4 180% CAUSE NO. N'yesha ANGLIN § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Vs. he HG" _suprctav pistrict EDWARD JAMISON, Director Dallas Animal Services, In His Individual and Official Capacity § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL PETITION - LATION OF RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS GUARANTEED BY THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION ‘TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW, N'yesha ANGLIN, Plaintiff herein, complaining of EDWARD JAMISON, Director of the Dallas Animal Services, In His Individual and Official Capacity. and would show the Court as follows: I. DISCOVERY Discovery in this cause shall be conducted pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 190.3; Discovery Control Plan Level 2. MH, RELIEF SOUGHT Plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief as permitted by law II. PARTIES, JURISDICTION, VENUE Plaintiff does not sue nor allege a complaint against the City of Dallas but rather brings this action alleging violation of Plaintif?'s rights by Defendant Fdward Jamison, Director of Dallas Animal Services, as guaranteed and protected by the Texas Constitution. ‘Anglin v. Jamison 1 “hitEdward Jamison may best be served with process by personal service upon him at Dallas, y Hall, located at 1500 Marilla Street, Dallas, Texas 75201 where he maintains an office or if not located there, he may be served at Dallas Animal Services, 1818 N. Westmoreland Road, Dallas, Texas 75212 or wherever he may be found. Edward Jamison is a resident of Dallas, Texas and all conduct alleged herein was undertaken by him in Dallas, Texas. Thus proper venue for this case is Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff, Nyesha Anglin is a resident of Dallas, Dallas County, Texas and can be served with process at the offices of the undersigned counsel. Plaintiff sues for relief within the jurisdiction of this Cour. IV. DEFENDANT EDWARD JAMISON Edward Jamison is the Director of Dallas Animal Services (DAS). As such he is responsible for upholding and enforcing laws governing animals in the City of Dallas over which DAS has control and enforcement. Further, it is his duty to supervise and administer the department of Dallas animal services, Defendant Jamison is the highest ranking employee in Dallas Animal Services and as such, is a department director. Itis also his duty, as Director of DAS, to abide by, follow, adhere to and carry out all court orders issued in animal cases brought by and through the animal control department (DAS) of the City of Dallas. Asset forth below, there was no discretion open to Jamison. Rather, he ignored the plaintiff language of the Court's order, which he was duty bound to follow and his conduct in ignoring suet order constituted ultr vires conduct, depriving Plaintiff of her rights and, her property by intentionally failing to comply with the direct order of the court. ‘Anglin v. Jamison 2 esV. BACKGROUND Plaintiff owned a companion animal, a dog named “Chloe”. “Chloe” was a loved and cherished member of her family, treated so not only by PlaintifT but her children as well. Plaintiff's neighbor alleged that “Chloe” had come toward her and in doing so, she was placed in fear of being bitten, At no p had Chloe ever bitten or harmed anyone. Due to Plaintiff's lack of understanding of the system, exacerbated by the confusion one ‘encounters at the Dallas Municipal Court Clerk’s office, Plaintiff failed to timely defend “Chloe” being deemed a dangerous dog on March 26, 2019 for allegedly placing someone in fear of being bitten. ‘There continued further confusion as to what conditions Plaintiff must meet to keep her dog in the city of Dallas. Thereafter a hearing for non-compliance was conducted and Plaintiff immediately complied with all of the conditions for keeping her dog On or about August 3, 2019 Dallas Animal Services officers (DAS) arrived at Plaintiff's residence pursuing an allegation, again alleged by Plaintif?’s neighbor, that “Chloe” had been outside of a secure enclosure (fence) and thus in violation of the requirement that “Chloe” not be lose. In fact, “Chloe” had walked through the open gate when those mowing the lawn opened it to walk through but as soon as she did so, one of the two young men mowing verbally told her to 180 back inside the fence, which she did immediately and the gate was closed, Based on the foregoing, DAS filed yet another non-compliance case and sought to have “hloe” euthanized ‘Anglin v. JamisonAt the hearing on August 21, 2019, officers from DAS testified that the matter had been caught on video security cameras and in fact that video revealed that “Chloe” had merely walked through the gate for a few feet and when ordered, turned around and went back in. Further, DAS. officers testified that “Chloe” was out for less than 10 seconds, Upon the foregoing complaint and upon the less than 10 seconds and but a couple of feet through the gate, the court ordered the euthanasia of “Chloe” due to non-compliance and in doing so pointed out thatthe statute left little room for discretion. (Copy of Court's order attached hereto Exhibit “A°) Plaintiff immediately gave notic of appeal and the Court, in its order, set forth that it set Plaintiff's appeal bond at -0- dollars “because no evidence was presented regarding the cost 10 house and care for the impounded dog during the appeal process.” The Court's order further set forth; *...City of Dallas Animal Services Department is authorized to humanely destroy the dog at issue if Owner doesn’t come into compliance with all the relevant statutes and ordinances within 11 days of the date of the order.” A plain reading of the language in the Court’s order prohibited the killing of “Chloe” for 11 days to determine if Plaintiff had come into compliance with all conditions and, provided that no bond would be necessary to perfect an appeal. By law, Plaintiff had the right to an appeal. (See V-T.C.A. Health and Safety C: le Ch, 822, Subchapter D, §822.042 — Ex. “B"; §822.0423 - Ex "C°, §822.0424 — Ex, “D and V.T.C.A. Gov't C,, Ch.. 30, Subchapter A, §30.00014 ~ Ex. “E" VI. CHLOE WAS KILLED 43 MINUTES AFTER THE COURT ISSUED ITS ORDER Even though the order of the Court contained a prohibition for the killing of “Chloe” for 11 days to give time to come into compliance and, permitted an appeal which gave Plaintiff 10 Anglin v. Jamison 4days during which to file her appeal as well as the provisions contained in the Texas Health and Safety Code and, Tex. Gov't. C. attached hereto as exhibits Jamison, by his own admission knew of the time to appeal but Killed, caused or permitted the killing of “Chloe” 43 minutes after the hearing, as revealed in the records of activity by DAS. DAS was contacted by telephone to affirm that an appeal was being filed and to assure no harm would come to “Chloe”. DAS, during that conversation admitted “Chloe” was already dead, Thus, while under the control of Director Jamison, DAS had killed a dog that had never harmed anyone and for the terrible offense of walking through a gate and returning immediately One could conclude that perhaps DAS feared an appeal because, as Plaintiff believed, no jury would order a dog that never harmed anyone, killed for walking through an open gate for less than 10 seconds. VII. JAMISON’S CONDUCT As set forth herein, there was no discretion open to Jamison, only the ministerial duty to carry out the court's order, Rather, he ignored the plaintiff language of the Court’s order, which hhe was duty bound to follow and had no lawful right to fail to follow. His conduct in ignoring such order constituted ultra vires conduct, depriving Plaintiff of her rights and, her property by intentionally failing to comply with the direct order of the court. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant, Edward Jamison killed “Chloe” or permitted others under his control to do so, while being fully aware that Plaintiff was entitled to an appeal to save her dog. The appeal is in addition to the Cour’s order that Plaintiff had 11 da to come into compliance, ‘an order which Defendant Jamison ignored and wholly failed to follow Anglin v. Jamison 5Defendant Jamison’s knowledge at the time that Plaintiff was entitled to an appeal is clearly demonstrated by his own admission in a television interview aired on NBC S on September 18, 2019. in which he was asked about killing “Chloe” even though the right to appeal existed. In that interview Jamison admitted he knew there was a right to appeal, but he had to follow the orders of the court In that interview with Jamison by reporter Ken Kalthof¥ of NBCS the following exchange 100k place: Kalthoff: “She (referring to a member of the City of Dallas Animal Shelter Commission previously interviewed and shown in the same interview with Jamison) says state law requires ten days before a dog is put down” Jamison: “It does call for that in the state. We also have to follow, follow orders, when given from a court” Defendant's statement was obviously meant to mislead the public into believing he was only folowing the orders of the judge in the case. In fact, the judge had followed the law, restricted and prohibited the killing of “Chloe” until the 11 days had expired to come into compliance or, the time to appeal (10 days from date of order) had expired without an appeal being filed. ‘There was nothing in the court’s order that could be construed to permit Jamison to kill “Chloe” outside of those two conditions. There was no ability to exercise judgment, no discretion, but only the ministerial duty to follow the plain and clear language of the court order. Instead, Jamison ignored the plain language of the order and attempted publicly to lay off any blame on the judge when in fact the wrongful conduct was wholly his. This deception goes further to reveal Jamison's knowledge of the wrongdoing he undertook and trying to cover up his own wrongful conduet. Anglin v. Jamison 6Jamison’s conduct clearly deprived Plaintiff of her beloved companion animal which is Property under Texas law. He further deprived Plaintiff of her legal right to an appeal and, the time to come into compliance with the court's order; both set forth in clear language in the court's order. As such Plaintiff was denied due process of law and equal protection under the law as all such parties have in order to comply within 11 days as given under the statute and, the right to appeal within 10 days. Jamison violated Plaintiff's rights as guaranteed by Art. 1, Sec. 19 and her right to be treated equally under the law as guaranteed by Art, I, Sec. 3 both pursuant to provisions of the Texas Constit As Jamison wrongflly Killed “Chloe” no relief can be granted to remedy that wrongdoing. Plaintiff and her children have forever lost their family member, a dog that never harmed anyone and that, but for Defendant Jamison’s conduct, would have continued to live, protected by the guarantees of the Texas Constitution and the explicit order of the court. Therefore, as Jamison learly ignores court orders and then misrepresents to the media and public the content of @ court order in this case so that publicly a picture is painted that Plaintiff's dog “Chloe” is dead only because Defendant Jamison was following the court's order, only prospective injunctive relief ean provide control over Jamison to ensure his compliance with the laws of the State of Texas, court orders and, compliance with provisions of the Texas Constitution. While governmental immunity provides broad protections to the state and its officers, it does not bar a suit against a government officer for acting outside his authority ~ ie., an ultra vires suit, Houston Belt and Terminal Railway Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 161 (Tex.2015) citing Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep't v. Sawyer Trust, 354 $.W.34 384, 393 (Teex.2011). This suit complains of Defendant, Edward Jamison and is an ultra vires suit. ‘Anglin v. Jamison 7VII. RELIEF SOUGHT Plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief in this matter. It is only through the issuance and enforcement of a permanent injunction as set forth in the prayer herein, that the willful and intentional conduct in violation of court orders, without legal justification, by Defendant Edward Jamison be stopped. Once killed, there is no relief by which Plaintiff herein or any other owner can recover possession or undo the wrongful loss and destruction of theit property, a beloved family member over which DAS has control. Only the permanent injunction requested herein can provide a degree of safety from Defendant Jamison’s ultra vires acts in violation of eourt orders ‘which constitute irreparable injury to personal property and, which do not permit any discretion, Plaintiff herei There is no adequate legal remedy available to Plaintiff herein. A suit proving ultra vires conduct against a governmental employee provides a plaintiff the right to prospective injunctive relief. City of EL Paso v. Heinri 284 8.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009), PRAYER Plaintiff prays this Court cite the Defendant, Edward Jamison, to appear and answer herein ‘and that upon trial of this cause, Plaintiff be granted as follows: L The Court declare the Plaintif’s rights and protections under the Texas Constitution which ‘were violated or denied to Plaintiff, by Defendant Jamison; 2. The Cour issue a permanent injunction by which Defendant Jamison would be compelled to undertake the following conduct in any case wherein the authority to kill a dog has been provided by a court order; Prior to killing the dog, not earlier than the 11" day subsequent to the date of the Court’s order, Defendant Jamison, personally, is to contact the court issuing the order Anglin v. Jamison 8or its clerk, making note in the records of DAS for the specific dog, noting the name of the person spoken to and that no notice of appeal has been filed within the 10 days permitted by law; b. Ifthe Court's order references 11 days to come into compliance with conditions to keep the dog within the City of Dallas, Defendant Jamison shall personally inspeet the premises where the dog is kept, not earlier than the 12!" days subsequent to the date of the Court's order, to ensure compliance and if there is a failure of compliance, note in the file of DAS for the dog in question, the precise information as constituting failure to comply; ©. Only after the these two conditions have been met, may Defendant Jamison and/or DAS kill a dog made subject of such a court order; 3. Plaintiffrecover her costs incurred herein; 4. That this Plaintiff be granted such other and further relief, both in law and equity, to which she may show herself justly entitled, Respectfully submitted, (s/__Donald D. Feare Donald D. Feare SBN 00798173 ‘THE FEARE LAW FIRM, P. 721 W. Division Street Arlington, Texas 76012 817-543-2202 — Telephone 817-861-7611 — Facsimile don.feare@gmail.com Anglin v. Jamison 9CAUSE NO. D19-000029-01 CITY OF DAL § INTHE MUNICIPAL COURT #11 y § CITY OF DALLAS s 3 DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS NYESHA ANGLIN ORDER (On this day the Court considered the City of Dallas’ request for a dangerous dog. noncompliance hearing pursuant to sections 7-5.5(d) of the Dallas City Code and 822,042{c) and 822.0423 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. After considering the evidence and arguments presented, The City of Dallas was represented by Assistant City antarney Timothy Eddins and the Defendant was represented by Mr. Donald Feare. Based on the evidence presented and the arguments of counsel, the Court finds that Nyesha Anglia ("Owner") is not in compliance with sections 822.402{a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code and section 7-5-5 of the Dallas City Code cegarding a dog named Chine” which was previously deemed dangerous on March 26, 2019. The Court specifically finds that Owner failed to 1) restrain the dangerous dog at al times on & leash in the immediate control of a person or in a secure enclosure, and 2) place an appropriate muzzle on “Chloe” when outside of its enclosure IT 15 THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED anc DECREED that, pursuant to section 7-5.5le) of the Dallas City Code, the City of Dallas’ Animal Services Department is authorize humanely destroy the dog “Chloe” ITS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to section 822.0423{c-1) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, the Court sets the appeal bond at $0 because no evidence of costs was presented to the Court. Signed this 21st day of August, 2029. Presiding Judge THE kr By, we) ee EXHIBIT ‘This is to certify that this is A true and correct copy of the original document filed in this ofice.rs2019 {§ 822.042 Roguiemonts or Owner of Dangerous 00g | States | Westin vernon’ Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Health and Safety Code (Refs & Annos) Title 10. Health and Safety of Animals Chapter 822. Regulation of Animals EXHIBIT Subchapter D. Dangerous Dogs PB Effective: September 1, 2015 V.T.C.A., Health & Safety Code § 822.042 § 822.042. Requirements for Owner of Dangerous Dog Currentness {a) Not later than the 30th day after a person leams that the person is the owner of a dangerous dog, the person shall: (1) register the dangerous dog with the animal control authority for the area in which the dog is kept; (2) restrain the dangerous dog at all times on a leash in the immediate control of a person or in a secure enclosure; (3) obtain liability insurance coverage or show financial responsibility in an amount of at least $100,000 to cover damages resulting from an attack by the dangerous dog causing bodily injury to a person and provide proof of the required liability insurance coverage or financial responsibility to the animal control authority for the area in which the dog is kept: and (4) comply with an applicable municipal or county regulation, requirement, or restriction on dangerous dogs. (b) The owner of a dangerous dog who does not comply with Subsection (a) shall deliver the dog to the animal control authority not later than the 30th day after the owner learns that the dog is a dangerous dog, (©) If, on application of any person, a justice court, county court, or municipal court finds, after Notice and hearing as provided by Section 822.0423, that the owner of a dangerous dog has failed to comply with Subsection (a) or (b), the court shall order the animal control authority to seize the dog and shall issue a warrant authorizing the seizure. The authority shall seize the dog or order its seizure and shall provide for the impoundment of the dog in secure and humane conditions. (d) The owner shall pay any cost or fee assessed by the municipality or county related to the seizure, acceptance, impoundment, or destruction of the dog. The governing body of the municipality or county may prescribe the amount of the fees. tps next westaw.comDocumertNCOTEAF202087 11ESABCOEFE2CSDS'401/Vewi ext hin orginaionContext=documenttoseansiion yp.svaz0r8 4 822.042. Requcemens for Owner of Dargerous Oog | Statutes | Westow (e) The court shall order the animal control authority to humanely destroy the dog if the owner has not complied with Subsection (a) before the 11th day after the date on which the dog is seized or delivered to the authority, except that, notwithstanding any other law or local regulation, the court may not order the destruction of a dog during the pendency of an appeal | _under Section 822.0424. The court shall order the authority to return the dog to the owner ifthe | owner complies with Subsection (a) before the 11th day after the date on which the dog is seized or delivered to the authority. (f) The court may order the humane destruction of a dog if the owner of the dog has not been | located before the 15th day after the seizure and impoundment of the dog. (g) For purposes of this section, a person learns that the person is the owner of a dangerous dog when: (1) the owner knows of an attack described in Section 822.041(2)(A) or (B); (2) the owner receives notice that a justice court, county court, or municipal court has found that the dog is a dangerous dog under Section 822.0423; or (3) the owner is informed by the animal control authority that the dog is a dangerous dog under Section 822.0421 pai next westaw coms DoeumenuNCOTEAF20208 11 6ABODEFE2CSDS 401 View/FusText him?orignatonGontostsdocumentiacRtransitonTyp 2/2 eeesy2019 822.0223, Neorg | Statutes | Westow vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Health and Safety Code (Refs & Annos) Title 10. Health and Safety of Animals Chapter 822. Regulation of Animals Subchapter D. Dangerous Dogs Effective: September 1, 2015 V.L.C.A., Health & Safety Code § 822.0423 § 822.0423. Hearing Currentness (a) The court, on receiving a report of an incident under Section 822.0422 or on application under Section 822.042(c), shall set a time for a hearing to determine whether the dog is a dangerous dog or whether the owner of the dog has complied with Section 822.042. The hearing must be held not later than the 10th day after the date on which the dog is seized or delivered. (b) The court shall give written notice of the time and place of the hearing to (1) the owner of the dog or the person from whom the dog was seized; and (2) the person who made the complaint (c) Any interested party, including the county or city attorney, is entitled to present evidence at the hearing (c-1) The court shall determine the estimated costs to house and care for the impounded dog during the appeal process and shall set the amount of bond for an appeal adequate to cover those estimated costs. (d) An owner or person filing the action may appeal the decision of the municipal or justice court in the manner described by Section 822.0424. EXHIBIT cS tps next westaw.comDocumentNC 1076720208711 €595238986 195F BOESVsow/FulText hin! ?orginaion ortertdacumentoc&tanatonypereiz0r8 45 822.0424, Appeal Statutes | Westaw Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Health and Safety Code (Refs & Annos) Tile 10. Health and Safety of Animals Chapter 822. Regulation of Animals ‘Subchapter D. Dangerous Dogs Effective: September 1, 2015 VI.CA., Health & Safety Code § 822.0424 § 822.0424. Appeal Currentness (a) A party to an appeal under Section 822.0421(d) or a hearing under Section 822.0423may appeal the decision to a county court or county court at law in the county in which the justice or municipal court is located and is entitled to a jury trial on request. (b) As a condition of perfecting an appeal, not later than the 10th calendar day after the date the decision is issued, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and, if applicable, an appeal bond in the amount determined by the court from which the appeal is taken. (c) Notwithstanding Section 30.00014, Government Code, or any other law, a person filing an appeal from a municipal court under Subsection (a) is not required to file a motion for a new trial to perfect an appeal. (d) A decision of a county court or county court at law under this section may be appealed in the same manner as an appeal for any other case in a county court or county court at law. (e) Notwithstanding any other law, a county court or a county court at law has jurisdiction to hear an appeal filed under this section. EXHIBIT ‘apa next west conDocumerN@FAFS1302087 NESBTETRAEF 1DESCTBEN een uffexthim!2enginatonContet=documentocstansitonTyp... 11snare 130.0004. Appa | States) West vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Government Code (Refs & Annos) Title 2. Judicial Branch (Refs & Annos) Subtitle A. Courts Chapter 30. Municipal Courts of Record (Refs & Annos) Subchapter A. General Law for Municipal Courts of Record (Refs & Annos) Effective: September 1, 2017 EXHIBIT § 30.00014. Appeal Currentness {a) A defendant has the right of appeal from a judgment or conviction in a municipal court of record. The state has the right to appeal as provided by Article 44.01, Code of Criminal Procedure. The county criminal courts or county criminal courts of appeal in the county in which the municipality is located or the municipal courts of appeal have jurisdiction of appeals from a Municipal court of record. If there is no county criminal court, county criminal court of appeal, or municipal court of appeal, the county courts at law have jurisdiction of an appeal. If a county does not have a county court at law under Chapter 25, the county court has jurisdiction of any appeal. (b) The appellate court shall determine each appeal from a municipal court of record conviction and each appeal from the state on the basis of the errors that are set forth in the appellant's motion for new trial and that are presented in the clerk's record and reporter's record prepared from the proceedings leading to the conviction or appeal. An appeal from the municipal court of record may not be by trial de novo. (c) To perfect an appeal, the appellant must file a written motion for new trial with the municipal clerk not later than the 10th day after the date on which judgment is rendered. The motion must set forth the points of error of which the appellant complains. The motion or an amended motion may be amended by leave of court at any time before action on the motion is taken, but ot later than the 20th day after the date on which the original or amended motion is filed. The court may for good cause extend the time for filing or amending, but the extension may not exceed 90 days from the original filing deadline. If the court does not act on the motion before the expiration of the 30 days allowed for determination of the motion, the original or amended mation is overruled by operation of law. (d) To perfect an appeal, the appellant must also give notice of the appeal. If the appellant Fequests a hearing on the motion for new trial, the appellant may give the notice of appeal orally in open court on the overruling of the motion. If there is no hearing, the appellant must give a written notice of appeal and must file the notice with the court not later than the 10th day hips" nex. westaw.comBecumentNAD S4ABOSCA3 1E7ECZABATFAEACE 19ChviewiFulTent m7orginatonConestsdocumentocSansitonTy. 1/2re2019 130000%4. Appeal | Staos| Westlaw after the date on which the motion is overruled. The court may for good cause extend that time period, but the extension may not exceed 90 days from the original filing deadline. (e) If the defendant is in custody, the appeal is perfected when the notice of appeal is given as provided by Article 44.13, Code of Criminal Procedure. (f) A municipality shall by ordinance establish a fee for the preparation of the clerk's record in the amount of $25. The preparation fee does not include the fee for an actual transcription of the proceedings, The clerk shall note the payment of the fee on the docket of the court. If the case is reversed on appeal, the fee shall be refunded to the defendant. (g) The defendant shall pay the fee for the preparation of the clerk's record and the fee for an actual transcription of the proceedings. (g) The defendant shall pay the fee for an actual transcription of the proceedings “105 next wos convDocumer NAD 1G4AB05CASIETC2ABASFSEACE196View/FulText hi 7originaionContext=documenticStanstionTy. 22