Feliciano Galvante v. Hon Casimiro (Dep. Omb. For Military and Other Law e.
e. My other companions on the jeep also alighted, raised their arms and
Enforcement Offices), Bienvenido Blancaflor (Director), Dennis L. Garcia (Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer), SPO4 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran, PO1
Valentino Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot | G.R. No. 162808 | Apr. 22, 2008 |
Austria-Martinez, J.:
1. In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento,
Agusan del Sur, Private Respondents confiscated from Petitioner one colt pistol
super .38 live ammunitions. The confiscated materials were covered by an expired
Memorandum Receipt dated Sept. 2, 1999.
2. The Assistance Provincial Prosecutor filed an Information against Petitioner
for Illegal Prosecution of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to COMELEC
Resolution No. 3258 before RTC Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
3. Pending resolution of the criminal case, Pettioner filed against Private
Respondents, an administrative case before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of
Region XIII of the DILG and a criminal case filed with the Ombudsman, for arbitrary
detention, illegal search, and grave threats.
4. In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint which he filed in both cases,
Petitioner narrated how, on May 14, 2001, Private Respondents aimed their long
firearms at him, arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention:
a. On May 14, I left my house at around 1pm for Sitio Cahi-an, Agusan de Sur
to meet retired police Percival Plaza and inquire about the retirement procedure for
policemen
b. Upon arrive at the house of Mr. Plaza, together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin
Ramirez and Pedro Ramas, I immediately went down from the (owner type) jeep but
before I could call Mr. Plaza, 4 policemen in uniform blocked myw ay.
c. The 4 policemen were Private Respondents, who all pointed their long
firearms ready to fire at me (having heard the sound of the release of the safety lock)
d. Raising my arms, I heard Avenido saying “give me your firearm” to which I
answered “I have no firearm” and showed them my waistline when I raised my t-
shirt.
showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire
holding an armalite also pointed their firearms at them. Mr. Plaza came down from
his house and told them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but
they did not heed his statements.
f. While we were raising our arms, SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my
owner type jeep and conducted a search. I asked them if they had a warrant
g. After a while, they saw my .38 pistol under the floor mat of my jeep and
asked me for the MR of the firearm which I gave them due to fear since their guns
were still pointed at us
h. Immediately after, the policemen left without saying anything bringing my
firearm with them
i. I left Mr. Plaza’s house at about 2:30 pm and went to Trento Police Station
where I saw a person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist, I asked the
police officers including those who searched my jeep why that person was not
apprehended
j. None of the policemen made a move to apprehend the armed civilian
person so I went to the office of Polcie Chief Rocacorba who immediately called the
armed civilian to his office where he was disarmed.
k. I was then detained together with that civilian and I was released only 2
days later on May 16, 2001 at 4pm after posting a bail bond
5. Petitioner’s affidavit was supported by the Joint Affidavit of his witnesses
Sanoria and Plaza.
6. In their Counter-Affidavit, Private Respondent Conde interposed the ff.
defenses:
a. He had nothing to do with the detention of Petitioner as it was Chief of
Police Rocacorba who ordered it. This was admitted by Petitioner in his own
affidavit.
b. He denies searching Petitioner’s vehicle, but even though he was not armed
with a warrant, he searched the person of Petitioner as the latter, in plain view was
committing a violation of COMELEC Resolution 3258 by carrying a firearm in his
person.
7. The remaining Private Respondents filed their Joint-Affidavit dated Mar. 25,
2002, contradicting the statements of Conde:
a. We executed a joint counter-affidavit dated Aug. 28, 2001 where we stated
that we saw Petitioner armed with a handgun/pistol tucked on his waist
b. That statement is not accurate because the truth is that the handgun was
taken by Conde who was acting as our team leader during the May 14, 2001
elections, from the jeep of Petitioner after searching the same; and
c. We only noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit after we
signed it.
8. Petitioner then filed an Affidavit of Desistance with both IAS and
Ombudsman absolving Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot but maintaining that
Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases.
9. IAS issued a decision in the Administrative Case finding all Private
Respondents guilty of grave misconduct but penalized them with suspension only.
The IAS noted that they were merely being enthusiastic in the conduct of the arrest
in line of duty.
10. In the criminal case, Petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Preliminary
Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of or Recall the Warrant of
Arrest. RTC granted the motion. Upon reinvestigation, the Prosecutor recommended
the dismissal of the case on the ground that "the action of the policemen who
conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances
justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his
property." This was approved by the Prosecutor’s Office. RTC granted the
prosecution’s motion to dismiss.
11. The Ombudsman, unaware of the RTC’s orders, issued a resolution through
Respondent Garcia stating that it found no probable cause for any of the offenses
charged against the Private Respondents as it appeared that the incident stemmed
from a valid warrantless arrest. The subsequent execution of an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant rendered the complaint even more uncertain and
subject to doubt, especially since it merely exculpated some but not all of the
respondents. Coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duty, this negates any criminal liability on the part of the Respondents. This
Resolution was approved upon the recommendation of Respondent Blancaflor.
12. In his MR, Petitioner called the attention of the Ombudsman to the IAS
Decision, Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss and the RTC Order, all of which
declared the warrantless search to be illegal. This MR was denied on the ground that
Petitioner offered no new evidence or errors of law which would warrant the
reversal or modification of the earlier Resolution.
13. Petitioner then filed the present petition attributing GAD on the part of
Deputy Omb. Casimiro, Director Blancaflor and Prosecutor Garcia for finding that
there was a valid warrantless arrest despite the fact that the search was conduced
without a valid warrant and it was not a valid warrantless search.
14. OSG argued that the Omb. did not act with GAD in dismissing the case since
no crime was committed in searching Petitioner and confiscating his firearm as they
were merely enforcing the law against illegal possession of firearms and the
COMELEC ban against the carrying of firearms outside of one’s residence.
ISSUE:
WON the Omb. acted with GAD in dismissing the case? NO.
1. The Omb. is constitutionally empowered to determine probable cause of
the commission of a crime and to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. The SC respects the relative autonomy of the Omb. to investigate
and prosecute and refrains from interfering when the latter exercises such powers
either directly or through the Deputy Omb., except when it it shown to be tainted
with GADALEJ.
2. It is noted that in the criminal complaint filed with the Omb., the Private
Respondents were charged with warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and grave
threats.
3. The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense as a
warrantless search is not a criminal act penalized under the RPC. The RPC punishes 2
forms of searches: Art. 129 Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the
service of those legally obtained and Art. 130 Searching domicile without witnesses.
The elements of these felonies where not alleged. While the situation is lamentable,
it is not covered by Art. 129 and 130 of the RPC. The remedy of Petitioner against the
warrantless search is to seek damages under Art. 32(9) of the Civil Code and/or
disciplinary and administrative under Sec. 41 of RA 6975 with the PNP/DILG.

4. The Omb.’s dismissal of the criminal case was therefore proper although
the reasons cited by them were rather off the mark because they relied solely on the
finding that the warrantless search conduct was valid and the Affidavit of Desistance
casted doubt on the veracity of his complaint. Omb. completely overlooked the fact
that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by them as illegal search is not a
criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result is the same, hence the Court need not
resolve the issue of WON public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of
the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance.

5. The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was likewise properly

dismissed. The sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be showed
that: (a) the offender is a public officer/employee, (b) the officer detained the
complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds. The second element was
not alleged by Petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by Conde,
Petitioner himself identified that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his
detention. Nowhere did Petitioner’s affidavit allege that Private Respondents
effected his detention or were in any other way involved in it. There was no factual
or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary detention against Private
Respondents.

6. With respect to the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor
General aptly pointed out that the same is based merely on Petitioner’s bare
allegation that the firearms were aimed at him – this stands no chance against the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official function. The IAS itself
observed that Private Respondents may have been carried away by their enthusiasm
in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty. Petitioner expressed the same view when,
in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that Private Respondents may have been
merely following orders when they pointed their long firearms at him.
People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Bohol | G.R. No. 171729 | July 28, 2008 |
Quisimbing, J.
FACTS:
 RTC had convicted Ricardo Bohol (Bohol) of violating Art. II Sections 11(3)
and 5 of R.A. No. 9165 also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002.
 August 2, 2002 an informant tipped police Jessie Nitullano that Bohol is
engaged in illegal drug trade in Isla Putting Bato, Tondo
 PO2 Estrada was assigned to act as a poseur buyer and was provided with a
marked 100 peso bill as buy-bust money.
 Estrada proceeded to the house of Bohol, whom they saw standing beside
the stairs of his house. Following a short introduction, Estrada and the
informant told Bohol of their purpose. Bohol asked, "How much?" to which
Estrada replied, "Piso lang" (meaning ₱100 worth of shabu) and handed to
the former the marked ₱100-bill.
 Bohol gave Estrada a plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules
which the latter suspected to be shabu. The illicit transaction having been
consummated, Estrada gave to his companions their pre-arranged signal.
Emerging from their hiding places, PO2 Luisito Gutierrez and his
companions arrested Bohol. PO2 Gutierrez frisked Bohol and recovered
from him the buy-bust money and three plastic sachets containing similar
white crystalline granules suspected to be shabu.
 Two informations were filed.
 Information for the violation of Section 11(3) states that Bohol possessed
under his custody and control three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets containing shabu weighing 0.048 gram and 0.035 gram.
 The violation of Section 5 of the same law stated that the accused willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly sell or attempt to sell or offer for sale for 100
pesos and deliver to PO2 Ferdinand Estrada (a poseur buyer) one sachet of
shabu containing 0.054 gram.
 Upon arraignment, Bohol entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.
 Trial court rendered the decision finding Bohol guilty for both charges.
 Since one of the penalties imposed by the trial court is life imprisonment,
the cases were forwarded to this Court for automatic review. The case was
transferred to the CA for intermediate review.
 CA affirmed the decision. Thus, Bohol filed a notice of appeal before the SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the search and arrest of Bohol is illegal? It is legal.
2. Whether the RTC erred in convicting Bohol despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt? No. the
prosecution established guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING/RATIO:
1st issue:
The arrest is legal.
Bohol claims that his arrest was illegal since he could not have committed, nor was
he about to commit, a crime as he was peacefully sleeping when he was arrested
without a warrant. Consequently, the search conducted by the police officers was
not incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest, and the confiscated shabu obtained
from the search was inadmissible as evidence against him.
The OSG stresses that the search made on the person of Bohol was incidental to a
lawful arrest which was made when he was caught in flagrante delicto. Further, the
OSG maintains that at the time of Bohol’s arrest, the police officers had probable
cause to suspect that a crime had been committed since they had received a tip
from a confidential informant of the existence of illegal drug trade in the said place.
The arresting officers were justified in arresting Bohol as he had just committed a
crime when he sold the shabu to PO2 Estrada. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.
The subsequent warrantless arrest is also valid.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. This Court has ruled that the following instances constitute valid
warrantless searches and seizures: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of
a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the
evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and
emergency circumstances.
2nd issue:

The prosecution established Bohol’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

This Court discerns no improper motive on the part of the police officers that would
impel them to fabricate a story and falsely implicate Bohol in such a serious offense.
In the absence of any evidence of the policemen’s improper motive, their testimony
is worthy of full faith and credit. Also, courts generally give full faith and credit to
officers of the law, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner. Accordingly, in entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of an
incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of the law and presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.

Lastly, Bohol cannot insist on the presentation of the informant. he informant’s

presence is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The appellate court held
that police authorities rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of confidentiality with which
they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will be over
the moment they are presented in court. Further, what is material to the
prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti. Both requirements were sufficiently proven in this case.
Baltazar v. People 1
FACTS:
 At about 8:30 p.m. of 21 April 2002, in the province of Bulacan, a silver/gray
colored car with Plate No. TNM-606, traveling from the direction of
Calumpit and going towards the direction of Pulilan Public Market, suddenly
hit a pedicab.
 Because of the impact, the passengers of the pedicab — Erlinda Baltazar
and her son, Rolando Baltazar — were thrown out of the pedicab.
Witnesses Cristobal Atienza and Louie Reyes claimed in their respective
sworn statements that after hitting the pedicab, they saw the car stop,
maneuver into reverse, and run over the hapless victims, before fleeing the
crime scene. As a result, Erlinda Baltazar died while Rolando Baltazar
suffered injuries and was brought to Good Shepherd Hospital in Pulilan,
Bulacan.
 In the course of the investigation of the incident, Police Officer 1 (PO1)
Simplicio Santos of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pulilan, Bulacan,
traced the ownership of the car which bumped the pedicab and discovered
that the registered owner thereof was a certain Celso Bautista, who had
already sold the said vehicle to private respondent Armando Bautista. PO1
Santos then went to private respondent's residence where he recovered
the car stained with blood.
 Consequently, petitioner Severino C. Baltazar, one of the children of the
deceased Erlinda Baltazar and brother of the injured Rolando Baltazar, filed
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pulilan, Bulacan two separate
criminal complaints against private respondent, one for the Murder of
Erlinda Baltazar and the other for Frustrated Murder for the injuries
suffered by Rolando Baltazar. It is petitioner's complaint for the Murder of
his mother, Erlinda Baltazar, which is the focus of the present controversy.
 MTC resolved to dismiss the Murder and Frustrated Murder charges and to
file a criminal case for reckless imprudence instead. Upon filing of the
information and determination of probable cause, the RTC issued a warrant
of arrest against the accused.
 When the accused (private respondent) was arrested, he filed a motion to
suspend arraignment because a petition for review was filed to the DOJ
Secretary. The DOJ Secretary granted the petition. 2 Thereafter, a motion to
1
Note: This case was decided during the time that the Municipal Trial Court judges
could conduct PIs.
2
All told, We are of the view and so hold that respondent could not be held
criminally liable for murder or less serious physical injury as there was no malice or
intent to cause injury (dolo) to the victims. Neither can he be held liable for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide or less serious physical injury as there was no
withdraw information was filed. The RTC judge granted the motion and
sustained the grant in the motion for reconsideration.3
 CA affirmed the RTC’s grant to the prosecution’s motion to withdraw.
ISSUE:
sufficient proof of negligence (culpa). This is a case of accident, an exempting
circumstance under paragraph 4 Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Where
the death of the deceased was due to an accident without any negligence on the part
of the driver of the automobile, there being no sufficient proof on record to establish
the latter's negligence, there is no criminal liability (United States vs. Tayongtong, 21
Phil. 476).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated September 23, 2002 of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Bulacan is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. He is hereby directed
to immediately cause the withdrawal of the information for murder and less serious
physical injury filed against respondent Armando C. Bautista before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12 of Malolos, Bulacan and to report the action taken thereon
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
3
The Denial of the MR says —
[A]fter reading the statements of the witnesses given to the police soon after the
tragic accident occurred in the evening of April 21, 2002, nothing was mentioned by
the witnesses of the alleged intentional killing of the victim by running over her with
the car of the accused. What they said to the police was what appeared to be a simple
case of criminal negligence in driving the car by the accused when said vehicle
bumped the pedicab occupied by the victims who were thrown out, resulting to the
death of one of them, without the accused rendering any help or assistance to them,
but fleeing from the scene of the accident — a case of hit and run accident. Then
later on one of these witnesses executed an affidavit stating that the car, after
bumping the pedicab of the victims, stopped and then moved backwards
intentionally to run over one of the victims who was killed as a result thereof. Such
declaration is suspect of a mere afterthought to create a much graver offense than a
case of criminal negligence, the Court not hesitating to say that from the statement of
the police investigator in his affidavit, he clearly appears not an impartial police
investigator but one who has expressed his bad opinions of the accused instead of
giving an impartial report on his findings as a police investigator. And the Court
could not help but suspect that the police investigation was so made to create a
capital offense against the accused, maybe because the brother of the victim who
died in the accident was a police officer himself by the name of SPO3 Cruz. Another
important factor in this case is the admission of one Joel Santos in his own affidavit
to be the driver of the car when the accident happened. Such admission under oath
by Joel Santos should not have been ignored at all in finally resolving the case before
filing it in Court. This probably is the reason why the Department of Justice directed
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to immediately cause the
withdrawal of the information for murder and less serious physical injury filed
against accused Armando C. Bautista.
Can the judge reverse his/her finding of probable cause on the basis of the
prosecution’s motion to withdraw?
HELD/RATIO:
Yes.
The determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor — one that, as far as crimes cognizable by the RTC are concerned, and
notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively
pertains, by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor. This broad
prosecutorial power is, however, not unfettered, because just as public prosecutors
are obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it, they are
also constrained to be circumspect in filing criminal charges against the innocent.
Thus, for crimes cognizable by the regional trial courts, preliminary investigations are
usually conducted. As defined under the law, a preliminary investigation is an inquiry
or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
XXX
The preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It
merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause for issuance of the
warrant of arrest. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents
to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is
the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in
assisting the Judge in making his determination.
The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court
is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause
for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by
the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man
weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules
of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A
finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely
than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction.
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable cause
for the arrest of the accused, such as in the case at bar, is to insulate from the very
start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of
a public trial.
A closer scrutiny of the substance of Judge Concepcion's Order dated 30
July 2004 would reveal that he reversed his earlier finding of probable cause in
issuing a warrant of arrest and allowed the withdrawal of the Information against
private respondent based on the following grounds: (1) witnesses to the crime failed
to categorically identify private respondent as the culprit; (2) private respondent's
nephew, Joel Santos, voluntarily admitted in his affidavit that he was the one driving
the car, which he borrowed from private respondent, and who accidentally hit the
pedicab which Erlinda Baltazar and Rolando Baltazar were riding; (3) private
respondent could not be held criminally liable for murder as there was no malice or
intent to cause injury (dolo) to Erlinda Baltazar; and (4) this was just a simple case of
criminal negligence or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or less serious
physical injury.
Given the foregoing, Judge Concepcion's Order dated 30 July 2004 granting
the withdrawal of the Information for murder against private respondent was not
issued with grave abuse of discretion. There was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross
and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to "an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law" on the part of Judge Concepcion. To the contrary, Judge Concepcion came to
the conclusion that there was no probable cause for private respondent to commit
murder, by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations, and
evidence on record.
XXX
We have likewise held that once a case has been filed with the court, it is
that court, no longer the prosecution, which has full control of the case, so much so
that the information may not be dismissed without its approval. Significantly, once a
motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed, the court may grant or deny
it, in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion. In doing so, the trial judge must
himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the
accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was
the trial judge's own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid
and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to accept the prosecution's word for
its supposed insufficiency.
Noel Navaja v. Hon. Manuel De Castro
G.R. No. 180969
September 11, 2017
Facts:
The instant case is an offshoot of a preliminary investigation proceeding initiated by
DKT Philippines, Inc. (DKT) charging its then-Regional Sales Manager for Visayas, Ana
Lou B. Navaja (Ana Navaja), of the crime of falsification of a Private Document,
docketed as I.S. Case No. 04-1238. In the course of the proceeding, Ms. Marilyn
Magsigay (Ms. Magsigay), a material witness for DKT, was subpoenaed to appear in a
hearing before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor-Bohol on March 15, 2004 in
order to shed light on the official receipt allegedly falsified by Ana Navaja.
On March 9, 2004, Petitoner Noel Navaja, Ana Navaja’s husband, went to Ms.
Magsigay’s workplace and told her that as per instruction from Ana Navaja's lawyer,
Atty. Orwen Bonghanoy (Atty. Bonghanoy), her attendance is no longer needed.
Thus, Ms. Magsigay no longer attended the March 15, 2004 hearing where
petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy presented an affidavit purportedly executed by Ms.
Magsigay and notarized by a certain Atty. Rolando Grapa (Atty. Grapa) in Cebu City,
supporting Ana Navaja's counter-affidavit (March 15, 2004 incident). Resultantly, the
case was dismissed.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Edgar Borje (Atty. Borje), DKT's counsel, found out
from Ms. Magsigay herself that: (a) she would have attended the scheduled March
15, 2004 hearing were it not for the misrepresentation of petitioner that her
presence therein was no longer required; (b) she was merely told by her superior in
Garden Cafe to sign the affidavit and that she did not personally prepare the same;
and (c) she could not have gone to Cebu to have it notarized before Atty. Grapa as
she was at work on that day.
Criminal Complaints were filed against the petitioner and Atty. Bonghanoy. First,
charging petitioner for Obstruction of Justice in violaton of Section 1(a) of PD No.
1829 for the March 9, 2004 incident; and Second, charging petitioner and Atty.
Bonghanoy also for Obstruction of Justice in violaton of Section 1(f) of PD No. 1829
for the March 15, 2004 incident. After due proceedings, separate Informations were
filed before the MCTC-Jagna and MTCC Tagbilaran, respectively.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash before MCTC-Jagna arguing that
the that the charge of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 pending before it should
have been absorbed by the charge of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law
pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran, considering that (a) the latter case was filed
first, (b) both cases arose from a single preliminary investigation proceeding,
involving the same set of facts and circumstances, and flowed from a single alleged
criminal intent, which is to obstruct the investigation of I.S. Case No. 04-1238; and (c)
to allow separate prosecutions of the foregoing cases would be tantamount to a
violation of his right to double jeopardy.
The MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to Quash on the ground that MCTC-
Jagna has yet to acquire jurisdiction over his person. On reconsideration, it upheld
the denial ruling that petitioner is being charged with violation of Section 1 (a) of PD
1829, an offense separate and distinct from violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law,
which is pending before the MTCC-Tagbilaran. As such, said offenses may be
prosecuted independently from each other.
RTC affirmed MCTC’s denial. CA affirmed RTC ruling saying that there is more than
enough basis to try petitioner for two (2) separate crimes under two (2) distinct
Informations. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the CA correctly ruled that petitioner may be separately tried for different
acts constituting violations of PD 1829, namely, violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of
the same law allegedly committed during the pendency of a single proceeding.
Held: NO, CA erred. Petition is meritorious.
Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts constituting the crime of
obstruction of justice, the pertinent portions of which read:
Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging
from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any
of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from
reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means
of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
xxxx
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with
knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
xxx
The elements of the crime are: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed
under Section 1 of PD 1829; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose
of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the successful investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases
While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in different
locations, the Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a
single violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were
motivated by a single criminal impulse - that is, to obstruct or impede the
preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact,
eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol. The foregoing conclusion is premised on the
principle of delito continuado (Continuous Crimes), which envisages a single crime
committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.
Petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying
in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit
were clearly motivated by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one
criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation
proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus, applying the principle of delito
continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD
1829 which may be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly
prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran
City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same case.40
However, since he was already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgment dated
July 3, 2007 - in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed
as the events that transpired in Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial
execution of petitioner's single criminal design. The Court's pronouncement in
Gamboa v. CA42 is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as
"delito continuado'" or "continuous crime." This is a single crime consisting of a
series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of
division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right
violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character,
merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence
or delictual acts is called a "delito continuado." In order that it may exist, there
should be "plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of
penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose,
which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in
one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or
aim."
Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise,
petitioner will be unduly exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot
countenance.
Notes on Delito Continuado:
In Santiago v. Garchitorena,35 the Court explained the principle of delito continuado
as follows:
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality
of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and
unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the
same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to
the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I
Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed).
Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several
crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator
(Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and
Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal
intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
The concept of delito continuado although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code,
has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of [Republic
Act] No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims
for war veteran's benefits x x x.

Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to
special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed
from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws.36 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
People v Abenes y Pascua | G.R. No. 210878 | July 7, 2016
FACTS:
(Version of Prosecution)
 SPO1 Badua received a tip that Appellant Jonalyn Abenes was involved in the
sale of shabu. A buy bust operation ensued where the informant and SPO1
Badua (acting as the poseur-buyer) would meet with Abenes to buy P 1000
worth of shabu at Leisure Lodge, Upper Magsaysay Avenue, Baguio City.
 About 30 minutes from their arrival, Abenes approached SPO1 Badua and the
informant. The buy bust money was handed in exchange for a plastic sheet
containing white crystalline substance.
 After the exchange, Abenes was placed under arrest. She was informed of her
constitutional rights and was subjected to a body search. Another plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance was found on her person.
 The two plastic sachets were marked on site. Abenes was then brought to the
police station where the arresting officers likewise prepared their affidavit,
Inventory, Booking Sheet, Qualitative Examination Request and Urine Request.
 The confiscated specimen tested positive for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
(Version of Defense)
 Jonalyn Abenes traveled from her home in La Trinidad, Benguet to Magsaysay
Ave., Baguio City, where she was working as a GRO with Jing Jing (her friend).
 Upon arriving at Baguio, she headed to Jing Jing’s room at Leisure Lodge. She
asked Jing Jing if the latter knows of anyone selling shabu. They thereafter went
to Katipunan Inn (at the back of Center Mall), where another woman brought
out shabu which the three of them consumed.
 Jing Jing and the other woman told Abenes to return to the overpass. Instead of
doing so, Abenes returned to Leisure Lodge to freshen up. While freshening up,
a man and woman knocked at the door and asking for Jing Jing. After saying that
Jing Jing was not in the room, Abenes gave her name and the two introduced
themselves as police officers.
 Abenes was arrested for being pointed by Jing Jing as the source of shabu. She
denied it. She was then handcuffed and while going down the stairs of Leisure
Lodge, she saw Jing Jing asking for forgiveness for pointing to her.
RTC: ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved that appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto selling drugs to a law enforcement agent who posed as buyer and
while being frisked, another plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was
found in her possession.
CA: affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: WON appellant Abenes is guilty of illegal possession of drugs? NO, she is not
guilty of illegal possession. She is only guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
HELD:
The following elements must be proven in the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs:
1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it
These elements were satisfied by the prosecution's evidence. The prosecution
witnesses positively identified appellant as the seller of shabu. They also positively
and categorically testified that the transaction or sale actually transpired. The subject
shabu weighing 0.02 grams and the money amounting to P1,000.00 were also
identified by the witnesses when presented in court.
The appellant contends that there was failure to comply with the law with respect to
the proper marking, inventory and taking of photograph of the seized specimen.
However, the admissibility in evidence of the seized item was not raised during trial.
"[O]bjection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal." In the present case, the police operatives' alleged non-compliance with
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 was raised for the first time on appeal. In any event,
it is "settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to faithfully
observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of RA 9165, for as long as the
chain of custody remains unbroken." Still, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was
able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody from the moment it was
seized from appellant, the delivery of the same to the crime laboratory up to the time it
was presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti.
While we uphold the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the illegal sale of
shabu, however, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not adequately established by
the prosecution in the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drug under Section
11, Article II of RA 9165.
The testimonies of SPO1 Badua and PO1 Lag-ey were not able to provide a clear
identification of the illegal drug seized from appellant's possession.

There was no clear identification of the item allegedly seized from the possession of
appellant after the sale. It was only PO1 Moyao who could directly and possibly
observe the uniqueness of the sachet of shabu in court since he was the one who
took initial custody of the seized plastic sachet when appellant was frisked at the
time of arrest and who allegedly marked the same with initials. However, PO1
Moyao was not even presented in court to identify the plastic sachet and more
importantly to acknowledge the alleged marking thereon as her own.

In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the

corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment
of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

It is therefore of prime importance that in these cases, the identity of the dangerous
drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. With the material omission
to show the identity of the dangerous drug, subject matter in the charge of illegal
possession, we rule and so hold that the evidence for the prosecution casts serious
doubt as to the guilt of the appellant for it has not proven the indispensable element
of corpus delicti.

While as a rule we desist from disturbing the findings and conclusions of the trial
court especially when affirmed by the appellate court, we must bow to the superior
and immutable rule that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt since the fundamental law presumes that the accused is innocent. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome
the presumption of innocence.
Ocampo vs. Abando
Recit-ready Digest: 12 complaint affidavits were filed by relatives of alleged victims of
Operation Venereal Disease (Operation VD) accusing 71 named members (including
the petitioners) of the CPP/NPA/NDFP of murder. Upon the recommendation of
Assistant Prosecutor Vivero, an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against
54 named members of CPP/NPA/NDFP including the petitioners. The Information
was filed before RTC, Hilongos, Leyte which was presided over by Judge Abando.
Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause to charge the accused in the
crime charged and issued arrest warrants. Petitioner filed a petition to annul the
Order of Judge Abando on the ground that a case for rebellion was already filed
against him before the RTC of Makati. Based on the political offense doctrine,
common crimes such as murder is already absorbed by rebellion. SC held that the
political offense doctrine is not applicable in this case because the petitioners were
not able to prove that the murders were committed in furtherance of a political
offense. If they were able to prove that their case falls under the political offense
doctrine then the remedy would be for the court to dismiss the old information and
file a new information charging the accused with the proper offense provided that
the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy based on Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court. Even assuming that there was a mistake in the offense to be
charged against the accused, in this case first jeopardy did not attach because the
case in the RTC of Makati was dismissed.
Facts:
1. On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd
Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.The mass grave contained 67 skeletal remains of
individuals believed to be victims of “Operation Venereal Disease” (Operation
VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to
purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
2. 12 complaint-affidavits were filed by relatives of the alleged victims of Operation
VD. They testified that their relatives had been abudcted or last seen with
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.
3. Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of those who claim to be former
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. According to them, Operation VD was ordered
in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee. Allegedly, petitioners
Ocampo, EchanisBaylosis), Ladladwere then members of the Central Committee.
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured
and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP 20 pursuant to Operation VD.
4. Police Chief Inspector Almaden and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Tiu sent 12
undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Vivero.These letters requested legal action on the 12
complaint affidavits filed accusing 71 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP of
murder including the petitioners.
5. Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of
multiple murder against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP including
petitioners (who were claimed by former members to be part of the Central
Committee responsible for Operation for VD) for the death of 15 individuals.
6. The Information was filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte, presided by Judge
Abando. Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause “in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged.” Thus, warrants of
arrest were issued against petitioners.
7. Petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking annulment of the Order of Judge Abando.
According to Ocampo a case for rebellion was already filed against him and 44
others which is pending before the RTC Makati. Based on the political offense
doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder in this
case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a
necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.
Note: During the oral arguments, the Court observed that only single Information
was filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte for charging 15 counts of murder. Thus, the
prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and New Informations.
Issue: WON the murder charges against petitioner are already included in the
rebellion case filed against him with RTC Makati? NO.4
Ratio:
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common"
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are
4
Connection niya to Sec. 14 – Sec. 14 is the remedy in case the wrong
offense was filed against the petitioners/if murder is absorbed by rebellion
mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver
penalty." [Basically, common crimes are absorbed by the main crime when it was
done in furtherance of a political offense]
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime
of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing
is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of
rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion
alone.
However, this does not mean that public prosecutors are obliged to charge
petitioners with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. In is well entrenched in
criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges, including whom and what
to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public prosecutor. But when
the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes
crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance
of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively
demonstrated.
Petitioners have the burden of proof in showing that the crime charged in
this complaint is in furtherance of the crime of rebellion. This should be ascertained
during trial because the SC is not concerned with factual matters.
If they are able to prove during trial that the alleged murders were
committed in furtherance of rebellion, the court shall dismiss the original
information and file a new one charging the petitioners with the proper offense. As
held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA,
the remedy is provided in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail
for their appearance at the trial.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have
been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges and
accordingly file an Information for simple rebellion, provided that petitioners will not
be placed in double jeopardy. Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy
attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been
acquitted or convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for which
the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment.
In this case, the petitioners were never arraigned for the Information filed
against them in RTC Makati charging them for the crime of rebellion. The rebellion
case was eventually dismissed therefore the first jepoardy never had a chance to
attach.
WN petitioner was denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the arrest- YES
On preliminary investigation:
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair." It is conducted to protect the
innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the
right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than
constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law
entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to accord an opportunity for the
presentation of the respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the
investigating officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a
reasonable belief that a crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent
who committed it. Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the
complaint.
The essence of due process in reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit evidence in support of one’s defense.
 In this case the petitioners’ claims consist of not receiving the copies of the
documents, not receiving the subpoena and not being given the right to reply to the
supplemental affidavits submitted to the court. But the Court held that there were
clearly efforts undertaken to serve subpoenas and the send copies of the documents
to the petitioners. This is already sufficient for due process. Moreover, evidence
shows that the petitioners were given the opportunity to reply or they knew of the
existence of the supplemental affidavits.
For instance, Section 3 (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor
Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent
could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and
he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary
investigation remains valid.
Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53
Sct. Rallos St., QC," which had never been his address at any time. However, Ladlad’s
wife claimed to have received the affidavit which was sent to the same address. Plus
his counsel timely filed a formal entry of appearance. His counsel was able to
participate in the PI. Having opted to remain passive during the preliminary
investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim a denial of due
process, since their failure to file a counter- affidavit was of their own doing.
On issuance of the warrants of arrest:
On the Determination of Probable Cause
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis moved for a reinvestigation on the determination of
probable cause but was denied. Petitioners filed an MR but was left undecided as the
case was transferred to the RTC of Manila. According to the petitioners, the Judge
should have dismissed the charge against them had he examined the records
submitted by the Prosecutor. They also argue that Judge Abando did not state the
facts and evidence upon which he based his finding of probable cause.
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.
The SC held that the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and witnesses
is not mandatory in determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. Art. 3. Section 2 of the Constitution requires that probable cause be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and witnesses. It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the
prosecutor's report and supporting documents showing the existence of probable
cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. The
judge’s personal evaluation of the report of the prosecutor along with the
supporting documents can be the basis for the issuance of a valid warrant or if he
finds no probable cause the judge may also require that additional affidavits be
submitted to help him in his determination. There is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement if the judge reviews the information along with the
attached documents and forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the
crime his charged with.
Leonen, Concurring (pampapoints para madouble 1)
Summary: He agrees that the case should be remanded to the lower courts for the
determination of whether the common crimes were committed in furtherance of
rebellion and would therefore be absorbed therein. He, however asserts the
contemporary view that in view of international instruments and RA 9851, crimes of
torture and summary execution should not be absorbed…
_________________________________________
I agree that this case should be remanded because there has been no evidence yet
to prove that the acts imputed to the petitioners actually happened or are
attributable to them. Judicial economy, however, requires that we state that there
are certain acts which have been committed on the occasion of a rebellion which
should no longer be absorbed in that crime.
Acts committed in violation of Republic Act No. 9851, 5 even in the context of armed
conflicts of a non-international character and in view of the declarations of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front, cannot be
deemed to be acts in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion.
History of the Political offense Doctrine:
Landmark case: People v. Hernandez
5
"Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and
Other Crimes Against Humanity".
Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive
factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide,
is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government
the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part thereof." then said offense
becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel
of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
different nature of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent. The contemporary
view is that these can never be considered as acts in furtherance of armed con􏰅ict
no matter what the motive. Incidentally, this is the view also apparently shared by
the CPP/NPA/NDF and major insurgent groups that are part of the present
government's peace process.
We, therefore, should nuance our interpretation of what will constitute rebellion.

National, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the
proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense,
are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
Rep. Act No. 9851 defines and provides for the penalties of crimes against humanity,
serious violations of IHL, genocide, and other crimes against humanity. This law
provides for the non-prescription of the prosecution of and execution of sentences
imposed with regard to the crimes defined in the Act. It also provides for the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the crimes defined in the Act.
The rebel, in his or her effort to assert a better view of humanity, cannot negate
himself or herself. Torture and summary execution of enemies or allies are never
acts of courage. They demean those who sacrificed and those who gave their lives so
that others may live justly and enjoy the blessings of more meaningful freedoms.
Torture and summary execution — in any context — are shameful, naked brutal acts
of those who may have simply been transformed into desperate cowards. Those who
may have suffered or may have died because of these acts deserve better than to be
told that they did so in the hands of a rebel.

These crimes are, therefore, separate from or independent from the crime of
rebellion even if they occur on the occasion of or argued to be connected with the
armed uprisings.

Not only does the statute exist. Relevant to these cases are the Declarations made
by the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army/National Democratic
Front or CPP/NPA/NDF invoking the Geneva Conventions and its 1977 Additional
Protocols.

One of these documents is the Declaration of Adherence to International

Humanitarian Law dated August 15, 1991, whereby the National Democratic Front
"formally declare[d] its adherence to international humanitarian law, especially
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions as well as Protocol II additional to said
conventions, in the conduct of armed conflict in the Philippines."

Concomitantly, persons committing crimes against humanity or serious violations of

international humanitarian law, international human rights laws, and Rep. Act No.
9851 must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to recognize the
Jay-ar Senin v. DOJ | GR No. 232413 | July 25, 2017
FACTS: As a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP Legal Aid Program, as
well as a series of consultations with the Philippine National Police (PNP) on the
extant condition of detention prisoners, it was discovered that several detention
prisoners had been languishing in jail for years without a case being filed in court by
the prosecutor's office and without definite findings as to the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause.
In this case, the IBP represents Jay-Ar Senin. In a buy-bust operation, Senin was
arrested by members of PNP of San Fabian, Pangasinan. During inquest proceedings,
he availed of his right to preliminary investigation and executed a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the RPC. After the preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor dismissed the case against him. Pursuant to the then prevailing DOJ
Circular No. 12, the case was forwarded to the DOJ for automatic review. In the
meantime, pursuant to such DOJ Circular, Senin remained detained in custody for at
least eight months pending review by the DOJ of his case.
The IBP filed the instant Petition for issuance of Writ of Kalayaan claiming that the
waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest the DOJ, Prosecutor’s Office, (BJMP),
and the PNP, the unbridled right to detain Senin indefinitely subject only to the
whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ, adding that Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that preliminary investigation must
be terminated within 15 days from its inception if the person arrested had requested
for a preliminary investigation and had signed a waiver of the provisions of Article
125.
Thus, IBP claims that the waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the 15-day period
of preliminary investigation. The detention beyond this period violates Senin's
constitutional right to liberty. The review of the investigating prosecutor's resolution
has been pending with the DOJ for more than eight months. The IBP concludes that
Senin must be released from detention and be relieved from the effects of the
unconstitutional issuances of the DOJ.
Thus, the petition prays that the Court: a) declare that pursuant to A.M. No. 08-11-
7-SC, the petitioner is exempt from the payment of filing fees; b) issue a writ of
habeas corpus directing the release of Senin; c) declare the aforementioned
issuances of the DOJ as unconstitutional; d) immediately set the case for hearing
due to its urgency; and e) issue a Writ of Kalayaan directing the release of all
detention prisoners in a similar plight.
During the pendency of this Petition, the DOJ reversed the prosecutor's finding of
lack of probable cause and filed an Information in court for violation of RA No. 9165
against Senin. He was then committed to the BJMP where he was detained to face
trial. Moreover, DOJ Secretary Aguirre II also revoked the department's circular that
authorized the detention of persons arrested and awaiting results of the automatic
review of their cases by the DOJ, and ordered their immediate released.
The OSG argues that the Petition should be dismissed for having become moot with
the filing of the Information in court and the DOJ's revocation of its circular. On the
other hand, respondent BJMP justifies its continued custody of Senin until a court
order is issued revoking the commitment order or authorizing the release of Senin.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petition be dismissed for having become moot.
2. Did Senin's waiver of the provisions of Art. 125, RPC, vest the DOJ,
PNP, and BJMP unbridled authority to detain Senin?
3. Whether or not the continued detention of Senin is lawful.
HELD:
1. The Petition should not be dismissed despite its mootness.
Although the latest circular of Secretary Aguirre is laudable as it adheres to the
constitutional provisions on the rights of pre-trial detainees, the Court will not
dismiss the case on the ground of mootness. As can be gleaned from the ever-
changing DOJ circulars, there is a possibility that the latest circular would again be
amended by succeeding secretaries. It has been repeatedly held that "the Court will
decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
1. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
 2. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest are involved;
3. When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
4. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All four (4) requisites are present in this case.
As the case is prone to being repeated as a result of constant changes, the Court, as
the guardian and final arbiter of the Constitution and pursuant to its prerogative to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, takes this opportunity to lay down controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar and the public on the propriety of the continued detention of an arrested
person whose case has been dismissed on inquest, preliminary investigation,
reinvestigation, or appeal but pending automatic review by the SOJ.
2. Waiver of Article 125 not a license to detain a person indefinitely.
The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the
proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC,
otherwise, the public official or employee could be held liable for the failure to
deliver except if grounded on reasonable and allowable delays. Article 125 of the
RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without
informing him of his offense and without allowing him to post bail. It punishes public
officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground but fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed
by law. In case the detention is without legal ground, the person arrested can charge
the arresting officer with arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the RPC. This is
without prejudice to the possible filing of an action for damages under Article 32 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly
arrested without a warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation. The
question to be addressed here, therefore, is whether such waiver gives the State the
right to detain a person indefinitely.
The Court answers in the negative.
The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP
the unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to
the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article
125 must coincide with the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as
mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period
violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty.
Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license
to detain a person ad infinitum. Waiver of a detainee's right to be delivered to
proper judicial authorities as prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC does not trump his
constitutional right in cases where probable cause was initially found wanting by
reason of the dismissal of the complaint filed before the prosecutor's office even if
such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or on automatic review.
Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by mere
operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law provides
limits and this must be all the more followed especially so that detention is
proscribed absent probable cause.
3. Senin's continued detention was unlawful
Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be
promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a
waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of
violation of R.A. No. 91659 ) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses.
This rule also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss
the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a
motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review. The reason is that
such dismissal automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of probable cause
to file an information in court and to detain a person.
The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some, especially at this
time when the present administration aggressively wages its "indisputably popular
war on illegal drugs." As Justice Diosdado Peralta puts it, that the security of the
public and the interest of the State would be jeopardized is not a justification to
trample upon the constitutional rights of the detainees against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law, to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
and to a speedy disposition of the case.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared, and ruled, that all detainees whose
pending cases have gone beyond the mandated periods for the conduct of
preliminary investigation, or whose cases have already been dismissed on inquest or
preliminary investigation, despite pending appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or
automatic review by the Secretary of Justice, are entitled to be released pursuant to
their constitutional right to liberty and their constitutional right against unreasonable
seizures, unless detained for some other lawful cause.