CASE DIGESTS COMPILATION: F.
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE AND The Court held that section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional as it amounts to
OTHER ENCOUNTERS
US v. WINDOSOR
FACTS:
Two women, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer, married in Canada in 2007 and
the State of New York recognised their marriage. At the time of their
marriage, they were resident in New York and they had registered as
domestic partners when New York City gave that right to same-sex couples
in 1993. Spyer died in 2009, leaving her entire estate to Windsor. Windsor
attempted to claim the federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses,
but was prevented from doing so under section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA). DOMA is a federal act which amends the Dictionary Act to
define “marriage” and “spouse” as excluding same-sex couples. Windsor
paid the estate taxes but requested a refund from the Inland Revenue
Service, which was denied. Windsor brought a refund suit in the District
Court, claiming that DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment equal protection
principles. While the case was pending, the Department of Justice decided
not to defend the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA and the Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (BLAG) intervened in
the litigation to do so.
The District Court ruled against the United States, finding section 3 of
DOMA to be unconstitutional and ordering the Treasury to refund Windsor’s
tax with interest. An appeal was filed and the District Court’s decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit. Although the US
government did not seek to defend the constitutionality of DOMA, they
refused to pay the refund to Windsor.
A petition for writ of certiorari was filed on 11 September 2012. The case
was argued before the Supreme Court on 27 March 2013.
Issue.
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act defines “marriage” and “spouse”
to exclude same-sex couples. Does this violate the Fifth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause?
Decision:
a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth
Amendment. The first question that the Court addressed was whether it had
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. All parties agreed that the
Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, but the court appointed an amicus
curiae to argue the opposite position. She argued that once the District
Court ordered a refund, the case should have ended and the appeal should
have been dismissed, as the parties were no longer adverse. However, the
Court decided that because the US government had refused to pay the tax
refund, this, combined with the fact that BLAG had intervened to defend
the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA with a “substantial adversarial
argument”, was a controversy which was sufficient for the Court to have
jurisdiction in this case.
The Court considered that historically, and by tradition, the definition and
regulation of marriage had been treated as being within the realm of the
separate states. It stated that DOMA, which controlled over 1,000 statutes
and many federal regulations, had a much greater reach than any previous
legislation enacted by Congress to regulate the meaning of marriage.
The Court held that DOMA meant to to injure the very class of people that
New York sought to recognise and protect by giving them the right to marry.
In doing so, DOMA violated “basic due process and equal protection
principles applicable to the Federal Government”. The Court held that
“interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages was the
“essence” of DOMA, which identified and made unequal a “subset of state-
sanctioned marriages”. It stated that DOMA sought to, and did in fact,
provide a disadvantage, separate status and stigma on those who entered
into same-sex marriages. Furthermore, the Court said: “[DOMA] frustrates
New York’s objective of eliminating equality by writing inequality into the
entire United States Code (...) creating two contradictory marriage regimes
within the same State”.
The Court went on to state that DOMA:
“[P]laces same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a
second-tier marriage. The differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral
and sexual choices the Constitution protects (...) and whose relationship the
State has sought to dignify. And it humiliates tens of thousands of children
now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even
more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of
their own family and its concord with other families in their community
and in their daily lives.”
 Because the Court found that the principle purpose and effect of
DOMA was to “demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex
marriage”, it held that “DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the
liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution”. It therefore affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
Of the nine Justices presiding over this case, five were of the
majority opinion, with the remaining four dissenting. The dissenting
Justices did not all agree with each other in their opinions, but broadly
considered that the Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case and, on
the merits, that DOMA was not unconstitutional. Justice Alito, in his
dissenting opinion, stated that:
“[S]ame-sex marriage presents a highly emotional and important
question of public policy – but not a difficult question of constitutional law.
The constitution does not guarantee the right to enter into a same-sex
marriage. Indeed, no provision of the Constitution speaks to the issue.”
CONCLUSION:
The Court held that under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment, same-sex couples have a fundamental right to
marry. Laws of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee were held invalid
to the extent they excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage on the
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. Because same-sex
couples can exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states, it follows
that there is no lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful same-
sex marriage performed in another state on the ground of its same-sex
character. The Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
AND RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.
Facts:

Justice Scalia gave a scathing dissenting opinion, in which he stated

Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while private
that “[b]y formally declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States, were married on
enemy of human decency, the majority arms well any challenger to a state
1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States;
law restricting marriage to its traditional definition.”
and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.

OBERGEFELL V. HODGES
FACTS:
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union
between one man and one woman. Fourteen same-sex couples, and two men
whose same-sex partners were deceased, filed suits in Federal District
Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state
officials violated the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to
marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in another State given full
recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners' favor, but the Sixth
Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed.
On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner, asking that
the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita,
Manila, and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce proceeding before
Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they had no community
property. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce
Decree abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
Issue:

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right
Did the state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying same- on conjugal properties.
sex couples the right to marry?
Held:
ANSWER: Yes.
As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate,
he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. Only Philippine Nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
Alicia Reyes under our National law is still considered married to private
respondent. However, petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.
FE D. QUITA and BLANDINA DANDAN, respondents
December 22, 1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on May 18, 1941. No children were born out of their marriage.
On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will.
On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in
favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan,
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving
children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed
that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death
of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent
and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of
his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issues:
1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?
2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of
the decedent?
Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person
is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from
the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs
of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.
Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage
to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito
under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving
spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is
affirmed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY,
respondent.
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot
five children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime
in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also,
she had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the
Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage
on March 25, 1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent
Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing
a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband
and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also
prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and
void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00
she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and
void ab ignition on the ground of psychological incapacity. One factor
considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the United
States of America and married another man and has established another
family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is
married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute
psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
RULING:
1st issue:
The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support
the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely. Using
the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos, this
Court found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding
of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
2nd issue:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein
one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a
foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that
she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband
in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American
citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino
citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when
she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do
not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could
not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24,
1981. They were blessed with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer
Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in
1986. After few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
sometime in 2000 and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in
California.
He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of
certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the
Family Code.
Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of
the Family Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also
to remarry under Philippine law.
The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on,one of them became naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a
divorce decree.
The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized,
the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized
as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed, she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the US. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.
However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s
naturalization, he was still barred from remarrying.
CORPUZ V. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, [11 August 2010]
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married
respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due
to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the
Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically
involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for
divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court
Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree
took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina
and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to
register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto.
Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics
Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian
divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that
Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the
principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino
citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion – i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor
of aliens -with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest
to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of aright by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE
G. R. No. 183622, [February 08, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which maybe recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid ac-cording to their national law.
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a
divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then
contracted a second marriage with petitioner.
When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC
a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment
as administratrix of the intestate estate. While the case was pending,
respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his
first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were
consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent
on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not
considered an interested person qualified to file the petition. Respondent
further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner
by Felicitas Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage
to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol.
However, the RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and that divorce was not
recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and
petitioner was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration
of nullity then pending filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and
petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in
determining the guilt of petition-er for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also
found that petitioner had never been married to Bristol.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters
of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held
that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and
subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not
an interested party who may file said petition. The CA affirmed the decision
of the lower court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the acquittal of petitioner in the crim. case for bigamy meant
that the marriage with Bristol was still valid.
2. Whether the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized
under Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD:
It is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the
divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters
of administration over the estate of Orlando. Petition is partially granted.
Case is remanded to RTC.
1. No. The RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding
of the RTC in Crim. Case that petitioner was never married to
Eusebio Bristol. It concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of
bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was
valid.
2. Yes. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of for-eign nationality. Aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the
fact of divorce must still first be proven by the divorce decree itself. The
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Under Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence
of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations
of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have
the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must
be alleged and proved.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the
validity of Orlando’s divorce under the laws of the United States and the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to
remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence
to establish the fact of divorce.
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v. HON. CORONA IBAY-
SOMERA, HON LUIS C. VICTOR AND ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.
Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino
citizen) and respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German
national, were married at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together
in Malate, Manila and had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany. The local court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouse.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a
trial court in Manila.
After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the
complaint for adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the
petitioner had an affair William Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still
married.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the
cases filed against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved
to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice
Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal
of the complaints against petitioner.
Issue:
Is the action tenable?
Ruling:
Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon sworn written filed by the offended
spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence since the raison
d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status
and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the
time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree is valid not only in his
country, may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the Civil Code on
the matter of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is dismissed.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together
as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was
married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer, Rederick
contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while
the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio
dissolved on the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage
of the couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree
of respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his
legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, the Court
find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed
that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose
of receiving evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot grant
petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void
because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
ELMAR O. PEREZ v. CA, GR NO. 162580, 2006-01-27
Facts:
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice
on May 16, 1968. The first marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central
Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila while the second took
place at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they
decided to separate from each other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they
decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition
for dissolution of conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican Republic ratified
the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily.
Subsequently, on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of properties between Tristan
and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of
Virginia in the United States and both lived as husband and wife until
October 2001.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued
by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage
between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her
marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law.
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Lily with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention
claiming that she has a legal interest in the matter in litigation
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in disregarding
her legal interest in the annulment case. between Tristan and Lily.
Ruling:
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still
lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained
from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between
them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of
the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with
respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status,
condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he
or she was married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an
absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting
an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute
divorce.
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code which took effect on August
30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano we held:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the
marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort,
subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country. (Emphasis added)
Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage
was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Petitioner never acquired the legal
interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Principles:
Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be
governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and
duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a
Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad,
initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the
Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
Case Digest: REPUBLIC vs ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
FACTS
Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen.
She later on filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to
enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof,
she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the
parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States
and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay
him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship.
She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio.
The RTC ruled in her favor.
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a
conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized
from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared
void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage
as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA, however,
upheld the RTC decision.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature
and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA
found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the
parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American
citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build
a family.
The OSG then elevate the case to the Supreme Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null
and void.
RULING:
No, respondent’s marriage is not void.
The court said:
“Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer.
In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal
tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”
The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void
if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long
as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and
it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.”
“No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices
of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties,
and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.”
Noveras v Noveras GR No 188289
Facts:
David and Leticia Noveras are US citizens who own properties in the USA
and in the Philippines. They have 2 children, Jerome and Jena. Leticia states
that sometime in 2003, David abandoned his family to live with his
mistress. Further, she states that David executed an affidavit where he
renounced all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties in
the Philippines.
After learning of the extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce
before the Superior Court of California. Upon issuance of the judicial decree
of divorce in June 2005, the US properties were awarded to Leticia. Leticia
then filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property before the
RTC of Baler, Aurora.
The RTC regarded the petition for judicial separation of conjugal property
as a petition for liquidation of property since the spouses’ marriage has
already been dissolved. It classified their property relation as absolute
community because they did not execute a marriage settlement before their
marriage ceremony. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the
doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because
the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not
submit any proof of their national law. The court awarded the properties in
the Philippines to David, subject to the payment of the children’s legitimes.
Upon Leticia’s appeal to the CA, the CA ruled that the Philippine properties
be divided equally between the spouses and that both should pay their
children P520k. David argues that the Court should have recognized the
California judgment that awarded him the Philippine properties and that
allowing Leticia to share in the PH properties is tantamount to unjust
enrichment considering she already owns all the US properties.
Issues
1. Whether the marriage between David and Leticia has been dissolved
2. Whether the filing of the judicial separation of property is proper
Held:
1. No. the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed
the bond of marriage between the parties. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the
record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be
proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such publication must be
authenticated by a seal of a consular official. Section 25 of the same Rule
states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state that the copy is a correct
copy of the original. The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer. Based on the records, only the divorce decree was
presented in evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity,
as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties
are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation.
2. Yes. Art 135 of the Family Code provides that:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property: xxxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact
for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of
property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court
erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the absolute community
of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David
had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is
undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business.
Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha
Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in
the Consent for Operation form. Third and more significantly, they had
filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least
one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of
property should be granted.
EDELINA T. ANDO v. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 195432; August 27, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National. After one year,
Yuichiro Kobayashi obtained and was granted a divorce in Japan. Said
Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry
of Manila. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to
remarry and that by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner
married Masatomi Y. Ando. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married
Ryo Miken.
Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to
indicate her surname with her husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told
at the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her
until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with her
said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for
Declaratory Relief praying that her marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando must be honored, considered and declared valid, until
otherwise declared by a competent court. Consequently, and until then,
petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a
Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’
RTC dismissed the Petition for want of cause and action for not complying
with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is
obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in
our country, thus not entitled to the reliefs prayed for. Petitioner’s
allegation that since no judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Ando was rendered does not make the same valid because such declaration
under Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable only in case of re-marriage.
Petitioner moved for Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this Petition
for Review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a Petition for Declaratory Relief is the proper remedy to
compel the DFA to issue a new passport to petitioner under her second
husband’s name.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s second marriage is valid.
HELD:
1. With respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport,
petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the
RTC. She should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was to question the DFA’s refusal
to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s name. The IRR
of R.A. 8239 provides that before a married woman may obtain a
passport under the name of her spouse, she needed to present the
following: (1) the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract
 and one photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been
and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of friends since they were both students at the University of the Philippines,
the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of
consular post that has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty.
obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.
the Philippines.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued
at a Methodist Church at Ermita Manila and a catholic wedding at Quezon
a Philippine passport under her second husband’s name. Should her
City followed it. However Atty. Catindig claimed that he only married
application for a passport be denied, the remedies available to her are
Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would
provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus: “Any person who
make a scandal out of her pregnancy if he refused to marry her, which could
feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act of the
have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School. The marriage
implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have
produced four children.
the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose
decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due course.” She
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they
should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event
decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Atty. Catindig
of the denial of her application for a passport, after having complied
told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign
with the provisions of R.A. 8239.
country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually
2. With respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, on April 27,
as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to
judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband. the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic,
appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed
before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,
On July 14, 1984, Atty. Tristan Catindig married Dr. Elmar Perez in the State
we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC,
of Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed
there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record
with four children. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the
of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the
divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which
validity of the divorce decree under that national law. Hence, any
"dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the
declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her
Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under
complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the
Philippine law.
national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper
forum.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter
in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty.
21. A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015 - DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents. signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001 In the said
letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry
FACTS: her once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into their
relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair
until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr.
August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his
Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August
marriage to Gomez.
27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E.
Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents
Code of Professional Responsibility.
to file their respective comments, which they separately did on November
25, 2002.14 Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez
on May 18, 1968.
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming
that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He
asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and
that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in
fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from
his firm in January 2001.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig.
She claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed
in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she
told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married
and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down,
Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned
from his law firm.
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within
90 days from notice. On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) issued an Order setting the mandatory conference of the
administrative case. During the conference, the parties manifested that
they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings
already submitted.
Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective
position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and
Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 2003 and October 20,
2003, respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper on October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation, which recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of
marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to
Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which
warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the
charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez
failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged
affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution, which adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration on the Resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying
solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations.
He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons
having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents
as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any
corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to
Dr. Perez’ testimony. He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention
of committing any felony; that he never concealed the status of his marriage
from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been
transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez. The IBP Board of Governors, in
its Resolution dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
reconsideration.
Issue: The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross
immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the
circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any
fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.”35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright
and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross
when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense
of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of
disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral, conduct.
Only Atty. Catindig should be disbarred. The facts gathered from the
evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it
is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he
obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in
our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time.
He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry
anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding,
he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty.
Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
With regards to Atty. Baydo, there is a lack of evidence to prove the claim
indicative relationship between Atty. Caindig. As it is, evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim were merely allegations, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondent were indeed having an
affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty.
Catindig.
Atty. Tristan Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and violating
the Lawyers oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is DISBARRED from the practice of law.
MEDINA v KOIKE
(G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016)
(EFFECTS OF ANNULMENT; MARRIAGE DISSOLVED BY A FOREIGN
JUDGMENT)
FACTS:
 Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino, and respondent
Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese were married on June 14,
2005 in Quezon City, Philippines.
 They bore two children – Masato and Fuka.
 On June 14, 2012, the spouses filed for divorce before the Mayor of
Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on the
same day and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family
Register of Michiyuki Koike.
 Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant
to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
 Doreen presented several foreign documents, namely:
o "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce"
o "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" both issued by the
Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the
Consul of the Republic of the Philippines for Osaka, Japan.
o Certified machine copy of a document entitled "Divorce
Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of
Japan in Manila authenticated by the DFA
o Certification issued by the City Civil Registry Office in
Manila that the original of said divorce certificate was 􏰀led
and recorded in the said Office
o Photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their
corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code
of Japan 2009" were likewise submitted as proof of the
existence of Japan's law on divorce.
 RTC’s Ruling:
 o Denied Doreen’s petition.
o The foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce
must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
o While the divorce documents presented by Doreen were
successfully proven to be public or official records of
Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law
of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on
divorce.
o "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of
Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by
the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24
and 25 of the said Rules
o Testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions
found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations
was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified
expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a
working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly those
on family relations and divorce.
o Did not consider the said books as learned treatises
pursuant to Section 46, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was
presented and considering further that Philippine courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign judgments and law.
 Doreen filed a petition DIRECTLY to the SC.
ISSUE:
W/N the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce.
HELD:
The case is REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the
pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.
The SC ruled that the issue in the case at bar raises questions of fact. In
citing the case of Corpuz v Sto. Tomas the SC said that foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
Another case that the Court mentioned is Garcia v Recio stating that, “Since
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law
on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of
the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and
Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter
are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence
presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously
a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final
orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be
brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court.
Finally, the SC held that since the said Rules denote discretion on the part
of the Court to either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA, the
question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of
justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further
appropriate proceedings.
Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino
Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings,
a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants
to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil
Registry and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse
initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the
Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be
taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member
of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid
the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign
spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According
to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does
not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the
Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that
the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be
initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation
since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.
In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case,
the Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality
principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose
rights are equally protected by the law.
The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the
equal protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article
26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The
violation of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the
discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign
spouse had initiated the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are
alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the validity of
the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly
discriminate against the other.
The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the
solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right
of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do
this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is
limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic
types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which
terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the
Court to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The
fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce
must still be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.
MARRIAGES DISSOLVED BY FOREIGN JUDGMENT
REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 199515
June 25, 2018
Third Division
Leonen J.
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001. They
lived together for nine (9) years in Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not
have any children. Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed
for divorce and the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate
issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese
Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated. She filed the Divorce
Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where
she was informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was
required to return to the Philippines to report the documents for
registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition of
divorce. She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil
Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since there was no
court order recognizing it. She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination
and Declaration of Capacity to Marry.
The RTC rendered a Decision, finding that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka
legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove
Tanaka's national law.
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement
becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by both
parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce
Certificate stating "Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce
issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan" is sufficient to
prove that she and her husband have divorced by agreement and have
already effected notification of the divorce.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that a divorce by agreement
is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code.
Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse," OSG posits that only the foreign spouse may
initiate divorce proceedings.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is
sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between petitioner Rhodora
Ilumin Racho and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the
latter according to his national law.
2.Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties was valid
SC:
1. YES.
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official
records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it must be
accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country.
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by
an Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of
the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular
Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and
for Japan. The Authentication further certified that he was authorized to
sign the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his
signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate
of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact
of divorce between petitioner and respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law of
Japan, a divorce by agreement "becomes effective by notification."
Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was
duly authenticated, the divorce between petitioner and respondent was
validly obtained according to respondent's national law.
2. YES.
Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse," the Office of the Solicitor General posits that
only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from
initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently
unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from
something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on
Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting
our own nationals.
The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of Article 26 disregards any
agency on the part of the Filipino spouse. It presumes that the Filipino
spouse is incapable of agreeing to the dissolution of the marital bond. It
perpetuates the notion that all divorce proceedings are protracted
litigations fraught with bitterness and drama. Some marriages can end
amicably, without the parties harboring any ill will against each other. The
parties could forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if the national law
of the foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient out-of-court divorce
process. This ensures amity between the former spouses, a friendly
atmosphere for the children and extended families, and less financial
burden for the family.
It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be more
progressive than current enactments. Our laws should never be intended to
put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution
guarantees fundamental equality, this Court should not tolerate an
unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To rule that the foreign spouse
may remarry, while the Filipino may not, only contributes to the patriarchy.
This interpretation encourages unequal partnerships and perpetuates
abuse m intimate relationships.
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our laws,
petitioner is still married to respondent despite the latter's newfound
companionship with another cannot be just. Justice is better served if she
is not discriminated against in her own country.86 As much as petitioner is
free to seek fulfillment in the love and devotion of another, so should she
be free to pledge her commitment within the institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court June 2, 2011
Decision and October 3, 2011 Order in SP. Proc. No. 10-0032 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second paragraph of the Family Code
and the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce dated December
16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to
remarry.
Williams v. State of North Carolina (I)
Citation. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed.
279, 1942 U.S. LEXIS 2, 143 A.L.R. 1273 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1942)
Brief Fact Summary
Williams (Defendant) and Hendrix (Defendant) were granted divorces from
their spouses in a Nevada court. Defendants then married each other and
moved back to their former home, North Carolina. The North Carolina court
refused to recognize the Nevada divorce decrees and convicted Defendants
of bigamy.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
A divorce granted in state A, on a finding that one spouse was domiciled in
state A, must be respected in state B, when state A’s finding of domicile is
unquestioned.
Facts
Williams (Defendant) and Hendrix (Defendant) were residents of North
Carolina. Both moved to Nevada and filed for divorce against their spouses
in a Nevada court. The defendants in these divorce actions entered no
appearance and were not served with process in Nevada. However, service
was made by publication in a Nevada newspaper and by personal service of
process in North Carolina. The Nevada court found that each was domiciled
in Nevada, and divorces were granted to Defendants. Williams (Defendant)
and Hendrix (Defendant) then married each other in Nevada and moved
back to North Carolina where they were convicted of bigamy on an implicit
finding that the Nevada divorce decrees would not be recognized in North
Carolina. In affirming the conviction, the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that the Nevada divorces did not need to be recognized, even if the
North Carolina court found that both Defendants had actually domiciled in
Nevada.
Issue
Must a divorce granted in state A, on a finding that one spouse was
domiciled in state A, be respected in state B, when state A’s finding of
domicile is unquestioned?
Held
(Douglas, J.) Yes. A divorce granted by Nevada, on a finding that one spouse
was domiciled there, must be respected in North Carolina, where Nevada’s
finding of domicile is unquestioned by the North Carolina court. The
divorce must be respected in North Carolina even though the defendant in
the divorce action has not appeared or been served with process in Nevada,
and though recognition of such a divorce offends the policy of North
Carolina. This rule is simply an application of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution. If one state were allowed to ignore a divorce in
a sister state, even though the requirements of procedural due process were
met in the divorce action, the result would be great injustice. In this case,
if the court had decided otherwise, Williams (Defendant) and Hendrix
(Defendant) would be lawfully married in Nevada but would be bigamists in
North Carolina. Their children would be legitimate in one state and
illegitimate in another state. Reversed and remanded.
Dissent
(Jackson, J.) There was no conceivable basis of jurisdiction in the Nevada
court over the absent spouses.
Concurrence
(Frankfurter, J.) North Carolina did not challenge the power of Nevada to
declare the marital status of individuals found to be Nevada residents but
chose to disrespect the consequences of such power.
Discussion
The court explicitly overruled Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906),
which held that a state does not have jurisdiction over an absent spouse
where that state is not the state of the “matrimonial domicile,― and
where the domiciled spouse has wrongfully left the absent spouse. The
Court felt that Haddock rested on “immaterial distinctions― and
should not be an exception to the rule expounded here. In this case the
court refused to determine whether North Carolina had the right to dispute
the Nevada court’s procedural finding of domicile as a basis for divorce
jurisdiction. This case simply states that North Carolina does not dispute
Nevada’s jurisdiction over the proceeding. It was left for a following
case, Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), to decide whether a
state may reject a sister state’s procedural finding of jurisdiction over an
action.
Williams v. State of North Carolina (1945)
Brief Fact Summary
Williams (Defendant) and Hendrix (Defendant) were granted divorces from
their spouse in a Nevada court. Defendants then married each other and
moved back to their prior home, North Carolina. The North Carolina court
refused to recognize the Nevada divorce decrees and convicted Defendants
of bigamy.
Synopsis of Rule of Law
State B may refuse to recognize a divorce decree granted in state A if state
B determines the basis of jurisdiction of state A to be unfounded.
Facts
Williams (Defendant) and Hendrix (Defendant) were residents of North
Carolina. They moved to Nevada and filed for divorce against their spouses
in a Nevada court. Defendants were granted divorces, the Nevada court
finding that each was domiciled in Nevada. Defendants then married each
other and moved back to North Carolina, where they were indicted for
bigamy. Defendants were convicted on the ground that they were not
domiciled in Nevada when the divorces were granted and therefore Nevada
had no divorce jurisdiction over them.
Issue
May state B may refuse to recognize a divorce decree granted in state A if
state B determines the basis of jurisdiction of state A to be unfounded?
Held
(Frankfurter, J.)Â Yes. A divorce decree is a conclusive adjudication of
everything except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and
domicile is a jurisdictional fact. Therefore, North Carolina may refuse to
recognize the Nevada divorces if the North Carolina court determines that
Nevada erred in its finding of domicile. However, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause demands that the determination of jurisdiction by one state be given
great weight in a sister state. A jurisdictional finding such as this may be
rejected only if the party urging its rejection can overcome the burden of
proof and can provide sufficient evidence of lack of jurisdiction. In this
case, the North Carolina trial court appropriately charged the jury that
Nevada’s finding of domicile was prima facie evidence of such domicile,
but was not conclusive. Acting under that standard of proof, North Carolina
had the right to reject Nevada’s finding of domicile. Affirmed.
Discussion
North Carolina did not question Nevada’s finding that Williams (Defendant)
and Hendrix (Defendant) were domiciled in Nevada at the time of their
divorces and, therefore, the first Williams case ruled that the divorces
granted to them by Nevada must be respected in North Carolina. In the
second Williams case, however, the Supreme Court addressed an issue not
present in the former appeal, specifically, whether North Carolina had the
power to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees because,
contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North Carolina finds that no
bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada. The Court ruled that North
Carolina had such power. The second Williams case raises the question
presented in Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019 (1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962), in which Maryland court had found that a
Nevada finding of divorce jurisdiction was improper and invalid. In spite of
Maryland’s decision, the Nevada court upheld the divorce when its validity
was questioned there. The divorce, therefore, was valid in Nevada and
invalid in Maryland, a result that seems to obstruct the purpose of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, as discussed in the first Williams case.
NORMA DEL SOCORRO V. WILSEM CASE DIGEST - CIVIL LAW
DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM G.R. No. 193707
December 10, 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland.
They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son
came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of
petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to
Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the
Philippines particulary in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma
filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court
dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien
ISSUES:
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child
under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A.
No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
RULING:
1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does
not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In
the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover,
foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands
neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2.YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the
foreigner is living here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.
CHEESMAN VS INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
G.R. NO. 74833 JANUARY 21, 1991
NARVASA, J.
PARTIES OF THE CASE:
THOMAS C. CHEESMAN (PETITIONER)
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ESTELITA PADILLA (RESPONDENTS)
KEYWORD: AMERICAN CITIZEN, LACK OF CONSENT OF FOREIGNER SPOUSE OF THE SALE OF
PHILIPPINE PROPERTY, PROHIBITION OF BARRING FOREIGNERS TO OWN PROPERTY IN THE
PHILIPPINES
SUMMARY: PETITIONER (AN AMERICAN CITIZEN) AND CRISELDA CHEESMAN ACQUIRED A
PARCEL OF LAND THAT WAS LATER REGISTERED IN THE LATTER’S NAME. CRISELDA
SUBSEQUENTLY SOLD THE LAND TO A THIRD PERSON WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
PETITIONER. THE PETITIONER THEN SOUGHT THE NULLIFICATION OF THE SALE AS HE DID NOT
GIVE HIS CONSENT THERETO. THE COURT HELD THAT ASSUMING THAT IT WAS HIS
(PETITIONER’S) INTENTION THAT THE LOT IN QUESTION BE PURCHASED BY HIM AND HIS WIFE,
HE ACQUIRED NO RIGHT WHATEVER OVER THE PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF THAT PURCHASE; AND
IN ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE A RIGHT OR INTEREST IN LAND, VICARIOUSLY AND
CLANDESTINELY, HE KNOWINGLY VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION; THUS, THE SALE AS TO HIM
WAS NULL AND VOID.
FACTS: THOMAS CHEESMAN AND CRISELDA P. CHEESMAN WERE MARRIED ON DECEMBER 4,
1970 BUT HAVE BEEN SEPARATED SINCE FEBRUARY 15,1981.1
ON JUNE 4, 1974, A "DEED OF SALE AND TRANSFER OF POSSESSORY RIGHTS" WAS EXECUTED
BY ARMANDO ALTARES CONVEYING A PARCEL OF UNREGISTERED LAND AND THE HOUSE
THEREON (AT NO. 7 NEPTUNE STREET, GORDON HEIGHTS, OLONGAPO CITY) IN FAVOR OF
"CRISELDA P. CHEESMAN, OF LEGAL AGE, FILIPINO CITIZEN, MARRIED TO THOMAS CHEESMAN,
AND RESIDING AT LOT NO. 1, BLK. 8, FILTRATION ROAD, STA. RITA, OLONGAPO CITY . . ."
THOMAS CHEESMAN, ALTHOUGH AWARE OF THE DEED, DID NOT OBJECT TO THE TRANSFER
BEING MADE ONLY TO HIS WIFE.
THEREAFTER—AND AGAIN WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THOMAS CHEESMAN AND ALSO WITHOUT
ANY PROTEST BY HIM—TAX DECLARATIONS FOR THE PROPERTY PURCHASED WERE ISSUED IN
THE NAME ONLY OF CRISELDA CHEESMAN AND CRISELDA ASSUMED EXCLUSIVE MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY, LEASING IT TO TENANTS.
ON JULY 1, 1981, CRISELDA CHEESMAN SOLD THE PROPERTY TOESTELITA M. PADILLA,
WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT OF THOMAS CHEESMAN. THE DEED DESCRIBED
CRISELDA AS BEING " . . . OF LEGAL AGE, MARRIED TO AN AMERICAN CITIZEN,. . ."
THIRTY DAYS LATER, OR ON JULY 31, 1981, THOMAS CHEESMAN BROUGHT SUIT IN THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE AT OLONGAPO CITY AGAINST HIS WIFE, CRISELDA, AND ESTELITA
PADILLA, PRAYING FOR THE ANNULMENT OF THE SALE ON THE GROUND THAT THE
TRANSACTION HAD BEEN EXECUTED WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT. AN ANSWER WAS
FILED IN THE NAMES OF BOTH DEFENDANTS, ALLEGING THAT (1) THE PROPERTY SOLD WAS
PARAPHERNAL, HAVING BEEN PURCHASED BY CRISELDA WITH FUNDS EXCLUSIVELY BELONGING
TO HER ("HER OWN SEPARATE MONEY");
(2) THOMAS CHEESMAN, BEING AN AMERICAN, WAS
DISQUALIFIED TO HAVE ANY INTEREST OR RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP IN THE LAND; AND (3) ESTELITA
PADILLA WAS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.
CFI: DECLARED THAT THE SALE EXECUTED BY CRISELDA CHEESMAN IN FAVOR OF PADILLA IS
VOID AB INITIO AND ORDERING THE DELIVERY OF THE PROPERTY TO THOMAS CHEESMAN AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.
TRIAL COURT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT: THE SALE BETWEEN CRISELDA CHEESMAN AND
PADILLA IS VALID. THOMAS CHEESMAN’S COMPLAINT IS DISMISSED AND IS ORDERED TO
IMMEDIATELY TURN OVER THE POSSESSION OF THE HOUS AND LOT TO PADILLA.
IAC: FOUND ALL OF THOMAS CHEESMAN’S CONTENTION TO BE WITHOUT MERIT. IAC
AFFIRMED SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAVING FOUND NO REVERSIBLE ERROR.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THOMAS CHEESMAN HAS A RIGHT OVER THE ALLEGED CONJUGAL
PROPERTY SOLD BY HIS FILIPINO WIFE WITHOUT HIS CONSENT DESPIITE HIM BEING AN
AMERICAN CITIZEN.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW PROHIBITS THE SALE TO ALIENS OF RESIDENTIAL LAND.
SECTION 14, ARTICLE XIV OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION ORDAINS THAT, "SAVE IN CASES OF
HEREDITARY SUCCESSION, NO PRIVATE LAND SHALL BE TRANSFERRED OR CONVEYED EXCEPT TO
INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, OR ASSOCIATIONS QUALIFIED TO ACQUIRE OR HOLD LANDS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN." PETITIONER THOMAS CHEESMAN WAS, OF COURSE, CHARGED WITH
KNOWLEDGE OF THIS PROHIBITION. THUS, ASSUMING THAT IT WAS HIS INTENTION THAT THE
LOT IN QUESTION BE PURCHASED BY HIM AND HIS WIFE, HE ACQUIRED NO RIGHT WHATEVER
OVER THE PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF THAT PURCHASE; AND IN ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE A RIGHT
OR INTEREST IN LAND, VICARIOUSLY AND CLANDESTINELY, HE KNOWINGLY VIOLATED THE
CONSTITUTION; THE SALE AS TO HIM WAS NULL AND VOID. IN ANY EVENT, HE HAD AND HAS
NO CAPACITY OR PERSONALITY TO QUESTION THE SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE SAME
PROPERTY BY HIS WIFE ON THE THEORY THAT IN SO DOING HE IS MERELY EXERCISING THE
PREROGATIVE OF A HUSBAND IN RESPECT OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY. TO SUSTAIN SUCH A
THEORY WOULD PERMIT INDIRECT CONTROVERSION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION. IF
THE PROPERTY WERE TO BE DECLARED CONJUGAL, THIS WOULD ACCORD TO THE ALIEN
HUSBAND A NOT INSUBSTANTIAL INTEREST AND RIGHT OVER LAND, AS HE WOULD THEN HAVE
A DECISIVE VOTE AS TO ITS TRANSFER OR DISPOSITION. THIS IS A RIGHT THAT THE
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PERMIT HIM TO HAVE.
AS ALREADY OBSERVED, THE FINDING THAT HIS WIFE HAD USED HER OWN MONEY TO PURCHASE
THE PROPERTY CANNOT, AND WILL NOT, AT THIS STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BE REVIEWED
AND OVERTURNED. BUT EVEN IF IT WERE A FACT THAT SAID WIFE HAD USED CONJUGAL FUNDS
TO MAKE THE ACQUISITION, THE CONSIDERATIONS JUST SET OUT MILITATE, ON HIGH
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS, AGAINST HIS RECOVERING AND HOLDING THE PROPERTY SO
ACQUIRED OR ANY PART THEREOF. AND WHETHER IN SUCH AN EVENT, HE MAY RECOVER FROM
HIS WIFE ANY SHARE OF THE MONEY USED FOR THE PURCHASE OR CHARGE HER WITH
UNAUTHORIZED DISPOSITION OR EXPENDITURE OF CONJUGAL FUNDS IS NOT NOW INQUIRED
INTO; THAT WOULD BE, IN THE PREMISES, A PURELY ACADEMIC EXERCISE. AN EQUALLY DECISIVE
CONSIDERATION IS THAT ESTELITA PADILLA IS A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH, BOTH THE TRIAL
COURT AND THE APPELLATE COURT HAVING FOUND THAT CHEESMAN'S OWN CONDUCT HAD
LED HER TO BELIEVE THE PROPERTY TO BE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF THE LATTER'S WIFE, FREELY
DISPOSABLE BY HER WITHOUT HIS CONSENT OR INTERVENTION. AN INNOCENT BUYER FOR
VALUE, SHE IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE LAW IN HER PURCHASE, PARTICULARLY AS
AGAINST CHEESMAN, WHO WOULD ASSERT RIGHTS TO THE PROPERTY DENIED HIM BY BOTH
LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF.
RULING: WHEREFORE, THE APPEALED DECISION IS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS AGAINST
PETITIONER.
SO ORDERED.
Case Digest: MULLER vs MULLER
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY; MULLER VS. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006
Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must
come with clean hands.
Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided
in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move
and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent
had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and
used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at
the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of
petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking,
and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of
properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court
granted said petition. It also decreed the separation of properties between
them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within
the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that
respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased
in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for
reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not
acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to
REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of
the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house
situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the
Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.”
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that
constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of his
Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law bars him
to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a
rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
HULST v PR BUILDERS, INC G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007
FACTS:
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van
Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch nationals, entered into a Contract to Sell with PR
Builders, Inc. (respondent), for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit
in respondent's townhouse project in Batangas. When respondent failed to
comply with its verbal promise to complete the project on their agreed
period, the spouses filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest, damages and
attorney's fees.
HLURB rendered a Decision in favor of spouses, thus rescinding the
Contract to Sell. The HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution addressed to
the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas
directing the latter to execute its judgment. The Ex-Officio Sheriff
proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution. However, upon complaint of
respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the levy
made by the Sheriff was set aside, requiring the Sheriff to levy first on
respondent's personal properties.
The HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution and the Sheriff levied
on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by 13 Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) and set the public auction of the levied properties. Two days
before the scheduled public auction, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to
Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff made an
over levy. During the day of the auction, respondent's counsel objected to
the conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent
Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending resolution. Absent any
restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15
parcels of land. The sum of was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction
of the judgment award after deducting the legal fees. Same day after the
auction, the Sheriff received the Order dated April 28, 2000 issued by the
HLURB Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the matter.
Four months later, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director issued an Order
setting aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties and rendered
that the levy on the subject properties made by the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the
RTC is set aside and the said Sheriff is hereby directed to levy instead
Respondent's real properties that are reasonably sufficient to enforce its
final and executory judgment, this time, taking into consideration not only
the value of the properties as indicated in their respective tax declarations,
but also all the other determinants at arriving at a fair market value, namely:
the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or
potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape or
location, and the tax declarations thereon.
A motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading under Section
1(h), Rule IV of the 1996 HLURB Rules and Procedure, petitioner filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA who then dismissed the
petition. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed
Petition for Review on Certiorari. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the spouses, being a foreign national, can acquire
property in the Philippines.
2. Whether or not Court of Appeals have gravely erred in affirming the
arbiter’s order setting aside the levy made by the sheriff on the
subject properties.
RATIO:
1. The 1987 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the
disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of lands of
the public domain for Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60
percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified
from acquiring private lands. Since petitioner and his wife, being
Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from
acquiring and owning real property, it is unequivocal that the
Contract to sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife
and respondent should be considered void. This rule, however is
subject to exceptions that permit the return of that which may have
been given under a void contract to the party repudiating the void
contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished or before
damage is caused to a third person and if public interest is sub
served by allowing recovery. Petitioner is therefore entitled to
recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for
rescission, which was granted by the HLURB, was not the fact that
he is not allowed to acquire private land under the Philippine
Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the
amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to
respondent. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void
contract; being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical
tie between the parties involved. Further, petitioner is not entitled
to actual as well as interests thereon, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees. Since the contract involved here is a Contract
to Sell, ownership has not yet transferred to the petitioner when he
filed the suit for rescission. While the intent to circumvent the
constitutional proscription on aliens owning real property was
evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to Sell, such
violation of the law did not materialize because petitioner caused
the rescission of the contract before the execution of the final deed
transferring ownership.
2. In the present case, the HLURB Arbiter and Director gravely abused
their discretion in setting aside the levy conducted by the Sheriff
for the reason that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff
rendered moot and academic the motion to quash the levy. The
HLURB Arbiter lost jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash the
levy by virtue of the consummation of the auction sale. Absent any
order from the HLURB suspending the auction sale, the sheriff
rightfully proceeded with the auction sale. The winning bidder had
already paid the winning bid. The legal fees had already been
remitted to the HLURB. The judgment award had already been
turned over to the judgment creditor. In the present case, the
Sheriff complied with the mandate of Section 9, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, to "sell only a sufficient portion" of the
levied properties "as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and the
lawful fees." Each of the 15 levied properties was successively
bidded upon and sold, one after the other until the judgment debt
and the lawful fees were fully satisfied. Holly Properties Realty
 Corporation successively bidded upon and bought each of the
levied properties for the total amount of P5,450,653.33 in full
satisfaction of the judgment award and legal fees. The HLURB
Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to determine the
value of the levied property. Respondent only submitted an
Appraisal Report, based merely on surmises. The Report was based
on the projected value of the townhouse project after it shall have
been fully developed, that is, on the assumption that the residential
units appraised had already been built. The Appraiser in fact made
this qualification in its Appraisal Report: "[t]he property subject of
this appraisal has not been constructed. The basis of the appraiser
is on the existing model units." Since it is undisputed that the
townhouse project did not push through, the projected value did
not become a reality. Thus, the appraisal value cannot be equated
with the fair market value. The Appraisal Report is not the best
proof to accurately show the value of the levied properties as it is
clearly self-serving.
HERALD BLACK DACASIN vs. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN G.R. No.
168785 February 5, 2010
Facts: Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent
Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in
April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995.
In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th
Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against
petitioner.3 In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of
petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of
Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a
contract (Agreement4 ) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose
Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the
Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
"relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged
that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over
Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack
of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to
enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondent’s
motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held
that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering
the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree,
including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2)
the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the "nationality rule"
prevailing in this jurisdiction;5 and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code6 prohibiting
compromise agreements on jurisdiction.7
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration,
holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding
on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Issue: The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint
custody of the parties’ child.
Ruling: The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not
to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and equity
considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for
the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed
his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation.9 An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of
actions.10 Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded
not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s
divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded.
What the Illinois court retained was "jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of
enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for
Dissolution."11 Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various
provisions" of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on
joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois
court’s so-called "retained jurisdiction."
Petitioner’s Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the
Agreement which is contrary to law.
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two
facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been
born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no
longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce
decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated
in fact or in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be
separated from the mother x x x."16 (This statutory awarding of sole
parental custody17 to the mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound
policy consideration,19subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to
obtain here.20 ) Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-
divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their
child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has
also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody
by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not
divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority
when spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses,
the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven
years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends
the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or
divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced
parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the
separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the
provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below
seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is
unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted
with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven
as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the
exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article
213.22
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that
"No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this
provision’s enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing
private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in
custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents.
This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of
avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated
mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a
tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her."23 This
ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of
a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."24
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree’s alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree
violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino
spouse26 - to support the Agreement’s enforceability. The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is
hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained
abroad.28 There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his
submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its
lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court to settle the
question of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus
removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody
regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default
standard on child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child.30 As
the question of custody is already before the trial court and the child’s
parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share
custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to
allow the parties to take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit
evidence on the custodial arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest,
and let the trial court render judgment. This disposition is consistent with
the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may be
invoked to serve the child’s best interest.31
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and 23 June 2005
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60. The case is REMANDED
for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

SO ORDERED.