264. SASIO VS.

GODON, October 17, 2006

FACTS:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”
Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him
to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation
because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered
performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members
or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

HELD:
No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically
ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of
the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their
constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

Read also Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 27, 28 and 35 of RA No. 9372, the
Human Security Act or the Anti-Terrorism Law.

1
 FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS, EXPRESSION,etc.

Rule on criticisms against acts of public officers Read:

265. Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil. 524

*nadiscuss po natin to sa crim, pabasa na lang po sa fulltext yung letter 

Facts: On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol,
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging
lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in
fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation
and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was
written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife
translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas,
pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write
to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is
infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue: whether the act done was an exercise of Freedom of expression

Held: In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right to
freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an
absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not
"unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom. " So statutes against sedition have guaranty,
although they should not be interpreted so as to agitate for institutional changes

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress
thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is
not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to
martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not
on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot
apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only
President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas
people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On
this score alone the conviction could be upheld

2
 266. US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 3.

FACTS:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding
charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him
from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found
him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary
justice, instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court
denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of the
affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their
counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in
this case arose.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the
peace in Pampanga.
HELD:
Freedom of speech was nonexistent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform
made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of
speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine
Liberty when he wrote, “that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press
or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the American cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy.” It also said “the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include
the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion
will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would
be tyranny of the basest sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged
misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate
or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to
inquire into and punish them.”

3
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility
for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result
of this. Privilged communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public
policy is the “unfettered administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of
malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public official’s conduct having a
duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may cover
the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking
motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an
interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the
defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of
probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be
considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one
of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace
dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as
suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations
published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus
qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the
charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the
removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the
privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which
not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge
of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The
manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.

267. P. vs. Perez, 45 Phil. 599

FACTS: Isaac Perez while holding a discussion with several persons on political matters uttered the following
words "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a
bad thing for the Philippines.” Because of such utterances, he was charged in the CFI of Sorsogon with violation
of Art. 256 of the RPC which has something to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in
authority. He was convicted. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON Perez’s remarks is protected by the constitutional protection on freedom of speech. Or WON the
provisions of Act No. 292 should be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
HELD: No, it is not. Agreed with the lower court in its findings of facts but convicted the accused for violation

4
of Act No. 292 (Section 8).1

RATIO DECIDENDI: It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations
of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is
within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention
and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly
and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp.
2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra)

In this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended.
There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and
a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which
tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done
an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which
tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which
tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various
tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No.
292 as amended.

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government
of the United States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any statement, or
speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends
to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to
stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

268. Mercado vs. CFI, 116 SCRA 93

FACTS:
The relevant question in this suit is whether or not the landmark case of United States v.
Bustos, 1 enunciating the doctrine that the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution
constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a superior
complaining against the conduct of a subordinate, is impressed with significance. The information in this
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition proceeding to quash an information for libel quoted in full the
alleged offensive telegram.
the petitioner in this case filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group a complaint against
private respondent and her husband, a relation, accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was
carnapped. After due hearing, a resolution was issued recommending that said case be closed for lack of
evidence. Again, during the pendency of such administrative complaint, petitioner filed with the
Criminal Investigation Service, a complaint for corrupt practices against private respondent, likewise

5
found without support in the evidence submitted.

Held:
The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate
that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of petitioner. The prosecution should
be given the opportunity then of proving malice.
In the instant case the information alleges that the defendants, appellees here, wrote and sent the
subject letter to the President 'with malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and
impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of one Jose J. Monteclaro ... and with
malicious intent of exposing (him) to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without
any justifiable motive.'
Under the foregoing allegation, the prosecution is entitled to go to trial and present the necessary
evidence to prove malice; and the denial, to it of the opportunity to do so, upon the defendants' motion
to quash, constitutes reversible error." 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

269. Baguio Midland Courier vs. CA & Ramon Labo, Jr., 444 SCRA 28

Freedom of Expression; the public has the right to be informed on the mental, moral and physical
fitness of candidates for public office.
FACTS:
1. In the January 3, 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier (BMC), Cecille Afable, the Editor-in-
Chief, in her column “In and Out of Baguio” made the following comments: “Of all the candidates for
Mayor of Baguio City), Labo has the most imponderables about him. People would ask: “can he read
and write”? Why is he always talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanes Senator
or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18M aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an
advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his
account of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. We will accept all advertisements for him
if he pays his old account first.”

2. In the same column, Cecille Afable wrote the following comments in her January 10, 1988 column
at the Courier: “I heard that the ‘Dumpty in the Egg’ is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair. Some real
doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo because he has not also paid their medical services
with them. Since he is donating millions he should also settle his small debts like the reportedly
insignificant amount of P27,000 only. If he wins, several teachers were signifying to resign and leave
Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio.”

3. As a result of the above articles, Ramon Labor, Jr. filed a complaint for Damages before the
regional trial Court of Baguio City as he claimed said articles were libelous. He likewise filed a
separate criminal complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio but was dismissed;

4. Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice because he was allegedly described
as “Dumpty in the Egg” or one “who is a failure in his business” which is false because he is a very
successful businessman or to mean “zero or a big lie”; that he is a “balasubas” due to his alleged
failure to pay his medical expenses; The petitioners, however, were able to prove that Labo has an
unpaid obligation to the Courier in the amount of P27,415.00 for the ads placed by his campaigners
for the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections;

6
 The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, in its Decision dated June 14, 1990 dismissed Labo’s
complaint for damages on the ground that the article of petitioner Afable was privileged and
constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation and
honesty of private respondent Labo who was a candidate for Mayor of Baguio City; On January 7,
1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and ordered the petitioners to pay Ramon
Labo, Jr. damages in the total amount of P350,000.00 after concluding that the “Dumpty in the Egg”
refers to no one but Labo himself. Hence, the Petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Was Labo the “Dumpty in the Egg” described in the questioned article/
2. Were the articles subject of the case libelous or privileged/

HELD:

1. The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the “Dumpty in the Egg” in the questioned
article. This is so because the article stated that “The Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for Cortes”,
another candidate for mayor and opponent of Labo himself. It is unbelievable that Labo campaigned
for his opponent and against himself. Although such gracious attitude on the part of Labo would
have been commendable, it is contrary to common human experience. As pointed out by the
petitioners, had he done that, it is doubtful whether he could have won as City Mayor of Baguio in
the 1988 elections, which he actually did. In line with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. CA, 310 SCRA 1,
that ‘it is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed, but it must be shown that at least a 3rd person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication’, the case should be dismissed since Labo utterly failed to dispose of this
responsibility.

2. Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke “public interest” to justify the publication since
he was not yet a public official at that time. This argument is without merit since he was already a
candidate for City mayor of Baguio. As such, the article is still within the mantle of protection
guaranteed by the freedom of expression provided in the Constitution since it is the public’s right to
be informed of the mental, moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office. This was
recognized as early as the case of US VS. SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and the case of NEW YORK
TIMES VS. SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254 where the US Supreme Court held: “…it is of the utmost
consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their
suffrages. The importance to the State and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the
advantages derived so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private
persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals
must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from
publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion must
be privileged. “ Clearly, the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter of public
interest as it dealt with the character of the private respondent who was running for the top elective
post in Baguio City at that time.
270. LOPEZ VS. PEOPLE, GR No. 172203, February 14, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information dated March 31, 2003.

7
In the early part of November 2002, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private
respondent saw billboards with the printed phrase CADIZ FOREVER with a blank space before the word
NEVER directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena
streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City.
Some days later, private respondent received a phone call relating that the blank space preceding the
word NEVER was filled up with the added words BADING AND SAGAY. The next day, he saw the
billboards with the phrase CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER printed in full. Private
respondent filled a complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted in mental
anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. He thus prayed for damages.
Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things happening
around Cadiz City. He mentioned BADING because he was not in conformity with the many things the
mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention whatsoever of referring to Bading as
the Tuta of Sagay. He contended that it was private respondent who referred to Bading as Tuta of Sagay.
He further maintained that his personal belief and expression was that he will never love Bading and
Sagay. He concluded that the message in the billboards is just a wake-up call for Cadiz City.

Issue:
1.) Whether the court erred in holding that the words “cadiz forever bading and sagay never”
contained in the billboards show injurious nature of the imputation made against the private
respondent and tends to induce suspicion on his character, integrity, and reputation as
mayor of Cadiz city.
2.) Assuming without conceding that the phrase in the billboard are defamatory, did the CA
erre in not holding that they comprise fair commentary on matters of public interest which
are therefore privileged.

Held:
At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and are not reviewable by this Court, unless
the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:

1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and,
10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

Indeed, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC that all the elements of the crime of libel are present in this

8
case. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that both lower courts have greatly misapprehended the facts in
arriving at their unanimous conclusion. Hence, we are constrained to apply one of the exceptions specifically
paragraph 4 above, instead of the general rule.

Petitioner takes exception to the CAs ruling that the controversial phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER tends to induce suspicion on private respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor
of Cadiz City. He avers that there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on the
character, integrity and reputation of private respondent.

A libel is defined as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit
or contempt of a natural or judicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.” For an
imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:
a)it must be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be
identifiable.” Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of
libel.

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or
discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in
their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless
it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.[15] Moreover, [a] charge is sufficient if the words
are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they
were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to
hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.

On personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to

defamation. Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was not pleased with the
controvercial printed matter. But that is grossly insufficient to make it actionable by itself. “Personal
hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation,” “words
which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words f general abuse
however opprobrious, Ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not contitutte bases for
an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language
is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself,”.

And pursuant to Art. 361 of the RPC, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with
respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the
accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the imputation was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends.

In arriving at an analogous finding of guilt on petitioner, both lower courts heavily relied on the
testimony of the petitioner pertaining to the reasons behind the printing of the phrase “CADIZ FOREVER
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER.” Our in-depth scrutiny of his testimony, however, reveals that the reasons
elicited by the prosecution mainly relate to the discharge of private respondent’s official duties as City

9
Mayor of Cadiz City. For that matter, granting that the controversial phrase is considered defamatory,
still, no liability attaches on petitioner. Pursuant to Art. 361 of the RPC, if the defamatory statement is
made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the
truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will been titled to an acquittal even though he does not
prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. As the court held in
United States v. Bustos, the policy of a public official may be attacked, rightly or wrongly wih every
argument which ability can find or ingenuity invent. The public officer “may suffer under a hostile and
clear conscience. A public official must not be too thin skinned with reference to comments upon his
official acts

271. RE: PETITION FOR RADIO & TV COVERAGE OF THE

MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOV.
XALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., A.M. No. 10-15-5-SC, June 14, 2011;

On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners

were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao Touted as the worst
election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the
tragic incident which came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned
charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion against 197
accused Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. On November 19, 2010, the National Union of
Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network,
Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and
members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live television
and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed, recording devices
(e.g.,still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the
working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast
coverage and the use of devices. Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao
Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the
crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They
inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and
cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live
broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom
has been limited to onereporter for each media institution.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation on the exercise of the freedom of the
press.
HELD: No. The court ruled that there can be live broadcast by television and radio of
the trial court proceeding but subject to some guidelines which addressed also the
concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada. Furthermore, the court held “that the
impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate
all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate
10
enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the
general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent
limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy imperative of a transparent, open and public
trial.”

The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─

[a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned
and should not be treated as a means of entertainment so treat it deprives the court of
the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth
for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The observation that massive
intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and
destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to
the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom
of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by
less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of
court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the court room, the judicial officers,
the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings.
No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

272. DISINI VS. DOJ, February 18, 2014 , GR No. 203335 . .

FACTS
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for
conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory
statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the requirement
of “actual malice” as opposed to “presumed malice” as basis for conviction of libel.
RULING
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such
element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement
turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the
cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on
Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against
private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of

11
malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the
assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.

273. DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS. COMELEC, January 21, 2015

FACTS: The diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral
of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front
walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to
the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay”
with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according
to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified by the diocese as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it
form “Team Buhay”.

Election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list
groups with the following names and messages, particularly described as follows:

Material size : six feet (6’) by ten feet (10’)

Description : FULL COLOR TARPAULIN
Message : CONSCIENCE VOTE (ANTI RH) TEAM
BUHAY; (PRO RH) TEAM PATAY
Location : POSTED ON THE CHURCH VICINITY
OF THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD CITY

During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of
Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.
Navarra. Election officer ordered the tarpaulin's removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized.

On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin;
otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law
Department was silent on the... remedies available to petitioners. The letter provides as follows: Please
order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda material, otherwise, we shall be constrained to
file an election offense case against you.

Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this
case through this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order

They question respondents' notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013.This court, on
March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and
letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013. Respondents insist that petitioners should have first brought the
matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of its divisions

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens.

12
2. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental
right to freedom of expression.

First ISSUE: No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had
the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and
political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not
have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.

Second ISSUE: Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree
of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’
way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.

The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return
for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that
personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.

We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was its duty in this case. However, it
was misdirected. COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending
among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as
it strives to participate in the electoral exercise. The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature
of those who are running for public office. Their message may be construed generalizations of very complex
individuals and party-list organizations.

They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."
But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue — and a
complex piece of legislation at that — can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereo type the candidates and
party-list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in fact there are other
Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners.
Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider being more broad-minded and non-
judgmental. Some may have expected that the authors would give more space to practice forgiveness and
humility.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a
detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in
the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This can often be
expressed by dominant institutions, even religious ones. That they made their point dramatically and in a large way
does not necessarily mean that their statements are true, or that they have basis, or that they have been
expressed in good taste.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected
by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It
may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner’s actions
will have very real secular consequences. Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse
the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is
a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive content of the
right to suffrage.
This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected as a
fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners
deserves our protection.

13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby made
permanent. The act of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated
February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.

Freedom of the press, in general

Read:
274. PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 90878 ,
January 29, 1990

FACTS: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC
ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION” was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the
City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite
for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however,
reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989.

The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to
govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the “OVERVIEW” for the BAGUIO
MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned provision of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is not
violative of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather it is a valid
implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite
periods as enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is stated further by respondent that Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner from expressing
his views and/or from campaigning for or against the Organic Act. He may still express his views or
campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 19 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional

HELD: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the
power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for
the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end
that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor,
for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be
prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage

14
to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a
“columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is acandidate for any elective office is required to
take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It
cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the
voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence.

However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed
to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising
their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates.
In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 has no statutory basis.

Anent respondent Comelec’s argument that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely
bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act
because he may do so through the Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not
meritorious. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner’s freedom of expression, it is still a
restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction
of petitioner’s freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people’s right to be informed and to
be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite
should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee
full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions
in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

Read also:

275. In re: RAMON TULFO,March 19, 1990

Facts:
In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that the Supreme Court
rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he called the
Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo
was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Tulfo said that he was just
reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of harassmen in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant
illogical and unwise, and "bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been
decided and terminated, there was not contempts. Lastly, the article does not pose any clear and
present danger to the Supreme court.

Issue:
Whether or not Tulfo is in contempt.

15
Held:
Yes.
1. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon, and the
Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the CA.
2. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of ocurt is defiance of the
authority, justice and dignity of the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of
publications which can be punished for contempt:
a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit.
Tulfo's article constituted both.
3. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its object is only to degrade
and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained from them.
Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an excuse also, because at the end of his
article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he said he was not sorry for having written
the articles.
Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.

276. 1-a. In re: ATTY. EMIL JURADO, July 12, 1990

Facts:

Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the “Manila

Standard” describes himself as a columnist, who “incidentally happens to be a lawyer.” He had
been writing about alleged improperties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months
(from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or
comments on the same subject. At the same time, anonymous communications were being
extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the
courts. And all these were being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors of society.

The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on
August 27, 1992, in the so-called “controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the
Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo
E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the “Philippine Daily Inquirer” and one or two other
newspapers published, on January 28, 1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David
Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentleman, it appears, had been commissioned
by one of the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), to examine and
analyze the decision of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings
of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if the decision had been written,
in whole or in part, by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the Gutierrez decision “looks,
reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDT’s counsel,” Thus, he speaks of the “Magnificent
Seven,” by merely referring to undisclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the “Magnificent
Seven” in the Supreme Court, as some undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one; the

16
“Dirty Dozen,” as unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other cities. He adverts to an
anonymous group of justices and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party; and six
unnamed justices of this Court who reportedly spent a prepaid vacation in Hong Kong with their
families.

The Chief Justice issued an administrative order “Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to

Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary,” to investigate the said reports of corruption in
the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility, denying the allegations in
Jurado’s column. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with
in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an official
Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true.

Issue:

WON Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom to justify the published writings.

Held:

No. Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross
irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name
and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as
they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function.
By doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible
journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all times to maintain the
prestige and nobility of their calling.

Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right
of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made
with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.

Norms for Proper Exercise of Press Freedom

a. Constitutional Law Norms

The freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute
and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no
antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the

17
protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context
of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of
viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

. . . A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent

judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free
society.

The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that
freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their
independence is a free press. Mr. Justice. Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the
following terms:

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right
must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant
regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall
continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness.
But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty
in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise
of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for
the Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for
good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate
accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the court.

b. Civil Law Norms

The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right,
constitutional or otherwise, viz.: “ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.” The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of “abuse of rights,”
“one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of
law.”

277. 1-b. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

FACTS:
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano issued search warrants for the address of the Metropolitan Mail and We
Forum newspapers. Printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia and numerous papers and documents
were seized. The petitioners alleged that the action done was actually a suppression of press freedom and
that the search warrants were issued in violation of the constitution.

18
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the warrants were issued to supress the freedom of the press

HELD:
The consequence for the search and seizure of the closure of the address and it constitutes a
virtual denial of freedom to express in form of print. In point of fact, there was nothing subversive
published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which has been published in MALAYA
which has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken.

278. Coro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 448

FACTS:

On September 29, 1983, respondent Judge Esteban Lising (RTC) upon application filed by Lt.
Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued Search
Warrant authorizing the search and seizure of—

1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;

2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;

3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;

4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners;

5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video

machines and tapes

Which have been used and are being used as instrument and means of committing the crime of
inciting to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by PD 1835

On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return
documents/personal properties alleging among others that:

2. ... the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines, video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute
things as they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.

3. More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body of the crime has been rendered
moot and academic due to the findings of the Agrava Board that a military conspiracy was
responsible for the slaying of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 at the
Manila International Airport. The Agrava Board which has the exclusive jurisdiction to

19
determine the facts and circumstances behind the killing had virtually affirmed by evidence
testamentary and documentary the fact that soldiers killed Benigno Aquino, Jr.

4. More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, has dismissed said case against the accused on all
documents pertinent and more so as we repeat, rendered moot and academic by the recent
Agrava Report.

On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution, pertinent
portions of which state:

... The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution and they are not under
the control of the prosecuting arm of the government. Under these circumstances, the proper
forum from which the petition to withdraw the articles should be addressed, is the Office of the
City Fiscal, Quezon City and not with this Branch of the Court. It is to be further noted that it is
not even with this Branch of the Court that the offense of inciting to sedition is pending. Hence,
this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction and
restraining order to enjoin respondent from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case praying
(a) that Search Warrant issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and
void ab initio and that a mandatory injunction be issued directing respondents City Fiscal's
Office of Quezon City and Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio jointly and
severally to return immediately the documents/properties illegally seized from herein petitioner
and that final injunction be issued enjoining respondents City Fiscal's Office, Lt. Col. Castillo
and 1st Lt. Ignacio from utilizing said documents/properties as evidence in Criminal Case; and
(b) that respondent PC-CIS officers Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo Ignacio be
directed to reopen the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times at

Feb. 19, 1985, respondents were required to file their comment. The plea for temporary
restraining order was granted and respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col.
Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were enjoined from introducing as evidence for the
state the documents/properties seized under Search Warrant in Criminal Cage (Sedition case),
pending before the RTC effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the
Court.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that (1) the present action
is premature because petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent
Judge Lising's order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a
search warrant; (3) the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant; (4) a
search was conducted in an orderly manner; (5) the padlocking of the searched premises was
with the consent of petitioner's wife; (6) the findings of the Agrava Board is irrelevant to the
issue of the validity of the search warrant; (7) press freedom is not an issue; and, (8) the petition
is barred by laches.

There is merit in the petition.

Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
in question before coming to the court. This is not always so. When the questions raised before

20
the Supreme Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon by the
lower court, the filing of the motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be
instituted in the Supreme Court is no longer a pre-requisite. It was held before that (t)he rule
requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari
can be entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances. The
rule does not apply where; the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to due process taints
the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity.
This Court ruled that "it is only when questions are raised for the first time before the high court
in a certiorari case that the writ shall not issue, unless the lower court had first been given an
opportunity to pass upon the same." Furthermore, We held that "while as a matter of policy a
motion for reconsideration in the lower court has often been considered a condition sine qua non
for the granting of a writ of certiorari, this rule does not apply where the proceeding in which the
error occurred is a patent nullity or where 'the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right to due
process ... taints the proceeding against him in the court below not only with irregularity but with
nullity, or when special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action. ..." The records
of this petition clearly disclose that the issues herein raised have already been presented to and
passed upon by the court a quo.

ISSUE:
Whether freedom of press is an issue in this case?
HELD:
Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which
petitioner was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed. The consequence is, the printing
and publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, supra, We held that "[sluch closure is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental
law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This
state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even
militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry."

279. Babst vs. NIB, 132 SCRA 316

Facts: Arlene Babst, Odette Alcantara, Ceres P. Doyo, Jo-Ann Q. Maglipon, Domini Torrevillas-
Suarez, Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Cielo Buenaventura, Sylvia Mayuga, Sheila S. Coronel, et al. are
columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At different dates
since July 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have
subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Aside from the interrogations, a
criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tidier, Jr. on 9 February 1983 with
the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama,
and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in the 28 March 1982
issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by Brig. Gen. Wilfredo
Estrada (Ret.), Col. Renato Ecarma, NBI Asst. Director Ponciano Fernando, Col. Balbino Diego,
Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Eustaquio Peralta, et. al. The complaint included an staggering P10
million claim for damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.) On 3 March 1983, Babst, et. al.
21
filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, which was superseded by the amended
and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to prohibit the
respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation to Babst, et. al. and interrogating
them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of inquiry by the
National Intelligence Board (NIB).
Issue: Whether the issuance by the NIB of letters of invitation to Babst, et.al., their subsequent
interrogation, and the filing of libel suits against Suarez and Dayo, are illegal and
unconstitutional as they are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since
they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media.
Held: Prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against
Suarez and Doyo and similar suits that might be filed. The writ of prohibition is directed against
a tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not
pending before the NIB or any other respondent. Further, the issue of validity of the libel,
charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression, is a matter that should
be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the libel cases are pending or where
they may be filed. The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that
have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by the NIB, which
Babst, et. al. claim to have been illegally obtained. Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled
is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one among the officials has
the authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right
by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against Suarez and Doyo in
his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of the NIB. And the NIB does not
appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.

280. Elizalde vs. Gutierrez,76 SCRA 448

Facts:
Petitioners were prosecuted for libel because the Evening News carried in its issue of
September 1, 1967 a news item about Maggie dela rosa rape case, furnished it by the Philippine
News Service. It was a faithful and accurate summary of what was testified to by a witness in a
pending rape case. That was all. The name of the alleged offended party, Vincent Crisologo, was
repeatedly mentioned in such testimony. It would have been a plain and simple distortion
thereof if such a fact were omitted by the Philippine News Service.
“The alleged offending news item was a reproduction of a news item coming from the
Philippine News Service, furnished the Evening News, of which petitioners Manuel Elizalde and
Fred J. Elizalde were the Publisher and Assistant Publisher and Prudencio R. Europa was the
Editor-in-Chief. It reads thus: "Jaime Jose implicated Tuesday Vincent Crisologo, as among his
four companions the night of the alleged rape of a former nightclub hostess last year. Jose, one
of four principal accused in the celebrated Maggie de la Riva rape case, denied, however, the
charges of forcible abduction with rape and robbery filed against him and his
companions by Zenaida de la Cruz, and Araceli Sy, both nightclub hostesses.”
It summarized the testimony of Jaime Jose in a pending rape case wherein the name of
Vincent Crisologo, the offended party in the information for libel, was mentioned.

Held:

22
 A publication of a dispatch coming from the Philippine News Agency by the
sensationalist newspaper Evening News about the Maggie dela Riva rape case involving prominent
individuals is not libelous.
Courts must be careful not to unnecessarily prosecute members of the press if it
finds the prosecution to be baseless, they should immediately dismiss the case and not allow the
editor and publisher to be derailed from their work by being dragged into trial
In order that any intelligence point associating to a judicial proceeding will non be
actionable. The same must be [a] a true and just study of the existent proceedings; [B] must be
done in good religion; and (c) no remarks nor comments shall be made by the author

281. Policarpio vs. Manila Times, 5 SCRA 148

Facts:

Lumen Policarpio, executive secretary of UNESCO seeks to recover P150,000.00, as actual damages, P70,000, as
moral damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary damages, and P20,000, as attorney's fees, aside from the
costs, by reason of the publication in the Saturday Mirror of August 11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror of August 13,
1956, of two (2) articles or news items which are claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and false, and to have
exposed her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity, good name and business and official transactions, and caused
her grave embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental and physical anguish and incalculable material,
moral, professional and business damages. The defendants are The Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher
of The Saturday Mirror and The Daily Mirror, which are newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, and
Constante C. Roldan, Manuel V. Villa-Real, E. Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio Borje, as the reporter or author of the first
article and the managing editor, the associate editor and the news editor, respectively, of said newspapers. Lumen
was a member of the bar and was charged by Herminia Reyes for estafa thru falsification and Malversation of
funds. Three different publication was publish by the said Publication and the last was :

The title of the article of August 11, 1956 — "WOMAN OFFICIAL SUED" — was given prominence with a 6-column
(about 11 inches) banner headline of one-inch types. Admittedly, its sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO PIO ON
FRAUD" — printed in bold one-centimeter types, is not true. Similarly, the statement in the first paragraph of the
article, to the effect that plaintiff "was charged with malversation and estafa in complaints filed with the city
fiscal's office by the Presidential Complaint and Action Commission" — otherwise known as PCAC — is untrue, the
complaints for said offenses having been filed by Miss Reyes. Neither is it true that said "criminal action was
initiated as a result of current administrative, investigation", as stated in the second paragraph of the same article.

Lumen alleged that such publication was to give general impression.

Whether or not such publication is libelous
Ruling: yes

aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article published on August 11, 1956, presented
her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true
report of the proceedings there in alluded to. What is more, its sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD"
— is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said article
are "presumed to be malicious".

Then too, how could defendants claim to have acted with good intentions or justifiable motive in falsely stating
that the complaints had been filed with the Office of the City Fiscal by the PCAC as a result of the administrative

23
investigation of Col. Alba? Either they knew the truth about it or they did not know it. If they did, then the
publication would be actually malicious. If they did not or if they acted under a misapprehension of the facts, they
were guilty of negligence in making said statement, for the consequences of which they are liable solidarily

We note that the news item published on August 13, 1956, rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the first
article, by stating that neither Col. Alba nor the PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's
office. It, likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But, this rectification or
clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article, although it may
and should mitigate it

282. Lopez vs. CA, 34 SCRA 116

FACTS: In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila
Chronicle, of which petitioner Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story
of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz, sending a distress signal to
a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. An American
Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an emergency-sustenance kit containing, among
other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in
the place were living in terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955.
Losing no time, the Philippines defense establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout
rangers. Upon arriving Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man
named Fidel Cruz who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major
Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," the report of respondent.

This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article
to it in its issue of January 15, 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz’ story turned out to
be false it brought attention to the government that people in that most people in the area are sick
sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce.

The magazine carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the
pictures that were published were that of private respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman
contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of respondent Cruz and
that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle but when
the news quiz format was prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched. However
a correction was published immediately.

Respondent sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages
alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture. Defense interposed that
they are beating the deadline. The court ruled in his favor. Hence the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioners abused the freedom of the press.

HELD: No. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, found for plaintiff, but with reduced damages,
since the error in this case could have been checked considering that this was a weekly magazine
and not a daily. The ruling: "there is no evidence in the record to prove that the publication of the
news item under consideration was prompted by personal ill will or spite, or that there was
intention to do harm,' and that on the other hand there was 'an honest and high sense of duty to
serve the best interests of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none.'
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider

24
that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the
freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable
them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the
preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and
consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

“No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what
otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or a defamatory
imputation resulting from the publication of respondent's picture with the offensive caption as in
the case here complained of. This is merely to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press
enjoys.”

283. New York Times vs. Sullivan,376 U.S.254

Facts: The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed
that he was defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The advertisement was
entitled, “Heed Their Rising Voices” and it charged in part that an unprecedented wave of terror
had been directed against those who participated in the civil rights movement in the South.
Some of the particulars of the advertisement were false. Although the advertisement did not
mention the Plaintiff by name, he claimed that it referred to him indirectly because he had
oversight responsibility of the police. The Defendant claimed that it authorized publication of the
advertisement because it did not have any reason to believe that its contents were false. There
was no independent effort to check its accuracy. The Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant
retract the advertisement. The Defendant was puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought the
advertisement reflected adversely on him. The jury found the ad libe
lous per se and actionable without proof of malice. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000 in
damages. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. The Defendant appealed.

Issue: Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an advertisement, which criticized a
public official’s official conduct?
Held: No. Reversed and remanded.
* Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are required by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution) in a libel action brought by a public
official against critics of his official conduct.
* Under Alabama law, a publication is libelous per se if the words tend to injure a person in his
reputation or to bring him into public contempt. The jury must find that the words were published
of and concerning the plaintiff. Once libel per se has been established, the defendant has no
defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their
particulars.
* Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and it must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the breathing space that the need to survive.
* The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
* The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) holds that the Constitution delimits
a State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of

25
their official conduct. In this case, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable.
* The Defendant’s failure to retract the advertisement upon the Plaintiff’s demand is not
adequate evidence of malice for constitutional purposes. Likewise, it is not adequate evidence
of malice that the Defendant failed to check the advertisements accuracy against the news
stories in the Defendant’s own files. Also, the evidence was constitutionally defective in another
respect: it was incapable of supporting the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements
were made of and concerning the Plaintiff.
Concurrence. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution do not merely “delimit” a State’s power to award damages, but completely
prohibit a State from exercising such a power. The Defendant had an absolute, unconditional
right to publish criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials.

284. Liwayway Publishing vs. PCGG, April 15,1988

FACTS:
The Commission had issued on February 12, 1987 two writs of sequestration, one
addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Automotive sequestering the
President/Chairman's shares of stocks in the Liwayway as of April 15, 1986, and the other
addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of Liwayway sequestering all shares of stocks
pertaining to U.S. Automotive in Liwayway Publishing, Inc. as of April 15, 1986. Petitioners' plea
for a temporary restraining order was heard on February 26, 1987, the hearing being limited to
whether a restraining order should issue to restrain the commission against denying Liwayway the
use and availment of its funds in the banks to put out its regular publications as well as against the
Commission's interference or intervention in the management or operations of Liwayway,
considering the Central Bank's blanket memorandum, at the Commission's behest, to all banks not
to allow any withdrawals or remittances from its funds, except for "payment of regular salaries
and wages" which would virtually shut down its publications.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is freedom of the press

RULING:

This Resolution is issued to uphold the freedom of our press institutions to independently
manage their affairs and effectively preserve their editorial policies and objectives, without the
shadow of government participation and intervention. The Commission itself has recognized that
government presence in petitioner's Board will most certainly cast that shadow and threaten the
independence of the press which is protected and guaranteed by the Constitution, As per agreement
of the parties as set forth in the Resolution of March 3, 1987, enjoining the Commission from any
act interfering or intervening in any way or manner with the management or operations or affirms
of petitioner Liwayway Publishing, Inc.; and Dismissing the petition for a writ of prohibition to
enjoin respondents from enforcing in any manner the writs of sequestration heretofore issued over
the questioned Liwayway shares whose ownership will have to be tried and determined in the
Sandiganbayan.

26
 3. Freedom of expression in general
Read:

285. FORTUN VS. QUINSAYAS , GR No. 194578, February, 2013

Atty. Fortun is the counsel for the Ampatuans, the principal accused in the Maguindanao Massacre.
Atty. Quinsayas filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun for misleading the prosecution
and trial court under the rules and muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the
main subject matter of the case.
Atty. Fortun filed an indirect contempt against Atty. Quinsayas and the media group for active
dissemination of the details of the disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court on confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.
The media group denied the posting and publication of the articles about the disbarment complaint.
It would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the
disbarment complaint to the members of the media.
It came out before the disbarment complaint was actually filed. They alleged that the news article
on the disbarment complaint is a qualified privileged communication. They alleged that the article
was a true, fair, and accurate report on the disbarment complaint. The article was straightforward,
truthful, and accurate, without any comments from the author. They alleged that Punay reported
the plan of Mangudadatu, et al. to file the disbarment complaint against petitioner as it involved
public interest and he perceived it to be a newsworthy subject. They further alleged that assuming
the news article is not a privileged communication, it is covered by the protection of the freedom
of expression, speech, and of the press under the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Quinsayas’s disclosure of disbarment complaint is covered by the
freedom of expression provide by the Constitution.
Held: Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
The Court explained the purpose of the rule, as follows:

x x x. The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free from
any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional
reputation of attorneys and judges from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and
irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the press from publishing administrative cases
or portions thereto without authority. We have ruled that malicious and unauthorized publication
or verbatim reproduction of administrative complaints against lawyers in newspapers by editors
and/or reporters may be actionable. Such premature publication constitutes a contempt of court,
punishable by either a fine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the Court.
In People v. Castelo, the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and that the principle of
privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The Court ruled:
While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for both
constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by our

27
Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other. The
same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the press or freedom
of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications can also be invoked
in favor of appellant.
The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech." As a general rule, disbarment
proceedings are confidential in nature until their final resolution and the final decision of this
Court. In this case, however, the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter
of public concern considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of
the public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and participation as defense
counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in the disbarment complaint
relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the Maguindanao Massacre case.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court is not a restriction on the freedom of the press. If
there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate
news report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a
disbarment complaint, members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment
proceedings during its pendency. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers must still remain
private and confidential until their final determination. Only the final order of this Court shall be
published like its decisions in other cases.
Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant
in the disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court,
Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.

286. Adiong vs. Comelec, March 31, 1992

FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution

No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other
election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following are lawful
election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and
stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:…
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary,
except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…

28
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11,
1992 elections assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits
the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other
moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic
Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of
decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their
location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15
(a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and
stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL
and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in
designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void
on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by
the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the
political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince
others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and
as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to
where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it
encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so
loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the
privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this
prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would
be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law.
(The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation
but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of
29
justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally
convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a
poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their
candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section
1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private
vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on
cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the
consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen
becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial
resources of the candidate.
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”
places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.

287. National Press Club vs. Comelec, March 5, 1992. Real also the
dissenting and separate opinions of the justices.

Facts:
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship,
because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only
publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during
the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media’s role,
function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant
to election issues.
Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and
that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing
in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts,
would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to
information and opinion.
The statutory text that petitioners ask to strike down as unconstitutional is that of Section 11 (b)
of Republic Act No. 6646, known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:

30
“Sec. 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – In addition to the forms of election
propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, it shall be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
881.b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass media, or any
person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for
campaign or other political purposes except to the Commission as provided under Section 90 and
92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave of absence from
his work as such during the campaign period.”

Issue: Whether Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 is valid/constitutional

Held: Yes.
It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of
speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be
taken in conjunction with Article IX(C)(4) which may be seen to be a special provision
applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., “during the election period.” It is difficult to
overemphasize the special importance of the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press in a democratic polity, in particular when they relate to the purity and integrity of
the electoral process itself, the process by which the people identify those who shall have
governance over them. Thus, it is frequently said that these rights are accorded a preferred status
in our constitutional hierarchy. Withal, the rights of free speech and free press are not
unlimited rights for they are not the only important and relevant values even in the most
democratic of polities. In our own society, equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public
office, without regard to the level of financial resources that one may have at one’s disposal, is
clearly an important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II,
Section 26 of the Constitution is the egalitarian demand that “the State shall guarantee equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law.”
The essential question is whether or not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions
constitute a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the operations of
communication and information enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has
gone beyond permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute
unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers
that Section 11 (b) has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation
of media operations during election periods.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass media of
the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and reasonable
connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C)(4) and Article II (26) of
the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and
television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a
crucial difference. Here lies the core problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates
with deep pockets and the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C)(4) of the
Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism which Section 11
(b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to bring about or promote equal

31
opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and sundry about
themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.

(In relation to PRIOR RESTRAINT, the concept is found in the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Cruz)
But the most important objection to Section 11(b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the
dissemination of ideas. In a word, it is censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and
no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be
so rash as to disobey. In his “Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,” Milton deplored
the impossibility of finding a man base enough to accept the office of censor and at the same
time good enough to perform its duties. Yet a pretender to that meddler is in our midst today,
smugly brandishing the threat of this miserable law.
One could perhaps concede some permissible instances of censorship, as where private mail is
screened during wartime to prevent deliberate or unwitting disclosure of sensitive or classified
matters that might prejudice the national security or where, to take a famous example, a person is
prohibited from shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. But these exceptions merely make and
bolster the rule that there should be no prior restraint upon a person’s right to express his ideas
on any subject of public interest. The rule applies whether the censorship be in the form of
outright prohibition, as in the cases before us, or in more subtle forms like the imposition of a tax
upon periodicals exceeding a prescribed maximum number of copies per issue or allowing the
circulation of books only if they are judged to be fit for minors, thus reducing the reading tastes
of adults to the level of juvenile morality.
I remind the Court of the doctrine announced in Bantam Books v. Sullivan that “any system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
validity.” That presumption has not been refuted in the cases sub judice. On the contrary, the
challenged provision appears quite clearly to be invalid on its face because of its undisguised
attempt at censorship. The feeble effort to justify it in the name of social justice and clean
elections cannot prevail over the self-evident fact that what we have here is an illegal intent to
suppress free speech by denying access to the mass media as the most convenient instruments for
the molding of public opinion. And it does not matter that the use of these facilities may involve
financial transactions, for the element of the commercial does not remove them from the
protection of the Constitution.

288. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan , GR No. 7960-707 & Zaldivar

vs.
Gonzales, GR No. 80578, February 1, 1989

FACTS:
Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who

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was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases
under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and
Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he
filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the
Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in
effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless
upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders.
Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then
ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in
the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled
to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into
error.

ISSUE:
Are lawyers entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech towards the
Court?

RULING:
His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their
oath of office. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through
the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom
of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance
of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona
fide. In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the
Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the
practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately.

289.Eastern Broadcasting vs. Dans,137 SCRA 628

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on grounds
of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. Petitioner, DYRE
contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to establish factual evidence for the
closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court
could even promulgate a decision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene
Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner,
Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and
academic, (because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme

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Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals in matters as this case.
Issue: Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of
Expression.
Resolution:
The closure of the radio station is likewise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast are entitled to
this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is
the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to
create this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio
and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The
freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The
people continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to
have the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore,
broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

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