Faculty of Law

Jamia Millia Islamia

Jurisprudence

Topic:
Doctrine of stare decisis its position in India and US

Name: Kamlesh Rai

Semester: 5th (3rd Year)
Roll no.: 21
Guided by: Dinesh Sir
Content

1. Reason and Importance of the Rule.

2. Proper Limitations of The Doctrine.

3. Doctrine of stare decisis In India

4. Stare Decisis and Precedent

5. Position in US
REASONS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE

The policy of the courts, and the principle upon which rests the authority of judicial decisions as
precedents in subsequent litigations, is embodied in the maxim, Stare decisis et non quieta mnovere
to abide by the precedents and not to 'disturb settled points. Its meaning is, that when a point of law
has been once solemnly and necessarily settled by the decision of a competent court, it will no
longer be considered open to examination, or to a new ruling, by the same tribunal or those which
are bound to follow its adjudications. The reasons which underlie this rule are stated by Chancellor
KENT, in a much quoted passage from the Commentaries, as follows: "A solemn decision upon a
point of law, arising in any given case, becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest
evidence which we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow
that decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood
or misapplied in that particular case. If a decision has been made upon solemn argument and mature
deliberation, the presumption is in favour of its correctness; and the community have a right to re-
gard it as a just declaration or exposition of the law, and to regulate their actions and contracts by it.
It would, therefore, be extremely inconvenient to the public, if precedents were not duly regarded
and implicitly followed. It is by the notoriety and stability of such rules that professional men can
give safe advice to those who consult them; and people in general can venture with confidence to
buy and trust, and to deal with each other. If judicial decisions were to be lightly disregarded, we
should disturb and unsettle the great landmarks of property. When a rule has been once deliberately
adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless by a court of appeal or review, and never
by the same court, except for very cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if
the practice were otherwise, it would be leaving us in a state of perplexing uncertainty as to the law.

The principle of stare decisis, therefore, though presenting certain analogies to the rule which estab-
lishes the conclusiveness of an estoppel by judgment, both rests upon a broader foundation and is
more comprehensive in its application. The latter doctrine springs from the two maxims, that "no
one should be twice harassed concerning the same dispute," and that "the interest of the state de-
mands there should be an end of litigation," and is necessarily limited, in its effect, to the parties to
the particular controversy and, their privies. But the former is predicated upon the necessity of final-
ly settling the rules of the common: law and the interpretation of statutory enactments in the inter-
est, and for the protection and guidance, of the entire community; and hence it interposes a barrier
to fluctuations of judicial opinion in all similar cases.

PROPER LIMITATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE

The principle of stare decisis is subject to certain necessary and proper limitations, which, on the
one hand, secure and enhance its practical utility, and on the other hand, prevent its abuse. The more
important of these limitations will be discussed in order.

Overruled Cases-If a decision has been expressly overruled, either by the same court which ren-
dered it, or by a court exercising appellate jurisdiction, it can of course no longer be cited as a
precedent. The latest utterance of the court, on any given point of law, constitutes the authority
which is not to be departed from without cause. And the same is true of decisions overruled by nec-
essary implication in a subsequent case. But here it would be necessary to show beyond reasonable
cavil, that the two authorities were really and necessarily inconsistent rulings on a state of facts sub-
stantially identical. An exception, however, would probably be made in the case of a single deci-
sion, probably erroneous, which should overrule a series of previous authorities or unsettle the es-
tablished principles of commercial or statutory law. And if a rule of law has been changed by leg-
islative enactment, the authorities which announced it are of course stripped of all binding force.

Two Extreme to be avoided-" That doctrine," says Lowris, J., speaking of the rule under considera-
tion, "though incapable of being expressed by any sharp and rigid definition, and therefore inca-
pable of becoming an institute of positive law, is among the most important principles of good gov-
ernment. But like all such principles, in its ideal it presents its medial and its extreme aspects and is
approximately defined by the negation of its extremes.

Decision manifestly Erroneous-Hence, in the third place, if a decision is clearly incorrect, whether
from a mistaken conception of the law or through a misapplication of the law to the facts, and no
injurious results would be likely to flow from a reversal of it, and especially if it is injurious and
unjust in its operation, it is not only an allowable departure from precedent, but the imperative duty
of the court, to reverse it.

Isolated cases- A single decision upon any given point of law is not regarded as conclusive as a
precedent in the same degree that a series of decisions upon that point would be: Duff v. Fisher. And
the Supreme Court of California declares that the doctrine of stare decisis will lead it to conform to
a principle of mercantile law established all over the world, rather than to follow a decision of its
own made a few years before, which is a very decided and probably injudicious innovation upon
that principle: Aud v. Magru'der, 10 Cal. 282

Doctrine of stare decisis In India

Like England, doctrine of stare decisis has been accepted in Indian law. Since the law in India is
mostly based on the English law therefore, system of law reporting is fairly developed in India. The
doctrine of stare decisis has essentially tapped as a result of progress made in a lot reporting. to be-
gin with, there was not Doctrine of stare decisis as they were no reporting of the decision of in Eng-
land. The reason of reporting of decisions in England can be traced back to the 17th century when
the decisions of Exchequer courts came to be reported and were given binding force. Later, with
establishment of High Court of judicature by the acts of 1873 and 1875 the doctrine of stare decisis
was firmly established and now it forms and indispensable part of the British legal system. Doctrine
of stare decisis literary means let the decision stand in its rightful place. When a decision contains a
new principal, it is binding on subordinate courts and has persuasive authority for equivalent courts.
The rule is based on an expediency and public policy. Although this principle is generally followed
by the courts, but it may not be applicable if court is convinced that the earlier wrong is likely to
perpetuate resulting into erroneous decision.

The operation of doctrine of stare decisis presupposes the existence of hierarchy of courts. For ex-
ample, in India the lower-most courts or courts of the first instance are the subordinate courts of the
high courts and Supreme courts is that the apex. The Supreme Court is the highest court in India.
Supreme Court in Supreme Court advocates on record Association v. Union of India held that
doctrine of stare decisis is not an flexible rule it can has a little relevance in constitutional cases.
The court observed that there's no doubt that the rule of stare decisis brings about consistency and
uniformity but at the same time in exercising its inherent power the Supreme Court should ask itself
whether in the interest of public good or any other reason, it is necessary that its earlier decision
should be revised.

In Krishna Swamy v. Union of India Mr. justice Rama Swamy supreme court spell out the basic
philosophy and limits of doctrine of stare decisis.

“The decision of the last word on the interpretation of the constitution and the law of the land on the
article 141. The judge is the living Oracle working in dry bones of law to articulate the felt necessi-
ty of the time.”

In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab the Supreme Court held, “if the rule of stare decisis were fol-
lowed blindly and mechanically, it would dwarf and stultify the growth of law and affect its capaci-
ty to the changing needs of society”.

Absolute authoritative precedent in India - Every court in India is absolutely bound by the deci-
sion of court superior to itself. The subordinate court are bound to follow the decision of the High
Court to which they are subordinate. subordinate court should not presume to set its own opinion
against the the authoritative statement of the law laid down by the court to which it is subordinate.
The judges of the high court sitting alone are bound by the decision of the bench of two or more
judges. A bench of two or more judges are bound by the decision of the Full bench of same court. A
Full bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Subbarayudu v. The state following
judgement was affirmed by Subbarao, C.J. in the interest of ensuring the uniformity of law “A sin-
gle judge shall not differ from the judgement of another judge of same court.

Stare Decisis and Precedent

Stare decisis means “let the decision stand” where the court is bound by its own decision. It was so
with the house of the Lords.
Indian Supreme Court is not bound by its own earlier decision. It can overrule prospectively and
retrospectively. The case law is very powerful source of general law of the land (i.e to say that case
laws of two countries differs in its form, points etc). The study and grasp of case law is very fruitful
for the lawyers. It is source of knowledge, provides basis for argument expound the implication of
law and sometimes even supplies the want of the legislature. It is said to be the second in the source
of the general law. First being the statute which is the formal expression of the legislature will. The
purpose of judiciary is to implement in all its intent and implication. Judges introduce their own
philosophies and attitudes which is reflected in the judgements. This take us to the conclusion that
nature of judgement and their recognition and validity differs from country to country.
Stare Decisis is the Latin phrase which means to stand ny the decided cases.
The doctrine of stare decisis does not mean Imprisonment of the reason or the dogmatic rule al-
lergic to the logic or reason. It is flexible of law operating in the province of the precedent provid-
ing room to accommodate with the changing needs dictated by the social needs, state policy and
judicial conscience.

Position in US

Janus v. AFSCME is a devastating blow against public sector unions, barring them from charging
“agency fees” to Janus v. AFSCME is a devastating blow against public sector unions, barring
them from charging “agency fees” to the public employees for whom they negotiate pay increases
and benefit bumps if those employees decline to join the union as full members.

Now, teachers unions, police unions, and more will be forced to lobby public employees to pay full
union dues, even though those employees will get the same benefits from the union if they pay
nothing at all.Janus is a rare Supreme Court decision (though the second in this term) that overrules
a previous judgment of the Court. The Supremes generally abide by a principle known as stare deci-
sis, Latin for “to stand by things decided.” That means that even if justices believe a past decision
was wrongly decided, they generally accept it as precedent and rule in accordance with it going
forward.The previous decision Janus overrules is known as Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,
decided back in 1977. Detroit teacher D. Louis Abood objected to being forced to become a mem-
ber or pay agency fees (which are generally lower but pay for bargaining services) to a teachers
union. To force him to give money to a group whose political ideas he disagreed with was, he
claimed, compelled speech.

First, consider the “internet tax” case – South Dakota v. Wayfair. Here, the justices considered two
Supreme Court precedents from the last 50 years, both of which held that a state cannot require an
out-of-state seller with no physical presence in the state to collect and remit sales taxes on goods the
seller ships to consumers in the state. Despite those precedents, the Court overruled them – in part
because of the changes in the country wrought by Amazon and other internet sellers. It held that
states are free to collect taxes on sales made over the internet to consumers in their states, even if
the sales are made by out-of-state sellers.

Next, consider the case of Janus v. AFSCME, an important case related to government employee
unions decided late in this year’s Supreme Court term. Here, once again the Court was confronted
with a precedent – this time from 1977 – which held a state could compel a government employee
to pay fees to a union that the employee refused to join. That the employee did not support the
union or what it did with his money did not matter to the justices when this question was first ad-
dressed in a case known as Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. There, the Court said it did not
violate the Constitution to force the employee to pay the union fees the employee did not want to
pay.

But, in the Janus case the Supreme Court held that it got the call wrong in Abood. Justice Samuel
Alito explained for a majority of the justices that forcing an employee to pay money to a union that
the employee does not support violates that employee’s free speech rights.

When the Court misapplies the Constitution, as it did in Abood, those concerns can be overcome by
the need to ensure the Constitution is followed and the path of the law corrected- as the Court did
in Janus.

Certainly, stare decisis has its place in our courts. Lower courts should and must always adhere to
the controlling precedents of higher courts. And even the nation’s highest court should recognize
that following precedent in most instances provides stability and reliability for both the law and the
nation. A stable, reliable system of laws allows Americans to understand what conduct is lawful and
what is not and to govern their behavior accordingly.
A good example of where stare decisis carried the day for these very reasons arose a decade or so
ago. Then, the Supreme Court was asked to reconsider Miranda v. Arizona – the 1966 decision that
required law enforcement officers to provide arrestees with their “Miranda warnings” – “you have
the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you…” All Americans
know those warnings because they appear on television so regularly.

Although those warnings are not exactly in the text of the Constitution, the nation came to rely upon
them over the years, with little objection, in the ensuing decades. The Miranda warnings became
widely adopted and accepted by the American people. Therefore, when the High Court was asked to
declare those warnings not constitutionally required in a case called Dickerson v. United States,
based in part on a congressional effort to overrule the warnings, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
upheld the warnings as “constitutionally-based” and worthy of protection specifically because of
stare decisis.

Thus, in that instance, stare decisis carried the day.

But compare the outcome of the Miranda warnings cases to the outcome of Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation. In that case, the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, overruled the
infamous Plessy v. Ferguson case—the case that said the government could offer “separate but
equal” accommodations to different races yet not run afoul of the Constitution. In Brown, the Court
threw out the Plessy decision—and rightly so. The country as a whole had not come to accept the
notion of separate but equal as equal at all, and legal organizations like the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund had attacked the decision in the years between Plessy and Brown to demonstrate
that Plessy was wrongly decided. Their arguments overcame the power and persuasiveness that
stare decisis plays in the courts by demonstrating beyond dispute how wrong Plessy was.

In deciding whether stare decisis should control the Supreme Court’s decision in reviewing a prece-
dent anew, perhaps some lessons can be gleaned from these earlier cases.

First, have the facts and technology changed in the country in a manner that makes relying upon the
precedent less persuasive, as in the internet tax case—Wayfair
Second, did the Court just get it wrong when it first considered the legal issue, as Justice Alito said
it did when he and a majority of the Court overruled Abood in the Janusdecision a few weeks ago?

And third, has the earlier decision come to be accepted by most Americans, like Miranda? Or is the
decision more like Plessy, a decision that rightly came to be reviled by many Americans in the years
after it was decided?

At bottom, as these earlier decisions demonstrate, stare decisis has an important role to play in our
court system. But it is by no means controlling. The Court has repeatedly rejected stare decisis
when the circumstances—and the text of the Constitution—demand it.

In a unanimous ruling, the Court rejected that argument, instead ruling that while agency fees could
not be used to pay for lobbying or political activity, unions could still force nonmembers to pay
them in exchange for collective bargaining and other apolitical services the union provides.

Now, teachers’ unions, police unions, and more will be forced to lobby public employees to pay full
union dues, even though those employees will get the same benefits from the union if they pay
nothing at all.
 Bibliography

1. Dias, Jurisprudence

2. Prof. S. N. Dhyani, Jurisprudence – a study of Indian legal theory,

3. Salmond, Jurisprudence.

4. Dr. Gokulesh Sharma, An introduction to Jurisprudence.

5. Dr. Harris, The concept of possession in English Law, Oxford Essays on

Jurisprudence.

6. Markby, Elements of Law.

7. B.N. Mani Tripathi, Jurisprudence.

8. Pollock and Right, Possession in the Common Law.