NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL

TOPIC:

COMMON INTENTION UNDER INDIAN PENAL CODE

NAME: ROHIT SINGH DHURVE SUBMITTED TO:

ROLL NO.: 2016 BA.LLB.HONS.81 ASST. PROF. DIVYA SALIM

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW I

2017-18
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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
NATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE UNIVERSITY, BHOPAL ......................................................... 1

TOPIC:........................................................................................................................................... 1

COMMON INTENTION UNDER INDIAN PENAL CODE ........................................................ 1

NAME: ROHIT SINGH DHURVE SUBMITTED TO: ................ 1

ROLL NO.: 2016 BA.LLB.HONS.81 ASST. PROF. DIVYA SALIM

......................................................................................................................................................... 1

SUBJECT: CRIMINAL LAW I ..................................................................................................... 1

2017-18 ........................................................................................................................................... 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................................... 15

This project is the outcome of valuable guidance and tremendous support of our Criminal
Law I teacher, Ass. Prof. Divya Salim. I extend our heartfelt gratitude to her for assisting me
throughout and suggesting reference material without which the project would not have been
possible. ........................................................................................................................................ 15

I would also like to thank the library staff for providing me with the reference material. ........... 15

At last I express my appreciation towards all my friends for their suggestions. .......................... 15

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 16

Ordinarily, every man is responsible criminally for a criminal act done by him. No man can be
held responsible for an independent act and wrong committed by another. The principle of
criminal liability is that the person who commits an offence is responsible for that and he can
only be held guilty. However, section 34 if Indian penal Code makes an exception to this
principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of criminal act. The essence of
that is liability is to be found in the existence of common intention, animating the accused
leading to the doing of the criminal act in furtherance of such intention. It deals with the doing of
separate acts, similar or adverse by several persons, if all are done in furtherance of common
intention. In such situation, each person is liable for the result of that as if he had done that act
himself.The soul of section 34 id the joint liability in doing a criminal act. ................................ 16

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Common Intention is known as a prearranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. It
must be proved that the Criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. It
comes into being prior to the Commission of the act in point of time, yet it need not be a long
gap. The gap need not be long sometimes common intention can be developed on the spot. The
fundamental factor is a pre-arranged plan to execute the plan for the desired result. Each of such
person will be liable in an act done in furtherance of common intention as if the act was done by
one person. Common Intention does not mean the similar intention of several person. To
constitute common intention, it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to
the rest of them and shared by them. ............................................................................................ 16

HISTORY ..................................................................................................................................... 17

Section 34 of Indian Penal Code is part of the original Code of 1860 as drafted by Lord
Macaulay. The original Section as it stood was “When a criminal act is done by several persons,
each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone.
“However on account of certain observations made by Sir Barnes Peacock C>J> in Queen v.
Gora Chand Gope & Ors., it was necessary to bring about a change in the wordings of this
section. Accordingly, in the year 1870 an amendment was brought which introduced the
following words after “when a criminal act is done by several persons….” “….in furtherance of
the common intention……”. After this change, the section has not been changed or amended
ever. ............................................................................................................................................... 17

OBJECT ........................................................................................................................................ 18

The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts
of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to
prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. The Section does not say “the common
intention of all”, nor does it say “an intention common to all “, the reason why all are deemed
guilty in such cases is that the presence of accomplices gives encouragement, support and
protection to the person actually committing an act. The true contents of the section are that if
two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each
of them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok kumar v. State of Punjab, the
existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for

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application of this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with
commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. .................................. 18

The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same
common intention in order to attract the provision. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. king Emperor,
stated the true purport of Section 34 as “The words of S.34 are not to be eviscerated by reading
them in this exceedingly limited sense. By S. 33 a criminal act in S. 34 includes a series of acts
and , further, ‘acts’ includes omission to act, for example, an omission to interfere in order to
prevent a murder being done before one’s very eyes. By S. 37, when any offence is committed
by means of several acts whoever intentionally cooperates in the commission of that offence by
doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence.
Even if the appellant did nothing as he stood outside the door, it is to be remembered that in
crimes as in other things ‘they also serve who only stand and wait’. ........................................... 18

When many persons armed with deadly weapons move together and cause fatal injuries to the
victim, all of them have to be held equally liable by virtue of the provision in S. 34 .................. 19

SECTION 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE ......................................................................... 19

Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done
by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable
for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone................................................... 19

Ingredients of Section 34: ......................................................................................................... 19

For the applicability of Section 34 following elements are necessary: ........................................ 19

(i) Criminal act; ............................................................................................................................. 19

(ii) Done by several persons; ........................................................................................................ 19

(iii) In furtherance of common intention of all. ............................................................................ 19

In Surendra Chauhan v. State of M.P.,it was held that to apply this section, apart from the fact
that there should be two or more accused, two facts must be established: (1) Common Intention
(2) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence. ............................................... 19

(i) Criminal Act: ........................................................................................................................ 19

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The section speaks of a “criminal act” being done by several persons. If the act in question is a
lawful act, this section will not apply. Where four persons were exercising their right of private
defence, they were engaged in a lawful act in the course of which one of them unlawfully caused
death.The other accused could not be held responsible with the help of Section 34 for the reason
that acts jointly done by them was a lawful and not a criminal act. Holding the same view the
Supreme Court pointed out that the question of common intention could not arise in the
circumstances and constructive liability of individual accused had to be ruled out. .................... 19

It means that if the act is a lawful and not a criminal act, and if in the course of such act any one
of the persons jointly doing that act commits an offence, then only such person shall be liable for
it and not others; Section 34 shall not apply. ................................................................................ 20

A “criminal act” is not the same thing as an “offence”. An offence is the result of a criminal act.
A criminal act is not equivalent to an offence which is composed of a physical act, its effect and
the intention or knowledge with which the physical act is done.The words “criminal act” are
wider than the words “offence” as defined in Section 40. A criminal act means the entire series
of acts committed by several persons resulting in something which is punishable under the Code
or any other law. ........................................................................................................................... 20

It indicates the unity of criminal behavior which results in something for which an individual
would be punishable if it were done by him alone. Section 33 lays down that an “act” denotes as
well a series of acts as a single act and omission denotes as well a series of omissions as a single
omission.Section 32 says that words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions. A
‘criminal act’ in Section 34 includes a series of acts, omission to act being included within the
meaning of the word ‘act’, e.g. an omission to interfere in order to prevent a murder being done
before one’s very eyes.The criminal act in Section 34 means a single act as a series of acts. But a
different view was held in the following cases, wherein it has been said that a criminal act must
include at least two acts; if only one act has been done, Section 34 cannot apply. The part played
by one of the several persons need be identical. ........................................................................... 20

“Criminal acts” does not denote a single act but refers to a whole criminal transaction in which
several persons are engaged, a transaction comprising the doing of separate acts, similar or
diverse by several persons.In a case some of the assailants came in one truck and attacked the
deceased and the other accused person came in another truck and attacked the companion of the

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deceased. The prior concert and planning by all the accused persons was clear from the evidence.
....................................................................................................................................................... 21

Supreme Court held that this fact would not make any difference as both the attacks were part of
the same transaction. Therefore, Section 34 was held applicable. Cunning, J. has explained in
K.E. v. Barendra Kumar, that it is impossible to conceive two individuals doing identically the
same act; such a thing is impossible. ............................................................................................ 21

Therefore, to have any meaning the expression “criminal act done by several persons” must
contemplate an act which can be divided into parts each part being executed by a different
person, the whole making up the “criminal act which was the common intention of all”. .......... 21

(ii) “Done by several persons”: ................................................................................................. 21

The offenders must be shown to be engaged in a criminal enterprise, that is to say, though they
may not be engaged in doing the same act, each one of them must be a participant in some act
connected with their common intention.In a case two persons being the partners of a business
had taken a room on rent for their business purposes. One of them alone defrauded third party in
that room. Supreme Court held that the other partner having no knowledge of the fraud was not
liable to be punished with the aid of Section 34, I.P.C. ................................................................ 21

It is not necessary that a similar or the same act may be committed by different offenders. The
acts may be different, e.g., where out of several burglars some keep out a watch and one of those
who enter the house shoots and kills an inmate or there may be similar acts as where several
persons combine to assault another.There must be evidence of some distinct act by the accused
which may be regarded as a part of the criminal act. Actual participation is necessary though the
participation may be passive ......................................................................................................... 21

(iii) “In furtherance of common intention”: .............................................................................. 21

What is the meaning of the expression “in furtherance of the common intention”? The dictionary
meaning of the word “furtherance” is “advancement or promotion”. If four persons have a
common intention to kill A, they will have to do many acts in promotion of that intention in
order to fulfil it.Some illustrations will clarify the point. Four persons intend to kill A, who is
expected to be found in a house. All of them participate in different ways. One of them attempts
to enter the house but is stopped by the sentry and he shoots the sentry. ..................................... 22

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Though the common intention was to kill A, the shooting of the sentry is in furtherance of the
said common intention. Section 34 applies. In a case father and son were accused. Along with
co-accused they attacked deceased and his family members. Accused brought out deadly
weapons from house by which accused and co-accused attacked deceased. One of the accused
dealt only one blow on arm of deceased. ...................................................................................... 22

The circumstances indicate the intention of causing death, Section 34 applies. Take a third
variation of the illustration. The intended victim has a twin brother who exactly resembles him
and the accused who is entrusted with the part of shooting the intended victim, on a mistaken
impression shoots the twin brother. .............................................................................................. 22

The shooting of the twin brother is also in furtherance of the common intention. The common
intention may be to do one act and another act may be done in furtherance of the common
intention. Such other act in furtherance may be a preliminary act necessary for achieving the
common intention, or it may be done while achieving it or it may be done after achieving it. .... 22

If such other act has no connection with the common intention, it shall not be in furtherance and
consequently Section 34 shall not apply. Thus, while the common intention is to kill a person, a
theft is also committed by one of the several persons participating in the criminal act, Section 34
shall not apply in respect of the theft which shall be the separate act of the individual concerned
and none others of the remaining persons shall be liable for it. ................................................... 22

Emphasising this third aspect the Supreme Court in a case observed that it is true that in order to
convict persons vicariously under Section 34, I.P.C., it is not necessary to prove that each and
every one of them had indulged in overt acts. Even so, there must be material to show that the
overt act or acts of one or more of the accused was or were done in furtherance of the common
intention of all the accused. .......................................................................................................... 22

Common intention may develop on the spot. : ......................................................................... 23

In certain circumstances common intention may suddenly develop on the spot, which may be
inferred by the conduct of the accused. This opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court in the
case of Krishna Gobind Patil v. State of Maharashtra. The similar opinion was also approved by
the Supreme Court in Hari Om v. State of U.P. ............................................................................ 23

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The Supreme Court, in Pratap Singh v. State of M.P., held that the common intention in criminal
jurisprudence is the premeditated meeting of minds. No doubt the common intention can also be
formed on the spot. ....................................................................................................................... 23

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "COMMON OBJECT" AND "COMMON INTENTION"

(SECTION 34 AND 149 OF IPC) ................................................................................................ 24

There is much difference in the scope and applicability of Section 34 and Section 149, I.P.C.,
though they have some resemblance and are to some extent overlapping. .................................. 24

Section 34 does not by itself create any offence, whereas Section 149 does. In a charge under
Section 34 there is active participation in the commission of the criminal act, under Section 149
the liability arises by reason of the membership of the unlawful assembly with a common object,
and there may be no active participation at all in the preparation or commission of the crime. .. 24

Sections 34 and 149 —”Common object” and “Common intention” —Distinction: .................. 24

The principal element in Section 34 is the common intention to commit a crime. There is no
question of common intention in Section 149. An offence may be committed by a member of an
unlawful assembly and the other members will be liable for that offence, although there was no
common intention between that person and other members of the unlawful assembly to commit
that offence provided the conditions laid down in the section are fulfilled. Section 34 does not fix
a minimum number of persons who must share the common intention whereas Section 149 IPC
requires that there must be at least five persons who must have the same common object. ........ 24

Thus, if the offence committed by the person is in prosecution of the common object of the
unlawful assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in
prosecution of the common object, every member of the unlawful assembly would be guilty of
that offence, although there may have been no common intention and no participation by the
other members in the actual commission of that object. Section 149 creates a specific offence
while Section 34 is merely explanatory and does not create any specific offence. ...................... 24

There is a difference between object and intention, for though their object is common, the
intentions of the several members may differ and indeed may be similar only in respect that they
are all unlawful, while the element of participation in action, which is the leading feature of
Section 34 is replaced in Section 149, by membership of the unlawful assembly. Both sections

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deal with combination of persons who become punishable as sharers in offence. Thus, they have
a certain resemblance and may be to some extent overlap. .......................................................... 25

Section 34 limits itself to the furtherance of the common intention while Section 149 goes further
and is more strongly worded than Section 34. The words “common object” and “common
intention” are not synonymous. They involve substantial difference.Under Section 34 a criminal
act must be done by several persons ‘in furtherance of common intention of all’, whereas under
Section 149, the mere membership of an unlawful assembly, any member of which commits an
offence, in prosecution of the common object of that assembly is punishable............................. 25

While Section 34 deals with the liability of persons where an offence is committed in furtherance
of a common intention to commit that act, Section 149 deals with the liability of persons in
respect of an offence when they had the knowledge of there being a likelihood of its being
committed in prosecution of their common object.Section 149 does not deal with the common
intention to commit an offence. In effect the common object with which it deals may be one
which is lawful, while the common intention contemplated by Section 34 is with reference to the
committing of a criminal act. ........................................................................................................ 25

Section 34 deals not with the liability of persons for an offence which is likely to be committed
in the course of what was intended by them, but deals with only the liability of persons who
intended to commit a criminal act when that act is committed. Knowledge, that an offence is
likely to be committed is not what is contemplated by Section 34.Even where an offence is
committed by one person, another person who was with him at the time the offence was
committed cannot be punished, though he had a similar intention because the section deals with
the liability of persons for a criminal act done in pursuance of a common intention. .................. 25

Participation of the individual offender in the criminal act in some form or other which is the
leading feature of Section 34 differentiates it not only from Section 149, but also from other
affiliated offences like criminal conspiracy and abetment.Whereas, Section 34 does take into
account the fact of the participation of every individual offender in the offence which is therein
described as criminal act as well as his mental state which is therein connoted by the word
“intention”. Section 149 completely ignores both these factors. .................................................. 26

Although, there is a difference in common object and common intention, they both deal with
combination of persons who become punishable as sharers in an offence, and a charge under

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Section 149 is no impediment to a conviction under Section 34 if the evidence discloses the
commission of the offence in furtherance of the common intention of all. .................................. 26

Alma v. State of M.P., is a good case on the point. There the Trial Court convicted certain five
accused persons under Sections 148, 149 and 302 of the Code and sentenced them to life
imprisonment. The High Court on appeal confirmed the conviction of three accused
persons.Before the Supreme Court it was argued that the conviction could not be recorded with
the aid of Section 149. The Court, however, could not agree with this argument and stated that
this state of affairs (regarding the required minimum number of accused persons under Sections
34 and 149) should not make any difference.“The submission that the conviction could not be
recorded with the aid of Section 149 should not make any difference as it can be sustained with
the aid of Section 34. Of course the High Court has recorded the conviction with the aid of
Section 149 as it came to the conclusion that at least five persons were involved”. .................... 26

If the common object which is the subject-matter of the charge under Section 149, does not
necessarily involve a common intention, then the substitution of Section 34 for Section l49 might
result in prejudice to the accused and might not therefore be permitted.The principal element in
Section 34 is the common intention to commit an offence. There is no question of common
intention in Section 149. In a case of riot or unlawful assembly, the Court is concerned with a
common object. ............................................................................................................................. 26

A common object is different from common intention in that it does not require prior concert and
a common meeting of minds before the attack, and an unlawful object can develop after the
people get there.In a case under Section 149 there need not be a prior meeting of minds. It is
enough that each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act
in an assembly to achieve that object.Section 34 is wider in scope than Section 149 in the sense
that in order to apply Section 34 only two persons are required whereas at least five persons are
required for the application of Section 149................................................................................... 27

The Supreme Court has made a distinction between common intention and common object in the
case of Ram Dular Rai v. State of Bihar, and said that “Common object” is different from a
“Common intention”, as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds
before the attack. ........................................................................................................................... 27

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It is enough if each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act
as assembly to achieve that object. The “common object” of an assembly is to be ascertained
from the acts and language of the members composing it, and from a consideration of all the
surrounding circumstances.It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the
members of the assembly. It is not necessary that the intention or the purpose, which is necessary
to render an assembly an unlawful one, comes into existence at the outset. ................................ 27

LEADING CASE LAWS ............................................................................................................. 28

The case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor is a locus classicus and has been followed
by number of High Courts and Supreme Court in a large number of cases. In this case, he judicial
committee dealt with the scope of Section 34 dealing with the acts done in furtherance of the
common intention, making all equally liable for the result of all acts of others. It was observed
that Section 34 when it speaks of a criminal act done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention of all, as regard to the offence not as a whole, but to the criminal act, that is to
say, the totality of the series of acts which resulted in the offence. In the case of a person
assaulted by many accused, the criminal act is the offence which finally results, though the
achievement of the criminal act maybe the result of the action of several persons. ..................... 28

In another celebrated case Mehboob Shah v. King Emperor, the court held that Section 34 lays
down the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The Section does not say the
common intention of all nor does it say the intention common to all. Under the Section, the
essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention. Animating the
accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. To invoke the aid
of Section 34 successfully it must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by
one of the accused person in the furtherance of the common intention of all, if this is shown then
liability for the crime maybe imposed on any one of the person in the same manner as if the act
were done by him alone. This being the principle it is clear to the lordship that common
intention within the meaning of the Section implies a pre arranged plan and to convict the
accused of an offence applying the Section it should be proved that the criminal act was done in
consult pursuant to the pre arranged plan. .................................................................................... 28

Approving the judgments of Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh and Mehboob Shah case, a
three judge bench of Supreme Court in Pandu Rang v. State of Hyderabad held that to attract the

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applicability of Section 34 of the code, the prosecution is under the obligation to establish that
there existed a common intention which requires a pre arranged plan because before a man can
be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been done in the
common intention of all. The court had in mind the ultimate act done in furtherance of common
intention. ....................................................................................................................................... 28

SECTION 35 IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE .......................................................................... 30

When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or
intention.—Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal
knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act
with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done
by him alone with that knowledge or intention ............................................................................ 30

There are many offences in the Indian Penal Code where an accused shall be liable only when he
possesses a certain criminal knowledge or intention. If such an act is done by more than one
persons each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention shall be
liable for the act in the same manner as if he alone had done that act with that knowledge or
intention. Under this section there is no common intention amongst the assailants as is required
under section 34 but all those who join in a criminal act, made punishable only when done with a
distinct criminal knowledge or intention, with the same knowledge or intention, are liable. In this
section also, the responsibility is shared by each offender individually if the act which is criminal
only by reason of certain criminal knowledge or intention is done by each person sharing that
knowledge or intention. ................................................................................................................ 30

SECTION 36 IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE .......................................................................... 31

Effect caused partly by act and partly by omission.—Wherever the causing of a certain effect, or
an attempt to cause that effect, by an act or by an omission, is an offence, it is to be understood
that the causing of that effect partly by an act and partly by an omission is the same offence. ... 31

Illustration..................................................................................................................................... 31

A intentionally causes Z’s death, partly by illegally omitting to give Z food, and partly by
beating Z. A has committed murder. ............................................................................................ 31

SECTION 37 IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE .......................................................................... 31

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Co-operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence.—When an offence is
committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that
offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits
that offence.................................................................................................................................... 31

Illustrations ................................................................................................................................... 31

(a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small doses of
poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with intent to murder Z. Z
dies from the effects of the several doses of poison so administered to him. Here A and B
intentionally co-operate in the commission of murder and as each of them does an act by which
the death is caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate. ............... 31

(b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such have the charge of Z, a prisoner, alternatively for six
hours at a time. A and B, intending to cause Z’s death, knowingly co-operate in causing that
effect by illegally omitting, each during the time of his attendance, to furnish Z with food
supplied to them for that purpose, Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z.
....................................................................................................................................................... 31

(c) A, a jailor, has the charge of Z, a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z’s death, illegally omits to
supply Z with food; in consequence of which Z is much reduced in strength, but the starvation is
not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed from his office, and B succeeds him. B, without
collusion or co-operation with A, illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely
thereby to cause Z’s death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder, but, as A did not co-operate
with B. A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder. ............................................................ 31

SECTION 38 IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE .......................................................................... 32

Persons concerned in criminal act may be guilty of different offences.—Where several persons
are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different
offences by means of that act. ....................................................................................................... 32

Illustration- ................................................................................................................................... 32

A attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation that his killing of Z would be only
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having ill-will towards Z and intending to kill
him, and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing Z. Here, though A and B

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are both engaged in causing Z’s death, B is guilty of murder, and A is guilty only of culpable
homicide........................................................................................................................................ 32

This section provides for different punishments for different offences as an alternative to one
punishment for one offence, whether the persons engaged or concerned in the commission of a
criminal act are set in motion by one or by the other.................................................................... 32

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 33

Intention is defined in R. v Mohan as “the decision to bring about a prohibited consequence”.

The real concept of the section 34 of IPC is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act
jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself.
One should not forget that section 34 does not speak “the common intentions of all” nor does it
speak “an intention common to all”. Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the
liability is to found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the
doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. . To prove the charge of common
intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that
there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which
they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be its pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; but
it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. ......................................................... 33

BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 34

Books Referred- ............................................................................................................................ 34

1. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal Code ...................................................................... 34

2. K.D. Gaur .............................................................................................................................. 34

Web Sources – .............................................................................................................................. 34

1. https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/common-intention-common-object ....................... 34

2. www.legalservicesindia.com ................................................................................................. 34

3. https://indiankanoon.org/search ............................................................................................. 34

4. www.shareyouressays.com .................................................................................................... 34

5. https://articlesonlaw.wordpress.com ..................................................................................... 34

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This project is the outcome of valuable guidance and tremendous support of our Criminal
Law I teacher, Ass. Prof. Divya Salim. I extend our heartfelt gratitude to her for assisting me
throughout and suggesting reference material without which the project would not have been
possible.

I would also like to thank the library staff for providing me with the reference material.

At last I express my appreciation towards all my friends for their suggestions.

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 INTRODUCTION

Ordinarily, every man is responsible criminally for a criminal act done by him. No man can be
held responsible for an independent act and wrong committed by another. The principle of
criminal liability is that the person who commits an offence is responsible for that and he can
only be held guilty. However, section 34 if Indian penal Code makes an exception to this
principle. It lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of criminal act. The essence of
that is liability is to be found in the existence of common intention, animating the accused
leading to the doing of the criminal act in furtherance of such intention. It deals with the doing of
separate acts, similar or adverse by several persons, if all are done in furtherance of common
intention. In such situation, each person is liable for the result of that as if he had done that act
himself1.The soul of section 34 id the joint liability in doing a criminal act2.

Common Intention is known as a prearranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. It
must be proved that the Criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. It
comes into being prior to the Commission of the act in point of time, yet it need not be a long
gap. The gap need not be long sometimes common intention can be developed on the spot. The
fundamental factor is a pre-arranged plan to execute the plan for the desired result. Each of such
person will be liable in an act done in furtherance of common intention as if the act was done by
one person. Common Intention does not mean the similar intention of several person. To
constitute common intention, it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to
the rest of them and shared by them.

1
Goudappa v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 3SCC 675 ; Satyavir Singh Rathi v. State Thr. C.B.I AIR 2011 SC 1748
2
Kuria and another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 1085

Page | 16
 HISTORY

Section 34 of Indian Penal Code is part of the original Code of 1860 as drafted by Lord
Macaulay. The original Section as it stood was “When a criminal act is done by several persons,
each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone.
“However on account of certain observations made by Sir Barnes Peacock C>J> in Queen v.
Gora Chand Gope & Ors3., it was necessary to bring about a change in the wordings of this
section. Accordingly, in the year 1870 an amendment was brought which introduced the
following words after “when a criminal act is done by several persons….” “….in furtherance of
the common intention……”. After this change, the section has not been changed or amended
ever.

3
(1866) 5 South WR (Cri) 45.

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 OBJECT

The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts
of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to
prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. The Section does not say “the common
intention of all”, nor does it say “an intention common to all “4, the reason why all are deemed
guilty in such cases is that the presence of accomplices gives encouragement, support and
protection to the person actually committing an act. The true contents of the section are that if
two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each
of them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok kumar v. State of Punjab5, the
existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for
application of this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with
commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar.

The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same
common intention in order to attract the provision6. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. king Emperor7,
stated the true purport of Section 34 as “The words of S.34 are not to be eviscerated by reading
them in this exceedingly limited sense. By S. 33 a criminal act in S. 34 includes a series of acts
and , further, ‘acts’ includes omission to act, for example, an omission to interfere in order to
prevent a murder being done before one’s very eyes. By S. 37, when any offence is committed
by means of several acts whoever intentionally cooperates in the commission of that offence by

4
Girija Shankar v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2013 SC 1085
5
AIR 1977 SC 109 ; (1977) 1SCC 746.
6
Babulal Bhagwan Khandare & Anr v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2005 SC 1460
7
AIR 1925 PC 1

Page | 18
doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits that offence.
Even if the appellant did nothing as he stood outside the door, it is to be remembered that in
crimes as in other things ‘they also serve who only stand and wait’.8

When many persons armed with deadly weapons move together and cause fatal injuries to the
victim, all of them have to be held equally liable by virtue of the provision in S. 349

SECTION 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done
by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable
for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

Ingredients of Section 34:

For the applicability of Section 34 following elements are necessary:

(i) Criminal act;

(ii) Done by several persons;

(iii) In furtherance of common intention of all.

In Surendra Chauhan v. State of M.P10.,it was held that to apply this section, apart from the fact
that there should be two or more accused, two facts must be established: (1) Common Intention
(2) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence.

(i) Criminal Act:

The section speaks of a “criminal act” being done by several persons. If the act in question is a
lawful act, this section will not apply. Where four persons were exercising their right of private
defence, they were engaged in a lawful act in the course of which one of them unlawfully caused
death.The other accused could not be held responsible with the help of Section 34 for the reason

8
Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar, AIR 2003 SC 333
9
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab (2008) 12 SCC237.
10
[(2000) 4 SCC 110

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that acts jointly done by them was a lawful and not a criminal act11. Holding the same view the
Supreme Court pointed out that the question of common intention could not arise in the
circumstances and constructive liability of individual accused had to be ruled out.

It means that if the act is a lawful and not a criminal act, and if in the course of such act any one
of the persons jointly doing that act commits an offence, then only such person shall be liable for
it and not others; Section 34 shall not apply.

A “criminal act” is not the same thing as an “offence”. An offence is the result of a criminal act.
A criminal act is not equivalent to an offence which is composed of a physical act, its effect and
the intention or knowledge with which the physical act is done.The words “criminal act” are
wider than the words “offence” as defined in Section 4012. A criminal act means the entire series
of acts committed by several persons resulting in something which is punishable under the Code
or any other law.

It indicates the unity of criminal behavior which results in something for which an individual
would be punishable if it were done by him alone. Section 33 lays down that an “act” denotes as
well a series of acts as a single act and omission denotes as well a series of omissions as a single
omission.Section 32 says that words which refer to acts done extend also to illegal omissions. A
‘criminal act’ in Section 34 includes a series of acts, omission to act being included within the
meaning of the word ‘act’, e.g. an omission to interfere in order to prevent a murder being done
before one’s very eyes.The criminal act in Section 34 means a single act as a series of acts. But a
different view was held in the following cases, wherein it has been said that a criminal act must
include at least two acts; if only one act has been done, Section 34 cannot apply. The part played
by one of the several persons need be identical.

11
Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab 1972 Cr LJ 465 (SC)
12
[40. "Offence"
Except in the 31[Chapters] and sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section, the word "offence" denotes a
thing made punishable by this Code.
In Chapter IV, 32[Chapter VA] and in the following sections, namely, sections 33[64, 65, 66, 34[67], 71], 109, 110,
112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 187, 194, 195, 203, 211, 213, 214, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 347,
348, 388, 389 and 445, the words "offence" denotes a thing punishable under this Code, or under any special or local
law as hereinafter defined.
And in sections 141, 176, 177, 201, 202, 212, 216 and 441, the word "offence" has the same meaning when the thing
punishable under the special or local law is punishable under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months
or upwards, whether with or without fine.]

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“Criminal acts” does not denote a single act but refers to a whole criminal transaction in which
several persons are engaged, a transaction comprising the doing of separate acts, similar or
diverse by several persons.In a case some of the assailants came in one truck and attacked the
deceased and the other accused person came in another truck and attacked the companion of the
deceased. The prior concert and planning by all the accused persons was clear from the evidence.

Supreme Court held that this fact would not make any difference as both the attacks were part of
the same transaction. Therefore, Section 34 was held applicable. Cunning, J. has explained in
K.E. v. Barendra Kumar13, that it is impossible to conceive two individuals doing identically the
same act; such a thing is impossible.

Therefore, to have any meaning the expression “criminal act done by several persons” must
contemplate an act which can be divided into parts each part being executed by a different
person, the whole making up the “criminal act which was the common intention of all”.

(ii) “Done by several persons”:

The offenders must be shown to be engaged in a criminal enterprise, that is to say, though they
may not be engaged in doing the same act, each one of them must be a participant in some act
connected with their common intention.In a case two persons being the partners of a business
had taken a room on rent for their business purposes. One of them alone defrauded third party in
that room. Supreme Court held that the other partner having no knowledge of the fraud was not
liable to be punished with the aid of Section 34, I.P.C.

It is not necessary that a similar or the same act may be committed by different offenders. The
acts may be different, e.g., where out of several burglars some keep out a watch and one of those
who enter the house shoots and kills an inmate or there may be similar acts as where several
persons combine to assault another.There must be evidence of some distinct act by the accused
which may be regarded as a part of the criminal act. Actual participation is necessary though the
participation may be passive

(iii) “In furtherance of common intention”:

13
AIR 1924 Cal 545.

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What is the meaning of the expression “in furtherance of the common intention”? The dictionary
meaning of the word “furtherance” is “advancement or promotion”. If four persons have a
common intention to kill A, they will have to do many acts in promotion of that intention in
order to fulfil it.Some illustrations will clarify the point. Four persons intend to kill A, who is
expected to be found in a house. All of them participate in different ways. One of them attempts
to enter the house but is stopped by the sentry and he shoots the sentry.

Though the common intention was to kill A, the shooting of the sentry is in furtherance of the
said common intention. Section 34 applies. In a case father and son were accused. Along with
co-accused they attacked deceased and his family members. Accused brought out deadly
weapons from house by which accused and co-accused attacked deceased. One of the accused
dealt only one blow on arm of deceased.

The circumstances indicate the intention of causing death, Section 34 applies. Take a third
variation of the illustration. The intended victim has a twin brother who exactly resembles him
and the accused who is entrusted with the part of shooting the intended victim, on a mistaken
impression shoots the twin brother.

The shooting of the twin brother is also in furtherance of the common intention. The common
intention may be to do one act and another act may be done in furtherance of the common
intention. Such other act in furtherance may be a preliminary act necessary for achieving the
common intention, or it may be done while achieving it or it may be done after achieving it.

If such other act has no connection with the common intention, it shall not be in furtherance and
consequently Section 34 shall not apply. Thus, while the common intention is to kill a person, a
theft is also committed by one of the several persons participating in the criminal act, Section 34
shall not apply in respect of the theft which shall be the separate act of the individual concerned
and none others of the remaining persons shall be liable for it.

Emphasising this third aspect the Supreme Court in a case observed that it is true that in order to
convict persons vicariously under Section 34, I.P.C., it is not necessary to prove that each and
every one of them had indulged in overt acts. Even so, there must be material to show that the

Page | 22
overt act or acts of one or more of the accused was or were done in furtherance of the common
intention of all the accused14.

Common intention may develop on the spot. :

In certain circumstances common intention may suddenly develop on the spot, which may be
inferred by the conduct of the accused. This opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court in the
case of Krishna Gobind Patil v. State of Maharashtra15. The similar opinion was also approved
by the Supreme Court in Hari Om v. State of U.P16.

The Supreme Court, in Pratap Singh v. State of M.P17., held that the common intention in
criminal jurisprudence is the premeditated meeting of minds. No doubt the common intention
can also be formed on the spot.

14
Mahbub Shah (1945) 47 Com LR 941
15
1963 AIR 1413, 1964 SCR (1) 678
16
1993 (2) SC 657
17
1961 AIR 586

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 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "COMMON OBJECT" AND
"COMMON INTENTION" (SECTION 34 AND 149 OF IPC)

There is much difference in the scope and applicability of Section 34 and Section 14918, I.P.C.,
though they have some resemblance and are to some extent overlapping.

Section 34 does not by itself create any offence, whereas Section 149 does. In a charge under
Section 34 there is active participation in the commission of the criminal act, under Section 149
the liability arises by reason of the membership of the unlawful assembly with a common object,
and there may be no active participation at all in the preparation or commission of the crime.

Sections 34 and 149 —”Common object” and “Common intention” —Distinction:

The principal element in Section 34 is the common intention to commit a crime. There is no
question of common intention in Section 149. An offence may be committed by a member of an
unlawful assembly and the other members will be liable for that offence, although there was no
common intention between that person and other members of the unlawful assembly to commit
that offence provided the conditions laid down in the section are fulfilled19. Section 34 does not
fix a minimum number of persons who must share the common intention whereas Section 149
IPC requires that there must be at least five persons who must have the same common object. 20

Thus, if the offence committed by the person is in prosecution of the common object of the
unlawful assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in

18
Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object
If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object,
every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that
offence.
19
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emp., AIR 1925 PC 1(7)
20
Virendra Singh v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 407

Page | 24
prosecution of the common object, every member of the unlawful assembly would be guilty of
that offence, although there may have been no common intention and no participation by the
other members in the actual commission of that object21. Section 149 creates a specific offence
while Section 34 is merely explanatory and does not create any specific offence.

There is a difference between object and intention, for though their object is common, the
intentions of the several members may differ and indeed may be similar only in respect that they
are all unlawful, while the element of participation in action, which is the leading feature of
Section 34 is replaced in Section 149, by membership of the unlawful assembly. Both sections
deal with combination of persons who become punishable as sharers in offence. Thus, they have
a certain resemblance and may be to some extent overlap.

Section 34 limits itself to the furtherance of the common intention while Section 149 goes further
and is more strongly worded than Section 34. The words “common object” and “common
intention” are not synonymous. They involve substantial difference.Under Section 34 a criminal
act must be done by several persons ‘in furtherance of common intention of all’, whereas under
Section 149, the mere membership of an unlawful assembly, any member of which commits an
offence, in prosecution of the common object of that assembly is punishable.

While Section 34 deals with the liability of persons where an offence is committed in furtherance
of a common intention to commit that act, Section 149 deals with the liability of persons in
respect of an offence when they had the knowledge of there being a likelihood of its being
committed in prosecution of their common object.Section 149 does not deal with the common
intention to commit an offence. In effect the common object with which it deals may be one
which is lawful, while the common intention contemplated by Section 34 is with reference to the
committing of a criminal act.

Section 34 deals not with the liability of persons for an offence which is likely to be committed
in the course of what was intended by them, but deals with only the liability of persons who
intended to commit a criminal act when that act is committed. Knowledge, that an offence is
likely to be committed is not what is contemplated by Section 34.Even where an offence is

21
Surinder Singh v. State Of Punjab, (2003) 10 SCC 66s

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committed by one person, another person who was with him at the time the offence was
committed cannot be punished, though he had a similar intention because the section deals with
the liability of persons for a criminal act done in pursuance of a common intention.

Participation of the individual offender in the criminal act in some form or other which is the
leading feature of Section 34 differentiates it not only from Section 149, but also from other
affiliated offences like criminal conspiracy and abetment.Whereas, Section 34 does take into
account the fact of the participation of every individual offender in the offence which is therein
described as criminal act as well as his mental state which is therein connoted by the word
“intention”. Section 149 completely ignores both these factors.

Although, there is a difference in common object and common intention, they both deal with
combination of persons who become punishable as sharers in an offence, and a charge under
Section 149 is no impediment to a conviction under Section 34 if the evidence discloses the
commission of the offence in furtherance of the common intention of all.

Alma v. State of M.P22., is a good case on the point. There the Trial Court convicted certain five
accused persons under Sections 148, 149 and 302 of the Code and sentenced them to life
imprisonment. The High Court on appeal confirmed the conviction of three accused
persons.Before the Supreme Court it was argued that the conviction could not be recorded with
the aid of Section 149. The Court, however, could not agree with this argument and stated that
this state of affairs (regarding the required minimum number of accused persons under Sections
34 and 149) should not make any difference.“The submission that the conviction could not be
recorded with the aid of Section 149 should not make any difference as it can be sustained with
the aid of Section 34. Of course the High Court has recorded the conviction with the aid of
Section 149 as it came to the conclusion that at least five persons were involved”.

If the common object which is the subject-matter of the charge under Section 149, does not
necessarily involve a common intention, then the substitution of Section 34 for Section l49 might
result in prejudice to the accused and might not therefore be permitted.The principal element in
Section 34 is the common intention to commit an offence. There is no question of common

22
AIR 1991 SC 1519

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intention in Section 149. In a case of riot or unlawful assembly, the Court is concerned with a
common object.

A common object is different from common intention in that it does not require prior concert and
a common meeting of minds before the attack, and an unlawful object can develop after the
people get there.In a case under Section 149 there need not be a prior meeting of minds. It is
enough that each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act
in an assembly to achieve that object.Section 34 is wider in scope than Section 149 in the sense
that in order to apply Section 34 only two persons are required whereas at least five persons are
required for the application of Section 149.

The Supreme Court has made a distinction between common intention and common object in the
case of Ram Dular Rai v. State of Bihar23, and said that “Common object” is different from a
“Common intention”, as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds
before the attack.

It is enough if each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act
as assembly to achieve that object. The “common object” of an assembly is to be ascertained
from the acts and language of the members composing it, and from a consideration of all the
surrounding circumstances.It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the
members of the assembly. It is not necessary that the intention or the purpose, which is necessary
to render an assembly an unlawful one, comes into existence at the outset.

23
(2003)12SCC352

Page | 27
 LEADING CASE LAWS

The case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor24 is a locus classicus and has been
followed by number of High Courts and Supreme Court in a large number of cases. In this case,
he judicial committee dealt with the scope of Section 34 dealing with the acts done in furtherance
of the common intention, making all equally liable for the result of all acts of others. It was
observed that Section 34 when it speaks of a criminal act done by several persons in furtherance
of common intention of all, as regard to the offence not as a whole, but to the criminal act, that is
to say, the totality of the series of acts which resulted in the offence. In the case of a person
assaulted by many accused, the criminal act is the offence which finally results, though the
achievement of the criminal act maybe the result of the action of several persons.

In another celebrated case Mehboob Shah v. King Emperor25, the court held that Section 34 lays
down the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The Section does not say the
common intention of all nor does it say the intention common to all. Under the Section, the
essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention. Animating the
accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. To invoke the aid
of Section 34 successfully it must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by
one of the accused person in the furtherance of the common intention of all, if this is shown then
liability for the crime maybe imposed on any one of the person in the same manner as if the act
were done by him alone. This being the principle it is clear to the lordship that common
intention within the meaning of the Section implies a pre arranged plan and to convict the
accused of an offence applying the Section it should be proved that the criminal act was done in
consult pursuant to the pre arranged plan.

Approving the judgments of Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh26 and Mehboob Shah27
case, a three judge bench of Supreme Court in Pandu Rang v. State of Hyderabad28 held that to
attract the applicability of Section 34 of the code, the prosecution is under the obligation to

24
AIR 1925 PC 1.
25
AIR 1945 PC 148
26
Supra.
27
Supra.
28
AIR 1955 SC 216

Page | 28
establish that there existed a common intention which requires a pre arranged plan because
before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another, the act must have been
done in the common intention of all. The court had in mind the ultimate act done in furtherance
of common intention.

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 SECTION 35 IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

When such an act is criminal by reason of its being done with a criminal knowledge or
intention.—Whenever an act, which is criminal only by reason of its being done with a criminal
knowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who joins in the act
with such knowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done
by him alone with that knowledge or intention

There are many offences in the Indian Penal Code where an accused shall be liable only when he
possesses a certain criminal knowledge or intention. If such an act is done by more than one
persons each of such persons who joins in the act with such knowledge or intention shall be
liable for the act in the same manner as if he alone had done that act with that knowledge or
intention. Under this section there is no common intention amongst the assailants as is required
under section 34 but all those who join in a criminal act, made punishable only when done with a
distinct criminal knowledge or intention, with the same knowledge or intention, are liable. In this
section also, the responsibility is shared by each offender individually if the act which is criminal
only by reason of certain criminal knowledge or intention is done by each person sharing that
knowledge or intention.29

29
Afrahim sheikh v. State of West Bengal AIR 1964 SC 1263.

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 SECTION 36 IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

Effect caused partly by act and partly by omission.—Wherever the causing of a certain effect, or
an attempt to cause that effect, by an act or by an omission, is an offence, it is to be understood
that the causing of that effect partly by an act and partly by an omission is the same offence.

Illustration

A intentionally causes Z’s death, partly by illegally omitting to give Z food, and partly by
beating Z. A has committed murder.

SECTION 37 IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

Co-operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence.—When an offence is

committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that
offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any other person, commits
that offence.

Illustrations

(a) A and B agree to murder Z by severally and at different times giving him small doses of
poison. A and B administer the poison according to the agreement with intent to murder Z. Z
dies from the effects of the several doses of poison so administered to him. Here A and B
intentionally co-operate in the commission of murder and as each of them does an act by which
the death is caused, they are both guilty of the offence though their acts are separate.

(b) A and B are joint jailors, and as such have the charge of Z, a prisoner, alternatively for six
hours at a time. A and B, intending to cause Z’s death, knowingly co-operate in causing that
effect by illegally omitting, each during the time of his attendance, to furnish Z with food
supplied to them for that purpose, Z dies of hunger. Both A and B are guilty of the murder of Z.

(c) A, a jailor, has the charge of Z, a prisoner. A, intending to cause Z’s death, illegally omits to
supply Z with food; in consequence of which Z is much reduced in strength, but the starvation is

Page | 31
not sufficient to cause his death. A is dismissed from his office, and B succeeds him. B, without
collusion or co-operation with A, illegally omits to supply Z with food, knowing that he is likely
thereby to cause Z’s death. Z dies of hunger. B is guilty of murder, but, as A did not co-operate
with B. A is guilty only of an attempt to commit murder.

SECTION 38 IN THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

Persons concerned in criminal act may be guilty of different offences.—Where several persons
are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different
offences by means of that act.

Illustration-

A attacks Z under such circumstances of grave provocation that his killing of Z would be only
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. B, having ill-will towards Z and intending to kill
him, and not having been subject to the provocation, assists A in killing Z. Here, though A and B
are both engaged in causing Z’s death, B is guilty of murder, and A is guilty only of culpable
homicide.

This section provides for different punishments for different offences as an alternative to one
punishment for one offence, whether the persons engaged or concerned in the commission of a
criminal act are set in motion by one or by the other.30

30
Barendra Kumar Ghosh (1924) 52 IA 40

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 CONCLUSION

Intention is defined in R. v Mohan31 as “the decision to bring about a prohibited consequence”.

The real concept of the section 34 of IPC is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act
jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself.
One should not forget that section 34 does not speak “the common intentions of all” nor does it
speak “an intention common to all”. Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the
liability is to found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the
doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. . To prove the charge of common
intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that
there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which
they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be its pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; but
it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime.

31
1994 CanLII 80

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books Referred-

1. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's The Indian Penal Code

2. K.D. Gaur

Web Sources –

1. https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/common-intention-common-object
2. www.legalservicesindia.com
3. https://indiankanoon.org/search
4. www.shareyouressays.com
5. https://articlesonlaw.wordpress.com

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