COMELEC CASES:

Sixto BRILLANTES v. Haydee YORAC

Topic: Art. IX- SEC 1 Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all
the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.”
192 SCRA 358 | December 18, 1990

FACTS:
A coup attempt occurred in December 1989 prompting president Aquino to create a fact
finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to
vacate his chairmanship over the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Haydee Yorac,
an associate commissioner in the COMELEC, was appointed by then President Corazon
Aquino as a temporary substitute.

The petitioner is challenging the designation on the ground that the choice of the
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the
Philippines violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the
senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice.
No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation of the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is
unconstitutional.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the designation is unconstitutional.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as “independent.” Although essentially executive in nature, they are not
under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions,
orders and rulings are subject only to review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by
the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7. The choice of a temporary chairman comes
under that discretion. Such discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent,
by the President of the Philippines.

The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved
only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while
conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the
Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista case, so
too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.
PERFECTO GALIDO vs. COMELEC AND SATURNINO GALEON
193 SCRA 78

Topic: Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that “Final decisions, orders or
rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory, and
not appealable.

Also, COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and
justice, and apply established jurisprudence, in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent
to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless
such discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party. But it shall not deprive the Supreme Court
the authority to review such decisions pursuant to Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution.

Facts: Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988 local
elections for mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private
respondent filed an election protest before the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation
of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the
RTC decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the COMELEC en banc denied
the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. The COMELEC held
that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial “C” after the name “Galido” were
marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.

Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction
before the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary restraining order. In his comment to the
petition, private respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987
Constitution, that “Final decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective
municipal offices are final and executory, and not appealable.

Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial court’s decision involving marked
ballots, be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party?

Held: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal
and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by
way of a special civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner
cites, it is stated, “Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt thereof.” We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. “We do not,
however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. The COMELEC has the inherent power to decide
an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence, in
support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its
discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the
prejudice of either party. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DIMISSSED.
CASE DIGEST: ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MARIA ISABELLE G. CLIMACO-SALAZAR, ROEL B. NATIVIDAD, ARTURO N. ONRUBIA,
AHMAD NARZAD K. SAMPANG, JOSE L. LOBREGAT, ADELANTE ZAMBOANGA PARTY,
AND ELBERT C. ATILANO, Respondents.

Topic: Art IX, Sec 3: Motions for Reconsideration shall be decided by the Comelec En Banc.

FACTS: On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner by
final judgment.Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
perpetua and reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued an order commuting his
prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days.

On April 26, 2012, petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because
of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the
Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent
List of Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City. Pending resolution of
the same, he filed a CoC on October 5, 2012, seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the
upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013. In his CoC, petitioner stated,inter alia,that
he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga
City.

On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual
absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such
denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in its Order which, pursuant to Section 138 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code"
(OEC), was immediately final and executory.

The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on January 15, 2013, resolving
"to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as
Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his
perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration
requirement.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc act beyond its jurisdiction when it issued
motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner's right to due
process.
HELD: The COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued
Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any
election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and
administer election laws in cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute
disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction.In this
regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the
need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings. There is also no
violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be acting in a purely
administrative manner. The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualified
the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the
term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case
of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.
 ABS- CBN vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Topic: Art IX, Sec. 4: The Commission, may during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other
public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants…”

Facts : Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections
(Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll
body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other
groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the
Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon
"information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR
groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . .
vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results
of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized
Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary
Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until
further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant
thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any
difficulty or problem.

Issue : WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting ABS CBN in
conducting exit polls during the election

Held : two theoretical test in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows:
These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. means that the
evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. . . . The "dangerous tendency" rule, on
the other hand, . . if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to
prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts
of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in
general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite
persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of
such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous
tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the
time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.33 The evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint
of a writing instrument By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected
at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general
sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to
replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling
group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data
gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of
the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The
holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections,
since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of
the other. With the foregoing premises, The SC conclude that the interest of the state in reducing
disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of
the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls —
properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful
and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

Topic: Art IX, Sec. 4: The Commission, may during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other
public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants…”

FACTS:

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section
9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements
of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one
hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend
that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs
the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their
right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per
station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits
violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom
of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and
programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time

limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as
possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements
in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of
these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.