17. Francisco Baguio v RP, GR No.

119682, January 21, 1999 (301 SCRA 450)

Facts:
William Michael filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for foreshore lease of a public land.
The application was recommended for approval by the land investigator who also recommended
that the applicant be granted a provisional permit to occupy the land for one year. By virtue of the
permit, Michael made reclamation of the land introducing improvements therein. Upon the
expiration of the permit the Highways District Engineer recommended to the Director of Lands
that the land be leased to Michael. On the other hand, the land investigator recommended
granting Michael the authority to survey the foreshore land in view of the completion of the
reclamation made by him on the premises. On February 25, 1968, Michael filed a miscellaneous
sales application covering the reclaimed foreshore land. On the other hand,
petitioner Baguio applied to the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the same land stating that
the land was agricultural and he has been in actual and continuous possession of the same. A
free patent was issued in Baguio’s favor by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. The petitioner now
demands rental payment from Michael for using the land occupied by Michael Slipways, Inc. and
filed an opposition to Michael’s miscellaneous sales application on the said land. In turn, Michael
filed a protest on the issuance of the free patent to Baguio by the Bureau of Lands since he is the
actual possessor of the land since 1963 and introduced substantial improvement thereon.
Upon recommendation of the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, the government filed a petition for the cancellation of the patent and reversion
of land to the public domain. Ricardo Michael was allowed to intervene as heir and successor-in-
interest of William Michael. The trial court cancelled the free patent of Baguio and ordered the
reversion of the land to public domain. It ruled that the false statement that Baguio made in his
application for free patent had the effects of ipso facto canceling the free patent granted to him.
On appeal, petitioner assails the court decision of cancelling his patent since the action has
already prescribed and that it erred in ruling that he acted in bad faith and procured the registration
of his free patent through fraud and misrepresentation.
Issue:
Whether or not the free patent of the petitioner may be cancelled?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court that while a Torrens Title becomes indefeasible within 1 year after its
registration the State may still bring action for reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain
covered by a Torrens title obtained through fraud because such action is not barred by
prescription as provided by Commonwealth 141. Public policy demands that one who obtains title
from a public land through fraud should not be allowed to benefit from it. The declaration of the
petitioner in his application for patent under oath that the land is an agricultural land not claimed
or occupied by another person, that he is in actual and continuous possession of the land
constitute fraud and misrepresentation. Records show 13 years before the alleged occupation of
the petitioner to the land, Michael already filed a foreshore lease application over the same and
since then it was Michael who was in actual possession of said land by operating a dry docking
service and made some improvements thereon. It was also established that the land in dispute is
a foreshore land and not agricultural. The false statement made by petitioner in his application
justifies the immediate cancellation of his title. The indefeasibility principle of Torrens System
does not apply on titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. The registration of a patent under
the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant’s title. It does not vest title where there is none
because registration under this system is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Michael has been in possession of the land by virtue of provisional permit granted to him to occupy
the same 13 years before the petitioner filed his application for a free patent and Michael filed a
sales application over the land 8 years prior to the petitioner’s application. Thus, it was correct for
the court to rule that William Michael and his successor-in-interest Ricardo Michael as the true
and rightful possessor of the land. Sec. 105 of the Public Land Act provides that in case of death
of the original applicant he can be succeeded in his rights and obligations by his legal heirs with
respect to the land applied for or leased therefore Ricardo Michael is entitled to the possession
of the land as contrary to what the petitioner asserts.
18. Heirs of Manlapat vs CA

Date: June 8, 2005

Petitioners: Heirs of Eduardo Manlapat, represented by Gloria Manlapat Banaag, et
alRespondents: CA, Rural Bank of San Pascual Inc and Jose Salazar, et al
Ponente: Tinga
Facts: The controversy involves Lot No. 2204 located at Panghulo, Obando, Bulacan. The
property had been originally in the possession of Jose Alvarez, Eduardo’s grandfather. It later
registered in the name of Eduardo and was entered in the Registry of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. The lot is adjacent to a fishpond owned by Ricardo Cruz, predecessor-in-interest of
respondentsConsuelo Cruz and Rosalina Cruz-Bautista. Before the lot was titled, Eduardo sold a
portion with an area of 553 sqm to Ricardo. Thesale is evidenced by a deed of sale which was
signed by Eduardo himself as vendor and his wife Engracia Aniceto with SantiagoEnriquez
signing as witness. The Kasulatan was registered with the Register of Deeds. Another deed of
sale covering 50sqm of the lotwas executed by Eduardo in favor of Ricardo.Later, Leon Banaag,
Jr, as attorney-in-fact of his father-in-law Eduardo, executed a mortgage with the Rural Bank of
SanPascual, Obando Branch (RBSP), for P100,000 with the subject lot as collateral. Banaag
deposited the owner’s duplicate certificate of OCT No. P-153(M) with the bank.Ricardo died
without learning of the prior issuance of OCT No. P-153(M) in the name of Eduardo. His heirs,
the Cruzes, werenot immediately aware of the consummated sale between Eduardo and Ricardo.
Eduardo himself died and was survived by his heirs,Engracia Aniceto, his spouse; and children,
Patricio, Bonifacio, Eduardo, Corazon, Anselmo, Teresita and Gloria, all surnamedManlapat.
Neither did the heirs of Eduardo inform the Cruzes of the prior sale in favor of Ricardo. Yet
subsequently, the Cruzes cameto learn about the sale and the issuance of the OCT in the name
of Eduardo.Upon learning the sale, the Cruzes tried to confront petitioners on the mortgage and
obtain the surrender of the OCT. Onthe advice of the Bureau of Lands, NCR Office, they brought
the matter to the barangay captain of Barangay Panghulo, Obando,Bulacan. Petitioners, however,
were unwilling to surrender the OCT.Having failed to physically obtain the title from petitioners, in
July 1989, the Cruzes instead went to RBSP which had custody of the owner’s duplicate certificate
of the OCT, earlier surrendered as a consequence of the mortgage. Transacting with RBSP’s
manager, Jose Salazar, the Cruzes sought to borrow the owner’s duplicate certificate for
the purpose of photocopying the same andthereafter showing a copy thereof to the Register of
Deeds. Salazar allowed the Cruzes to bring the owner’s duplicate certificate outside the bank
premises when the latter showed the Kasulatan. They then brought the copy of the OCT
to Register of Deeds JoseFlores of Meycauayan and showed the same to him to secure his
legal opinion as to how the Cruzes could legally protect theirinterest in the property and register
the same. Flores suggested the preparation of a subdivision plan to be able to segregate thearea
purchased by Ricardo from Eduardo and have the same covered by a separate title.After securing
the approval of the subdivision plan, the Cruzes went back to RBSP and again asked for
the owner’s duplicatecertificate from Salazar. The Cruzes informed him that the presentation of
the owner’s duplicate certificate was necessary, per advise of the Register of Deeds, for the
cancellation of the OCT and the issuance in lieu thereof of two separate titles in the namesof
Ricardo and Eduardo in accordance with the subdivision plan. The Cruzes got hold again of the
owner’s duplicate certificate.

After the Cruzes presented the owner’s duplicate certificate, along with the deeds of sale and the
subdivision plan, theRegister of Deeds cancelled the OCT and issued in lieu thereof TCT No. T-
9326-P(M) covering 603 square meters of Lot No. 2204 inthe name of Ricardo and TCT No. T-
9327-P(M) covering the remaining 455 square meters in the name of Eduardo.The Cruzes went
back to the bank and surrendered to Salazar TCT No. 9327-P(M) in the name of Eduardo and
retrieved thetitle they had earlier given as substitute collateral. After securing the new separate
titles, the Cruzes furnished petitioners with acopy of TCT No. 9327-P(M) through the barangay
captain and paid the real property tax for 1989.Banaag went to RBSP, intending to tender full
payment of the mortgage obligation. It was only then that he learned of thedealings of the Cruzes
with the bank which eventually led to the subdivision of the subject lot and the issuance of
two separate titlesthereon. In exchange for the full payment of the loan, RBSP tried to persuade
petitioners to accept TCT No. T-9327-P(M) in the nameof Eduardo. As a result, three (3) cases
were lodged, later consolidated, with the trial court, all involving the issuance of the TCTs.After
trial of the consolidated cases, the RTC of Malolos rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of
Eduardo. The trial courtfound that petitioners were entitled to the reliefs of reconveyance
and damages. On this matter, it ruled that petitioners were bonafide mortgagors of an unclouded
title bearing no annotation of any lien and/or encumbrance. It found that petitioners
werecomplacent and unperturbed, believing that the title to their property, while serving as
security for a loan, was safely vaulted in theimpermeable confines of RBSP. To their surprise and
prejudice, said title was subdivided into two portions, leaving them a portion of 455 square meters
from the original total area of 1,058 square meters, all because of the fraudulent and negligent
acts of respondents and RBSP. It ruled that although the act of the Cruzes could be deemed
fraudulent, still it would not constitute intrinsic fraud. Salazar, nonetheless, was clearly guilty of
negligence in letting the Cruzes borrow the owner’s duplicate certificate of the OCT.Neither the
bank nor its manager had business entrusting to strangers titles mortgaged to it by other persons
for whatever reason. Itwas a clear violation of the mortgage and banking laws, the trial court
concluded
The trial court also ruled that although Salazar was personally responsible for allowing the title to
be borrowed, the bankcould not escape liability for it was guilty of contributory negligence. The
evidence showed that RBSP’s legal counsel was sought foradvice regarding respondents’
request. This could only mean that RBSP through its lawyer if not through its manager had known
in advance of the Cruzes’ intention and still it did nothing to prevent the eventuality. Salazar was
not even summarily dismissed by the bank if he was indeed the sole person to blame. Hence, the
bank’s claim for damages must necessarily fail.The CA reversed and ruled that petitioners were
not bona fide mortgagors since as early as 1954 or before the 1981mortgage, Eduardo already
sold to Ricardo a portion of the subject lot with an area of 553 square meters. This fact, the Court
of Appeals noted, is even supported by a document of sale signed by Eduardo Jr. and Engracia
Aniceto, the surviving spouse of Eduardo, and registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
The appellate court also found that on 18 March 1981, for thesecond time, Eduardo sold to
Ricardo a separate area containing 50 square meters, as a road right-of-way. Clearly, the OCT
wasissued only after the first sale. It also noted that the title was given to the Cruzes by RBSP
voluntarily, with knowledge even of the bank’s counsel.
Hence, the imposition of damages cannot be justified, the Cruzes themselves being the owners
of the property.Certainly, Eduardo misled the bank into accepting the entire area as a collateral
since the 603-square meter portion did not anymore belong to him. The appellate court, however,
concluded that there was no conspiracy between the bank and Salazar.
Issue: WON the Cruzes own the portion titled in their names
Held: Yes
Ratio: A careful perusal of the evidence on record reveals that the Cruzes have sufficiently
proven their claim of ownership overthe portion of Lot No. 2204 with an area of 553 square
meters. The duly notarized instrument of conveyance was executed in 1954to which no less than
Eduardo was a signatory. The execution of the deed of sale was rendered beyond doubt by
Eduardo’s admission in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 24 April 1963. These documents make
the affirmance of the right of the Cruzes ineluctable. The apparent irregularity, however, in
the obtention of the owner’s duplicate certificate from the bank, later to bepresented to the
Register of Deeds to secure the issuance of two new TCTs in place of the OCT, is another
matter.Petitioners argue that the 1954 deed of sale was not annotated on the OCT which was
issued in 1976 in favor of Eduardo;thus, the Cruzes’ claim of ownership based on the sale would
not hold water. The Court is not persuaded.
Registration is not arequirement for validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect
of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. Theprincipal purpose of registration is merely
to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the propertyhad been
entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at
the time he acquired aright to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has
the effect of registration as to him.Further, the heirs of Eduardo cannot be considered third
persons for purposes of applying the rule. The conveyance shallnot be valid against any person
unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and devisees, and (3) third persons
havingactual notice or knowledge thereof. Not only are petitioners the heirs of Eduardo, some of
them were actually parties to theKasulatan executed in favor of Ricardo. Thus, the annotation of
the adverse claim of the Cruzes on the OCT is no longer required tobind the heirs of Eduardo,
petitioners herein.Issue: WON petitioners had a right to constitute mortgage over the disputed
portionHeld: NoRatio: For a person to validly constitute a valid mortgage on real estate, he must
be the absolute owner thereof as required byArticle 2085 of the New Civil Code. The mortgagor
must be the owner, otherwise the mortgage is void. In a contract of mortgage,the mortgagor
remains to be the owner of the property although the property is subjected to a lien. A mortgage
is regarded asnothing more than a mere lien, encumbrance, or security for a debt, and passes
no title or estate to the mortgagee and gives him noright or claim to the possession of the property.
In this kind of contract, the property mortgaged is merely delivered to themortgagee to secure the
fulfillment of the principal obligation. Such delivery does not empower the mortgagee to
convey anyportion thereof in favor of another person as the right to dispose is an attribute of
ownership. The right to dispose includes the rightto donate, to sell, to pledge or mortgage. Thus,
the mortgagee, not being the owner of the property, cannot dispose of the whole orpart thereof
nor cause the impairment of the security in any manner without violating the foregoing rule. The
mortgagee only ownsthe mortgage credit, not the property itself.Petitioners submit as an issue
whether a mortgagor may be compelled to receive from the mortgagee a smaller portion of the
lot covered by the originally encumbered title, which lot was partitioned during the subsistence of
the mortgage without theknowledge or authority of the mortgagor as registered owner. This
formulation is disingenuous, baselessly assuming, as it does, asan admitted fact that the
mortgagor is the owner of the mortgaged property in its entirety. Indeed, it has not become a
salient issuein this case since the mortgagor was not the owner of the entire mortgaged property
in the first place.
Issue: WON the issuance of OCT No. P-153(M) was prope
Held: No
Ratio: It is a glaring fact that OCT No. P-153(M) covering the property mortgaged was in
the name of Eduardo, without anyannotation of any prior disposition or encumbrance. However,
the property was sufficiently shown to be not entirely owned byEduardo as evidenced by the
Kasulatan. The OCT was issued in 1976, long after the Kasulatan was executed way back in
1954. Thus,a portion of the property registered in Eduardo’s name arising from the grant of free
patent did not actually belong to him. Theutilization of the Torrens system to perpetrate fraud
cannot be accorded judicial sanction.Time and again, this Court has ruled that the principle
of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraudattended the issuance of the title, as
was conclusively established in this case. The Torrens title does not furnish a shied
for fraud.Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is
merely evidence of such title over a particularproperty. It does not give the holder any better right
than what he actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith.The effect is that it
is as if no registration was made at all. In fact, this Court has ruled that a decree of registration
cut off orextinguished a right acquired by a person when such right refers to a lien or encumbrance
on the land¾not to the right of ownershipthereof which was not annotated on the certificate of title
issued thereon.
Issue: WON the issuance of TCT Nos. T-9326-P(M) and T-9327-P(M) were valid
Held: Yes
Ratio: The validity of the issuance of two TCTs, one for the portion sold to the predecessor-in-
interest of the Cruzes and the other forthe portion retained by petitioners, is readily apparent from
Section 53 of the PD No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.Petitioners argue that the
issuance of the TCTs violated the third paragraph of Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529. The argument
is baseless.It must be noted that the provision speaks of forged duplicate certificate of title
and forged deed or instrument. Neither instance obtains in this case. What the Cruzes presented
before the Register of Deeds was the very genuine owner’s duplicate certificateearlier deposited
by Banaag, Eduardo’s attorney-in-fact, with RBSP. Likewise, the instruments of conveyance
are authentic, not forged. Section 53 has never been clearer on the point that as long as the
owner’s duplicate certificate is presented to the Registerof Deeds together with the instrument of
conveyance, such presentation serves as conclusive authority to the Register of Deeds toissue a
transfer certificate or make a memorandum of registration in accordance with the instrument.The
records of the case show that despite the efforts made by the Cruzes in persuading the heirs of
Eduardo to allow themto secure a separate TCT on the claimed portion, their ownership being
amply evidenced by the Kasulatan and Sinumpaang Salaysaywhere Eduardo himself
acknowledged the sales in favor of Ricardo, the heirs adamantly rejected the notion of separate
titling. Thisprompted the Cruzes to approach the bank manager of RBSP for the purpose
of protecting their property right. They succeeded in persuading the latter to lend the owner’s
duplicate certificate. Despite the apparent irregularity in allowing the Cruzes to get hold of the
owner’s duplicate certificate, the bank officers consented to the Cruzes’ plan to register the deeds
of sale and secure two newseparate titles, without notifying the heirs of Eduardo about it.Further,
the law on the matter, specifically P.D. No. 1529, has no explicit requirement as to the manner
of acquiring the owner’s duplicate for purposes of issuing a TCT. This led the Register of Deeds
of Meycauayan as well as the Central Bank officer, inrendering an opinion on the legal feasibility
of the process resorted to by the Cruzes. Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529 simply requires
theproduction of the owner’s duplicate certificate, whenever any voluntary instrument is presented
for registration, and the same shallbe conclusive authority from the registered owner to the
Register of Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of registration in
accordance with such instrument, and the new certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon
the registeredowner and upon all persons claiming under him, in favor of every purchaser for
value and in good faith.Quite interesting, however, is the contentionof the heirs of Eduardo that
the surreptitious lending of the owner’s duplicatecertificate constitutes fraud within the ambit of
the third paragraph of Section 53 which could nullify the eventual issuance of theTCTs. Yet we
cannot subscribe to their position.Indeed, petitioners contend that the mortgagee cannot question
the veracity of the registered title of the mortgagor as noted in the owner’s duplicate certificate,
and, thus, he cannot deliver the certificate to such third persons invoking an adverse,prior, and
unregistered claim against the registered title of the mortgagor. The strength of this argument is
diluted by the peculiarfactual milieu of the case.A mortgagee can rely on what appears on the
certificate of title presented by the mortgagor and an innocent mortgagee is not expected to
conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagor’s title. This rule is strictly
applied to bankinginstitutions. A mortgagee-bank must exercise due diligence before entering into
said contract. Judicial notice is taken of the standardpractice for banks, before approving a loan,
to send representatives to the premises of the land offered as collateral and toinvestigate who the
real owners thereof are.Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even
with registered lands, than private individuals, astheir business is one affected with public interest.
Banks keep in trust money belonging to their depositors, which they should guardagainst loss by
not committing any act of negligence that amounts to lack of good faith. Absent good faith, banks
would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration statute, Act 496, which extends only
to purchasers for value and good faith, as well asto mortgagees of the same character and
description. Thus, this Court clarified that the rule that persons dealing with registeredlands can
rely solely on the certificate of title does not apply to banks.
Issue: WON the bank is liable for nominal damages
Held: Yes
Ratio: Of deep concern to this Court, however, is the fact that the bank lent the owner’s duplicate
of the OCT to the Cruzes when the latter presented the instruments of conveyance as basis of
their claim of ownership over a portion of land covered by the title.Simple rationalization would
dictate that a mortgagee-bank has no right to deliver to any stranger any property entrusted to it
other than to those contractually and legally entitled to its possession. Although we cannot
dismiss the bank’s acknowledgment of the Cruzes’ claim as legitimized by instruments of
conveyance in their possession, we nonetheless cannot sanction how the bank was inveigled to
do the bidding of virtual strangers. Undoubtedly, the bank’s cooperative stance facilitated the
issuance of the TCTs. Tomake matters worse, the bank did not even notify the heirs of Eduardo.
The conduct of the bank is as dangerous as it is unthinkablynegligent. However, the aspect does
not impair the right of the Cruzes to be recognized as legitimate owners of their portion of
theproperty.
Undoubtedly, in the absence of the bank’s participation, the Register of Deeds could not have
issued the disputed TCTs. Wecannot find fault on the part of the Register of Deeds in issuing the
TCTs as his authority to issue the same is clearly sanctioned bylaw. It is thus ministerial on the
part of the Register of Deeds to issue TCT if the deed of conveyance and the original
owner’sduplicate are presented to him as there appears on the
face of the instruments no badge of irregularity or nullity. If there is someone to blame for the
shortcut resorted to by the Cruzes, it would be the bank itself whose manager and legal
officer helpedthe Cruzes to facilitate the issuance of the TCTs.The bank should not have allowed
complete strangers to take possession of the owner’s duplicate certificate even if the purpose is
merely for photocopying for a danger of losing the same is more than imminent. They
should be aware of the conclusivepresumption in Section 53. Such act constitutes manifest
negligence on the part of the bank which would necessarily hold it liablefor damages under Article
1170 and other relevant provisions of the Civil Code.In the absence of evidence, the damages
that may be awarded may be in the form of nominal damages. Nominal damagesare adjudicated
in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated orrecognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him.
This award rests on the mortgagor’sright to rely on the bank’s observance of the highest diligence
in the conduct of its business. The act of RBSP of entrusting to respondents the owner’s duplicate
certificate entrusted to it by the mortgagor without even notifying the mortgagor and absent
anyprior investigation on the veracity of respondents’ claim and character is a patent failure to
foresee the risk created by the act inview of the provisions of Section 53 of P.D. No. 1529. This
act runs afoul of every bank’s mandate to observe the highest degree of diligence in dealing with
its clients. Moreover, a mortgagor has also the right to be afforded due process before deprivation
ordiminution of his property is effected as the OCT was still in the name of Eduardo. Notice and
hearing are indispensable elements of this right which the bank miserably ignored. Under the
circumstances, the Court believes the award of P50,000.00 as nominaldamages is appropriate.
Issue: WON the first sale was valid
Held: No
Ratio: Eduardo was issued a title in 1976 on the basis of his free patent application. Such
application implies the recognition of the public dominion character of the land and, hence, the
five (5)-year prohibition imposed by the Public Land Act against alienationor encumbrance of the
land covered by a free patent or homestead should have been considered.The deed of sale
covering the fifty (50)-square meter right of way executed by Eduardo on 18 March 1981 is
obviouslycovered by the proscription, the free patent having been issued on 8 October
1976. However, petitioners may recover the portionsold since the prohibition was imposed in favor
of the free patent holder.The sale of the 553 square meter portion is a different story. It was
executed in 1954, twenty-two (22) years before theissuance of the patent in 1976. Apparently,
Eduardo disposed of the portion even before he thought of applying for a free patent.Where the
sale or transfer took place before the filing of the free patent application, whether by the vendor
or the vendee, theprohibition should not be applied. In such situation, neither the prohibition nor
the rationale therefor which is to keep in the familyof the patentee that portion of the public land
which the government has gratuitously given him, by shielding him from thetemptation to dispose
of his landholding, could be relevant. Precisely, he had disposed of his rights to the lot even before
thegovernment could give the title to him.The mortgage executed in favor of RBSP is also beyond
the pale of the prohibition, as it was forged in December 1981 a fewmonths past the period of
prohibition.
19. MAMERTO DY vs. MARIA LOURDES ROSELL ALDEA
G.R. No. 219500 [09 August 2017]
Ponente: Justice Mendoza
Second Division
Facts: Mamerto Dy is the owner of Lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
24849. Nelson Dy the brother of Mamerto found out that the subject land had gone through a
series of anomalous transactions. The owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24849 was declared
lost. As a result, a new owner's duplicate copy of the same TCT was issued and the subject land
was subsequently mortgaged. Mamerto, through his lawyer, sent a letter to the Register of Deeds
of informing the said office that his owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-24849 was never lost
and that he never mortgaged his property to anyone.

Then Mamerto immediately filed a complaint against the Lourdes before the barangay office.
Lourdes, however, failed to attend the hearing. A certificate to file action was subsequently issued.

Atty. Manolo D. Rubi, Deputy Register of Deeds, informed Nelson that TCT No. T-134753
covering the subject land was issued in Lourdes' name. Mamerto insisted that he never executed
any deed of sale in favor of Lourdes and that the signature appearing on the purported deed of
sale was not his authentic signature.

Lourdes alleged that she met the person impersonating Mamerto. She gave the impostor the
payment for the subject land. Thereafter, they signed the Deed of Sales. Thereafter, Lourdes was
informed that the impostor was dead and he had not given any money to process the transfer of
the subject land. So, she went to the Office of the Provincial Assessor to process the payment
and the transfer of title in her name. Eventually, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No. T-134753
under her name. Consequently, Mamerto filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of sale
and TCT No. T-134753, and recovery of real property with injunction and damages.

RTC rule in favor of Mamerto. On appeal CA reversed the RTC’s decision. It declared that Lourdes
was an innocent purchaser for value and that a person dealing with registered land is only charged
with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the
certificate of title. It observed that the only annotation at the back of the title was that it was
mortgaged to Audie C. Uy.

Issue: Whether or not Lourdes is an innocent purchaser for value who is entitled to the application
of the Mirror Doctrine.

Ruling: No. Only an innocent purchaser for value may invoke the mirror doctrine. The real
purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land and to put a stop to any
question of legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title at
the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto. As a consequence, the mirror
doctrine provides that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way obliged to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property. Every registered owner and every
subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds the title to the property free from all
encumbrances except those noted in the certificate. As such, a defective title, or one the
procurement of which is tainted with fraud and misrepresentation may be the source of a
completely legal and valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third person who, in good
faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or an innocent purchaser for value.

Thus, in order to resolve whether Lourdes holds an indefeasible title to the subject land, it
becomes necessary to determine whether she is an innocent purchaser for value.

Lourdes is not an innocent purchaser for value. In Nobleza v. Nuega, the Court defined an
innocent purchaser for value, to wit: An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property
of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in the property, for which
a full and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any notice
of claims or interest of some other person in the property. It is the party who claims to be an
innocent purchaser for value who has the burden of proving such assertion, and it is not enough
to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith. To successfully invoke and be considered as a
buyer in good faith, the presumption is that first and foremost, the "buyer in good faith" must have
shown prudence and due diligence in the exercise of his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer
did everything that an ordinary person would do for the protection and defense of his/her rights
and interests against prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in such a situation. The
prudence required of a buyer in good faith is not that of a person with training in law, but rather
that of an average man who 'weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration
of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil.' A buyer in good faith does his
homework and verifies that the particulars are in order — such as the title, the parties, the mode
of transfer and the provisions in the deed/contract of sale, to name a few. To be more specific,
such prudence can be shown by making an ocular inspection of the property, checking the
title/ownership with the proper Register of Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or
inquiring into the minutiae such as the parameters or lot area, the type of ownership, and the
capacity of the seller to dispose of the property, which capacity necessarily includes an inquiry
into the civil status of the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent is secured when
necessary. In fine, for a purchaser of a property in the possession of another to be in good faith,
he must exercise due diligence, conduct an investigation, and weigh the surrounding facts and
circumstances like what any prudent man in a similar situation would do.

In the case at bench, Lourdes was deficient in her vigilance as buyer of the subject land.

20. G.R. No. 202414 : June 4, 2014

JOSEPHINE WEE, Petitioner v. FELICIDAD MARDO, Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent FelicidadMardo was granted a registered Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284, dated April
26, 1979, covering the Lot No. 8348, situated in Putting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite.

On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner Josephine Wee, through a

Deed of Absolute Sale a portion of the said lot known as Lot No. 8348-B, for a consideration of
P250,000.00 which was fully paid. Respondent however refused to vacate and turnover the
subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.
Petitioner file an Application for Original Registration of a parcel of land claiming that she is the
owner of said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.
Respondent filed a Motion to dismiss the application alleging that the land described in the
application was different from the land being claimed for titling. The motion was however, denied.
A motion for reconsideration and second urgent motion for reconsideration were subsequently
filed by respondent, but both were denied by the RTC.

Upon presentation of evidence by the parties, the RTC granted the application of the petitioner.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC, hence, respondent
appealed to the CA.
The CA held, among others, that petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of
possession and occupation under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529. Her admission that the subject
lot was not physically turned over to her due to some objections and oppositions to her title
suggested that she was not exercising any acts of dominion over the subject property, an essential
element in the requirement and occupation contemplated under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Petitioner is entitled to the subject property.

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CIVIL LAW: registration of title

Based on the legal paramaters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must
sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Republic v. Manimtim, G.R.
No. 169599, March 16, 2011

The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land. It was of the view that she could not have complied
with the requirement of possession and occupation under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529
considering that she admitted that it was not physically turned over to her.

A more important consideration, however, is that the subject land is already registered under OCT
No. OP-1840 (Patent No. 042118-03-6111) of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, under the name
of respondent Felicidad Mardo.

The Petition is DENIED.

21. VAGILIDAD vs VAGILIDAD

G.R. No. 116136
*error while copying so I just provided you with the link 
https://dokumen.tips/documents/vagilidad-vs-vagilidad-568ffb8aad4d3.html
22. HEIRS OF TIRO VS PES
G.R. No. 170528 August 26, 2008

FACTS: Guillerma Tiro et al. filed before the RTC a Complaint for Quieting of Title against PES.
Petitioners alleged that they are the children of the late Julian Tiro. They averred that they and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the disputed land since time
immemorial until they were prevented from entering the same by persons claiming to be the new
owners sometime in 1995. But they discovered that OCT No. RO-1121 had already been
cancelled as early as 1969 and was presently registered in the name of respondent. The
petitioners prayed that all the transactions emanating from the "Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs
and Confirmation of Sale," executed by Maxima Ochea, be declared void, including the transfer
made in favor of the respondent; that the title which was issued in the name of respondent be
cancelled; and that the property be restored and registered in the name of the petitioners.
Respondent claimed that its predecessor-in-interest Pacific Rehouse Corporation acquired the
subject land from the Spouses Velayo, the registered owners of the property who were also in
possession of the same at the time of the sale. Respondent argued that petitioners’ action for
quieting of title was barred by laches and prescription. The RTC issued a decision dismissing
petitioners’ complaint. The RTC ruled that respondent was an innocent purchaser for value who
relied on the correctness of the certificate of title in the name of the vendor. The petitioners filed
with the CA an appeal and MR but were denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in not finding that the act of the RD of registering a clearly void
and unregistrable document confers no valid title on the presentor and his successors-in-interest.

HELD: Petitioners’ arguments are unfounded. Certificates of title merely confirm or record title
already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used as a means
to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with
registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.
A person is considered in law as an innocent purchaser for value when he buys the property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right or an interest in such property, and
pays a full price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims
or interest of some other person in the property. A person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and the law will in no way
oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. The courts cannot
disregard the rights of innocent third persons, for that would impair or erode public confidence in
the torrens system of land registration. Thus, a title procured by fraud or misrepresentation can
still be the source of a completely legal and valid title if the same is in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.
22. Torbela vs. Spouses Rosario GR 140528 Dec. 07, 2011
FACTS: The issue is over a parcel of land inherited by the Torbela siblings from their parents.
They executed a deed of absolute quitclaim over the property in favor of Dr. Rosario. Four days
after, a TCT was issued in Dr. Rosario’s name covering the property.

Another deed of absolute quitclaim was subsequently executed twelve days after by Dr. Rosario
acknowledging that he only borrowed the lot from the Torbela siblings and was already returning
the same. This deed was notarized but not immediately annotated.

Dr. Rosario used the land as mortgage for a loan he obtain through DBP for P70,000.00. He used
the proceeds of the loan to build a 4 storey building which was initially used as a hospital but later
converted into a commercial space. Part was leased to PT&T and the rest to Rosario ’s sister who
operated the Rose Inn Hotel and Restaurant.

Dr. Rosario fully paid the loan from DBP and the mortgage was cancelled and ratified by a notary
public. However, Dr. Rosario took another loan from PNB. He later acquired a third loan from
Banco Filipino and bought out the loan from PNB cancelling the mortgage with PNB. Rosario
failed to pay their loan in Banco Filipino and the property was extrajudicially foreclosed.

Meanwhile, back in 1965, the Torbela siblings sought to register their ownership over the lot and
to perfect their title but couldn’t because the title was still with DBP. They showed as proof the
deed of absolute quitclaim presented executed by Rosario himself. In 1986, they filed a civil case
for recovery of ownership and possession and damages. They tried to redeem the lot from Banco
Filipino but failed. TCT was issued to Banco FIilipino.

The Torbela’s claim they have right over the rents of the building through accession because they
are the land owners.

ISSUE: Who has right over the improvements made on the lot and the rents thereof.

RULING: According to Art. 440, the accessory follows the principal. Ownership of property gives
the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or
attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.

However, in the case at bar, both Torbela siblings and Rosario are deemed in bad faith. The
Torbelas knew Rosario built on the land and even allowed him to use the land to obtain a loan
from DBP. Rosario on the other hand consciously built on land he knew was not his. They both
had knowledge and did not oppose.

Art. 453 states that when both parties are in bad faith, the case shall be treated as though both
were in good faith thus the application of Art. 448.

448 allows the Land Owner 2 options in the case at bar. Either indemnify Rosario and appropriate
the lot to himself or ask Rosario to buy the lot or the rent rate. This case was remanded to the
RTC for the Torbelas to make such decision.

Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits such as rent belong to the owner of the building.
Rosario has rights over the rent and improvements and shall continue until the Torbela siblings
have chosen an option from 448.

25. G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000]

RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, respondent.

NATURE:
A petition for review on the decision rendered by RTC of Parañaque City, Metro Manila involving
questions of law.

FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name from Rudolf Lietz,
Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a consequence
of its change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over
real properties owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner
instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Parañaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because
the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by
the subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles
are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Admit Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of
Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Parañaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground
of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City
and the properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the
lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay
City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Parañaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the
case, it could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.
HELD:
Venue of real actions
This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where
this Court held that it may not. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by respondent
trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to
distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by
law.[16] It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as
fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties, and an objection on improper
venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an
event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the
consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be
waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the
courts as it relates to the place of trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course
of action at this stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue
in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the
trial to be held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be
permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly
erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the
complaint on the ground of improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the
rules of court to take its proper course.
Amendments as a matter of right
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case
may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or
prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. The trial court, therefore, should have
allowed the amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual
merits of the case to be speedily determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and
in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and
the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early
stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made
before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to
prepare for trial.
26. Junio vs. De Los Santos
GR No. L-35744 ; September 28, 1984
Facts:
Wenceslao Junio is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Bayambang, Pangasinan
with an area of 7.65 hectares covered by TCT No. 1004. An Affidavit of Adverse Claim was
executed by respondent Feliciano de los Santos, claiming one third undivided portion of Junio’s
property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Junio. Junio then denies
having sold any portion of his property to De Los Santos, hence his petition for the cancellation
of said adverse claim. Junio disputes the appropriateness of the annotation alleging that under
section 110 of the land registration act such inscription may be resorted only when there is no
other means of registering an interest or right, and that section 57 of the same statute provides
for the registration of a documented sale involving a titled property and that the register of deeds
acted negligently in registering the document without the formal legal requisites. Respondent de
los Santos countered that he had tried to avail himself of Section 57 by requesting Junio to
surrender his owner’s dusplicate certificate of title but since the latter refused to do so he was
compelled to present an adverse claim pursuant to section 110 of the LRA.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s acts were appropriate
Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties
Held:
The court ruled that considering that Junio had refused to surrender the title; De Los Santos could
not avail of Section 57. Hence the latter correctly resorted to the annotation of an adverse claim.
Further, the court found that the genuineness and due execution of the sale between the parties
is in controversy. Moreover, although the grounds relied upon by Junio for the cancellation of the
adverse claim were unmeritous, it behoved the lower court to have conducted a speedy hearing
upon the question of validity of the adverse claim. The case was remanded to the RTC for hearing
and for passing upon the controversy on the merits between Junio and De Los Santos.

27. LOZADA v. BRACEWELL G.R. No. 179155 April 2, 2014 J. Perlas-Bernabe VENUE
FACTS:
On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration and confirmation of title over
a parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514, which was granted on February 23, 1989 by the
RTC of Makati City, acting as a land registration court. Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA
issued Decree No. N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later obtained OCT No. 0-78 covering
the said parcel of land.
On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the aforementioned decree, Bracewell
filed a petition for review of a decree of registration before the RTC of Las Piñas City, claiming
that a portion of the subject lot – of which he is the absolute owner and possessor – is fraudulently
included in Decree No. N-217036.
Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78 in bad faith, the Las
Piñas City-RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Bracewell.
On appeal before the CA, the appellate court affirmed the assailed judgment of the RTC. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for review of Decree No.
N-217036, which was issued as a result of the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City.
RULING:
The petition must fail.
Since the land is situated in Las Piñas, it is proper that the cancellation of the decree was filed
before RTC Las Piñas.
Under the Land Registration Act, which was the law in force at the time of the commencement by
both parties of their respective registration proceedings – jurisdiction over all applications for
registration of title was conferred upon the CFIs, (now RTCs) of the respective provinces in which
the land sought to be registered is situated.
The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD 1529, which took effect on
January 23, 1979, and under Section 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land
registration is still vested on the CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated.
While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City, which rendered the decision
directing the LRA to issue Decree No. N-217036, and should be the same court before which a
petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 is filed, the Court must consider the circumstantial
milieu in this case that, in the interest of orderly procedure, warrants the filing of the said petition
before the Las Piñas City-RTC.
28. Concepcion vs. Concepcion
Posted by bestre on Monday, January 19, 2009
(G. R. No. 147928, January 11, 2005)

FACTS:
The land under dispute in the case at bar is the Zulueta property. The trial court in the partition
case filed by Jose Concepcion, father of herein respondents, declared Jose entitled to a part of
the land under dispute and ordered petitioners to contribute proportionately to satisfy said claim.
Petitioners failed to comply said order. Hence, Jose Concepcion filed a petition for the cancellation
of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the questioned land before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
sitting as a Land Registration Court. Said court ordered the delivery of said title to the Register of
Deeds for the registration of Jose's part of the land. Petitioners opposed the decision but said
opposition was dismissed by the cadastral court on the ground that it does not have jurisdiction
to resolve the matter.

ISSU:
Whether or not the cadastral court has jurisdiction to resolve the opposition.
RULING:
It is the decision of the Supreme Court that the trial court sitting as a cadastral court has
jurisdiction to resolve the opposition brought about by herein petitioners. Under Section 2 of P. D.
1529, it is provided that Regional Trial Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications
for original registration of titles to lands, including improvements and interests therein and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions. The Supreme Court further held that the above
provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the Regional
Trial Court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as
a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on
applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.