THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED IN SAGA NEWSLETTER

123, APRIL 2010 WITH THE TITLE ‘MACEDONIAN ART OF WAR’, PP. 30-
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PUBLISHED HERE WITH REFERENCES IN PARENTHESES TO THE
PAGE NUMBERS IN THE SAGA NEWSLETTER. I HAVE ALSO
INCLUDED SOME ADDITIONAL COMMENTS IN PARENTHESES
WRITTEN TODAY. ALL PHOTOS (SHOT BY THE AUTHOR) ARE FROM
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ETC. ARE BY AUTHOR UNLESS STATED OTHERWISE.

THE INTENTION HAS BEEN TO MAKE THESE HARD TO OBTAIN SAGA

ARTICLES MORE WIDELY AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC.

I APOLOGIZE FOR ANY POSSIBLE MISTAKES IN MY ENGLISH AS THIS

IS THE NON-EDITED VERSION (I HAVE CORRECTED A COUPLE OF
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ANY COMMENTS REGARDING THE ARTICLE ARE WELCOME. I WILL

PROBABLY RETURN TO THE TOPIC AT SOME LATER DATE AND
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KANGASALA ON SEPTEMBER 25, 2013

ILKKA SYVANNE

E-MAIL: ISYVANNE (ÄT) YAHOO.COM

© ILKKA SYVANNE (SYVÄNNE/SYVAENNE)

 MACEDONIAN ART OF WAR
THE BALKANS 335, THE GRANICUS RIVER 334 BC, AND GAUGAMELA
331 BC

by Dr. Ilkka Syvanne

THIS PHOTO WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ARTICLE

Copyright © Ilkka Syvanne

2
THE PHOTOS OF THE COINS (BRITISH MUSEUM BY AUTHOR) WERE NOT INCLUDED IN
THE ARTICLE, BUT THE RELIEF OF THE GREEK PHALANX WAS ON P. 93.

3
 [SAGA P. 30] MACEDONIAN ART OF WAR
THE BALKANS 335, THE GRANICUS RIVER 334 BC, AND GAUGAMELA 331 BC

by Dr. Ilkka Syvanne

[Saga p.31]“All battles are decided either because of the strength [or otherwise] of our forces in heavy infantry or in
cavalry, or because of the superiority of our forces in tens of thousands or thousands, or because of the morale of the
men, or on account of their physical strength, or because of their training, or because of the skillfulness [or otherwise]
of the tactical deployment, or because of the terrain, or because of the suitability of the time.”
Aelian, Tactica (Headings, Preface 3, Laur. folio 145v), Tr. by Devine (1989b), p.43.

The aim of this article is to compliment my presentation of the Battle of the Granicus River in 334 at
the Historicon 2010. It aims to show some aspects of the Macedonian tactics that have hitherto not been
given adequate attention. It should be noted, though, that the following contains some tentative suggestions
and conclusions, and that I will return to the topic in other research papers, articles and detailed studies. I
will then also pay more attention to the campaigns, logistics, strategy, diplomacy, counter insurgency (e.g. in
Bactria), strategies of occupation etc. that I have purposefully left out here. The article begins with a short
description of the extant sources and then moves on to the description of the opposing armies, and ends with
descriptions of the battles.

1. The Major Narrative Sources

Unfortunately, we no longer possess the original written histories of Alexander’s exploits except in
fragments. Consequently, for the most part we have to rely on later historians who have used earlier authors
as their sources. The documentary evidence is also very sparse. In addition, we do not possess anything that
could be regarded of any real historical value from the Persian side.
The major extant sources can be divided into two groups: 1) the popular tradition known as the
Alexander Vulgate (Diodorus of Sicily, Pompeius Trogus/Justin, Quintus Curtius Rufus, part of Plutarch,
Alexander Romance); 2) the apologetic tradition (Arrian, Itinerary of Alexander). For additional
information, see the secondary literature in the bibliography.
Despite the fact that some of the authors preserve information that is hostile towards Alexander, the
picture that emerges from the extant sources is still one that stresses too much the personal exploits of
Alexander, his elite units and the rest of the Macedonians at the expense of the allied Greek forces. In fact,
in the following account I hope to correct this bias that has even found its way to modern historiography.
[p.32] One can also add to these the bits and pieces of information provided by the collections of
military stratagems (Polyaenus, Frontinus) or other collections (Aelian, Valerius Maximus), but these are
useful only in places. In addition, there are also military treatises (Asclepiodotus, Aelian, Arrian, and a
number of later Byzantine treatises that preserve bits and pieces of earlier information) that describe the
Hellenistic/Macedonian military system in some detail. These are actually quite useful when read with
critical eye, and form the basis of the following reinterpretation of the tactics. Even though Polybius wrote
about 170 years after Alexander’s death, he also preserves some very important observations regarding
Greek, Macedonian and Persian tactical systems not to be found anywhere else.

4
2. The Armies

2.1.TheMacedonians1

Basic Organization
The Kingdom Alexander the Great inherited from his father was a complex conglomeration of
different elements. At the very core were the Kingdom of Macedonia and its Royal Army, but even
Macedonia was far from united. The king had to rule with the consent of the regional nobility that was not
fully pacified. Macedonia was also surrounded vassal princedoms of Paeonians, Agrianians, Triballians,
Oddrysians, and Illyrians all of which were required to contribute contingents to the Macedonian army.
Alexander was also archon (leader/president) of Thessalian League and therefore the commander of the
Thessalian army. To make matters even more complicated, Alexander was also the head of the League of
Corinth, which was a creation of Philip and Alexander into which they had forced most of the Greek city
states. What Philip and Alexander needed was an enemy to unite the disparate elements for a common
cause. This was to be a war of revenge against Persia. It not only served to unite the peoples, but it also
removed the most dangerous elements (i.e. the soldiers and warriors) away from their homes, where they
could have caused trouble. In addition, the Macedonian king needed a justification for the diverse positions
he held. He needed to prove himself on the battlefield, and he needed money to pay his men. Alexander was
also a risk-taker. He loaned all the money he could and hired all the mercenaries he could afford, because he
also needed the numbers in order to be able to fight against the mighty Persian Empire.
[p.33] The Macedonian army and state was run from the royal court. The court consisted of about 100
courtiers called “Personal Companions” (hoi amf’auton hetairoi) or simply “Companions” (hetairoi), and
naturally of the king himself. These Companions are not to be confused with the Companion Cavalry
(hetairoi). When Alexander appointed a Companion to a command of a unit or addressed a council of
Companions it meant the courtiers. It is also possible that they, or the most intimate Companions, were
called with the name “Friends” (philoi) just like they were during the Hellenistic era. As their name implies,
the Personal Companions fought alongside their king in the Royal Cavalry Squadron (ilê) of the Companion
cavalry. The king was assisted by a council consisting of the Friends, seven Personal Bodyguards, and of the
most significant military commanders. Notably, each of the councilors had a freedom of speech. Twice a
year (before and after campaign) or when needed the king (or caretaker) also called an assembly of citizen-
soldiers to acclaim the new king, or to obtain its jurisdiction in cases of capital trials, or to obtain its support
for the matters already discusses in council (i.e. to get the army on board).
The exact organization of the sômatofylakes is a contested issue among the historians. What we know,
however, is that there were seven higher ranking Royal Bodyguards each of which was called sômatofylax
basilikos (equivalent of archisômatofylax of Hellenistic armies) until Peucestas was named honorary

1
Excluding the tactical sections the following account is based especially on Sekunda (2004), and English. The
following also contain valuable analyses of the Macedonian military: Heckel (summarizes the info well); Bosworth
(esp. 259ff.); Hammond (scattered info); Fuller (still valuable); Lonsdale (a good analysis of the reasons of Alexander’s
successes including the army); Head. Of these, even if I do not always agree on details, I have found most useful the
overview of the Macedonian army by Sekunda, and most of the following organizational info is based on his analysis.

5
bodyguard as a mark of gratitude for saving Alexander’s life. The Royal Bodyguards also served as staff
officers from which they could be appointed to temporary commands in the army. The actual Bodyguards
seem to have consisted of young adult nobles, and the unit appears to have acted as a sort of officer training
corps from which the nobles were transferred to field commands. I would also suggest that we should
identify the mass of Bodyguards with the ilê Basilike (Royal Squadron) some of whom as bodyguards of the
king always accompanied him wherever he went both on horseback or dismounted.
The Macedonian units were recruited on a regional basis so that each local noble had command over
his own people. In other words, despite all the professionalism of the Macedonian army, its core
organization was feudal. Alexander was also in the habit of creating special commands/corpses for which he
appointed general from among his entourage. Such a commander not only had command of this special
command, but also usually retained command of his own unit.
The king had a secretariat consisting of several sections to assist him the governance of the court,
Empire, and the army. Each section was placed under a Royal Secretary (grammateus basilikos), the most
important being the position of the Army Secretary. [p.34] Eumenes of Cardia2, who served in this position,
was also called with the title Chief Secretary (archigrammateus). The Army Secretariat was divided into
several sections each under a Secretary (grammateus) who were assisted by Inspectors (episkopoi). The
Secretariat was responsible for the keeping of muster-rolls and conduct sheets, and for the procurement and
distribution of equipment, and for payments and supplying of the troops3.
As a result of Philip’s long campaigns Alexander had at his disposal about 30,000 veteran infantry and
slightly over 3,000 cavalry. In addition to these came whatever could be assembled together by levying
Macedonians and by ordering the allies to contribute reinforcements and by hiring as many mercenaries as
the treasury allowed. In 334 BC this meant that with allies and mercenaries Alexander had at his disposal
30,000-43,000 infantry and 4,000-5,500 cavalry to face the Persians in Asia Minor while his regent Antipater
had 12,000 phalangites and 1,500 cavalry in Macedonia in addition to which he could levy additional troops,
hire mercenaries, and ask the allies to contribute men.
The military manuals depicting the Macedonian military system (and references in histories) dating
from the Roman and Byzantine periods allow the tentative reconstruction of the Macedonian military
organization at the time of Alexander the Great. The most significant problem from the point of view of
reconstruction is that all of these treatises depict the Hellenistic military system as it was after the reforms of
Antiochos III who introduced cataphracts into the military. Consequently, we need to take into account the
changes that Alexander had himself introduced after 330 BC and the changes introduced by his successors.
According to these military treatises, the armed forces consisted of the land and naval forces (sea or
rivers). The majority of these consisted of fighters who were supported by non-combatants like surgeons and
servants. The land forces consisted of infantry (phalangites/hoplites, peltasts, and psiloi light infantry) and
of mounted troops (cavalry, elephants, chariots). At the beginning of his reign Alexander’s army included all
of these except the elephants and chariots.

2
One of the most important players during the Wars of the Successors for which see: esp. Devine 1985b-c; Bennett &
Roberts 1-2; Billows; Anson.
3
For the supplying of Alexander’s army, see esp. Engels.

6
 The army operated by using various forms of phalanx tactics. The treatises divide the infantry into
16,384 men heavy infantry, 8,192 men light infantry, and 4,096 cavalry making altogether 28,672 fighting
men. This division appears to reflect the approximate ideal army structure towards the very end of
Alexander’s reign. At the beginning of his [p.35] reign, Alexander had to improvise. While he needed
sizable forces to face the might of Persia, he also needed to leave a sizable force behind to keep the Greeks
and other neighbors pacified. Consequently, he took only those forces with him that he could spare, which
meant that he had to adapt the structures to meet the realities.

Infantry
According to the treatises, the heavy infantry (hoplites) consisted of the “Macedonian” type of infantry
who were equipped with linen armor (or chain mail/scale or breastplate or mixed armor), helmet, large round
bronze shield (diameter 78 or 97.5 cm?)4, shin and arm guards, a sword (single-edged machaira/kopis or
double-edged xifos), and with a short spear (2.5 m or 3.74 m?) and long sarisa/sarissa-spear (6.6 m?). The
peltasts were otherwise similarly equipped but carried smaller peltê-shield (diameter 47 or 59-61 cm5),
lighter armor, and shorter spear (3.74 m?) instead of the sarissa or two javelins. The peltasts were
considered part of the light infantry in military theory. The actual light infantry (psiloi) consisted of the
archers, javelin-throwers, and of the slingers. They light infantry could have shields, but they did not usually
wear any armor.6 The list of equipment (a “short” spear and sarissa) given by Dio, Herodian and Sylloge
Tacticorum for the phalangite explains why there has been so much confusion regarding the equipment of
the Macedonian infantry during the reign of Alexander. Notably, unless Diodorus (17.11.3-4) has mistaken
the tactics of his day with Alexander’s, his claim that the Macedonian phalangites first threw their missiles
and then engaged the Thebans with swords in 334 proves the use of spears/javelins. Indeed, as has often
been suggested Alexander’s phalangites (esp. hypaspists) could vary the type of spear according to the needs
of the situation. This explains why his phalangites were able to operate so well [p.36] in difficult terrain.7 It
is possible that this practice was later abandoned as a result of which the phalanx became less maneuverable.
Alexander employed all of the above types of troops: the Macedonian phalangites;
hypaspists/hypaspistai (the use of aspis as part of the name may imply the use of the larger hoplon-shield)
who fought as phalangites in battles, but may have usually carried lighter equipment in difficult terrain (note

4
According to Everson (178), the surviving infantry shields have a diameter of c.65-75 cm, which points to the
probability that the lower figure would be closer to the truth.
5
The latter option seems more likely since it would have been impossible to form locked shields array with the former.
6
Synthesis of the following: Asclepiodotus; Aelian; Arrian; Dio 78.7.1-8.3, 78.18.1; Herodian, 4.8.1-3, 4.9.4; Sylloge
Tacticorum 30 (early 10th century) with the units of measurements taken from Dawson. Dawson’s article of the
Byzantine measurements is highly recommended. I have here adopted the lower to middle range of the suggested
measurements. In about 215 AD the Roman Emperor Caracalla (Dio 78.7.1-8.3, 78.18.1; Herodian, 4.8.1-3, 4.9.4)
recreated the 16,000 (i.e. 16384) men Macedonian phalanx and its supporting Greek mercenary phalanx (“Spartan
phalanx/lochos or Laconian lochos, or Pitanean lochos”). The list of equipment given by Dio and Herodian indicates
that at least according to the opinion of Caracalla each of Alexander’s phalangites was equipped with a helmet of ox-
hide, three-ply linen breastplate, a bronze shield, long pike, short spear, crepidae high boots/calf-boot, and a xifos-
sword. Caracalla was also similarly dressed or wore the kausia (Macedonian beret). Neither Dio nor Herodian gives
any description of the equipment of the Laconians, but it must have consisted of the hoplite equipment or of the peltast
equipment.
7
For additional information regarding the Macedonian infantry, I recommend that the readers would consult the works
of Heckel, English, and Sekunda.

7
for example that the king of the Agrianians had peltastai!); Macedonian archers (and slingers?); Greek
hoplites/peltasts8; mercenary peltasts/peltastai; mercenary archers and slingers.
At the beginning of Alexander’s reign the phalangites consisted mostly of the native Macedonians
who were usually deployed in 8 or 16 or 32 deep phalanxes. Unless otherwise stated, the terms in the
following list are taken from the military treatises and do not correspond with the terms of Alexander’s day.
The 16 men file, called lochos under a lochagos, consisted of two former dekania each apparently under a
dekadarchos/dekarchos9. In truth, the ten men dekarchia always consisted of eight fighting men (the last of
whom was the file-closer ouragos) in addition to which came one spare fighter who was assigned to guard
the baggage and one servant. The lochagos was basically the senior of the two dekarchoi. The two eight
men groups were united into the 16 men file by placing the senior dekarchos/lochagos in the front rank, the
junior dekarchos in the second rank and so forth so that every other was called either front rank or rear rank
man. For pitched battles in the open the phalangites were armed with the sarissa so that the spearheads of the
first five ranks protruded outside the formation while the rest held them slanted forward to protect that array
from missiles (see Diagram 1). The 16,384 men phalangite formation appears to have followed the basic
structure presented in the military treatises consisting of units with the following names: 8192 men
diphalangarchia or meros (division) or keras (wing) under kerarchês; 4096 men phalangarchia under
phalangarchês; 2048 men merarchia under merarchês; (at this place during Alexander’s day there was a unit
called taxis with 1,536 men) 1024 men chiliarchia under chiliarchês; 512 men pentekosiarchia under
pentekosiarchês; 256 men syntagma/xenagia (called lochos under lochagos in Alexander’s time) under
syntagmatarchês (plus 5 supernumeraries: a standard-bearer, file-closer, trumpeter, aide, and herald); 128
men taxis under taxiarchos/hekatontarchês; 64 men tetrarchia [p.37] under tetrarchês; 32 men dilochia
under dilochitês or dimoiria under dimoiritês; 16 men file called lochos under lochagos; and of the 8 men
dekarchia/dekania under dekarchos.10

DIAGRAM 1

The structure of the light infantry was similar except that its maximum depth was eight men and its
units and commanders had different names and the maximum number of men was 8,192. The light infantry

8
See the discussion of Iphicrates’ reforms in the chapter on Persian Army.
9
See my discussion of the meaning of the kontoubernion/dekarchy in the Strategikon in Saga (sent to the editor in early
spring with the title A Note on the Meaning of Kontoubernion and therefore due to appear at some point in time in a
suitable issue).
10
For additional info of the Macedonian infantryman during Alexander’s reign, see Heckel & Jones. The reader should
beware that my views differ form theirs in places.

8
was placed either behind, in front, between, or on the flanks of the phalanx as needed. It should be noted that
when the peltasts or hypaspists were armed with spears they were part of the heavy infantry phalanx even if
they were in theory considered as light infantry.
Despite the fact that the basic structure followed the above principles, the names of Alexander’s units
were often different and for most of his reign Alexander used improvised structures based either on territorial
commands so that local baron/lord commanded his own troops or on the needs of the moment that often
reflected the availability of troops for specific missions. Consequently, in 334 Alexander divided his 9,000
(9216 plus 54 officers and 180 supernumeraries) phalangites/pezetairoi/pezhetairoi (Foot Companions) into
six taxeis (each 3 x 512 = 1536 + 9 officers + 30 supernumeraries) each under its own local lord/baron. In
addition, the 3,000 (3 x 1,024 = 3,072 + 18 officers + 60 supernumeraries) elite hypaspistai (three
chiliarchies of which one was the agêma bodyguards) who formed Alexander’s infantry “bodyguards” were
all put under one commander. In addition, Alexander was in the habit of creating larger temporary or semi-
permanent commands so that there could be separate commanders for the wings, center, and for various
smaller or larger detachments. In addition, the fact that Alexander used a heterogeneous force which
included foreign allies and mercenaries who [p.38] fought in their own units according to their own military
practices, the unit sizes and types of troops could vary greatly.

Cavalry
The cavalry consisted of various different types of troops. The following Diagram 2 is based on
Arrian’s classification with additions, and it represents the division of types of troops as these stood at the
turn of the third century BC into which Arrian has added a classification of the Roman cavalry. At the
beginning of the Persian campaign Alexander’s cavalry included the xystoforoi (Companions and possibly
the Thessalians if they had stopped using javelins and adopted the xyston), sarissoforoi/doratoforoi
(Prodromoi, Paeonians?, Thracians/Odrysians?), lonchoforoi (Greek allies and mercenaries, and possibly the
Thessalians, if they had not adopted the xyston), and may also have included Tarentines and other javelin-
throwers among the mercenary cavalry. The hetairoi were equipped with linen or iron armor, Boeotian
helmet, the long xyston-spear, xifos-sword, and calf-boots11. Diodorus’ (17.20.3ff., 17.60.2) and Plutarch’s
(Alexander 16.5) and Arrian’s (1.2.6, 1.5.5-6) accounts suggest the possibility that Alexander, his
somatofylakes (ilê Basilike), and the hetairoi may also have carried shields and javelins. It has been
suggested that the shield may have been the one Alexander took from Ilium and conversely that the use of
the shield in Diodorus is a later addition, because the extant period works of art (Pompeii painting,
Alexander Sarcophagus) depict Alexander without shield. The question is unsolvable, but considering
Alexander’s eagerness for military reform already at the beginning of his reign (beards forbidden, cavalry
given Boeotian helmets instead of the Phrygian, unit organizations and commands improvised), it is not
impossible that Alexander may have experimented with cavalry shields and javelins. The Thessalians appear
to have been similarly equipped except that it is possible that they still carried only two throwing spears and
not the xyston. The Prodromoi and Paeonians and Thracians appear to have been mostly unarmored light

11
For discussions of the cavalry equipment in general, see Everson and English. Even though I am indebted to their
views, it should be noted that I still do not always share their opinions.

9
cavalry scouts who fought with the sarissa in (Scythian?) wedge formations. The Greek allied and
mercenary logchoforoi were equipped with armor, helmets, spears, and kopis/machaira swords, and were
equally well suited to skirmishing and melee. At the beginning of his reign the only significant weakness of
Alexander’s cavalry was the lack of real light cavalry consisting of mounted archers12. [p.39]

DIAGRAM 2

Arrian: Cavalry 2) Amphippoi (amfippoi) two-horse cavalry. According to Arrian, the amphippoi were
with additions those who rode a pair of horses linked together without saddle cloths so that the rider
could jump from one to the other. The later Byzantine Interpolation of Aelian (38.3)
makes it clear that in actuality the amphippoi were nomadic mounted archers that
exchanged their horses after the first mount grew tired. It should be noted that the
amphippoi are unlikely to have used two horses side by side in battles, this would have
been the practice during the march. The nomad would have ridden one horse during the
1) Cavalry proper, advance and then jumped to the better and rested war horse and left the other horse
single horse cavalry behind and then returned back if the other horse grew tired.

Roman cavalry two main types:

Cataphracts/katafraktoi 1) kontophoroi cavalry that charged like
(armored cavalry, katafraktos):
the Alans and Sarmatians (note that both
Both man and horse armored. The horseman Unarmored cavalry (afraktos): also carried bows).
wears corslets of scale armor, linen or horn - doratophoroi (doratoforoi,, one hand spear- 2) lonchophoroi (logchoforoi) lancers.
together with thigh-guards. The horse wears bearers). Included sarissophoroi? They wore spatha long sword suspended
side protectors and chamfrons. According to - kontophoroi (kontoforoi, pike-bearers, from the shoulders, and were equipped
Sylloge Tacticorum 31.1, the katafraktos was weapon held by both hands, length c. 3.74 m) with broad oval shield (thyreos), an iron
equipped with mail armor with lamellae/scale - lonchophoroi (logchoforoi,) lancers who helmet, an interlocked corslet and small
coat, arm and shin protectors, a two-edged either threw their lance/spear or used it at greaves. They either threw lances/spears
sword, 78 or 97.5 cm oval shield, 3.1 m or 3.74 close quarters with thrusts. at distance or thrust with them at close
m doru-spear (2 pecheis à 31.23 cm or 46.8 cm - akrobolistai (skirmishers) consisting of range. At really close quarters they used
emended to 2 orguia 156.2 or 187.4 cm after mounted bowmen or javelin-throwers. spathae. They also carried a small spiked
doratoforoi). The horse’ head and sides were
axe evidently also for use at melee.
also protected by armor.
akrobolistai skirmishers (In the Sylloge 31.3: elafroi
consisting of the toxotai and akontistai)
Doratophoroi (spear-bearers) - those who fought at distance like the Armenians and those of
- those who approached the enemy the Parthians that did not carry the pikes.
ranks and fought with spears.
- those who drove the enemy back with
- those who fought at distance with - mounted archers
pikes like the Alans and Sarmatians
javelins/throwing spears (doratia) called (hippotoxotai)
Tarentines.
-shield-bearers - in the Sylloge 31.3: javelin-throwers
(thyreophoroi). In the Sylloge (akontistai) who had only small shields.
Tacticorum 31.2, the doratoforoi -non shield-bearers
were equipped with 62.4 cm or fighting with spears (doratophoroi) - light-armed (elafroi) who first threw
78 cm shield. Note also that and pikes (kontophoroi) and xyston- their spears at distance and then
according to Arrian 43.2-3 the bearers (lance-bearers, - Tarentines proper who engaged the enemy at close quarters
kontos could be used with shield xystophoroi). Included probably skirmished at distance, either with a spear or spatha sword. In
with a one-handed grip. the sarissophoroi. keeping far off, or riding the Sylloge the elafroi included the
around the enemy in a circle. toxotai and akontistai.

In Saga 123 the above diagram covered (by mistake) about three lines of text, but the missing
portion is included here on the following page.

12
For the organization of the Macedonian cavalry and its tactics, see also: Sidnell, 75ff. (highly recommended);
English, 36ff; Worley, 153ff.; Sekunda, 2004; Warry 2004; Gaebel, 143-196; DiMarco, 34-48. For earlier Greek
cavalry organization and tactics, see also Spence.

10
 According to the military treatises, the cavalry was likewise divided into similar groups as infantry so
that its basic building block, the file, consisted of four horsemen that were grouped as combat units called 32
men oulamos (fought as a square/oblong array and was used for skirmishing and shock), 64 men ilê (fought
as wedge, which was very maneuverable and useful for breakthroughs), and 128 men epeilarchia (fought as
a rhombus: the most versatile and maneuverable of the formations). The larger units consisted either of their
combinations so that the total was 4,096 horsemen. The allied Greeks and mercenaries may have used really
large oblong formations, but these do not fit the numerical scheme of Macedonian cavalry except when the
depth was either four or eight. The 4,096 horsemen (8 ilai of [p.40] 512 horsemen) represent the reformed
cavalry force created by Alexander in the course of 330-328 which consisted of the Macedonian and Greek
cavalry forces in addition to which came the cavalries provided by his new subjects and allies. At the
beginning of his Persian campaign Alexander had only about 1800 Macedonian cavalry, 1800 Thessalian
cavalry, 600 prodromoi/sarissoforoi, 300 Paeonians, 600 Thracians, and 400 mercenaries13. It should also be
noted that each of the foreign contingents had its own unit structures and combat methods. On the basis of
later information (Sylloge 33.2, 43.6), the cavalry had two unit orders: open (each file of horsemen occupied
c.156.2 or 187.4 cm in width in the formation and each rank had 156.2 or 187.4 cm intervals between them)
and close (the width of each file of horsemen in the formation was three feet = 31.23 cm x 3 = 93.69 cm; and
there were 156.2 or 187.4 cm intervals between each rank).
On the basis of the figures given for Alexander’s early cavalry forces, it is very likely that the
strengths of Alexander’s early cavalry units differed from those presented by the military treatises. I would
here tentatively suggest that the Macedonian cavalry combat formations were the oblong/square array (4
ranks by 9 files = 36) and the rank-and-file version of the wedge consisting of 36 horsemen (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11
= 36), since this is in agreement with the later use of ranks and files14, and with the figures (1,800 is divisible
with 36) given for Alexander’s cavalry, and with the descriptions of combat. Note that the 200 to 300 men
wedges would not have fit inside the river at the Battle of the Granicus River. It would also have been
unbelievable waste of resources to post so many elite lancers behind and/or in the middle where they could
not contribute anything to the battle. Furthermore, if we compare the Scythian and Macedonian wedges with
the Middle Byzantine 384 and 504 men blunted wedges (trapezoids) it becomes immediately obvious that
these cannot be the wedges employed by Alexander because: 1) he stood alone as the apex of his wedge just
like the leaders of Scythian wedges did in their wedges; 2) the Byzantine wedges did not waste manpower,
because the inner parts were filled with archers unlike Alexander’s wedges. Therefore, the evidence points
to the probability that the Royal Squadron was not a single unit but a “regiment” consisting of smaller units.
In other words, I do agree with Nick Sekunda’s basic view (2004, 17-18) that the Macedonian ilê would have
consisted of smaller units (Sekunda suggests that 200 horsemen ilê consisted of four 49 horsemen
tetrarchiai).

13
The calculation is from English, 39.
14
The “loose” Scythian wedge array (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8) could also include 36 horsemen, but the rank and file version
seems more likely. See Sidnell (79-80) for a discussion of the development of the cavalry wedge and its tactical
advantages which were its easy wheeling and maneuverability and its ability to create breakthroughs at the apex of the
formation.

11
 [p.41] In short, in my opinion the ilê Basilike had eight troops of 36 horsemen for a total 288 men
while the rest of the seven ilai had six troops of 36 horsemen each for a total of 216 men. Similarly, I would
suggest that the 1800 Thessalians used the “Scythian” rhombus array15 in which the men were not arrayed
simultaneously by files and ranks (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 = 36) were similarly organized into ilai. When
in 330-328 BC Alexander received reinforcements that made it possible to increase the size of the basic
combat unit, which he did it by adding two new ranks (13 and 15 men) to the 36 men troop thereby creating
the 64 horsemen ilê/wedge of Polybius mentioned by Aelian 19.10. See Diagrams 3-4.
The various units and unit formation had also particular battlefield functions: the oblong/square could
be used for skirmishing in files and frontal assaults; the wedge was usually used for shock and penetration of
enemy formation; while the rhombus was used for both shock action and for skirmishing. The Diagram 5
(based on Arrian’s and Polybius’ descriptions of cavalry drills) give a good indication how the cavalry
skirmished with files. See also my article on Magnesia in Saga 121 (with errata due to appear in Saga).

Alexander’s 36 horsemen wedge

ilarchês = hêgemôn
DIAGRAM 3 This represents my best educated guess for
the strength and type of Alexander’s combat
wedge. The other alternatives would be that:
1) the 64 horsemen wedge had already been
ouragos? the standard from the reign of Philip II, but
that for lack of manpower Alexander had to
take away two ranks of horsemen; 2) the
wedge had 49 horseman (i.e. one rank more
plagiofylax? to make it a “tetrarchia”) at the apex of
which stood tetrarchês as suggested by
Sekunda (2004, 17-18), which would equate
doratoforoi, xystoforoi, 1813 horsemen for the hetairoi; 3) just like
sarissoforoi the Scythians and Thessalians, the
Macedonians also employed the no ranks
and files wedge (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8).

[p.42]

15
See also the excellent article dealing with rhomboids by Lendon.

12
 Alexander’s Thessalian squadron of 36
doratoforos, xystoforos,
horsemen deployed as a rhombus/rhomboid.
longchoforos
This represents the likeliest way in which the 8
Thessalian ilai consisting of 1800 horsemen were
eilarchês/ilarchês (leader of ilê); deployed for combat. The other alternatives would
title during Alexander’s reign have been the use of 49 men rhombus (1, 3, 3, 4, 5, 6,
unknown, perhaps hêgemôn (?). 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) or the 128 men rank and file
rhombus, but the former doesn’t result in exact 1800
ouragos (rear-guard)
men and nor does the latter. Furthermore, it is likely
that since the Thessalians were the best horsemen of
plagiofylax Greece that they used the rhombus array that resembled
most closely the wedge employed by the Scythians
rather than the rank and file version. On the other hand
when Alexander subsequently disbanded the
Thessalians in 330, 130 of them remained behind as
mercenaries. This can suggest that the Thessalians had
already been using the 128 rhombus or two 64 men (1,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) “Scythian”
rhomboids.

DIAGRAM 4

DIAGRAM 5

A squadron of 36 horsemen deployed for skirmishing in

files.

The skirmishing tactic in files consisted of sending single

files from the flanks and/or center forward which then
engaged the enemy with javelins before wheeling back after
which the next files moved forward to skirmish. If the
enemy followed the skirmishing file or files back to their
unit, the rest of the squadron moved forward as a unit and
threw a volley or volleys of javelins and then engaged the
enemy in melee. This is what happened at Battle of Granicus
River 334 BC when Alexander had advanced forward as an
apex of his wedge and the Persian commanders had advanced
forward as files. Since Alexander’s wedge had failed to
follow him when he galloped forward, he had to endure the
volleys of javelins thrown by the 40 Persian Kinsmen (see
later). For additional information regarding the sources
(Polybius and Arrian, see Syvanne, Saga 121).

13
 [p.44] The Byzantine Sylloge Tacticorum 33-34 gives details of the ideal Macedonian cavalry
formation that was used in cavalry battles. See Diagram 6 with the caption. [2013: the following diagram
and text were on p.43 in Saga 123]
DIAGRAM 6

Sylloge Tacticorum 33-34:

The early 10th century AD Sylloge includes a description of the Macedonian cavalry battle formation that was
used against enemy cavalry. The formation consisted of four tagmata (divisions) each with the strength of 1024
horsemen. The center right and center left divisions consisted of the katafraktoi (men and horses armored) and
doryforoi (spear-bearers), while the right and left divisions consisted of the light cavalry (elafroi) akontistai
(javelin-throwers) and toxotai (archers). The flank divisions were at most 8 orguiai (12.4 or 15 m) in front of the
center and the intervals between the divisions at most 20 orguiai (31.24 or 37.48 m). The center divisions appear
to have been deployed in close order and the flanks in open. For the Byzantine measurements, see the
groundbreaking study of Dawson. The depth of the divisions seem to have been four ranks, since the treatise stated
that the divisions were not to have more than four ranks of which the first two consisted of the katafraktoi and the
next two of the elafroi. This suggests that the two center divisions actually consisted of a mix of light and heavy
cavalry so that only the two front ranks consisted of the katafraktoi (did the 2nd rank consist of the doryforoi?). It
is very difficult to pinpoint the exact date for this array. The original concept of four divisions (but not the
katafraktoi unless these were part of Alexander’s later ideal array which included Bactrians etc.) may have already
been in use during Philip’s and Alexander’s time so that the center consisted of the hetairoi and the wings of light
cavalry. What we know, however, is that a variant of this array was definitely used by Antiochos III Megas against
the Bactrians in c. 208 BC in which instance the center consisted of the 1024 hetairoi and 1024 men agêma
(Polybius 10.49) as I have already discussed on several occasions. Notably all of the military treatises also have
the cavalry to consist of a quarter of the men of the phalanx, similarly divided. It was after finishing the
abovementioned eastern campaign that cataphracts appeared in the Seleucid army and therefore formed the center
of this kind array. However, it is very difficult to date the unit organization consisting of the two ranks of
katafraktoi and two of elefroi. On the surface this appears to bear too close a resemblance to the late Roman and
Byzantine practices, but one cannot completely rule out the possibility that the Scythians and/or the Bactrians and
others in Central Asia would have employed this unit structure already at the time they were subjects of the
Achaemenids. Therefore, it is quite possible that at the later stages of his Persian campaign Alexander may already
have experimented with this system. In fact, this seems quite logical since it is well known that Alexander added
Persian archers even to the Macedonian phalanx. Why would he not have done the same with the cavalry? What is
certain, however, is that at the beginning of the campaign, he did not use this kind of unit structure. To complicate
matters further, we cannot rule out another alternative, which is that some of the Greek mercenary or allied
cavalries or Persians or even the Macedonians could have always placed their spear-bearers in the front ranks and
javelin-throwers in the back. It is even possible that the Macedonian front rankers would have used javelins in
conjunction with the xyston, since according to Diodorus 17.60.2 Alexander threw a javelin at Dareios at the Battle
of Gaugamela and the hetairoi used them in Thrace (Arrian 1.5.5-6). It should be noted, though, that the xyston
could also be used as a thrown weapon! As regards the deployment of the 4096 cavalry with infantry (16,384
“hoplites” and 8192 peltastai/psiloi), the Sylloge states that the cavalry could be deployed either in front of the
phalanx or behind it. Asclepiodotus 7.10 and Aelian 20.1 state that the cavalry was to be placed either in front, or
behind or flanks as needed. All in all, it is likely that the basic concept of four 1024 divisions (eight hipparchies of
512 horsemen) was already in use by 328, and that a similar concept, albeit with varying cavalry strengths, may
already have been in use at the beginning of Alexander’s reign. The earliest plausible date for the inclusion of
mounted archers and cataphracts also happens after 330. They were definitely in use by 205 in the Seleucid
kingdom! In fact, it is probable that we do not hear much about the cataphracts before this date mainly because
only the Seleucids had access to Central Asian cavalries and even their contacts were periodically broken off with
these sources because of the continuous revolts. We should not, however, see the cataphracts as a superior
weapons system. The hetairoi and sarissoforoi were entirely capable of crushing them and it is difficult to see any
significant protective advantage for the cataphracts over the Persian style thorakitai (only the head, chest and sides
of the horse protected). My educated guess is that the system described by the Sylloge indeed dates from the reign
of Alexander after he had introduced Persians and Central Asians into his army.

14
 [p.44] On the basis of the historical narratives, Philip’s and Alexander’s forces appear to have been
able to use all of the combat methods described by the military treatises. Consequently, the units and
divisions of the infantry phalanx could assume the open, close (pyknosis, each file occupied c. 90 cm in
width), and locked-shields (synaspismos, each file occupied either c. 45 cm or 52 cm or 62 cm in width)
formations as needed just like the cavalry its open and close formations. The frontally almost impenetrable
synaspismos-order was used primarily as a defensive order, because once assumed it was difficult to
maneuver the men into new formations caused by the use of sarissa in such a tight formation. The men
could be ordered to perform various types of wheeling, turning, counter-marching (Macedonian; Laconian;
Cretan/Persian/Chorios16), about turn, closing, double front etc. maneuvers as needed. The phalanx and its
divisions could be ordered to assume the column (orthia phalanx, plinthion), left and right oblique (loxê
phalanx), oblong (plagia phalanx), hollow square/oblong (plaision), crescent (mênoidês, koilê), convex
(kyrtê), rearward angled half-square (epikampios opisthia), forward angled half-square (epikampios
emprosthia), double phalanx (two phalanxes), triple phalanx (= epikampios), quadruple phalanx (= square),
wedge (embolos), and hollow wedge (koilembolos). Each of these arrays was needed for a particular
offensive or defensive tactical purpose. The basic tactics had three variants: 1) the use of wedges or columns
for breakthroughs (counter tactic koilembolos) in the middle; 2) outflanking the enemy on one wing
(hyperkerasis); 3) outflanking the enemy on both wings (hyperfalangesis). The role of the light infantry and
cavalry varied according to the tactics and formation chosen, but the light infantry was usually used as a
screen for the cavalry and for the weakening of the enemy with missiles, and for pursuit, while the cavalry
was used to outflank, to prevent outflanking, and for shock action and pursuit. For additional details, see
Saga 121 with forthcoming errata.
Despite the fact that Alexander’s forces were able to use all of the tactics mentioned by the military
treatises, the most typical variant that Alexander used during the early years against the Persians when the
Greeks were still accompanying the army consisted of a [p.45] double phalanx in which the Macedonian
phalangites and hypaspists were placed in front with a depth of eight (?) and the Greek allies and mercenary
hoplites/phalangites with a depth of eight (?) behind as the second reserve phalanx to support the
Macedonian when needed or to protect its rear. The combat performance of the Greek phalanx has received
much too little attention, because the sources did their best to extol the efforts of Alexander and the
Macedonians on behalf of the Greeks. Additional, medium or light infantry or hoplites could be placed on
the flanks to create a hollow square formation (plaision) with protective screens for the cavalry as happened
at the battle of Gaugamela (see later), or to protect and support the cavalry wings as seem to have happened
at Granicus and Issus. The left wing cavalry consisted of the Thessalians, other Greeks and sarissoforoi; and
the right wing of the hetairoi, sarissoforoi, and possibly of Greek support cavalry. For illustrations, see the

16
It is no surprise that the counter-march used by the Cretan archers and Persian sparabara would have resembled each
other. Both were archers and both could be equipped with shields for close combat. Even if the purpose of the counter-
march was usually to change the face of the formation, the use of this maneuver suggests that both nationalities
employed continuous firing technique in which one or several ranks fired simultaneously and then counter-marched to
the rear to reload rather than used series of volleys so that all of the archers would have fired simultaneously.

15
diagrams accompanying the battles! When Alexander disbanded the Greeks in 330, his formation became
that what is described by the military treatises.

2.2. The Persians17

The Achaemenid military consisted of the levy of Persians, subject peoples, allies, and mercenaries.
The military forces were further divided into: 1) the professional palatine forces (i.e. bodyguard units:
Immortals, Spear-bearers, Kinsmen etc.) that acted as the elite forces and bodyguards of the king of kings; 2)
and the forces serving under the different satraps. Just like the king of kings, the satraps had at their disposal
their own bodyguard units usually consisting of cavalry in addition to which came the locally raised levies of
Persians and subjects, and the mercenaries.
The core of the Persian army consisted of the levy (Kara18) of native able-bodied male Persians who
were required to start military training at the age of five which continued until they turned twenty years of
age. According to Herodotus during that time they were taught “to ride, to use the bow, and to speak the
truth”. In addition to this, the Persian youth were also taught many other necessary skills such as running,
swimming, hunting, forced marches, handicrafts, and the use of spears, javelins, and swords. After twenty,
the youth were required to perform military service until the age of 24 or 25 depending upon the way which
one interprets the sources, but they were liable to serve up to the age of 50. The strength of this Persian
national army appears to have been 120,000 men plus the reserves of older men. The strength of the national
army was divided between the forces immediately available to the court and to those that served under their
local satrap.
[p.46] The Persians of the Achaemenid army were organized into units according to decimal principle:
10 (dathabam under dathapatiš), 100 (satabam under satapatiš)19, 1000 (hazarabam under hazarapatiš), and
10000 (baivarabam under baivarapatiš). In addition to these there were commanders of five
(rearguard/ouragos/pasčadathapatiš) and fifty. In practice the numbers varied [2013: and may have
resembled the Greco-Roman system 8 fighters, 1 recruit, 1 servant etc., see Xenophon below]!
The infantry dathaba were organized into files of ten men so that in each file the dathapatiš occupied
the front rank and the commander of five/rearguard (pasčadathapatiš) apparently the last rank. In the normal
circumstance the dathapatiš was equipped with a short spear (6ft long) and a wall shield/pavise (spara). The
spara was a wicker-work (woven osiers inserted to leather) shield. The remaining nine ranks [2013:
uncertain, see e.g. Xenophon below] were equipped with bows and kopis-falchions. Some of the Persians
wore armor, but their numbers remained small. Collectively the front-rankers were sparabara (pavise-
bearers) who formed a pavise-wall behind which the rest of the nine men could employ their bows. On some
occasions, however, every man was equipped with a bow and the spara were simply propped up to act as a

17
Excluding the description of battle formations and tactics the following discussion of the Persian military
organization is based on: Sekunda 1989, 1992; Farrokh, 36-111, esp. 39-40, 56-60, 68-69, 75-77, 84-85; Shahbazi;
Cawkwell, esp. 220-273; Head, esp. 3-4, 44-45, 64-66, 85-91.
18
The equivalent in Lithuanian is karis/karias, in Gothic harjis, and in modern German Heer.
19
The ancient Persian may have influenced Finnish since the Finnish word for 100 is sata. During ancient and
medieval times there seems to have been a continuous spread of influence from the Iranian speaking peoples to the
north, since the cavalry panoplies dating from the Sasanian Era and after that have been dug up in both Sweden and
Finland bear close resemblance to the Sasanian equipment of the elite Savaran cavalry. For the Savaran, see Farrokh.

16
wall of pavises. One may guess also that at least on occasion the rearguard may also have carried the spara
and spear so that both the front and rear would be protected by the “heavy infantry”. The use of the wicker-
work shield and lack of body armor and metal helmet made the Persian “heavy infantry” very vulnerable
when attacked by Greek hoplites or by Macedonian phalangites both of whom could thrust their spears right
through the wicker-work shield to the body of the defender. When the Greeks had penetrated the first rank,
the rest of the Persians were even more vulnerable to being butchered despite their considerable bravery.
Therefore, it is by no means surprising that the Persian resorted to the use of Greek mercenaries, and to the
use of the so-called kardaka (see below). The Persians also attempted to improve the security by other
means. At least on some occasions, the Persians appear to have equipped their foot archers with crescent-
shaped kara-shields20 (wood or leather shields reinforced with a metal rim) in order to improve their chances
of survival in melee. In addition, Xenophon appears to suggests that the Persians experimented also with
composite formations more suited to melee in which the two front ranks consisted of armored infantry, the
next two of javelin throwers, followed by two ranks of archers, behind which stood two ranks of file-closers.
[p.47] The most famous Persian infantry myriad consisted of the so-called Immortals (Amrtaka)
whose numbers were constantly kept at full strength. The Immortals appear to have consisted of the best of
the conscripts of the national army. 1,000 of the Immortals had spears with golden-butts and while the rest
had spears with silver-butts. In addition to their spears, the Immortals were also armed with bows, arrows,
and swords, and carried shields. Consequently, the Immortals were multipurpose soldiers able to fight both
at long distance and in melee. There was also an elite unit called Spear-bearers (arštibara) who have been
associated with the Apple-bearers (meloforoi in Greek). Most of the historians identify the arštibara/Apple-
bearers with the elite 1,000 men of the Immortals, but the information in Herodotus and Diodorus seems to
suggest that there may have been even more elite units besides the Apple-bearers.
The cavalry portion of the Persian National Army consisted of 30,000 horsemen who appear to have
been commanded by a general with the rank of Master of Cavalry (asapatiš). The cavalry was recruited
from among the Persian nobility while their horses were provided by the state.
The elite cavalry consisting of the Persians (and Medes) were trained to employ both bows and spears
while mounted or dismounted, but the vast majority of the Persian cavalry appear to have carried two spears
(palta) of which one was meant to be thrown and the other used for thrusting. Drawing on his experience of
Persian cavalry Xenophon (On Horsemanship 12.1ff.; Cavalry Commander 1.6-7) recommended that the
Athenian horsemen used a thorax (breastplate) (i.e. they were thorakitai) to protect the torso with flaps to
protect against missiles, a gorget to protect the throat, a “hand” (cheir = gauntlet/manikes) to protect the hand
holding reins, and detachable flaps to protect the armpit on the right with a greave on the forearm so that the
right hand could be used securely for the throwing of javelins and cutting with the sword. The horse was to
be protected by a head-piece, a chest-piece and side-pieces that also protected the rider’s thighs. The side-
pieces had been replaced by armored pants by the time Alexander the Great invaded. The rider’s shins were
to be protected by leather boots. The armament consisted of the machaira/kopis (a sort of saber) rather than
of the xifos (two-edged sword), and of two handy and strong cornel wood Persian javelins (palta) of which

20
I.e. it looked like the original Thracian peltê-shield, but was larger.

17
one palton was to be thrown and the other used for thrusts to front, rear and sides. The Persian javelins were
shorter than the Greek spear, but stronger and easier to handle in combat. In combat the javelin was to be
thrown at the longest distance possible in order to give time for the rider to turn his horse and grasp his other
javelin. In other words, the tactic was to pepper the enemy with volleys of javelins before engaging them in
melee. There were two different ways to do this: 1) single or double files of the cavalry units arrayed as
oblongs/squares could advance in front of the battle line and skirmish with the enemy in a freewheeling way
as files (see the diagrams in the [p.48] Saga 121)21; 2) or the whole line of units could attack at a gallop and
then pursue the enemy, retreat, wheel, or pass through the enemy files as units22, which suggest the
possibility that the javelin throwing could be dispensed with since the speed of the gallop would not have
allowed the men to take new weapons23. The purpose of the latter tactic would have been to try to scare the
enemy to flee, but if this failed the attackers would have stopped (and possibly fled) before making contact
with an infantry force or tight cavalry array, and in case of open cavalry formation the units would have
intermingled or passed through.
On the basis of the decimal division, it would appear possible that the Persian cavalry was divided into
files of ten men, but this is mere conjecture, but it is more than likely that the Persians varied the depths of
their cavalry formations according to the needs. For example, on one occasion a 12 horsemen wide column
of thorakitai crushed a four deep Greek cavalry formation operating under Agesilaus (Xen., Hell. 3.4.13-14).
Furthermore, it appears probable that the Persians used files divisible by four (i.e. the ten men group
consisted of two four men files plus two servants). What is clear, however, is that the Persian cavalry were
typically deployed in oblong/square units of ranks and files (Arrian, Tactica 16.9/18.9 Köchly; Aelian,
Tactica 18.5; Asclepiodotus 7.4). The Persian cavalry employed also another peculiar tactic to crush enemy
infantry or cavalry formation that consisted of sending chariots/scythed chariots to break up the cohesion of
the enemy formation, which was then exploited by the cavalry units placed behind (Xen., Hell. 4.1.17ff.)24.
It appears likely that the tactic with the elephants was similar in intention.
The elite cavalry of the king of kings consisted either of 10,000 or 15,000 Kinsmen (Huvaka) cavalry.
All of these consisted of Persian nobility. As regards their numbers and organization, the historians are just
as opposed in their opinions as the sources are difficult to interpret. Some historians suggest that there were
actually no more than 1,000 Kinsmen, but this seems to be a mistake, since once again there appears to have
been at least three separate 1,000 strong elite cavalry units of which one was also Royal Regiment of
Kinsmen. This Royal Regiment and the other two may have been drawn from the ranks of the Huvaka, but
they may also have been entirely separate from them drawn from the highest echelons of Persian society.
[p.49] The foreign element of the army consisted of the men provided by subject peoples, allies, and
mercenary captains. Each of these groups fought in their own native manner. These forces were recruited
locally by the satraps and centrally by the king of kings. Some were horsemen, while others were light or

21
See: Xenophon, Cavalry Commander 3.9; with Syvanne, Battle of Magnesia, Saga 121 (a list of errata due to appear
in Saga).
22
Proves that there were intervals of at least about 3ft (90 cm) between the files.
23
Xenophon, Cavalry Commander 3.2-8, 3.10-14.
24
For the military uses of the chariots in general, see Cotterel.

18
heavy infantry. The Central Asian and Scythian peoples provided some of the best cavalry, (cataphracts,
shield-bearing cavalry, and mounted archers). In fact so good that subsequently Alexander the Great
recruited Bactrians and Saka/Sacae in droves to his army. The various independent or semi-independent
tribes and nations provided the Persians also with some of their best infantry forces, which included large
numbers of so-called (taka-shield-bearers) takabara/peltoforoi (peltê-bearers) who were equipped with small
shields and spears capable of fighting in melee. The Lycians, who were equipped with full hoplite panoply
excepting that they had their own peculiar spears and sickle-swords, can be considered to have been a real
asset to the local satrap against the Greeks. Nick Sekunda has suggested that the 120,000 so-called kardaka
troops (equipped like the Greek hoplites/peltasts) may actually have been Asiatic mercenary Royal
household troops, but this is uncertain. As Sekunda notes, it is possible that the kardaka were a sub-group of
the National Army.
The best infantry forces available to the Persians consisted of the Greek mercenaries, who at the time
of Alexander’s invasion consisted of: 1) the so-called epilektoi (picked troops) provided by the new Federal
states in return for payment; 2) of the mercenaries provided by the city states; 3) of the disenchanted
elements and refugees; 4) and of those who wanted to fight against the Macedonian oppression. Most of
these forces consisted of the Iphicratean peltasts equipped with the small round peltê shield (diameter 61
cm), long spear (c. 3.74 m?), sword, helmet, boots, and linen armor. There were also mercenary hoplites
who used their traditional equipment (bronze hoplon/aspis shield, bronze breastplate and shin-guards, spear,
sword), but there were also some peltasts and hoplites who did not use armor at all. In most cases the Greek
mercenaries formed the backbone of the Persian battle array, and one should not make the common mistake
of considering the Macedonian phalanx militarily superior to the period Greek phalanx. It had not been the
phalangites who had defeated the Greeks in frontal combat at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 and in the
Lamian War25 the Greek hoplites/peltasts were more than a match to the Macedonian phalangites in combat!
In fact, the Macedonians needed 40,000 phalangites to defeat mere 20,000 hoplites at the Battle of Krannon
in 322 and even then they failed to defeat them completely, because the latter made an orderly withdrawal to
the hills.
The satraps in Asia Minor had access to their local levies and mercenaries, including the Bactrian
cataphracts, in addition to their armored Persian cavalry and Greek mercenaries. Therefore, one should not
consider Alexander’s victory at the Battle of Granicus River over the Persian satraps as foregone conclusion.
However, the leadership on the Persian side was [p.50] hampered by the fact that the Persian king didn’t
trust large enough forces under a single commander and all generals were also fearful of incurring the king’s
anger.
The sources usually give impossibly huge figures for the Persian armies. As a result, we do not know
the actual army sizes, except that the Persians apparently were able to field huge armies. The practice of
exaggerating the size of the Persian army was not without its critics as Polybius’ scathing criticism of
Callisthenes’ figures at the Battle of Issus proves. In fact, the only way to calculate the approximate size of

25
For the Lamian War, see: Diodorus (18.9.1-18.18.9) with Bennett & Roberts (27-40).

19
the Persian army in each battle is to compare its length with that of the Macedonian army just like Polybius
did in his criticism.
Unlike usually assumed the Persian battle doctrine clearly called for the use of decisive pitched battle
against the invader. Why else would they have persisted upon engaging the Greeks and Macedonians in
pitched battles, when the use cavalry and navy for guerrilla campaign would have been wiser? More than
anything else it was a question of Persian honor. The typical Persian battle formation was based on the
concept of five so that the battle array consisted of five divisions (outer wings, left and right wing, center)
behind which was placed commander’s reserve in the center. The array could consist of several lines each of
which was divided according to the same principle, and the array could consist of cavalry alone or it could
include other arms of service placed according to the will and tactics chosen by the commander/king. The
different divisions could also assume advanced or refused positions in the battle line according to the tactics
(which was also a reflection of the composition and types of troops in the array) chosen by the commander.
In other words, the cavalry, chariots, heavy infantry, light infantry, and even the elephants were placed into
different positions in the five part array as considered useful. This same basic concept of dividing the array
into five sections can still be found in use during the Sasanian period and after in Iran, Central Asia and
India26. For two examples of this five section array, see the battles of the Granicus River and Gaugamela.

3. The Balkan Campaign 335 27

Alexander’s father Philip was assassinated by Philip’s former gay lover in 336. There have been
suspicions that Alexander or his mother Olympias would have been behind the [p.51] murder, but on the
basis of the fact that the father and son had been reconciled this is probably not the case, but these details
need not concern us here. What is certain, though, is that the 20 year old Alexander reacted swiftly to secure
the throne and removed all potential enemies promptly and without hesitation. The situation tempted the
Greeks to denounce their loyalty towards Macedonian. Characteristically, Alexander acted promptly. He
was promptly confirmed head of the Thessalian League and neighboring tribes and the Greek resistance
collapsed immediately when Alexander approached with his army. He was now confirmed as the head of the
Greek League, and Alexander returned to Macedonia to make preparations for the Persian campaign.
However, before he could join the 10,000 strong advance force now under Parmenion sent by his father, he
received news that the northern tribes were restless. The youth of the new king undoubtedly tempted the
neighbors. Alexander could not leave these behind. He had to secure his rear.
Alexander decided to use two-pronged attack. He sent his navy to the mouth of the Danube while he
marched his army there through the Haemus Range. Alexander started from Amphipolis and moved against
the independent Thracians, and reached the Haemus on the tenth day where the independent Thracians tried
to block his route of advance. The enemy had occupied the heights in the line of march and placed carts as a
stockade. They also planned to push part of the carts downhill against the Macedonians. Alexander

26
Note for example: The Sasanian (and Arabo-Iranian) battle array (right wing, left wing, center, outer wings, and rear)
in the 13th century Persian Adab al-Harb (Martinez, 130). See also Syvanne in Saga Newsletter 120 (with one errata:
the Persian general in command of 20,000 cav. is wrongly named.)
27
The account of the Balkan campaign in 335 is entirely based upon Arrian 1.1ff.

20
consulted his officers for advice, as a result of which it was decided that the hoplites/phalangites were to
break their formation to avoid the carts and if that was not possible use a variant of the interlocked shields
formation so that the front-rankers would crouch close together in order that the carts would bound over the
shields. The tactic proved successful and the carts caused no harm to the phalangites who then shouted in
unison to start the attack. Alexander noted that the most advantageous tactic was to move his archers from
the right wing to the front of the phalanx to shoot at the enemy and then with the agêma, hypaspistai, and
Agrianians move to the left to outflank the enemy. The Thracians tried to stop the outflanking forces, but the
archers effectively kept them at bay until the outflanking forces drove them away from their positions. This
action proves that from the very beginning of Alexander’s day, the phalangites were entirely capable of
fighting in the mountainous terrain. The booty (women and children) was sent back home, and Alexander
continued his march against the Triballians.
When Alexander reached the River Lynginus, he learnt that Syrmus, the king of Triballians, had sent
women and children to the island of Peuce in the middle of the Danube where they had been joined by
refugee Thracians and by Syrmus and his men. When Alexander moved forward, some Triballians moved
behind him to the River Lynginus evidently to block his route of retreat. The scouts reported this to
Alexander and he turned back. The enemy were in the process of encamping when Alexander [p.52] arrived.
The enemy was forced to draw a battle line near the valley by the river. Alexander arrayed his phalanx into a
deep formation (32 deep?) and sent archers and slingers in front to lure the enemy out of the valley. The
volleys of arrows and stones provoked the enemy to attack and leave their shelter as Alexander had expected.
He sent Philotas with the cavalry of Upper Macedonia against their right flank, Bottiaean and Amphipolean
cavalry under Heracleides and Sopolis against their left flank, and the remaining cavalry ahead of the
phalanx against the center. The hetairoi cavalry engaged the enemy with javelins (!) until the phalanx
arrived, after which the cavalry charged together with the phalangites. The Triballians were crushed and
about 3,000 of them perished. According to Ptolemy, Macedonians lost 11 horsemen and about 40 footmen
were killed. What is notable in this encounter is that the hetairoi cavalry is shown to have used javelins to
skirmish with the enemy. This must have been done either in the Persian/Greek manner of sending single
and double files (from the 9 files by 4 ranks formation) forward to throw javelins at the enemy or in the less
effective way of advancing with the wedge close enough for the men to throw their javelins. This suggests
that under Alexander the hetairoi cavalry were also equipped with javelins and not only with the single
xyston. Therefore, Arrian’s account supports the use of javelins by the hetairoi just like Diodorus’ account
of Alexander’s encounter with Dareios.
On the third day after the battle, Alexander reached the Danube where he had a rendezvous with his
fleet. He boarded part of his forces and tried disembark them on the island of Peuce, but the attempt failed
because the enemy opposed him everywhere. Alexander abandoned the attempt and decided instead to cross
the Danube and attack the Getae on the other side since they had evidently provided assistance to those
stranded at Peuce. He embarked as many men as possible on the ships, canoes, and improvised rafts and
crossed the river. He managed to ferry over about 1500 cavalry and 4000 infantry. The crossing was made
in the night to surprise the enemy on a locale where there was a cornfield. Alexander ordered the phalangites

21
to level the corn with their sarissae. As long as the army marched through the corn, the cavalry followed
behind, but when they reached open terrain Alexander led it in person to the right wing while Nicanor led the
phalanx forward in plaision formation. The use of the plaision usually implies the presence of light infantry,
but the figure 4000 (4096) implies the presence of only phalangites. It is of course possible that Arrian (or
his source) has simply failed to mention the presence of light infantry. The Diagram 7 drawn after the
Byzantine Interpolation of Aelian (Codex Burney 108 f.22, p. 43) shows the presence of light infantry, but it
could have been arrayed without them. I have added to it 7 ilai of cavalry with the symbol K. [p.53]

Diagram 7

Plaision:
The 10 c. AD Byzantine Interpolation of
Aelian (Dain M1, M ad fig., Scholium 32,
p.106; tr. by A.M. Devine, Aelian’s Manual
of Hellenistic Military Tactics 48.1, 48.4,
Ancient World 19, 1989, p. 63): “This
formation [plaision] has a depth much
greater than the length or a length much
greater than the depth, and is called “an
oblong-formation [plaision] when all its sides
consist of heavy infantry, with archers and
slingers inside… It is called an “oblong-
formation” [plaision] when the deployment
takes place on the four sides of a formation
not in the shape of a square but in that of an
oblong” The diagram is drawn after Codex
Burney 108 f.22 (“p.43”).
file-leader (lochagos); a misleading term since in all of the diagrams the
lochagos is clearly a higher ranking officer (probably a falangarchês or in
some cases the kerarchês or even strategos/hypostrategos) usually posted in
the front center or in the front right flank of the formation; in Roman usage
this means probably a tribune or legate or dux or comes or magister.
spear-bearing (kontos-bearing) heavy infantryman (hoplitês kontaratos
pezos); kontos was a c. 3.6 m long (cavalry) spear that could be used for both
thrusting and throwing.
targeteer or light-armed slinger (peltastês ê sfendonêtês psilos); the 10th c.
AD infantry peltast seems to have been a javelin thrower.
archer (psilos toxotês)

horseman (kaballarios), here 7 ilai of hetairoi cavalry each consisting of

several wedges.

[p.54] The cavalry of the Getae did not withstand Alexander’s cavalry charge and fled immediately to
their city, mounted as many women and children on horseback as they could and fled. Alexander captured
the city and took as much booty as was left behind, and then re-crossed the river. The defeat of the Getae
broke the back of the resistance, and ambassadors arrived from Syrmus, the king of the Triballi, and from
other independent tribes along the Danube, and from the Celts settled on the Adriatic Gulf. Alexander
agreed to conclude peace treaties with the Danubians, and concluded a treaty of friendship with the Celts.
After this, Alexander proceeded against those Agrianians and Paeonians who had revolted. Alexander’s
informers had reported to him that Clitus, son of Bardylis was in revolt and he had been joined by Glaucia,
king of the Taulatians. He was also told that the Autariates planned to attack him en route. Langarus, the

22
king of the Agrianians, was accompanying Alexander with his finest hypaspistai (note that according to
Arrian the Agrianians had hypaspistai, which suggests that the Agrianian javelinmen and hypaspistai could
be similarly equipped!). He told Alexander that he should not worry about the Autarites, because he would
invade their country and keep them busy while Alexander would advance against Pelium. Alexander agreed
to the suggestion.
When Alexander approached Pelium, the enemy advanced to close combat with the Macedonians, but
with disastrous results. They were routed. Alexander planned to surround the city with a circumvallation,
but next day the arrival of Glaucias changed the plans. It was now impossible to attack the city and
Alexander’s position between the enemy forces was untenable. Alexander sent Philotas to obtain food with
all the baggage animals in the camp. Alexander clearly did not have adequate food supplies and had to resort
to foraging. As a screen Alexander gave as many horsemen as he could spare. When Alexander received a
report that his foragers would be in trouble if they had to approach during the night (i.e. cavalry would not be
of use), he took with him 400 horsemen, hypaspists, archers, and Agrianians and with their assistance
brought Philotas and his men safely back to the camp.
Alexander decided to extradite his army next day. He divided his army into two sections: 1) the front
consisting of a phalanx/column with a depth of 120 (= 128) ranks (probably 16 files by 128 ranks = 4096
men) which was protected by 400 cavalry divided equally between the flanks; 2) behind them followed the
rest of the army and the baggage train. See Map 1 drawn after Hammond (1994, 51; 2004, 38) but with
changes in the unit symbols. He planned to use parade ground drills to overawe the enemy consisting of
horsemen, javelin-men, slingers and “hoplites” in preparation for the actual attack. In the end, Alexander
wheeled the left half towards the left, and right half towards the right and made a wedge from his phalanx on
the left (i.e. the right half was probably marched left to form the apex, see Diagram 8 [Diagram 9 in Saga])
and led it to the attack. The enemy fled. In the [p.55] meanwhile, the warriors inside Pelium tried to attack
the main column, but a mere shout in unison sufficed to scare them back inside the city. The wedge and
cavalry held the hill until the main column passed and then became its rear guard. Alexander secured the
next hill with his bodyguards (ilê Basilike or the seven Bodyguards?) and his Personal Companion cavalry
who were told to take their shields with them and employ the tactic of dismounting half the men to fight
among the cavalry if the enemy resisted. The enemy, however, fled, and Alexander stayed on the hill to
protect the crossing of the river. Note that the Companions could be expected to fight on foot [2013: with
their shields!] and in mixed infantry/cavalry formations (see also the Battle of the Granicus!). He then
ordered the 2,000 Agrianians and archers forward to protect the crossing and sent the hypaspists across the
river, and the taxeis of the phalanx to follow. Once across, they were ordered to extend their line towards the
left. When the enemy saw the Macedonians leaving, they ran down from the hills to attack the last of
Alexander’s phalangists. When the enemy was already close at hand Alexander charged downhill and the
phalanx on the opposite shore shouted its battle-cry. This combination proved too much for the enemy to
bear and it fled. After this Alexander crossed the river on the double being the first man across while the
Agrianians and archers protected the crossing first from the bank and then from the middle of the river while
Alexander set up artillery pieces on the river bank to shoot every kind of missile possible across the river at

23
the enemy. However, the enemy did not dare to come to within the range. See Map 1. Note the use of light
infantry in the river just as Alexander was to do later at the Battle of the Granicus. [p.56] [The following
was Diagram 9 in Saga]
Alexander’s drill ground maneuver near Pelium:
Forming the wedge to the left.
4
DIAGRAM 8

3
Since the resulting wedge was formed on the left, I have made the educated guess that the right half
of the phalanx was marched left to become the apex of the wedge (3). The wedge as such was
always meant to be used for breakthroughs forward and I have therefore pointed the direction of the
attack towards the front (4).

1 2

As Alexander approached he ordered some to shieldward (1) side and others to

spearward (2) side a drill ground maneuver, which means that he wheeled the two
portions left and right in preparation to assume the wedge.

Alexander marches his phalanx epi keras/orthia/plinthion (in column) with a depth of 120 (=128)
men. Both flanks are protected by c. 200 cavalry (6 x 36 = 216, or 4 x 49 = 196, or 4 x 64 = 256, or 3
x 64 = 192). There are two alternatives for the width of the column either 16 men or 32 men, the
former giving a total of 4,096 men phalangarchia and the latter 8,192 men diphalangarchia.
Unfortunately, Arrian’s text is of no help here. On the basis of Alexander’s previous use of 4,096
men phalanx the former appears likelier.

24
[p.57: slightly different in Saga with height differences shown with lines/contours]
MAP 1
Drawn after Hammond with
slight changes.

Pelium
K2

Higher ground/mountains gray dots.

1. Alexander attacks with the wedge and drives the enemy
away while the main column moves forward. The wedge
and 400 cavalry remain on the hill until the column passes
and then becomes its rear guard.
2. Alexander takes his bodyguards (ilê Basilike) and
hetairoi and orders them to carry their shields to secure the
hill K 2. Half of the forces is ordered to dismount and
1 fight among the horsemen, if the enemy puts up any
Alexander’s resistance. The enemy flees, Alexander occupies the hill
Camp and protects the crossing of the river against the enemy.
3. Hypaspists, phalanx and baggage train cross the river
followed by Alexander’s hetairoi and then archers and
Agrianians.

[p.57] After having successfully extradited his forces from troubles, Alexander still hang around in the
area but hidden from the enemy’s eyes. On the third day after the retreat, Alexander learnt from the scouts
that Clitus’ and Glaucias’ forces were carelessly bivouacked with no sentries, palisade or trench to protect
them. Alexander exploited the opportunity. Alexander took with him hypaspistai, Agrianians, archers and
the taxeis of Perdiccas and Coenus, and crossed the river unobserved during the night. He had ordered the
rest of the army to follow, but when he observed an opportunity to attack, he did not wait for their arrival,
but attacked with those that he had at hand by sending the Agrianians and archers to spearhead the attack.
The enemy were utterly defeated and the fleeing Clitus set Pelium on fire and fled to Glaucias’ lands. Note
that Alexander was quite ready to resort to underhand tricks and night attacks!
This was the end of the campaign, since now Alexander learnt that Thebes had revolted when it had
been falsely reported that Alexander was dead and Athens was preparing to support them. There was also
the danger that others would join the revolt. However, with a [p.58] speedy march to the scene Alexander
managed to avert the danger. In order to dissuade others from having similar plans Alexander used the
strategy of terror by destroying Thebes and selling as slaves most of the survivors. When it suited his needs,
Alexander could be quite ruthless as champion of the Greeks! Alexander was confirmed as the leader of the
Greek cities for the Persian campaign, which he was now finally free to pursue. The northern tribes and the
Greeks had been cowed enough and in order to turn the attention of the Greeks to the champion of their
cause, he needed to invade Persia, his goal all along. The aim of the description of the Balkans campaign has
been to show that Alexander's phalangitae and hypaspists used both the sarissa and the shorter spear/javelin,
and that they were entirely capable of fighting in difficult terrain. Likewise, it has shown that, besides the

25
xyston, Alexander's Companion cavalry also carried shields and javelins. It has also shown that Alexander's
infantry could use a great variety of tactical formations including the hollow square/oblong that we will see
in use later (see Gaugamela). Furthermore, it has shown that Alexander was quite capable of using
underhand tricks such as the night attack (see Gaugamela), and unhesitatingly order the killing of Greeks
even though he was supposedly their champion (see Granicus).

4. The Battle of Granicus River 334 BC

In the early spring of 334 BC, Alexander (Alexandros) began his epic conquest of the Persian Empire
by embarking his invasion force on ships and by transporting it from the Hellespont to Asia. He left
Antipatros (Antipater) in charge of Macedonia and Greece. The stated purpose of the campaign was to
liberate the Greeks and to exact a war of revenge against Persia for the wrongs they had committed against
the Greeks. When the fleet reached the Troad, Alexander threw his spear (dory) from the ship fixing it in the
ground and then leapt ashore first. The symbolical significance was that he would receive Asia from the
gods as a spear-won prize. Before embarkation and after landing, Alexander set up altars to Zeus of Safe
Landings, Athena and Heracles. From Troad Alexander moved on to visit the tombs of Achilles, Ajax and
other Greek heroes at Troy to honor them with offerings. He also sacrificed to the Trojan Athena and
dedicated his armor in the temple and took the finest of the dedicated arms for himself. According to
Diodoros, Alexander wore this equipment at the Battle of Granicus, while according to Arrian, the
Hypaspists henceforth carried this panoply before Alexander into battle. According to Arrian, some also
stated that while Alexander sacrificed to Achilles (Achilleus), his intimate friend Hefaistion (Hephaistion)
placed a wreath on Patroklos (Patroklus). The aim of this would have been to honor the close relationship of
[p.59] Achilles and Patroklos28 which was similar to that of Alexander and Hefaistion. Alexander also
wanted to stress that Achilles (through his mother) and Heracles (through his father) were considered his
ancestors. In addition, he may also have sought to encourage the companionship and camaraderie among his
men by honoring of the most famous military couple of mythical antiquity. In sum, Alexander sought to
stress the Panhellenic nature of the military campaign and to encourage his superstitious troops with a series
of sacrifices and offerings to the gods and Greek mythical heroes.
According to Diodoros (17.3ff.), at the time of his landing in Asia Alexander had 32,000 infantry
consisting of 12,000 Macedonian infantry; 7,000 allies; 5,000 mercenaries; 7,000 Odrysians (Odrysai),
Triballians (Triballoi) and Illyrians (Illyroi); and of 1,000 Agrianian javeliners and archers. The cavalry
28
Alternatively, it is possible as suggested by Heckel (2008, 42-3) that the story of Hefaistion sacrificing to Patrokles
and Alexander to Achilles is almost certainly late – after all Arrian notes that only some alleged such event- and that
real purpose was to stress the Panhellenic propaganda and Alexander’s alleged descend from his mother’s side from
Achilles. One such possible later date would in fact have been Arrian’s own period. It would not be impossible to
suppose that it was Arrian himself who had invented such stories at a time when the emperor Trajan had been openly
gay and the current emperor Hadrian was also openly so with Antinous. Hadrian would have loved to have been
compared to Alexander in his tastes. It is also possible that the homosexual relationship between Achilles and Patroklos
is a later invention, but we do not know for certain. However, I have here chosen to follow what Arrian wrote, because
at the time, it would by no means have been unacceptable for Alexander and Hefaistion to have been lovers in their
youth. Such behaviour may in fact been encouraged before the age of maturity and marriage. [2013: It should be
noted, however, that there were and are historians who vehemently deny that such behaviour was acceptable. I
do not have any definite opinion on this because I have not studied the language and all of the period sources for
this purpose, but I do hope that a full-blown study of that will resolve the question once and for all in the future]

26
consisted 1,800 Macedonian Companions (hetairoi) commanded by Philotas son of Parmenion; 1,800
Thessalians (Thettaloi) under Kallas son of Harpalos; 600 Greeks under Erigyios; 900 Thracian and Paionian
prodromoi (scouts also known as sarissoforoi) under Kassandros, making a total of 5,100 cavalry.29 In
addition to these, there were the 10,000 soldiers sent previously by Philip to Asia, but we do not know
whether these forces were subsequently used to reinforce Alexander’s main field army or whether they
contributed to the overall effort by controlling some strategic key points near the landing zone. 30 Antipatros
had been left 12,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry for the security of Macedonia and Greece.
In the meanwhile, the Persians in Asia Minor had done nothing concrete to prevent the crossing of the
Hellespont, but they had still managed to assemble their forces to oppose Alexander. There has been a lot of
speculation about the lack of coherent leadership among the Persians and since the sources do not specify
any overall commander [p.60] for the Persians most historians consider the Persians to have been led by a
committee of satraps, generals and grandees31. In my opinion, this conclusion is wrong. The actual
reconstruction of the Persian battle array demonstrates that the overall commander was either Mithridates,
the son-in-law of Dareios (Darius), or Farnakes (Pharnaces), Darios’ brother-in-law32. I would suggest that
Mithridates was probably the nominal commander while Farnakes acted as his advisor. Memnon of Rhodes,
the Greek mercenary commander in Persian service, recommended the wisest course of action, the use of
guerrilla warfare and policy of scorched earth and diversionary campaign in Greece to defeat Alexander, but
the local satrap Arsites unequivocally stated that he would not accept any destruction of the property of his
subjects and the rest of the Persians rallied to this opinion. Consequently, the Persians gathered their forces
in a strong defensive position behind the River Granicus. The Persians were proud and brave.
Alexander was more than happy to comply with the wishes of the satraps and to come to the chosen
battle site, because he wanted to engage the enemy in a decisive pitched battle in order to gain operational
freedom in Asia Minor. Furthermore, as stated by Waldemar Heckel among others, Alexander was running
out of money in 10 days and he also needed a significant victory in order to convince the Greek cities to open
their gates to him33. Initially Alexander sent the scouts (skopoi) under Amyntas consisting of the ilê of
Apollonian hetairoi and four ilai of prodromoi cavalry ahead of the army to reconnoiter. See Map 2.
[p.61] According to Arrian, the Persian army consisted of 20,000 cavalry and 20,000 Greek mercenary
infantry while according to Diodoros the Persians had 10,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry. Both figures
have rightly been suspected by contemporary historians, but have not been compared with the period military
practices. I would suggest that we can arrive at a likely figure for the Persian cavalry by comparing the

29
According to Diodoros, there were 4,500 cavalry, but he has miscalculated the totals.
30
The other sources give slightly different totals, but Diodoros’ totals seem to have come from the original. For a
detailed discussion of the totals in the various sources, see Brunt’s introduction in Arrian (p. lxixff.) and Devine 1988
(AncW18). However, as noted by Brunt, one should probably also add to the totals the 10,000 men previously sent by
Philip to Asia (Polyainos 5.44.4), but we do not know how many of these, if any, were used to reinforce Alexander’s
main force.
31
See for example Devine (1988, AncW 18, 6-9) and Heckel, 2008, 45.
32
The reconstruction is based on the fact that the position of the Persian grandees in the centre corresponds to the actual
Indo-Persian practice of using five divisions and a reserve in cavalry combat, for which see the discussion later. Devine
(1988, 6) has in my opinion rightly noted the presence of the Persian grandees in the centre, but has failed to notice that
these would have been placed behind the main line and that it would have been what is termed as commander’s reserve.
33
Heckel, 2008, 45.

27
length of the Macedonian and Persian lines to each other. See below! As regards to the size of the Greek
mercenary infantry, A.M. Devine has suggested the reducing of the 20,000 given by Arrian to 4,000-5,00034.
However, I would not go as low as he has. Dareios had indeed given Memnon only 4,000-5,000 Greek
hoplites, but there would also have been other Greeks in Persian service among the armies of the satraps. I
would therefore suggest that we check the reliability of Arrian’s account before we arrive at any conclusion
as to their strength.
[Map 2 below left on p. 61 before the sentence According to Arrian..; Map 3 below right was not
included in the Saga article]

Macedonians march to the

Hellespont/Dardanelles
MAP 3

Persian army

Abydus
Granicus Map 2
Troy

Lesbos Alexander’s route

Sardis

Chios Ephesu
s

Rhodes

According to Arrian (Anabasis 1.13.1), when Alexander learnt of the concentration of enemy forces,
he advanced with his army arrayed ready for battle. The hoplites were drawn up in two lines (undoubtedly
Macedonians in front and Greeks behind as in all of the major battles against Persia, see below) with cavalry
placed on the wings, and the array was preceded by a vanguard of cavalry sarissoforoi (= c. 900 prodromoi)
and 500 infantry psiloi under Hegelochos35. See Diagram 9. The psiloi probably rode pillion [p.62] behind

34
Devine, 1988, 7-9.
35
In other words, unlike Devine (1988, 5-6) and many others supposes, the conclusion drawn earlier by Judeich and
Kromayer-Veith that the surviving battle accounts have left out the presence and exploits of the second Greek phalanx
placed behind the Macedonians, is a sound one.

28
the riders or on their spare horses. The baggage train was ordered to follow behind. The scouts soon
informed Alexander that the enemy was drawn up for battle on the other side of the Granicus. Parmenion
(Parmenio) advised Alexander to rest his army and attack at dawn, but Alexander wisely chose to attack the
enemy immediately as that would discourage them. After this, Alexander sent Parmenion to take command
of the left wing while he himself would take command of the right wing.

DIAGRAM 9

According to Arrian (1.14.1ff.)36, Alexander had placed in front of his right wing Philotas son of
Parmenion, with the hetairoi (Companion) cavalry (c.1,584?), and the c.1,000 archers and Agrianian
javeliners. Next to Philotas, Alexander placed Amyntas, son of Arrabeos, together with the sarissoforoi
(sarisaforoi), Paionai/Paionians/Paeonians (Thracian sarissaforoi of the client king of Paionia) and
Sokrates’ ilê of hetairoi. The sarissoforoi consisted of about 684 or 756 horsemen37 and Sokrates’ ilê of c.
216 horsemen. Next to them were placed the 3,000 (= 3,07238) hypaspistai of the hetairoi under Nikanor son
of Parmenion. Now on the basis of this, most of the modern reconstructions of the battle array place the
sarissoforoi and Sokrates’ ilê next to the [p.63] hypaspists, but this is actually a mistake. If one takes the
“next to them” to refer to the whole cavalry wing, beginning with the hetairoi cavalry, the text starts to make
a lot more sense. It would also explain better the way in which the marching order in readiness for combat
was changed for the actual combat with the addition of the vanguard. The vanguard was simply placed on
the outer right wing while the whole array preceded by the Companion cavalry was marched opposite to the

36
Arrian is the only extant source to give details of Alexander’s array. The unit strengths are taken from Diodoros.
37
900 – 216 Odrysians = 684 horsemen, or (if the Paeonians and Odrysians consisted of c.300 men) 900 – 144 (150 ≈
144 = 4 x 36) = 756.
38
I have here opted to guess that during Alexander’s reign the Macedonian phalanx was already organized in 256 men
combat units with alternative unit depths of 4, 8, 16 or 32 men. However, the use of dekas for a file proves that the
Macedonian phalanx was originally organized into 10 rank phalanxes. If this system was still used, then the hypaspists
and phalangites were organized on units divisible with the figure 10 and the basic unit would have been about 150 men
strong. This would tally with the figures 3,000 hypaspists (20 x 150) and 9,000 phalangites (6 taxeis each consisting of
10x150 = 1,500 men). However, no source supports this. In fact, Polybios’ (12.19.6ff.) criticism of Callisthenes’ text
proves that Alexander already used the division of the phalanx into depths of 32 ranks, 16, 8 and 4 so familiar to us
from the Hellenistic military treatises.

29
river. Beside the hypaspists were the taxeis of the Macedonian phalanx consisting of the divisions of
Perdikkas, Koenos,39 Amyntas son of Andromenes and Philip son of Amyntas.
On the left wing were first the 1,800 Thessalian cavalry commanded by Kallas/Kalas, next the 600
allied cavalry under Philip son of Menelaos, and then the ilê of Thracian Odrysians (6 x 36 = 216 men, or 4 x
36 = 144?) under Agathon. Just like their sarissoforoi counterparts on the right wing, it is likely that the
Odrysians acted as flank guards to their cavalry wing. The allied cavalry may also have been placed between
the phalanx and Thessalians. On their right were the taxeis of the Macedonian phalanx consisting of the
divisions of Krateros (note above), Meleagros (Meleager) and Philip (a doublet of the one mentioned above).
It should be noted that this description of the battle array leaves out the second line of hoplites mentioned
previously that must have consisted of the 12,000 allies and mercenaries. In truth these Greeks must have
played a very important role in the battle because according to the ancient sources the Granicus River
presented a formidable obstacle to the Macedonian pike phalanx40, which means that they had to plug in any
holes appearing in the Macedonian phalanx. The Greek hoplite phalanx was much more flexible in that
respect than the Macedonian phalanx. It is also unlikely that the Macedonians would have used the shorter
3.74 cm spear at this battle, because the Macedonians would have gained extra advantage from the use of the
sarissae when they had to fight their way up a steep riverbank against the Persian cavalry.
The working hypothesis that I have adopted here is that the original Macedonian cavalry wedge
consisted of 36 horsemen (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 = 36) arrayed with a depth of six [p.64] horsemen41. The actual
figures given for the hetairoi and sarissoforoi cavalry seem to bear out this hypothesis. The 1,800 hetairoi
would therefore have been divided into 50 squadrons (tetrachia?) and the sarissoforoi into 25 squadrons.
Since the hetairoi consisted of eight ilai, it is clear that the ilai themselves consisted of different numbers of
squadrons, the largest number of squadrons probably belonging to the royal bodyguard ilê Basilike/agêma.

39
In the existing manuscripts Arrian 1.14.2 mentions Krateros after Koenos, but as noted by Brunt (Arrian /Brunt p.59,
n.3) this must be a later interpolation, because Krateros was actually on the left as always.
40
In other words, I do not accept the argumentation of Devine (1988, 4) after Hammond (Alexander the Great: King,
Commander and Statesman, 70-3) that on the basis of the dried up ancient river bed a kilometre away from the modern
river (the flow of which is controlled by artificial flood banks), the ancient river must not have presented any great
obstacle to the crossing and the sources therefore reflect only the glorification of Alexander’s achievement. First of all,
the modern river is in a different locale and secondly its flow is controlled by flood banks. In order to gain
experimental information, one would have to transfer the river bank to its original locale and try to figure out the
amount of water flow in it at the time of Alexander’s conquests. Therefore, it is safer to trust what the ancient sources
state, especially so because the Persians clearly considered the river usable as a defensive barrier.
41
However, as noted previously, it is possible that at the time the Macedonian wedge was organized in the
Scythian/Thracian manner (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 men), and that the use of the rank and file wedge belongs to the time of
the reform in 330-328. However, it is still more likely that the rank and file system was in use already and that
Alexander just added two ranks to the formation when he had more men available. In short, when Alexander received
reinforcements to his hetairoi in 331 BC, he seems to have reorganized both the organization and the structure of the
wedge array. After this, the wedges appear to have consisted of 64 horsemen arrayed in files and ranks. The
reorganization had many aims: the arrangement of the men in files and ranks made it easier to incorporate new recruits
consisting of Greeks and Persians (if the change occurred then); the larger size made the unit more effective in melee
when they were facing larger enemy units; the use of the rank and file structure allowed shorter training period. The
rhombus formation appears to have been similarly reorganized according to these lines when Alexander disbanded the
Thessalians. Henceforth, unless consisting of allied Thessalians, the cavalry rhomboids consisted of 128 men arrayed in
ranks and files. The rank and file rhomboid came to later serve as a model for the Parthian and Armenian rhomboid
array. For additional argumentation, see the discussion later. In this respect, it is particularly important to note that the
Perso-Arabian version of Aelian’s treatise contains diagram only of the rank and file version (Gotha Ms. Cap. 19, pp.
56-7) with 113 horsemen (perfect rhombus with one rank short of the 128 men).

30
On the basis of this, I would suggest that the ilê Basilike consisted probably of 288 horsemen (8 x 36 = 288)
while the rest of the ilai consisted of 216 horsemen (7 x 216 = 1,512). The Thracian and prodromoi cavalry
would also have consisted of different sized ilai, the size of which it is impossible to state with any
certainty42.
Another working hypothesis adopted here is that the military manuals have actually misunderstood the
way in which the Thessalian and later the Macedonian rhombus array were formed. All agree that a wedge
constituted the front half of the rhombus array and that the rear half of the rhombus also consisted of a
wedge, but all, with the notable exception of Arrian43, a practicing soldier, have reconstructed the rhombus in
such a manner [p.65] that the end result looks like a perfect rhombus, but it does not consist of two equal
sized wedges. In order to make the rhombus a perfect rhombus they have left out the rear rank of the rear
wedge. However, if one reconstructs the rhombus to consist of two actual wedges, then the sources are in
agreement, and the reformed unit structure would correspond with the formations (32 for square/oblong, 64
for wedge, and 128 for rhombus). I have here adopted the solution that the Thessalians would have used the
“Scythian” rhombus of 36 horsemen to make its structure similar to that of the hetairoi on the other flank as
the sources would seem to suggest, but it also possible to think that the Thessalian rhombus could consisted
of two wedges arrayed in ranks and files just like the later rhombus, which would mean that there were 72
horsemen per rhombus, then there were exactly 25 rhomboids (25 x 72 = 1,800) each arranged as two 36
wedges back to back. However, the array also afforded some flexibility. If there was a shortage of men
resulting from sickness, injuries, deaths etc., it would still have been possible to form a perfect rhombus just
by taking away one rank of horsemen.
As regards to the 600 allied Greek cavalry, it is unfortunately impossible to arrive at any definite
hypothesis, because the squadron sizes in the military manuals allow many different reconstructions and the
different Greek cities seem to have followed different practices. The military manuals give the following
different alternatives for the Greek square or oblong squadrons: 3 ranks of 9 horsemen = 27; 4 ranks of 8
horsemen = 32; 4 ranks of 12 = 48; 8 ranks of 16 = 128; 5 ranks of 10 = 50; 10 ranks of 20 = 20044. The
figure 600 is divisible with the 50 and 200 horsemen squadrons, the former consisting of 12 squadrons and
the latter of three squadrons. However, one also has to remember that the figure of 600 horsemen is likely to
be a nice round figure, an approximation, which means that one cannot achieve any certainty. If the Greeks
used 27 men squadrons, then there would have been 22 squadrons and 594 men. If the Greeks used 32 men
squadrons, then the paper strength would have been 19 squadrons for a total 608 men. The other alternatives

42
According to Sekunda’s (2004, 24-6) calculation there were four ilai of Thracian prodromoi scouting cavalry
belonging to the royal army and another four ilai of auxiliary Thracian cavalry (the Paeonian and Odrysian ilai). In
other words, while the figure 900 is readily divisible into 36 horsemen wedges, it is not divisible into eight ilai. [2013:
if the prodromoi consisted of 128 men rhomboids, then the total 7x128=896 would be close to the figure 900].
43
Arrian Tactica 17.1-2 explains the rhombus as follows: “The ilarch is placed first, and the cavalry on either side of
him do not go forward in step with him, but advance sufficiently behind him for the heads of their horses to be more or
less at the level of the shoulders of the horse on which the ilarch is riding. Similarly the subsequent ranks in turn
broaden out as far as the half-way line of the whole, and from there in same way they narrow the formation and so
complete the rhombus. The half of a rhombus is a wedge, consequently in what I have already explained the formation
of the wedge.” Tr. by Frank Brudenall in Hyland, 1990, 71. In other words, Arrian’s text can be understood in a
manner in which the rhombus consisted of two equal sized wedges placed back to back.
44
[p.65] Asclepiodotos 7.4; Aelian 18.5-7; Arrian, Tactica 16.9-14. Some of the figures are based on the claim that the
Greeks deployed horsemen with the principle of having three times as many men in length than in depth.

31
are quite far off from the overall figure of 600 men. 45 There is obviously no certainty, but I have here
adopted as a working hypothesis that the Greeks would have been deployed in twelve 50 men squadrons in
order to make the cavalry wing wider.
On the basis of Polybios’ (12.18.2ff.) analysis of the space occupied by cavalry in battle formation,
according to which each cavalry unit had an interval equal to its width, the hetairoi cavalry had a frontage of
about 1090-1100 m, the right wing sarissoforoi occupied a frontage of about 300-350 m, the Thessalians
about 890-900 m, Odrysian ilê [p.66] about 80-121 m, and the Greek cavalry about 230-240 m46. Since the
Agrianians and archers were placed in front of the Companions, they did not add any length to the battle line.
When one remembers that in the eight deep attacking formation (pyknosis), each Macedonian infantryman
occupied about 90 cm in width, then each of the six taxeis of c. 1,536 men had a width of about 192 men
plus the small intervals between the 256 men units. This would give a width of about 1.3 km (1,152 m plus
perhaps 136-150 m for the intervals). The hypaspists would have had a width of about 434 m (384 m plus
the intervals c.40-50 m). The hypaspists were organized as 1,024 men divisions, which were further divided
into 256 men units that were later called as syntagmata (sing. syntagma). In sum, the total length of the
battle line was about 4,324-4,445 m. Alexander’ battle plan was to outflank the enemy with his right wing
cavalry by tying up it first frontally by expendable units.
Unfortunately, the sources do not state how the second infantry phalanx consisting of 7,000 allies and
5,000 mercenaries was organized. Consequently, I have taken the liberty to array them as 1,000 men
divisions behind the Macedonian phalanx47. Each of the divisions would also have consisted of smaller units
not shown here, but which were used to plug in any holes appearing in the Macedonian phalanx.
We can calculate the approximate strength of the Persian cavalry line on the basis of the length of the
Macedonian line. In order to do this, the first thing we need to know is the strength of the Persian cavalry
squadron (ilê) and how they were deployed for combat. Fortunately, both Diodoros and Polybios have left
us with clear clues to follow. According to Diodoros, the Persian squadron of Kinsmen consisted of 40
horsemen, which implies combat deployments either of 8 files and 5 ranks, or 5 files and 8 ranks. The
former deployment would have been used in the open terrain to cover as wide a frontage as possible and/or
for skirmishing in single files (see later), while the latter would have been used either in restricted terrain or
when the intention was to initiate a [p.67] breakthrough. In his criticism of Callisthenes (Kallisthenes),
Polybios (12.17.1ff.) states that the maximum depth for the Persian cavalry was 8 ranks and that when each

45
If the Greeks used 48 men squadrons, then there would have been 12 to 13 squadrons and 576-624 men. If the
Greeks used 128 men squadrons, then there would have been five squadrons and 640 men.
46
In the making of this calculation, I have assumed about 1 m per horseman in width for the rank and file arrays and for
the Scythian arrays 1.5 m, and then rounded up the figures even more as an allowance for the men not fully closing up.
47
According to Lazenby’s (1989, 64-5) calculation, in the fourth century the Spartans probably arrayed their army into
morai (sing. mora) consisting of 1,280 men. According to the same controversial organizational chart, each mora had
probably 32 enomotiai divided into eight pentekostyes and two lochoi. Therefore the full strength mora consisted of
1,280 men, a lochos 640 men and a pentekostys 160 men and an enomotia 40 men. In practise, however, the number
could be considerably less. For example at Leuctra 371 BC, the four morai had only 1,120 men. If the allies and
mercenaries followed this practise, which is a distinct possibility, because the Lacedaimonians and Peloponnesians were
the archetypical mercenaries, the array would have consisted of nine to ten morai with a total of 11,520-12,800 men.
However, since we do not know how the men were organized, I have simply arrayed them in ten divisions.

32
ilê48 had an interval equal to its width, a stadion would hold a maximum of 800 horsemen. In other words,
there were a maximum of 20 ilai (5 files by 8 ranks) per stadion, which means that the Persian ilê consisted
of 40 horsemen. Callisthenes’ total for the Persian vanguard cavalry in the Battle of Issus, 30,000 horsemen,
gives a total of 750 ilai of cavalry that would have to have been deployed in three lines if Callisthenes’
figures were right as observed by Polybios (12.18)49. In other words, Polybios considered it possible that the
Persians could deploy their cavalry in successive lines! The actual battle descriptions prove that when the
Persian ilai were deployed in width, the Persian cavalry sought to harass the enemy with flying columns/files
of horsemen who advanced out of their own ilai and then threw their javelins at the enemy while galloping
and engaged the enemy at close quarters when it suited them. If the enemy advanced against these brave
warriors, then their ilai could advance forward to protect them in close order and throw their javelins
collectively in a concentrated volley against the enemy.
Now we need to determine the manner in which the Persian 40 horsemen ilai were deployed in this
particular battle. If the ilai were deployed in the shallow formation (8 files by 5 ranks) to increase the length
of the line50, then with the smaller frontage (4,324 m) the Persian cavalry front would have consisted of at
least of c.10,800 horsemen (270 ilai) in addition to which came the reserve. In this case each of the five
divisions would have consisted in average of 2,160 horsemen, which makes it likely that the reserve also
consisted of 2,160 horsemen making a grand total of 12,960 horsemen. This would render support for
Diodoros’ figure of 10,000 horsemen, but if the ilai were deployed in depth (5 files by 8 ranks) in order to
make the Persian cavalry line more resistant to Macedonian cavalry charge, then with the larger frontage
(4,445m) there would have been a maximum of about 17,800 horsemen (445 ilai) and a reserve consisting of
about 3,560 horsemen for a grand total of c.21,360 horsemen.51 This would make Arrian’s figure of 20,000
horsemen closer to the truth. In sum, it is possible that both figures [p.68] are based on contemporary
evidence, which would have been based on the guess made by the participants regarding the depth of the
enemy formation. It is in fact possible that both depths were used depending upon the tactical intentions of
the commanders. Some may have preferred to post their elite units as striking forces with deeper depth while
others would have preferred the skirmishing tactics with javelins.
In order to solve this question we have to turn to the description of the Persian battle formation
provided by Diodoros. According to him (17.19.3ff.), the Persian left wing consisted of cavalry under
Memnon of Rhodes and the satrap of Kilikia Arsamenes. Next to them were stationed the Paphlagonian
cavalry under Arsites; then the Hyrkanians under the satrap of Lydia and Ioania Spithrobates. The right

48
In Polybios’ lifetime the ilê meant a cavalry unit of 64 horsemen, but here the ilê clearly means a Persian cavalry
squadron!
49
Each of Polybios’ (12.18) Persian cavalry strengths are divisible with the 40 horsemen: a stadion held 800 horse (20
ilai); ten stadia held 8,000 (200 ilai); four stadia held 3,200 (80 ilai); 14 stadia held 11,200 (280 ilai); 30,000 horsemen
(750 ilai).
50
Arrian’s (Anabasis 1.15.1ff.) description of the Persian battle tactics on the riverbank consisting of volleys of thrown
javelins followed up by hand to hand combat and Diodoros’ battle narrative (17.20, see the analysis below) with its
flying columns/files of Persian horsemen and volleys of thrown javelins may imply that the Persian ilai were deployed
as units of 8 files by 5 ranks, but not conclusively so.
51
In other words, there would have been about 13,560-14,296 horsemen (rounded up here to 15,000). One might also
consider the possibility that the ilai were deployed without the regular intervals (implies a maximum of 16,950-17,870
horsemen), but considering Persian cavalry tactics, which required manoeuvrability this alternative is very unlikely.

33
wing consisted of 1,000 Medes and 2,000 horsemen with Rheomitres and 2,000 Bactrians52. In addition,
other national picked elite contingents were placed on the centre. If Diodoros has recorded the numbers
correctly, this means that each of the three sections (left, centre, right53) had 5,000 troops, which in turn
would mean that the Persians fielded about 15,000 horsemen (375 x 40 horsemen ilai) in the front line and
behind it a reserve force consisting of about 3,000 horsemen (75 ilai). In sum, the evidence points to the
likelihood that the Persians used the deep unit order (ilai deployed for combat in 5 files by 8 ranks) to
counter the weight of the Macedonian attack and fielded about 18,000 horsemen in total.
Diodoros’ battle narrative shows that the reserve elite cavalry units placed behind the front line
consisted at least of the Persians and included units belonging to the crème de la crème of the Persian
cavalry, the Kinsmen. These elite units were probably under the nominal command of Mithridates while
Farnakes acted as his second-in-command. Farnakes may in fact have been the regular commander of the
Kinsmen, who on this occasion had been placed under his junior Mithridates. As regards to the rest of the
commanders, this still leaves out the commanders of the Medes and Bactrians. According to Arrian, the
Persians were commanded by Arsames, Rheomithres, Petenes, Nifates, Spithridates and Arsites (5 divisions
+ reserve). On the basis of this, the commanders would have been Petenes and Nifates, but this is less than
likely. Arrian’s text implies that they were divisional commanders and not adjutants or sub-officers.
Furthermore, since both Diodoros and Arrian seem to have confused Spithridates and Mithridates54 with each
other, it is clear that we cannot achieve any definite certainty of [p.69] who was in command of which
divisions in this battle. All we can state is that there were in all probability five cavalry divisions placed in
front and one cavalry division as commander’s reserve55. As a working hypothesis we can adopt the
following command structure: outer left wing under Arsames who was assisted by Memnon; left wing under
Arsites; centre under the satrap of Ionia and Lydia; right wing under Rheomitres; outer right wing under
someone; and reserve under Mihtridates/Spithridates. On the basis of the above analysis, it appears likely
that Arrian has preserved numbers that are closest to the truth. This probably means that we should also
consider his figure for the infantry only very slightly exaggerated.
According to Arrian (1.14.4-15.2), when the Persians observed how Alexander had arrayed his troops
and noticed that he had taken personally charge of the right wing, they opposed him with the best of their
Persian cavalry. In other words, they appear to have reinforced their left wing with their elite reserve units.
They played into Alexander’s hand! The Battle formations of the respective armies are given below in

52
In other words, if the right wing with the outer right wing had 5,000 horsemen, it is likely that the other divisions had
approximately same numbers of men, which Diodoros has himself failed to notice.
53
The Greco-Roman writers seem not to have understood the standard Indo-Persian battle array consisting of the outer
left and right wings, left and right wings, centre and reserve, and always describe the arrays with their own conceptual
system (left, centre and right).
54
Diodoros names Spithrobates as son-in-law of Dareios while Arrian names Mithridates as son-in-law of Dareios. It
also appears likely that the authors have confused Spithrobates and Spithridates. The confusion must have resulted
from the fact that the satrap of Lydia and Ionia (Spithrobates or Spithridates) fought in the centre of the frontline, while
Dareios’ son-in-law (probably Mithridates, but Arrian may have confused him with the hyparch Mithrobuzanes) also
fought in the centre but behind at the head of the reserve division.
55
Arrian’s six commanders imply the use of five divisions and one reserve division, but he has not really understood
how these were deployed.

34
Diagram 10. It is also possible that Sokrates may have been dressed like the king to fool Memnon and
Persians. [p.70]
Battle of the Granicus River
DIAGRAM
10

B A
E D C

2
4 1
8 7 6 5

The Persians The Macedonians

A. Outer Left Wing under Arsames and Memnon 1. Sarissoforoi and Sokrates’ ilê.
B. Left Wing under Arsites. 2. Agrianians and archers.
C. Centre/Front under Spithrobates or Petenes? 3. Companions under Philotas and Alexander.
D. Right wing under Nifates? 4. Hypaspists
E. Outer Right Wing under Rheomitres? 5. Six taxeis of Macedonian phalangites
F. Reserve under Mithridates/Spithridates? 6. Thessalians
G. Greek mercenary infantry on a hill. 7. Greek cavalry.
8. Odrysian ilê.
9. Greek hoplites.

According to Arrian (Anabasis 1.14.5ff.), Alexander ordered the prodromoi, the Paionians, one taxis
of infantry (undoubtedly the Agrianians and archers) and Sokrates’ ilê under Amyntas son of Arrabaios to
plunge into the stream first. Their mission was clearly to attack frontally the Persian outer left wing and tie
them up56. Alexander did not [p.71] expect them to be able to force their way on the shore, but simply to
keep the enemy preoccupied while he himself attacked elsewhere. Devine has very aptly called this move a

56
The use of shielding forces in front of the hetairoi cavalry was to become one of the trademarks of Alexander’s battle
tactics. The same concept was later employed by the Diadochoi and other Hellenistic monarchs, but instead of the
Agrianians, archers, infantry and possibly of cavalry, they usually employed elephants or elephants with light infantry.
The use of light infantry and caltrops on the one side and the elephants and light infantry on the other side can be seen
for example at the Battle of Gaza. The use of similar tactics can also be witnessed for example at the battles of Raphia
and Magnesia. The tactical purpose [p.71] of these forces was to protect the cavalry force for the decisive action to be
undertaken at the right moment while disordering or distracting the enemy. Sidnell (94ff.) has struck the right cord in
suggesting that Alexander the Great led his Companion Cavalry obliquely upstream to the right passing behind the
advance screen so as to extend the line to outflank the enemy.

35
Pawn-Sacrifice57. After this Alexander led the right wing obliquely into the river behind Sokrates and
Prodromoi to outflank the Persian left wing58. While Alexander was making his decisive move, the troops
(Prodromoi) under Amyntas were in trouble. The Persians had advanced to the riverbank to oppose the
attack. They threw volley after volley of javelins from the bank above and caused great numbers of
casualties among the attackers - some Persians even advanced down to the stream where ground was more
level. The cavalries fought almost like infantry, horses shoving horses, while the Macedonians thrust their
spears and Persians used their shorter javelins. The heavily outnumbered Macedonians first across the river
were all cut down, except those who managed to retreat back. According to Arrian, 25 of the Companions
fell in the very first encounter. However, at that moment Alexander had already crossed the river and
outflanked the Persians unopposed. It seems likely that he attacked the closest of the enemy ilai on the flank
to help the prodromoi to overcome their opposition, while the rest of the Companion squadrons took their
places on his right side in opposite order as they had previously been, each one taking its place as it reached
its position further out in the line.59 See Diagram 11. [p.72]
[p.72] According to Arrian (1.15.3 ff.), Alexander charged the Persians at the head of his men just
where the Persian cavalry were massed and the Persian commanders (hêgemones) were posted (i.e. the
center), but between him and them laid at least some units of the Persian left wing. This resulted in a fierce
fight around Alexander. Alexander’s outflanking attack made it relatively easy for the rest of the
Macedonian army including the taxeis to cross the river. Alexander’s attack had unbalanced the enemy. On
the other wing, according to Diodoros (17.19.6), the Thessalian cavalry under Parmenion gallantly met the
enemy attack. According to Arrian, the right wing cavalry battle resembled an infantry battle in which horse
shoved horse and man shoved man, the Macedonians trying to push the Persians away from the river bank,
while the Persians tried to push them back [p.73] into the river. The Macedonians, however, were soon
gaining the advantage mainly because they were fighting with xystoi (cornel-wood lances) against palta
(sing. palton, a short javelin).
According to Arrian, it was at this point in the melee that Alexander’s dory (i.e. xyston) was broken.
He first called his groom Aretas for another, but Aretas had also snapped his lance and was fighting with the
rear half. He showed his xyston to Alexander and told him to call on someone else. Demaratos of Korinth,
one of the hetairoi, gave Alexander his xyston. We can deduce from this account that Alexander had by now
defeated that part of the Persian left wing that had turned to oppose him and had halted in front of the enemy

57
Devine (AncW 18, 1988) with Devine (1989, Hackett, 109-111). We agree with Alexander’s purpose, but disagree in
details of the battle array and in the directions of the movements of the troops.
58
Arrian, Anabasis 1.14.7; Polyainos 4.3.16. As a result of this manoeuvre Alexander and his companions managed to
reach the opposing bank without facing opposition. It is possible that it was this that led to Diodoros’ (17.19.3)
misunderstanding that Alexander had managed to cross the river unopposed in the early morning: “But Alexander at
dawn boldly brought his army across the river and deployed in good order before they could stop him.” Tr. by Bradford
Welles, 171. In other words, if one substitutes the word dymanis (army) with the hetairoi, then the account makes a lot
more sense.
59
This is of course my own guess. It is possible that Alexander would have led his cavalry further out to avoid
engaging the enemy wing at all and then led out his whole force in the same formation as previously. It just seems to
me to have been the more dangerous course to take. By charging immediately the enemy flank, he would have relieved
some pressure off the prodoromoi cavalry. Furthermore, it would tally with the information that he fought and broke
his xyston before he engaged the enemy commanders.

36
reserve (see next) to rearm himself. According to Arrian, Alexander then grasped the new xyston and saw
Mithridates, son-in-law of Dareios, riding far ahead of the line.
[Diagram 11, i.e. the Diagram 12 of Saga is on p.72 before “According to Arrian (1.15.3)…” in
Saga]

Battle of the Granicus River

DIAGRAM 11

1. Sarissoforoi and Sokrates’ ilê attack to tie the Persians’ outer left flank in place.
2. Agrianians and archers attack to keep the Persian left flank in place.
3. Companions under Philotas and Alexander advance obliquely toward the right and outflank the Persian left. Alexander
wheels left first and forms the left flank of the line of Companions while the rest assume their places towards the right.

Diodoros’ account clarifies what happened. According to him, Spithrobates, son-in-law of Dareios
(i.e. Mithridates) hurled himself together with a large body of cavalry and with a unit of 40 Kinsmen against
the Macedonians. He pressed hard the Macedonian lines and in a fierce attack slew some and wounded
others. Since the attack seemed dangerous, Alexander turned his horse towards the satrap and rode at him.
In other words, counterattack of the Persian reserve threw part the line of Companions (i.e. the right wing
that had already advanced against the center, because Alexander was apparently on the left wing of the line
of Companions) into confusion, but Alexander came to the rescue. According to Diodoros, Spithrobates (i.e.
Mithridates) saw this as a god given opportunity. He could save the day by killing Alexander. He threw his
javelin at Alexander with such power that it pierced Alexander’s shield (i.e. the shield taken from Troy) and
the epomis (shoulder) of the breastplate. Despite this the javelin did not wound Alexander. The king merely
shook off the dangling javelin and exploited the momentum of his horse to drive his spear to the chest of the

37
satrap, but the armour withstood the strike. The satrap drew his sword, but Alexander changed his grip and
thrust his xyston at the face. The Persian fell, but at the same moment, his brother Rhosakes (Rhoisakes)
split Alexander’s helmet with his sword. When he was trying to strike another blow, Kleitos the Black (ho
melas) cut off his arm. It was at that moment that the rest of the Kinsmen came to the rescue. They
protected the two fallen men in closed array and threw a volley of javelins at Alexander and then advanced to
kill the king. Alexander did not give in, but fought back furiously. He received two blows on the
breastplate, one on the helmet and three on the shield. After this several other noble Persian were said to
have died, which means that the timely arrival of Alexander’s companions saved the day. As a result the
surviving Kinsmen fled and with them the rest of the Persian cavalry still on the field.
[p.74] Arrian gives a slightly different account. According to him, after having received the xyston,
Alexander led out his own wedge forward in advance of his own men and thrust his xyston into Mithridates’
face and hurled him to the ground60. Then Rhoisakes rode at Alexander, struck him on the helmet with a
kopis-saber, but Alexander thrust him to the ground too with his xyston that pierced his cuirass. At that
moment, Spithridates had raised his kopis to hit Alexander from behind, but Kleitos, son of Dropides, struck
first with his kopis and cut off Spithridates’ shoulder together with the sword hand. It was at this point that
the Persians were beginning to be hard pressed on all quarters. They were being pushed back by the cavalry
and were suffering terribly from the attacks of the light infantry, who had intermingled with the cavalry. In
other words, the Agrianians and archers had advanced between the cavalry units to attack the now vulnerable
stationary enemy cavalry. According to Arrian, the first to give way had been those opposing Alexander in
the centre (i.e. the commander’s reserve division) followed by the cavalry wings. According to Arrian, about
1,000 enemy horsemen perished in the battle and in the following short pursuit, after which Alexander turned
his troops against the remaining mercenary infantry. However, according to Diodoros (17.21.6), not less
than 2,000 Persian horsemen were killed, before Alexander turned his attention to enemy infantry, while
according to Plutarch (Alexander, 16.7), the death toll among the Persian cavalry stood at 2,500 horsemen.
According to Diodoros (17.21.4), the Thessalian cavalry had also distinguished themselves and gained
great fame because of their skillful handling of their ilai and unmatched bravery. Unfortunately, it is not
stated how the Thessalians fought, but one may guess that they might have directed their rhomboids at the
intervals between the Persian cavalry units in order to break apart the enemy formation. If they did this, they
could throw their javelins simultaneously at the two units on both sides while penetrating the enemy line. In
such case, the Thessalian rhomboids would have been outnumbered, but the sheer audacity of such attack
would have lowered the morale of the Persians. Furthermore, if the Persians let the Thessalians through,
they could not make a typical attack from behind, since the rhombus allowed an all-around defense. See
Diagram 12.
[p.76] Unfortunately, the sources do not state how the Greek allies and mercenaries fought against the
Persians. If they first skirmished with the enemy by sending forth files of horsemen, they might have faced a
prolonged period of skirmishing, if the Persians opposite them chose to do the same. In such cases, some of

60
I place a comma between Arrian’s προϊππευοντα and και and take the latter sentence to refer to Alexander’s actions.
Diodoros’ reference in this instance to the 40 horsemen Persian cavalry unit gives additional support for my
interpretation of the wedge (ἔμβολον) as Alexander’s Macedonian unit.

38
the files may have reached the front of the enemy ilai and faced a volley of javelins, or alternatively have
been stopped in their track by the skirmishing enemy files, or they may have crossed the path of the enemy
files, or some sections may have become entangled in a series of single combats. If the Greeks advanced
straight at the enemy, then they would have become embroiled in a desperate melee with the Persians who
held the advantageous ground. The Greeks with their javelins and spears would not have had any special
advantage from their weapons since the Persians (included Bactrians!) were likely to possess better
protective equipment and use equally long spears and javelins.
[Diagram 12 (13 in Saga) is on p.75 in Saga]
Battle of the Granicus River

DIAGRAM 12

1
5
3
6

1. The Persian counterattack throws back the right flank of the Companion cavalry.
2. The Right flank of the Companions is forced back.
3. After having defeated the left flank Persians trying to oppose the outflanking, Alexander grabs a new spear and attacks at the
head of his wedge against the ilê of Kinsmen with the Persian commanders. The Persian commanders see this and advance as a
file to engage Alexander in single combat. Alexander and his Companions managed to kill those who attacked at about the place
with X after which the Kinsmen ilê attacks as a group and throws a volley of javelins at Alexander. Alexander and his closest
Companions are saved by the timely arrival of the rest of the regrouped wedges of Companions. As a result, the Persian center
flees.
4. Part of the Agrianians mingle with the sarissoforoi and Companions and help them to defeat the rest of the Persian outer left
wing, and left wing.
5. The Thessalians defeat the Persian outer right wing while Alexander is fighting against the counterattacking Persian reserve.
6. The phalanx engage the Persian center and wings in frontal combat and forces them to join the rout began with the flight of
their center reserve.

[p.76] We can deduce from the above accounts that after Alexander had defeated part of the enemy’s
reinforced left wing; he had advanced directly against the enemy reserve and center. The Persian elite
troops, the Kinsmen at their head, counterattacked and threw part of Alexander’s hetairoi into confusion61. It

61
If my above suggestion is correct, then the section of the hetairoi in trouble at this point would have been the
outermost right wing, which would have had a clear route open to attack the enemy reserves, while Alexander himself

39
was at this point that Alexander turned his own unit against the Persian commanders and the 40 men unit of
Kinsmen. The Persian Kinsmen were by now clearly using the tactic of sending forward individual files of
riders from the close order unit, who at this case were led by the overall commander in person. It was this
practice that allowed Alexander to engage the enemy commander in a single combat, before the rest of the
troops arrived. The death of the Persian commander and the flight of the Kinsmen sealed the fate of the
Persians. Alexander had aimed his attack directly at position of the enemy leader and had with this one
surgical attack defeated the whole enemy army.
[p.77] After Alexander had pursued the enemy cavalry off the field, he turned his forces against the
remaining enemy infantry. According to Arrian, the mercenary infantry stood where it had been deployed
stunned at what had happened while Alexander surrounded it with his cavalry and infantry phalanx. The
Greeks seem to have expected to be able to surrender, but Alexander would have none of that. He massacred
them all except the 2,000 which were taken prisoners. According to Diodoros, in the ensuing infantry battle
the dispirited Persians lost more than 10,000 men in killed and about 20,000 prisoners. According to
Plutarch, the Persians lost 20,000 footmen killed. It seems preferable to follow Arrian and Plutarch in this
instance rather than Diodoros who seems to have confused the information he had read62. The Greek
mercenaries had clearly expected to be able to surrender on terms and change sides, and when this did not
happen, they simply panicked and were butchered on the spot. In my opinion, it is quite likely that the
enemy infantry had been lulled into believing that they could surrender by giving up their weapons after
which they had been mercilessly killed. It would not have been beyond the capability of the Greek historians
and panegyrists of Alexander to have covered up his treacherous treatment of fellow Greeks. Alexander
was using terror tactics to dissuade the Greeks from joining the Persian side.
The Macedonians were said to have lost 9 foot and 120 horse (Justin 11.6.12) or 9 foot and 25 horse
(Plutarch, Alexander 16.7) or 30 foot and 60 horse (Arrian, Anabasis 1.16.4). We cannot know how
trustworthy any of these casualty figures are, but what is clear is that the victory had been achieved with
remarkably small number of casualties and that most of the casualties were suffered by the cavalry that had
borne the brunt of the battle at the crossing of the river. This suggests that the butchery of the remaining
enemy infantry had been quite one sided affair.
The Persian high command suffered terribly in this battle. According to Arrian, Nifates, Petenes,
Spithridates (satrap of Lydia and Ionia), Mithrobuzanes (hyparchos of Kappadokia), Mithridates (son-in-law
of Dareios), Arbupales (son of Darios, who was son of Artaxerxes II), Farnakes (brother of Dareios’ wife)

was preoccupied with the clearing of the opposing forces on the outer enemy left wing. In other words, Alexander
came to the rescue of his right wing (originally his left wing) Companion cavalry, after he had first cleared the enemy
opposite himself and taken a new xyston to replace the one broken. The counterattack of the Persian Kinsmen and
cavalry reserves had clearly been quite effective and had it not been for Alexander’s timely arrival, the battle could have
ended differently.
62
For an entirely different analysis of the events, see now Rupert Matthews who has based his whole analysis of the
battle on Diodoros’ flawed account. This is in my view a grave mistake. Diodoros has clearly misunderstood his
sources and grossly exaggerated the strength of the Persian infantry and underestimated the strength of Persian cavalry.
In fact, he even contradicts himself by providing detailed information about the strength of the Persian right wing
cavalry (see above). Matthews has also noted that Diodoros’ figure for the cavalry strength is too small. Notably P.
Green, who also put more trust in Diodoros, has changed his view (1991, xiv). For other alternative reconstructions, see
also the excellent article by A.M. Devine and the books by Heckel (2008, 41-51), Warry (2004), Thompson, Hammond
(1994, 66-78; 2004, 65-67, Farrokh (98-99).

40
and Omares (commander of the mercenaries) all fell. This terrible death toll among the command echelon
basically ensured that the Persians lacked almost all command and control in Asia Minor.

[p.78] Alexander’s Generalship at the Battle of Granicus River

If we want to try to assess Alexander’s generalship in this battle, it is clear that it was simply outstanding.
Unlike later, he did not make any serious misjudgments in the heat of battle. The only thing that can be
criticized is his readiness to take personal risks in combat, but we should not forget that this sort of behaviour
was expected of him. He was expected him to fight alongside his Companions, and lead by personal
example. Like any good commander he needed luck, and he had plenty it, and as a result he was able to
decide his battles through the combination of sound tactics, personal example, and individual fighting skills.

5. Gaugamela/Arbela 331 BC
My reconstruction of the battle of Gaugamela/Arbela in 331 is based on a re-interpretation of the
sources in such a way that it takes fully and literally into account the meaning of the military terminology in
the sources. The following reconstruction is based on the combined information in the accounts of Plutarch
(Alexander 31.6-33.11), Polyaenus (4.3.6), Frontinus (2.3.19), Diodorus (17.55.1ff.), Justin (Epitome of
Pompeius Trogus 11.13-14), Curtius (4.12.1ff.), and Arrian (3.7.1ff.). Most of the reconstruction is build
around the narrative of Arrian, which is clearly the only one of the sources to give a coherent account, which
is based on eye-witness account(s).63
I also pay closer attention to the use of the word epikampios in its many forms, and therefore with
what the sources actually say in terms of military terminology versus modern interpretation of the words.
Furthermore, I pay particular attention to the fact that the double phalanx was stated to be double-fronted
(amphistomos) by Arrian (3.12.1), which means that the second line consisting of the Greek mercenary and
allied infantry was as long as the first line and therefore at least equal to the of length of the line of the
phalangites and hypaspists. On the basis of how the flanks were arrayed at 90° degree angle to the phalanx
(i.e. as epikampios)64 and on the basis of Frontinus’ statement that: “At Arbela, Alexander, fearing the
numbers of the enemy, yet confident in the valor of his own troops, drew up a line of battle facing in all
directions, in order that his men, if surrounded, might be able to fight from all sides.65”, I would suggest that
the Greek line also covered the rear of the Thessalian and hetairoi [p.79] cavalry. In other words, I would
suggest that Alexander the Great used a variant of the plaision formation with some cavalry and light
infantry placed outside it as he had already used against the Getae in 335.

63
For additional discussion and analyses of the sources, and for other reconstructions of the battle I refer the reader in
particular to the works of J.F.C. Fuller (163ff.), A.M. Devine (1986, 1989c), N.G.L. Hammond (1994, 138ff.; 2004,
103ff.), W. Heckel (2008, 75ff), and Lonsdale (129ff.). My reconstruction is probably closest to those of Hammond,
Heckel, and Lonsdale
64
Similarly, the right wing of the Macedonian formation at the Battle of Issus was deployed in 90° degree angle to the
phalanx.
65
Frontinus 2.3.19, English tr. by C.E. Bennett, Frontinus, Loeb 1925, p.119.

41
 After the Battle of Granicus River, Alexander had secured Asia Minor while Dareios III had
assembled his forces. When Alexander had learnt of Dareios’ preparations, he decided to seek a battle. The
armies passed each other without noticing it when Alexander marched south along the Syrian coast. Dareios
exploited the situation by blocking Alexander’s route of retreat, but at the same time made the mistake of
arraying his forces in such a locale in which he could not exploit his superior numbers. Alexander was
happy to engage the Persians. After having defeated the Great King, Alexander exploited the situation by
marching southwards along the coast, which enabled him to occupy the harbors and thereby end the threat
posed by the Persian navy. All of this took time. As a result, Dareios III was able to rebuild his army, obtain
numerical superiority, acquire scythed chariots supposedly suitable as weapons of rupture against the
phalanx and cavalry, institute reforms (longer swords and spears to counter the Macedonian advantage in the
length of weapons), and choose and prepare the locale for the decisive battle. He also tried diplomacy to
solve the matter, since his relatives were held hostage by Alexander, but with no result. The armies met near
Arbela/Gaugamela on a level plain, which Dareios had leveled even further, and which was therefore well
suited to Persian cavalry tactics. He had improved the terrain even further by placing hidden caltrops to such
locales that he imagined would be used by the enemy cavalry. He was so confident that the length of the
open plain would suffice that he did not mind that on his left were rougher terrain that was not suited to his
tactical plan. He fully expected that Alexander would fight in his chosen terrain. And in fact he was not
entirely mistaken.
When Alexander learnt from the captured Persian scouts that Dareios III had encamped at Gaugamela
600 stades from the city of Arbela, he stopped for four days to rest his army. He strengthened the camp with
a ditch and palisade, and made it his base camp where he left behind most of the baggage animals and
soldiers unfit for fighting, and, then marched his army through the night to attack the enemy at dawn. When
Dareios heard from his scouts that Alexander was advancing, he arrayed his army for battle. 66 This actually
suggests that Alexander was attempting to steal a battle with a night attack, but failed to accomplish it!
Perhaps, he had made a serious mistake by taking with him the marching column of wagons which were
needed for the pitching of marching camp. It slowed him down. When Alexander descended the hills
between the armies, he found this out himself. He halted the army, and summoned the hetairoi (the nobles),
strategoi (generals), ilarchai (commanders of cavalry ‘regiments’), and hêgemones (leaders) of the allies
[p.80] and foreign mercenary troops. Most urged Alexander to attack, but Parmenion advised that he first
reconnoitered the terrain to see whether the enemy had hidden ditches or stakes in the soil. Alexander
accepted Parmenion’s advise and conducted commander’s reconnaissance in person. In fact, according to
Polyaenus (4.3.17) the Persians had scattered caltrops which Alexander wanted to avoid by his oblique
march towards the right, while according to Curtius (4.13.36-37, 4.15.1), it was actually a deserter who
pointed out the places of the caltrops. The Persians had scattered the caltrops in those places where they
thought Alexander would use his cavalry. When Alexander had conducted his reconnaissance, he again
assembled the same officers and told each to encourage their men.

66
Arrian 3.9.2.

42
 According to the Vulgate tradition it was now that Parmenion advised the use of night attack, which
Alexander refused. As we have seen, this refusal happened only after Alexander had already once tried to
use it and failed. It may even have been an attempt to encourage the men after the failed surprise attack.
Regardless, Alexander knew now that the Persians were prepared for such an eventuality. In fact, the
Persians, who did not have fortified camp, kept their men in battle order throughout the night with the result
that they were already exhausted even before the battle. Alexander also knew that he had qualitatively
superior forces. He only needed to negate the enemy’s numerical advantage with a hollow oblong battle
formation (plaision). He also fully understood that the Persians saw the open battle as a test of their
manhood. As a young man he had already held long discussions with Persian nobility (both refugees and
ambassadors) at Pella. As a result, he knew Persian psyche and he also knew that the Persians were entirely
dependent on their king/commander and his death or flight would end the fight. After this, Alexander had a
good night sleep. In fact, Parmenion had to awaken him up as it seemed as if he would oversleep. It is of
course possible that this was just another gimmick to encourage the men.
Dareios’ battle plan was to encircle Alexander’s army with his numerically superior cavalry forces and
break it into pieces with a frontal attack of his scythed chariots, which would then be exploited by the
cavalry placed behind them. His battle formation followed the traditional Persian lines, but also had some
improvised elements regarding the placing of the outer wings and vanguard forces (chariots, cavalry and
elephants). For the dispositions, see the Diagram 13 with explanations.
The only practically certain figure regarding the army strengths is that Alexander seems to have had
about 7,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry at this battle (Arrian 3.12.5), but we do not know the exact rundown
for each of his units. We are on an even more uncertain [p.81] ground with the Persians who are credited
with simply fantastic figures67. However, since in the initial stages Alexander was approximately opposite
Dareios who was in the center, we can make the educated guess that the Persians would have had at least
about twice the number of men as the Macedonians and probably even more than that since their formations
appear to have been considerably deeper. Consequently, a good guess would be that the Persians had about
30,000-40,000 cavalry and 80,000 infantry. Since it is impossible to come into certain conclusions regarding
the numbers, I have in the following reconstruction/diagrams for the most part followed the suggestions of
A.M. Devine. See the Diagram 13.
Alexander’ battle plan was to force Dareios either to commit his forces to oppose the oblique
movement of his army to the rough terrain, which would inevitably lead to opportunities Alexander could
exploit, or to let Alexander conduct a grand tactical outflanking maneuver against his prepared position. As
always, Alexander took command of the Companion cavalry with the intention of leading the decisive strike
against the great king in person. He deployed his army in a grand tactical hollow oblong (plaision) so that
the decisive striking force, the Companions, were protected from the sides, behind, front so that he would not
be required to commit his forces prematurely. For additional details, see the Diagrams 13-14.
[p.82]

67
Arrian: 1,000,000 inf., 40,000 cav., 200 scythed chariots; Curtius: 800,000 inf., 200,000 cav.; Justin: 400,000 inf.,
100,000 cav.

43
 EXPLANATIONS TO THE DIAGRAM 13

The Macedonian Army: The Persian Army:

1. Companion cavalry (Philotas + Alexander) I Bactrian Cavalry (Bessus), 8,000?

2. Hypaspists (Nicanor) II Dahae cavalry 1,000?
3. Pezhetairoi and Asthetairoi – Taxis of Coenus III Arachosian cavalry (Barsaentes?) 2,000?
4. Taxis of Perdiccas IV Persian cavalry and infantry
5. Taxis of Meleager V Susian cavalry 2,000?
6. Taxis of Polyperchon VI Cadusian cavalry 2,000?
7. Taxis of Amyntas VII Scythian cavalry 2,000
(Simmias) VIII Bactrian cavalry 1,000
8. Taxis of Craterus IX Scythed chariots 100
9. Allied Greek cavalry (Erygyius) X Greek mercenary infantry (Paron?) 1,000?
10. Thessalian cavalry (Philip + Parmenion) XI Kinsmen cavalry (Dareios) at least 1,000 (Diod
11. Agrianians, archers, and javelin-men (Balacrus) 17.59.2), but there may have been more Huvaka on the
12. Agrianians (Attalus) field, since the elite cavalry consisted of 10,000 or
13. Macedonian archers (Brison) 15,000 men.
14. Old mercenary infantry (Cleander) XII Apple-Bearers 1,000?
15. Prodromoi/sarissoforoi (Aretes) XIII Greek mercenary infantry (Glaucus?) 1,000?
16. Paeonian cavalry (Ariston) XIV Indian cavalry
17. Mercenary cavalry (Menides) XV Resettled Carians (Bupares?)
18. Thracian javelin-men (Sitalces) XVI Mardian archers
19. Cretan archers (Diod. 17.57.4) XVII Uxians (Oxathres?)
20. Achaean mercenary infantry (Diod. 17.57.4) XVIII Babylonians (Bupares?)
21. Allied Greek cavalry (Coeranus) XIX Red Sea tribesmen (Ocondobates,
22. Odrysian cavalry (Agathon) Ariobarzanes, and Orxines)
23. Mercenary cavalry (Andromachus) XX Sitacenians (Bupares?)
24. Greek infantry XXI Elephants 15
XXII Scythed chariots 50
XXIII Syrians and Mesopotamians (Mazaeus)
XXIV Medes (Atropates?)
XXV Parthian and Sacae mounted archers (Mauaces?)
XXVI Tapurian and Hyrcanian cavalry (Phrataphernes)
XXVII Albanians and Sacesinians
XXVIII Armenian cavalry (Orontes?)
XXIX Cappadocian cavalry (Ariaces?)
XXX Scythed chariots 50
After A.M Devine (1986, 1989c) with some changes. After A.M Devine (1986, 1989c) with some changes.

44
[Diagram 13, even though part of the manuscript sent, is missing from the Saga]

DIAGRAM 13

45
[p.83]

Macedonian Right Wing

The structure of the left wing was otherwise similar except that the Thessalians were arrayed as rhomboids (the extra large
bodyguard ilê consisted of the Pharsalian cavalry under Parmenion), and there appears to have been an extra unit of Greek
mercenary cavalry under Erygius placed between the Thessalians and the phalanx. However, it is possible that the
Thessalians had suffered so many casualties that it had been necessary to post the mercenaries in front of the Thessalians as
its front ilai, but I have chosen to reconstruct the left wing with the extra Greeks between the units Note how the cavalry is
placed in depth, which explains why Arrian stated that the first to advance against the left wing Persians was Menidas (Arr.
3.13.3), whose attack was driven back by the enemy, after which Alexander sent Ariston (Arr. 3.3-4) who in turn threw the
enemy back, to which the enemy responded by sending in the main force of 8,000 Bactrians, which in turn stabilized the
situation (Arr. 3.13.4), but the Macedonians (i.e. the Prodromoi) withstood this attack vigorously by counterattacking ilê
after ilê (Arr. 13.4), which suggest indeed suggest that Alexander had already sent Aretes with his Prodromoi to the attack,
which Arrian actually mentions happened a bit later (Arr. 3.14.1, 3.14.1-3). In other words, the Macedonians won the right
wing cavalry battle against superior enemy numbers by placing their units in depth so that they won the battle by possessing
the last reserve.

400? (8 ranks x 10 files = 80

Agrianians, archers, javelin-men x 5 = 400?) Greek mercenary
under Balacrus cavalry under Menidas
1024 men agêma of the Alexander?
hypaspistai Philotas?

1 1 ilê (150 men) of

Paeonians under Ariston
2
Companions 1-8 : Commander
Philotas 3
1. ilê Basilike (Clitus +
4
Alexander)
2. Glaucias
3. Aristo 5
4. Sopolis
5.Heraclides 6
6. Demetrius
7.Meleager 7
8.Hegelochus
8 4 ilai (600
men?) of
prodromoi
Agrianians under Attalus, under Aretas
Macedonian archers under
Brison
DIAGRAM 14
Old mercenary infantry
under Cleander

[p.83] When Alexander was about the leave the area the Persians had prepared for their scythed
chariots, Dareios apparently ordered both cavalry wings to prevent this after which he sent [p.84] his scythed
chariots to the attack. On the basis of Plutarch’s text it is possible that the first ones to attack were actually
the right wing Persian cavalry who managed to reach the wagon park behind the Macedonian line with the
result that Parmenion sent a message to Alexander in which he stated that unless he was given help they
would loose the baggage. Alexander supposedly replied that this was meaningless, because to the victor
belonged the spoils, and continued his oblique march towards the right. If true, he was undoubtedly right,
but any attack directed to his left flank while he continued his march was bound to endanger the cohesion of

46
the formation as did happen. Therefore, Parmenion was at least partially right in asking for help. However,
his job would have been to follow his leader and conduct a fighting retreat towards right, and not try to fight
it out with the enemy who attacked. In the meanwhile, the Persian left wing was also trying to outflank the
Macedonian right wing and stop its advance so that it would be forced to stay in place and face the onslaught
of the scythed chariots. The Persian outer left wing, consisting of the Scythians and Bactrians, tried to
outflank the Macedonians. As ordered by Alexander Menidas wheeled and attacked the enemy (Arr. 3.13.3),
but was driven back by the enemy. Alexander responded by sending Ariston (Arr. 3.3-4) to the attack who
managed to throw the enemy back, to which the enemy responded by sending in the main force of 8,000
Bactrians, which in turn stabilized the situation (Arr. 3.13.4), but the Macedonians (i.e. the Prodromoi)
withstood this attack vigorously by counterattacking ilê after ilê (Arr. 13.4), which suggest that Alexander
had already sent Aretes with his Prodromoi to the attack, which Arrian actually mentions happened a bit
later (Arr. 3.14.1, 3.14.1-3). In other words, the Macedonians won the right wing cavalry battle against
superior enemy numbers by placing their units in depth so that they won the battle by possessing the last
reserve, and this despite the fact that the Scythian riders and horses were better protected than the
Macedonian. The Macedonians broke the enemy formation, which basically removed the threat to the
Companion cavalry from that flank. After this, the right wing cavalry apparently regrouped to wait for
further developments,
When the combined attack of both wings had halted the Macedonians on the spot, Dareios sent his
scythed chariots to the attack, but despite causing a number of casualties especially among the phalanx, it
proved to be a non-event except against the Phalanx. The Agrianians effectively destroyed the attack aimed
at them and Companions and the overflow of that attack was also effectively dealt by the hypaspists. After
this attack had failed, Alexander supposedly again ordered Aretas to charge the left wing Persian cavalry
which was trying to outflank the Macedonians while he himself led the Companions in column evidently
around the right of the Agrianian line, and then formed a wedge out of the front ilai of the Companions and
part of the phalanx stationed next to it and led them into the gap in the enemy line. It is probable that the
Companions were deployed in depth as successive lines. See Diagrams 14-17.
[p.85] If the information regarding the instructions to Aretes is right, it means that the Persians had
sent the remaining left wing cavalry forces (Dahae, Arachosians, Persians, Susians, Cadusians) to outflank
the Macedonians as a result of which their whole center became exposed. However, a gap had also appeared
in the Macedonian line. According to Arrian, Simmias’ taxis was unable to join Alexander’s forward
movement, because the left wing was in trouble and they themselves were facing enemies. Another possible
reason for the breakup of the line is that the attack of the scythed chariots was more effective than the
sources would lead us to believe since it is the Indians and Persians (must be the Kinsmen or their part) who
then penetrated the gap, and the chariots had been placed in front of them. Since the Indians and Persians
also managed to penetrate through the Greek phalanx, its formation had also broken up as a result of
Alexander’s advance or alternatively, they let the enemy’s deep cavalry formations (included the wedges and
columns) pass through as later recommended by the Byzantine Interpolation of Aelian (Devine 1989b, 40.5,

47
44.1-2). When the enemy had reached the Macedonian wagon park, the Greeks turned around and attacked
the disordered enemy and routed them. See the Diagram 15-17.
[p.86]

DIAGRAM 15 Phase 1

The Scythians and Bactrians

flee after the combined attack
The attack of the of Greek mercenaries,
Persian left wing Paeonians, and Prodromoi had
chariots fails to achieve crushed their outflanking
anything, which attempt.
together with the defeat
of the left wing cavalry
decides the battle.

Persian right wing cavalry

attacks the Macedonian left while
the outer right wing outflanks it
and reaches the wagon
park/marching camp in the rear.
Parmenion is in trouble, because
the Persians have isolated his
wing entirely.

The attack of the scythed chariots against the phalanx is

probably at least partially successful since the cavalry that
exploited the gap in the phalanx had been placed behind
them. The Greek phalanx appears to have let the Persians
through and then turned around to destroy them.

48
[p.87]

DIAGRAM 16 Aretes crushes the

remnants of Persian
left wing.

Phase 2

Alexander crushes the Persian center and

Dareios flees.

Parmenion manages to
defeat the Persian right
wing, but not before he had
sent another appeal for help
to Alexander.

Some of the Indian and Persian elite cavalry manage to

fight their way through the phalanxes as a result of which
they and the Parthians engage Alexander’s Companions
when Alexander wheels to help the left wing, which
results in the heaviest fought fight of the battle.

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[p.88]

Forming the Wedge

Alexander leads the ilê Basilike first in a column formation (as stated by Arr. 3.14.2 epi keras) out from behind the
Agrianians (1) to form the apex of the wedge and his movement is followed in succession by the other ilai so that
the second ilê (2) encircles the Agrianians from the other side to form the other half of the grand tactical wedge
followed up by the rest of the ilai (3-8). Arrian’s text doesn’t state whether all of the following ilai formed part of
the same wedge, but my educated guess is that at least part of them were kept as reserves behind the first half of
the wedge formed up by the front ilai. Furthermore, it is possible that not only the hypaspists and other taxeis after
them became part of the grand tactical wedge but also the right wing cavalry and infantry.

1
DIAGRAM 17

[p.89] Alexander led his wedge of Companion cavalry into the gap in the enemy line. For a while
there was a fight at close quarter in which the Companions shoved the Persians with their horses and stroke
them with their xysta, which lasted until the Macedonian phalanx reached the scene with their bristling
sarisae. Alexander and Dareios seem to have come within the range of javelins before the latter fled and
according to some sources they had even tried to throw javelins at each other when they came within the
range. When Dareios fled, the Persian resistance ended and all began to flee as best they could. When
Alexander was about to start the pursuit, he received an urgent call for help from Parmenion who by now had
become almost completely isolated on the left wing. Alexander halted the pursuit and turned around to assist
the left wing, which he should have done even without being asked. En route he faced Parthians and some

50
Indians and Huvaka Persians who were attempting to flee. Consequently, when the Companions together
with the Greek mercenaries of Menidas (and probably also with some of the sarissoforoi) and the desperate
Persian cavalry, which was arrayed in a deep formation of several lines, clashed front to front it resulted in
the fiercest fight of the whole battle. Each side did not attempt to maneuver but tried to fight its way
through. According to Arrian about 60 Companions fell, and Hephaistion, Coenus, and Menidas were
wounded in action. Since those of the Persians who managed to fight their way through continued their
flight, Alexander won this battle too and was poised to come to the assistance of his left wing. However, in
the meanwhile Parmenion had managed to win his battle as a result of the heroic fight of the Thessalian
cavalry. Consequently, Alexander was now ready to continue the pursuit of the enemy up to the Greater
Zab, where he halted to rest his men. In the meanwhile, Parmenion had captured the enemy camp.
According to Arrian Alexander had lost 100 men, over 1,000 horses (of which 500 belonged to the hetairoi)
from wounds and exhaustion caused by the pursuit. Diodorus claims that the Macedonians lost 500 plus
many wounded while Curtius states that they lost less than 300 Macedonians. It is impossible to verify
these, but the figure for the lost horses suggests that the cavalry had suffered dearly because the horses were
not as well armored as their enemies’ horses. The figures of Persian casualties given by the sources are so
incredible that they do not merit repetition. About 30,000 killed and about similar amount of prisoners
would be as good a guess as any.
Alexander the Great’s generalship in this battle deserves both admiration and criticism. His battle plan
and battle formation were excellent, but he failed to maintain the cohesion of his hollow oblong array by
making a hasty attack into the gap that appeared in the enemy line. The exploitation of the opportunity as
such deserves praise, but he did it at the expense of the cohesion of his formation. It would have been a lot
safer to send help to Parmenion, and prevent the penetration of the phalanx by Indian and Persian cavalry,
and then to outflank the enemy with the combined attack of the mercenary, Paeonian, [p.90] Prodromoi, and
hetairoi cavalry all the while keeping the infantry formation intact. In fact, since the mercenary, Paeonian,
and Prodromoi cavalries proved capable of crushing the enemy’s left wing on their own without any help
from Alexander, it is clear that Alexander could have won the battle in a safer way by outflanking the enemy
with his cavalry without risking his infantry or left wing by leaving gaps in his own line with an impetuous
over hasty attack. The fact that Parmenion also managed to defeat the Persian right wing without any help
form Alexander only reinforces the same conclusion. This brings up another indispensable feature of
generalship. In the end Alexander won because he was lucky in that his enemies did not fully exploit their
opportunities and a good general needs luck more than anything else.

6. Conclusions
I hope to have shown that by reinterpreting the sources and events in light of what the military
treatises state, it is possible to see such tactical details that have been missed previously. Consequently, on
the basis of the above analysis of some of the features of Macedonian art of war, I would suggest that there is
still plenty of research to do even if it at times might seem like the subject has already been thoroughly

51
researched. Every new pair of eyes sees the very same sources in a slightly different light which makes it
worthwhile for everyone to attempt to write his or her version of the events.

Select Secondary Sources:

Unsurprisingly Alexander the Great is among the most well researched rulers in the history of mankind, and therefore a
lot has been written about him and his army. Unfortunately due to lack of time (I have no research grants), I have been
able to read only a small fraction of the works that definitely would need to be consulted. I apologize from those who
as a result feel that I have neglected to use or mention their works in the notes or the bibliography.

Anson E.W (2004), Eumenes of Cardia. A Greek among Macedonians. Boston, Leiden.
Bennett B. & Roberts M. (2008-2009), The Wars of Alexander’s Successors 323-281 BC. Volumes I- II. Barnsley.
Billows R.A. (1990/1997), Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State. Berkeley, Los Angeles,
London.
Bosworth A.B. (1995), Conquest and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great. Cambridge.
Cawkwell G. (2005/6), The Greek Wars. The Failure of Persia. Oxford.
[p.91] Chugg, A.M. (2009), Alexander the Great in India. A Reconstruction of Cleitarchus. Milton Keynes.
Cotterel A. (2005), Chariot. London.
Dawson T. (2007), ‘Fit for the task’: equipment sizes and the transmission of military lore, sixth to tenth centuries, in
BMGS 31.1, 1-12.
Devine A.M. (1985a), “The Strategies of Alexander the Great and Darius III in the Issus Campaign (333 B.C.),” in
Ancient World 12, 25-38.
(1985b), “Grand Tactics at the Battle of Issus,” in Ancient World 12, 39-59.
(1985c), “Diodorus’ Account of the Battle of Paraicetene (317 B.C.),” in Ancient World 12, 75-86.
(1985d), “Diodorus’ Account of the Battle of Gabiene,” in Ancient World 12, 87-96.
(1986), “The Battle of Gaugamela: A Tactical and Source-Critical Study,” Ancient World 13, 87-118.
(1987), “The Battle of the Hydaspes: A Tactica and Source-Critical Study,” in Ancient World 16, 91-
113.
(1988) “A Pawn-Sacrifice at the Battle of the Granicus: The Origins of A Favorite Strategem of
Alexander the Great,” in Ancient World 18, 3-20.
(1989a), “Alexander the Great,” in Warfare in the Ancient World, ed. General Sir John Hackett.
London, 104-129.
(1989b), “Aelian’s Manual of Hellenistic Military Tactics. A New Translation from the Greek with an
Introduction,” Ancient World 19, 31-64.
(1989c), “The Macedonian Army at Gaugamela: Its Strength and the Length of its Battle-Line,” in
Ancient World 19, 77-80.
(1989d), “The Generalship of Ptolemy I and Demetrius Poliorcetes at the Battle of Gaza (312 B.C.),” in
Ancient World 20, 29-38.
DiMarco. L.A. (2008). War Horse. A History of the Military Horse and Rider. Yardley.
Engels D.W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.
English S. (2009), The Army of Alexander the Great. Barnsley.
Everson T. (2004). Warfare in Ancient Greece. Arms and Armour from the Heroes of Home to Alexander the Great.
Stroud.

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Farrokh, K. (2007), Shadows in the Desert. Ancient Persia at War. Oxford.
[p.92] Fuller J.F.C. (1958/1998), The Generalship of Alexander the Great. London.
Gaebel R.E. (2002), Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World. Oklahoma.
Green, P. (1991), Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C.. A Historical Biography. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford.
Hammond N. (2004), The Genius of Alexander the Great. London.
Hatzopoulos M.B. (2001), L’organization de l’armee macedonienne sous les Antigonides. Athens.
Heckel W. (2009), Who’s Who in the Age of Alexander the Great. Oxford.
(2008), The Conquests of Alexander the Great. Cambridge.
Heckel W. & Jones R. (2006), Macedonian Warrior. Alexander’s elite infantryman. Oxford.
Head D. (1982), Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars 359 BC to 146 BC. A Wargames Research Group
Publication.
Lendon J.E. (Ted) (2005), “Cavalry Formations in the Greek Tactical Tradition”, in Slingshot 240, 10-15.
Lonsdale D.J. (2004), Alexander the Great, Killer of Men. History’s Greatest Conqueror and the Macedonian Art of
War. New York.
Matthews R. (2008), Alexander at the Battle of the Granicus. A Campaign in Context. Stroud.
Sekunda N. (1992), The Persian Army 560-330 BC. Oxford.
(1989) “The Persians”, in Warfare in the Ancient World, ed. General Sir John Hackett. London, 82-103.
(2004), “Alexander’s Army”, in Nick Sekunda and John Warry, Alexander the Great, Book One.
Oxford. Originally published as The Army of Alexander the Great, Osprey Men-at-Arms 184. Oxford
1984.
Shahbazi Sh., “The Army, i. Pre-Islamic Iran, 3. The Achaemenid Period”, in Encyclopedia Iranica (www.iranica.com).
Sidnell P. (2006), Warhorse. Cavalry in Ancient Warfare. London and New York.
Spence I.G. (1993), The Cavalry of Classical Greece. Oxford.
Thomson M. (2007), Granicus 334 BC. Alexander’s first Persian victory. Oxford.
[p.93] Warry J. (2004), “Alexander’s Campaigns”, in Nick Sekunda and John Warry, Alexander the Great, Book Two.
Oxford. Originally published as Alexander 334-323, Osprey Campaign 7. Oxford.
Worley L.J. (1994), Hippeis. The Cavalry of Ancient Greece. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford.

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