Santos vs CA (G.R. No.

112019) Jan 4, 1995

Santos vs. CA (Leouel Santos v Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia Santos)
240 SCRA 20

FACTS:

Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18, 1988, Julia left for the
U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leouel filed with the RTC
of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC
dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal.

ISSUE:

Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years
constitute psychological incapacity?

HELD:

No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years
does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability

Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem
Petition is denied.
Republic v. Court of Appeals Molina (G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997)
FACTS:
Spouses Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila; that
a son, Andre O. Molina was born. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on
whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them.
Sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which
their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live
with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then
abandoned them. Reynaldo had shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as
a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple’s best interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No, the marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of
marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of thoughtfulness and gentleness on Reynaldo’s part and of being conservative, homely and
intelligent on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological
incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts;
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
In Leouel Santos v Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
“psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological
incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 130087, 24 September 2003
FACTS:
Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot five children. On 29 March 1995,
private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M.
Barcelona. Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists
up to the present time. The petition allegedthe non-complied marital obligations. During their marriage, they
had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, wasa
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sister‘s house or would
play tennis the whole day. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and
the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.
On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of
re-evaluatingher feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his
desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondent‘s pregnancy, the petitioner was
compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with theessential obligation of marriage and such incapacity
subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity wasconclusively found in the psychological
examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and therespondent Diana claims that
petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action.
ISSUE:
Whether of not petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana.
RULING:
YES, since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana, and her act or omission as seen
infacts FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS. Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage – petition does not need to show root cause sinceonly experts can determine it b the
physical manifestations of physical incapacity.PETITION IS DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION.
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family
Code and must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
The elements of Psychological incapacity are:
(a) Grave – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurable and Permanent – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Tongol v. Tongol
G.R. No. 157610, 19 October 2007
FACTS:
Orlando G. Tongol and Filipinas M. Tongol were married on August 27, 1967. Out of their union, they begot four
children, namely: Crisanto, Olivia, Frederick, and Ma. Cecilia. On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a
petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, which was granted in a Judgment issued by the
RTC of Makati City, Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations. Orlando alleged that Filipinas was unable to perform her duty as a wife because
of Filipinas unbearable attitude that will lead to their constant quarrel. In her answer with Counter-Petition,
Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However,
she claims that their marriage failed because it is Orlando`s insufficiency to fulfill his obligation as married man.
Both parties underwent a psychological exam which proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol has a
psychological insufficiency.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol, and of Annaliza
Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the spouses Tongol. Orlando also
presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who conducted a psychological examination of both parties.
Orlando submitted documents evidencing their marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision
granting the petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written evaluation of Dr.
Villegas regarding the spouses’ psychological examination. On the other hand, record shows that evidence for
Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing the petition on appeal,
the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC. Hence, herein petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented in the present case is enough to sustain a finding that
herein respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
RULING:
The Court cannot see how respondent’s personality disorder would render her unaware of the essential marital
obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos Case, “to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” What has been
established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy and rejection, respondent not
only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations towards her husband,
such as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has ruled that psychological incapacity must be
more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal” or”neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations.
Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of respondent is grave enough
to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. There is no evidence that such
incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and
conclusively characterizes respondent’s inadequate personality disorder as permanent or incurable.
The psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. The fourth guideline in Molina requires that the psychological incapacity as
understood under Article 36 of the Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In the
present case, the testimonies of petitioner and respondent as well as the other witnesses regarding the spouses’
differences and misunderstanding basically revolve around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the
management of their business. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and
wife enumerated under the Family Code include the mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the
household and provide support for the family, which means that compliance with this obligation necessarily
entails the management of the income and expenses of the household. While disagreements on money
matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory,
this is not a sufficient ground to declare a marriage null and void.
Marital obligation includes not only a spouse’s obligation to the other spouse but also one’s obligation toward
their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent had been remiss in
performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code.
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese
association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the latter already had a
boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who
asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however,
made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000
and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his
parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from
getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month,
Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their
house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it
was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis
of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony
found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification
of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined
by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such
as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons
around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Ting v. Ting
G.R. No. 166562, 31 March 2009
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical school and they married each other after several
years. Years after, Benjamin became a full-fledged doctor and he practiced at the Velez Hospital owned by
Carmen’s family. Benjamin and Carmen had six children during their marriage. But after 18 years of marriage,
Carmen went to court to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated. She alleged that even before she married Benjamin, the latter was already a drunkard; that
Benjamin was a gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend on his expensive hobby; that he rarely stayed
home and even neglected his children and family obligations.
Carmen presented an expert witness, Dr. Oñate, to prove Benjamin’s psychological incapacity. However, Oñate
merely based her findings on the statement submitted by Benjamin. Oñate was not able to personally examine
Benjamin because at that time, Benjamin was already working as an anaesthesiologist in South Africa. On his
part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also presented his own expert witness to disprove Carmen’s allegations.
Obra was not able to personally examine Benjamin but he also evaluated the same deposition evaluated by
Oñate. Also, Benjamin submitted himself for evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr. Pentz) and the transcript of
said evaluation was submitted to Obra and the latter also evaluated the same. Obra found Benjamin not to be
psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled in favor of Carmen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin Ting’s psychological incapacity was proven.
RULING:
No, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage 18 years ago.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an absolute insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a disorder so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the celebration of
their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally
drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence presented prove such defects to be
incurable. The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the significant evidence in determining
whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, the Court was not
convinced that the opinions proiced by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of psychological
incapacity. The two provided absolutely contradicting psychological evaluations.
Azcueta v. Republic
G.R. No. 180668, 26 May 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24, 1993. They separated in 1997 after
four years of marriage and bore no child.
Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, claiming that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.
According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt
himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of husband
Petitioner also complained of physical violence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.
RULING:
Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with the
guidelines in the Molina case to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
In all, the Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
Najera v. Najera
G.R. No. 164817, 3 July 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for
Legal separation, with Appliction for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of
Gains. Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is
presently living in the (United States of America). They were married but are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became
manifest only after marriage; (1) that respondent was jobless and was not exerting effort to find a job at the
time of marriage; only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was respondent able to
land a job as a seaman; (2) that while employed as a seaman, respondent did not give petitioner sufficient
financial support); (3) that respondent would quarrel with petitioner and falsely accuse her of having an affair
with another man whenever he came home, and took to smoking marijuana and drinking; (4) that on July 1,
1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and
attempted to kill her with a bolo; and (6) after the said incident respondent left the family home, taking along
all their personal belongings, and abandoned the petitioner. Petitioner reported the incident at the police
station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage
under Article 1: of the Family Code.
RULING:
No. The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct toward
petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds
for legal separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.
SUAZO v. SUAZO G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Without any means to
support themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work
and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year
after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since
lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological
incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts
of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was
psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC
annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such
as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants
(like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval)
and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but
the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and
has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of a deeper
psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the
respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the
product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner,
anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work
could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless
marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC
decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist evaluated
Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information
coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and
could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition.
While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not
true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness
of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the
psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise
to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or
the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s
testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative
of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying
with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him
from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
Republic v. Galang
G.R. No. 168335, 6 June 2010
FACTS:
In March 1994, Nestor and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. In August 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as the same was a kleptomaniac, gambler and a swindler; that
Juvy suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and
affection [towards him and their] child” basing these allegations on Juvy’s unwillingness to prepare breakfast
and the incident where Juvy almost lost their son in the market. He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was
“extremely serious” and “appears to be incurable.”
Nestor presented Anna Liza Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted psychological test on the
former. In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the findings on couple, stating that the husband is
psychologically mature while his wife is not, without citing the tests conducted and the reason for the wife’s
incapacity.
RTC ruled on the nullity of the marriage which was affirmed by the CA, citing that the facts presented satisfied
the Santos doctrine.
ISSUE:
Whether there is basis to nullify the respondent’s marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying
with her essential marital obligations.
RULING:
None. The Supreme Court held that the totality of Nestor’s evidence – his testimonies and the psychologist, and
the psychological report and evaluation – insufficient to prove Juvy’s psychological incapacity pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. [Louel Santos v. CA]
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
The defect should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage.
It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the
totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos v. Marcos]
Instead of serving as a guideline, Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a straight jacket; it forced all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te v. Yu-Te] In Ting v Velez-Ting, far from
abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements; the Ngo Te
case merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity.
In the present case, the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she
administered on Nestor and the root cause of Juvy’s psychological condition. There was no showing that any
mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. The report failed to prove the gravity or severity of
Juvy’s alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated
her to comply with her marital duties; the report did not even categorically state the particular type of
personality disorder found. The report failed to establish the incurability of Juvy’s condition. The report’s
pronouncements that Juvy “lacks the initiative to change” and that her mental incapacity “appears
incorrigible” are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond her means to undertake.
Petition was granted. Galang’s petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article
36 of the Family Code was dismissed.
 Mendoza vs. Republic G.R. 157649, Nov. 12, 2012 Psychological Incapacity

FACTS:

Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003, whereby the CA reversed the judgment
of the RTC declaring her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza as null and void. The CA held the
testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic’s psychological affliction to be of such a
grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted.

Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation she had
presented in the trial of the case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements in Dagdag, Hernandez and
Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Samson more than
complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v. Court of Appeals and Molina. She insists that the CA
should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcoso the effect that personal medical or psychological
examination was not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

ISSUES:

1. Is OSG appeal no longer required under A.M. No. 02-11-10?

2. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of respondent’s
psychological incapacity.

RULING:

1. The contention is grossly erroneous and unfounded. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG
were no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in
all stages of the proceedings. The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear as
counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e., defender of the marital bond) to oppose
petitions for, and to appeal judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for the declaration of nullity of marriages
based on psychological incapacity-those sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical
antecedence-would succeed.

2. We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well taken and
warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards Dominic, which she
admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert
witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric
evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings
and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial
descriptions and characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give
weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological
incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable
evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings.
 Enrico vs. Heirs
G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007

FACTS:

The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging that Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962
and begot seven children, herein respondents. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004,
Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a
marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months later. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which
exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment
from securing a marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the
marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely
three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the
additional ground of lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its
performance impossible.

In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for
21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. She
further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan,
and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on
the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage.

ISSUES:

Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita

RULING:

No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August 26, 2004
which falls within the ambit of the order. The order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for,
as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
 OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.

Facts:

On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a declaration of nullity of
his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.

After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the regional trial
court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without
a valid marriage license.

Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.

Issue:

Is the action of the husband tenable?

Ruling:

No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or “estoppels by verdict,”
which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res judicata in its concept as
“conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different
cause of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then that the present action for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred. The petition is denied for
lack of merit.