palo. Thus, complainant
disapproved ACP Jarder’s Resolution and filed the information in Court. The Office of the City
Prosecutor sent a letter explaining the impossibility of submitting the Jarder Resolution to the
Court, but the respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the City
Prosecutor and insisted that the Jarder Resolution should form part of the records of the ca se.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not respondent erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution when all
other pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation have been submitted to the
Court.

HELD:

YES. The conduct of a prelimina ry investigation is primarily an executive function. Thus, the
courts must consider the rules of procedure of the DOJ in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. An examination of the 2008
Revised Manual for Prosecutors of the Department of Justice - National Prosecution Service 31
(DOJ-NPS Manual), therefore, is necessary. There is nothing in the DOJ -NPS Manual requiring
the removal of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor recommending the d ismissal of a
criminal complaint after it was reversed by the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor.
Nonetheless, the Court also noted that attaching such a resolution to an information filed in Court
is optional under the aforementioned manual. The D OJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of
the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as practicable”;
thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules. In view of the foregoing, the
Court held that r espondent erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution when all
other pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation have been submitted to the
Court.

DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE:

The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primari ly an executive function. Thus, the courts
must consider the rules of procedure of the DOJ in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question.

28. Heirs of Nestor Tria vs. Obias 635 SCRA 91

Facts: Engr. Nestor Tria, Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Region V and concurrently Officer -In-Charge of the 2nd Engineering District of
Camarines Sur, was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was bro ught
to a hospital but died the following day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape. Subsequently,
the incident was investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On July 31, 1998,
NBI Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife, Chairman of Tas k Force Tria, recommended to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of Roberto "Obet" Aclan y Gulpo, Juanito
"Totoy" Ona y Masalonga and Atty. Epifania "Fanny" Gonzales -Obias, for the murder of Engr.
Tria.
Petitioners appealed to the Dep artment of Justice (DOJ) assailing the Provincial Prosecutor’s
order to dismiss the charge against respondent. 9 On January 25, 2000, then Justice Secretary
Serafin Cuevas issued a Resolution10 modifying the July 2, 1999 resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor and directing the latter to include respondent in the information f or murder filed
against Aclan and Ona. Respondent along with Aclan and Ona filed a motion for reconsideration
of the DOJ’s January 25, 2000 resolution. 13 On September 17, 2001, then Justice Secretary
Hernando B. Perez issued a resolution denying respondent’s motion for reconsideration. 15
In the meantime, the informatio n charging Aclan and Ona has already been filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur. On October 8, 2001, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal with the DOJ under the provisions of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987. 18 In a
letter dated December 3, 2001 addressed to respondent’s counsel, the DOJ denied respondent’s
notice of appeal on the ground that pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 1266 dated November
4, 1983, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 58 dated June 30, 1993, appeals to the OP
where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is "reclusion perpetua to death," shall be
taken by petition for review. 19 Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her
notice of appeal.20
On February 6, 2002, the DOJ denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration stating that the
proper procedure is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not before the
DOJ. Hence, the case was considered closed and terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s dismissal of the
murder charge.
Ruling: On the procedural issue raised by the petitioners, we hold that the OP did not err in taking
cognizance of the appeal of respondent, and that t he CA likewise had jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue of probable cause in a petition challenging the OP’s ruling.
Memorandum Circular No. 58 34 provides:
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice
on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President,
except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death wherein new and
material issues are raised which were not previously presented before the Department of Justice
and were not ruled upon in the subject decision/order/resolution, in which case the President may
order the Secretary of Justice to reo pen/review the case, provided, that, the prescription of the
offense is not due to lapse within six (6) months from notice of the questioned
resolution/order/decision, and provided further, that, the appeal or petition for review is filed
within thirty (30) days from such notice.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the jurisdiction of the
Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed
outright and no order shall be issued requiring the payment of the appeal fee, the submission of
appeal brief/memorandum or the elevation of the records to the Office of the President from the
Department of Justice.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 35 we clarified that the justice secretary is not precluded from
exercising his power of review over the investigating prosecutor even after the information has
already been filed in court. However, the justice secretary’s subsequent resolution withdrawing
the information or dismissing the case does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case.
In fact, the court is duty -bound to exercise judicial discretion and its own independent judgment
in assessing the merits of the resulting motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution,
Petitioners’ argument that the non -referral by the OP to the DOJ of the appeal or motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent had deprived them of the opportunity to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses on those affidavits belatedly submitted by the respondent is likewise
untenable. Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amend ed,38 in case the investigating prosecutor
conducts a hearing where there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness, "[t]he
parties can be prese nt at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross -examine. They may,
however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness
concerned."39 Hence, the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the motion for reconsideration of
respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not violate petitioners’ right to due process.
Preliminary investigation is executive in charac ter. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It
is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be
reasonably charged with a crime. 54 Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal
offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of
Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive
determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse. 55

29. Uy vs. Javellana, 680 SCRA 13

FACTS:

An administrative case was filed again st Judge Javellana arising

from a verified complaint for “gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and
unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others,” filed by Public
Attorneys Uy and Bascug of the Public Attorneys Office. The
complaint/allegations involve cases decided and/or were handled by
Judge Javellana and his alleged business relation as co -agent in a
surety company. In People vs Lopez, a case of malicious mischief,
Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
and, instead, conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for
arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainan t
and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts
alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for
dismissal of said case.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on

Summary Procedure.

HELD:

Yes. Without any showing that the accused in People vs Lopez,

et al were charged with the special cases of malicious mischief
particularly described in Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code the
appropriate penalty for the accused would be arre sto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods which under Article 329(a) of the
Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and
one (1) day to six (6) months. Clearly, this case should be governed by
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. A lso, the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation
prior to the filing of a criminal case under Rule 16, but in People vs.
Lopez, Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even
when it was not required or justified.
 Section 11 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure states:

“How commenced. – The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope
of this Rule shall be etiher by complaint or by information; Provided,
however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such
cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the
offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.”

On the other hand, Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted
before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the
penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously established
herein, the maximum penalty imposable for

30. People vs. Valencia, 214 SCRA 89

FACTS: The People's version of the facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General is as
follows:
"Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., aged five and three,
respectively, and her mother, residents of 2008 F. Muñoz St., Paco, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m. of
March 19, 1989, she noticed appellant standing five steps away from the ope n door of her house
and holding a sumpak. Seized with fear, she closed the door. After a few moments, heard a burst
of gunfire followed by cries of pain from her children inside the house. she immediately went
outside and shouted for help. As she did, she saw appellant running away, carrying the sumpak.
That same evening, an investigator, interviewed Jimenez at the hospital about the shooting
incident, while still in shock, Jimenez forgot to mention the name of appellant as the one who shot
her children
Early next morning, the policemen were led by Rolando Valencia to the residence of his aunt,
where he believed appellant was sleeping. The police apprehended appellant there and took him to
the Ong Detachment for initial investigation. He was indorsed to th e police headquarters for
further investigation in the evening of March 22, 1989. At 12:20 a.m. of the follo wing day,
Annabelle died as a result of the gunshot wounds she suffered. The other child, Samuel Jr., who
was shot, was discharged from the hospital one week after the incident,
On March 30, 1989, two Informations for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide, were filed against
the accused -appellant.
When arraigned, the accused -appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial then proceeded resulting in
accused-appellant's conviction as above stated.
ISSUE:
In finding that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the defendant -appellant beyond
reasonable doubt in spite of the fact that there was allegedly no preliminary investigation, and
that no sufficient evidence exists proving his guilt; and
HELD:
The accused -appellant decries the fact that he was denied the right of preliminary investigation.
This is not true.
A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule
113, Rules of Court should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. Under said Section 7, Rule 112, the prosecuting officer can
file the Information in court without a preliminary investigation, w hich was done in the accused -
appellant's case.
Since the records do not show whether the accused -appellant asked for a preliminary investigation
after the case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused -appellant signified his readiness to
be arraigned, the Court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary
investigation, when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment.

31. PCGG vs. Navarro-Gutierrez, 773 SCRA

FACTS: PCGG filed a complaint, through the Legal Consultant in -charge of reviewing behest
loan cases--- against former officers and directors of the DBP as well as former officers/
stockholders of National Galleon Shipping Corporation, for violation of Secs. 3 (e) and (g) of
R.A. 3019. FVR created the Ad Hoc Committee to identify various anomalous behest loans
entered into the government in the past. Ombudsman found not probable cause against private
respondents and the complaint was dismissed. It found that the evidence attached were not
sufficient where it contained merely most of executive summaries and technical reports.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no
probable cause to indict respondents of vio lating Scetions 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.

HELD: The petition is of merit. The Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s
action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. It finds that the Ombudsman gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause.
It was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG’s findings contained in the
Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self -
serving, and of little probative value.
Probable cause are such facts sufficient to engender a well -founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not require an inquiry
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
The deter mination of probable cause can rest partially or even entirely, on hearsay
evidence, as long as the person making the hearsay s tatement is credible and as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adj udicate rights and obligations of parties.
There is probable cause to indict individual respondents of violating Secs. 3 (e) and (g) of
R.A. 3019. Petition granted.

32. De Lima vs. Reyes, 779 SCRA

FACTS:

Secretary of Justice Leila de Lima filed a Petit ion for Review on Certiorari to assail the
decision and Resolution of the CA which rendered null and void Department Justice Order No.
710 issued by the Secretary of Justice. The Department Order created a second panel of
prosecutors to conduct reinvestiga tion of a murder case in view of the first panel of prosecutors’
failure to admit the complainant’s additional evidence.
 Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also kno wn as “Doc Gerry” was shot dead and it was
alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr.
Ortega. Soon after Secretary de Lima issued a Department Order creating a special panel of
prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation.

Dr. Ortega’s wife, Dr. Patricia Gloria Inocencio -Ortega (Dr. Incencio -Ortega) filed a
Supplemental Affidavit Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as mastermind of her
husband’s murder which was dismissed in a Resolution issued by the First Panel after it has
concluded its preliminary investigation. C onsequently, Dr. Inocencio -Ortega filed a Motion to Re -
Open Preliminary Investigation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam which were
both denied by the First Panel in a resolution.

Sec. de Lima issued a Department Order creating a new pane l of investigators (Second
Panel) to conduct reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel issued a Resolution finding
probable cause and recommending the filing of all information on all accused, including former
Governor Reyes. Former Governor Reyes file d before the CA a Supplemental Petition. Thereafter
CA rendered a Decision declaring Department Order No. 710 null and void reinstating the First
Panel’s Resolution. The Secretary of Justice filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA in a Resolution and hence the petition.

ISSUES:

Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu proprio another panel of
prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, the Secretary
of Justice may motu proprio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or
the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for review . Section 4 states:

SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the investigating prosecutor
finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He
shall certify under oath in the informa tion that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized
officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;
that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and
that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall
recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
. . . .

If upon petition by a proper part y under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned
either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation,
or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. The
same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

33. Saraum vs. People, 781 SCRA (1/25/16)

Saraum vs. People, 781 SCRA (1/25/16)
FACTS:

PO3 Larrobis thru an informant was informed of illegal drug activities in Barangay Lorega , Cebu
City. A buy-bust team was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis and 4 other police officers
against a certain "Pata." The operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA. After preparing all the necessary documents and s ubmitting it to PDEA, the team
proceeded to the subject area.

During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty where the buy -bust
team follo wed him. Inside the house, the buy -bust team also saw Saraum and Esperanza, who wer e
holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. They
recovered from Saraum’s possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter).
PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic pac k of misua wrapper, and made
initial markings ("A" for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police station, PO3 Larrobis
marked as "AIS-08-17-2006" the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the case was filed,
the subject items were turned over to th e property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor.

At the Police station, PO3 Larrobis marked as “AIS -08-17-2006” the paraphernalia recovered
from Saraum. After the case files, the subject items were turned over to the property custodian of
the office of City Prosecutor. By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged
offense. He testified that on the date and time in question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on
his way to the house of his parents -in-law when he was held by men with fi rearms. They were
already with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he had not
committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only when he
was brought to the court. The accused was convi cted in the RTC. The decision of RTC was
affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the accused is guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drug Act?

HELD:

YES. Saraum failed to show any arbitrariness, palpable error, or capriciousness on the findings o f
fact of the RTC and CA, such findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and
binding. After a review of the records, it was found that the CA did not err in affirming his
conviction.

The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrume nt, apparatus and other paraphernalia
for dangerous drugs under RA 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or introdu cing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such
possession is not authorized by law.

The Prosecution has convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug
paraphernalia, Saraum was arrested during the commission of crime, which instance d oes not
require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is
committing or attempting to commit or has just committed a n offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

34. Comerciante vs. People, 763 SCRA 587

Facts: According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent
Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag)
were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visi t a friend at Private Road,
Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private
Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante
and a certain Erick Dasilla 7 (Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper and unpleasant
movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may
contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla At a distance of
around five (5) meters, P03 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and
Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white cryst alline substance from them.
A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu. 8
Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section
11, Article II of RA 9165.
Ruling: The petition is meritorious. The exclusionary rule is not, ho wever, an absolute and rigid
proscription. One of the recognized exceptions establi shed by jurisprudence is a search incident to
a lawful arrest. 24 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made - the process cannot be reversed. 25 Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows:
SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an o ffense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal kno wledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has esc aped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
On the basis of such testimony, the Court finds it hig hly implausible that P03 Calag, even
assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy -
especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed
of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very
small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be
properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that the fo rmer
had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing
around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his compa nion were sho wing "improper
and unpleasant movements" as put by P03 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order
to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. 31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his
fellow officers arrest persons in possession of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illega l
drugs when he was still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what
he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu. 32
In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante' s acts of standing around with a companion and
handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts.1âwphi1 These circumstances
are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal ac tivity which would constitute a
"genuine reason" for P03 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light,
the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arres t nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all
criminal liability.

35. Luz vs. People, 667 SCRA 421

FACTS:
On March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza , who was then
assigned as a traffic enforcer saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive
and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; this prompted him to flag
down the accused for violating a m unicipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet
while driving said motor vehicle, he invited the accused to come inside their sub -station since the place is
almost in front of the said sub -station. He was alerted of the accused’s un easy movement and thus asked
to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket, as the latter may have a weapon inside it; the accused
obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel -like tin or metal
container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors
and one (1) Swiss knife; upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; after the
accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four
(4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs as the substances are
positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision. Upon a
petition for review on certiorari, petitioner claims that there was no law ful search and seizure, because
there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since
he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming
there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.

RULING:
There was no valid arrest. When the petitioner was flagged down for committing a traffic violation,
he was not, by the fact itself (ipso facto) and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual to uching of the body,
or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention
on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. There being no valid arrest, the
warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. The following are the instances when a
warrantless search is allowed:

(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

(ii) search of evidence in “plain view;”
 (iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search;
(v) customs search;
(vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and
(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.

None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to
this case.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very concrete
evidence (corpus delicti) of the crime illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, the ir inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

36. Antiquera vs. People, 712 SCRA, 12/11/2013

37. People Vs. Vasuez, 714 SCRA, 1/15/2014

FACTS:
An informant went to the police and reported that a certain Don Vasquez was engaged in
illegal drug activity. So, the police conducted a buy -bust operation wherein one female officer
posed as a buyer and convinced Don to meet with her for the said transact ion. After the exchange
of drugs and money, the rest of the police team started arresting Vasquez and later on seized the
objects of the crime.
RTC rendered Don Vasquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Secs. 15 and 16, Art. II I of R.A. 6425 for illegal possession and selling of shabu. This was
affirmed by CA and ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crime.
Don appealed his case to the SC to impugn his conviction on two grounds: (1) purported
illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the police officers (2) his supposed
authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from him. He argues that the police officers did not
have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arres ted, despite the fact that the
police officers allegedly had ample time to secure it.
ISSUE: Whether the arrest of Don Vasquez was valid.
HELD: The Court ruled that Don can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. Having failed to
move for the quashing of the information against them before arraignment, appellants are now
estopped form questioning the legality of their arrest. Be as it may, the fact of the matter is that
he was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover pol ice in a buy-bust
operation. This falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. It is a valid warrantless arrest.
The follo wing are the instances when a wa rrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in “plain view”; (iii) search of a moving
vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a “stop and frisk” search; and
(vi) exigent and emergency circumstances.
38. Zuno vs. Cabebe, 444 SCRA 382

FACTS:

This administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaint of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño of the Department of Justice, against Alejandrino C. Cabebe . The charges are
knowingly rendering an unjust judgement, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.

Chief State Prosecutor Zuño alleged that Criminal Case No. 3950 -18 for illegal possession
of regulated drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte. All
the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The respondent judge motu proprio issued an
Order granting bail to the accused without the accused’s application for bail.

The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration but instead of acting thereon,
respondent judge issued an order inhibiting himself from proceeding with the case, reali zing that
what he did was patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be dismissed
From the service with forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.

ISSUES:

Whether Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe erred in gra nting bail to the accused without the
accused’s application for bail.

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that there is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the
accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of t he Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as follo ws:

"Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of sho wing that evidence of guilt is
strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may rec all any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
testify."

"Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. In the application for bail under section 8 of this
Rule, the court must give re asonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to
submit his recommendation. (18a)"

The respondent Judge did not conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus
depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose object ions to the grant of bail.
Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of
the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and
the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
39. Govt of HK Spec. Adm. Region vs. Olalia

FACTS:

For the resolution of the SC is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the RTC Manila (presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.). These are: (1) the Order allowing Juan Antonio
Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated denying the motion to vacate the
said first Order filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine De partment of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that
both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potentia l
extraditee.

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect
on June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong revert ed back to the People’s Republic of China and became the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Se ction 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest wer e issued against him.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the NBI
which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila a n application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

CA rendered its Decision declaring the Ord er of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari and praying
that the Decision of the CA be reversed.

The SC rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the
Order of Arrest against private respondent.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. For his part,
private respondent filed , in the same case, - a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, the Judge issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a h igh "flight risk."
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail.
This was granted by respondent judge in an Order allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The
petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the i ssues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to rep ort to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

ISSUE(S):

Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

HELD:

NO. Private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaran teed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impa ired,
thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the
first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective
extraditee may be granted bail.

As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flo ws from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt". It foll o ws that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion".
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to
bail in criminal proceedings for the aforemention ed offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the
right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

The SC noted that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.

The SC has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail
has been allo wed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed
in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Phil ippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is
not impaired.

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and
the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the de manding state.

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it
entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed
to attain the purpose of extradition is al so "the machinery of criminal law."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a

criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to tra nsfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.

Records sho w that private respondent had been detained for o ver two (2) years without having
been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extra dition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, ho wever, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the po tential extraditee. This is based on the assumption
that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee
thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines sh ould diminish a potential extraditee’s rights
to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should
not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard
for the grant is satisfactorily met.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled t o bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If
not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

40. Leviste vs. CA, 615 SCRA 619

FACTS:

For the resolution of the SC is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the RTC Manila (presided by
respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.). These are: (1) the Order allowing Juan Antonio
Muñoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated denying the motion to vacate the
said first Order filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philip pine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that
both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a p otential
extraditee.

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong
Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect
on June 20, 1997.

On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violatio n of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and
October 25, 1999, warrants of arr est were issued against him.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the NBI
which, in turn, filed with the RTC of M anila an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent.

On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

On October 14, 1999, p rivate respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas
corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.

CA rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari and praying
that the Decision of the CA be reversed.

The SC rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the
Order of Arrest against private respondent.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case, - a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.

After hearing, the Judge issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail.
This was granted by respondent judge in an Order allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The
petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer t he issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails
in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for
hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be fi led with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner fi led an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.

ISSUE(S):

Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
proceedings.

HELD:
NO. Private respondent maintained that the right to bail gu aranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of one’s liberty.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired,
thus:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the
first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective
extraditee may be granted bail.

As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flo ws from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt". It follo ws that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion".
Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to
bail in criminal proceedings for the aforemen tioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the
right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

The SC noted that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.

The SC has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail
has been allo wed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international
conventions to uphold human rights.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.

Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed
in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Phil ippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is
not impaired.
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and
the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the de manding state.

But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it
entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed
to attain the purpose of extradition is al so "the machinery of criminal law."

Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a

criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of
liberty, and forced to tra nsfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.

Records sho w that private respondent had been detained for o ver two (2) years without having
been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extra dition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, ho wever, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the
Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal
proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is premised on the presumption of
innocence of the accused. As Purganan correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the
ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary
detention" is the possibility of flight of the po tential extraditee. This is based on the assumption
that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee
thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted
bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign
relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines sh ould diminish a potential extraditee’s rights
to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should
not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard
for the grant is satisfactorily met.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent is entitled t o bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If
not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

41. Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, 767 SCRA, 8/18/15; 796 SCRA

FACTS:
On June 5, 2014 Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged by the Office of the Ombudsman
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriations under the Priorit y Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). The case is a
petition for certiorari to annul the decision of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to fix bail
and Motion for Reconsideration on the following grounds: (a) The prosecution failed to show
conclusively that Enrile, if ever convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; (b) The
prosecution failed to show that evidence of Enrile’s guilt is strong; (c) Enrile is not a flight risk.

ISSUE: Whether or not Enrile can bail?

RULING:
Yes. The purpose of the bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial. It is
the Philippine’s responsibility in the international community under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights “….of protecting and promoting the right of every pers on to liberty and due
process…under the obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail”. Enrile is not a flight risk be cause of his social and political standing and his
having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon being charged in court. The currently
fragile state of Enrile’s health is a compelling justification for his admission to bail. (Chronic
hypertension, diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia,
etc.)

42. Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan, 844 SCRA 244 (2017)

FACTS:
On September 16, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received the report of the National Bureau
of Investigatio n (NBI), regarding its investigation on several persons, including Napoles, former
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) and his former Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes
(Reyes). In its report, the NBI recommended to prosecute Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Reyes,
and several other named individuals for the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section
2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7080, as amended, for essentially misappropriating former Senator
Enrile's Priority Development Assistant Fund (PDA F) through non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that were selected without the required bidding procedure.
In an Information, Napoles, together with former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald John Lim and
John Raymund De Asis, were charged with Plunder filed w ith the Sandiganbayan. Napoles filed
her Petition for Bail, arguing that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed the credibility of the State witnesses
(otherwise referred to as whistleblo wers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with bias,
and baseless. Citing the res inter alios acta rule, Napoles submitted that the testimonies of these
whistleblowers are inadmissible against her.
In view of Napoles' application for bai l, the Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings. The
prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a) Carmencita N. Delantar, then Director in the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM); (b) Susan P. Garcia, an Assistant Commissioner
in the Commission on Audit (COA), and the former Director of the Special Audit Office; (c) Ryan
P. Medrano, the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer from the FIO, Office of the
Ombudsman; (d) Marina Cortez Sula, former employee of Napoles; (e) Mary Arlene Joyce
Baltazar, former bookkeeper for JLN Corporation; (f) Merlina P. Suñas, former employee of
Napoles; (g) Benhur K. Luy, former finance officer of Napoles; and (h) Ruby Chan Tuason,
former Social Secretary of former President Joseph E. Estrada.
The prosecution likewise presented the following supposed beneficiaries of former Senator
Enrile's PDAF projects, all of whom identified their respective sworn statements before the
Sandiganbayan. The defense also stipulated that: (a) the witnesses occupied their respective
positions at the time material to the case; (b) they were unaware that their respective
municipalities were recipients of livelihood projects from former Senator Enrile's PDAF; (c) they
did not receive any agricultural package or livelihood training from for mer Senator Enrile, the
implementing agencies of his PDAF, or from any NGO; and (d) they did not sign or prepare any
ackno wledgment receipt or liquidation documents pertaining to the transactions. Furthermore, the
prosecution presented another group of ben eficiaries, whose testimonies were subject of the same
stipulations.
After the conclusion of the prosecution's presentation of evidence, Napoles manifested that she is
not presenting any evidence for her bail application.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Resolutions denying Napoles' application for bail.
HELD:
While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the conviction of the accused,
those charged with a capital offense is granted bail only when the evidence of guilt is not strong:
Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or a n offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)
The trial court is thus granted the discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt
on the part of the accused. The trial court may also deny the application for bail when the accused
is a flight risk, notwithstanding the prosecution's evidence on the guilt of the accused. In
exercising this discretion, the tr ial court should receive the parties' evidence at a hearing duly
scheduled for this purpose. The prosecution and the accused are granted reasonable opportunity to
prove their respective positions: on the part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong, and on the part of the defense, the opposite. The hearing is summary and
limited to the determination of the weight of evidence for purposes of granting or denying bail.
The denial or refusal must be supported by a summary of the prosecution's evidence.
In Cortes v. Catral, this Court laid do wn the following duties of the trial court in cases of an
application for bail:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Sections 7 and 8,
supra).
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Other wise petition should b e denied.
Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the imposable penalty of
reclusion perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when the evidence of her guilt is strong. This
was the burden that the prosecution assumed in the subse quent hearings that followed the filing of
Napoles' Petition for Bail before the Sandiganbayan. As a trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn,
possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence of the prosecution and the defense. At
that stage of the proceedings, the bail hearings are limited to the determination of whether there is
a strong presumption of Napoles' guilt. It is merely a preliminary determination, and the
Sandiganbayan may deny admission to bail even when there is reasonable doubt as t o the guilt of
Napoles.
As a lesser quantum of proof than guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Sandiganbayan may deny the
application for bail on evidence less than that required for the conviction of Napoles.
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan "does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as
to the weight that ought to be allo wed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate
on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted." It
should not be forgotten that the purpose of the bail hearing is to determine whether the accused is
entitled to provisional liberty before conviction. To require more from the prosecution, as well as
from the trial court, effectively defeats the purpose of the proceeding.
43. Altobano-Ruiz vs. Pichay, 856 SCRA 1

FACTS: Ruiz and Paran are the accused in an adultery case pending in MTCC of Cavite. Paran
was apprehended in his residence in QC by Paranaque officer by virtue of warrant of arrest by
Judge Mapili. He wa s detained for several days in Paranaque station. Paran filed an application
for bail in Paranaque approved by Judge Pichay after his posting of cash bond. On the other hand,
Ruiz voluntarily surrended before Judge Mapili and was temporarily released upon cash bond as
well. Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay has no authority to approve Paran’s application for bail since
the latter already has a pending criminal case for adultery in another court, and was actually
arrested in QC which was outside Pichay’s territ orial jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pichay had no authority to approve Paran’s application for
bail
HELD: Indeed, the only circumstance where Judge Pichay can exercise authority to
rule on Paran’s bail application is if the latter, who was de tained in Parañaque City,
was not yet charged with a criminal offense in another court, pursuant to Section
17(c), 9 Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
However, in the instant case, there was already a pending criminal case against Paran
before the MTCC, Trece Martires, Cavite as shown in the Certificate of
Detention 1 0 attached in Paran’s application of bail. In fact, Paran’s arrest was by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Mapili of the MTCC, Trece Martires City.
More importantly, Judge Pichay likewise failed to prove that there was no available
judge to act on Paran’s application of bail in the said respective courts. Clearly, Judge
Pichay’s approval of Paran’s bail constituted an irregularity arising from his lack of
the authority to do so.
Judges should ensure strict compliance therewith at all times in their respective
jurisdictions. 1 4 Judge Pichay cannot excuse himself from the consequences of his action
by invoking good faith. As a judge, he must have the basic rules at the palm of his
hands as he is expected to maintain professional competence at all times. Since Judge
Pichay presides over MeTC -Br. 78 in Parañaque City, his territorial jurisdiction is
confined therein. Therefore, to approve bail applications and issue corresponding
release orders in a case pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction,
constitute ignorance of the law so gross as to amount to incompetence.

44. A.M. No. 18-07-5-SC: Rule on Precautionary Hold Departure Order, August 7,
2018

45. Del Castillo v. People, 664 SCRA

46. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, 675 SCRA

FACTS: Vice Mayor and other local officials of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter -
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman -Mindanao charging the petitioner, Fernando Miguel,
of violations of R.A. 3019 (Antigraft and Corrupt Practices Act) in connection with the
consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal Public Market. The Ombudsman directed the
petitioner to submit his counter -affidavit. After moving for an extension, the petitioner filed his
counter-affidavit. Thereafter, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and
some other private individuals for violation of RA 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Documents under Art. 171 par. 4 of the RPC. The Ombudsman filed the
corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner 10
days to file his counter -affidavit with the OSP. Instead of submitting his counter -affidavit,
petitioner asked for another 3 -day extension and afterwhich another 20 -day extension. Despite the
given extensions, the petitioner still failed to file his counter -affidavit prompting prosecutor
Norberto B. Ruiz to declare the petitioner to have waived his right to submit countervailing
evidence. Ombudsman approved the resolution. After several extensions sought and granted, the
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. The
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigat ion this,
despite the OSPs earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure
to submit his counteraffidavit. After the arraignment, the OSP file a Motion to Suspend Pendente
Lite. The petitioner filed his Vigorous Oppositio n based on the obvious and fatal defect in the
information. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner
pendent lite The petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded pre -
suspension hearing. T he Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari
petition to challenge the validity of the suspension order.
ISSUES: Whether the absence of an actual pre -suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension
order against the petition er.
HELD: No. In Bedruz vs Sandiganbayan, the court considered the opposition of the accused
(Motion to Suspend Pendente Lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the
prosecution’s motion for hearing. In the case at bar, while there wa s no pre-suspension hearing
held to deter mine the validity of the information/suspension, the court believed that the pleadings
filed for and against them achieved the goal of the procedure. The right to due process is satisfied
not by just oral arguments but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’
pleadings, memoranda and other position papers. Since a pre -suspension hearing is basically a due
process requirement, when an accused public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard
on his possible defenses against a mandatory suspension under RA 3019, then an accused would
have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be
heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may b e heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no
denial of procedural due process exists.
The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelli gible terms
and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the
offense charged.

47. People v. Lara, 678 SCRA

FACTS:
Lara was arrested and, later, charged with Robbery with Homicide
for stealing San Sebastian Inc.’s money, amounting to more or less Php
230,000.00, and for the death of one Joselito Bautista in the occasion
thereof. When police operatives seized Lara, the latter was placed in a
police line-up whereby Enrique Sumulong, Jeff Atie, and Virgilio Manac ob
identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. Consequently, the Pasig
RTC convicted Lara of the crime charged. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed this decision. Lara’s case reached the Supreme Court via
an automatic appeal from the Court of Appeals. At this juncture, he
argues, among others, that he was not assisted by counsel when the
police placed him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the
prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. He
maintains that the police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his
right to counsel had already attached.

ISSUE:
Whether or not police line up is a part of custodial investigation.

HELD:
Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is
deemed waived.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial
investigation begins. However, being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
This is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

48. Sanico vs. People, 754

FACTS:

Jose “Pepe” Sanico and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for trespassing and theft of
minerals in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon -Carmen-Sogod, Cebu (MCTC) for Violation
of Section 103 of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995. Sanico’s counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC. Consequently, the RTC in Danao City
ordered Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC ruled on
the dismissal of the Appeal.

Atty. Dennis Cañete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a motion for reconsideration vis -à-vis
the dismissal of the appeal, stating that Sanico had not filed the memorandum on appea l because he
had been beset with problems due to his wife’s debilitating illness which eventually claimed her life,
as well as his counsel, Atty. Baring’s own medical condition which caused her to forget how she got
this case and whom to contact as princip al counsel hereof. The RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration because of its lack of verification and affidavit of merit; and because the supposed
sickness of Sanico’s wife and the lapses of Atty. Baring were not justifiable reasons.

Sanico, through At ty. Cañete, filed a petition for review in the CA, contesting his conviction, and
assailing the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file the memorandum on appeal.

On April 14, 2011, the CA denied the petition for review on the following grounds, namely :
(a) the docket fees were not paid;
(b) there was no proper proof of service of a copy of the petition for review on the adverse party;
(c) the petitioner did not furnish to the RTC a copy of the petition for review; (d) there was no
affidavit of service;
(e) no written explanation for not resorting to personal filing was filed;
(f) the documents appended to the petition were only plain photocopies of the certified true copies;
(g) no copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record we re attached;
(h) the verification and certification of non -forum shopping were defective due to failure to contain
a statement that the allegations therein were based on the petitioner’s personal knowledge;
(i) the verification and certification of non -forum shopping did not contain competent evidence of
identity of the petitioner; and
(j) the serial number of the commission of the notary public and the office address of the notary
public were not properly indicated.

The petitioner moved for reconsid eration, but his motion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the negligence of the petitioner’s counsel should be binding on the petitioner.

HELD:

In our view, however, we do not need to belabor the point with a lengthy discussion. Without doubt,
the petitioner could reasonably expect that his counsel would afford to him competent legal
representation. The mere failure of the counsel to observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the
protection of the interests of the petitioner as the client – as manifested in the multiple defects and
shortcomings discovered in the petition for review – was gross negligence in any language because
the defects were plainly avoidable by the simple application of the relevant guidelines existing in the
Rules of Court. If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result was so
serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation ought to be re -
opened to give to the client another chance to present his case. The legit imate interests of the
petitioner, particularly the right to have his conviction reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal,
should not be sacrificed in the altar of technicalities.

49. People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216

50. Villareal v. People 664 SCRA

FACTS:
Leonardo “Lenny” Villa (neophyte) a freshman law student of Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified his intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). He was subjected to traditional Aquilan “initiation rites” were the accused non-
resident or alumni members Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal subjected the neophytes to
“paddling” and rounds of physical pain. Lenny received a strong paddle blow which has sent him
sprawling to the ground. The Aquilans rushed him to the h ospital were Lenny was pronounced
dead.

Criminal cases were filed against 35 Aquilans, twenty -six of the accused were jointly
tried. The trial against the remaining nine accused was held in abeyance due to certain matters
that had to be resolved first. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, the criminal
case against the remaining nine accused commenced a new wherein the criminal liability of each
accused was modified according to their participation. The Trial Court dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
 Gerarda Villa, Lenny’s mother assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case involving 4
of the 9 accused. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right to s peedy trial within a
reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for delay, as
the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the
appellate court.

ISSUES:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca and Adriano for Violation
of the right of the accused to speedy trial.

RULING:
No. The Court ruled that the righ t of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in
Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial
free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive. In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do mo re than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. The conduct
of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also, to be considered are factors such
as the length of delay, the assertion or n onassertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon
the defendant.

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or

inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused
amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases - a clear violation of the right of the
accused to a speedy disposition of cases. Thus, we held:

The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition
of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where
the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act
promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information which was
filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right
to a speedy disposition of the case. So, it must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by
the Ombud sman has dragged on for a decade already.

51. People vs. Estomaca – 256 SCRA 421

FACTS:

Melchor Estomaca, an illiterate laborer, was charged in RTC of Iloilo City with 5 criminal cases
of rape. The complainant is his daughter Estelita Estomaca who accused his father of raping her
on five separate occasions.

During the arraignment, Melchor pleaded guilty to the 5 charges against him. Ho wever, when
asked if despite the imposition of death penalty, he would still insist on his pleas of guilty in the
5 cases, he answered that he only performed 2 acts. At the subsequent hearing, when he was asked
whether the plea was voluntary, without force or intimidation from anyone else, he answered in
the negative. He was then asked if he intend to present evi dence, he likewise answered in the
negative, so the court asked the prosecution to present evidence instead.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not all five criminal complaints were actually read, translated or explained to
appellant in a language or dialect kno wn to him taking into consideration his comprehension and
education.

HELD:

NO. There was no record that appellant fully understood the language used. It is very important
that complaints should have been read in the local dialect.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court Rule 116 Section 1(a), “the arraignment must be
made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him wheth er he
pleads guilty or not guilty.

No valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Hence, the court set aside the
criminal cases convicting Melchor of 2 crimes of rape and remanded to the trial court for further
and appropriate proceedings.

52. People vs. Pangilinan – 518 SCRA 359

FACTS: Alfredo Pangilinan was charged with 2 informations for the rape of his daughter, AAA.
He was arrested and detained with no bail recommended. He then filed a petition for bail. The
petition for bail was heard and prosecution presented evidence. The Regional Trial Court denied
petition Defense then presented its evidence. The RTC after having discovered that Pangilinan
was not yet arraigned, scheduled his arraignment. Pangilinan pleaded not guilty. RTC convicted
him and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arraignment was valid.
HELD: YES. Pangilinan assails his conviction because he was not properly arraigned. Since he
was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision, said irregularity , he argues, is a
procedural error which is prejudicial to the appellant and is tantamount to denial of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. He claims that his subsequent
arraignment did not cure the defect in the trial pr oceedings because at the time the petition for
bail was heard, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person. The accused is
mistaken. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.19 In the case at bar, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arr ested on 19 March 1997. His
arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person. Arraignment
is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of t he accusation against him. The purpose of arraignment is,
thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm
of the State is mobilized against him. Ad mittedly, appellant was arraigned after the case was
submitted for decision. The question is: Were appellant’s rights and interests prejudiced by the
fact that he was arraigned only at this stage of the proceedings? We do not think so. Appellant’s
belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel
participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. In
fact, his counsel even cross -examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active
participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against
him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and informed the court of this blunder.
Moreover, no pro test was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned. The parties did not
question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It is only now, after being convicted and
sentenced to two death sentences, that appellant cries that his constitutional righ t has been
violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect. This Court will not allow it. In
People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised under similar
circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of appellan t was conducted after the cases had
been submitted for decision, the error is non - prejudicial and has been fully cured. Since
appellant’s rights and interests were not prejudiced by this lapse in procedure, it only follo ws that
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
not violated. Procedural defect of belated arraignment was cured when the counsel of the accused
participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be ar raigned.

53. Daan vs. Sandiganbayan – 560 SCRA 233

FACTS: The controversy arose from GMA -7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino
overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz. As summarized by the CA: Overseas
Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for his
release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he
was released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July
2004. Occasioned by said homecoming and the public interest it generated, both GMA Network,
Inc. and petitioner made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event. Allegedly,
GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS -
CBN. GMA-7’s news control room staff saw neither the “No Access Philippines” notice nor a
notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS -CBN. ABS-CBN filed the
Complaint for copyright infringement against Dela Pena -Reyes and Manalastas to which the
prosecutor found probable cause to indict the latter. Respondents filed the Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice. DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents and
held that good faith may be r aised as a defense in the case. The parties moved for reconsideration
of the Gonzalez Resolution. The trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed
earlier by Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas. The Motion to Suspend was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court is correct in granting the Motion to Suspend.
HELD: The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas’
arraignment after the 60 -day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the
interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. The suspension of the arraignment
should always be within the limits allo wed by law. The doctrine i n Crespo v. Judge Mogul was
reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals where this court reminded the Department of
Justice Secretary to refrain from entertaining petitions for review when the case is already
pending with this court: In order to avoi d a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the Court.
The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. The trial court should have
proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas’ a rraignment after the 60 -day period
from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It
was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals. The trial court erre d when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It
had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to
dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the arraignment “disregards the requirements of due
process and erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”

54. People vs. Janjalani – 639 SCRA 157

FACTS: The controversy arose from GMA -7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino
overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz. As summarized by the CA: Overseas
Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for his
release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he
was released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July
2004. Occasioned by said homecoming and the public interest it generated, both GMA Network,
Inc. and petitioner made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event. Allegedly,
GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS -
CBN. GMA-7’s news control room staff saw neither the “No Access Philippines” notice nor a
notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS -CBN. ABS-CBN filed the
Complaint for copyright infringement against Dela Pena -Reyes and Manalastas to which the
prosecutor found probable cause to indict the latter. Respondents filed the Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice. DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez ruled in favor o f respondents and
held that good faith may be raised as a defense in the case. The parties moved for reconsideration
of the Gonzalez Resolution. The trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed
earlier by Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas. The Motion to Suspend was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court is correct in granting the Motion to Suspend.
HELD: The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas ’
arraignment after the 60 -day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the
interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. The suspension of the arraignment
should always be within the limits allo wed by law. The doctrine in Crespo v. Judge Mogul was
reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals where this court reminded the Department of
Justice Secretary to refrain from enter taining petitions for review when the case is already
pending with this court: In order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the Court.
The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. The trial court should have
proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60 -day period
from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It
was only on September 13, 201 0 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It
had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motio n to
dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the arraignment “disregards the requirements of due
process and erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”

55. ABS-CBN Corp. vs. Gozon, 753 SCRA 1

FACTS: The controversy arose from GMA -7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino
overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz. As summarized by the CA: Overseas
Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for his
release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he
was released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July
2004. Occasioned by said homecoming and the public interest it generated, both GMA Network,
Inc. and petitioner made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event. Allegedly,
GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS -
CBN. GMA-7’s news control room staff saw neither the “No Access Philippines” notice no r a
notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS -CBN. ABS-CBN filed the
Complaint for copyright infringement against Dela Pena -Reyes and Manalastas to which the
prosecutor found probable cause to indict the latter. Respondents filed the Pet ition for Review
before the Department of Justice. DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents and
held that good faith may be raised as a defense in the case. The parties moved for reconsideration
of the Gonzalez Resolution. The trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed
earlier by Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas. The Motion to Suspend was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court is correct in granting the Motion to Suspend.
HELD: The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas’
arraignment after the 60 -day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the
interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. The suspension of the arraignment
should always be within the limits allo wed by law. The doctrine in Crespo v. Judge Mogul was
reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals where this court reminded the Depart ment of
Justice Secretary to refrain from entertaining petitions for review when the case is already
pending with this court: In order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregard ed by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the Court.
The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. The trial court should have
proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60 -day period
from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It
was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It
had full control and direction of the cas e. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to
dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the arraignment “disregards the requirements of due
process and erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”

56. Enrile vs. People 766 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Juan Ponce Enrile filed a petition for certiorari with prayers (a) for the Court En Banc to
act on the petition; (b) to expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and (c)
to issue a temporary restraining order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial and further
proceedings, to challenge the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

The Ofiice of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, Jessica
Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before th e
Sandiganbayan. After Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him on his arraignment, he
filed a motion for bill of particulars and a motion for deferment of arraignment since he was to
undergo medical examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). Enrile filed a motion for
reconsideration when his motion for bill particulars was denied, likewise this was also denied, and
hence the arraignment was ordered to proceed as scheduled. Enrile entered a “no plea,” prompting
the Sandiganbayan to enter a “not guilty” plea on his behalf.

Enrile claims that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the
ambiguity and insufficiency of the Info rmation filed against him. He maintains that the denial was
a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. Hence the petition.

ISSUES:

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Enrile’s

motion for bill of particulars.

RULING:

Yes. The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s motion for a bill
of particulars, on the ground that the d etails sought to be itemized or specified are all evidentiary
– without any explanation supporting this conclusion – constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
 Some of the desired details are material facts that must be alleged to enable the petitioner
to properly plead and prepare his defense. The Sandiganbayan should have diligently sifted
through each detail sought to be specified, and made the necessary determination of whether each
detail was an ultimate or evidentiary fact, particularly after Enrile stat ed in his Reply that the
“desired details” could not be found in the bundle of documents marked by the prosecution. We
cannot insist or speculate that he is feigning ignorance of the presence of these desired details;
neither can we put on him the burden o f unearthing from these voluminous documents what the
desired details are. The remedy of a bill of particulars is precisely made available by the Rules to
enable an accused to positively respond and make an intelligent defense.

The grant or denial of a mo tion for bill of particulars is discretionary on the court where the
Information is filed. As usual in matters of discretion, the ruling of the trial court will not be
reversed unless grave abuse of discretion or a manifestly erroneous order amounting to g rave
abuse of discretion is shown.

Grave abuse of discretion refers to the capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that
amounts or is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion o f a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law such as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. For the extraordinary writ of cer tiorari to
lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power.

57. People vs. Lacson – 400 SCRA 267

FACTS: The controversy arose from GMA -7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino
overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cr uz. As summarized by the CA: Overseas
Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for his
release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he
was released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July
2004. Occasioned by said homecoming and the public interest it generated, both GMA Network,
Inc. and petitioner made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event. Allegedl y,
GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS -
CBN. GMA-7’s news control room staff saw neither the “No Access Philippines” notice nor a
notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS -CBN. ABS-CBN filed the
Complaint for copyright infringement against Dela Pena -Reyes and Manalastas to which the
prosecutor found probable cause to indict the latter. Respondents filed the Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice. DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzale z ruled in favor of respondents and
held that good faith may be raised as a defense in the case. The parties moved for reconsideration
of the Gonzalez Resolution. The trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed
earlier by Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas. The Motion to Suspend was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court is correct in granting the Motion to Suspend.
HELD: The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas’
arraignment after the 60 -day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the
interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. The suspension of the arraignment
should always be within the limits allo wed by law. The doctrine in Crespo v. Judge Mogul was
reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. Court of Appeals where this court reminded the Department of
Justice Secretary to refrain from entertaining petitions for review w hen the case is already
pending with this court: In order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable , refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the Court.
The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. The trial court should have
proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60 -day period
from the filing of the Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It
was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraini ng order was issued by the Court of
Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It
had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to
dismiss in Crespo, failur e to proceed with the arraignment “disregards the requirements of due
process and erodes the Court’s independence and integrity.”

58. Panaguiton vs. DOJ – 571 SCRA 549

FACTS: The controversy arose from GMA -7’s news coverage on the homecoming of Filipino
overseas worker and hostage victim Angelo dela Cruz. As summarized by the CA: Overseas
Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for his
release, a demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he
was released by his captors and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of 22 July
2004. Occasioned by said homecoming and the public inter est it generated, both GMA Network,
Inc. and petitioner made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event. Allegedly,
GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS -
CBN. GMA-7’s news control room sta ff saw neither the “No Access Philippines” notice nor a
notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS -CBN. ABS-CBN filed the
Complaint for copyright infringement against Dela Pena -Reyes and Manalastas to which the
prosecutor found probable c ause to indict the latter. Respondents filed the Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice. DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents and
held that good faith may be raised as a defense in the case. The parties moved for reconsid eration
of the Gonzalez Resolution. The trial court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed
earlier by Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas. The Motion to Suspend was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Trial Court is correct in granting the Motion to Su spend.
HELD: The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas’
arraignment after the 60 -day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the
interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. The suspension of the arraignment
should always be within the limits allo wed by law. The doctrine in Crespo v. Judge Mogul was
reiterated in Mayor Balindong v. C ourt of Appeals where this court reminded the Department of
Justice Secretary to refrain from entertaining petitions for review when the case is already
pending with this court: In order to avoid a situation where the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information ha s already been filed in the Court.
The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. The trial court should have
proceeded with respondents Dela Peña -Reyes and Manalastas’ arraignment after the 60 -day period
from the filing of the Peti tion for Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It
was only on September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It
had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to
dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the arraignment “disregards the requirements of due
process and erodes the Court’s independence and integrity .”

59. People vs. Dumlao – 580 SCRA 409

FACTS:
An information was filed in Sandiganbayan charging Hermenegildo
Dumlao, Emilio La’o and others for violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA No. 3019
or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Said information alleged that the
respondents, who were members of the GSIS Board of Trustees, entered
into a contract of lease-purchase with respondent La’o, a private person.
The said contract provided the concurrence of GSIS to sell La’o a property
it had acquired, consisting of land and building known as the Government
Counsel Center for P2 million on an installment with annual interest and
amortization. La’o was also authorized to sub-lease the ground floor of
the said building during the lease period, from which he collected yearly
rentals in excess of the yearly amortization, causing huge disadvantage
to the government. Dumlao filed a motion to quash on the ground that
the facts alleged did not constitute an offense. He averred that the
prosecution’s main thrust against him was the alleged approval by the
GSIS Board of the said contract. He contended that it was never approved
as the signatures of his fellow respondents did not appear in the minutes
of meeting therefor, proving their non-participation therein. Additionally,
there was no board quorum during that time to push through with the
approval thereof. Hence, since the evidence of the prosecution was
insufficient, he should be deemed innocent. The Sandiganbayan ruled in
Dumlao’s favor, based on the said insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not “insufficiency of evidence” can be a ground for a motion
to quash.

HELD: No. Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion

to Quash. The grounds, as enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as follows:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of
the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after

the prosecution rests its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be
heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court.

In the case under consideration, the Sandi ganbayan dismissed the case
against respondent for insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence. In so doing, it
violated the prosecution’s right to due process. It deprived the
prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the
accused’s culpability.

It was therefore erroneous for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case

under the premises. Not only did it not consider the ground invoked by
respondent Dumlao; it even dismissed the ca se on a ground not raised
by him, and not at the appropriate time. The dismissal was thus
without basis and untimely.

60. Soriano vs. People – 591 SCRA 244

FACTS:
Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), through its officers, transmitted a
letter to Jovencito Zuño, Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). The letter attached as annexes five affidavits, which
would allegedly serve as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa
thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, in relation to Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1689, and for Violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as
amended by PD 1795, against, petitioner herein Hilario P. Soriano.
These affidavits, along with other documents, stated that spouses
Enrico and Amalia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8
million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but
had never applied for nor received such loan; that it was petitioner,
who was then president of RBSM, who had ordered, facilitated, and
received the proceeds of the loan; and that the P8 million loan had
never been authorized by RBSM's Board of Directors and no report
thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural Banks,
Supervision and Examination Sector of the BSP. The letter of the OSI,
which was not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a
preliminary investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal
charges be filed against petitioner at his last known address. Acting on
the letter-request and its annexes, State Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier
proceeded with the preliminary investigation. Issued a subpoena with
the witnesses' affidavits and supporting documents attached, and
required petitioner to file his counter-affidavit. In due course, the
investigating officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause and
correspondingly filed two separate informations against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.

The first Information, was for estafa through falsification of

commercial documents, under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), in relation to Article 172 of the RPC and
PD 1689. It basically alleged that petitioner and his co -accused, in
abuse of the confidence reposed in them as RBSM officers, caused the
falsification of a number of loan documents, making it appear that one
Enrico Carlos filled up the same, and thereby succeeded in securing a
loan and converting the loan proceeds for their personal gain and
benefit. The other Information, was for violation of Section 83 of RA
337, as amended by PD 1795. Which refers to the prohibition against
the so-called DOSRI loans. The information alleged that, in his
capacity as President of RBSM, petitioner indirectly secured an P8
million loan with RBSM, for his personal use and benefit, without the
written consent and approval of the bank's Board of Directors, without
entering the said transaction in the bank's records, and without
transmitting a copy of the transaction to the supervi sing department of
the bank. His ruse was facilitated by placing the loan in the name of an
unsuspecting RBSM depositor, one Enrico Carlos.

On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to quash these informations on two

grounds: 1) that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
and 2) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

On the first ground, petitioner argued that the letter transmitted by the
BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was defective for
failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(a),
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the statement of address of
petitioner and oath and subscription. Moreover, petitioner argued that
the officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the "letter-complaint,"
were not authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the Monetary
Board, to file the complaint. According to petitioner, this alleged fatal
oversight violated Section 18, pars. (c) and (d) of the New Central
Bank Act (RA 7653).

On the second ground, petitioner contended that the commission of

estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the RPC is inherently
incompatible with the violation of DOSRI law (as set out in Section 83
of RA 337, as amended by PD 1795), hence a person cannot be charged
for both offenses. He argued that a violation of DOSRI law requires
the offender to obtain a loan from his bank, without complying with
procedural, reportorial, or ceiling requirements. On the other hand,
estafa under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC requires the o ffender to
misappropriate or convert something that he holds in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to return the same.

Essentially, the petitioner theorized that the characterization of

possession is different in the two offenses. If petitioner acquired the
loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned money and therefore, cannot
misappropriate or convert it as contemplated in the offense of estafa.
Conversely, if petitioner committed estafa, then he merel y held the
money in trust for someone else and therefore, did not acquire a loan
in violation of DOSRI rules.
ISSUE:
Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy against an
Order denying a Motion to Quash?
HELD:
This issue may be speedily resolved by adopting our ruling in Soriano v.
People, where we held:

In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to
quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the
accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to
present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and
if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners should
not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
and instead, they should have gone to trial and reiterated the special
defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or
exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify
immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA
did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition.

61. Cerezo vs. People – 650 SCRA 222

FACTS: In 2002, Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel against Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda,
Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia, as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo). Finding probable cause to indict
Yaneza, et al., the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office (OP -QC) filed the corresponding Information
against them before the RTC. Yaneza, et al. thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecution’s Evidence before the OP -QC. In its resolution, the OP -QC
reversed its earlier finding and recommended the withdrawal of the Information. Consequently, a
Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC.During the intervening
period, Yaneza, et al. were arraigned. All of them entered a "not guilty" plea. In deference to the
prosecutor’s last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed. Aggrieved, Cerezo
moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the OP -QC resolution has not yet
attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed before
the Department of Justice (DOJ). The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the
resolution of the DOJ. In 2006, the Secretary of Justice promulgated his resolution re versing and
setting aside the OP -QC’s resolution, and directing the latter to refile the earlier Information for
libel. The RTC issued its Order granting Cerezo's motion for reconsideration, conformably with
the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. Yaneza, et al. moved for reconsideration, but the motion was
denied by the RTC. Relentless, Yaneza, et al. elevated their predicament to the CA through a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA annulled the impugned RTC
Orders. Cerezo interposed the appeal when his motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was
denied.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the case by the RTC was valid and whether double jeopardy set
in after the RTC's dismissal of the case.
HELD: No, because there was indep endent assessment of the merits of the motion on the part of
the RTC. The elements of double jeopardy are not attendant in the present case. Well -entrenched
is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public
prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the court’s bounden duty to asses s independently the
merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the
motion. While the recommendation of the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts. By r elying solely on the manifestation of the public
prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and
refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The said Orders were thus stained with grave
abuse of discretion and violated the complainant’s right to due process. They were void, had no
legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever. This Court must therefore remand the case to
the RTC, so that the latter can rule on the merits of the case to determi ne if a prima facie case
exists and consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information anew. It is
beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy att ached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has
been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted
or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Since we
have held that the Order granting the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of
discretion, then respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or
termination of the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal of the
accused, or the dismissal of the case wit hout the approval of the accused, was not met. Thus,
double jeopardy has not set in.

62. Co. vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products, 727 SCRA 503

FACTS:
Willian Co filed a petition for review on certiorari on the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, which dismissed his petition and denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed the
decision of the RTC, which annulled and set aside the orders of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), which permanently dismissed Criminal Cases of concern.

New Prosperity Plastic Products represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed Criminal Cases against
William Co for Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 which were raffled to the MeTC
Branch 49 of Caloocan City. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were
provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Revive Criminal Cases which was granted by the MeTC and denied Co’s Motion f or
Reconsideration. When Co moved for recusation, the cases were raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of
Caloocan, he then filed a petition for certiorari and inhibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO)/ writ of preliminary injuncti on (WPI) before the RTC o f
Caloocan challenging the revival of the criminal cases which was dismissed for lack of merit.
Co’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence the petition.

ISSUES:

a. Whether the one -year time bar of their revival is computed from issuance of the Order of
provisional dismissal.
b. Whether the actual number of days in a year is the basis for computing the one -year time
bar;
c. Whether the provisionally dismissed cases against the petitioner are revived ipso facto by
the filing of motion to revive these cases.

RULING:

First Issue:

Yes. The court ruled that granting for the sake of argument that this Court should
take into account 2004 as a leap year and that the one -year period to revive the case should be
reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy , We still hold that
the motion to revive the criminal cases against Co was timely filed.A year is equivalent to 365
days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. Equally so, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is irrelevant. This
was our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., which
was subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of
Asia, Inc.

Second Issue:

No. The Court ruled that the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to
determine the timeliness of Uy's motion to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is
Co's categorical admission that Uy is represented by a pri vate counsel who only received a copy
of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not belatedly filed on July
2, 2004. Since the period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's
receipt of the order of pr ovisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for
the permanent dismissal is likewise the private counsel's date of receipt of the order of
provisional dismissal .

Third Issue:

No. The Court ruled that both the filing of the moti on to revive the case and the court
order reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one -year period is unsustainable.
Such interpretation is not found in the Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put
the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or unwittingly not comply.
Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal
with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they could
not be expected to act at all times on all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within
the prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of them, motivated by ill -will or
malice, may simply exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.

63. People vs. De Leon, 754 SCRA 147

FACTS:

On March 2, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above -named accused, conspiring,
confederating with and mutually helping with two others, with intent to gain, by means of
violence and/or intimidation against person, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously rob one Emilio
A. Prasmo, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned, while
victim/deceased Emilio A. Prasmo was walking alon g A. Bonifacio Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia,
Novaliches, together with his wife and daughter in -law, accused pursuant to their conspiracy
armed with sumpak, samurai, lead pipe and .38 cal. revolver rob Prasmo and took and carried
away ₱7,000.00, Philippine currency. With evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
treachery, accused with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon said
victim by shooting and hacking him with the use of said weapons, thereby inflicting serious and
grave wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said victim. When arraigned, all the accused -appellants entered a plea of
not guilty except accused Antonio. Thus, the RTC order ed a reverse trial in so far as Antonio is
concerned. The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as
charged in the Information, but found all the accused guilt of the crime of murder. According to
the RTC, contrary to the charge of robbery with homicide, the accused is guilty of the crime of
murder because the prosecution failed to establish the crime of robbery. The RTC ratiocinated that
in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be proven as
conclusively as the killing itself. On the other hand, the CA affirmed with modifications the
ruling of the RTC and found all of the accused guilty of the crime of murder. However, contrary
to the findings of the RTC with regard to the crime of robbery, t he CA reversed the ruling of the
RTC and found accused Danilo guilty of the separate crime of robbery.

ISSUE(S):

Whether or not the accused appellant Danilo De Leon was placed in double jeopardy when the
appellate court also found him guilty of robbery b ased on the same information filed where he was
found guilty of murder.

HELD:

Yes. In case at bar, all the elements of double jeopardy are present: (1) a valid Information for
robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the Information was filed in the court of competent
jurisdiction; (3) the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo
for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which amounted to an acquittal from
which no appeal can be had. Indeed the conviction for murder was premised on the fact that
robbery was not proven.

The RTC Decision which found accused guilty of the crime of murder and not of robbery with
homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of
robbery alone.

As the first jeopardy already attached, the CA is precluded from rul ing on the innocence or guilt
of Danilo of the crime of robbery. As it stands, the acquittal on the crime of robbery based on lack
of sufficient evidence is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The SC cannot, even an appeal based
on an alleged misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of acquittal of the trial court due to
the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant, who has b een
acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government oppression through the abuse of criminal
processes. The crime of robbery was not proven during the trial. As we discussed, the acquittal of
the accused -appellant, including Danilo, is not reversible .