Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW

Table of Contents
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE: GOVERNMENT ......................................................................................6
ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CSC ........................................................................................................................... 6
DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE ..........................................................................................................6
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONTE DE PIEDAD BANK ............................................................ 6
MELCHORA CABANAS v. FRANCISCO PILAPIL ........................................................................................... 7
DE JURE versus DE FACTO GOVERNMENT ...........................................................................................7
ANASTACIO LAUREL v. ERIBERTO MISA .................................................................................................... 7
SOVEREIGNTY ....................................................................................................................................8
WIGBERTO TANADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA.............................................................................................. 8
EFFECTS OF CHANGE IN SOVEREIGNTY ................................................................................................8
BERNARDITA MECARIOLA v. HON. ELIAS ASUNCION ............................................................................... 8
EFFECTS OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION ..............................................................................................9
WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS ................................................................................ 9
DOMINIUM versus IMPERIUM, REGALIAN DOCTRINE..........................................................................9
FELIPE SEVILLE v. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY ......................................................................... 9
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY ................................................................................................ 10
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO ................................................................ 10
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.................................... 10
VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS ................................ 11
MARIANO E. GARCIA v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF.......................................................................................... 12
ERNESTO CALLADO v. INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI) ............................................. 12
THE HOLY SEE v. HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO ....................................................................................... 12
GAUDENCIO RAYO v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN ............................................................ 13
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JAVIER PABALAN ................................................................................... 13
PALAFOX v. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE .............................................................................................. 14
LAUDENCIO TORIO v. FONTANILLA ......................................................................................................... 14
GLORIA V CA............................................................................................................................................ 15
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES ............................................................................. 15
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA ........................................................ 15
OPOSA v. FACTORAN .............................................................................................................................. 16

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GERRY TOYOTO v. HON. FIDEL RAMOS ................................................................................................... 16

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TRANQUILINO LAGMAN ................................................................ 17
KILOSBAYAN, INC v. MORATO................................................................................................................. 17
PHILIP MORRIS v. CA ............................................................................................................................... 17
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN v. HON. ROMEO F. EDU....................................................................................... 18
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH LANTION................................................................................... 19
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR ................................................................. 20
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAGRAPH & TELEPHONE CO. v. NLRC ........................................................................ 20
MAXIMO CALALANG v. WILLIAMS .......................................................................................................... 21
DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION .................................................. 22
FRANCISCO GUDANI v. GENEROSO S. SENGA ......................................................................................... 22
SEPARATION OF POWERS ................................................................................................................. 23
LOUIS  “BAROK”  C.  BIRAGAO  V.  THE  PHILIPPINE  TRUTH  COMMISSION  OF  2010 ................................... 23
ELDEPIO LASCO v. UNITED NATIONS REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL RESOURCES EXPLORATION
(UNRFNRE) .............................................................................................................................................. 23
BENGZON ET AL., v. HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON .................................................................................... 24
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) v. ................................................... 24
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ............................................................................................................... 24
SAGUIGUIT VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ........................................................................................... 25
CHECKS AND BALANCES ................................................................................................................... 25
JAWORSKI VS PAGCOR ............................................................................................................................ 25
PHILIPPINES JUDGES ASSOCIATION v. PRADO ........................................................................................ 26
DELEGATION OF POWERS ................................................................................................................. 27
ABAKADA V. ERMITA ............................................................................................................................... 27
THE UNITED STATES v. ANG TANG HO .................................................................................................... 27
SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ........................................................................................... 28
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION (PBA) V. COMELEC ................................................................................. 29
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON VS. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR ................................... 29
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. CA............................................................................................... 30
OSMENA v. ORBOS .................................................................................................................................. 30
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION V. ANGELES ...................................................... 31
LEO ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE............................................................................................ 32

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CHAVEZ v. ROMULO ................................................................................................................................ 32

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DACUYCUY ............................................................................................ 33
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT ........................................................................................................ 33
GONZALES v. COMELEC........................................................................................................................... 33
JOSE MARI EULALIO C. LOZADA v. COMELEC.......................................................................................... 34
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JALOSJOS ............................................................................................... 35
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ v. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ............................................................................ 35
TOLENTINO, et al. v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE ........................................................................................ 36
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS .................................................................................................................... 36
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS et al. vs. THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (SET) .......................................... 36
SIXTO BRILLANTES, et al. v. COMELEC .................................................................................................... 37
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS ................................................................................................... 37
DAZA v. SINGSON .................................................................................................................................... 37
FRANKLIN DRILON v. JOSE DE VENECIA .................................................................................................. 38
ARROYO v. DE VENECIA........................................................................................................................... 39
PACETE v. SEC OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINMENTS ...................................................................... 39
RUFINO R. TAN, v. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR. .................................................................................... 39
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., et al. v. THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ............................................. 40
FRANCISCO GUDANI v. GENEROSO S. SENGA ......................................................................................... 40
GONZALES v. NARVASA ........................................................................................................................... 41
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION v. ENRIQUEZ ........................................................................ 42
RUFINO R. TAN v. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO, JR. ..................................................................................... 42
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT .......................................................................................................... 43
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL-ARROYO ....... 43
G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010 .............................................................................................................. 43
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS ........................................................................................................... 44
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELEC .............................................................................................. 44
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY .................................................................................. 45
CORPUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS............................................................................................................... 45
LUEGO v. CSC .......................................................................................................................................... 46
IN RE APPOINTMENT OF HON MATEO VALENZUELA ............................................................................. 47
VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYES .......................................................................... 47

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ARMITA RUFINO v. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA ......................................................................................... 48

FRANKLIN M. DRILON v. ALFREDO S. LIM ............................................................................................... 49
EUGENE GONZALES v. NARCISO ABAYA.................................................................................................. 49
SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ANGELO REYES............................................................................. 50
DAVID, et al. v ARROYO, et al.................................................................................................................. 51
SALVACION A. MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., .............................................................. 52
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO SALLE, JR. and RICKY MENGOTE ...................................... 52
VICENTE GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN.................................................................................. 53
GONZALES v. NARVAZA ........................................................................................................................... 54
FERDINAND MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS .................................................................................................... 54
BENJAMIN U. BORJA v. COMELEC ........................................................................................................... 55
IBP V. ZAMORA ....................................................................................................................................... 55
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT .................................................................................................................... 56
FRANCISCO S. TATAD v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY................................................ 56
CESAR BENGZON v. FRANKLIN N. DRILON .............................................................................................. 56
APEX MINING CO., INC v. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP. ............................................ 56
FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK .................................................. 57
WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN v. HERNANI T. BARRIOS ...................................... 58
TEODORO B. PANGILINAN vs. GUILLERMO T. MAGLAYA........................................................................ 58
SPOUSES CONSING v. COURT OF APPEALS ............................................................................................. 59
CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY v. GUERRERO .................................................................................. 59
NITAFAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ............................................................................ 60
BERNARDINO MARCELINO v. HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR. ..................................................................... 60
PEOPLE V. NADERA ................................................................................................................................. 60
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS .............................................................................................. 61
GAMINDE V COMMISSION ON AUDIT .................................................................................................... 61
BRILLANTES v. YORAC ............................................................................................................................. 61
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION v. JUCO......................................................................................... 61
CADIENTE v. SANTOS .............................................................................................................................. 62
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) v. THE COURT OF APPEALS .................. 62
FRANCISCO ABELLA JR v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION .......................................................................... 63
LUCITA Q. GARCES v. COURT OF APPEALS .............................................................................................. 63

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IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v COMELEC........................................................................................... 63

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), v. COMELEC
................................................................................................................................................................ 64
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT ........................................................................... 65
ANIANO A. ALBON v. BAYANI F. FERNANDO........................................................................................... 65
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS ............................................................................................. 66
ROMEO ACOP v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ..................................................................................... 66
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA v. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ .............................................................. 66
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY ........................................................................................... 67
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FACTORAN ..................................................................... 67
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC v. COURT OF APPEALS .................................................................... 68
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY v. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG ............................................................... 68
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS v. COURT OF APPEALS .............................................................................. 69
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS v. COURT OF APPEALS ..................................... 69
AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION .......................................................................... 70
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ...................................................................... 70
LAMBINO v. COMELEC ............................................................................................................................ 71

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THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE:
GOVERNMENT
ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CSC
GR. No. 104226. August 3, 1993
FACTS: Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working
with the PNB as special assistant with the rank of
Second Assistant Manager assigned to the office
of the PNB President. After several promotions,
she was appointed as Senior VP assigned to the
Fund Transfer Department. She filed several
applications for leave of absence due to medical
reasons which were duly approved. Executive
Order no. 80, otherwise known as the Revised
Charter of the PNB, was approved while she was
on leave. It authorized the restructure or
reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB. Pursuant
to the reorganization plan, the Fund Transfer
Department was abolished and its functions
transferred to the International Department.
Consequently, Conchita was notified of her
separation from the service.
Yap’s   appealed   to   the   Civil   Service   DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE
Commission questioning her separation. CSC
Chairman Samilo Barlongay upheld the validity of
her separation from the service. Yap filed an MR
but was denied. It cited that Sec. 33 of E.O. 80 or
the Revised Charter of the PNB provides for the
authority of the bank to effect reorganization. It
also cited Dario vs. Mison wherein it held that
reorganizations are regarded as valid provided
they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule,
reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. In that event, no dismissal or
separation actually occurs because the position
itself ceases to exist.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reorganization was
effected with bad faith and thus be considered
invalid.
HELD: PNB’s   reorganization   was   by   virtue   of   a   that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands
valid law, EO 80. At the time of reorganization, due
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to the critical financial situation of the bank,
departments, positions and functions were
abolished or merged. The abolition of the Fund
Transfer Department was deemed necessary. This
was a management prerogative exercised
pursuant to a business judgment.
A person claiming to be entitled to a public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another may bring an action for quo
warranto. The petitioner therein must show a clear
legal right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by
another. Such action should be brought within one
(1) year after ouster from office, and failure to
institute the same within the reglementary period
constitutes more than a sufficient basis for its
dismissal since it is not proper that the title to a
public office be subjected to continued uncertainty.
An exception to this prescriptive period lies only if
the failure to file the action can be attributed to the
acts of a responsible government officer and not of
the dismissed employee.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MONTE
DE PIEDAD BANK
GR. No. L-9959. December 13, 1916
FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating
earthquake in the Philippines took place. The
Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as
received by the National Treasury as relief of the
victims of the earthquake. The government used
the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched
and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank,
which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent
to the same amount.
In June 1983, the Department of Finance
called upon the same bank to return the $80,000
deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad
declined to comply with this order on the ground
and not the Department of Finance had the right to
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order the reimbursement because the Philippine
government is not the affected party. On account
of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine
Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for
a recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for
the benefit of those persons and their heirs.
Respondent refuse to provide the money.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government
is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money
of the people deposited in respondent bank.
HELD: The Philippine government is competent to
file a complaint/reimbursement against respondent
bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens
Patriae. The government is the sole protector of
the rights of the people thus it holds an inherent
supreme power to enforce laws which promote
public interest. The government has the right to
"take back" the money intended for the people.
The government has the right to enforce all
charities of public nature, by virtue of its general
superintending authority over the public interests,
where no other person is entrusted with it. No other
party has been entrusted with such right, hence as
“parents”   of   the   people,   the   government   has   the  
right to take back the money intended for the
people.
MELCHORA CABANAS v. FRANCISCO PILAPIL
GR. No. L-25843. July 25, 1974
FACTS: Florentino Pilapil insured himself and
indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He
likewise indicated that if he dies while the child is
still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by
his brother Francisco. Florentino died when the
child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took
charge   of   Florentino’s   benefits   for   the   child.   cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to
Meanwhile, the mother of the child
Melchora Cabañas filed a complaint seeking the
delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow
herself  to  be  the  child’s  trustee.  Francisco  asserted   against the Commonwealth which was replaced
the terms of the insurance policy and contended
that as a private contract its terms and obligations
must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mother should be
entitled to act as a trustee of a minor beneficiary of
the proceeds of an insurance policy from the
deceased.
HELD: The Constitution provides for the
strengthening of the family as the basic social unit,
and that whenever any member thereof such as in
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the case at bar would be prejudiced and his
interest be affected then the judiciary if a litigation
has been filed should resolve according to the best
interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it
should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is
assumed that the mother shows more care
towards the child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the
concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the
State acting as parens patriae, is called upon
whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one
who is a minor to accord priority to his best
interest. It may happen, family relations may press
their respective claims. It would be more in
consonance not only with the natural order of
things but the tradition of the country for a parent
to be preferred. it could have been different if the
conflict were between father and mother. Such is
not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority.
Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality of the
State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain
insensible to the validity of her plea.
DE JURE versus DE FACTO
GOVERNMENT
ANASTACIO LAUREL v. ERIBERTO MISA
GR. No. L-200. March 28, 1946
FACTS: The accused, Anastacio Laurel, was
charged with treason. During the Japanese
occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he
the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also,
he claims that he cannot be tried under a change
of sovereignty over the country since his acts were
already by the Republic.
Anastacio Laurel, a Filipino citizen, was
arrested in Camarines Sur in May 1945 by the
United States Army, and was intended, under a
commitment  order  “for  his  active  collaboration  with  
the   Japanese   during   the   Japanese   occupation”;;  
but in September 1945, he was turned over to the
Commonwealth Government, and since then has
been under the custody of the respondent Director
of Prisons.
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ISSUE: During the long period of Japanese Navarro embodies not only the WTO but also (1)
occupation, all the political laws of the the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2)
Philippinesw e r e s u s p e n d e d . T h u s , t r e a s o the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
n under theRevised Penal Code canno Services.
t b e p u n i s h a b l e where the laws of the land
are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the
sovereignty, it is true   that   the   Philippines   wasn’t   Agreement Establishing the World Trade
sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it Organization and the Agreements and Associated
was under the United States. Hence, the acts of Legal directly contravene spirit and intent of
treason done cannot carry over to the new Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12,
Republic where the Philippines is now indeed Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
sovereign.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the
The accused was found guilty. A citizen
Resolution no. 97 as not unconstitutional. While
owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his
the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same
made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine
time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
government still had the power. Moreover,
with the rest of the world on the basis of equality
sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either
and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty
interests only against foreign competition and trade
per se wasn’t   suspended;;   rather,   it   was the
practices that are unfair. In other words, the
exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus,
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the
policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a
change of government, there is no such change
“self-reliant   and   independent   national   economy”  
since the sovereign, the Filipino people, is still the
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign
same. What happened was a mere change of name of
investments, goods and services. It contemplates
government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the
neither   “economic   seclusion”   nor   “mendicancy   in
Philippines.
the  international  community.”

The Senate, after deliberation and voting,

SOVEREIGNTY voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to
the   WTO   Agreement   thereby   making   it   “a   part   of  
WIGBERTO TANADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA the   law   of   the   land”   is   a   legitimate   exercise   of   its  
GR. No. 118295. May 2, 1997 sovereign duty and power.

FACTS: April 15, 1994: Respondent Rizalino EFFECTS OF CHANGE IN SOVEREIGNTY

Navarro, then Sec. of the Department of Trade and
Industry, representing the Government of the BERNARDITA MECARIOLA v. HON. ELIAS
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, ASUNCION
Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of A.M. No. 133-J. May 31, 1982
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.
FACTS: On August 6, 1968 Macariola filed a
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine complaint   against   Judge   Asuncion   with   “acts  
Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which unbecoming  a  judge”.  The  judge  apparently  bought  
“Resolved,  as  it  is  hereby  resolved,  that  the  Senate   a property , formerly owned by Macariola, which
concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by was involved in a civil case decided by him; and on
the President of the Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos, August 31, 1966, the Asuncion couples conveyed
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade their share and interest in the said property to The
Organization.” Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc.
The act of Asuncion engaging in commerce is said
The WTO Agreement ratified by the to be a violation of paragraphs 1 & 5, Article 14 of
President of the Philippines is composed of the the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges in
Agreement   Proper   and   “the   associated legal active service, among others, to do so within the
instruments of that Agreement which are integral limits of the place where they discharge their
parts   thereof.”   The   Final   Act   signed   by   Secretary   duties.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the actuation of Judge
Asuncion in purchasing a portion of the property in
a Civil case previously handled by him is an act
unbecoming of a judge.
HELD: The Court held that respondent Judge
Asuncion's acts did not constitute an "Act
Unbecoming of a Judge" but he was reminded to
be more discreet in his private and business
activities for next time.
Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code
applies only to the sale or assignment of the
property which is the subject of litigation to the
persons disqualified therein. Respondent judge
purchased the said lot after the decision rendered
was already final because no party filed for an
appeal within the reglementary period which
makes the lot in question no longer the subject to
litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy
the lot in question directly from plaintiffs, rather
from a Dr. Arcadio Galapon.
EFFECTS OF BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION
WILLIAM F. PERALTA v. THE DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS
GR. No. L-49. November 12, 1945
FACTS: During the Japanese occupation of the
Philippines, Peralta, a local policeman, was
convicted of the offense of robbing in violation of a
law enacted by the Japanese puppet government,
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. This is a
habeas corpus action brought before the courts of
the restored government of the Philippine Islands
which   was   based   on   the   ground   that   the   Court’s  
existence was void ab initio because it was created
as a political instrumentality under the command of
the Japanese Imperial Army; that the provisions of
the said ordinance violate his constitutional rights;
that the penalties provided for are much more
severe than the Revised Penal Code. Solicitor
General is of the opinion that the petition should be
granted because the ordinance is “tinged   with  
political   complexion”;;   that   the   procedure   does   not  
afford a fair trial and violates constitutional right of
accused person under a legitimate Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of an
occupation court in a criminal case cease to be
valid upon the return of the legitimate sovereign.
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HELD: The so-called Republic of the Philippines,
being a governmental instrumentality of the
belligerent occupant, had the power or was
competent to create the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction.
After first determining that the law of which
Peralta had been convicted of violating was of
apolitical complexion, in that it could be violated
only by the persons charged or connected with the
supervision and control of the production,
procurement and distribution of food and other
necessaries enacted to prevent such items from
reaching guerillas, the court held that under the
doctrine   of   postliminium,   Peralta’s   conviction   must  
be considered as having ceased to be valid, ipso
facto, upon the liberation of the Philippines by
General McArthur.
It appears that it was within the power and
competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate, through the National Assembly of the
so-called Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of
the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of
robbery and other offenses by imprisonment
ranging from the maximum period of the
imprisonment prescribed by the laws and
ordnances promulgated by the President or death
as maximum. Although these crimes are defined in
the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and
penalized by said Act no. 65 with different and
heavier penalties, as new crimes and offenses
demanded by military necessity, incident to a state
of war, and necessity for the control of the country
by the belligerent occupant, the protection and
safety of the army of occupation, its support and
efficiency, and the success of its operations.
DOMINIUM versus IMPERIUM, REGALIAN
DOCTRINE
FELIPE SEVILLE v. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY
GR. No. 129401. February 2, 2001
FACTS: The LSBOA recovered a Letter of
Instruction no. 962 to authorize them to acquire
privately owned lands by way of negotiated sales
with the land owner. On June 1, 1982, LSBOA filed
miscellaneous sales application covering the
subject lot. Then, the lot was assigned to the
National Development Company with all its rights.
On November 29, 1988, the estate of Joaquin
Ortega represented by Judicial Administration
Felipe Seville filed with the Regional Trial Court a
9

complaint for recovery of real property, rentals and
damages against the respondents. The Regional
Trial Court reversed the judgment against the
respondents. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
ISSUE: Whether or not Felipe Seville is the real
owner of the subject lot.
HELD: The petitioner could not have become
owner thereof through acquisitive prescription and
petitioners   challenge   to   LSBOA’s   title   cannot   be   descended to the level of the other contracting
ranted because it is based on wrong premises and
amounts to collateral attacks which is not allowed
by the state or by the law. Under the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are preserved to
belong to the state. Whereby, the petition is denied
and assailed decision affirmed.
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. HON.
ELIODORO B. GUINTO
GR. No. 76607. February 26, 1990
FACTS: The private respondents are suing several
officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for
contracts for barber services in the said base
which was won by a certain Dizon. The
respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid
winner because they claimed that Dizon had
included in his bid an area not included in the
invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a
rebidding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants were
immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty
for acts done by them in the performance of their
official duties.
HELD: The rule that a State may not be sued
without its consent is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that were have
adopted as part of the law of our land. Even
without such affirmation, we would still be bound
by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of
incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by
the majority of the states, such principles are
deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized
state as a condition and consequence of its
membership in the society of nations. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
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over one another. While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the states for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be
regarded as against the state although it has not
been formally impleaded. When the government
enters into a contract, it is deemed to have
party and divested of its sovereign immunity from
suit with its implied consent. In the case Of US, the
customary law of international law on state
immunity is expressed with more specificity in the
RP-US Bases Treaty. There is no question that the
US, like any other state, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietory or private capacity.
It is only when the contract involves its sovereign
or governmental capacity that no such waiver may
be implied.It is clear from a study of the records of
GR No. 80018 that the petitioners therein were
acting in the exercise of their official functions
when they conducted the buy-bust operations
against the complainant and thereafter testified
against him at his trial. It follows that for
discharging their duties as agents of the US, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to
their principal, which has not given its consent to
be sued.As for GR No. 80018, the record is too
meager to indicate what really happened. The
needed inquiry first be made by the lower court so
it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of
the parties on the basis of evidence that has yet to
be presented at the trial.
The court finds the barbershops subject to
the concessions granted by the US government to
be commercial enterprises operated by private
persons. The petitioners cannot plead any
immunity from the complaint, the contract in
question being decidedly commercial. Thus, the
petition is DISMISSED and the lower court directed
to proceed with the hearing and decision of the
case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
GR. No. 120385. October 17, 1996
FACTS: Petitioners Masagana Concrete Products
and Kingstone Concrete Products are licensed
business establishments owned by petitioner
10

Alfredo Chua. Sometime in May 1983, Masagana
Concrete Products hired private respondent Ruben
Marinas as truck helper at the compensation of
P107.00 a day. The name of the establishment
was later changed to Kingstone Concrete
Products. Private respondent worked continuously
for petitioners until November 30, 1990.
Chua accused Marinas of tampering a
“vale  sheet”  and  was  ordered  to  leave  the  business   minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight
premises. Marinas returned the next day but he
was not allowed to enter the premises. On
December 3, 1990, Marinas sent a letter to Chua
requesting that the petitioner be allowed to return
to work. This request was ignored by petitioners.
Marinas discovered that he has been replaced by
a   certain   “Anton”   and   that   his   time   card   was   no   operate a security agency.
longer in the rack.
Marinas filed a complaint against
petitioners for Unfair Labor Practice, Illegal
Dismissal, Overtime Pay, Legal Holiday Pay,
Premium Pay for Holiday and Rent Day Service
Incentive Leave. On the hearing date, only the
respondent with his counsel appeared. The
hearing was reset but no one appeared for
petitioners. The hearing was rescheduled again
but only Marinas appeared before the Labor
Arbiter, although petitioners were notified thereof.
A Notice of Hearing was sent to Chua stating that
“failure   on   your   part   to   attend   the   scheduled  
hearing on the same be conducted ex-parte after
which  the  case  submitted  for  resolution.”
ISSUE: Whether or not National Labor Relations
Commission went beyond its jurisdiction.
HELD: The Court found no basis from the records
to hold that the NLRC went beyond its jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion when it rejected the
claim of petitioners that they were never served
any copy of the notices or summons of the
scheduled hearings before the Labor Arbiter and
that the persons who allegedly signed the registry
return cards correspondingly attached thereto were
total strangers to herein petitioners. Equally without
merit   is   herein   petitioner’s   contention   that   they   1988, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary
were not afforded due process of law when the
Labor Arbiter rendered its decision based only on
the evidence adduced by private respondent
Ruben Marinas. The authority of the labor arbiter to
render judgment based on the evidence adduced
by complaint is explicitly sanctioned by the Section
10 of the Rule VII of the Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC.
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VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE
SERVICES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the decision dated August 11, 1989. On May 12,
1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed
by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
(8) hours of service security per day. On June 29,
1987, Odin Security Agency filed a complaint with
PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition. PADPAO and PC-SUSIA found
VMPSI guilty and recommended its expulsion from
PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to
As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a cl
earance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when
it requested one. VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-
471 against the PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA in the
RTC-Makati Branch 135, on March 28, 1988. On
the same date, the court issued a restraining order
enjoining the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA from
committing acts that would result in the
cancellation or non-renewal   of   VMPSI’s   license.  
The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion to
Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the
TRO, on the grounds that the case is against the
State which had not given consent thereto and that
VMPSI’s   license   already   expired on March 31,
1988, hence, the restraining order or preliminary
injunction would not serve any purpose because
there was no more license to be cancelled.
Respondent VMPSI opposed the motion. On April
18,   1988   the   lower   court   denied   VMPSI’s  
application for a writ of preliminary injunction for
being premature but VMPSI reiterated its
application for the issuance of preliminary
injunction because PC-SUSIA had rejected
payment of the penalty for its failure to submit its
application for renewal of its license. On June 10,
injunction upon a bond of P100,000, restraining the
defendant from cancelling or denying renewal of
VMPSI’s   license.   The   PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above
order, but it was denied by the court. On November
3, 1988, the PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA sought relief
by a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition.
11

ISSUE: Whether  or  not  VMPSI’s  complaint against
the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the
State without its consent.
HELD: The State may not be sued without its
consent. Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA, being instrumentalities of the national
government exercising a primarily governmental
function of regulating the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen, or
security guard agencies, said official and agency
may   not   be   sued   without   the   Government’s  
consent,   especially   in   this   case   because   VMPSI’s  
complaint seeks not only to compel the public
respondents to act in a certain way, but worse,
because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory
damages in the sum P1,000,000.00 exemplary
damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00as
attorney’s  fees  from  said  public  respondents. Even
if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary
claims may not been forced because the State did
not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for
that purpose.
A public official may sometimes be held
liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts
in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the
PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to
account in this case, were performed as part of
their official duties, without malice, gross
negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had
against them in their private capacities.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the
Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not
constitute an implied consent by the State to be
sued. The consent of the State to be sued must
emanate from statutory authority, hence, a
legislative act, not from a mere memorandum.
Without such consent, the trial court did not
acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents.
MARIANO E. GARCIA v. THE CHIEF OF STAFF
GR. No. L-20213. January 31, 1966
FACTS: While undergoing military training for a
period of 10 months, plaintiff-appellant Mariano
Garcia, alleged that he suffered injuries at Camp
Florida Blanca, Pampanga. On April 1957,he filed
a claim to the Adjustant General Officer to recover
a sum of money.
A  motion  was  filed  by  Philippine  Veteran’s   ROSARIO
Administration and the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces assailing for the dismissal of the claim. The
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court dismissed the complainant as the action has
prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suit against the Chief of
Staff is a suit against the staff.
HELD: The Court held that the Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over the said matter,
the action being the money claim against the
government. It should be filed before the Auditor
General and will decide within 60mdays, in line
with Commonwealth Act 327.
ERNESTO CALLADO v. INTERNATIONAL RICE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IRRI)
GR. No. 106483. May 22, 1995
FACTS: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed
as a driver at the IRRI from April 11, 1983 –
December 4, 1990. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to
the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a
preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's
Human Resource Development Department
Manager.
In 1990, the petitioner submitted his
answer and defenses to the charges against him.
After   evaluating   petitioner’s   answer,   explanations  
and other evidences, the petitioner was issued a
notice of termination on December 7, 1990.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IRRI waived its
immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from
as employer-employee relationship.
HELD: The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and
equivalent and an express waiver by its director-
general is the only way by which it may relinquish
or abandon this immunity. On the matter of waiving
its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its
position clear. The petitioners reliance on the
Memorandum   with   “Guidelines   on   handling   cases  
of dismissal of employees in relation to PD 1620
dated July 26, 1993 is misplaced. The Supreme
Court agrees with private respondents IRRI, that
this memorandum cannot, by any stretch of
immigration, be considered the express waiver of
the Director-General.
THE HOLY SEE v. HON. ERIBERTO U.
GR. No. 101949. December 1, 1994
12

FACTS: This petition arose from a controversy
over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square
meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque.
Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. Said
lots was acquired as a donation not for commercial
purpose but for the use of the petitioner to
construct the official place of residence of the
Dapal Menico. This right is recognized by the 1961
Vienna Convention of Diplomatic relations.
The decision to transfer the property and
the subsequent disposal thereof was likewise
clothed with a governmental character.
Subsequently, the lot was sold to Ramon Licup. In
view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lot
sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting
and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating
the petitions of the parties was the sale by the
petitioner of the lot to Tropicana Properties and
Development Corporation.
Manager Domingo Arilos, Jr. acting as the
agent of the seller moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity
from suit. The trial court denied said petition after
finding   that   petitioner   “shed-off”   its   sovereignty   damages against respondent corporation and
immunity by entering into a contract specifically
business contract in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner waived its
immunity from suit when it entered to the contract
of sale of lots.
HELD: As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the
1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally
accepted principles of International Law. Even
without this affirmation, such principles of
International Law are deemed incorporated as part
of the law of the land as a condition and
consequence of our admission in the society of
nations. In the present case, if petitioner has
bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of
real estate business, surely the said transaction
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition
and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for
profit but claimed that it acquired said property for
the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in
the Philippines.
The Holy See is immune from suit for the
act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in
nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a
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donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The
donation was made not for commercial purpose,
but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon
the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.
The decision to transfer the property and the
subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed
with a governmental character. Petitioner did not
sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to
dispose of the same because the squatters living
thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to
use it for the purpose of the donation.
GAUDENCIO RAYO v. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BULACAN
GR. No. L-55273-83. December 19, 1981
FACTS: On October 26, 1978, respondent
corporation through its plant superintendent
Benjamin Chavez caused to be opened
simultaneously all the three floodgates of Angat
Dam. As a result, hundreds of residents on
Norzagaray died and million worth of properties
were destroyed and washed away.
Petitioners filed 22 complaints for
Benjamin Chavez, as plant superintendent.
Respondent corporation filed an answer invoking
that the operation of Angat Dam is purely
governmental function, hence, it cannot be sued
without the express consent of the state. The
complaint was dismissed as well as the motion for
reconsideration and holding Benjamin Chavez as
the sole party defendant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of respondent
NAPOCOR to sue and be sued under its organic
character invokes to be sued and for tort.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the
government owned and controlled corporation,
having a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government has the
power to sue and be sued. It is sufficient to say
that the government has organized a private
corporation, but many in it and has allowed it to
sue and be sued in any court under its character
which includes a tort claim such as the one
instituted by the petitioners. The petition was
granted.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JAVIER
PABALAN
GR. No. L-33112. June 15, 1978
13

FACTS: Respondent Judge Javier Pabalan issued
a writ of execution on December 17, 1910 followed
thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds
of respondent Virginia Tobacco Administration.
The said funds were deposited at the PNB,
petitioner, which invoked the doctrine of non-
suability, it being alleged that such funds are
publication character.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Philippine
National Bank can invoke the doctrine of non-
suability.
HELD: In the case, the petitioner invoke such
doctrine because funds of public corporation could
be properly made official or object of a notice of
garnishment. Government – owned and controlled
corporation have a personality of their own,
separate and distinct from the government, their
funds are not exempt from garnishment.
PALAFOX v. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE
GR. No L-10059. January 31, 1958
FACTS: Sabas Jorralba was employed as a driver
of the Presidential Government of Ilocos Norte
detailed to the office of the distinct engineer.
September 30, 1948, while driving his freight-truck
in compliance with his duties, he ran over Precento
Palafox, father of appellants, victim died.
Jorralba pleaded guilty and sentence to
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. Having
reserved their right, the heirs of Paladox file a civil
action against the District Engineer, the employer
and Provincial Treasurer and Sabas Jorralba.
Appellants invoked the doctrine of respondent
superior concerning liability of municipal
corporations for negligent acts of their employees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Province of Ilocos
Norte can be liable for the acts of its regular
agents.
HELD: If, the construction or maintenance of roads
in which the truck and the driver worked at the time
of the accident are governmental activities. Hence,
the death of Palafox imposed in the Province no
duty to pay monetary compensation.
LAUDENCIO TORIO v. FONTANILLA
GR. No. L-29993. October 23, 1978
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FACTS: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui,
Pangasinan,   passed   Resolution   No.   159   “to  
manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta
celebration…”   The   “1959   Malasiqui   ‘Town   Fiesta  
Executive  Committee”  was  created,  which,  in  turn,  
organized a sub-committee on entertainment and
stage.   A   “zarzuela”   troupe,   of   which   Vicente  
Fontanilla was a member, arrived for their
performance  on  January  22.  During  the  “zarzuela”,  
the stage collapsed and Fontanilla was pinned
underneath. He was immediately hospitalized, but
died the following day.
Fontanilla’s   heirs   filed   a   complaint   to  
recover damages against the Municipality of
Malasiqui, its Municipal Council and all the
Council’s   individual   members.
The municipality invoked inter alia the defense that
as a legally and duly organized public corporation
it performs sovereign functions and the holding of
a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental
functions from which no liability can arise to
answer for the negligence of any of its agents.
The councilors maintained that they
merely acted   as   the   municipality’s   agents   in  
carrying out the municipal ordinance and as such
they are likewise not liable for damages as the
undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore,
they had exercised due care and diligence in
implementing the municipal ordinance. After trial,
the RTC dismisses the complaint, concluding that
the Executive Committee had exercised due
diligence and care in selecting a competent man
for the construction of the stage, and the collapse
was due to forces beyond the control of the
committee. Consequently, the defendants were not
liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s   decision   and   ordered   all   the   defendants-
appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Vicente Fontanilla the sums of P12,000.00 by way
of moral and actual damages:P1200.00 its
attorney’s  fees;;  and  the  costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of
Malasiqui may be held liable.
HELD: Yes. Under Philippine laws, municipalities
are political bodies endowed with the faculties of
municipal corporations to be exercised by and
through their respective municipal governments in
conformity with law, and in their proper corporate
name, they may inter alia sue and be sued, and
14

contract and be contracted with. The powers of a
municipality are two-fold in character: public,
governmental or political on the one hand; and
corporate, private, or proprietary on the other.
Governmental powers are those exercised by the
corporation in administering the powers of the state
and promoting the public welfare. These include
the legislative, judicial public, and political.
Municipal powers, on the other hand, are exercised
for the special benefit and advantage of the
community. These include those which are
ministerial, private and corporate.
These distinctions of powers are
necessary in determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result
in injury to third persons. If the injury is caused in
the course of the performance of a governmental
function or duty, no recovery can be had from the
municipality unless there is an existing statute on
the matter, nor from its officers, so long as they
performed their duties honestly and in good faith or
that they did not act wantonly and maliciously. With
respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is
that a municipal corporation can be held liable to
third persons ex contract or ex delicto. They may
also be subject to suit upon contracts and its tort.
GLORIA V CA
G.R. No. 119903 (August 15, 2000)
FACTS: Upon recommendation by the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports, respondent was
reassigned as superintendent in another school.
Respondent filed a petition for prohibition against
the Secretary on the ground that his indefinite
reassignment violated his security of tenure. The
Secretary argued that the filing of the case violated
the immunity of the President from suit.
ISSUE:
Is the contention tenable?
HELD: The contention is untenable. The petition
is not directed against the President. Presidential
decisions may be questioned before the courts.
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE
AMANTE P. PURISIMA
GR. No. L-42050-66. November 20, 1978
FACTS: These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review
filed by the People of the Philippines represented
involve one basic question of law. These Petitions
or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance,
namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima
(17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A.
Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First
Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo,
presiding, (1 Petition). Before those courts,
Informations were filed charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9
or the law that punishes "illegal possession of
deadly weapon". However, the judges quashed or
dismissed the Informations, on a common ground,
that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential
Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime. This essential
element is that the carrying outside of the
accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt
weapon   “must   be   connected   with   or   related   to  
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness  or  public  disorder.”
ISSUE: Did the respondents err in dismissing the
different information filed before them?
HELD: No. First, it is a constitutional right of any
person who stands charged in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. In these cases, the
information filed must be clear and correct because
the designation of the offense by the statute were
incorrect. Example, the carrying of so-called
"deadly weapons" is a subject of another penal
statute and a Manila city ordinance (Act No. 1780
Section 26: It should be unlawful for any person to
carry concealed about his person any bowie knife,
dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon) and
another is Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of
Manila who punishes anyone who shall carry
concealed in his person in any manner that would
disguise its deadly character any kind of firearm,
bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any
public place. It was not shown that the above-
mentioned statutes were repealed by P.D. 9 (3)
15

because it does not contain any repealing clause.
Second, a simple act of carrying any of the
weapons described in the presidential decree is
not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act
criminal or punishable under the decree is the
motivation behind it. Example if the offender is
carrying a knife to use for a livelihood or just
cooking, then he must be detained? Third, when
ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to
construe and interpret guided by the basic principle
that penal statutes are to be construed and applied
liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against
the state. Thus the court, DENIED these 26
Petitions for Review and AFFIRMED the Orders of
respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the
Information concerned.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
GR. No. 101083. July 30, 1993
FACTS: The principal petitioners are all minors
duly represented and joined by their respective
parents and a case as being enjoined in the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation
organized for the purpose of engaging in concerted
action geared for the protection of our environment
and natural resources. The defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
The government grants Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) allowing people to cut timber
within a period of 25 years. Thus petitioners filed
the act to the court saying that it was an unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.
However, the court said that the act of the
concerned department is a pure political question
giving them no power to take jurisdiction as based
on the non-impairment clause. Moreover,
obligation of contracts must be followed.
ISSUE: Would the claims of the petitioners be set
aside?
HELD: No. Their petition is granted. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature and Sec. 15. The State shall
protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among
them. Moreover, a timber license is a license or
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privilege,   which   can   be   “validly   withdrawn”  
whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case. The freedom of contract,
under our system of government, is not meant to
be absolute. The same is understood to be subject
to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and
welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty
of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare. In the case at bar, it is the
state’s   purpose   of   advancing   the   right   of   the  
people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. Thus, as emphasized, the petition is
granted.
GERRY TOYOTO v. HON. FIDEL RAMOS
GR. No. L-69270. October 15, 1985
FACTS: Gerry Toyoto, Eddie Gonzales and
Dominador Gabiana belong to a group called the
"Urban Poor" which conducted a march
demonstration and rally along Northbay Boulevard
in Navotas, Metro Manila, on October 23, 1983.
Thus among others, they were accused of violating
Presidential Decree No. 1835 (Codifying the
Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing
the Penalties for Membership in Subversive
Organizations). Because of insufficiency of
evidence, an order of dismissal was dated
November 9, 1984, but on December 5, 1984,
when the petition for habeas corpus was filed, the
respondents had not been released. The
authorities refused to release the petitioners on the
ground that a Preventive Detention Action had
been issued against them. It is to be noted that the
petitioners had been in detention for over one year
for they were arrested on October 23, 1983 even
though the case to them was already dismissed.
ISSUE: Does the state have the power to re-arrest
the petitioners even after they had been acquitted
by a court of competent jurisdiction for the offense
for which they had been previously arrested?
HELD: No. The court held that such act of the
authorities is repugnant to the government of laws
and not of men principle. Under this principle the
moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge
he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the
same offense. WHEREFORE, the petition is
granted; the release of the petitioners is hereby
declared to be permanent.
16

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN
GR. No. L-45892. July 13, 1938
FACTS: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892
and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and
Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as
the National Defense Law. As Filipinos and having
reached the age of twenty years in 1936, the
appellants refused to register in the military service
between the 1st and 7th of April of said year,
notwithstanding the fact that they had been
required to do so. It was shown that the two
appellants were duly notified by the corresponding
authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board
in order to register for military service in
accordance with law, but in spite of these notices,
they had not registered up to the date of the filing
of the information. Primitivo de Sosa reasons that
he is fatherless and has a mother and a brother
eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman
also has a father to support, has no military
learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. As
a result, each of these appellants was sentenced
by the Court of First Instance to one month and
one day of imprisonment.
ISSUE: Could one be exempted of such Military
Service?
HELD: No. According to Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:
The defense of the state is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal
military or civil service. The National Defense Law,
in so far as it establishes compulsory military
service, does not go against this constitutional
provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful
compliance therewith. This military service is a
consequence of its duty to defend the State and is
reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty,
and property of the citizen. Thus, the appealed
judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed.
KILOSBAYAN, INC v. MORATO
GR No. 118910. November 16, 1995
FACTS: The petitioner filed this petition seeking to
declare the ELA, in real sense a lease agreement
between PCSO and PGMC, invalid on the ground
that it is the same with the case of nullification of
the Contract of Lease in the case of Kilosbayan, et
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al v Guingona. Petitioners here in this case argued
that the amended ELA is inconsistent with and
violative  of  PCSO’s  charter  and  the  decision  of  the  
Supreme Court of May 5, 1995, that it violate the
laws on public binding of contracts. In response,
respondents  questioned  the  petitioners’  standing  to  
bring the suit.
ISSUE: Do petitioners possess the legal standing
to file the instant petition?
HELD: The court held that the Kilosbayan do not
possess the legal standing to file the petition. The
petition should not be brought by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of the law
but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who
actually sue in the public interest. This means that
only those who have interest can bring the sue and
it is the duty of the state to respect and protect
their legitimate and collective interest. In this case,
petitioners had no substantial interest in the
agreement being challenged.
PHILIP MORRIS v. CA
GR No. 91332. July 16, 1993
FACTS: Philip Morris, Incorporated is a
corporation organized under the laws of the State
of Virginia, United States of America, and does
business at 100 Park Avenue, New York, New
York, United States of America. The two other
plaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly-
owned subsidiaries of Philip Morris, Inc., are
similarly not doing business in the Philippines but
are suing on an isolated transaction. As registered
owners of "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK"
per certificates of registration issued by the
Philippine Patent Office on April 26, 1973, May 28,
1964, and March 25, 1964, plaintiffs-petitioners
asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco
Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell
cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or
confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in
contravention of Section 22 of the Trademark Law.
In response, Fortune Tobacco Corporation
admitted petitioners' certificates of registration with
the Philippine Patent Office subject to the
affirmative and special defense on misjoinder of
party plaintiffs. Private respondent alleged,
however, that it has been authorized by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell
cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK", and that
"MARK" is a common word which cannot be
exclusively appropriated.
17

Petitioners filed a previous petition for
certiorari before the Court but the petition was
referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals initially issued a resolution which set aside
the court of origin's order dated April 22, 1987, and
granted the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Fortune, its agents,
employees, and representatives, from
manufacturing, selling, and advertising "MARK"
cigarettes.
Respondents filed a motion to dissolve the
disputed writ of preliminary injunction with offer to
post a counterbond was submitted which was
favorably acted upon by the Court of Appeals,
premised on the filing of a sufficient counterbond to
answer for whatever perjuicio petitioners may
suffer. Petitioners, in turn, filed their own motion for
re-examination geared towards reimposition of the
writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner can enjoy the
protection of the Incorporation Clause/
International Law?
HELD: The court held that cannot invoke the
protection they enjoy under the Paris Convention
of 1965 to which the Philippines is a signatory. Our
municipal law on trademarks regarding the
requirement of actual use in the Philippines must
subordinate an international agreement inasmuch
as the apparent clash is being decided by a
municipal tribunal. The fact that international law
has been made part of the law of the land does not
by any means imply the primacy of international
law over national law in the municipal sphere.
Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in
most countries, rules of international law are given
a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislative enactments.
Petitioners may have the capacity to sue
for infringement irrespective of lack of business
activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-
A of the Trademark Law but the question is
whether they have an exclusive right over their
symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial
writ will depend on actual use of their trademarks
in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of
the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners
to claim that when a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in Philippines files a
complaint for infringement, the entity need not be
actually using its trademark in commerce in the
Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have
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the personality to file a suit for infringement but it
may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to
absence of actual use of the emblem in the local
market.
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN v. HON. ROMEO F. EDU
GR. No. L-49112. February 22, 1979
FACTS: Agustin, the petitioner, was an owner of a
Volkswagen   Beetle   car,   model   13035   who   didn’t  
execute an early warning device. The petitioner
violated Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President
Ferdinand Marcos. This letter of Instruction aimed
to prevent road accidents and in the interest of
safety on all streets, highways including
expressways. This Letter of Instruction requires all
vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early
warning devices to be installed a distance away
from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. All
motorist and motor vehicle owners shall have at all
times one pair of early warning device. Edu,
respondent and in his capacity as Land
Transportation Commissioner, set forth the
implementing rules and regulations of the said
instruction.
In the present case, the petitioner filed a
petition questioning the validity of a Letter of
Instruction providing for an early warning device
mandatory for motor vehicles. This petition alleges
that such letter of instruction and subsequent
administrative order are unlawful and
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions of due
process in as far as the rules and regulations for its
implementation are concerned.
ISSUE Is the assailed Letter of Instruction unlawful
and violated constitutional guarantees of due
process?
HELD: The assailed Letter of Instruction is valid
and constitutional. The said Letter of Instruction
was a valid exercise of police power and there was
no unlawful delegation of legislative power on the
part of the respondent. Police power is a state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere
personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. In this case, the particular
exercise of police power was clearly intended to
promote public safety.
The Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the nation. Thus, as impressed in the
1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
18
 Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW

word.   Our   country’s   word   was   resembled   in   our   Government, as well as all documents and papers
own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague submitted therewith. In response to private
and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207. The respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a
concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by
of such an attitude which is, moreover, at war with private respondent only on August 4, 1999),
the principle of international morality. denied the foregoing requests.
In Santiago v. Far Eatern Broadcasting
Company , it was held that the constitutionality of On August 6, 1999, private respondent
the law will not be considered unless the point is filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
specially pleaded, insisted upon and adequately
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
argued. Equal protection is not a talismanic
Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a
Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein
lawsuit can rightfully expect success will crown his
efforts. The law is anything but that. petitioner to furnish private respondent the
extradition documents, to give him access
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. HON. RALPH thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to
comment on, or oppose, the extradition request,
LANTION
and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially,
GR No 139465. January 18, 2000 fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside
herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and
prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering
FACTS: On January 13, 1977, President
the extradition request and from filing an
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the
No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
the NBI from performing any act directed to the
Crimes in a Foreign Country". On November 13,
extradition of private respondent to the United
1994, Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
States), with an application for the issuance of a
representing the Government of the Republic of
temporary restraining order and a writ of
the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition
preliminary injunction. The aforementioned
Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of
petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684
the Philippines and the Government of the United
and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said
States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the
regional trial court stationed in Manila which is
RP-US Extradition Treaty).
presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion,
respondent. Lantion rendered decision ordering
On June 18, 1999, the Department of
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign
Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of
Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a
Investigation, their agents and/or representatives
request for the extradition of private respondent
to maintain the status quo by refraining from
Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the
committing the acts complained of and from
Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the
conducting further proceedings in connection with
warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court,
the request of the United States Government for
Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
the extradition of the private petitioner.
documents for said extradition. Based on the
papers submitted, private respondent appears to
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent, Mark
be charged in the United States violating some
B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official
provisions of the United States Code (USC). On
extradition request and documents with an
the same day, petitioner issued Department Order
opportunity to file a comment on or opposition?
No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the private
pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No.
respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition
1069.
request and its supporting papers and to give him
a reasonable period of time within which to file his
Private respondent Mark Jimenez,
comment with supporting evidence. In this case,
through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999
there exists a clear conflict between the obligation
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the
of the Philippine Government to comply with the
official extradition request from the U.S.
provisions of the treaty and its equally significant

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role of protection of its citizens of its right of due
process. The processes outlined in the treaty and
in the presidential decree already pose an
impending threat to a prospective extradite liberty
as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an
imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent
one.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NORMA
CUISON-MELGAR
GR. No. 139676. March 31, 2006
FACTS: On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio
were married in Dagupan City. On August 19,
1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground that Eulogio is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with its
essential marital obligations. The manifestations of
Eulogio’s   psychological   incapacity   are   his   Guzman, who had already gained the status of a
immaturity, alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, laziness and abandonment of his
family since December 27, 1985.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged psychological
incapacity of respondent is in the nature of
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD: The Court cannot presume psychological
detect   from   the   mere   fact   of   Eulogio’s   immaturity,   discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a
habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy and the
like. These circumstances, by themselves, cannot
be equated with psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It was not
shown that these acts are manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes Eulogio
completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAGRAPH & TELEPHONE
CO. v. NLRC
GR. No. 118978. May 23, 1997
FACTS: PT&T initially hired Grace de Guzman
specifically  as  “Supernumerary  Project  Worker”,  for   provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on
a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April
20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on
maternity leave. She was again invited for
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employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who
went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to
July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was
again asked to join PT&T as a probationary
employee where probationary period will cover 150
days. She indicated in the portion of the job
application form under civil status that she was
single although she had contracted marriage a few
months earlier. When petitioner learned later
about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M.
Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring
her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the
company’s   policy   of  not  accepting  married  women  
for employment. She was dismissed from the
company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter
handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De
regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent
that she had been discriminated on account of her
having contracted marriage in violation of company
policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil
status can be grounds to terminate the services of
an employee.
HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the
protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
female employee. It is recognized that company is
free to regulate manpower and employment from
hiring to firing, according to their discretion and
best business judgment, except in those cases of
unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&T’s   policy   of   not   accepting   or  
disqualifying from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage is afoul of the right against
discrimination provided to all women workers by
our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record
discloses  clearly  that  de  Guzman’s  ties  with  PT&T  
were dissolved principally because of the
company’s   policy   that   married   women   are   not  
qualified for employment in the company, and not
merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the
the right of a woman to be free from any kind of
stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good
morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her
20

freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is
inherent in an individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by
PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and
purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and ultimately, family as the foundation
of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all
its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of
the land not only for order but also imperatively
required.
MAXIMO CALALANG v. WILLIAMS
GR. No. 47800. December 2, 1940
FACTS: The National Traffic Commission, in its
resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend
to the Director of Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza
Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from
7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the
railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague
Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940,
recommended to the Director of Public Works the
adoption of the measure proposed in the
resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said
Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads. On
2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his
first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, recommended to the latter
the approval of the recommendation made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with
the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to
traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the
portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing
at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street.
On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, in his second
indorsement addressed to the Director of Public
Works, approved the recommendation of the latter
that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to
traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points
and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante
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Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the
Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulations
thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as
a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila,
brought before the Supreme court the petition for a
writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission;
Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works;
Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works
and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez,
as Acting Chief of Police of Manila
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue
delegation of legislative power.
HELD: There is no undue delegation of legislative
power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer
legislative powers to the Director of Public Works.
The authority conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations
now complained of is not to determine what public
policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly   in   said   Act,   to   wit,   “to   promote   safe  
transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President   of   the   Philippines”   and   to   close   them  
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic
“whenever   the   condition   of   the   road   or   the   traffic  
makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience  and  interest.”
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said
law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the
use of national roads and to determine when and
how long a national road should be closed to
traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the
National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to
whom is confided the duty of determining whether
the proper occasion exists for executing the law.
But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law.
21

DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
GR. No. 124382. August 16, 1999
FACTS: At around 5 PM of December 2, 1984,
petitioner converged at J.R. Lawee Street, Manila
for the ostensible purpose of having mass at the
St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacanang
grounds located in the street. Wearing the familiar
yellow t-shirts, they started to march down said
street with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-
governmental investives. However, they were
barred by respondent Mayor Isabello Larriosa,
upon orders of his superior and co-respondent
General Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any
further and because of the alleged warning given
by Mayor Larriosa that any similar attempt by
petitioners to enter the church in the future world
likewise be barred, thus, this recourse.
During the hearing, respondents assured
petitioners and the court that they have never
restricted and will never restrict any person or
persons from entering and worshipping of said.
They   maintain,   however,   that   petitioner’s   intention   power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
was not really to perform an act of religious
worship, but to conduct an anti-governmental
demonstration at a place close to the residence
and offer of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can invoke
their constitutional freedom to religious worship
and locomotion.
HELD: The foregoing cannot but cost serious
doubts on the sincerity and good faith of petitioners
in invoking the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of religious worship and of locomotion. While it is
beyond that every citizen has the undeniable and
inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise
thereof, must be done with good faith.
The restriction done by private
respondents is intended to secure the several
executive officers within the Malacanang grounds
from possible external attacks and disturbances. It
is necessary to maintain the smooth functioning of
the executive branch of the government, which
petitioners mass action would certainly disrupt
petitioners are not denied of their freedom of belief
or religion, but only in the manner by which they
had attempted to translate the same into action.
FRANCISCO GUDANI v. GENEROSO S. SENGA
GR. No. 170165. August. 15, 2006
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FACTS: On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited
several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.
Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the
Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security concerning the conduct of the 2004
elections wherein allegations of massive cheating
and  the  “Hello  Garci”  tapes  emerged.  AFP  Chief  of  
Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and
company from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval.
Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
testified before said Committee, prompting Gen.
Senga to order them subjected to General Court
Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of
a superior officer. In the meantime, President
Arroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequently
declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President can
prevent military officers from testifying at a
legislative inquiry.
HELD: We hold that the President has
constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the
same time, we also hold that any chamber of
Congress which seeks the appearance before it of
a military officer against the consent of the
President has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance. Any military official whom
Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the
President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial
orders have the force of the law of the land which
the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
As earlier noted, it was ruled in Senate that
the President may not issue a blanket requirement
of prior consent on executive officials summoned
by the legislature to attend a congressional
hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the
considerable limitations on executive privilege, and
affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked
on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege,   but   on   the   Chief   Executive’s   power   as  
commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The
President’s   prerogatives   as   commander-in-chief
22

are not hampered by the same limitations as in
executive privilege.
The President could, as a general rule,
require military officers to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress is
based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule
unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant
control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-
rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the
Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief
and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining
to the position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate that
the   President’s   ability   to   control   the   individual  
members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the
Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that
the officer has to choose the President. After all,
the Constitution prescribes that it is the President,
and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
LOUIS  “BAROK”  C.  BIRAGAO  V.  THE   sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been
PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
G.R. No. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010
FACTS:
At the dawn of administration, the
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, on July 30,
2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC).
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive
order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to
declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1
violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions
HELD:
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No. The creation of the PTC finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
constitution, imposing upon the President the
duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the
allocation of power in the three principal branches
of government is a grant of all powers inherent
them.   The   president’s   power   to   conduct  
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws-in this case, fundamental laws
on public accountability and transparency- is
inherent   in   the   president’s   powers   as   the   Chief  
Executive. That the authority of the President to
conduct investigations and to create bodies to
execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in
the constitution or in statutes does not mean that
he is bereft of such authority.
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of
“executive   power”.   Corollarily,   the   powers   of   the  
President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the
advanced that whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive.
The  Chief  Executive’s  power  to  create  the  Ad  hoc  
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control
of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law.
ELDEPIO LASCO v. UNITED NATIONS
REVOLVING FUND FOR NATURAL
RESOURCES EXPLORATION (UNRFNRE)
GR. Nos. 109095-109107. February 23, 1995
FACTS: Petitioners filed a suit because they were
dismissed from their employment with private
respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for
23

Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) which
involved a joint project of the Philippine
Government and the United Nations for exploration
work in Dinagat Island.
Later, a letter from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) dated August 26, 1991
acknowledged UNRFNRE as immune from suit.
The letter confirmed that private respondent was
covered by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations of which the
Philippine Government was an original signatory.
On November 25, 1991, respondent Labor
Arbiter issued an order dismissing the complaints
on the ground that private respondent was
protected by diplomatic immunity. The Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was denied. When an
appeal was filed with the NLRC, it affirmed the
dismissal of the complaints.
ISSUE: Was the principle of separation of powers
between the decision of the court and the letter
from the DFA followed in this case?
HELD: Yes. Diplomatic immunity is essentially a
political question and it is the duty of the courts to
accept the claim of immunity as to not embarrass
the executive arm of the government (which is the
DFA) in conducting foreign relations. It is generally
accepted that in such cases, the judicial
department of the government follows the action of
the political branch and will not embarrass the
latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
Thus the petition was dismissed.
BENGZON ET AL., v. HON. FRANKLIN N.
DRILON
GR. No. 103524. April 15, 1992
FACTS:
This is an instant petition for readjustment of
retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals monthly pension. The petitioners are
retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals who are currently receiving monthly
pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A.
No. 1797.
Section 3-A, which authorizes said
pensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealed by
President Marcos. The legislature saw the need to
re-enact said R.A.s to restore said retirement
pensions and privilege. President Aquino,
however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as well as
portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of
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the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of
the Philippines and the Lower Courts.
ISSUE: Can the President veto certain provisions
of the General Appropriations Act?
HELD: No. The act of the Executive in vetoing the
particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the
Constitution grants the power, it also provides
limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto
a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is,
therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire
bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this
reason that the Constitution has wisely provided
the   “item   veto   power”   to   avoid   inexpedient   riders  
from being attached to an indispensable
appropriation or revenue measure.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS
FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR. Nos. 177857-58. September 17, 2009
FACTS: This is an Urgent Motion to Approve the
Conversion of the SMC Common Shares into SMC
Series 1 Preferred Shares. COCOFED seeks the
Court’s  approval  of  the  conversion  of  753,848,312  
Class   “A”   and   Class   “B”   common   shares   of   San  
Miguel Corporation (SMC) registered in the names
of Coconut Industry Investment Fund and the so-
called  “14  Holding  Companies”  (collectively  known  
as  “CIIF  companies”)  into  753,848,312  SMC  Series  
1 Preferred Shares (hereinafter, the Conversion).
Respondent Republic filed its Comment
questioning   COCOFED’s   personality   to   seek   the  
Court’s   approval   of   the   desired   conversion. It
postulates that, owing to the sequestrated status of
the said common shares, only PCGG has the
authority to approve the proposed conversion and
seek the necessary Court approval. After
considerations, the executive branch of the
government, proposed for the conversion of the
CIIF SMC shares.
ISSUE: Can the Court question the reasons
behind the decision of the executive branch to ask
for the conversion of the common shares to
preferred shares?
HELD: No, because in doing so the Court would
be trenching on the well-settled doctrine of
separation of powers. The cardinal postulate
explains that the three branches must discharge
their respective functions within the limits of
authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the
24

principle of separation of powers, neither
Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may
encroach on fields allocated to the other branches
of government. The legislature is generally limited
to the enactment of laws, the executive to the
enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and
controversies.
SAGUIGUIT VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 144054. June 30, 2006
FACTS: In eight (8) separate informations filed
with the RTC of Angeles City, thereat docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 94-03-226 to 94-03-233,
Nieves Saguiguit was charged with violations of
the Bouncing Checks Law. All containing identical
allegations as to the elements of the offense
charged and differing only as regards the
respective amounts and due dates of the check
involved in each case, the eight (8) informations
uniformly alleged:
"That on or about the 1st week of April,
1991, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously draw and issue to the
complainant MR. ELMER EVANGELISTA a
Traders Royal Bank Check No._______, in the
amount of _______, dated ________, 1991, well
knowing and without informing the complainant
that she has no sufficient funds with the drawee
bank, which check when deposited for payment
was dishonored for reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED"
and demand notwithstanding for more than five (5)
days from notice of dishonor, the accused failed
and refused and still fails and refuses to redeem
the said check to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant ELMER EVANGELISTA in the afore-
mentioned amount of
__________,Philippine Currency".
On March 16, 1998, the Regional Trial
Court rendered a decision that petitioner is guilty
as charged in each information.
Unable to accept the verdict of guilt,
petitioner went on appeal to the CA. On June 28,
2000, the appellate court affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can re-examine
extant jurisprudence on the Bouncing Checks Law.
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HELD: The court held that court cannot re-
examine extant jurisprudence on the Bouncing
Checks Law. What the petitioner asks is for the
Court to delve into the policy behind or wisdom of a
statute, i.e., B.P. Blg. 22, which, under the doctrine
of separation of powers, it cannot do, matters of
legislative wisdom being within the domain of
Congress. The Court can only interpret and apply
the law and cannot, despite doubts about its
wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have
no right to encroach on the prerogatives of
lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that
they have acted with grave abuse of discretion.
In the case, petitioner's last and only
remaining remedy is to seek an amendment of the
law in question, a matter which should be
addressed to Congress because the legislature is
the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any
law.
CHECKS AND BALANCES
JAWORSKI VS PAGCOR
GR No. 144463. January 14, 2004
FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeks   to   nullify   the   “Grant   of   Authority   and  
Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and
Internet   Gaming,”   executed   by   respondent  
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as PAGCOR) in favor of
respondent Sports and Games and Entertainment
Corporation (also referred to as SAGE).
PAGCOR is a government owned and
controlled corporation existing under Presidential
Decree No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then
President Ferdinand Marcos.
On  March  31,  1998,  PAGCOR’s  board  of  directors  
approved  an  instrument  denominated  as  “Grant  of  
Authority and Agreement for the Operation of
Sports   Betting   and   Internet   Gaming”,   which  
granted SAGE the authority to operate and
maintain Sports Betting station   in   PAGCOR’s  
casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to
service local and international bettors, provided
that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate
safeguards and procedures are established to
ensure the integrity and fairness of the games.
Pursuant to the authority granted by
PAGCOR, SAGE commenced its operations by
conducting gambling on the Internet on a trial-run
25
 Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW

basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of franchise to operate a gambling activity. The grant
winnings available at various Bingo Bonanza of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a
outlets. right and a duty to be performed by the grantee.
The grantee must not perform its activities
Petitioner, in his capacity as member of arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the
the Senate and Chairman of the Senate limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its
Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, terms and conditionalities. A corporation as a
files the instant petition, praying that the grant of creature of the State is presumed to exist for the
authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be common good. Hence, the special privileges and
nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR committed franchises it receives are subject to the laws of the
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or State and the limitations of its charter.
excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to
operate gambling on the internet. According to The court held that while PAGCOR is
petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s  
any of the categories of the authorized gambling and/or management contracts, it is not allowed
activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. under the same charter to relinquish or share its
1869   which   grants   PAGCOR   the   “right,   privilege   franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
and authority to operate and maintain gambling another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot
casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement delegate its power in view of the legal principle
places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial of delegata potestas delegare non potest,
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines.”   He   inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show
contends that internet gambling could not have that it has been expressly authorized to do so.
been included within the commonly accepted
definition   of   “gambling   casinos”,   “clubs”   or   “other   PHILIPPINES JUDGES ASSOCIATION v.
recreation   or   amusement   places”   as   these   terms   PRADO
refer to a physical structure in real-space where
people who intend to bet or gamble go and play GR. No. 105371. November 11, 1993
games of chance authorized by law.
FACTS: The petitioners, who are members of the
lower courts, are questioning the constitutionality of
ISSUE: Whether   or   not   PAGCOR’s   legislative   R.A. No. 7354 (An Act Creating the Philippine
franchise includes the right to vest another entity, Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions
SAGE in this case, with the authority to operate and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of
Internet gambling. the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected
Therewith) on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not
HELD: A legislative franchise is a special privilege express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege required readings in both Houses of Congress and
of public concern which cannot be exercised at will printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
and pleasure, but should be reserved for public distributed among the members before its
control and administration, either by the passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
government directly, or by public agents, under encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
such conditions and regulations as the government
may impose on them in the interest of the public. It ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 7354 constitutional?
is Congress that prescribes the conditions on HELD: Based on the decision, the title of R.A. No.
which the grant of the franchise may be made. 7354 does not violate the constitution. The title of
the bill is not required to be an index to the body of
In the case, the court holds that PAGCOR the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it every single detail of the measure. It has been held
passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE. that if the title fairly indicates the general subject,
PAGCOR executed an agreement with SAGE and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act,
whereby the former grants the latter the authority and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or
to operate and maintain sports betting stations and the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
Internet gaming operations. In essence, the grant constitutional requirement. The withdrawal of the
of authority gives SAGE the privilege to actively franking privilege from some agencies is germane
participate,   partake   and   share   PAGCOR’s   to the accomplishment of the principal objective of

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R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more
efficient and effective postal service system.
Also, while it is true that a conference
committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it
is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. A
conference committee may, deal generally with the
subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences between the two houses.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court
may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of
Congress. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 of
the Constitution.
However, Section 35 of R. A. No. 7354
was annulled since it was found to be violative of
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that
no person shall "be deprived of the equal
protection of laws."
DELEGATION OF POWERS
ABAKADA V. ERMITA
GR. No. 168056, G.R. No. 168207, GR. No.
168461, GR. No. 168463, GR. No. 168730.
September 1, 2005
FACTS: RA 9337 is the VAT Reform Act enacted
on May 24, 2005. Sec. 4 (sales of goods and
properties), Sec. 5 (importation of goods) and Sec.
6 (services and lease of property) of RA 9337, in
collective, granted the Secretary of Finance the
authority to ascertain: a.) Whether by 31 December
2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of the
2004 GDP exceeds 2.8%; or b.) The National
Government deficit as a percentage of the 2004
GDP exceeds 1.5%.
If either condition is met, the Secretary of
Finance must inform the President who, in turn,
must impose the 12% VAT rate (from 10%)
effective January 1, 2006. ABAKADA maintained
that Congress abandoned its exclusive authority to
fix taxes and that RA 9337 contained a uniform
proviso authorizing the President upon
recommendation by the Department of Finance
(DOF) Secretary to raise VAT to 12%.
Sen. Pimentel maintained that RA 9337
constituted undue delegation of legislative powers
and a violation of due process since the law was
ambiguous and arbitrary. Same with Rep.
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Escudero. Pilipinas Shell dealers argued that the
VAT reform was arbitrary, oppressive and
confiscatory. Respondents countered that the law
was complete, that it left no discretion to the
President, and that it merely charged the President
with carrying out the rate increase once any of the
two (2) conditions arise.
ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of powers?
HELD: No. The Constitution allows as under
exempted delegation the delegation of tariffs,
customs duties, and other tolls, levies on goods
imported and exported. VAT is tax levied on sales
of goods and services which could not fall under
this exemption. Hence, its delegation if unqualified
is unconstitutional. The Legislative power has the
authority to make a complete law. Thus, to be
valid, a law must be complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy and it must fix a standard, limits
of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable.
No undue delegation when congress
describes what job must be done who must do it
and the scope of the authority given. Secretary of
Finance was merely tasked to ascertain the
existence of facts. All else was laid out. Mainly
ministerial for the secretary to ascertain the facts
and for the president to carry out the
implementation for the VAT. They were agents of
the legislative department thus, their acts were
merely implementations of the law.
THE UNITED STATES v. ANG TANG HO
GR. No. 17122. February 27, 1922
FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature
(during special session) passed and approved Act
No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly
and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said
act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes
the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary
Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution
of such products.
Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919,
the GG issued Executive Order (EO) 53 which was
published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed
the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tang
Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally
sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price
of eighty centavos. The said amount was way
higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale
27

was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08
August 1919, he was charged in violation of the
said EO.
He was found guilty as charged and was
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a
P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence
countering that there is an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of power to
the Governor General?
HELD: Yes, unconstitutional and void. The
lower court’s decision was reversed and the
petitioner was discharged. When it authorizes the
Governor-General to fix the price at which
rice should be sold, it can be gathered that
legislative power to enact law, is lodged in
the Executive. Promulgation of temporary rules
and emergency measures was left to the discretion
of the GG. Legislature did not specify or
define what conditions the GG shall issue the
proclamation. Thus, the act states that it can be
issued “For   any   cause.”   Legislature   did   not   define   for the amendment of the Constitution?
what is an extraordinary rise in the price of rice.
(which shall be what is prevented by such
legislature). In the absence of the proclamation, it
was not a crime to sell rice at any price. If ever
there is a crime, it is because the GG issued the
proclamation. The power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to
the GG or anyone else. The legislative cannot
delegate the legislative power to enact any law. It
can only pass a law that does nothing more than to
authorize the GG to make rules and regulations to
carry the law into effect.
SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR. No. L-44640, GR. No. L-44684, GR. No. L-
44714. October 12, 1976
FACTS:On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinan
d E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of
martial law. On 22 September 1976, the President
issued another PD 1031, amending the previous
Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the
provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for
the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
"barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to
the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October
1976.
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The President also issued PD 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people
in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976.
The Commission on Elections was vested with the
exclusive supervision and control of the October
1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
Pablo and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, com
menced for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC
from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force
and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031.
They contend that under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. Another action for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction was instituted by Vicente M.
Guzman, Raul M. Gonzales, hisson, and Alfredo
Salapantan, to restrain the implementation of
Presidential Decrees.
ISSUE: May the President call upon a referendum
HELD: Yes. The power to legislate is
constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However,
the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter
fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent
President. And, in the exercise of that judgment,
the President opted to defer convening of that
body in utter recognition of the people's
preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution
lies in the interim National Assembly upon special
call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory
Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the
sovereign will, the President decided not to call the
interim National Assembly. Would it then be within
the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the
President to assume that constituent power of the
interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that
body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If
the President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there
is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the
function of that Assembly to propose amendments
to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although
peculiar, to its gross legislative power.
28

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION (PBA) V.
COMELEC
GR. No. L-72915. December 19, 1985
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883
calling for a special (snap) election for President
and Vice President was assailed by PBA, et al.
They contend that it is violative of the Constitution
because the office is not vacant. Then President
Marcos, although tendered
a letter of resignation, gave condition that his
resignation will be effective only when the election
is held and after the winner is proclaimed and
qualified as President by taking his oath of office
ten (10) days after his proclamation.
The plaintiff contends that vacancy must
be real and in Esse not a parody or shadow of the
real thing. In the same way that death, disability, or
removal from office must be actual and permanent
before the pertinent provisions of Section 9, Art. VII
of the 1973 Constitution may come into play, so
must a resignation be real and irrevocably
permanent.
ISSUE: Is BP Blg. 883 unconstitutional and should
this Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding
of the election?
HELD: By a 7-to-
5 vote the SC decided to uphold the
constitutionality of said law. There is no clear case
has been made of an absolute void of power and
authority that would warrant its nullification and that
prohibition is not a remedy for acts done that can
no longer be undone.
It is a political question. An examination of
the Constitution, particularly Art.VII, Section 9,
does not yield the conclusion that BP Blg.883 is
offensive to its provisions. What is clear is that the
Constitution does not prohibit the President from
tendering a resignation that is not immediately
effective. Indeed, there is no provision whatsoever
regarding such kind of resignation.4. The
enactment of BP 883 falls within the legislative
authority of the Batasang Pambansa. The case is
dismissed and the prayer for
the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election
on February 7, 1986 is denied.
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MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO, QUEZON
VS. HON. ANTONIO V. MENDEZ, SR
GR. No. 103702, December 06, 1994
FACTS: On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P.
Garcia, issued Executive Order No. 353 creating
the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by
segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of
the same province, the barrios of San Andres,
Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala
along with their respective sitios, upon the request
of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon.
By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05
October 1965, issued by President Diosdado
Macapagal, the municipal district of San Andres
was later officially recognized to have gained the
status of a fifth class municipality beginning 01 July
1963;
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San
Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto. The
petitioning municipality contended that Executive
Order No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear
usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature
and in violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. In their answer, respondents
asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by
way of affirmative and special defenses, that since
it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that
the Municipality of San Andres was given life with
the issuance of Executive Order No. 353.
ISSUE: Is Executive Order No. 353 constitutional?
HELD: Executive Order No. 353 creating the
municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
August 1959 but it was
only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June
1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally
decided to challenge the legality of the executive
order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and
later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and
continued to exercise the powers and authority of a
duly created local government unit. In the same
manner that the failure of a public officer to
question his ouster or the right of another to hold a
position within a one-year period can abrogate an
action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed with
greatest imperativeness.
At the present time, all doubts on
the de jure standing of the municipality must be
dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15
October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House
of Representatives, appended to the 1987
29

Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has
been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect
that   municipal   districts   “organized   pursuant   to
presidential issuances or executive orders and
which have their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
considered   as   regular   municipalities.”   No   Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions
pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code is proferred.
It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made,
would succeed. The power to create political
subdivisions is a function of the legislature.
Congress did just that when it has incorporated
Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in
essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving
“validity  to  acts  done  that  would  have  been  invalid  
under existing laws, as if existing laws have been
complied   with,”   are   validly   accepted in this
jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification
against impairment of vested rights.
All considered, the de jure status of the
Municipality of San Andres in the province of
Quezon must now be conceded.
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. CA
GR. No. 100152. March 31, 2000
FACTS: Acebedo Optical applied for
a business permit to operate in Iligan City.
After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor
Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached
various special conditions which basically made
Acebedo’s   dependent   upon   prescriptions   to   be   P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No.
issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not
allowed to practice optometry within the city.
Acebedo however acquiesced to the said
conditions and operated under the permit;
Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the
said conditions and was subsequently suspended
from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed
the validity of the attached conditions. The local
optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in
assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced
to the same and that the imposition of the special
conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that
such conditions were entered upon by the city in its
proprietary function hence the permit is actually a
contract.
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ISSUE: Is the special conditions attached by the
mayor a valid exercise of police power?
HELD: No. Acebedo was applying for a business
permit to operate its business and not to practice
optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction
PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached
by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given
any legal application therefore estoppel does not
apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power.
in the granting of permits, he must base such
conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the
conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the
license is not a contract, it is a special privilege –
estoppels does not apply.
OSMENA v. ORBOS
GR No. 99886. March 31, 1993
Facts: P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the
General Fund, designated as the OilPrice
Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was
designed to reimburse oil companies for cost
increases in crude oil and imported petroleum
products resulting from exchange rate adjustments
and from increases in the world market prices of
crude oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified
into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024,
7 and ordered released from the National Treasury
to the Ministry of Energy. The same Executive
Order also authorized the investment of the fund in
government securities, with the earnings from such
placements accruing to the fund.
President Corazon C. Aquino, amended
137 on February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds
for reimbursement to oil companies for possible
cost underrecovery incurred as a result of the
reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products,
the amount of the underrecovery being left for
determination by the Ministry of Finance.
The petition further avers that the creation
of the trust fund violates Section 29(3), Article VI of
the Constitution. The petitioner argues that "the
monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as
amended, must be treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,'
not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if
a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the
revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a
special fund' to be used only for the purpose
indicated, and not channeled to another
government objective."
Petitioner further points out that since "a
'special fund' consists of monies collected through
30

the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong
to the State, although the use thereof is limited to
the special purpose/objective for which it was
created."
ISSUE: Whether or not the "delegation of
legislative authority" to the Energy Regulatory
Board valid.
HELD: For a valid delegation of power, it is
essential that the law delegating the power must
be (1) complete in itself, that is it must set forth the
policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it
must fix a standard — limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which
the delegate must conform. The standard, as the
Court has already stated, may even be implied. In
that light, there can be no ground upon which to
sustain the petition, inasmuch as the challenged
law sets forth a determinable standard which
guides the exercise of the power granted to the
ERB. By the same token, the proper exercise of
the delegated power may be tested with ease. It
seems obvious that what the law intended was to
permit the additional imposts for as long as there
exists a need to protect the general public and the
petroleum industry from the adverse
consequences of pump rate fluctuations. "Where
the standards set up for the guidance of an
administrative officer and the action taken are in
fact recorded in the orders of such officer, so that
Congress, the courts and the public are assured
that the orders in the judgment of such officer
conform to the legislative standard, there is no
failure in the performance of the legislative
functions."
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING
CORPORATION V. ANGELES
GR No. 108461. October 21, 1996
FACTS: The controversy springs from the
issuance by the PITC of Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01,[1] under which, applications to
the   PITC   for   importation   from   the   People’s   valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The
Republic of China (PROC. for brevity) must be
accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export
Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried
out by the importer himself or through a tie-up with
a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to
the value of the importation from PROC being
applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio. To
ensure that the export commitments of the
IMPORTER are carried out in accordance with
these rules, all IMPORTERS concerned are
required to submit an EXPORT PERFORMANCE
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GUARANTEE  (the  “Guarantee”)  at  the  time  of  filing  
of the Import Application. The guarantee shall be
made in favor of PITC and will be automatically
forfeited in favor of PITC, fully or partially, if the
required export program is not completed by the
importer within six (6) months from date of
approval of the Import Application. Should the
IMPORTER or any of his duly authorized
representatives make any false statements or
fraudulent misrepresentations in the Import/Export
Application, or falsify, forge or simulate any
document required under these rules and
regulations, PITC is authorized to reject all pending
and future import/export applications of said
IMPORTER and/or disqualify said IMPORTER
and/or disqualify said IMPORTER from doing any
business  with  SOCPEC  through  PITC.”
Desiring to make importations from PROC,
private respondents Remington and Firestone,
both domestic corporations, organized and existing
under Philippines laws, individually applied for
authority to import from PROC with the petitioner.
They were granted such authority after satisfying
the requirements for importers, and after they
executed respective undertakings to balance their
importations from PROC with corresponding export
of Philippine products to PROC.
Subsequently, for failing to comply with
their undertakings to submit export credits
equivalent to the value of their importations, further
import applications were withheld by petitioner
PITC from private respondents, such that the latter
both barred from importing goods from PROC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PITC is empowered to
issue the Administrative Order?
HELD: The PITC was legally empowered to issue
Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a
power ancillary to legislation. This does not imply
however, that the subject Administrative Order is a
original Administrative Order issued on August 30,
1989, under which the respondents filed their
applications for importations, was not published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The questioned Administrative Order,
legally, until it is published, is invalid within the
context of Article 2 of Civil Code. The
Administrative Order under consideration is one of
those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and
implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
31

delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation to LOI 444
and EO 133.
LEO ECHEGARAY v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
GR. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
FACTS: On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed the
conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for
the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him
of the death penalty for the said crime.
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and
on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue
of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659(the
death penalty law) and the imposition of the death
penalty for the crime of rape. On February 7, 1998,
this Court denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit
to change the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection and
passed Republic Act No. 8177. Pursuant to the
provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice
promulgated the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177and directed the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare
the Lethal Injection Manual.
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a
Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin
respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of
the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the
execution by lethal injection of petitioner under
R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these
are unconstitutional and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Secretary
unlawfully delegated the legislative powers
delegated to him under Republic Act No. 8177 to
respondent Director?
HELD: The court held that there is no undue
delegation of Legislative power in R.A. No. 8177 to
the Sec of Justice and the Director of Bureau of
Corrections, but section 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to implement RA No. 8177 is invalid.
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction
with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and
regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a
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form of delegation of legislative authority to
administrative bodies. the Court finds that the
existence of an area for exercise of discretion by
the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative
power is proper where standards are formulated
for the guidance and the exercise of limited
discretion, which though general, are capable of
reasonable application.
The Courts finds in the first paragraph of
Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically
abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on
the execution procedure to the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode
of review and approval thereof. Being a mere
constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the
Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the
administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as
the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177.
Such apparent abdication of departmental
responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
CHAVEZ v. ROMULO
GR No. 157036. June 9,2004
FACTS: In January 2003, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the
members of the PNP stressing the need for a
nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the
rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP
Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the
issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of
Residence (PTCFOR). Acting on President
Arroyo’s   directive,   respondent   Ebdane   issued   the  
assailed Guidelines.
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed
gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
requested the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of
Firearms Outside of Residence. However, his
request was denied. Thus, he filed the present
petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as
Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive
Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the
PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ebdane is
authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines.
32

HELD: By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the
Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the
PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the
Constabulary   and,   therefore,   assumed   the   latter’s   amended petition. On September 8, 1976,
licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies,
as   one   of   PNP’s   powers,   the   issuance   of   licenses   challenged decision holding in substance that
for the possession of firearms and explosives in
accordance with law. This is in conjunction with the
PNP  Chief’s  “power  to  issue  detailed  implementing   jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and
policies  and  instructions”  on  such  “matters  as  may   remanding the case to the former Municipal Court
be necessary to effectively carry out the functions,
powers  and  duties”  of  the  PNP.
R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of
the Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his
authority to promulgate rules and regulations for
the effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866.
For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D.
No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of
penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus,
the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief
of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules and
regulations regarding firearms remains effective.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DACUYCUY
GR. No. L-45127. May 5, 1989
FACTS: On April 4, 1975, herein private
respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A.
Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials
of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court
of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof
for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The case
was set for arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975.
At the arraignment, the herein private respondents,
as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally moved
to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature
of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the
offense. The motion to quash was subsequently
reduced to writing on June 13, 1975. On August
21, 1975, the municipal court denied the motion to
quash for lack of merit. On September 2, 1975,
private respondents filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on the
same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the
further allegation that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense considering that Section 32
of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being
unconstitutional. In an undated order received by
the counsel for private respondents on October 20,
1975, the motion for reconsideration was denied.
On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein
filed an opposition to the admission of the said
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amended petitions 9 but respondent judge denied
the same in his resolution of April 20, 1976. On
August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a
supplementary memorandum in answer to the
respondent judge rendered the aforecited
Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional
but cases for its violation fall outside of the
of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic Act No. 4670
should be invalidated as an "undue delegation of
legislative power.
HELD: The respondent judge erroneously
assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment
has been provided for by the legislature, the court
is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the
term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree
with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the
term of imprisonment where no points of reference
have been provided by the legislature. What valid
delegation presupposes and sanctions is an
exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of
a term of imprisonment which must be
encompassed within specific or designated limits
provided by law, the absence of which designated
limits well constitute such exercise as an undue
delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or
assumption, of legislative power.
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
GONZALES v. COMELEC
GR. No. L-28196. November 9, 1967
FACTS: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the
House of Representatives passed the
1.) R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1,
proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so
as to increase the membership of the House of
Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum
of 180, to be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, although
each province shall have, at least, one member; 2.)
33

R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose
amendments to said Constitution, the convention
to be composed of two elective delegates from
each representative district, to be "elected in the
general elections to be held on the second
Tuesday of November, 1971;" 3.) R. B. H. No. 3,
proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same
Constitution, be amended so as to authorize
Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats in the Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill,
which, upon approval by the President, on June
17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913,
providing that the amendments to the Constitution
proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1
and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at
the general elections which shall be held on
November 14, 1967.
ISSUE: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the
Constitution.
HELD: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8)
votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and
R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid,
the petitions in these two cases must be, as they
are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed
for denied, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto
officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de
facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it
would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the
office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within
the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as
the public is concerned.
Article XV of the Constitution provides that
“the   Congress   in   joint   session
assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a
contention for that purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to
the people for their ratification. From our viewpoint,
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the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are
satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B.
H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats
as legislators, even if they should run for and
assume the functions of delegates to the
Convention.
JOSE MARI EULALIO C. LOZADA v. COMELEC
GR. No. L-59068. January 27, 1983
FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition
for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold
an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim
Batasang Pambansa. They anchor their contention
on Section 5 (2), Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution
which   provides   that   “in   case   a   vacancy   arises   in  
the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more
before a regular election, the Commission on
Election shall call a special election to be held
within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to
elect   the   member   to   serve   the   unexpired   term.”  
COMELEC opposes the petition alleging,
substantially, that 1) petitioners lack of standing to
file the Instant petition alleging for they are not the
proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3)
Section 5 (2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
does not apply to the Interim Batansang
Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can
compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill
vacancies in the legislatures.
HELD: The   Supreme   Court’s   jurisdiction   over   the  
COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the
latter’s  decision,  orders  or  rulings.  This  is  as  clearly  
provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the new
Constitution   which   provides   that   “any   decision,  
order or ruling of the Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt
of  a  copy  thereof.”
It is obvious that the holding of special
elections in several districts where vacancies exist,
would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the
Batasang Pambansa can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose, and this power of BP
may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts
much less may COMELEC compel the BP to
exercise its power of appropriation. The power of
appropriation is the only sole and exclusive
prerogative of the legislative body, the exdercise of
which may not be compelled througha petition for
34

mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section
5 (2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended
to apply to vacancies in the regular National
Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JALOSJOS
GR. No. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos,
is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-
appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
includingattendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and
the need for his constituents to be represented.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should
be allowed to discharge mandate as member
of the House of Representatives.
HELLD: Election is the expression of the sovereign
power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution.
The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the
absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
To allow accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meetings
for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him
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a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s   status   to   that   of   a  
special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ v. BARTOLOME
CABANGBANG
GR. No. L-15905. August 3, 1966
FACTS: Cabangbang was a member of the House
of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee
on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958,
Cabangbang caused the publication of an open
letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter
alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some
ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists
have had collusions with communists and that the
Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning
a   coup   d’état   to   place   him   as   the   president.   The  
“planners”  allegedly  have  Nicanor  Jimenez,  among  
others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al
may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said
to have been published in newspapers of general
circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against
Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang   alleging   that   Cabangbang’s  
statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for
the case to be dismissed because he said that as
a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and
that he is covered by the privileged communication
rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered
by privilege communication endowed to members
of Congress.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution
provides   “The   Senators   and   Members   of   the  
House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or
debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any
other  place.”  The  publication  of  the  said  letter  is  not  
covered by said expression which refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session as well as bills introduced in Congress,
35
 Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW

whether the same is in session or not, and other Sec. 24 of the Constitution. Although they admit
acts performed by Congressmen, either in that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of
Congress or outside the premises housing its Representatives where it passed three readings
offices, in the official discharge of their duties as and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where
members of Congress and of Congressional after first reading it was referred to the Senate
Committees duly authorized to perform its Ways and Means Committee, they complain that
functions as such at the time of the performance of the Senate did not pass it on second and third
the acts in question. Congress was not in session readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass
when the letter was published and at the same its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on
time he, himself, caused the publication of the said May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what
letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the the Senate committee should have done was to
communication to be so published, he was not amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the
performing his official duty, either as a member of bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630.
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower and the Senate version just becomes the text (only
court the said communication is not absolutely the text) of the House bill.
privileged. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 7716 is
The SC is satisfied that the letter in
unconstitutional.
question  is  not  sufficient  to  support  Jimenez’  action  
for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs HELD: The court concluded that the law suffers
are under the control of the persons unnamed from none of the infirmities attributed to it by
therein   alluded   to   as   “planners”,   and   that,   having   petitioners and that its enactment by the other
been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted branches of the government does not constitute a
that  defendant,  likewise,  added  that  “it  is  of  course   grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its
possible”   that   plaintiffs   “are   unwitting   tools   of   the   necessity, desirability or expediency must be
plan of which they may have absolutely no addressed to Congress as the body which is
knowledge”.   In   other   words,   the   very   document   electorally responsible, remembering that, as
upon   which   plaintiffs’   action   is   based   explicitly   Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are the
indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the alleged operational plans, and that they may the people in quite as great a degree as are the
be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC courts." It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No.
does not think that this statement is derogatory to 115543 does in arguing that we should enforce the
Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover public accountability of legislators, that those who
damages, considering that they are officers of our took part in passing the law in question by voting
Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts
the control of the Secretary of National Defense the burden of reviewing measures in the flush of
and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in enactment. This Court does not sit as a third
question seems to suggest that the group therein branch of the legislature, much less exercise a
described  as  “planners”  include  these  two  (2)  high   veto power over legislation.
ranking officers. Petition is dismissed. WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are
denied with finality and the temporary restraining
TOLENTINO, et al. v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE order previously issued is hereby lifted.
GR. No. 115455. October 30, 1995
FACTS: These are motions seeking
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
reconsideration of our decision dismissing the
petitions filed in these cases for the declaration of FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS et al. vs. THE
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise
known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (SET)

Petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc.,
Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA))
reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A.
No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI,
GR. No. 83767. October 27, 1988
FACTS: On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed
before the respondent Tribunal an election contest
docketed as SET Case No. 002-87 against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were

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proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on
Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time
composed of three (3) Justices of the Supreme
Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior
Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman).
Associate Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo
E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada,
Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose
Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners,
with the exception of Senator Estrada but including
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who had been
designated Member of the Tribunal replacing
Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the
Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition's
representative in the Tribunal) filed with the
respondent Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from
the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-
87 on the ground that all of them are interested
parties to said case, as respondents therein.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SET can function
without Senator Members.
HELD: The proposed amendment to the
Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)—requiring the
concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption
of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that
where more than four (4) members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall
constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3)
including one (1) Justice, and may adopt
resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the
decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-
Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just
let them refrain from participating in the resolution
of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, et al. v. COMELEC
GR. No. 163193. June 15, 2004
FACTS: On December 22, 1997, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system
(AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes
and canvassing/consolidating the results of the
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Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW
national and local elections. It also mandated the
COMELEC to acquire automated counting
machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices
and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms
and printing materials.
On October 29, 2002, the COMELEC
adopted, in its Resolution No. 02-0170, a
modernization program for the 2004 elections
consisting of three (3) phases, to wit: (1) PHASE I
– Computerized system of registration and voters
validation or the so-called "biometrics" system of
registration; (2) PHASE II – Computerized voting
and counting of votes; and (3) PHASE III –
Electronic transmission of results.
COMELEC subsequently approved
Resolution 6712 adopting the policy that the
precinct election results of each city and
municipality shall be immediately transmitted
electronically in advance to the COMELEC in
Manila.
Petitioners in this case questioned, among others,
the Constitutionality of the quick count as being
pre-emptive of the authority vested in Congress to
canvass the votes for the President and Vice-
President under Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE: Can   the   COMELEC   conduct   “unofficial”  
tabulation of presidential election results based on
a copy of the election returns?
HELD: No. The assailed resolution usurps, under
the guise of an "unofficial" tabulation of election
results based on a copy of the election returns, the
sole and exclusive authority of Congress to
canvass the votes for the election of President and
Vice-President as provided by Article VII, Section 4
of the Constitution.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
DAZA v. SINGSON
GR. No. 86344. December 21, 1989
FACTS: Raul A. Daza was removed as the
representative of the Liberal Party in the House of
Representatives after the reorganization of the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). He
therefore challenged hid removal from the
Commission of Appointments and the assumption
of his seat in the Commission of Appointments by
Luis C. Singson.
37

According to Daza, he cannot be removed
because his election is permanent and that
reorganization of the House representation in the
said body is not based on a permanent political
realignment because LDP is not a registered
political party and has not yet attained political
stability.
For his part, Singson argued that the
question raised is political in nature and so,
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. He also
maintains that he is improperly impleaded fort real
party is the House of Representatives and that a
political party is not required to be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation.
ISSUE: Is the question raised in this case political
or justiciable?
HELD: The issue raised in this case is justiciable
rather political, involving as it does the legality and
not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the
manner of filling the Commission on Appointments
as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the
question were political in nature, it would still come
within   the   court’s   powers   of   review   under   the   Proclamation No. 2. The second mode of
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Article
VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes
the authority to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The court
resolved that issue in favor of the authority of the
House of Representatives to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments
to reflect at any time the changes that may
transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes
must be permanent and do not include the
temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance
from one political party to another. Wherefore, Luis
Singson has been validly elected as a member of
the Commission on Appointments.
GUEVARA v. INOCENTES
GR. No. L – 25577. March 15, 1966
FACTS: Onofre   P.   Guevara’s   ad   interim   ISSUE: Whether or not the House of
appointment as Undersecretary of Labor was
declared to be invalid on the ground that such
appointment lapsed when the Congress adjourned
its last special session called under Proclamation
No. 2 of President Marcos. With this, Guevara filed
a petition for quo warranto seeking to be declared
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the person legally entitled to said office of the
Undersecretary of Labor.
ISSUE: Is the ad interim appointment of Guevara
valid?
HELD: After due deliberation, the Court resolved
that the ad interim appointment extended to
Guevara on November 18, 1965 by the former
Executive lapsed when the special session of
Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of
January 22, 1966, as embodied in the resolution
dated February 16, 1966. As expressly provided in
Article   VII,   Section   10   of   the   Constitution,   “The  
President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
or   until   the   next   adjournment   of   the   Congress.”.  
This provision contemplates two modes of
termination of an ad interim appointment: one
made during the recess of Congress and the other
during the special session called under
termination had its constitutional effect as when
Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of
January 22. 1966. Such adjournment, in legal
contemplation, had the effect of terminating
petitioner's appointment thereby rendering it legally
ineffective.
FRANKLIN DRILON v. JOSE DE VENECIA
GR. No. 180055. January 31, 2009
FACTS: Tanada requested from the House of
Representatives leadership in one seat in the CA
for the Liberal Party. He also requested the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives
the reconstruction of the House contingent in the
CA to include one seat for the Liberal Party. He
also brought the matter to the attention of De
Venecia, reiterating the position that since there
were at least 20 members of the Liberal Party in
th
the 14 Congress, the party should be represented
in the CA.
Representatives respondents have committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in constituting the CA in contravention
of the required proportional constitution of
depriving the liberal party of its constitutional
entitlement to one seat therein.
38

HELD: Furnishing   a   copy   of   petitioner’s   letter   to   as such. As his appointment was made during the
the Senate President and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives does not constitute the
primary recourse required prior to the invocation of
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It is the
members who claim to have been deprived of a
seat in the Commission on Appointments that must
first show to the House that they possess the
required numerical strength to be entitled to seats
in the Commission on Appointments.
ARROYO v. DE VENECIA
GR. No. 127255. August 14, 1997
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and/or
prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act
No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-
called   “sin   taxes”   on   the   manufacture   and   sale   of   Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory
beer and cigarettes. The petitioners are members
of the House of Representatives. They brought the
suit against the respondents charging violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
“constitutionally  mandated”  so  that  their  violation  is   petitioner’s  appointment as a Municipal Judge?
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Did Congress act with grave abuse of
discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240?
HELD: After considering the arguments of the
parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore
dismissed. The matter complained of concerns a
matter of internal rules of the procedure of the
House rather than the constitutional requirements
for the enactment of law. Further, in the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume
that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by
its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body.
PACETE v. SEC OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINMENTS
GR. No. L – 25895. July 23, 1971
FACTS: On April 4, 1966, Felizardo S. Pacete filed
a petition for mandamus alleging that he was
appointed as a Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan,
Cotabato on August 31, 1964. He assumed office
on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties
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recess of Congress, it was submitted to the
Commission on Appointments at its next session in
1965. On May 20 of that year, he was unanimously
confirmed. As a matter of fact, two days later, he
was sent a congratulatory telegram by the then
Senate President Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was
likewise the Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments. More than nine months after such
confirmation, the then Secretary of Justice, advised
petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge,
the ground being that his appointment had not
been duly confirmed. Pacete was informed that on
May 21, 1965, a day after his confirmation, one of
the members of the Commission on Appointments,
the then Senator Rodolfo Guanzon, wrote to its
Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for the
reconsideration of the confirmation of the
appointment of petitioner as municipal judge of
information which he had received.
ISSUE: Is the filing of the motion for
reconsideration a bar to the confirmation of the
HELD: No. The mere filing of a motion for
reconsideration did not have the effect of setting
aside a confirmation. A confirmation duly made is
not nullified simply by a motion for reconsideration
being filed, without its being voted upon and
approved. The constitutional requirement is clear.
There must either be a rejection by the
Commission on Appointments or nonaction on its
part. No such thing happened in this case. Hence,
the petitioner in this case must prevail.
RUFINO R. TAN, v. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO,
JR.
GR. No. 109289. October 3, 1994
FACTS: This special civil action for prohibition
challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code.
Petitioners asserted that the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7496 violates the Article VI,
Section 26(1) of the Constitution which states that
“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title  thereof.”
39

The Solicitor General espouses the
position taken by public respondents.
ISSUE: Is RA 7496 constitutional?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner contends that the title of
House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act
No. 7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for
being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their
Profession"
The full text of the title actually reads:
An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their
Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the
Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to
prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the
members of the legislature who favor any one of
unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b)
to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the
legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publications of its proceedings as are
usually made, of the subjects of legislation. The
above objectives of the fundamental law appear to
us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else
would be to require a virtual compendium of the
law which could not have been the intendment of
the constitutional mandate.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea
of petitioner to have the law declared
unconstitutional for being violative of due process
must perforce fail. The due process clause may
correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional
limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No
such transgression is so evident to us.
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., et al. v. THE SENATE
BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
GR. No. 89914. November 20, 1991
FACTS: The complaint insofar as pertinent to
herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges that
defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and
Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves
and/or in unlawful concert with defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and
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taking undue advantage of their relationship,
influence and connection with the latter Defendant
spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and
stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as
defendants) filed their respective answers. On 13
September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech before the Senate on the
alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo
Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case)
and called upon the senate to look into possible
violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
or RA 3019. The Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon
Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through
a hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon
declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner
Bengzon’s   plea   and   voted   to   pursue   its  
investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in
requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative
purpose.
HELD: The 1987 Constitution expressly
recognizes the power of both houses of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committee
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile
contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to
look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No.
3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act." In other words, the purpose
of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue
Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not
the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection
with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the
Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved.
FRANCISCO GUDANI v. GENEROSO S. SENGA
GR. No. 170165. August. 15, 2006
40

FACTS: On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited
several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen.
Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the
Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security concerning the conduct of the 2004
elections wherein allegations of massive cheating
and  the  “Hello  Garci”  tapes  emerged.  AFP  Chief  of   based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule
Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and
company from appearing before the Senate
Committee without Presidential approval.
Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan
testified before said Committee, prompting Gen.
Senga to order them subjected to General Court
Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of
a superior officer. In the meantime, President
Arroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequently
declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President can
prevent military officers from testifying at a
legislative inquiry.
HELD: We hold that the President has
constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the
same time, we also hold that any chamber of
Congress which seeks the appearance before it of
a military officer against the consent of the
President has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance. Any military official whom
Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the
President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial
orders have the force of the law of the land which
the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
As earlier noted, it was ruled in Senate that
the President may not issue a blanket requirement
of prior consent on executive officials summoned
by the legislature to attend a congressional
hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the
considerable limitations on executive privilege, and
affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked
on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege,   but   on   the   Chief   Executive’s   power   as   PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers
commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The
President’s   prerogatives   as   commander-in-chief
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are not hampered by the same limitations as in
executive privilege.
The President could, as a general rule,
require military officers to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress is
unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President
as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant
control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-
rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the
Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief
and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining
to the position. Again, the exigencies of military
discipline and the chain of command mandate that
the   President’s   ability   to   control   the   individual  
members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the
Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that
the officer has to choose the President. After all,
the Constitution prescribes that it is the President,
and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.
GONZALES v. NARVASA
GR No. 140835. August 14, 2000
FACTS: The Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by
President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue
of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order
“to   study   and   recommend   proposed   amendments  
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the
manner  of  implementing  the  same.”
In this petition for prohibition and
mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner
Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen
and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the
creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions
of presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the
PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers
and assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin
Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from
enforcing their advice and recommendations. In
addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission
on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the
and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays for an order
compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner
with information on certain matters.
41

On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon.
Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as
Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the
Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are
being represented in this case by the Solicitor
General, filed their Comment with this Court on
March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a
Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon
this case was considered submitted for decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriations for the
PCCR is valid.
HELD: The appropriations for the PCCR were
authorized by the President, not by Congress. In
fact,   there   was   no   an   appropriation   at   all.   “In   a  
strict sense,   appropriation   has   been   defined   ‘as   ISSUE: Whether or not the power given to the
nothing more than the legislative authorization
prescribed by the Constitution that money may be
paid  out  of  the  Treasury’,  while  appropriation  made   Countrywide
by   law   refers   to   ‘the   act   of   the   legislature   setting   encroachment by the legislature on executive
apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum
to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the
State   to   its   creditors.’   “   The   funds   used   for   the   HELD: Under the Constitution, the spending power
PCCR were taken from funds intended for the
Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief
Executive’s   power   to transfer funds pursuant to
section 25 (5) of article VI of the Constitution.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION v.
ENRIQUEZ
GR. No. 113105. August 19, 1994
FACTS: House Bill No. 10900, the General
Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress
on December 17, 1993. It imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the
proposed budget previously submitted by the
President. It also authorized members of Congress
to propose and identify projects in the "pork
barrels" allotted to them and to realign their
respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President
signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN
ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same
day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he
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vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions.
The Philippine Constitution Association,
Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A. Gonzales as
taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to
declare as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI
on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special
provision in Article I entitled Realignment of
Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article
XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the
amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in
excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and
(b) the veto of the President of the Special
Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
members of Congress to propose and identify the
projects and activities to be funded by the
Development Fund is an
power.
called by James Madison as "the power of the
purse," belongs to Congress, subject only to the
veto power of the President. The President may
propose the budget, but still the final say on the
matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it
the power to specify the project or activity to be
funded under the appropriation law. It can be as
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that
it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of
ambulances and computers and other priority
projects and activities and credit facilities to
qualified beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself
that determined the purposes for the appropriation.
Executive function under the Countrywide
Development Fund involves implementation of the
priority projects specified in the law.
RUFINO R. TAN v. RAMON R. DEL ROSARIO,
JR.
GR. No. 109289. October 3, 1994
FACTS: This special civil action for prohibition
challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7496, also commonly known as the Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), amending
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code.
42

Petitioners asserted that the enactment of
Republic Act No. 7496 violates the Article VI,
Section 26(1) of the Constitution which states that
“Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title  thereof.”
The Solicitor General espouses the
position taken by public respondents.
ISSUE: Is RA 7496 constitutional?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner contends that the title of
House Bill No. 34314, progenitor of Republic Act
No. 7496, is a misnomer or, at least, deficient for
being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their
Profession"
The full text of the title actually reads:
An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their
Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.
Article VI, Section 26(1), of the
Constitution has been envisioned so as (a) to
prevent log-rolling legislation intended to unite the
members of the legislature who favor any one of
unrelated subjects in support of the whole act, (b)
to avoid surprises or even fraud upon the
legislature, and (c) to fairly apprise the people,
through such publications of its proceedings as are
usually made, of the subjects of legislation. The
above objectives of the fundamental law appear to
us to have been sufficiently met. Anything else
would be to require a virtual compendium of the
law which could not have been the intendment of
the constitutional mandate.
Having arrived at this conclusion, the plea
of petitioner to have the law declared
unconstitutional for being violative of due process
must perforce fail. The due process clause may
correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional
limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No
such transgression is so evident to us.
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
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ARTURO M. DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010
FACTS:
On March 17, 2010, the Court
promulgated its decision granting the petition in
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directing the
Judicial and Bar Council: (1) To resume its
proceedings for the nomination of candidates to
fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
May 17, 2010; (2) To prepare the short list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (3) To
submit to the incumbent President the short list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or
before May 17, 2010; and(4) To continue its
proceedings for the nomination of candidates to
fill the vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the
President the short list of nominees corresponding
thereto in accordance with this decision.
Motions for reconsideration were herein filed by
the petitioners with the aversion that a plain
reading of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution does not lead to an interpretation
that exempts judicial appointments from the
express ban on midnight appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether judicial appointments are
exempted from the ban on midnight
appointments stated under Section 15, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Section 15, Article VII does not apply
to appointments in the Judiciary. The decision of
March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: Had the
framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court,
they could have explicitly done so.
That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or
Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and
up   to   the   end   of   the   President’s   or   Acting  
43

President’s  term  does  not  refer  to  the  Members  of   office is a public trust. In assuming the office
the Supreme Court.
We cannot allow the meaning of the Constitution
to be stretched to any unintended point in order
to suit the purpose of any quarter.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS
253 SCRA 559
FACTS: The Supreme Court discussed the
purpose of an election protest. The purpose of an
election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed elected by the board
of canvassers is really the lawful choice of
the electorate. What is sought in an election
protest is the correction of the canvass of the
votes, which is the basis of the proclamation of the
winning candidate. An election contest involves a
public office in which the public
has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing
candidate of recognizing the one who is proclaime
d the winner should not bar the losingcandidate
from questioning the validity of the election of the
winner in the manner provided by law. Miriam
Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency in the 1992
National Elections. She lost, but filed this protest
against the winner, Pres. FV Ramos. Subsequently
however, she ran for Senator in the 1995
Senatorial elections. She won and assumed office
as Senator in 1995. Considering this factual milieu,
the issues revolve on whether this present
electoral protest would still be valid, even after the
protestant has already assumed office as Senator,
noting that should she win this protest, her term as
president would coincide with her term as senator,
which she is now in. Now, in 1996, the SC as PET
decides the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the present electoral
protest would still be valid, even after the
protestant has already assumed office as Senator,
noting that she win this protest, her term as
president would coincide with her terms as
senator, which she is now in.
HELD: Defensor-Santiago filed her certificate of
candidacy to run for senator without qualification or
reservation. In doing so, she entered into a political
contract with the electorate, that, if elected, she
would assume the office as senator. This is in
accord with the constitutional doctrine that a public
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of Senator, she has effectively abandoned her
determination to pursue this
presentprotest. Such abandonment operates to ren
der this protest moot.
The Supreme Court cannot subscribe to
the view of the Protestee that by filing her
certificate of candidacy for Senator Protestant
Santiago ipso facto forfeited her claim to the office
of President pursuant to Section 67 of B.P. Blg.
881. Plainly, the said section applies exclusively to
an incumbent elective official who files a certificate
of candidacy for any office" other than the one he
is holding in a permanent capacity." Even more
plain is that the Protestant was not the incumbent
President at the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy for Senator nor at any time before that.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the
protestant to inform the PET within 10days if after
the completion of the revision of the ballots from
her pilot areas, she still wishes to present
evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal
of any such intention, such is a manifest indication
that she no longer intends to do so.
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004
FACTS: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a
petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ
and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino
citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a
prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born
Filipino citizen.
44

HELD: It is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy
of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any
conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any
other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens
regardless of whether such children are legitimate
or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may
not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election
Code.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
GR. No. 83896. February 22, 1991
FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive
Order No. 284 issued by the President
allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst.
secretaries and other appointive officials of the
executive department to hold 2 positions in the
government and government corporations and to
receive additional compensation. They find it
unconstitutional against the provision provided by
Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the
President, Cabinet members and their deputies to
hold any other office or employment. Section 7,
par. (2), Article IX-B   further   states   that   “Unless   Morato’s  memorandum  of  11  September  1987.
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
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hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporation or their
subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed
by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order
is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-
B  stated  “unless  otherwise  allowed  by  law”  which  is  
construed to be an exemption from that stipulated
on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the
Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to
become a cabinet member and the Secretary of
Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides
an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the
constitution.
HELD: The court held it is not an exemption since
the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from
holding multiple positions in the government for
self-enrichment which a betrayal of public trust.
Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants. Thus the phrase  “unless  otherwise  
provided  by  the  Constitution”  in  Section  13,  Article  
VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from
Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the
legislative intent of both constitutional provisions.
Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies
only to particular instances of allowing the VP to
become a cabinet member and the Secretary of
Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284
as null and void.
CORPUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 123989. January 26, 1998
Facts: On 18 July 1986, CORPUZ was appointed
as   the   MTRCB’s   legal   Counsel   -- Prosecutor and
Investigation Services (Supervising Legal Staff
Officer). The appointment was approved by Asst.
Regional Director Benita Santos of the CSC-
National Capital Region. As MTRCB Legal
Counsel,  CORPUZ’  duties  included  “attendance  in  
Board   meetings”   pursuant   to   then   Chairman  
45

Sometime in August 1991, the MTRCB
passed MTRCB Resolution No. 8-1-91  entitled  “An   Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor,
Act To Declare The Appointments Of The
Administrative And Subordinate Employees Of
This   Board   As   Null   And   Void.”     This   undated   permanent" but the Civil Service Commission
resolution noted that the past and present
Chairmen of the MTRCB had failed to submit for
approval the appointments of administrative and
subordinate employees to the MTRCB before
forwarding them to the CSC, in violation of Section
5 of P.D. No. 876-A, and later, P.D. No. 1986.
CORPUZ was unaware of the
promulgation of Resolution No. 8-1-91 as he was
then on leave. The Resolution was likewise kept
secret and it was only on 12 March 1993 that an
announcement of its contents was posted by an Ad
Hoc Committee on the MTRCB bulletin board.
On 14 July 1992, Henrietta S. Mendez was
appointed MTRCB Chairman. Ad Hoc Committee
composed of MTRCB members was then
constituted to look into the appointments extended
by former Chairman Morato, as well as the
qualifications of the appointees. Thereafter, the
Committee resolved to recommend to the MTRCB
the approval of the appointments, except that of
CORPUZ and seven others.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that the appointment of Corpus did not
have the approval of MTCRB Board which if not
corrected, is tantamount to a violation of his
constitutional rights to security of tenure.
HELD: It is thus clear that there are two stages in
the process of appointing MTRCB personnel, other
than its Secretary, namely: (a) recommendation by
the Chairman which is accomplished by the signing
of the appointment paper, which is among his
powers under Section 5(d) above; and (b) approval
or disapproval by the MTRCB of the appointment.
As to the Secretary, it is the MTRCB itself that is
empowered to appoint said official pursuant to
Section 16. Hence, in the case of CORPUZ, since
the last act required for the completion of his
appointment, viz., approval by the MTRCB itself,
was not obtained, as a matter of fact, the MTRCB
ultimately disapproved it, his appointment ceased
to have effect, if at all, and his services were
properly terminated.
LUEGO v. CSC
GR. NO. L-69137. August 5, 1986
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FACTS: The petitioner was appointed
Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February
18, 1983. The appointment was described as
approved it as "temporary," subject to the final
action taken in the protest filed by the private
respondent and another employee, and provided
"there (was) no pending administrative case
against the appointee, no pending protest against
the appointment nor any decision by competent
authority that will adversely affect the approval of
the appointment." On March 22, 1984, after
protracted hearings the legality of which does not
have to be decided here, the Civil Service
Commission found the private respondent better
qualified than the petitioner for the contested
position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula
Tuozo be appointed to the position of
Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative
Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego
whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is
hereby revoked."
ISSUE: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized
to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than
the appointee and, on the basis of this finding,
order his replacement by the latter?
HELD: The stamping of the words "APPROVED as
TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the
appointment, which was clearly described as
"Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil
Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983.
What was temporary was the approval of the
appointment, not the appointment it sell And what
made the approval temporary was the fact that it
was made to depend on the condition specified
therein and on the verification of the qualifications
of the appointee to the position. The Civil Service
Commission is not empowered to determine the
kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light
of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. The
Civil Service Commission is limited only to the non-
discretionary authority of determining whether or
not the person appointed meets all the required
conditions laid down by the law. Significantly, the
Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that
both the petitioner and the private respondent were
qualified for the position in controversy. To be sure,
it had no authority to revoke the said appointment
simply because it believed that the private
respondent was better qualified for that would have
46

constituted an encroachment on the discretion
vested solely in the city mayor.
IN RE APPOINTMENT OF HON MATEO
VALENZUELA
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998
FACTS: Referred to the Court En Banc by the
Chief Justice are the appointments signed by His
Excellency the President under the date of March
30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial
Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively. The appointments
were received at the Chief Justice's chambers on
May 12, 1998. The referral was made in view of
the serious constitutional issue concerning said
appointments arising from the pertinent
antecedents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is
constitutional.
HELD: It is the Court that is empowered under the
Constitution to make an authoritative interpretation
of its (provisions) or of those of any other law. On
May 12, 1998, the Chief Justice received from
Malacañang the appointments of two (2) Judges of
the Regional Trial Court mentioned above. This
places on the Chief Justice the obligation of acting
thereon; i.e., transmitting the appointments to the
appointees so that they might take their oaths and
assume their duties of their office. The trouble is
that in doing so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of
acting in a manner inconsistent with the
Constitution, for these appointments appear prima
facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by
Section 15, Article VII of the charter. This
circumstance, and the referral of the constitutional
question to the Court in virtue of the Resolution of
May 8, 1998, supra, operate to raise a justiciable
issue before the Court, an issue of sufficient
importance to warrant consideration and
adjudication on the merits.
VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
v. REYES
GR. No. 155027. February 28, 2006
FACTS: Petitioner VFP was created under Rep.
Act No. 2640, a statute approved on 18 June 1960.
On 15 April 2002, petitioner's incumbent president
received a letter dated 13 April 2002. On 10 June
2002, respondent DND Secretary issued the
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assailed DND Department Circular No. 04 entitled,
"Further Implementing the Provisions of Sections
1and 2 of Republic Act No. 2640.Thereafter,
petitioner's President received a letter dated 23
August 2002 from respondent Undersecretary,
informing him that Department Order No. 129
dated 23 August 2002 directed "the conduct of a
Management Audit of the Veterans Federation of
the Philippines." The letter went on to state that
respondent DND Secretary "believes that the
mandate given by said law can be meaningfully
exercised if this department can better appreciate
the functions, responsibilities and situation on the
ground and this can be done by undertaking a
thorough  study  of  the  organization.”
Subsequently, the Secretary General of the
VFP sent an undated letter to respondent DND
Secretary, with notice to respondent
Undersecretary for Civil Relations and
Administration, complaining about the alleged
broadness of the scope of the management audit
and requesting the suspension thereof until such
time that specific areas of the audit shall have
been agreed upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed Department
Circular No. 04 expanded the scope of "control and
supervision" beyond what has been laid down in
Rep. Act No. 2640.
HELD: This Court has defined the power of control
as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate has done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former to that of the latter." The
power of supervision, on the other hand, means
"overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties." These
definitions are synonymous with the definitions in
the assailed Department Circular No. 04, while the
other provisions of the assailed department circular
are mere consequences of control and supervision
as defined.
Department Circular No. 04 is an internal
regulation. They are meant to regulate a public
corporation under the control of DND, and not the
public in general.
As to petitioner's allegation that VFP was
intended as a self-governing autonomous body
with a Supreme Council as governing authority, we
47

find that the provisions of Rep. Act No. 2640
concerning the control and supervision of the
Secretary of National Defense clearly withholds
from the VFP complete autonomy. To say,
however, that such provisions render the VFP
inutile is an exaggeration. An office is not rendered
inutile by the fact that it is placed under the control
of a higher office. These subordinate offices, such
as the executive offices under the control of the
President, exercise discretion at the first instance.
While their acts can be altered or even set aside by
the superior, these acts are effective and are
deemed the acts of the superior until they are
modified. Surely, we cannot say that the offices of
all the Department Secretaries are worthless
positions.
ARMITA RUFINO v. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA
GR. No. 139554. July 21, 2006
FACTS: Petitioners Armita B. Rufino, Zenaida R.
Tantoco, Lorenzo Calma, Rafael Simpao, Jr., and
Freddie Garcia, represented by the Solicitor
General and collectively referred to as the Rufino
group, seek to set aside the Decision dated 14
May 1999 of the Court of Appeals as well as the
Resolution dated 3 August 1999 denying their
motion for reconsideration.
It was on 25 June 1966 when the then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive
Order No. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of
Trustees of seven members to preserve and
promote Philippine culture. After the declaration of
Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15 which
converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-
municipal public corporation free from the pressure
or influence of politics. He also increased the
members of CCP's Board from seven to nine
trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued
on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees
to 11. Subsequently, Aquino asked for the courtesy
resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees
and appointed new trustees to the Board.
During the term of President Fidel V.
Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga,
Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora
A. Cabili, and Manuel T. Mañosa ("Mañosa"). Still,
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E.
Estrada appointed seven new trustees, the Rufino
group, to the CCP Board for a term of four years to
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th
replace the Endriga group. However on 6 January
1999, the Endriga group filed a petition alleging
that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the
CCP Board "shall be filled by election by a vote of
a majority of the trustees held at the next regular
meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s],
the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving
trustee acting in consultation with the ranking
officers of the [CCP]." The Endriga group claimed
that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely
vacant may the President of the Philippines fill
such vacancies. They also asserted that when
former President Estrada appointed the Rufino
group, only one seat was vacant due to the
expiration of Mañosa's term. The Court of appeals
granted the allegation of Endriga group thus this
appeal by the Rufino group.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in its
decision?
HELD: Yes. Basically, Section 6(b) of PD 15
violates two constitutional provisions. First is
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which  provides:  “The  President  shall  nominate  and,  
with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from
the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies,  commissions,  or  boards.”  This  says  that  
the trustees fall under the last - third group of
officers. While Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP
Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing
them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other
hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution allows heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only
"officers lower in rank" than such "heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards."
This excludes a situation where the appointing
officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him.
Second, it also violated Section 17, Article VII of
the   1987   Constitution   provides:   “The   President  
shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be   faithfully   executed.”   The   presidential   power   of  
48

control over the Executive branch of government
extends to all executive employees from the
Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk thus
showing that CCP falls under the Executive branch
to which the President necessarily exercises
control over it. Thereby, this petition was granted
and Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 was declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON v. ALFREDO S. LIM
GR. No. 112497. August 4, 1994
FACTS: The Secretary of Justice declared
Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the
Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances as given in Section
187 of the Local Government Code:
The procedure for approval of
local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance
with the provisions of this Code:
Provided, That public hearings
shall be conducted for the purpose
prior to the enactment thereof;
Provided, further, That any
question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or
revenue measures may be raised
on appeal within thirty (30) days
from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall
render a decision within sixty (60)
days from the date of receipt of the
appeal: Provided, however, That
such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity
of the ordinance and the accrual
and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein: Provided,
finally, That within thirty (30) days
after receipt of the decision or the
lapse of the sixty-day period
without the Secretary of Justice
acting upon the appeal, the
aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a
court of competent jurisdiction.
Consequently, a petition filed by the City of
Manila then the Regional Trial Court of Manila
revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained
the ordinance, holding that the procedural
requirements had been observed. Further, they
said that Section 187 of the Local Government
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Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the
Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and,
inferentially, to annul them. This was based that
the power of control is only as vested to the
President of the Philippines. Thereby, Secretary of
Justice having the power of control over local
governments is in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on the
President of the Philippines only the power of
supervision over local governments.
ISSUE: Was the decision of the trial court correct?
HELD: Partly, first Section 187 of the Local
Government Code authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to
revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When
he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance,
he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government
that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set
aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not
replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance
unwise or unreasonable. What this presupposes is
that the act of Secretary Drilon is basically a
supervision and not control. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such
rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may
order the work done or re-done but only to conform
to the prescribed rules. Also, it was further stated
that all the procedural requirements had been
observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
Code and that the City of Manila even consisting of
25 exhibits. Thereby, judgment is hereby rendered
REVERSING the challenged decision of the
Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section
187 of the Local Government Code
unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the
procedural requirements in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code have been observed
EUGENE GONZALES v. NARCISO ABAYA
GR. No. 164007. August 10, 2006
FACTS: On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m.,
more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, entered the premises of
the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala
Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security
guards and planted explosive devices around the
building. Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV,
49
 Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW

the troops then, through broadcast media,
announced their grievances against the
administration such as the graft and corruption in
the military, the illegal sale of arms and
ammunition  to  the  “enemies”  of  the  State,  and  the   offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War.
bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more
military assistance from the US government; thus
demanded that the then President Gloria resign as
President of the Republic. About noontime of the
same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation
No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed by
General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to
take all necessary measures to suppress the
rebellion then taking place in Makati City. Later, the
government sent negotiators whose aim was to
persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of
the law. After several hours of negotiation, the
government panel succeeded in convincing them
to lay down their arms and defuse the explosives
placed around the premises of the Oakwood
Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their
barracks. Subsequently, a total of 321 soldiers,
including petitioners herein, surrendered to the
authorities.
crimes’   is   peculiar   to   criminal   law   and   generally  
applies to crimes only punished by the same
statute. Second, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives
civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected
Still the focus is that the Supreme Court
has recognized that courts-martial are
instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively
command, control, and discipline the armed forces.
In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary
system   that   ensures   the   President’s   control,   and  
thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the
apex of this disciplinary system is the President
who exercises review powers over decisions of
courts-martial. Thereby, this petition for prohibition
is DISMISSED.
SANLAKAS v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ANGELO REYES
GR. No. 159085. February 3, 2004

Petitioners invoke Republic Act No. 7055 FACTS: Armed with high-powered ammunitions
which says that the members of the AFP and other and explosives, some three hundred junior officers
persons subject to military law, who commit crimes and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood
Code  (like  coup  d’etat),  other  special  penal laws, or Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee
local ordinances, shall be tried by the proper civil hours of July 27, 2003. The soldiers demanded
court. But, an exception to the general rule, i.e., the resignation of the President, the Secretary of
where the civil court, before arraignment, has Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National
determined the offense to be service-connected, Police (PNP). President issued later in the day
and then the offending soldier shall be tried by a Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,
court martial. Thus they further say that the both  declaring  “a  state  of  rebellion”  and  calling  out
respondent’s  allegation  of  them  violating  Article  96   the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. By the
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation
of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the
is  absorbed  in  the  crime  of  coup  d’etat,  the  military soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The
tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its President, however, did not immediately lift the
jurisdiction. declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only
on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435.
ISSUE: Should the contention of the petitioners be
granted that their case be tried in a civil court and The petitioners now contend that Section
not to the military tribunal? 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require
the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the
HELD: No.   Basically,   the   trial   court’s   order   that   armed forces. They further submit that, because of
what the petitioners did was not service-connected, the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there
but is rather absorbed and in the crime of coup exists no sufficient factual basis for the
d’etat,  fails  because  it  practically  amended  the  law.   proclamation by the President of a state of
Fundamentally, the law expressly vests that the rebellion for an indefinite period.
court   martial   has   the   jurisdiction   over   “service-
connected crimes   or   offenses.”   The   act   of   the   ISSUE: Was the contention of the petitioners
petitioners are fundamentally service-oriented correct?
because:   First,   the   doctrine   of   ‘absorption   of  

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 Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW

HELD: No. Although, it is true that for the purpose In their presentation of the factual bases of
of exercising the calling out power, the Constitution PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that
does not require the President to make a the proximate cause behind the executive
declaration of a state of rebellion, still Section 18, issuances was the conspiracy among some
Article   VII   provides:   “The   President   shall   be   the   military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the People’s   Army   (NPA),   and   some   members   of   the  
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, political opposition in a plot to unseat or
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered
suppress  lawless  violence,  invasion  or  rebellion…”     the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
basically this provision grants the President, as take-over the reigns of government as a clear and
Commander-in-Chief,   a   “sequence”   of   “graduated   present danger. During the oral arguments held on
power.”   From   the   most   to   the   least   benign,   these   March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the
are: the calling out power, the power to suspend facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O.
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from
power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the petitioners’  counsels.
latter two powers, the Constitution requires the
concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual The Solicitor General argued that the
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
requires the exercise of such power. Note that the powers to the President in determining the
Constitution vests the President not only with necessity of calling out the armed forces. He
Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown
foremost, with Executive powers. Thus it could be that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he
seen   that   the   President’s   authority   to   declare   a   explained   that   it   is   not   respondents’   task   to   state  
state of rebellion springs in the main from her the facts behind the questioned Proclamation,
powers as chief executive and, at the same time, however, they are presenting the same, narrated
draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
powers. Thereby, the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of are unconstitutional.
such power. Furthermore, none of the petitioners
here have, by way of proof, supported their HELD: The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017
assertion that the President acted without factual is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
basis. Consequently, this petition was the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress
DISMISSED. lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the
DAVID, et al. v ARROYO, et al. relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However,
PP   1017’s   extraneous   provisions   giving   the  
GR. No. 171396. May 3, 2006 President express or implied power (1) to issue
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience
th
celebrated the 20 Anniversary of the Edsa People to all laws even those not related to lawless
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 violence as well as decrees promulgated by the
declaring a state of national emergency President; and (3) to impose standards on media
commanding the Armed Forces of the Philippines or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
“to   maintain   law   and   order   throughout   the   vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of that under Section 17, Article XII of the
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection Constitution, the President, in the absence of a
or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations by utility and private business affected with public
the President. On the same day, the President interest.
issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017. On
March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No.
declaration of a state of national emergency and 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President –
after all the petitions had been filed, the President acting as Commander-in-Chief – addressed to
lifted PP 1017. subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of
PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid
standard – that the military and the police should

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take   only   the   “necessary   and   appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless   violence.” But   the   words   “acts   of   appointment to her former position and that,
terrorism”   found   in   G.O.   No.   5   have   not   been   notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable
legally defined and made punishable by Congress
and should thus be deemed deleted from the said
G.O. While   “terrorism”   has   been   denounced   ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has
generally in media, no law has been enacted to
guide the military, and eventually the courts, to
determine   the   limits   of   the   AFP’s   authority   in  
carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
SALVACION A. MONSANTO vs. FULGENCIO S.
FACTORAN, JR.,
GR. No. 78239. February 9, 1989
FACTS: On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan
convicted Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other
accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents. Monsanto
appealed her conviction to the Court which
subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a
motion for reconsideration but while said motion
was pending, she was extended on December 17,
1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon
which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By
reason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote the
Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Monsanto’s letter-request was referred to the
Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the
provision of the Local Government Code
transferring the power of appointment of treasurers
from the city governments to the said Ministry. The
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the
city treasurer to see to it that the amount of
P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required
to be indemnified in favor of the government as
well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing
ruling, Monsanto wrote the Ministry on April 17,
1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on
her has wiped out the crime which implies that her
service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982.
On April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy
Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held
that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an
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Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the
absolute pardon granted her but must secure an
for the civil liability concomitant to her previous
conviction.
been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former
position without need of a new appointment.
HELD: For Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the
absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification
of public documents. It is clear from the authorities
referred to that when her guilt and punishment
were expunged by her pardon, this particular
disability was likewise removed. Henceforth,
Monsanto may apply for reappointment to the
office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications
and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be
evaluated and taken into account to determine
ultimately whether she can once again be
entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the
pardon granted to her has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but
it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post
as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and
undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO
SALLE, JR. and RICKY MENGOTE
GR. No. 103567. December 4, 1995
FACTS: Francisco Salle Jr. and Ricky Mengote
were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals of the compound crime of murder and
destructive arson. They filed their Notice of Appeal.
On 24 March 1993, this Court accepted the
appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, Francisco
Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw
Appeal. The Court then required his counsel, Atty.
Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the aforesaid
motion.
In her Manifestation with Motion to
Withdraw Appeal, Atty. La'o informed the Court
that her verification disclosed that Salle signed the
motion without the assistance of counsel on his
misimpression that the motion was merely a
bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early
release from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP)
52

following the grant of a conditional pardon by the
President on 9 December 1993. He was
discharged from the NBP on 28 December 1993.
She further informed the Court that Ricky Mengote
was, on the same dates, granted a conditional
pardon and released from confinement, and that
he immediately left for his province without
consulting her. She then prays that the Court grant
Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider
it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional
pardon.
In the resolution of 23 March 1994, this
Court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his
appeal and considered this case. In its
Memorandum filed for the Appellee on 15
December 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintains that the conditional pardon granted to
appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the
judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the
pendency in this Court of his appeal. On the other
hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that
the conditional pardon extended to Mengote is
valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs.
Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did
not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was
deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his
acceptance of the conditional pardon which
resulted in the finality of his conviction.
ISSUE: Is the pardon granted to the accused
during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment
of conviction by the trial court enforceable?
HELD: Where the pardoning power is subject to
the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at
any time after conviction even if the judgment is on
appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the
requirement is " final conviction, " as was
mandated in the original provision of Section 14,
Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction
by final judgment," as presently prescribed in
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In
such a case, no pardon may be extended before a
judgment of conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a)
when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when
the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c)
when the right to appeal is expressly waived in
writing, except where the death penalty was
imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the
accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his
right to appeal. Where the judgment of conviction
is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore
attained finality, as in the instant case, executive
clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
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The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or
conditional, to an accused during the pendency of
his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
Any application, if one is made, should not be
acted upon or the process toward its grant should
not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of
the Government concerned must require proof
from the accused that he has not appealed from
his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal.
Such proof may be in the form of a certification
issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as
the case may be. The acceptance of the pardon
shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of
the appeal, and the release of an accused by
virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall
render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused
must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for
the release of the accused from confinement.
Considering that appellant Ricky Mengote has not
filed a motion to withdraw his appeal up to this
date the conditional pardon extended to him
should not have been enforced. Nonetheless,
since he stands on the same footing as the
accused-appellants in the Hinlo case, he may be
freed from the full force, impact, and effect of the
rule herein pronounced subject to the condition set
forth below. This rule shall fully bind pardons
extended after 31 January 1995 during the
pendency of the grantee's appeal.
VICENTE GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE
CHAIRMAN
GR. No. 75025. September 14, 1993
FACTS: Petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed
as a supervising lineman at the Bureau of
Telecommunications. He was accused of stealing
some materials in their company. Thus, public
respondents filed a criminal case against him for
qualified theft before a court and on the same
ground respondents also filed an administrative
case in which petitioner was found guilty and was
later dismissed from the service. With respect to
the criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted by
the court due to insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is
now claiming before the Commission on Audit
(COA) for his back salaries from the time of his
53

dismissal up to present. But COA on the other
hand reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile,
petitioner was extended an executive clemency
(absolute pardon) by the President. Still,
respondent COA strongly refused to give due
course to petitioners claim.
ISSUE: Is respondent entitled to the payment of
back wages after having been reinstated pursuant
to the grant of executive clemency?
HELD: The Court ruled initially by explaining the
mandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitution
and further articulates that the bestowal of
executive clemency on petitioner in effect
completely obliterated the adverse effects of the
administrative decision which found him guilty of
dishonesty and ordered his separation from the
service. This can be inferred from the executive
clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the
administrative charge and thereby directing his
reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the
grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner
need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto
upon the issuance of the clemency.
GONZALES v. NARVAZA
GR. No. 140835. August 14, 2000
FACTS: On December 9, 1999, Ramon A.
Gonzales filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus assailing the constitutionality of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
(PCCR) on two grounds: first, it is a public office
which only the legislature can create by way of a
law and second, the President is excluded by the
Constitution in creating the said body. Gonzales
also seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from
passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and
the presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants.
In response, the respondents alleged that with
respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot
or academic, meaning it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved
have become academic or dead. Moreover,
Gonzales’   lack of standing constitutes another
obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial
power insofar as the PCCR is concerned.
ISSUE: Is there an exercise of the taxing or
spending power by the Congress?
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HELD: There is no exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created
by the President and that the amount of Php 3
million was appropriated for its operational
expenses to be sourced from the funds of the
Office of the President. The appropriations for the
PCCR were authorized by the President, not by
Congress. In fact, there was no an appropriation at
all. "In a strict sense, appropriation has been
defined   ‘as   nothing   more   than   the   legislative  
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that
money may be paid out of the Treasury’,   while  
appropriation  made  by  law  refers  to  ‘the  act  of  the  
legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular
use a certain sum to be used in the payment of
debt  or  dues  from  the  State  to  its  creditors.’  "  The  
funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds
intended for the Office of the President, in the
exercise  of  the  Chief  Executive’s  power  to  transfer  
funds pursuant to Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the
Constitution.
FERDINAND MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS
GR. No. 88211. October 27, 1989
FACTS: On September 28, 1989, President
Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement,
President Corazon Aquino said that in the interest
of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr.
Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting
ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order
of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will
not be allowed to be brought to our country until
such time as the government, be it under this
administration or the succeeding one, shall
otherwise decide.
Because of such statement, the petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing the
following: that to bar former President Marcos and
his family from returning to the Philippines is to
deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to
return to their country of birth but also the
protection of the Constitution and all of the rights
guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution; the
President has no power to bar a Filipino from his
own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily; and there is no basis for barring the
return of the family of former President Marcos.
The   petitioner’s   Motion   for   Reconsideration   was  
however denied for it has been considered as
moot and academic as to the deceased Mr.
54

Marcos.
ISSUE: Does the President have unstated residual
powers other than those expressly stated in the
Constitution?
HELD: Yes. The President has unstated residual
powers which are implied from the grant of the
executive power and which are necessary for her
to comply with her duties under the Constitution.
The powers of the President are not limited to what
are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions
of the Constitution. Among the duties of the
President under the Constitution, in compliance
with his or her oath of office, is to protect and
promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her
decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the
present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence
of a clear showing that she had acted with
arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in
arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin
the implementation of this decision.
BENJAMIN U. BORJA v. COMELEC
GR. No. 133495. September 3, 1998
FACTS: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr.
was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18,
1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent,
Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was
elected mayor for a term of three years which
ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was
reelected mayor for another term of three years
ending June 30,
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco
filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros
relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner
Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate
for   mayor,   sought   Capco’s   disqualification   on   the   Is   the   President’s   exercise     of   power   to   call
theory that the latter would have already served as
mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30,
1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for
another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of
petitioner and declared private respondent Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of
Pateros. However, on motion of private
respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2,
reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible
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Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW
to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998
elections. Accordingly, private respondent was
voted for in the elections. He received 16,558
votes   against   petitioner’s   7,773   votes   and   was  
proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers.
ISSUE: Does a vice-mayor who succeeds to the
office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of the term be considered to have
served a term in that office for the purpose of the
three-term limit?
HELD: No. Under the local Government Code, he
is the presiding officer of the Sanggunian and he
appoints all officials and employees of such local
assembly. He has distinct powers and functions,
succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy
therein being only one of them. It cannot be said of
him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event
of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for
vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His
assumption of the mayorship in the event of
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design.
Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.
IBP V. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 941284 (August 15, 2000)
FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent
crimes in Metropolitan Manila, the President
ordered the PNP and the Phil. Marines to conduct
joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and
suppression. IBP questioned validity of the order
on the ground that there is no factual basis for
1998. President to exercise his power to call out the
Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
ISSUE:
 
out armed forces vaild?
HELD:
The IBP failed to support its assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The
President has determined the necessity and
factual basis for calling the armed forces. He
asserted that violent crimes like bank and store
robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings
continue to occur. The court can take judicial
55

notice of the recent bombing perpetrated by
lawless elements in public places.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
FRANCISCO S. TATAD v. SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
GR. No. 124360. November 5, 1997
FACTS: The petitions at bar challenge the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled
"An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry
and For Other Purposes," and E.O. No. 392 which
provides the declaration of the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry. Petitioners add that
the imposition of different tariff rates on imported
crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
violates the equal protection clause, and that
undue delegation of legislative power to the
President and the Secretary of Energy because it
does not provide a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Respondents, on the other hand, fervently
defend the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and
E.O. No. 392 and allege that the issues raised by
the petitions are not justiciable as they pertain to
the wisdom of the law.
ISSUE: Does the courts have jurisdiction in this
case?
HELD: Yes. Judicial power includes not only the
duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also the duty to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The courts, as
guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted
by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by
the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of
the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional
and void. Still, the principle of separation of power
mandates that challenges on the constitutionality
of a law should be resolved in our courts of justice
while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be
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Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW
debated in the halls of Congress. Later, the court
decided that the petitions are granted. R.A. No.
8180 is declared unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372
void.
CESAR BENGZON v. FRANKLIN N. DRILON
GR. No. 103524. April 15, 1992
FACTS: Certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating
to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals were vetoed by the then President Aquino
for the reason that they would erode the very
foundation of our collective effort to adhere
faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy and
standardization of compensation. She reasons that
the government should not permit the grant of
distinct privileges to select group of officials whose
retirement pensions under existing laws already
enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast
majority of our civil servants.
ISSUE: Was the veto of the President
constitutional?
HELD: No.   Sec.   3,   Art.   VIII   mandates   that:   “The  
Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.”   This   presupposes   the   fact   that   Fiscal  
autonomy means freedom from outside control.
Thus the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the
disposition of the funds allocated to it in the
appropriations law. The veto made by the
president in the specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is
clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy and it impairs
the power of the Chief Justice to augment other
items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in
contravention of the constitutional provision on
"fiscal autonomy." This petition is thereby granted.
APEX MINING CO., INC v. SOUTHEAST
MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP.
GR. Nos. 152613 & 152628. November 20, 2009
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration dated
12 July 2006, filed by Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining  Corporation  (SEM),  of  this  Court’s  Decision  
dated 23 June 2006 (Assailed Decision). The court
56

decided in its late decision that the assignment of
Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM
violated one of the conditions stipulated in the
permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive
use and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation
(MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Also, SEM did
not claim or submit evidence that it was a
designated agent of MMC, making the latter not
considered as an agent of the former; that the
transfer of EP 133 violated Presidential Decree No.
463, which requires that the assignment of a
mining right be made with the prior approval of the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR); that EP 133 expired
by non-renewal since it was not renewed before or
after its expiration; and that Executive Department
to undertake directly the mining operations of the
disputed area or to award the operations to private
entities including petitioners Apex and Balite,
subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations,
and provided that these private entities are
qualified.
Now , SEM contends that Proclamation No.
297, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and declaring the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as a
mineral reservation, is invalid and unconstitutional
on the ground that it lacks the concurrence of
Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of
the Constitution; Section 1 of Republic Act No.
3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 7586, and
Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6657.
ISSUE: Would the contention of SEM be granted
or reconsidered?
HELD: No. It is well-settled that when questions of
constitutionality are raised, the court can exercise
its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are present: (1) an actual and
appropriate case exists; (2) there is a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case. In this case at bar, it is clear that the third
requisite is absent. It must be pointed out that it
was only after the assailed Decision was
promulgated -- i.e.,   in   SEM’s   Motion   for   the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated,
Reconsideration of the questioned Decision filed
on 13 July 2006 and its Motion for Referral of the
Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments
filed on 22 August 2006 -- that it assailed the
validity of said proclamation. Certainly, posing the
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question on the constitutionality of Proclamation
No. 297 for the first time in its Motion for
Reconsideration is, indeed, too late.
FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
GR. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971
FACTS: Serrano de Agbayani obtained a loan in
the amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank dated
July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured
by real estate mortgage duly registered covering
property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the
province of Pangasinan. As of November 27, 1959,
the balance due on said loan was in the amount of
P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year,
defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial
Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the
balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff
countered with his suit against both defendants on
August 10, 1959, his main allegation being that the
mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long
prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the
date of maturity, July 19, 1944. He sought and was
able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction
against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was
made permanent in the decision now on appeal.
Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the
dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own
theory the defense of prescription would not be
available if the period from March 10, 1945, when
Executive Order No. 32 was issued, to July 26,
1948, when the subsequent legislative
act extending the period of moratorium was
declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took
no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As
noted, the lower court did not find such contention
persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
ISSUE: Was the lower court correct in their
decision?
HELD: No.   From   July   19,   1944,   when   plaintiff’s  
loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant
Bank, the time consumed is six days short of
fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled
however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of
Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when
covering eight years, two months and eight days.
Obviously then, when resort was had extra-
judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage
obligation, there was time to spare before
prescription could be availed of as a defense.
57

Wherefore, the decision of January 27, 1960 is
reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed August 10,
1959 dismissed.
WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and
VICENTE TAN v. HERNANI T. BARRIOS
GR. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990
FACTS: On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners,
with twelve (12) others, were arrested and charged
before the Military Commission No. 1, for the
crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an
unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm (2)
unlawful possession, control, and custody of a
pistol.
On September 15, 1988, Secretary of
Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order
No. 226 designating State Prosecutor Hernani
Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of
Cagayan de Oro City in the
investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case No.
MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants to
prosecute the case in the court of competent
jurisdiction.”   what the media later described as "the license
Without conducting an
investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on
December 9, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City two (2) information for Illegal
Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim. Case
No. 88-824 and Murder docketed as Crim. Case
No. 88-825 against all the 15 original defendants in
Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 including those who
already died.
On November 7, 1988, William Tan,
Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition
for certiorari and prohibition praying that the
information in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-
825, and the order of respondent Judge dated
October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the public
respondents or any other prosecution officer "be
permanently enjoined from indicting, prosecuting
and trying them anew for the offenses charged
therein because they had already
ISSUE: Whether or not State Prosecutor Barrios
exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his
discretion in reprosecuting them.
HELD: Yes. The public respondents gravely
abused their discretion and acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the
third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this
Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority
to refiled in the civil court the criminal actions
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against petitioners who had been tried and
acquitted by Military Commission No. 1 during the
period of martial law. It is an unreasonable
application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision
therein will be searched in vain for such authority
to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a
court martial, much less those who had been
acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago
like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein. The decision
in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument of
oppression and injustice unless given a limited
application only to the parties/petitioners therein
who sought the annulment of the court martial
proceedings against themselves and prayed for a
retrial in the civil courts of the criminal cases
against them.
TEODORO B. PANGILINAN vs. GUILLERMO T.
MAGLAYA
GR. Nos. 104216 August 20, 1993.
FACTS: Teodoro B. Pangilinan was appointed as
Executive Director of the Land Transportation
Office on July 8, 1987. On September 27, 1991,
the petitioner called a press conference expose
plate mess." He also announced his intention to file
graft charges with the Ombudsman against Prado,
Sabalza and Undersecretary Jose Valdecañas,
also of the DOTC. The following day, Secretary
Prado relieved Pangilinan as Executive Director of
the LTO and replaced him with Guillermo Maglaya
as officer-in-charge. In this petition, Pangilinan
prays for reinstatement on the ground that no
charge has been filed or proved against him to
justify his removal.
Required to comment, the Solicitor
General argues that Pangilinan was validly
separated because he was appointed to the
disputed position in an acting capacity only. He
does not possess the qualifications prescribed for
the office of Executive Director of the LTO, which is
a career executive service position for which only a
career executive service official is eligible. The
petitioner is not a career executive service official.
Hence, he could not be, and was not extended a
permanent appointment.
ISSUE: Was   Pangilinan’s   removal   from   the   office  
valid?
HELD: Yes. Pangilinan was only an acting
appointee because he did not have the requisite
qualifications; as such, he could not claim security
of tenure. The Court has repeatedly held that this
guaranty is available only to permanent
appointees. The fact that Pangilinan was qualified
58

for his initial appointment as agent in the NBI does
not mean he was qualified for all other positions he
might later occupy in the civil service. The law
does not prescribe uniform qualifications for all
public positions regardless of nature or degree.
Strictly speaking, the petitioner's
temporary appointment as Executive Director of
the LTO should have ended twelve months after
he assumed office, or on July 16, 1988. From that
date, his appointment had ceased to be valid even
if a qualified replacement was not yet available and
consequently had to be discontinued pursuant to
the above-quoted provision. Indeed, even on the
assumption that his appointment could be and had
been validly extended beyond the one-year limit,
that extended term was nevertheless validly
terminated with the appointment of his qualified
replacement
SPOUSES CONSING v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 143584. March 10, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner-spouses Antonio and Soledad
Consing   (“Antonio   and   Soledad”)   were   sugar-farm
landowners. Antonio and Soledad mortgaged their
properties   to   the   Philippine   National   Bank   (“PNB”)  
Victorias Branch. Private respondent Sugar
Producers’   Cooperative   Marketing   Association  
(“SPCMA”)   is   a   cooperative   engaged   in   assisting   CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY v.
planters-members procure fertilizer and other farm
needs. In 1975, Antonio and Soledad purchased
on credit various grades of fertilizer through
SPCMA on the strength of the documents
presented by Antonio and Soledad. The
documents consisted of a certification issued by
PNB and a promissory note chargeable against
PNB. When SPCMA presented the promissory
note, PNB refused to honor the note as Antonio
and Soledad no longer had a fertilizer line with
PNB. On 8 November 1977, SPCMA filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money against
Antonio and Soledad with the Regional Trial Court
of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. On 19 June
1989, the trial court ruled in favor of SPCMA.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court,
Antonio and Soledad appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On 29 November1999, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. On
5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals denied Antonio
and  Soledad’s  motion  for  reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the
Regional Trial Court failed to State the Legal Basis
of its Ruling.
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HELD: Antonio and Soledad draw our attention to
the two-page decision of the trial court penned by
Judge Cicero U. Querubin. While Judge Querubin
mentioned his factual findings, the legal basis of
his ruling is not set out in the decision.
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
declares that: No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
The court must inform the parties to a case of the
legal basis for the court’s  decision  so  that  if  a  party  
appeals, it can point out to the appellate court the
points of law to which it disagrees. Every judge
should know the constitutional mandate and the
rationale behind it. Judge Querubin should have
known the exacting standard imposed on courts by
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and
should not have sacrificed the constitutional
standard   for   brevity’s   sake.   The   failure   of   the   trial  
court decision to measure up to the standard set
by the Constitution is too gross to ignore as it is in
stark   contrast   to   the   Court   of   Appeals’   decision.  
The   Court   of   Appeals’   decision,   while   also   brief,  
being only three pages long, laid down the factual
and legal reasons why Antonio and Soledad are
the ones liable to SPCMA, and not PNB.
GUERRERO
GR. Nos. 140743 & 140745. September 17, 2009
FACTS: Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development
Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of
two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-98163 and T-
98174 of the Registry of Deeds of Tagaytay City.
TTTDC incurred real estate tax liabilities on the
said properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983. On
November 28, 1983, for failure of TTTDC to settle
its delinquent real estate tax obligations, the City
Government of Tagaytay (City of Tagaytay) offered
the properties for sale at public auction. Being the
only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in
favor of the City of Tagaytay and was
correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the
properties on November 20, 1984. On July 14,
1989, the City of Tagaytay filed an unnumbered
petition for entry of new certificates of title in its
favor before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cavite, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City.
On July 21, 1991, TTTDC filed a petition
for nullification of the public auction involving the
disputed properties on the ground that the
59

properties were not within the jurisdiction of the
City of Tagaytay and, thus, beyond its taxing
authority. The City of Tagaytay averred that based
on its Charter, the subject properties were within its
territorial jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of
tagaytay has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: There is no boundary dispute in the case at
bar. The RTC did not amend the existing territorial
limits of the City of Tagaytay and the Province of
Batangas. The entire Barrio Birinayan was
transferred to the Municipality of Talisay, Province
of Batangas, by virtue of R.A. No. 1418. At
present, Barrio Birinayan forms part of the
Municipality of Laurel, also in the Province of
Batangas, pursuant to R.A. No. 5689. The RTC
acted well within its powers when it passed
judgment on the nullification of the auction sale of
the contested properties, considering that the City
of Tagaytay has no right to collect real estate taxes
on properties that are not within its territorial
jurisdiction.
NITAFAN v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
GR L-78780. July 23, 1987
FACTS: Nitafan and some others seek to prohibit
the CIR from making any deduction of withholding
taxes from their salaries or compensation for such
would tantamount to a diminution of their salary,
which is unconstitutional. On June 7 1987, the
Court en banc had reaffirmed the directive of the
Chief Justice.
ISSUE: Whether the members of the judiciary are
exempt from the payment of income tax.
HELD: No. Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987
Constitution provides that salaries of judges may
not be decreased during their continuance in
office. They have a fix salary which may not be
subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But
the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the
general income tax as well as other members of
the judiciary.
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BERNARDINO MARCELINO v. HON.
FERNANDO CRUZ, JR.
GR No. L-42428. March 18, 1983
FACTS: On 04 Aug 1975, Marcelino
was convicted for rape. On the same date, the
attorneys of both parties in the criminal case
moved for time within which to submit their
respective memoranda. On the date set for
promulgation of the decision in its finality,
Marcelino’s  counsel  moved  for  postponement.  The  
court ignored his motion.
ISSUE: Did Judge Cruz resolve the case within
the allotted period?
HELD: The date of promulgation of a decision
could not serve as the reckoning date because the
same necessarily comes at a later date. Section 11
(1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
“upon   the   effectivity   of   this   constitution,   the  
maximum period within which case or matter shall
be decided or resolved from the date of its
submission shall be; 18 months for the Supreme
Court, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3
months for lower courts. In practice, the Supreme
Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. It
had various stands depending upon proper
application and for valid or meritorious reasons
which are provided for by judges of the lower
courts in which extension may be given to resolve
such cases.
PEOPLE V. NADERA
324 SCRA 490
FACTS:
The accused was charged with rape. The
trial court convicted him. The decision merely
narrated the evidence of the prosecution and a
republic act.
ISSUE:
Is the decision valid?
HELD:
No. The trial court failed to state the factual
and legal reasons on which it based the conviction
of the accused. There is nothing to indicate the
reason for the decision. No reason is given why
the trial court found the testimonies of the
witnesses credible.
60

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
GAMINDE V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 140335 (December 13, 2000)
FACTS:
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed
petitioner as Commissioner of the CSC for a term
expiring on February 2, 1999. She took her oath of
office on June 22, 1993 and was confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on September 7,
1993. The Commission on Audit issued a decision
that her term expired on Feb. 2, 1999.
ISSUE:
What is the proper starting point of the terms
of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
Commission?
HELD:
The constitution adopted a rotational system
for the appointment of the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions.
The operation of the rotational plan requires that
the terms of the first Commissioners should start
on a common date and any vacancy before the
expiration of the term should be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term. Consequently, the
term of the first Chairman and Commissioners of
the Constitutional Commissions must start on a
common date, irrespective of variations in the
dates of appointments and qualifications of the
appointees in order that the expiration of the first
terms should lead to the regular recurrence of the
two-year interval between the expiration of the
terms. February 2, 1987 is the proper starting
point of the terms of office of the first appointees to
the Constitutional Commission, as the beginning of
the term of office is understood to coincide with the
effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification.
BRILLANTES v. YORAC
GR. No. 93867. December 18, 1990
FACTS: The petitioner is challenging the
designation by the President of the Philippines of
Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections,
in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had
been named chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate the December 1989
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coup d'etat attempt. The qualifications of the
respondent are conceded by the petitioner and are
not in issue in this case. The petitioner contends
that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is an internal matter that
should be resolved by the members themselves
and that the intrusion of the President of the
Philippines violates their independence.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Yorac as
acting chairman of the COMELEC valid.
HELD: Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution
expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as "independent." Although
essentially executive in nature, they are not under
the control of the President of the Philippines in the
discharge of their respective functions. Each of
these Commissions conducts its own proceedings
under the applicable laws and its own rules and in
the exercise of its own discretion. The choice of a
temporary chairman in the absence of the regular
chairman comes under that discretion. That
discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its
consent, by the President of the Philippines.
The designation by the President of the
Philippines of respondent Haydee B. Yorac as
Acting Chairman of the Commissions on Elections
is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the
respondent is hereby ordered to desist from
serving as such.
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION v. JUCO
GR. No. L-64313. January 17, 1985
FACTS: The records reveal that private
respondent (Benjamin C. Juco) was a project
engineer of the National Housing Corporation
(NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975.
For having been implicated in a crime of theft
and/or malversation of public funds involving 214
pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the
corporation which was allegedly committed on
March  5,  1975.  Juco’s  services  were  terminated  by  
(NHC) effective as of the close of working hours on
May 14, 1975. On March 25, 1977 he filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner
(NHC) with Regional Office No. 4, Department of
Labor. The said complaint was certified by
Regional Branch No. IV of the NLRC. On July 28,
1977, the NHC filed its position paper alleging that
the Regional Office Branch IV, Manila, NLRC, is
without authority to entertain the case for lack of
61

jurisdiction, considering that the NHC is a
government owned and controlled corporation; that
even assuming that this case falls within the
jurisdiction of this Office, respondent firm (now
petitioner) maintains that respondent (Juco), now
private respondent, was separated from the
service for valid and justified reasons.
ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing
Corporation (NHC) covered by the Labor Code or
by laws and regulations governing the civil
service?
HELD: The NHC is a one hundred percent (100%)
government-owned corporation organized in
accordance with Executive Order No. 399, the
Uniform Charter of Government Corporations,
dated January 5, 1951. Section 1, Article XII-B of
the Constitution specifically provides:The Civil
Service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the
Government, including every government-owned
or controlled corporation. Applying the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution, the Labor Code as
amended, and the Civil Service Decree as
amended and the precedent in the Alliance of
Government Workers decision, it is clear that the
petitioner National Housing Corporation comes
under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and
Employment.
CADIENTE v. SANTOS
GR. No. L-35592. June 11, 1986
FACTS: On September 13, 1971, petitioner
Cadiente was appointed by then Mayor Elias B.
Lopez as City Legal Officer of Davao City. The
appointment was duly attested to and/or approved
as "permanent" by the Civil Service Commission
under Section 24(b) of R.A. 2260. On January 6,
1972, the new City Mayor Luis T. Santos, herein
respondent, sent a letter to the petitioner advising
the latter that his services as City Legal Officer of
Davao City "are dispensed with effective upon
receipt of said letter" on the ground that the
position of City Legal Officer was primarily
confidential in nature. Petitioner appealed to the
Civil Service Commission on January 7, 1982,
which rendered its decision in its lst Indorsement
dated March 2, 1972, therein holding that the
termination, removal and/or dismissal of petitioner
is "without cause and without due process" and
that the position of City Legal Officer "is not
included among those positions enumerated in
Sec. 5 of R.A. 2260 as belonging to the non-
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competitive service." The public respondents in
this case who are the City Mayor, the City
Treasurer, and the City Auditor of Davao City, still
declined and refused to recognize petitioner as the
one entitled to the disputed position of City Legal
Officer of Davao City.
Meanwhile, in an Indorsement dated
February 8, 1972, the Civil Service Commission
returned the appointment of respondent Clapano
to respondent City Mayor.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of respondent
Clapano be declared illegal and invalid.
HELD: The Court found as an undeniable fact that
the position of a City Legal Officer is one which is
"primarily confidential". The termination of their
official relation can be justified on the ground of
loss of confidence because in that case their
cessation from office involves no removal but
merely the expiration of the term of office-two
different causes for the termination of official
relations recognized in the Law of Public Officers.
In the case at bar, when the respondent City Mayor
of Davao terminated the services of the petitioner,
he was not removed or dismissed. There being no
removal or dismissal it could not, therefore, be said
that there was a violation of the constitutional
provision that "no officer or employee in the civil
service shall be suspended or dismissed except for
cause as provided by law" (Article XII-B, Section
1(3), 1973 Constitution).
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
GR. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
FACTS: The petitioners went on strike after the
SSS   failed   to   act   upon   the   union’s   demands  
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS
filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court
issued a temporary restraining. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in
taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor
Relations Commission as the case involves a labor
dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws,
rules and regulation thus have no right to strike.
They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE
therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from
striking.
62

ISSUE: Whether SSS employers have the right to
strike.
HELD: No. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the
employees in the civil service are denominated as
“government employees”   and   that   the   SSS   is one
such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A.
No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service
and  are  covered  by  the  Civil  Service  Commission’s   ISSUE: Is the COMELEC correct in retaining
memorandum prohibiting strikes.
FRANCISCO ABELLA JR v. CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 152574. November 17, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., having
completed the training program for Executive
Leadership and Management in 1982 under the
Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC
Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which
was then the required eligibility for said position,
was permanently appointed as Department
Manager III of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) in 1999, however, the CSC rejected the
appointment because he does not possess the
CES eligibility pursuant to Memorandum Circular
No. 21, series of 1994 issued on May 1994.
ISSUE: Is the CSC correct in rejecting the
permanent appointment of the petitioner?
HELD: Yes. Since petitioner had no CES eligibility,
the CSC correctly denied his permanent
appointment. The appointee need not have been
previously heard, because the nature of the action
did not involve the imposition of an administrative
disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or
disapproving an appointment, merely examines the
conformity of the appointment with the law and the
appointee’s   possession   of   all   the   minimum   of Leyte, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
qualifications and none of the disqualification.
While petitioner was able to demonstrate
his standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the
courts, he failed to prove his eligibility to the
position he was appointed to.
LUCITA Q. GARCES v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 114795. July 17, 1996
FACTS: Lucita Garces was appointed Election
Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July
27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election
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Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was
transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as
he did not request for it. The COMELEC en
banc resolved to recognize respondent
Concepcion as the Election Registrar of
Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of
Garces be cancelled.
Conception as the Election Registrar of Gutalac,
Zamboanga del Norte?
HELD: Yes. A transfer requires a prior
appointment. If the transfer was made without the
consent of the official concerned, it is tantamount
to removal without valid cause contrary to the
fundamental guarantee on non-removal except for
cause. Concepcion’s  transfer  thus  becomes  legally  
infirm and without effect for he was not validly
terminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, in
fact, was incomplete because he did not accept
it. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, is
indispensable to complete an
appointment. Corollarily,   Concepcion’s   post   in  
Gutalac never became vacant. It is a basic
precept   in   the   law   of   public   officers   that   “no  
person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is
for a certain position may be appointed to an office
which is not vacant. There can be no appointment
to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first
be legally removed, or his appointment validly
terminated before one could be validly installed to
succeed him
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v COMELEC
GR. No. 119976. September 18, 1995
FACTS: On March 23, 1995, private respondent
Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative
of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the
same position of Representative of the First District
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections
alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his
petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives for she only wrote in her
Certificate of Candidacy that her residence is
“seven   months.”   On   April   24,   1995   COMELEC   en  
banc declared her not qualified to run for the
position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte.
63

Now the petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that
the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24,
1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. She also contends that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the
COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election
of members of the House of Representatives in
accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Does the COMELEC have jurisdiction as
regards to this case?
HELD: Yes. Although it is a settled doctrine that a
statute requiring rendition of judgment within a
specified time must be followed, it does not
invalidate the judgment especially when such
judgment is essential to effect the aim and purpose
of the Legislature. The court said that the fact that
our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would
then refuse to render judgments merely on the
ground of having failed to reach a decision within a
given or prescribed period is a great mischief on
the part of the petitioner. Moreover, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed to
judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.
Still, because of the fact that a clear and positive
proof was not showed that there was
abandonment of domicile of origin of the petitioner
(keeping   close   ties   to   Tacloban   even   if   she’s   in   (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
Manila  because  of  President  Marcos’  regime),  this   twenty per centum of the total number of
petition was granted.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL
ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY
(BANAT), v. COMELEC
GR. No. 179271. July 8, 2009
FACTS: Petitioners in G.R. No. 179271 and in
G.R. No. 179295 seeks to reverse the Resolution
promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 and
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 which made use
Veterans formula in the declaration of winners in
14 May 2007 elections and of a partial
proclamation of parties, organizations and
coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the
total votes cast under the Party-List System. They
further say that using the Veterans formula, as
coming from the decision Veterans Federation
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Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW
Party v. COMELEC, is in contrast with the Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section
11(b) of RA 7941.
ISSUE: Would the contention of the petitioners be
granted?
HELD: Partly. Beforehand, Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in
part,   “The   parties,   organizations,   and   coalitions  
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled
to one seat each: provided, that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: provided, finally, that each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not   more   than   three   (3)   seats;;”   and   Veteran’s  
Formula would be:
No. of votes of
concerned party
No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x
seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of
first party
first party
Then Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides :(1) The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila ....
representatives including those under the party-
list….
The court resolve that Section 5(1), Article
VI   of   the   Constitution   states   that   the   “House   of  
Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise   fixed   by   law.”     Thus,   the   Constitution  
allows the legislature to modify the number of the
members of the House of Representatives which
also coincides with the provisions of the Veterans
Formula. However, Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is declared unconstitutional because the SC finds
that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when
the number of available party list seats exceeds 50
(given the fact that there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress which shows
64

only 55 to be elected Party-List Representatives).
Thus again, this petition was partly granted not
SETTING ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC
dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as
well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC
No. 07-60.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
GR. No. 91890. June 9, 1995
FACTS: Philippine Airline Inc. is a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, principally engaged in the air
transport business, both domestic and
international. Later on August 17, 1989, COA
wrote   PAL   a   letter   4   stating:   “It   has   come to our
attention that PAL international fuel supply
contracts are expiring this August 31, 1989. In this
connection, you are advised to desist from bidding
the company's fuel supply contracts, considering
that existing regulations require government-
owned or controlled corporations and other
agencies of government to procure their petroleum
product  requirements  from  PETRON  Corporation.”   sidewalks were private property because Marikina
Now, PAL says that COA gravely abused its power
and that it seeks to review, annul end reverse
Decision No. 1127 of COA dated January 5, 1990.
ISSUE: Was there a grave abuse of discretion of
COA?
HELD: NONE. The COA is clothed under Section
2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution with the
"exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in
this Article, to define the scope of its audit and
examination, establish the techniques and
methods required therefor, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules, and regulations
including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties." This
enables COA to adopt as its own, simply by
reiteration or by reference, without the necessity of
repromulgation and may also expand the coverage
thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its
audit jurisdiction. However, PAL's corporate
complexion have changed during the pendency of
the instant petition from government-controlled to
private ownership, this means that PAL having
ceased to be a government-owned or controlled
corporation, which, consequently, is no longer
under the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Thereby
the court dismissed the petition for being moot and
academic.
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ANIANO A. ALBON v. BAYANI F. FERNANDO
GR. No. 148357. June 30, 2006
FACTS: In May 1999, the City of Marikina
undertook a public works project to widen, clear
and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision. It was undertaken by
the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59,
s. 1993 like other infrastructure projects relating to
roads, streets and sidewalks previously undertaken
by the city.
On June 14, 1999, petitioner Aniano A.
Albon filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina,  Branch  73,  a  taxpayer’s  suit  for  certiorari,  
prohibition and injunction with damages against
respondents. Petitioner claimed that it was
unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to
use government equipment and property, and to
disburse public funds, of the City of Marikina for
the grading, widening, clearing, repair and
maintenance of the existing sidewalks of Marikina
Greenheights Subdivision. He alleged that the
Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V.
Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government could not
use public resources on them. In undertaking the
project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated
the constitutional proscription against the use of
public funds for private purposes as well as
Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 and the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner further
alleged that there was no appropriation for the
project.
On November 15, 1999, the trial court
rendered its decision dismissing the petition. It
ruled that the City of Marikina was authorized to
carry out the contested undertaking pursuant to its
inherent police power. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration   of   the   trial   court’s   decision   but   it  
was denied. Thereafter, petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, injunction and damages
which was also denied.
ISSUE: May a local government unit validly use
public funds to undertake the widening, repair and
improvement of the sidewalks of a privately-owned
subdivision?
HELD: Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and
specific that no public money or property shall be
appropriated or applied for private purposes. This
is in consonance with the fundamental principle in
local fiscal administration that local government
65

funds and monies shall be spent solely for public
purposes.
Therefore, the use of LGU funds for the
widening and improvement of privately-owned
sidewalks is unlawful as it directly contravenes
Section 335 of RA 7160. This conclusion finds
further support from the language of Section 17 of
RA 7160 which mandates LGUs to efficiently and
effectively provide basic services and facilities. The
law speaks of infrastructure facilities intended
primarily to service the needs of the residents of
the LGU and "which are funded out of municipal
funds." It particularly refers to "municipal roads and
bridges" and "similar facilities."
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
ROMEO ACOP v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
GR. No. 120422. September 27, 1995
FACTS: On May 18, 1995, eleven (11) suspected
members of the notorious robbery gang, "Kuratong
Baleleng," were killed in an alleged shootout with
composite teams of the National Capital Regional
Command, Traffic Management Command,
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, Central
Police District Command and Criminal
Investigation Command. On May 22, 1995, SPO2
Eduardo de los Reyes of the Central Intelligence
Command made an expose', stating that there was
no shootout. De los Reyes stated that the eleven
(11) suspected members of the "Kuratong
Baleleng" gang were victims of summary
execution. The following day, he executed a sworn
statement to this effect.
On May 26, 1995, Acting Ombudsman
Francisco A. Villa, in a handwritten note, directed
public respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casaclang
to monitor the investigations being conducted by
the Commission on Human Rights, the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights, and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Director for
Investigation regarding the alleged shootout. On
June 14, 1995, public respondent Casaclang
issued the questioned order directing petitioners
and nine others to submit their counter-affidavits
and controverting evidence within ten days from
receipt thereof.
The petitioners did not comply with the 14
June 1995 order, neither did they move for
reconsideration. Instead, the petitioners
questioned the conduct of the preliminary
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Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW
investigation without the required preliminary
evaluation in their respective petitions filed with this
Court.
ISSSUE: Whether or not Casaclang committed
grave abuse of discretion when he set the case for
preliminary investigation and required the
petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits before
any preliminary evaluation of the complaint as
required by Section 2, Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman.
HELD: No. In the case, no evidence to that effect
was adduced. On the contrary, as shown by the
summary of antecedent facts, the Panel of
Investigators submitted its evaluation report on 8
June 1995, and it was only on 14 June 1995 that
respondent Casaclang issued the questioned
order. Section 2, Rule II of Administrative Order
No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), on
the process and nature of the evaluation required.
It cannot be denied that the evaluation required is
merely preliminary in nature and scope, not a
detailed inquiry. Likewise, the conduct of such
evaluation involves the exercise of discretion which
has not been shown to be abused in the instant
case.
GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA v. OMBUDSMAN
CONRADO VASQUEZ
GR. No. 116801. April 6, 1995
FACTS: Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and
the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate
failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the
Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty
and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime
was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor
and a charge for indirect contempt was brought
against them, both in the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed
under preventive suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman can charge the accused for indirect
contempt.
HELD: Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives
the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish
for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of
Court and under the same procedure and with the
66
 Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW

same penalties provided therein." There is no merit compelled the Miners Association of the
in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of
Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for mining prospectors and claim owners and claim
contempt because their refusal arose out of an holders, to file the instant petition assailing their
administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding validity and constitutionality before this Court.
before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner
herself says in another context, the preliminary
investigation of a case, of which the filing of an ISSUE: Are the two Department Administrative
information is a part, is quasi judicial in character. Orders valid?
Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the
HELD: Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the
Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance,
application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
disobedience or resistance of a lawful process,
amended, as the governing law on the acceptance
order or command of the Ombudsman thus making
her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 and approval of declarations of location and all
of the Rules of Court is for respondents to other kinds of applications for the exploration,
development, and utilization of mineral resources
determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it
pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous.
is important only to note the existence of the
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains
contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of
to the old system of exploration, development and
enforcing his lawful orders.
utilization of natural resources through "license,
concession or lease" which, however, has been
disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional
mandate and its implementing law, Executive
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order
FACTORAN No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license,
concession or lease" of mineral resources under
GR. No. 98332. January 16, 1995 Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and
other existing mining laws are deemed repealed
FACTS: Former President Corazon Aquino issued
and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 in the exercise
law. In other words, in all other areas of
of her legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes
administration and management of mineral lands,
the interim procedures in the processing and
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
approval of applications for the exploration,
amended, and other existing mining laws, still
development and utilization of minerals pursuant to
govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO
provides that all provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to
No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws,
negotiate and conclude joint-venture, co-
and their implementing rules and regulations, or
production, or production- sharing agreements for
parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the
the exploration, development, and utilization of
provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in
mineral resources.
force and effect.
The issuance and the impeding
Well -settled is the rule, however, that
implementation by the DENR of Administrative
regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases
Order Nos. 57 which declares that all existing
or agreements granted by the State, such as those
mining leases or agreements which were granted
granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution…shall  
referred to this petition, are subject to alterations
be converted into production-sharing agreements
through a reasonable exercise of the police power
within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
of the State.
guidelines.”  and  Administrative  Order  No.  82  which  
provides that a failure to submit Letter of Intent and
Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of
Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2
its police power in this regard, may not be
years from the effectivity of the Department
precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-
Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the
impairment of contract from altering, modifying and
abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand and
amending the mining leases or agreements
gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates
granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as

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amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211.
Police Power, being co-extensive with the
necessities of the case and the demands of public
interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The
passage of Executive Order No. 279 which
superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided
legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into
effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC v. COURT
OF APPEALS
GR. No. 100588. March 7, 1994
FACTS: Private respondents were third year
Nursing students of petitioner University of San
Agustin (USA) who were refused re-admission in
the summer classes of 1989 and last two
semesters of school year 1989-1990 on the
alleged ground that they failed to obtain grades of
not lower than 80% in Nursing 104 (Nursing
Practice II with Related Learning Experience).
They filed this petition because of their belief that
the persistent refusal to re-admit them prejudiced
their right to freely choose their field of study and
finish a college degree.
ISSUE: Were the petitioners deprived of their
rights?
HELD: No. Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the 1987
Constitution reiterates that academic freedom shall
be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
Academic freedom of educational institutions has
been defined as the right of the school or college
to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and
how best to attain them — free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It
has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending
to the choice of students. While it is true that an
institution of learning has a contractual obligation
to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete
the course they seek to pursue, since a contract
creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the
obligation of the school to educate a student would
imply a corresponding obligation on the part of the
student to study and obey the rules and
regulations of the school. When a student commits
a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain
the required academic standard, he forfeits his
contractual right. In this connection, this Court
recognizes the expertise of educational institutions
in the various fields of learning. Thus, they are
afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable
rules and regulations in the admission of students,
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Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW
including setting of academic standards. Within the
parameters thereof, they are competent to
determine who are entitled to admission and re-
admission.  Thus  it  could  be  seen  in  the  petitioners’  
performances that they are still academically
deficient for failure to meet the standards set by
petitioner USA. Thereby, this petition was granted.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY v. IGNACIO
M. CAPULONG
GR. No. 99327. May 27, 1993
FACTS: As a requisite to membership, the Aquila
Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law
School, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and
10, 1991, for students interested in joining its
ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo
"Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner
university, died of serious physical injuries. He was
not the lone victim, though, for another freshman
by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also
hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute
renal failure occasioned by the serious physical
injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.
In a notice dated February 11, 1991,
petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint
Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee which was tasked to investigate and
submit a report within 72 hours on the
circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie
Villa. Although respondent students received a
copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply.
In the meantime, they were placed on preventive
suspension. The school alleges that the
respondent students clearly violated Rule 3 of the
Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
ISSUE: Was the suspension by the petitioner
acceptable?
HELD: Yes. When petitioner Cynthia del Castillo,
as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and
required respondent students on February 11,
1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their
written statement on the incident, records show
that instead of filing a reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel, copies of the
charges. This shows that the respondent students
were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence
in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled
against them, but did not do so. Further, as
mandated in Article XIV, Section 5(2) stating:
"Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning," it and in Garcia v.
Loyola School of Theology, that the court has
68

consistently upheld the salutary proposition that
admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the same being a
privilege on the part of the student rather than a
right. These rules are basically incidents to the
very object of incorporation and indispensable to
the successful management of the college which
may include those that are governing student
discipline. Thus, this petition was granted.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS v. COURT OF
APPEALS
GR. No. 79237. October 18, 1988
FACTS: Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed
an action for mandamus with damages against
petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A.
Satorre, asking that petitioners be compelled to
confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science
in Commerce, major in Accounting, cumlaude,
retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and
deliver to her all necessary credentials evidencing
her graduation with honors, and to pay her
damages. After trial, the lower court rendered its
Decision dated January 29, 1986 in favor of
plaintiff. Petitioners appealed to the respondent
Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is the proper
remedy to compel a university to confer a degree
with honors.
HELD: It is an accepted principle that schools of
teaming are given ample discretion to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for
purposes of graduation. This is part of academic
freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is
within the competence of universities and colleges
to determine who are entitled to the grant of
honors among the graduating students. Its
discretion on this academic matter may not be
disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless
there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of
information provides all students and all other
interested parties advice on the University policies
and rules on enrollment and academic
achievements. Therein it is provided, among
others, that a student may not officially withdraw
from subjects in the curriculum if he does not have
the written permission of his parents or guardian.
For an incomplete grade, there must be an
application for completion or removal within the
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Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW
period announced by the school calendar and
when not removed within one (1) year, it
automatically becomes final. A "DR" (Dropped)
subject which is in the same category, as a "5"
disqualifies a student from receiving honors. A
failure in any subject disqualifies a student from
honors. Good moral character and exemplary
conduct are as important criteria for honors as
academic achievements. Private respondent
should know and is presumed to know those
University policies and is bound to comply
therewith. It is precisely because she knew of
these rules that she exerted all efforts to have her
final grades of "5's" in Architecture 122 and
Architecture 123 be disregarded in the
computation of honors. Nevertheless, even if she
succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was
still within the sound discretion of the petitioners to
determine whether private respondent was entitled
to graduate with honors. The Court finds that
petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in denying the honors sought by private
respondent under the circumstances. Indeed, the
aforesaid change of grades did not automatically
entitle her to the award of honors.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF
REGENTS v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 134625. August 31, 1999
FACTS: Private respondent Arokiasawamy William
Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and a holder of
a   Philippine   visitor’s   visa.   She   enrolled   in   a  
doctoral program in anthropology of the University
of the Philippines. After completing her units of
course work required in her doctoral program, she
left the country to work in Rome. After two years,
she returned to the Philippines to work on her
dissertation. Upon her presentation of her
dissertation for approval to the panel, Dr. Medina,
a   dean’s   representative   to   the   panel,   noticed   that  
some portions of her work were lifted from other
works without the proper acknowledgement.
Nonetheless, she was allowed to defend her
dissertation. She passed her oral defense, which
was approved by four of the five panelists with the
condition that she shall incorporate certain
amendments to the final copy of her dissertation.
However, in her final submission of the copy of her
dissertation, she failed to incorporate the
necessary revisions. With this development, Dr.
Medina formally charged her with plagiarism and
recommended that the doctorate granted upon her
be withdrawn. After an investigation, the College of
Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) College
69

Assembly recommended the withdrawal of her
doctorate degree, which was approved by the U.P.
Board of Regents. Private respondent filed a
petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and damages against
petitioners herein, alleging that they had unlawfully
withdrawn her degree without justification. The trial
court dismissed her petition. However, on appeal,
the   Court   of   Appeals   reversed   the   lower   court’s   thereof, Republic Act 6132.
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in its decision.
HELD: The narration of facts showed that various
committees were formed to investigate the charges
that private respondent committed plagiarism. In all
investigations held, she was heard in her defense.
Where it was shown that the conferment of an
honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a
university has the right to withdraw the honor or
distinction it has conferred. Under the U.P. Charter,
the Board of Regents is the highest governing
body of the U.P. In the case at bar, the Board of
Regents’  decision  to  withdraw  private  respondent’s   that direction are null and void. lt says distinctly
doctorate degree was based on records, including
her admission that she committed the offense. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals and the petition for mandamus was
dismissed.
AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
GR. No. L-34150. October 16, 1971
FACTS: The case is a petition for prohibition to
restrain respondent Commission on Elections
"from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on
November 8, 1971," at which the proposed
constitutional amendment "reducing the voting
age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of
the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be,
submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to
Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971, and the subsequent
implementing resolutions, by declaring said
resolutions to be without the force and effect of law
for being violative of the Constitution of the
Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971
came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the
Congress of the Philippines approved in its
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Constitutional Law I POLITICAL LAW
capacity as a constituent assembly convened for
the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution namely,
Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of
Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17,
1969 respectively. The delegates to the said
Convention were all elected under and by virtue of
said resolutions and the implementing legislation
ISSUE: Is it within the powers of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a
plebiscite for the ratification of the proposed
amendment/s?
HELD: The Court holds that all amendments to be
proposed must be submitted to the people in a
single "election" or plebiscite. We hold that the
plebiscite being called for the purpose of
submitting the same for ratification of the people on
November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1
of Article XV of the Constitution; hence all acts of
the Convention and the respondent COMELEC in
that either Congress sitting as a constituent
assembly or a convention called for the purpose
"may propose amendments to this
Constitution,". The same provision also as
definitely provides that "such amendments shall be
valid as part of this Constitution when approved by
a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as
to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held
to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed
by the same constituent assembly of Congress or
convention, and the provision unequivocably says
"an election" which means only one.
The petition herein is granted. Organic
Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention
of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions
of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the
holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as
well as the resolution of the respondent COMELEC
complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are
hereby declared null and void. The respondents
COMELEC, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant
and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are
hereby enjoined from taking any action in
compliance with the said organic resolution. In
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
Court declares this decision immediately
executory.
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LAMBINO v. COMELEC
GR. No. 174153. October 25, 2006

FACTS: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced

gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition
with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will
ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735.
Lambino group alleged that the petition had the
support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was
provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition
changes the 1987 constitution by modifying
sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and
by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift
the present bicameral- presidential form of
government to unicameral- parliamentary.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and
invoked the Santiago vs. COMELEC ruling that RA
6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative
petitions.

ISSUE: Whether   the   Lambino   Group’s   initiative  

petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through  a  people’s  initiative.

HELD: According to the SC the Lambino group

failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting   a   people’s   initiative.   The   Court   held  
that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of
discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People. The petitioners failed to
show the court that the initiative signer must be
informed at the time of the signing of the nature
and   effect,   failure   to   do   so   is   “deceptive   and  
misleading”  which  renders  the  initiative  void.

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