238. People vs. Marti, January 18, 199.

Andre Marti and his common law wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, carrying
with them four gift wrapped packages to be delivered to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes
(wife of the proprietor) asked if she could inspect the packages, however, Marti refused assuring that it
only contained books, cigars and gloves as gift to his friend.

Before delivery to Bureau of Customs/Posts, the proprietor Job Reyes, following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened Marti's boxes, a particular
odor emitted therefrom and he soon found out that the boxes contained dried marijuana leaves. He
reported the incident to the NBI who acknowledged custody of the incident. Marti was convicted for
violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issues :
1. Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and siezure and privacy of communication.

Ruling :
Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting
in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State.
Mere presence of NBI agents does not convert it to warrantless search and seizure. Merely to look
at that which is plain sight is not search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed is not search.
Commissioner Bernas :
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy...is a
protection against the State. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
State. Its concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other
individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder.

239. Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538

Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while they were riding
together in a motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street, Quezon City, by elements of Task
Force Makabansa of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Since their arrest, they have
been under detention. Petitioner Morales filed his petition for habeas corpus with this
Court on July 9, 1982, while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19, 1982. On July 20,
1982 petitioners, together with several others, were charged with rebellion (Art. 134,
Revised Penal Code) before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-
21091 filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The trial of the case has yet to be
terminated. The continued detention of petitioners to answer for the offense charged is
therefore legal.

Issue: Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest
Held:
 Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of arrest and limits
them to a “judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law.” It also lays
down in unmistakable terms the procedure required before a search warrant or warrant of
arrest may issue.
A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued by the President
of the Philippines. 6 Its issuance must therefore comply with the requirements of the
Constitution, in the same manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest issued by a
judge issuance must therefore comply with the requirements of the Constitution, in the same
manner and to the same extent, as a warrant of arrest by a judge.

The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The Memorandum to the
President dated April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, wherein he reported the arrest of petitioners, the subversive documents
seized from them and the results of the ensuing tactical interrogation, with a recommendation
for the issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, was approved by the
President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were arrested without a
warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners were already under surveillance on
suspicion of committing rebellion. From the results of the said surveillance, the evidence then
at hand, and the documents seized from them at the time of their arrest, it would appear that
they had committed or were actually committing the offense of rebellion. Their arrest without
a warrant for the said offense is therefore clearly justified.

240. P vs. Burgos. 144 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Ruben Burgos was charged of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
subversion. Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA,
threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. Pursuant to this
information, PC-INP members went to the house of Burgos and saw him plowing his
field when they arrived. One of the arresting offices called Burgos and asked him about
the firearm. At first, Burgos denied having any firearm, but later, Burgos's wife pointed to
a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.

After recovery of said firearm, Burgos pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the officers
recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos further admitted that the firearm was
issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.
ISSUE:
Is the warrantless arrest and search valid?
HELD:
NO. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his
view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed
by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the wife of Burgos.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may
have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.
The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

In this case, Burgos was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They
were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery
of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife
cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is
made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterward can make it lawful.
The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.

241. People vs. de la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416

FACTS: After receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their informant, a "buy-bust" operation was
conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as Team
Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer
and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30 p.m. of 4 May 1987 to catch the
pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to buy marijuana worth
P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom
Arcoy first negotiated with on the purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00
worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one aluminum foil of marijuana which
Beltran got from his pants' pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After ascertaining that the foil of suspected
marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his head
and his teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity, converged at the place, identified
themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used
by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing
marijuana.

Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged in Criminal Case 87-54417 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of
Republic Act 6425, as amended.

The court, on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and Beltran guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced
each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to pay
a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half of the
costs.

From this decision, de la Cruz and Beltran appealed. In a letter of the Warden, Manila City Jail, dated 3 March
1989, the Court was informed of the death of de la Cruz on 21 February 1989. Thus, the criminal case against
de la Cruz was dismissed in the Supreme Court resolution of 25 September 1989. The present appellate
proceeding is limited only to Beltran.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation violates Beltran’s constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

HELD: A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in
flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces
the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of
trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only
effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. While it is conceded that
in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person without a search warrant, needless to
state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were invariably caught
redhanded.
There being no violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated
articles are admissible in evidence.

242. Gatchalian vs. Board, May 31, 1991

FACTS:

the question in this case is whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On June 27, 1961,
William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with
Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of
Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram
bearing the signature of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought
admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of
Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.

Although it was the Board of commissioners who allowed access to the Philippine citizenship
of the Gatchalians, it was later on reversed by the Board itself prior to the memorandum issued by
the secretary of Justice. They said that the Gatchalians violated

Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration
Act of 1940, reads:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied)

That allegedly, a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, which was
dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I.
citizens." ( secretary of foreign affairs in Hong Kong forged a document stating that said Petitioners
were Filipino citizens).

It was in this manner that a warrant of arrest and a deportation proceeding was instituted.

Held: the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990. 28
long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed.

Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of deportation or
exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph
(a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; andIn the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision
was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent
William Gatchalian in 1990.

the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other
words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole
purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being
unconstitutional

the issuance of warrant of arrest is unconstitutional

243. People vs. Sucro, March 18, 1991

Facts: Pat. Roy fulgencio, a member of the INP Kalibo, Aklan was instructed by P/Lt Vicente Seraspi Jr.,
Station commander, to monitor the activities of appellant. Fulgencio positioned himself to a house,
adjacent of which i a chapel. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel taking something which turn
out later to be marijuana from a compartment of a cart found inside the chapel and return to the
street where he handed the same to a buyer. Fulgencio radioed Seraspi and reported the activity,
Seraspi instructed Fulgencio to continue monitoring. At about 6:30 PM Fulgencio again called up
Sraspi to report the third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
At that point, the team seraspi proceeded to the area and fulgencio told seraspi to intercept
Macabante and Appellant. Team Seraspi caught up with macabante at a crossing. Upon seeing the
police Macabante throw something at the ground which turned to a tea bag of marijuana. Macabante
admitted that he brought the same from appellant. The police team was able to overtake and arrest
appellant.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful
2. Whether or not the evidence resulting from arrest is admissible

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure for
the instance that arrest without warrant is considered lawful. – A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
 In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112. An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer
when the officer sees the offense, although at the distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby
and proceed at once at the scene – the act of surveillance Second requirement: the act of macabante,
throwing of the marijuana and the admission, constitute that he just committed an illegal act which
the police officer had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitors Sucro’s
nefarious activity People vs bati – police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of
the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities.

Evidence - admissible because the arrest is valid

244. PEOPLE VS. SOLAYAO , 262 SCRA 255

Facts: The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Nio, narrated that at about 9:00
o'clock in the evening of July 9, 1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and
Cecilio Cenining, he went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to
conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify
reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. [2]
From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Nio proceeded to Barangay
Onion where they met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The
former became suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and that
accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accused-
appellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.[3]
Police Officer Nio told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as
"PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and
found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When
he asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he
was connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had
no permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and
turned him over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran who subsequently
investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.[4]
Issue/COA: accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject
firearm in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He
maintained that the search made on his person violated his constitutional right to be
secure in his person and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
HELD: Not only was the search made without a warrant but it did not fall under any of
the circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides, inter alia:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in his
presence; the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense."
Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is
inadmissible in evidence for being "the fruit of the poisonous tree." As such, the
prosecution's case must necessarily fail and the accused-appellant acquitted.
The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining where this Court held that
"at the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as
he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant."
This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case brought
about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk"
situation. There was a probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could
be made.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure
may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and
frisk" accused-appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the government
agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have
procured a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures

245. PEOPLE VS . CUIZON, 256 SCRA 325

FACTS: Vuizon and his wife arrived from Hong Kong, at the arrival area they allegedly
handed four (4) bags to Paul Lee and Steve Pua who boarded a taxi immediately after
the event. The NBI agents were observing the activities because of the earlier tip given
to them. Because of some uncontrolled event they were not able to apprehend Lee and
Pua so they decided to pursue them, based on the tips given to them the two (2) will be
staying at Manila Peninsula Hotel. They apprehended Lee and Pua inside their
hotel room confiscating the four bags and was opened in the presence of Col. Regino
Arellano, Chief security of the hotel. Consequently, Cuizon was also apprehended in his
house at Caloocan that same day. They were brought to the NBI headquarters and
subsequently referred to the prosecution division of the DOJ for Inquest. An was
charged in court violationg Section 15 of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drug Act of 1972. Appellant Cuizon challenges the validity and legality of his
warrantless arrest and the search and seizure incidental thereto.

ISSUE: W/N the accused were caught in flagrante delicto, justifying the search without
a warrant

RULING: The SC did not agree that the accused were caught in flagrante delicto.
The requirements stated in Section5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrest
without warrant are not present in the case at bar, for at the time of their arrest,
appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in the hotel room, and appellant Cuizon
for his part was in bed resting with his wife and child. No offense had just been
committed or being actually committed or being attempted by any of the accused in the
presence of the lawmen. It is well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest,
search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial
authority, guaranteed by section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constituiton. It is evident and
clear that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust operation and in the process
violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and
seizures

246. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547

Facts: Accsused-appellant charged in an information of violation of PD 1866 in connection with the

crime of subversion assailed the legality of a search and seizure conducted at his house at night time
when he was not around, on the ground that it violated constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Issue: Whether or not a search on a house of a person without the owner’s presence is valid.
Held: No. The search in the dwelling of the accused-appellant without his knowledge is a violation of
the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal one, cannot be
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do
so in his or her behalf (De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, 695). In the case at bar, the records show that
appellant was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed
the authorities to enter it (TSN, October 31, 1989, p. 10). The court find no evidence that would
establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant's helper or if it was true that she was his
helper, that the appellant had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution
likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities'
intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search
and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without
transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government (Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65
Phil. 230, 235). As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have
been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to
dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to the
house of the appellant at nighttime (Exh. J, p. 7, Records), does not grant them the license to go inside
his house.

247. POSADAS VS. CA, 258 SCRA 188

FACTS: While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes Street,Davao City,
they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They
approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to
flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance. They then
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38revolver, two (2) rounds of
live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22
caliber gun.
The petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess the firearms and
ammunitions but failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited
articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted
for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein
after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged.
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due
course a decision was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed decision with costs
against the petitioner. Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being
no lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the
petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest and search was valid.
RULING: An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among
others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. Contrary to the
argument of the Solicitor General that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was
actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was
incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure; At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing
the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding
something in the buri bag. They did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not
justify an arrest without a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at
military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court
in Valmonte vs. de Villa, as follows:
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a
search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details
of the incidents which amount to a violation of his light against unlawful search and seizure, is not
sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against
unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable
are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on
the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the
search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable
considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable
cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General:
The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose
object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo
momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the case of
Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men repeatedly walked past a store window and
returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion of a
police officer. To the experienced officer, the behavior of the men indicated that they were sizing up the
store for an armed robbery. When the police officer approached the men and asked them for their
names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and
frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the same to the other two and found another
weapon. In the prosecution for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal search
and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held that "a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In such a
situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to
occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain the status quo
while obtaining more information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and
hence, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been
violated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.

248. PEOPLE VS. JUATAN , 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust operation)

FA CTS: The Western Police District Command, based in the City of Manila, received word
from a confidential informant and some barangay officials that Danilo Juatan had been dealing in
prohibited drugs. On orders of P/Maj. Cipriano Herrera, Jr., of the Narcotics Section, a police
team, led by Lt. Enrique Sy, was organized to conduct a one-week surveillance on Juatan.When
its surveillance showed positive results, the police team decided to conduct a buy-bust operation.
On 05 July 1991, at around one o'clock in the morning, the 8-member police
team[4] proceeded to Instruccion Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Pat. Ernesto Yamson was designated
to be the poseur-buyer, while Pat. Eduardo Sison and the others were assigned to secure the
area. Pat. Amelito Lopez placed himself around seven meters away from the house of the
accused.[5]
The actual operation started with the informant calling the accused and telling him that
Yamson wanted to buy "drugs." Juatan met Yamson and the informant at the corner of an alley,
near Maceda and Instruccion streets, around ten meters away from Juatan's house. Yamson
gave Juatan a P500-bill marked with his initials on the upper right hand portion of the bill;[6] in turn,
Juatan handed over to Yamson a plastic container measuring 2" x 2 1/2."[7] At that precise
moment, Yamson raised his right hand to signal his companions that the deal had been
made. Sensing that something was amiss, Juatan fled. He was about to get into his house when
the police apprehended him. Upon being searched, Juatan's right side pocket yielded the
marked P500-bill.[8] Juatan was accompanied by his wife to the police headquarters.[9] The
booking and information sheet bearing Juatan's signature[10] described him to be a 5'6" tall taxi
driver, with tattoo marks of the "Sigue-Sigue" commando.[11]
At around nine o'clock that same morning, the members of police team executed a joint
affidavit of arrest.[12] Sgt. Antonio T. Taca, signing for Maj. Cipriano Herrera, Jr., sent a letter-
request to the Chemistry Section of the Criminal Investigation Laboratory for the laboratory
examination of the contents of the plastic bag taken from Juatan.[13] The request, along with the
specimen, was received in the late afternoon of 05 July 1991.[14] On 08 July 1991,[15] the item was
turned over to the forensic chemist, Renee Eric Checa, of the Chemistry Section.Measuring the
specimen, Checa found it to weigh 0.395 gram.[16] Using the thin-layer chromatography, Checa
specifically identified the article to be shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride.[17]
At the police headquarters, Juatan admitted that he was a drug user but, after being apprised
of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent, appellant decided not to make any
further statement.[18] On 08 July 1991, Sgt. Taca referred the case to the inquest fiscal[19] who
suggested that the accused be detained.[20]
In his testimony, Juatan said that he was arrested by policemen Edwin Sison, Ernesto
Yamson and Amelito Lopez. Surprised by the arrest, Juatan asked the police officers what the
problem was. He was told to produce a certain Boy Chua whom he did not know at all, thus
prompting him to remark, "Edwin (referring to Pat. Sison), personal na yata ang ginagawa mo sa
akin."[21] When Juatan asked to be shown either a search warrant or a warrant of arrest, he,
instead, got a punch on the face from Sison. The other police officers stopped Sison from doing
any possible further harm on the accused. The group made a search. Finding nothing, they
dragged Juatan out of his house and brought him, along with his wife, to the police
headquarters.[22]
Juatan's wife, 38-year-old Aurora, declared that she was doing her laundry, at about one
o'clock in the morning of 05 July 1991, when armed men forcibly entered their house. When she
started to complain, the men simply told her to keep quiet. She followed the group upstairs; she
was told that they were looking for her husband and a certain Boy Chua. When she told them that
her husband was asleep in the room, the men went in and immediately handcuffed him. It only
angered the policemen when she demanded to be shown a warrant. At the police headquarters,
she recognized one of the apprehending police officers to be Pat. Sison.[23]
The defense presented three other witnesses. Jesus Lingat, a 32-year-old driver who resided
just a house away from the Juatan residence, testified that at around 1:30 a.m. of 05 July 1991,
he and his brother saw around nine armed men entering Juatan's house and later taking appellant
with them. The witness did not see Juatan's wife.[24] Ludovico Munsayac, a 35-year old merchant
and member of the barangay council, said that he personally knew Juatan to be just a taxi
driver. Nonilon Reyes, barangay captain of Barangay 524, Zone 52, Sampaloc, Manila, stated
that Juatan used to be a neighbor, and that, in connection with the latter's application with the
"Operation Tulong of DZRH," he had issued a certification to the effect that Juatan was a taxi
driver "ready to lend a helping hand to his neighbor."[25]

ISSUE: Whether or not the police should could have easily procured a "warrant before
proceeding with the buy-bust operation"?
HELD: A buy-bust operation is far variant from an ordinary arrest; it is a form of entrapment
which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Law. In a buy-bust operation the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers
conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to
search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime. [30]
Appellant has a violated Section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Law, as amended, which
prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant, however, to the Court's ruling
in People vs. Simon,[31] the penalty, considering that only 0.395 gram of shabu is involved in the
prohibited sale, should now be prision correccional conformably with the amendatory
law.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being neither an aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty could be within the range of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.
Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended

Effect posting bail or entering a plea or failing to file a motion to quash, if

the arrest was illegal

Read:

249. STEPHEN SY VS. PEOPLE, GR No. 182178, August 15, 2011

Facts:
PO3 Faelogo, a member of the PNP and assigned as Intelligence Operative of the Dumaguete City Police
Station, testified that at about 2 oclock in the afternoon of June 11, 2005, while he was on duty, their
office received a telephone call from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug trade was going on at Zone
3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City. With him at that time was PO3 Paquera. PO3 Faelogo averred that the
two (2) of them immediately responded and went to the place as reported. While walking at the pathway
going to the interior portion of Zone 3, Barangay Looc, at a distance of about two (2) meters away, they
saw a man, later identified as the [petitioner] in this case, examining a transparent plastic sachet
containing shabu powder by flicking the same. They approached the [petitioner], introduced themselves
as policemen and announced his arrest for illegal possession of dangerous drug. PO3 Faelogo then
apprised the [petitioner] of his constitutional rights but while doing so, the [petitioner] hurriedly boarded
on his motorcycle for a possible escape. PO3 Faelogo was not able to finish his recital of the constitutional
rights of the [petitioner]. PO3 Faelogo had to wrestle with the [petitioner] who dropped the sachet of
shabu on the ground. While PO3 Faelogo and the [petitioner] were wrestling, PO3 Paquera picked up the
said sachet of shabu. After a few minutes of struggle, they were able to subdue the [petitioner] and
handcuff him. PO3 Faelogo continued to inform the [petitioner] of his constitutional rights in the Cebuano
dialect. The [petitioner] was searched and found in his possession was a disposable lighter. PO3 Paquera
gave the plastic sachet of shabu to PO3 Faelogo who made markings on it with the initials SS 06-11-05 with
SS to mean the name of the [petitioner] Stephen Sy and the numbers, the date of the incident. They then
brought the [petitioner] with the seized items to the police station. They were not able to conduct an
inventory in the crime scene, as there was a commotion where some people tried to rescue the
[petitioner]. For their safety, they left the area.
At the police station, PO3 Paquera took a photograph of the [petitioner] and the seized items. PO3 Faelogo
then conducted an inventory of the recovered sachet of shabu including the disposable lighter in the
presence of DOJ Representative Pros. Angelita Alcoran, Brgy. Kagawad Rogelio Talavera of Barangay Looc,
the elected official representative, Reysan Elloren, the media representative and PO2 Glenn Corsame of
the PDEA, who all signed the receipt of property seized. The [petitioner] was given a copy of the
receipt. PO2 Corsame had the incident recorded in the PDEA blotter.
PO3 Faelogo also averred that he was the one who submitted the seized one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing white crystalline pow[d]er/granules to the PNP Crime Laboratory, together with
a letter request dated June 11, 2005 of the Chief of Police of Dumaguete City Police Station. The
[petitioner] was not subjected to drug examination, as no drug testing kit was available at that time.
It was Police Senior Inspector Maria Ana Rivera-Dagasdas, forensic chemical officer of the Negros Oriental
Provincial Crime Laboratory who received the seized one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with
marking SS-06-11-05 and conducted a laboratory examination on the contents thereof. She re-marked
the sachet as Specimen A which had a weight of 0.02 gram. Her qualitative examination conducted on the
specimen gave positive result to the tests for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug under RA 9165. Her conclusion was that Specimen A contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug under RA 9165. Her examination results were embodied in a Chemistry
Report No. D-103-05 and a certification, which she signed and submitted.
In support of the case filed, PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera executed a joint affidavit of arrest, which they
identified in Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the right of the petitioner against unlawful search and seizure was violated.

Held:
the established facts reveal that on June 11, 2005, PO3 Faelogo, an Intelligence Operative of the
Dumaguete City Police Station, received information from a concerned citizen that an illegal drug trade
was going on at Zone 3, Barangay Looc, Dumaguete City.Together with PO3 Paquera, PO3 Faelogo
immediately acted on the information and went to the place. While traversing the pathway going to the
interior portion of Zone 3, Barangay Looc, they saw petitioner, at a distance of two (2) meters, examining
and flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing shabu powder. The two then approached petitioner,
introduced themselves as police officers, and announced the he is being arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. While being informed of his constitutional rights during the arrest, petitioner tried to
escape by boarding his motorcycle. While wrestling with PO3 Faelogo, petitioner dropped the sachet of
shabu on the ground, which was picked up by PO3 Paquera. The police officers eventually were able to
subdue and handcuff petitioner. Upon searching his person, they also found in his possession a disposable
lighter. The seized sachet was marked on location. They then brought petitioner, together with the items
seized, to the police station and conducted a proper inventory thereof. The heat-sealed transparent
sachet containing white crystalline substance was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for drug
examination, which later yielded positive results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug under RA No. 9165.
From the foregoing, sufficient evidence supports that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was effected
under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. The police officers witnessed petitioner
flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in plain view. Arousing their
suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached petitioner,
introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest. After laboratory examination, the white
crystalline substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
Under these circumstances, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing
a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the police officers. At the time of his
arrest, the police officers were actively performing their duties, since they were following up a tip that
there was an illegal drug trade being conducted in the area. This fact, coupled with the overt acts of
petitioner, formed sufficient basis on the part of the police officers to believe that a crime was actually
being committed. Thus, petitioners case falls within the exception to the rule requiring a warrant before
effecting an arrest. Consequently, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in
evidence to prove petitioners guilt of the offense charged.

250. PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246

Facts:

At around 11:30 in the evening of May 9, 1998, Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad, Alvin Adolfo and the victim
Romen Castro were at a local fair inside the DM Compound in Heroes del 98, Caloocan City and were playing games
when five men including Manuel Galvez approached Romen Castro and stabbed him at the back with a knife which
caused his death. Reynaldo Castro, brother of the victim, testified that the day after his brother’s death, that two
policemen arrived in his house with accused-appellant Galvez. Reynaldo Castro told them, however, that accused-
appellant Galvez was not the one who stabbed his brother and should be released. The policemen, therefore, left and
allowed Galvez to go. A few minutes after they had left, the people inside Reynaldo Castro’s house began talking and
told Reynaldo that accused-appellant Galvez was the one who had stabbed Romen Castro. Danilo Julia, Loreto Palad,
Armando Rufo, and Alvin Adolfo, who were then in the house of Reynaldo Castro, pointed to accused-appellant
Galvez as Romen’s assailant. At the instance of Reynaldo, Arturo Saligumba, a barangay tanod, apprehended Manuel
Galvez. Accused-appellant no longer had the opportunity to file his counter-affidavit as he was apprehended a day
after the incident.

On cross-examination, SPO2 Vivencio Gamboa, investigator of the Station Investigation Division of the
Caloocan City police, the prosecution stipulated that there was no warrant of arrest at the time Galvez was taken into
custody by Saligumba. He also explained that the statements of the witnesses were prepared only when accused-
appellant Galvez was already in the custody of the police authorities. From the time he was brought to the police
station, accused-appellant had been under detention, having been committed to the Caloocan City Jail during the
inquest. Accused-appellant had not been released because no bail was recommended considering the charge against
him. Gamboa stated that Saligumba did not tell him that Galvez was arrested on mere suspicion.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court rendered a decision, dated November 18, 1998 which
convicted Galvez of murder.

Issue:

Whether or not his arrest was valid since he alleges that it was based on hearsay evidence.
(He maintains that he was arrested not because of the positive identification of the eyewitnesses but on the basis of
the hearsay testimony of Reynaldo Castro.)

Resolution:

Accused-appellant’s arrest was illegal. Arturo Saligumba admitted that he arrested Galvez on the basis solely
of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw accused-appellant commit the crime charged against
him. Indeed, the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant when the
latter was taken into custody. Considering that accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the time he was
arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant committed
a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.

By entering a plea of not guilty and participating actively in the trial, however, accused-appellant Galvez
waived his right to raise the issue of the illegality of his arrest. It is now settled that objection to a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his
plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. The fact that the arrest was illegal does not render the subsequent
proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts point to the culpability of
the accused.
251. Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377

FACTS:
Judge Felipe Villanueva denied the motions to quash the two complains of oral defamation
against Faustina Callanta who gave rise to the validity of warrant which was contested on the ground
that it should have been the City Fiscal who should have conducted the preliminary examination. She
admitted in court that she had posted bail for her provisional liberty.

ISSUE:
 Whether the Posting of Bail will affect the validity of the warrant in question.

HELD:
Posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person and
stops him from discussing the validity of his arrest. If the accused has filed bail and waived the
preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any in the preliminary examination
conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

252. PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO, 260 SCRA 256

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision, dated May 28, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch
136), finding accused-appellants Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala guilty of murder for the killing of
Romulo Molet Bunye II in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on December 14, 1988 and sentencing them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition, the two were ordered to pay jointly and severally to the heirs
of the deceased the amount of P50,000.00. Two others, accused with them, Manuel Laureaga and Orlando
Hular, were acquitted.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on December 14, 1988, between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.,
Romulo Bunye II took a tricycle (referred to in the record as stainless tricycle evidently because its body
was made of stainless steel), which was driven by Fernando Hernandez. Unknown to Bunye was that two
men were waiting outside his house and that the two hailed another tricycle in order to follow him.
Bunye alighted at the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinlupa and crossed to
the left side of the street. Shortly after, the tricycle, driven by Rogelio de Limos, arrived and stopped in
front of Hernandezs stainless tricycle.One of the men jumped out of the tricycle and shot Bunye at the back
of the head. When Bunye fell face down, the assailant fired another shot at Bunyes head. Then, the other
man approached Bunye and shot him also in the head.
Rogelio de Limos and Fernando Hernandez, the tricycle drivers, executed sworn affidavits relating what
they had witnessed. The two described the assailants and stated that they could recognize the killers if they
saw them again. There was another witness, a woman, who was also a passenger of the stainless tricycle on
which Bunye rode but her identity had remained unknown.
 The autopsy report on the victim showed that he died of gunshot wounds in the head. On December 28,
1988, Ramil Regala, Narciso Nazareno, Orlando Hular and Manuel Laureaga were arrested. Regala and
Nazareno were put in a police line-up. They were identified and pointed to as the assailants by the tricycle
drivers Hernandez and de Limos. Hernandez and de Limos executed additional sworn affidavits.
Ramil Regala executed affidavits, dated December 28, 1988 and January 2, 1989 admitting participation
in the slaying of Bunye and pointing to Narciso Nazareno and a certain Rey Taling as his co-
conspirators. He claimed that they had been hired by Orlando Boy Hular to kill the victim and told that they
would be paid P30,000.00 by Manuel Laureaga. His affidavits were corroborated by Orlando Hular who,
in an affidavit, executed on the same day, December 28, 1988, stated that it was Laureaga who wanted
Bunye killed, apparently in connection with Bunyes job as administrator of the public market in Alabang.
However, Regala and Hular subsequently recanted. Regala claimed that he had been tortured. On the
other hand, Hular claimed that, although he was not tortured, he admitted to the crime and signed the
affidavit because he was afraid he would also be tortured. Narciso Nazareno also claimed to have been
tortured to admit to the crime but refused to sign any written statements.
The trial court ruled the confessions of Regala and Hular to be inadmissible. However, it held Regala
and Nazareno guilty on the basis of their positive identification by Hernandez and de Limos during the
police line-up on December 28, 1988 and their testimony in court. The trial court stated:
As between the aforecited testimonies of Rogelio de Limos and Hernandez on one hand and the
testimonies of Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala on the other, the Court would place its reliance on
the testimonies of the prosecution

253. FILOTEO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN , 263 SCRA 222

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, an
old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations
attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that
one day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected mastermind of
the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van.
Petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is
applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983 -- long before
the effectivity of the new Constitution. He also alleges that his arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial
confession was extracted through torture, and that the prosecutions evidence was insufficient to convict
him.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding
uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture,
maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and assistance of
counsel?
HELD: By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by
an accused of his right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of
counsel may not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior
to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should, by
such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions
made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of
counsel,[64] the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through
Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile,[65] issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during custodial
investigation. The court specifically ruled that (t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel.
Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive
effect for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that (p)enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, what is being construed here is a constitutional
provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal statute. A bill of rights
is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution is
designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of individual. It is a
charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state.

PEOPLE VS. NAZARENO, 260 SCRA 256 (repeated)

254. PEOPLE VS. LAPURA, 255 SCRA 85

***what is certification/information is telling in this case is the motion to quash

Facts: Appellant(lapura) was arrested by police at the house of a fellow musician,

Danilo Cabrera, in Mata Street, Divisoria, Manila. Appellant and Cabrera, along with
another musician friend, Reynaldo Eliezer, were brought to Station 1 at North Bay,
Tondo, Manila, where statements were taken. They were later brought inside the office
of Col. Maganto where appellant was informed that his being a suspect in the killing of
Petronilo Lim was because he resembled the cartograph of the killer(based from the
witness, Samson).
After evaluating the evidence presented before it, the trial court gave credence to the
prosecutions case, particularly to the eyewitness account of Samson, and accordingly
rendered judgment convicting appellant of murder.
The prosecutor failed to obtain the prior written authority of the city prosecutor in the
manner required under Section 4, Rule, 112, of the Rules of Court, before the filling of
the case.

Held: hereby certify that an ex-parte investigation in this case has been conducted by
me in accordance with law; that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense
charged has been committed; that the accused is probably guilty thereof and that the
filing of this information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Fiscal.

Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official functions has to be upheld. Moreover, this matter should have
been raised below in a proper motion to quash that appellant could have done but did
not.
Relative to the claim that the certification did not fully comply with the requirements
of Sections 4,Rule 112, of the Rules of Court, we need merely to reiterate the settled rule
that such certification is not an indispensable part of, let alone invalidate even by its
absence, information

xxx It should be observed that now Section 4 of Rule 110 defines an information as
nothing more than an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed
by the fiscal and filed with the court Thus it is obvious that such certification is not an
essential part of the information itself and its absence cannot vitiate it as such. True, as
already stated, Section 14 of Rule 112 enjoin that no information shall be filed, without
first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation, but, as can
be seen, the injunction refers to the non-holding certification. In other words, what is not
allowed is the filing of the information without a preliminary investigation having been
previously conducted, and the injunction that there should be a certification is only a
consequence of the requirement that a preliminary investigation should first be
conducted.

255. PEOPLE VS. SILAN, 254 SCRA 491

Facts:
Crime: Complex crime of robbery with homicide
Rhodesa inquired from Carol Concepcion at 2:00 pm at june 1 or may 31 if there is anyone at the house of her
auntie Evangeline Gargantos for she needed to retrieved her things and sell it because money was needed by
Virgillio “Billy” Garcia. At 7:00 pm in the same day. Carol saw Rhodesa “Silan” with two company namely virgillio
and certain Tol entered the house of evangeline at the back door using screw driver to unlock the kitchen door. As
they entered, Rhodesa heard a commotion upstairs and she got their and saw the house in disarray and she was
told by virgillio to get things she want so she get two jackets, coleman, colored blue dress of Remia, perfume,
make-up kit, t-shirt, girdle of Remia and plate with saucer. She was also been asked by virgillio to go with him in
some room to have sexual intercourse. Thereafter, they heard her auntie Evangeline knocking. Virgillio told her to
stay put for he will take care of the matter. She heard her auntie shouting “who are you”, followed by a
commotion and plea for help, and followed by nothingness. They then flee to the place.
(Silan extra-judicially confessed to convict Virgillio)
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not considering (Virgillio) the illegality of his arrest

Ruling: no, he never objected thereto nor placed that matter in issue when, instead, he entered his plea on
arraignment and went to trial. As the Solicitor General points out, even assuming that he was illegally arrested, this
will not affect his culpability since an allegation of a warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State
of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability.

We also agree with the advertence to our pronouncement in the aforecited case of Briones which could very well
be said of this incident in the case at bar:
 Immediately after their arrest, appellants . . . could have objected to the legality thereof due to
the failure of the police officer to secure first a warrant for their arrest. Not only that, without
having questioned the legality of their arrest, they even pleaded, on arraignment, to the
information filed against them. Appellants' acts constitute a clear waiver of their right against
unlawful restraint of liberty. Besides, it would be impractical, if not ridiculous, to order the
court a quo to set the appellants free then issue a warrant for their arrest, and try them all over
again when appellants themselves have waived their right to object to such irregularity and when
their objection is truly based on overwhelming evidence.

Read:

256. Paton vs. NAPOLCOM , May 28 , 1989(di mahanap)

Judicial pronouncements on illegally seized evidence, 106 SCRA 336

The exclusionary rule,155 SCRA 494

What is the status of a document obtained through subpoena?

Read:
257. Dianalan vs. Pros., Office of the Tanodbayan, Nov. 27, 1990( di
mahanap)

Search warrant for pirated video tapes

258. Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655

FACTS:
Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in
conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign.
Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old
Intellectual Property Law). The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants
against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired
search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and
seized the items described in the three warrants. Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the
search warrants and release the seized properties, which was granted by the lower court.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial
court.

ISSUE: Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?
 RULING:
The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of
the CA. YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier. The lower court
lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private
respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application for
search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony, which
was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the
petitioner’s counsel who was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal
knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken
from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that
the testimony of petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of the
allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application. The presentation of
the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were allegedly copied,
was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the
pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at
the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and
not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search
warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns. The essence of a copyright infringement
is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted
work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with
the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an
unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated
films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to
the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant

259. COLUMBIA PICTURES VS. CA, 261 SCRA 144

In 1986, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco (Jingco),
owner of Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies produced and owned by Columbia
Pictures and other motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion to quash the search warrant
but the same was denied in 1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the Search
Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. In 1989, the RTC judge granted the motion. The judge
ruled that based on the ruling in the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs CA, before
a search warrant could be issued in copyright cases, the master copy of the films alleged to be
pirated must be attached in the application for warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 20th Century Fox ruling may be applied retroactively in this case.
HELD: No. In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox was not yet promulgated. The
lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from the VRB and Columbia Pictures
in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing
and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court also revisited and clarified the ruling in the 20th Century Fox Case. It is
evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in
copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyright films is always
necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is
true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the
ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstration involving the direct use
of the senses of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out
the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of
evidence tending to prove the factum probandum, especially where the production in court of
object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to is
evidentiary value.
In fine, the supposed pronouncement in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of
the master tapes of the copy-righted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be
understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in
copy-right infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape
and the pirated copies. An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to
no other conclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible
requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases.

CHAPTER IV-A

READ: Sections 7 and 27 of the Anti -Terrorism Law

Read:

260. DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GR No. 203335, February 18,

2014;

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest jurisprudence
already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue
that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the
penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the requirement
of “actual malice” as opposed to “presumed malice” as basis for conviction of libel.
RULING
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such
element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement
turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the
cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on
Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against
private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of
malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the
assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.

261. OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998

FACTS:
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the
shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we
invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We
grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion.

ISSUE:
Whether there is violation of right of privacy

HELD:
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot
pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because
facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." In the 1965
case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of
privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy
which can be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, viz:

"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these
guarantees that help give them life and substance x x x. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we
have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers `in any house'
in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the `right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: `The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.'"
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state
whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact,
the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning."This is an admission that the PRN will not be
used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual
through his PRN.
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his
ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.[They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.

262. ZULUETA VS. CA, February 10, 1996

FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible intrusion and from
unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.

HELD:
Indeed, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court
or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with
the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
263. KMU VS. ERMITA, & BAYAN MUNA VS. ERMITA, April 19, 2006 & June
20, 2000

FACTS: In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and
streamline the country’s id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups
sought to enjoin the Director-General from implementing the EO because they allege that the said
EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is
a usurpation of legislative power by the president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to “adopt a unified multi-
purpose ID system.” Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under
existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs.
Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The
President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the
Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the
1987 Constitution provides that the “President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices.” The same Section also mandates the President to “ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.” Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct
all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform
ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and
convenience to the public.
The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any
implementing legislation. Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the Executive
branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional
commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under
existing laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is
compulsory for all branches of government.