Republic of the Philippines In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the
SUPREME COURT dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
January 26, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51832, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated January 12, 1996
of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in
Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the
annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to
pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed
is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-
Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On
November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for
annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress
forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not
get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her
after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's
child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.4
married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a
month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he
returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him
personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy,
which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also
prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in
the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition
and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral
and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence,
the instant petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN
OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND
IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT
THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
1
 II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS
ERROR IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS
WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE
ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be
annulled on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner
should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s
fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with
those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this
Court.8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or
intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that
despite the alleged coerced consent which supposedly
characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only
on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4)
years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to
have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged
inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this
annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a
favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not
altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy
which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately,
however, let alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly
decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x
x even the very outcome of the present case disappointed his
expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still
pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope
that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may
yet secure an acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this
perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage
on the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from
the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three
men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes
thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a
supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant
claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him
in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of
danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the
will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed
that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked
as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time,
it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself
out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were
indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he
never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school
nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was
made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his
child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could
not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at
worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to
copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the
lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the
appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January
1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual act
was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
2
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his
wife, appellant resorted to undermining the credibility of the
latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on
August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal
death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because
it is inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the date
of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation
of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her
child was prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the
date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not
prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her
entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the
exact date of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself
had presented documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as
the date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the
appellee’s evidence continues in his argument that if indeed there
is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in
December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on
August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the
35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether
the appellee’s impression that she had delivered prematurely is
correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus
on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he
had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his
failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man,
appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee
into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the
letters allegedly written by him to the appellee. During his cross-
examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters,
appellant identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the
appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters
admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and
concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under
duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant
suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7)
letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was
threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under
duress when he made the admission, where did he find the
temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6)
letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight
realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight of those
letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that
his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per
se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a
marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can
terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure
to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the
perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage,
such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or
undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his
failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the
validity of his marriage must be upheld.9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article
2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides that attorney’s may be awarded
where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as
in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack
of factual and legal basis. There is nothing in the records or in the appealed
decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the
award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the
baseless portrayal of her by the appellant as the perpetrator of
fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x10
3
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference
to any testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as
would entitle her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be
pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and
the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed,
respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have
testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered
to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not
suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof.
No other person could have proven such damages except the
respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.
establishes his clear right to moral damages.12 In the instant case, private
respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages,
thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with
modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92
dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with
private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and
exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.

As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is

not entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not
be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed
upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such
liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the
court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition
to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would
be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it
not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages

such that no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first
4
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,1 affirming the
Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in
Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,2 declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void
on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a
Complaint3 for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on
25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus
married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children –
Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal
ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus
discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old,
to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,
respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in
1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American
family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did
not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to
bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the
Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest
child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child,
Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her
American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the
surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she
was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus." At the time the Complaint was
filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent
Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles
68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim4 with the RTC on 05 June 1997.
She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988
and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being
previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with
him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his
Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any
normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on
certain occasions but it was because of the latter’s drunkenness,
womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to
contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been
extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs.
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had
no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all
of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial
support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was
able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to
stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from
respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent
5
Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing
a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband
and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her
status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also
pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with
another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus
of misusing the amount of ₱90,000.00 which she advanced to him to
finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the
foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered
to pay to Fely the ₱90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial
Briefs,5 the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their
evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.6
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support
of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which
he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;7 (2) the
Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City,
on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus
and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place
on 16 December 1961;8 and (3) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus,
Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband’s
surname, Micklus.9
Fely’s counsel filed a Notice,10 and, later on, a Motion,11 to take the
deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and
Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the
Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses
reside. Despite the Orders12 and Commissions13 issued by the RTC to the
Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the
depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single
deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had
been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and
that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an
Order, dated 05 October 1998,14 considering Fely to have waived her right
to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for
decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment
declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab
initio, on the basis of the following findings –
The ground bearing defendant’s psychological incapacity deserves a
reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff’s testimony is decidedly
credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love,
respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff
adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married
another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is
in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already
married to another man in another country.
Defendant’s intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest
before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment
of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the
wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendant’s posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals
her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage
which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world.
It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart
to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there
at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own
attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant’s psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already
existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily
proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
6
Going over plaintiff’s testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court
finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are
her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital
stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the
marriage in question is shown by defendant’s own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to
declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.15
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC
was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001,
affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error
therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit –
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-
appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the
declaration of nullity of their marriage…
… I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not per
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
"WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A
FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING
HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE
HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW."
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision
is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being
married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In
the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American
husband’s citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court
cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to
a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship
and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff
would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total
incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn
plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not
exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge
essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court’s
declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.16
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,17 denied
its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant
Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds –
se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord
with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals
committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of
the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.18
In his Comment19 to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that
Fely’s psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown
trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus
and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He
further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because
Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to
7
intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the
Family Code of the Philippines, reads –
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological
incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for
determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the term psychological incapacity was
defined, thus –
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated…21
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –
(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party
only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.22
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court
in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,23 which, although quite lengthy,
by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below –
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
8
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job…
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.24
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,25 further clarified that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the
totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence,
this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent
Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity
of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the
RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being
self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He
submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the
recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between
respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16
December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their
eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to
respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not
enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
9
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.26 Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do
not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.27
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is
not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume."28
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-
temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent
Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her
American family and her American surname, may indeed be
manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the
root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is
serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time
of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal
examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court’s ruling
in Marcos v. Marcos,29 respondent Crasus must still have complied with
the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina30 that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a
psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.31 No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family.32
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
–
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the
other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely
obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the
exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed
before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she
married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged
that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed
for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic,
in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent
Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the
10
RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor
General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. Article 48 provides –
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not
bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General
as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government.33 His
Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The
Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of
lawyers.34
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings
for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of
evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal
law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such
proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such
intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or
the Court of Appeals.35 While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who
actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the
Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking
the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is
only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being
held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already
exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the
Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the
case of Ancheta v. Ancheta36 –
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this
Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art.
48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)]
reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.]
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the State…37
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,38 which
became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of
respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the
11
instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority
of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on
appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below –
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. –
…
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or
Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
…
Sec. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file
their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days
from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the
Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant
interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision. –
… the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor,
shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered
mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the
action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a
newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from
notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for
reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
…
Sec. 20. Appeal. –
…
(2) Notice of Appeal. – An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may
appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days
from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The
appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence
of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s
abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus
grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent
Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and
loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.39
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming
20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.
12
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice

Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division

Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

13
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004
MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA, RTC – BR. 11, SINDANGAN,
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.,
On May 22, 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the
verified Complaint1 of Margie Corpus-Macias (Mrs. Macias) dated May 11,
2001, accusing Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena, then Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte,
of bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in connection with his
disposition of Civil Case No. S-695 for declaration of nullity of marriage,
entitled "Mariano Joaquin S. Macias v. Margie Corpus-Macias."
The antecedents follow.
On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias ("Mr.
Macias"), her husband and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11,
Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The case was raffled to the respondent's
court.2 On the same day the Complaint was filed, the respondent
immediately issued Summons to Mrs. Macias.3 However,
the Summons was not served on Mrs. Macias for the reason that her
whereabouts were allegedly unknown.4 Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a
motion to serve summons by publication. The respondent granted the
motion in his Order5 dated March 7, 2001, with the directive that Mrs.
Macias should file her answer within 30 days after notice. Thereafter, Mr.
Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the local weekly
newspaper, "Tingog Peninsula," based in Dipolog City in its March 11-17,
2001 issue.6
Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication
of Summons during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on April
10, 2001 or within the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion
to Dismiss, which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001.7 However, instead
of first acting upon the motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on
the merits of the subject case on April 19, 2001, or one day before.
On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-
set the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3, 2001.8 After the
scheduled hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings
and declared the case submitted for decision.9
In the interim, from April 10, 2001 up to April 30, 2001, various motions
and manifestations, one after the other but interrelated, were filed by the
counsel of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case
before the respondent judge.10 One was denied while the rest were
ignored. As previously stated, the respondent proceeded with the hearing
on April 30, 2001 without resolving the other motions and manifestations.
It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the
respondent judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process
with utmost bias and partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the
instant Complaint containing the above-cited facts before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA).11 Also in the Complaint is her prayer that an
order be issued ex-parte directing the respondent judge to desist from
taking any further action in the subject case and imposing an
administrative sanction against him.
Without waiting for the OCA's Indorsement, the respondent judge
submitted his Comment/Answer12 on May 25, 2001.13
The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally defective
because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons who have
knowledge of the facts and documents needed to substantiate the
allegations therein. Also, he asserts that malice, bad faith, and the
14
intention to harass, embarrass and humiliate him had motivated Mrs.
Macias to file the said Complaint.
The respondent judge disputes violating Mrs. Macias' right to due process.
He argues that Mrs. Macias was given the opportunity to be heard but
chose not to give her side, as shown by her failure to appear during the
trial despite prior notice. Furthermore, he points out that the records of
the case would show that the proceedings was done in good faith and
based on law and jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the respondent judge posits that even if he may have
committed an error, such should be corrected by availing of judicial
remedies and not by resorting to the filing of an administrative action. He
argues that it is only after the Supreme Court finds that a judge had
committed malice or gross ignorance that he should be administratively
sanctioned. Moreover, respondent claims that a Petition14 dated May 11,
2001, containing similar allegations as the instant complaint, was filed
before the Court of Appeals, a copy of which he received on May 21, 2001.
Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision15 is valid and prays for
the dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.
In her Reply16 which she filed on July 19, 2001, Mrs. Macias admits having
filed a petition for certiorari17 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64733
entitled "Margie Corpus Macias v. Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena" on May
18, 2001.18
In addition, Mrs. Macias claims that the Court of Appeals decided the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction in her favor on July 13, 2001, finding respondent judge
blatantly transgressing her right to due process and ignorant of the basic
rudiments of Civil Procedure. She notes that the Decision19 nullified the
assailed proceedings and the Decision20 rendered by the respondent
judge on May 15, 2001 in Civil Case No. S-695.21 And finally, Mrs. Macias
stresses that the instant charge against respondent judge may simply be
verified by checking the records of the case.
On June 4, 2001, the respondent judge retired from the service. However,
pursuant to the Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 10597-Ret. dated 22
October 2001, the Court retained the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) from his retirement benefits, to answer for whatever
administrative sanction the Court may impose in relation to the instant
case.22
In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the
respondent judge's actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct
unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and
conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of
the law and procedure. For these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias
concludes that the Court should sanction him.
The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision
which states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias'
right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the
case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was
filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last
pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to
promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering
that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent
judge should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr.
Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial.
What happened in the case is a classic example of "railroading" or
"procedural short-cut." Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the
respondent judge completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on
the merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias' evidence ex-parte.
The respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs.
Macias' Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr. Macias'
evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter,
considered the case submitted for decision despite Mrs. Macias' filing of
a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying her Motion to Dismiss.
15
In holding the trial of the case up to its completion, the respondent judge
had acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court,
even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the
period therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to
conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits
default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.23
In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where
she indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public
Prosecutor of his investigation.24
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the
defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between
the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated." Thus, the
report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further
proceedings to go on in the case. Respondent judge ignored this
procedural rule.
While the record shows that Public Prosecutor Arturo M. Paculanag had
filed a Certification dated May 04, 200125 with the respondent judge's
court, stating, among others, that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor
General during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff's evidence, even
cross-examining the plaintiff and his witness, the psychiatrist Dr. Cheryl
T. Zalsos, and that he had no objection to the granting of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice to
comply with the mandatory requirement that the court should order the
investigating public prosecutor whether a collusion exists between the
parties. Such directive must be made by the court before trial could
proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case had already been had.
Notably, said Certification was filed after the respondent judge had
ordered the termination of the case.
Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge
violated Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he completely ignored the
pertinent rules. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum
of acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep
always abreast with law and jurisprudence.26 When the law or procedure
is so elementary, for him not to know it or to act as if he does not know it
constitutes gross ignorance.27
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a
penalty of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits,
suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding
six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may
be imposed.
Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June 04, 2001, thus,
dismissal or suspension from the service is no longer possible.
Nonetheless, a penalty of fine may still be imposed upon him considering
that under the Resolution of the First Division in A.M. No. 10597-Ret.
dated October 22, 2001,28 the Court retained the amount of Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) from his retirement benefits to answer for
whatever administrative sanction the Court may impose upon him with
regard to this case. Considering that this is the first time the respondent
judge will be meted a penalty,29 the Court finds a fine of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount
earlier withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management
Office of the OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent
judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
from the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons
for its further retention.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
16
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 155409 June 8, 2007
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner,
vs.
DITA MAQUILAN, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated August 30, 2002
promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69689, which
affirmed the Judgment on Compromise Agreement dated January 2, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela
Valley, and the RTC Orders dated January 21, 2002 and February 7, 2002
(ORDERS) in Civil Case No. 656.
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once
had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son.
However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with
her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of
adultery against private respondent and the latter’s paramour.
Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour were
convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of
prision correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as
maximum penalty.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal
Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil
Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the
petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent
entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT in the following terms, to wit:
1. In partial settlement of the conjugal partnership of gains, the parties
agree to the following:
a. ₱500,000.00 of the money deposited in the bank jointly in the name of
the spouses shall be withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of their
common child, Neil Maquilan, with the deposit in the joint account of the
parties.
The balance of such deposit, which presently stands at ₱1,318,043.36,
shall be withdrawn and divided equally by the parties;
b. The store that is now being occupied by the plaintiff shall be allotted to
her while the bodega shall be for the defendant. The defendant shall be
paid the sum of ₱50,000.00 as his share in the stocks of the store in full
settlement thereof.
The plaintiff shall be allowed to occupy the bodega until the time the
owner of the lot on which it stands shall construct a building thereon;
c. The motorcycles shall be divided between them such that the Kawasaki
shall be owned by the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for the
defendant;
d. The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff who shall pay the defendant
the sum of ₱75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full settlement thereof;
e. The house and lot shall be to the common child.
17
2. This settlement is only partial, i.e., without prejudice to the litigation of
other conjugal properties that have not been mentioned;
xxxx
The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the
respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise
Agreement, which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002.2
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002,
praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and the
reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the
respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the
Compromise Agreement.
The respondent Judge in the assailed Order dated January 21, 2002,
denied the aforementioned Omnibus Motion.
Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
Order, but the same was denied in the assailed Order dated February 7,
2002.3 (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court claiming that the RTC committed grave
error and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
(1) in upholding the validity of the Compromise Agreement dated January
11, 2002; (2) when it held in its Order dated February 7, 2002 that the
Compromise Agreement was made within the cooling-off period; (3)
when it denied petitioner’s Motion to Repudiate Compromise Agreement
and to Reconsider Its Judgment on Compromise Agreement; and (4) when
it conducted the proceedings without the appearance and participation of
the Office of the Solicitor General and/or the Provincial Prosecutor.4
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The
CA held that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery does
not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property,
especially considering that she had only been sentenced with the penalty
of prision correccional, a penalty that does not carry the accessory penalty
of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her
property and to dispose of such property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and
63 of the Family Code, which pertain to the effects of a nullified marriage
and the effects of legal separation, respectively, do not apply, considering,
too, that the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage filed by
the respondent invoking Article 36 of the Family Code has yet to be
decided, and, hence, it is premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the
Family Code; that, although adultery is a ground for legal separation,
nonetheless, Article 63 finds no application in the instant case since no
petition to that effect was filed by the petitioner against the respondent;
that the spouses voluntarily separated their property through their
Compromise Agreement with court approval under Article 134 of the
Family Code; that the Compromise Agreement, which embodies the
voluntary separation of property, is valid and binding in all respects
because it had been voluntarily entered into by the parties; that,
furthermore, even if it were true that the petitioner was not duly informed
by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the Compromise
Agreement, this point is untenable since the mistake or negligence of the
lawyer binds his client, unless such mistake or negligence amounts to
gross negligence or deprivation of due process on the part of his client;
that these exceptions are not present in the instant case; that the
Compromise Agreement was plainly worded and written in simple
language, which a person of ordinary intelligence can discern the
consequences thereof, hence, petitioner’s claim that his consent was
vitiated is highly incredible; that the Compromise Agreement was made
during the existence of the marriage of the parties since it was submitted
during the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage;
that the application of Article 2035 of the Civil Code is misplaced; that the
cooling-off period under Article 58 of the Family Code has no bearing on
the validity of the Compromise Agreement; that the Compromise
Agreement is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, and
public policy; that this agreement may not be later disowned simply
because of a change of mind; that the presence of the Solicitor General or
his deputy is not indispensable to the execution and validity of the
Compromise Agreement, since the purpose of his presence is to curtail
any collusion between the parties and to see to it that evidence is not
fabricated, and, with this in mind, nothing in the Compromise Agreement
touches on the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage
for the court to be wary of any possible collusion; and, finally, that the
18
Compromise Agreement is merely an agreement between the parties to
separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the
outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
Hence, herein Petition, purely on questions of law, raising the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR
ADULTERY, CAN STILL SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY
SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF ADULTERY, GIVING THE
CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND
LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND LEGAL
SEPARATION IS A PRE-REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF
EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE DISQUALIFIED AND
PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED SPOUSE
OF ADULTERY FROM SHARING IN A CONJUGAL PROPERTY,
CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION.5
The petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement should not have
been given judicial imprimatur since it is against law and public policy;
that the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being
no appearance and participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial
Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that the respondent, having
been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in the
conjugal property.
The Petition must fail.
The essential question is whether the partial voluntary separation of
property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is valid.
First. The petitioner contends that the Compromise Agreement is void
because it circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse, who was
convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal
property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner
argues that her share should be forfeited in favor of the common child
under Articles 43(2)6 and 637 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the
spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property; and
because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final and
executory.
Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 20358 of the Civil Code and argues
that since adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise
Agreement is therefore void.
These arguments are specious. The foregoing provisions of the law are
inapplicable to the instant case.
Article 43 of the Family Code refers to Article 42, to wit:
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding
Article9 shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit
of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the
subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
19
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice
to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed.
where a subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance
of an absent spouse; while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of
legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where the nullity
of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological
capacity.
Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise
Agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of
gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage
or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by
Article 2035.
Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount
to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing
in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do
not impose such disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be
effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval.
The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is
exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This
conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity
of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that this
voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of
the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code.
Second. Petitioner’s claim that since the proceedings before the RTC were
void in the absence of the participation of the provincial prosecutor or
solicitor, the voluntary separation made during the pendency of the case
is also void. The proceedings pertaining to the Compromise Agreement
involved the conjugal properties of the spouses. The settlement had no
relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their marriage. Nor
did the settlement amount to a collusion between the parties.
Article 48 of the Family Code states:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3(e) of Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- x x x x
xxxx
(e) Where no defaults allowed.— If the defending party in action for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation
fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists if there
is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied
Truly, the purpose of the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or
the Solicitor General is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration
of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.10 While the appearances of the
Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure
of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the
Compromise Agreement. This Court fully concurs with the findings of the
CA:
x x x. It bears emphasizing that the intendment of the law in requiring the
presence of the Solicitor General and/or State prosecutor in all
proceedings of legal separation and annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriage is to curtail or prevent any possibility of collusion between the
parties and to see to it that their evidence respecting the case is not
fabricated. In the instant case, there is no exigency for the presence of the
Solicitor General and/or the State prosecutor because as already stated,
nothing in the subject compromise agreement touched into the very
20
merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be
wary of any possible collusion between the parties. At the risk of being
repetiti[ve], the compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement
between the petitioner and the private respondent to separate their
conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the
pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.11
Third. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil
interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
consequences of civil interdiction:
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. – Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender
during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose
of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be
read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional – Its accessory penalties. – The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in
the pardon.
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of
adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose
of such property inter vivos.
Fourth. Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently
and judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the compromise
agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the Compromise
Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly informed
by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement
is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the
petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said
to be evident. In Salonga v. Court of Appeals,12 this Court held:
[I]t is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is
based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of
his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may
result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them.
Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases
where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law, or when its application "results in the outright deprivation
of one's property through a technicality." x x x x13
None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the subject Compromise
Agreement is VALID without prejudice to the rights of all creditors and
other persons with pecuniary interest in the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice<brchairperson< p="">
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
Associate Justice NACHURA
Associate Justice
21
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

22
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006
Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were
childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984
until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent
decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in
her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned
her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees
and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at
times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at
the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States
of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an
answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her
marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of
California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there
were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and the case was
set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a
psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her
system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s
disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the
ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with
the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was
able to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. The trial court
ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s psychological report, the allegations
in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a
case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found
that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner
and the rest of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family
Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner
when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
23
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued
upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the
dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the
decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion
and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local
Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered
that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family
Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void
marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
24
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must
be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section
19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition,
it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the
Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under
Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated,
shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and
129.
25
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all
common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the
trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless
the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already
provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask
for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no
way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing
upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the
properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute
nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short,
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should
be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of
the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or
bigamous marriage was contracted.1avvphil Under Article 40, "[t]he
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable
marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set aside by
final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.12 In both
instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a
marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property
relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and
distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.
That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on
co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.16 The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the
spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions
on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x."
It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with
the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage
shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without waiting
for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
26
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

27
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 189607 April 18, 2016
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR.
CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed
the Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
between the parties on the ground that respondent had a previous valid
marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes on the other
hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second
marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she
did not have to await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was
correct in holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's
declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married
Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married
herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due
to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that
petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the
RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in
this Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license
therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which
the solemnizing officer belonged.5
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage
to Baustista void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring that Lea's
first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter,
the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision
dated 22 January 2003 had become final and executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming
that the proof adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was
bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not
the first marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that
she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she
still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him,
her previous marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter
denied respondent's demurrer in its Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground
that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby declares the marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P.
DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen
Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND
28
VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the
Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting
when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to
Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court
dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of
nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The
RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior
marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent
eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains
that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of
nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second
marriage with Renato. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their
properties were concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the
RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007. Thereafter, both
petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage.
In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were
solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the
law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family
Code.20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise
denied in the questioned CA Resolution22 dated 16 September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her
marriage to petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties
acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared conjugal. In his
Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his
Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in
accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration.25 In this
case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the
Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code
was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve
this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in
particular, Articles 80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those
on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and
86.32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in
the following ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no
marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage
is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot
be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3)
being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a
voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage,
there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by
legal fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and
the children conceived before the decree of annulment are considered
legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the
invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a
judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that
the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941,
and 1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first
wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the
29
death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was
deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and
void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second
marriage was void from its performance, hence, nonexistent without the
need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved
substantially the same factual antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977),
citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under
Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered
the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages
celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous
marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A
second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of
nullity is thus considered bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this
requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it
"shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter
of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of
the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of
marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and
nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations
indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and
far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a
socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement
through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms
of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the
courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage,
but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible
to everyone.40 (Emphases supplied)1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of
Appeals, 42 the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code
was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be
governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the then-
prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial
judge of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge
claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into
marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of
the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that
since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were
born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family
Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent
was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule
was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private
respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need
for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's
second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the
vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be
impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of
30
vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations CERTIFICATION
omitted)
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
to this case. The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista Division.
because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under Chief Justice
the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of
Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is
valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence,
we find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September
2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS BERSAMIN ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice

31
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by
her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner
Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others that: they were married on
November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a
Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No.
4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous
marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is
valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only
sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from
January 23 1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia
and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would avail of the
one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since
1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely
dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal
earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount
of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-
month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another
woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about
this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-
in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over
the possession and administration of said properties to her
brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and
possess the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition
prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be
declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be
declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the
time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated
no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It
added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying
the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a
first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal and
void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA
229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v.
Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845).
Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the
second marriage contracted by respondent with herein
petitioner after a first marriage with another woman is
illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the second
marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not
32
 an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of its
nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage
deviated from the previous rulings of the
Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of
Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent
movant that petitioner has no property in
his possession is an issue that may be
determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous
application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable
controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991,
Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner
fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the
motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It
explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that
of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance
in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt
with the successional rights of the second wife while the instant case
prays for separation of property corollary with the declaration of nullity
of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution
of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship between said
parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of
suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this
proceeding together with the partition and distribution of the properties
involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held that
private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage
such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the
Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to
dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have
been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse
decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration
was subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage
is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only
for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private
respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People
v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be
dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his
own interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is required only for
purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition
should therefore, be dismissed.
33
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of
remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of
their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by
petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous
marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however,
dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former
marriage was void there would be nothing to dissolve, still
it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage
was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. .
. . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in
subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez
v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order
forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during
the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of
the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need
for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action
for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra
v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while
the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the
first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the
correction of the death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained
that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent
during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning
and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court
reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded
as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity
is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the
Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the
following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was
discussed.
B. Article 39. —
34
 The absolute nullity of a marriage may be
invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should
include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then
suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they
say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage
may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be
invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot
determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid
and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly
proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be
invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment annulling the marriage or
declaring the marriage void, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no
question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if
it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce
the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be
invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage invalid,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is
declared invalid, does it include the annulment of a
marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is
annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that
this matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the
provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void
marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that
annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct
action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the
phrase "absolute nullity" can stand since it might result in
confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what
they are referring to in the provision is the declaration
that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away
with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice
Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that
there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage
void and a party should not declare for himself whether or
not the marriage is void, while the other members
affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore,
trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof.
Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought
35
on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then
asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the
defense that he has no liability because the basis of the
liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say
that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity
of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same
proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is
a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof.
Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded
as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for
purposes of remarriage may be invoked
only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of
establishing the validity of a subsequent
marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity
of a subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as provided
in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too
broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He
proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a
subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may only be
invoked on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity, except as provided
in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above
provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage
without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of
a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab
initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that
they go back to the original wording of the provision as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a
necessity for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre
v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre
who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting
a second marriage and living with another woman other than complainant
while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that "for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
36
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is
for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to
petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
(n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the
provision of the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is
meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise
intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally
emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case "solely"
would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant
the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause
denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one
can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as
well as an action for the custody and support of their common children
and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where
a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains
subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for
purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for
declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an
"inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it
"shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code
characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal, and family life." 21 So crucial are marriage and the family to
the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a
matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose
of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it
void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so,
this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and
would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would
such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the
nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone.
37
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a
second sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from
new information required in the Family Code to be included in the
application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when
and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the
Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that
private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed
to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of
the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be
misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of remarriage." Judge
Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice
Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal
term "solely" instead of "only," which the Committee
approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity
of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent
should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties
alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality,
the lower court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be
clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the issues of possession and
ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were
acquired with private respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the
prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised
together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation
of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final
judgment therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes,
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial
proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing therefrom, in proper cases,
are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property
shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent
spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid,
except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad
faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the
other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage
in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted
in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked
by operation of law. (n) 26
38
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer
for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties
to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that
purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of
the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It
stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of
a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide
the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly,
the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the
lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March
20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth
P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I believe, no
judicial decree is required to establish their nullity, except in the following
instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of Article 40 of
the Family Code; viz.:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
(n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in
case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage (Article 36, Family Code), where
an action or defense for the declaration of nullity prescribes ten (10) years
after the Family Code took effect (Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the
marriage is deemed unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a nullity, albeit
the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in the majority
opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or the
consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances where
certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void marriage.
Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under Article 36
(due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to Article 52
(due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes of children
and recording thereof following the annulment or declaration of nullity a
prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial declaration of
nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate (Article
54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be considered
extant per se. Neither the conjugal, partnership of gain under the old
regime nor the absolute community of property under the new Code
(absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead, their property
relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules under either Article
147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must hasten to add as a personal
view, however, that the exceptional effects on children of a void marriage
because of the psychological incapacity of a party thereto should have
been extended to cover even the personal and property relations of the
spouses. Unlike the other cases of void marriages where the grounds
therefor may be established by hard facts and with little uncertainty, the
term "psychological incapacity" is so relative and unsettling that until a
judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long and
literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses themselves
39
are concerned but also as regards third persons with whom the spouses
deal.

40
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164435 June 29, 2010
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration1 dated November
11, 2009 and respondent's Comment2 thereto dated March 5, 2010.
In the Decision dated September 29, 2009, the Court affirmed petitioner's
conviction for bigamy. Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the
Decision, arguing that since petitioner's marriages were entered into
before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section
29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family
Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.
Petitioner's argument lacks merit.
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.,3 the Court already made
the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be
applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself
provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to
explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights
may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The
reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.4
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,5 the Court pointed out the danger of not
enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot
have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack
of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter
into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite – usually the marriage
license – and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the
first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision
on bigamy. x x x 6lawphil
The foregoing scenario is what petitioner seeks to obtain in her case, and
this, the Court shall never sanction. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's
asseveration, that Article 40 of the Family Code should not be applied to
her case, cannot be upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 11, 2009 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
41
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

NACHURA CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Special Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

42
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 167139 February 25, 2010
SUSIE CHAN-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
JESSE C. TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of (i) the 17 May 2004 Resolution2 amending
the 30 March 2004 Decision3 and (ii) the 15 February 2005 Resolution4 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, in Civil Case No. Q-
01-45743. In its 30 March 2004 Decision, the trial court declared the
marriage between petitioner Susie Chan-Tan and respondent Jesse Tan
void under Article 36 of the Family Code. Incorporated as part of the
decision was the 31 July 2003 Partial Judgment5 approving the
Compromise Agreement6 of the parties. In its 17 May 2004 Resolution, the
trial court granted to respondent custody of the children, ordered
petitioner to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's
name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling. In its 15
February 2005 Resolution, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution7 denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12
October 2004 Resolution,8 which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila
Cathedral in Intramuros, Manila.9 They were blessed with two sons:
Justin, who was born in Canada in 1990 and Russel, who was born in the
Philippines in 1993.10
In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the
annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement, which we quote
in full:
1. The herein parties mutually agreed that the two (2) lots located at
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City and more particularly described in the
Contract to Sell, marked in open court as Exhibits "H" to "H-3" shall be
considered as part of the presumptive legitimes of their two (2) minor
children namely, Justin Tan born on October 12, 1990 and Russel Tan
born on November 28, 1993. Copies of the Contract to Sell are hereto
attached as Annexes "A" and "B" and made integral parts hereof.
2. Susie Tan hereby voluntarily agrees to exclusively shoulder and pay out
of her own funds/assets whatever is the remaining balance or unpaid
amounts on said lots mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof directly with
Megaworld Properties, Inc., until the whole purchase or contract amounts
are fully paid.
Susie Tan is hereby authorized and empowered to directly negotiate,
transact, pay and deal with the seller/developer Megaworld Properties,
Inc., in connection with the Contract to Sell marked as Annexes "A" and
"B" hereof.
The property covered by CCT No. 3754 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City and located at Unit O, Richmore Town Homes 12-B Mariposa St.,
Quezon City shall be placed in co-ownership under the name of Susie Tan
(1/3), Justin Tan (1/3) and Russel Tan (1/3) to the exclusion of Jesse Tan.
The property covered by TCT No. 48137 of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City and located at View Master Town Homes, 1387 Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City shall be exclusively owned by Jesse Tan to the
exclusion of Susie Tan.
43
The undivided interest in the Condominium Unit in Cityland Shaw. Jesse
Tan shall exclusively own blvd. to the exclusion of Susie Tan.
The shares of stocks, bank accounts and other properties presently under
the respective names of Jesse Tan and Susie Tan shall be exclusively
owned by the spouse whose name appears as the registered/account
owner or holder in the corporate records/stock transfer books, passbooks
and/or the one in possession thereof, including the dividends/fruits
thereof, to the exclusion of the other spouse.
Otherwise stated, all shares, bank accounts and properties registered and
under the name and/or in the possession of Jesse Tan shall be exclusively
owned by him only and all shares, accounts and properties registered
and/or in the possession and under the name of Susie Tan shall be
exclusively owned by her only.
However, as to the family corporations of Susie Tan, Jesse Tan shall
execute any and all documents transferring the shares of stocks registered
in his name in favor of Susie Tan, or Justin Tan/Russel Tan. A copy of the
list of the corporation owned by the family of Susie Tan is hereto attached
as Annex "C" and made an integral part hereof.
The parties shall voluntarily and without need of demand turn over to the
other spouse any and all original documents, papers, titles, contracts
registered in the name of the other spouse that are in their respective
possessions and/or safekeeping.
3. Thereafter and upon approval of this Compromise Agreement by the
Honorable Court, the existing property regime of the spouses shall be
dissolved and shall now be governed by "Complete Separation of
Property". Parties expressly represent that there are no known creditors
that will be prejudiced by the present compromise agreement.
The parties shall have joint custody of their minor children. However, the
two (2) minor children shall stay with their mother, Susie Tan at 12-B
Mariposa St., Quezon City.
The husband, Jesse Tan, shall have the right to bring out the two (2)
children every Sunday of each month from 8:00 AM to 9:00 PM. The minor
children shall be returned to 12-B Mariposa Street, Quezon City on or
before 9:00 PM of every Sunday of each month.
The husband shall also have the right to pick up the two (2) minor
children in school/or in the house every Thursday of each month. The
husband shall ensure that the children be home by 8:00 PM of said
Thursdays.
During the summer vacation/semestral break or Christmas vacation of
the children, the parties shall discuss the proper arrangement to be made
regarding the stay of the children with Jesse Tan.
Neither party shall put any obstacle in the way of the maintenance of the
love and affection between the children and the other party, or in the way
of a reasonable and proper companionship between them, either by
influencing the children against the other, or otherwise; nor shall they do
anything to estrange any of them from the other.
The parties agreed to observe civility, courteousness and politeness in
dealing with each other and shall not insult, malign or commit
discourteous acts against each other and shall endeavor to cause their
other relatives to act similarly.
4. Likewise, the husband shall have the right to bring out and see the
children on the following additional dates, provided that the same will not
impede or disrupt their academic schedule in Xavier School, the dates are
as follows:
a. Birthday of Jesse Tan
b. Birthday of Grandfather and Grandmother, first cousins
and uncles and aunties
c. Father's Day
d. Death Anniversaries of immediate members of the
family of Jesse Tan
44
 e. During the Christmas seasons/vacation the herein
parties will agree on such dates as when the children can
stay with their father. Provided that if the children stay
with their father on Christmas Day from December 24th to
December 25th until 1:00 PM the children will stay with
their mother on December 31 until January 1, 1:00 PM, or
vice versa.
The husband shall always be notified of all school activities of the children
and shall see to it that he will exert his best effort to attend the same.
5. During the birthdays of the two (2) minor children, the parties shall as
far as practicable have one celebration.
Provided that if the same is not possible, the Husband (Jesse Tan) shall
have the right to see and bring out the children for at least four (4) hours
during the day or the day immediately following/or after the birthday, if
said visit or birthday coincides with the school day.
6. The existing Educational Plans of the two children shall be used and
utilized for their High School and College education, in the event that the
Educational Plans are insufficient to cover their tuition, the Husband shall
shoulder the tuition and other miscellaneous fees, costs of books and
educational materials, uniform, school bags, shoes and similar expenses
like summer workshops which are taken in Xavier School, which will be
paid directly by Jesse Tan to the children's school when the same fall due.
Jesse Tan, if necessary, shall pay tutorial expenses, directly to the tutor
concerned.
The husband further undertake to pay ₱10,000.00/monthly support
pendente lite to be deposited in the ATM Account of SUSIE CHAN with
account no. 3-189-53867-8 Boni Serrano Branch effective on the 15th of
each month. In addition Jesse Tan undertakes to give directly to his two
(2) sons every Sunday, the amount needed and necessary for the purpose
of the daily meals of the two (2) children in school.
7. This Compromise Agreement is not against the law, customs, public
policy, public order and good morals. Parties hereby voluntarily agree and
bind themselves to execute and sign any and all documents to give effect
to this Compromise Agreement.11
On 31 July 2003, the trial court issued a partial judgment12 approving the
compromise agreement. On 30 March 2004, the trial court rendered a
decision declaring the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code
on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity of the parties. The trial
court incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of the
parties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and
property relations.
Meanwhile, petitioner cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills
Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2. She authorized Megaworld Corp. to
allocate the amount of ₱11,992,968.32 so far paid on the said lot in the
following manner:
(a) ₱3,656,250.04 shall be transferred to fully pay the
other lot in Corinthian Hills on Lot 11, Block 2;
(b) ₱7,783,297.56 shall be transferred to fully pay the
contract price in Unit 9H of the 8 Wack Wack Road
Condominium project; and
(c) ₱533,420.72 shall be forfeited in favor of Megaworld
Corp. to cover the marketing and administrative costs of
Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot 12, Block 2.13
Petitioner authorized Megaworld Corp. to offer Lot 12, Block 2 of
Corinthian Hills to other interested buyers. It also appears from the
records that petitioner left the country bringing the children with her.
Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the
children. The evidence presented by respondent established that
petitioner brought the children out of the country without his knowledge
and without prior authority of the trial court; petitioner failed to pay the
₱8,000,000 remaining balance for the Megaworld property which, if
forfeited would prejudice the interest of the children; and petitioner failed
to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's
name.1avvphi1
45
Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent
custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondent
documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowed respondent to stay
in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City.
Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration14 alleging
denial of due process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. She alleged she was not able to present evidence because of
the negligence of her counsel and her own fear for her life and the future
of the children. She claimed she was forced to leave the country, together
with her children, due to the alleged beating she received from
respondent and the pernicious effects of the latter's supposed gambling
and womanizing ways. She prayed for an increase in respondent's
monthly support obligation in the amount of ₱150,000.
Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution,15 denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, which was filed beyond the 15-
day reglementary period. It also declared petitioner in contempt of court
for non-compliance with the partial judgment and the 17 May 2004
resolution. The trial court also denied petitioner's prayer for increase in
monthly support. The trial court reasoned that since petitioner took it
upon herself to enroll the children in another school without respondent's
knowledge, she should therefore defray the resulting increase in their
expenses.
On 4 November 2004, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss16 and a motion
for reconsideration17 of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed she
was no longer interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the
circumstances in her life had led her to the conclusion that withdrawing
the petition was for the best interest of the children. She prayed that an
order be issued vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at
the status quo ante the filing of the suit.
In its 28 December 2004 Resolution,18 the trial court denied both the
motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
It held that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution
had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day
reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by
either party.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the 28
December 2004 resolution, which the trial court denied in its 15 February
2005 resolution.19 The trial court then issued a Certificate of Finality20 of
the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The Trial Court's Rulings
The 30 March 2004 Decision21 declared the marriage between the parties
void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual
psychological incapacity. It incorporated the 31 July 2003 Partial
Judgment22 approving the Compromise Agreement23 between the parties.
The 17 May 2004 Resolution24 amended the earlier partial judgment in
granting to respondent custody of the children, ordering petitioner to turn
over to respondent documents and titles in the latter's name, and allowing
respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City. The
15 February 2005 Resolution25 denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 28 December 2004 Resolution26 denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the 12
October 2004 Resolution,27 which in turn denied for late filing petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution.
The Issue
Petitioner raises the question of whether the 30 March 2004 decision and
the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court have attained finality despite
the alleged denial of due process.
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner contends she was denied due process when her counsel failed
to file pleadings and appear at the hearings for respondent's omnibus
motion to amend the partial judgment as regards the custody of the
children and the properties in her possession. Petitioner claims the trial
court issued the 17 May 2004 resolution relying solely on the testimony
of respondent. Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying
to her motion to dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
46
Petitioner argues that if indeed the provision is applicable, the same is
unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the preservation of the family.
Respondent maintains that the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May
2004 resolution of the trial court are now final and executory and could
no longer be reviewed, modified, or vacated. Respondent alleges
petitioner is making a mockery of our justice system in disregarding our
lawful processes. Respondent stresses neither petitioner nor her counsel
appeared in court at the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion or on
petitioner's motion to dismiss.
The issue raised in this petition has been settled in the case of Tuason v.
Court of Appeals.28 In Tuason, private respondent therein filed a petition
for the annulment of her marriage on the ground of her husband's
psychological incapacity. There, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring the nullity of the marriage and awarding custody of the children
to private respondent therein. No timely appeal was taken from the trial
court's judgment.
We held that the decision annulling the marriage had already become final
and executory when the husband failed to appeal during the reglementary
period. The husband claimed that the decision of the trial court was null
and void for violation of his right to due process. He argued he was denied
due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the
trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and
rendered judgment based solely on the evidence presented by private
respondent. We upheld the judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it
was based solely on evidence presented by therein private respondent.
We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to the counsel of record is binding
upon the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to inform the client
of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the latter's right to appeal
is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.29
In the present case, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
resolution of the trial court had become final and executory upon the lapse
of the reglementary period to appeal.30 Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which the trial court
received on 28 June 2004, was clearly filed out of time. Applying the
doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence of counsel resulting
in petitioner's loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the
trial court's judgments.
Further, petitioner cannot claim that she was denied due process. While
she may have lost her right to present evidence due to the supposed
negligence of her counsel, she cannot say she was denied her day in court.
Records show petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the
proceedings below, filing motion after motion. Contrary to petitioner's
allegation of negligence of her counsel, we have reason to believe the
negligence in pursuing the case was on petitioner's end, as may be gleaned
from her counsel's manifestation dated 3 May 2004:
Undersigned Counsel, who appeared for petitioner, in the nullity
proceedings, respectfully informs the Honorable Court that she has not
heard from petitioner since Holy Week. Attempts to call petitioner have
failed.
Undersigned counsel regrets therefore that she is unable to respond in an
intelligent manner to the Motion (Omnibus Motion) filed by respondent.31
Clearly, despite her counsel's efforts to reach her, petitioner showed utter
disinterest in the hearings on respondent's omnibus motion seeking,
among others, custody of the children. The trial judge was left with no
other recourse but to proceed with the hearings and rule on the motion
based on the evidence presented by respondent. Petitioner cannot now
come to this Court crying denial of due process.
As for the applicability to petitioner's motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the
Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section 7 of the
Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides:
SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. - No motion to dismiss the petition shall be
allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that
might warrant a dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative
defense in an answer. (Emphasis supplied)
47
The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all
possible defenses in an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so
that judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the
purpose or object of the law is an important factor to be
considered.32 Further, the letter of the law admits of no other
interpretation but that the provision applies only to a respondent, not a
petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an
answer where any ground that may warrant a dismissal may be raised as
an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical
conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to
dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage.
Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of
the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to the motion to dismiss
filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable, petitioner's claim
that it is unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the
preservation of the family is without basis.
Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to
a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the
annulment of voidable marriage. In this connection, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court allows dismissal of the action upon notice or upon motion of the
plaintiff, to wit:
Section 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. - A complaint may be
dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such
notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal.
xxx
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. - Except as provided in the
preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's
instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November
2004, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the
trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-
day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by
either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution
may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss
filed by petitioner. The trial court was correct in denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law.33 The reason is grounded on the fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some
definite date fixed by law. Once a judgment has become final and
executory, the issues there should be laid to rest.34
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review. We AFFIRM the (i) 17 May
2004 Resolution amending the 30 March 2004 Decision and (ii) the 15
February 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 107, in Civil Case No. Q-01-45743.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice
48
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

49
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014
NOEL A. LASANAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its
face void and in existent for lack of a marriage license, is guilty of bigamy
as defined and penalized by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
The accused seeks the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 29,
2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for
bigamy under the judgment rendered on October 30, 2000 in Criminal
Case No. 49808 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, in Iloilo City.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1968,2 Judge Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial
Court of San Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel
Lasanas and Socorro Patingo3 without the benefit of a marriage
license.4 The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any
affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license.5 On
August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in
a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose Church in
Iloilo City.6 They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of
cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies were evidenced by the
corresponding marriage certificates.8 In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo
separated de facto because of irreconcilable differences.9
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa
Eslaban in a religious ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the
Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate reflected the
civil status of the accused as single.10
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage
and damages against Socorro in the RTC in Iloilo City,11 which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the RTC. The
complaint alleged that Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations
and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent
marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities and her infidelity had
caused him to suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social
humiliation warranting the award of damages. In support of his
complaint, he further alleged, among others, that:
He was married to the defendant on February 16, 1968 which marriage
was officiated by Hon. Carlos B. Salazar, Municipal Judge of San Miguel,
Iloilo. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract is herewith attached as
Exhibit "A" and made part hereof; which marriage was ratified by a
wedding at San Jose Church, Iloilo City on August 27, 1980 and registered
at the office of Iloilo City Registrar. Machine copy of the Marriage Contract
is herewith attached as Annex "B";
Plaintiff and defendant have no children and have no properties except
some personal belongings;
Plaintiff met the defendant sometime in the middle of 1967 at the house
of Mr. Raul L. Cataloctocan in Burgos Street, Lapaz, Iloilo City wherein the
purpose of their meeting was for the plaintiff to consult and seek
treatment by the defendant because the latter was a "babaylan": Plaintiff
was treated by the defendant and the subsequent treatments were
performed by the defendant at her residence in Barangay, Banga, Mina,
Iloilo, the treatment made being on a continuing basis;
xxxx
50
On February 16, 1968, defendant asked the plaintiff to come with her to
Iloilo City. They went to Dainty Restaurant at J.M. Basa Street. Plaintiff saw
several persons therein. After eating plaintiff was made to sign the
marriage contract, which was null and void for lack of marriage license
and based on a false affidavit of cohabitation. After their marriage, they
went home to Barangay Bangac, Mina, Iloilo, which marked the start of a
married life rocked with marital differences, quarrels and
incompatibilities, without love, but under the uncontrollable fear of harm
that should befall him should he not follow her;
xxxx
During the period the parties are living together defendant would nag the
plaintiff, fabricate stories against him and displayed her fit of jealousy,
neglect her marital obligations even committed infidelity, which
psychological incompatibilities and marital breaches have forced the
petitioner to live separately from defendant since 1982 up to the
present.12
In October 1998, Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.13 After due proceedings, the accused
was formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October
20, 1998 in the RTC, viz:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1993 in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, Noel
Lasanas being previously united in a lawful marriage with Socorro
Patingo and without the said marriage having been legally dissolve (sic)
or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second or subsequent marriage with Josefa Eslaban.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
The criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 49808, was raffled to
Branch 38 of the RTC in Iloilo City. The accused pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment,15 and trial ensued in due course.
In the meanwhile, on November 24, 1998, the RTC (Branch 39) rendered
its judgment in Civil Case No. 23133 dismissing the accused’s complaint
for annulment of marriage, and declaring the marriage between him and
Socorro valid and legal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint filed by the plaintiff Noel Arenga Lasanas against
the defendant, Socorro Patingo, considering that the marriage between
them is valid and legal.
The plaintiff Noel Lasanas is hereby ordered to give monthly support to
his wife, the defendant in this case, Ma. Socorro Patingo in the amount of
₱3,000.00 a month, from the time that she filed her answer with
counterclaim on February 3, 1997, pursuant to Article 203 of the Family
Code and every month thereafter. Costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.16
The accused appealed to the CA.17
Ruling of the RTC
On October 30, 2000, the RTC (Branch 38) rendered its assailed decision
in Criminal Case No. 49808, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, finding accused NOEL LASANAS guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of BIGAMY punishable under Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, judgment is hereby entered ordering him to serve an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
The accused is entitled to the privileges extended to him under Art. 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.18
Decision of the CA Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the
CA, insisting that the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally
51
married Socorro despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of
cohabitation and affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good
faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and
that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision,
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the
appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule
embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration
of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not
apply in this purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the
Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his
subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded
judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to
Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element
of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was
lacking;25 and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient
to relieve him of criminal liability.26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender
has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant
Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence
of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory
religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage.
Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do
so, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be
present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no
marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who
presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated
as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first
secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private
complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just
that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the
law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these
cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court
of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza
doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family
52
Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals,
supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is
unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, the accused appealed his conviction to the CA, insisting that
the RTC thereby erred in finding that he had legally married Socorro
despite the absence of the marriage license, affidavit of cohabitation and
affidavit of the solemnizing officer.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to
Socorro, the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good
faith and the absence of criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and
that he had been of the honest belief that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he could contract a
subsequent marriage.19
On August 29, 2002, however, the CA promulgated its challenged decision,
decreeing: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Court DISMISSES the
appeal and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision.
SO ORDERED.20
Issues
Hence, the accused has appealed by petition for review on certiorari.21 He
argues that the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the provisions of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,22 asserting that the civil law rule
embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a judicial declaration
of nullity before one could contract a subsequent marriage should not
apply in this purely criminal prosecution;23 that even if Article 40 of the
Family Code was applicable, he should still be acquitted because his
subsequent marriage was null and void for being without a recorded
judgment of nullity of marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to
Article 52 of the Family Code;24 that, consequently, an essential element
of the crime of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be valid, was
lacking;25 and that his good faith and lack of criminal intent were sufficient
to relieve him of criminal liability.26
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) that the offender
has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he or she
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.27
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant
Lasanas and private complainant Patingo was void because of the absence
of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory
religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage.
Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for to do
so, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be
present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused. There having been no
marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who
53
presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated
as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first
secured a judicial declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to private
complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just
that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the
law on bigamy.
Accused’s reliance on the cases of People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and
People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling in these
cases have already been abandoned per Relova v. Landico, supra, and
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited Yap v. Court
of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza
doctrine but Yap’s ruling too had been overtaken by Art. 40 of the Family
Code and by Domingo v. Court of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals,
supra.
Regarding accused-appellant’s defense of good faith, the same is
unavailing pursuant to Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the appealed Decision is correct in all
respect.28
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the foregoing elements
attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the
absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between the
accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is found
in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. (n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed in Teves v. People:29
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground
for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines
took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently held that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can
be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner’s contention would be allowed, a person who commits
bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable
decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against
him. We note that in petitioner’s case the complaint was filed before the
first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of the
Information that was overtaken by the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. Following petitioner’s argument, even assuming that a
complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender can still
escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage
precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To
do so would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or
inability of the Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
54
complaints and eventually file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner’s
strained reading of the law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accused’s conviction for bigamy is
affirmed.1âwphi1 The crime of bigamy was consummated from the
moment he contracted the second marriage without his marriage to
Socorro being first judicially declared null and void, because at the time of
the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still
deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared
null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction.30 "What makes a
person criminally liable for bigamy," according to People v. Odtuhan:31
x x x is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity
of the marriage is so declared can it beheld as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
The accused’s defense of acting in good faith deserves scant consideration
especially because the records show that he had filed a complaint for the
annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the institution of the
criminal complaint against him but after he had already contracted his
second marriage with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon him
because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for annulment of
marriage after the information for bigamy had already been filed against
him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to Socorro. Considering
that the accused’s subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact,
the third element of bigamy was established. Nonetheless, he submits that
his marriage to Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded judgment
of nullity of marriage. Such argument had no worth, however, because it
was he himself who failed to secure a judicial declaration of nullity of his
previous marriage prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court has explained that "[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
x x x A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore,
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage."33
The Court has further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:34 x x x Nollora may
not impugn his [subsequent] marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening the doors
to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage ceremonies. As
we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs
of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for bigamy is
prision mayor. With neither an aggravating nor a mitigating circumstance
attendant in the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is the
medium period of prision mayor,35 which ranges from eight years and one
day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of prision
correccional, the penalty next lower than that prescribed for the offense,
which is from six months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the
indeterminate sentence of two years and four months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum, as imposed by the RTC, was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
55
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

56
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City,
and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to
annul (1) the Order of the respondent Judge, dated 10 December 1986,
ordering petitioner to pay support pendente lite to private respondent
(his wife) and their child, and (2) the Order of the same respondent Judge,
dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in
the action for legal separation filed against him by private respondent as
well as his motion to inhibit respondent Judge from further hearing and
trying the case.
On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial District,
Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a
complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. This
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 October 1986, private
respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court, General Santos City,
a complaint against petitioner for concubinage, which was docketed on 23
October 1986 as Criminal Case No. 15437111. On 14 November 1986,
application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a
decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent
in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge, as already
stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of support pendente
lite.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for
support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case
for concubinage filed against him the private respondent. In support of his
contention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses.
— Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the
civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense. as contemplated in the first Section 1 hereof, the
following rules shall be observed:
(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the
pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. .
..
The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is
petitioner's position that such civil action arises from, or is inextricably
tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all proceedings related
to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or
acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Authority for this position
is this Court's decision in the case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano. 1
Petitioner's contention is not correct.
In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of an
action for legal separation would be proper if an allegation of concubinage
is made therein, relied solely on Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions
of the Rules of Court on criminal procedure, to wit:
Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-
Except as otherwise provided by law, the following rules
shall he observed:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged
57
 is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately;
(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action can not be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the
criminal action;
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and
the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has
been rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)
The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that
the civil action to be suspended, with or upon the filing of a criminal
action, is one which is "to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense". In other words, in view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on
concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal
action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the
civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is
one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal
consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from
inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. As correctly pointed
out by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 5 August 1987:
The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon. Roberto
Zurbano, Judge of CFI of Antique, et al., L-11935, April 24,
1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not controlling. It applied
paragraph C of Sec. 1, of then Rule 107 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
After a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted and the
same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment
in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which refers to "civil actions to enforce the civil liability arising
from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 111-which is a civil action "for recovery of civil liability arising from
the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil
action arising from the offense."
As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil
liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and
their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles 7 to 108,
of the Civil Code."2
Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be
first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed,
as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of
concubinage.
Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued
upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal
separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this
end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao 4 has been modified, as that case
was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed
and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the
New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such former law, that the
guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a
criminal action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by
the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly
accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.5
58
Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife
must also fail, as we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a
remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at
the discretion of the judge. 6 If petitioner finds the amount of
support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion
to modify or reduce the same. 7

Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from

hearing the case, as the grant of support pendente lite and the denial of the
motion to suspend hearings in the case, are taken by the petitioner as a
disregard of applicable laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing the
respondent Judge's alleged manifest partiality to private respondent.

Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between

a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to applicable laws and
jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from
hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is
more so, in this case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's
motions to be sound and well-taken.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

59
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957
WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.
Jimenez B. Buendia for appellant.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafel A. Jose for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance
of Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao.
He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from
1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife
engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot
a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon
his release from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately
and later executed a document (Annex A ) liquidating their conjugal
partnership and assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her
share. The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation
agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that the
defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their
remedy as might be just and equitable.
Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in
default, for failure to answer in due time, despite service of summons; and
directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to—
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code,
whether or not a collusion exists between the parties and to
report to this Court the result of his investigation within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of copy of this order. The City Fiscal or his
representative is also directed to intervene in the case in behalf of
the State. (Rec. App. p. 9).
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and
cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions (strenuously objected to by
Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived
maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her.
Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation
asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established,
Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right
of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code, providing:
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of
consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall
cause the dismissal of the petition.
that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action
had prescribed under Article 102 of the same Code:
ART. 102 An action for legal separation cannot be filed except
within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after
date when such cause occurred.
since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945
but only filed action in 1945.
Brown appeared to this Court, assigning the following errors:
The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of
Manila to act as counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.
The court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or
consent to the adultery.
60
 The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his
marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his wife, the Assistant Fiscal
acted as consel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of the
prosecuting officer is limited to finding out whether or not there is
collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar,
to intervene for the state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth
of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao, the defendant-
appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state.".
The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act
of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by
preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure,
in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedia
Law Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it was
legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give
rise to the inference that the wife's default was calculated, or agreed upon,
to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought
without regard to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is
obviously the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his
wife, since it bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision
of Article 100 of the new Civil Code. Wherefore, such evidence of such
misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be
considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention
of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal
separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation
or interruption cannot be made depend upon the parties themselves (Civil
Code, Article 52; Adong vs, Cheong Gee, 43 Phil, 43; Ramirez vs. Gmur 42
Phil. 855; Goitia vs. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy
that the injury by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant
matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or
annulment are fully justified or not.
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action
was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which
was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the
new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within
one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and
within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.
Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings
and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense.
Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions
seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve
public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued
if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for
denying the remedy sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner
and prescription of the action), it becomes unnecesary to delve further
into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also evidences
condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation
would not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second
assignment of error.
The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others
must necessarily fail with them.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.
Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
61
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, EMELDA C.
PACETE, EVELINA C. PACETE and EDUARDO C. PACETE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and CONCEPCION (CONCHITA)
ALANIS PACETE, respondents.
Juan G. Sibug and Rodolfo B. Quiachon for petitioners.
Julio F. Andres, Jr. for private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
The issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cotabato, Branch I, in Cotabato
City, gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file their answer in Civil Case No. 2518,
in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision of 17
March 1980 which, among other things, decreed the legal separation of
petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent Concepcion Alanis and
held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita
de la Concepcion.
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as
well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and
separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was
married to Pacete on 30 April 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of
Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo who was born
on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North
Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that
during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting
of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he
fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and
Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;"
that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that
reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979.
They filed a motion for an extension of twenty (20) days from 30
November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court granted the
motion. On 18 December 1979, appearing through a new counsel, the
defendants filed a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30)
days from 20 December 1979. On 07 January 1980, the lower court
granted the motion but only for twenty (20) days to be counted from 20
December 1979 or until 09 January 1980. The Order of the court was
mailed to defendants' counsel on 11 January 1980. Likely still unaware of
the court order, the defendants, on 05 February 1980, again filed another
motion (dated 18 January 1980) for an extension of "fifteen (15) days
counted from the expiration of the 30-day period previously sought"
within which to file an answer. The following day, or on 06 February 1980,
the court denied this last motion on the ground that it was "filed after the
original period given . . . as first extension had expired."1
The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default,
which the court forthwith granted. The plaintiff was then directed to
present her evidence.2 The court received plaintiff's evidence during the
hearings held on 15, 20, 21 and 22 February 1980.
On 17 March 1980, the court3 promulgated the herein questioned
decision, disposing of the case, thus —
WHEREFORE, order is hereby issued ordering:
1. The issuance of a Decree of Legal Separation of the
marriage between, the plaintiff, Concepcion (Conchita)
Alanis Pacete and the herein defendants, Enrico L. Pacete,
62
in accordance with the Philippine laws and with
consequences, as provided for by our laws;
2. That the following properties are hereby declared as the
conjugal properties of the partnership of the plaintiff,
Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and the defendant,
Enrico L. Pacete, half and half, to wit:
1. The parcel of land covered by TCT No. V-815 which is a
parcel of land situated in the barrio of Langcong,
Municipality of Matanog (previously of Parang), province
of Maguindanao (previously of Cotabato province) with an
area of 45,265 square meters registered in the name of
Enrico Pacete, Filipino, of legal age, married to Conchita
Alanis as shown in Exhibits "B" and "B-1" for the plaintiff.
2. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-20442, with an area of 538 square meters and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 2650 (74) in the name of
Enrico Pacete, situated in the Poblacion of Kidapawan,
North Cotabato, together with all its improvements, which
parcel of land, as shown by Exhibits "K-1" was acquired by
way of absolute deed of sale executed by Amrosio Mondog
on January 14, 1965.
3. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-20424 and covered by Tax Declaration No. 803 (74),
with an area of 5.1670 hectares, more or less, as shown by
Exhibit "R", the same was registered in the name of Enrico
Pacete and the same was acquired by Enrico Pacete last
February 17, 1967 from Ambag Ampoy, as shown by
Exhibit "R-1", situated at Musan, Kidapawan, North
Cotabato.
4. A parcel of land situated at Lanao, Kidapawan, North
Cotabato, with an area of 5.0567 hectares, covered by Tax
Declaration No. 4332 (74), as shown by Exhibit "S", and
registered in the name of Enrico Pacete.
5. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-9750, situated at Lika, Mlang, North Cotabato, with
an area of 4.9841 hectares and the same is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 803 (74) and registered in the name of
Enrico Pacete and which land was acquired by Enrico
Pacete from Salvador Pacete on September 24, 1962, as
shown by Exhibit "Q-1".
6. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-9944, with an area of 9.9566 and also covered by
Tax Declaration No. 8608 (74) and registered in the name
of the defendant Enrico L. Pacete which Enrico L. Pacete
acquired from Sancho Balingcos last October 22, 1962, as
shown by Exhibit "L-1" and which parcel of land is situated
at (Kialab), Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato.
7. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-9227, situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato,
with an area of 12.04339 hectares, more or less, and also
covered by Tax Declaration No. 8607 (74) both in the
name of the defendant Enrico L. Pacete which he acquired
last October 15, 1962 from Minda Bernardino, as shown
by Exhibit "M-1".
8. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-9228, situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato,
with an area of 10.8908 hectares, registered in the name
of Enrico Pacete and also covered by Tax Declaration No.
5781 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete and which parcel
of land he acquired last September 25, 1962 from Conchita
dela Torre, as shown by Exhibit "P-1".
9. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-10301, situated at Linao, Matalam, North Cotabato,
with an area of 7.2547 hectares, registered in the name of
Enrico Pacete and also covered by Tax Declaration No.
8716 (74) also in the name of Enrico Pacete which Enrico
Pacete acquired from Agustin Bijo last July 16, 1963, as
shown by Exhibit "N-1".
63
10. A parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 12728 in the name of the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete,
with an area of 10.9006 hectares, situated at Linao,
Matalam, North Cotabato and is also covered by Tax
Declaration No. 5745 (74) in the name of Enrico Pacete, as
shown on Exhibit "O" and which Enrico Pacete acquired
last December 31, 1963 from Eliseo Pugni, as shown on
Exhibit "0-1".
3. Ordering the Cancellation of Original Certificate of Title
No. P-34243 covering Lot No. 1066, issued in the name of
Evelina Pacete, situated at Kiab, Matalam, North Cotabato,
and ordering the registration of the same in the joint name
of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L.
Pacete as their conjugal property, with address on the part
of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete at Parang,
Maguindanao and on the part of Enrico L. Pacete at
Kidapawan, North Cotabato.
4. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate
of Title No. V-20101, covering Lot No. 77, in the name of
Eduardo C. Pacete, situated at New Lawaan, Mlang, North
Cotabato, and the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of
Title in the joint name of (half and half) Concepcion
(Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete.
5. Ordering likewise the cancellation of Original Certificate
of Title No. P-29890, covering Lot 1068, situated at Kiab,
Matalam, North Cotabato, with an area of 12.1031
hectares, in the name of Emelda C. Pacete and the issuance
of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the joint name (half
and half) of Concepcion (Conchita) Alanis Pacete and
Enrico L. Pacete; and declaring that the fishpond situated
at Barrio Tumanan, Bislig, Surigao Del Sur, with an area of
48 hectares and covered by Fishpond Lease Agreement of
Emelda C. Pacete, dated July 29, 1977 be cancelled and in
lieu thereof, the joint name of Concepcion (Conchita)
Alanis Pacete and her husband, Enrico L. Pacete, be
registered as their joint property, including the 50
hectares fishpond situated in the same place, Barrio
Timanan, Bislig, Surigao del Sur.
6. Ordering the following motor vehicles to be the joint
properties of the conjugal partnership of Concepcion
(Conchita) Alanis Pacete and Enrico L. Pacete, viz:
a. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-783; Make, Dodge;
Motor No. T137-20561; Chassis No. 83920393, and Type,
Mcarrier;
b. Motor vehicle with Plate No. T-RG-784; Make, Dodge;
Motor No. T214-229547; Chassis No. 10D-1302-C; and
Type, Mcarrier;
c. Motor vehicle with Plate No. J-PR-818; Make, Ford;
Motor No. GRW-116188; Chassis No. HOCC-GPW-1161-
88-C; Type, Jeep;
d. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-583; Make, Ford:
Motor No. F70MU5-11111; Chassis No. HOCC-GPW-
1161188-G; Type, Stake;
e. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-584; Make, Hino;
Motor No. ED300-45758; Chassis No. KB222-22044; Type,
Stake; and
f. Motor vehicle with Plate No. TH-5J-585; Make, Ford:
Motor No. LTC-780-Dv; Chassis No. 10F-13582-K; Type,
Stake.
7. Ordering the defendant Enrico L. Pacete to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P46,950.00 which is the share of the
plaintiff in the unaccounted income of the ricemill and
corn sheller for three years from 1971 to 1973.
64
 8. Ordering the defendant, Enrico L. Pacete, to reimburse
the plaintiff the monetary equipment of 30% of whether
the plaintiff has recovered as attorney's fees;
9. Declaring the subsequent marriage between defendant
Enrico L. Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion to be void ab
initio; and
10. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of this suit.4
Hence, the instant special civil action of certiorari.
Under ordinary circumstances, the petition would have outrightly been
dismissed, for, as also pointed out by private respondents, the proper
remedy of petitioners should have instead been either to appeal from the
judgment by default or to file a petition for relief from judgment.5 This
rule, however, is not inflexible; a petition for certiorari is allowed when
the default order is improperly declared, or even when it
is properly declared, where grave abuse of discretion attended such
declaration.6 In these exceptional instances, the special civil action
of certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is available.7 In
the case at bench, the default order unquestionably is not legally
sanctioned. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for the
plaintiff is not fabricated.
The provision has been taken from Article 30 of the California Civil
Code,8 and it is, in substance, reproduced in Article 60 of the Family Code.9
Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should easily
explain the mandatory tenor of the law. In Brown v. Yambao, 10 the Court
has observed:
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for
the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract;
that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested, so that its continuation or interruption can not
be made to depend upon the parties themselves (Civil
Code, Article 52; Adong vs. Cheong Gee, 43 Phil. 43;
Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Goitia v. Campos, 35 Phil.
252). It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by
the Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant
matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for
separation or annulment are fully justified or not.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,"
obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further
underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or
for legal separation. — If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State
in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
65
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage
to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the
marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within
the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal
separation. 11 That other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have
likewise been sought in the same action cannot dispense, nor excuse
compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the

proceedings below, including the Decision of 17 March 1980 appealed
from, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

66
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO
LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review
by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case
for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff,
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case,
abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order
was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased
plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased
and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they
were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30
September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife
continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had
no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she
discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok
at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order
that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio
S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with
several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-
claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated
according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their
respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed (the
respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9
and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular
accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of
her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for
legal separation"1 on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal
separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio
opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the
case.2 In the body of the order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss
and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of
whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court
resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the motion
was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the
order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the
petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was
given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed
for the affirmance of the said order.3
67
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio,
filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them after the court below
dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims
by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the
petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the
Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute
— for the lower court did not act on the motion for substitution) stated
the principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the
counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a
marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of
a legal separation suit to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which
is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has
acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page
22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim
to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and
separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the action for
legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the
counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while
the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before
final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does,
will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-
and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in
this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse
(and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by
providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis
moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for
divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs
cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse
takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244,
Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27,
1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933,
332.")4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the
sanction of law, and an action for divorce is a proceeding
brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that
relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the
absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the
parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that
death has settled the question of separation beyond all
controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both
over the persons of the parties to the action and of the
subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the
courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of
either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree,
abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2
Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of
Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830;
17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W.
817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659;
McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717;
Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and
maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses
shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation;
hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to
the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
68
 Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the
following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from
each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute
conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to
any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, without prejudice to the provisions of article
176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to
the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the
court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court
may appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from
inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending
spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be
revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property),
the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned
by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the
innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the
Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and
by their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to
conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not
a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section
17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action
through a substitute of the deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon
proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a
period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the
actions that survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of
the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be
brought against executor or administrator. No action upon
a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to
enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for
an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be
deemed fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death
of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are
mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before
the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation;
and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of
nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such
action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there
could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights
69
acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for
partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only
voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the
second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an
absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon
as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87,
paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should
be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have
resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided
in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and

Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,

Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

70
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17014 August 11, 1921
MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.
Fisher & DeWitt for appellant.
Powell & Hill for appellee.
STREET, J.:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the
bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with
a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and
wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from
their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from
her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to
induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to
compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a
dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and
that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred
by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to
leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in
turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation;
(2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the
cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant,
authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at
the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay to
the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant
in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the
usual formalities by appeal to this court.
The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached
the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that
his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and weighed
every line of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is
wholly untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a
disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and
to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that
have attended their married life. In view of the decision which we are to
pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the
resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a
reminder to either of the mistakes of the past; and we prefer to record the
fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of the spouses has
at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has given just cause to the
other to suspect illicit relations with any person. The tales of cruelty on
the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-
action, are in our opinion no more than highly colored versions of
personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from
time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart
from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must
therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home
was without sufficient justification in fact.
In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to
dispose first of the defendant's cross-complaint. To begin with, the
obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is
a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in
articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation
by the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance
of a divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce.
Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife is forced to leave
the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this
jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance
(Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay
the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing
such obligation, (Mercado vs. Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.)
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large
require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to
71
provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a
recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state which is
abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this
consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate
maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary
from the fault of the husband.
In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking
through the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held that an action
for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only be
sustained when the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151). That
imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a proceeding can
be maintained also appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12
Md., 294). In the State of South Carolina, where judicial divorces have
never been procurable on any ground, the Supreme court fully recognizes
the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance, where it
is impossible for her to continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but
the same court has more than once rejected the petition of the wife for
separate maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged
cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper
conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec.,
597; Boyd vs. Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)
Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the
English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where cruelty on the part of the
husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the
following eloquent words, — which are perhaps even more applicable in
a proceeding for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction where, as here, a
divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and
this, too, after the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution
for that crime. Said he:
That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of
the parties is admitted, but the question occurs, What is cruelty? .
..
What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be
admitted where they are not accompanied with bodily injury,
either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of
manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and
accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not
threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high
moral offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent
surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against
which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the
parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the
suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an
injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by
prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer
in silence. . . .
The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly
invoked. Humanity is the second virtue of courts, but undoubtedly
the first is justice. If it were a question of humanity simply, and of
humanity which confined its views merely to the happiness of the
present parties, it would be a question easily decided upon first
impressions. Every body must feel a wish to sever those who wish
to live separate from each other, who cannot live together with
any degree of harmony, and consequently with any degree of
happiness; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the
feelings, much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has
said that married persons shall not be legally separated upon the
mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. . . .
To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office
of a judge; but if it were, it would not be difficult to show that the
law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity
with that true wisdom, and that real humanity, that regards the
general interests of mankind. For though in particular cases the
repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial
cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individual, yet
it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the
married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people
understand that they must live together, except for a very few
reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual
accommodation that yoke which they know cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and good wives form the necessity of
72
 remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master
in teaching the duties which it imposes. . . . In this case, as in many
others, the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the
greater and more general good. (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35;
161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)
In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-
complaint is not well founded and none of the relief sought therein can be
granted.
The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint
conclusively prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing
to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under
an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and
cohabit with him. The only question which here arises is as to the
character and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him
by judicial decree.
The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal
rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part of the complaint that he is
entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to
return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the
precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in
unqualified terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for
contempt, in case she should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present
writer is aware, the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction
whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.
Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within
the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course
where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt,
may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights
of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the
experience of these countries where the court of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights
at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to
warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by
process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice
was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce
such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir
James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on
the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a
decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but
could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act
(1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of
disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for
the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so
far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a peremptory order
requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case
where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had
changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to
(Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code
of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in
the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of
enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to
have affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring
a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her
failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and
effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest
which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does not appear that this
73
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by
any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her
in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear
that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed
by imprisonment for contempt.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is

entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife
to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration
that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is
her duty to return.

Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the

original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez
de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient
cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is
absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to
costs of either instance. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

74
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the
claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed
"Escaño," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University
of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year
student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-
do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a
"sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez,
32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt.
Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate
that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel,
their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital
future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they
started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret
marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the
engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for
Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the
elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita
Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the
elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back
to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the
intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was
taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor.
Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked
for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal
that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06).
The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father
Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of
authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place,
because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming
from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter
to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta
and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter,
Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job
in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of
her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when
their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and
Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was
not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-
75
Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of
June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño").
Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for
her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her
marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was
dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a
passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her
purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she
intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she
left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint
for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court
of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a
decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the
said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of
Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10
September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh.
"D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran,
in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten
children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May
1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño,
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from
joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while
her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the
plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion
of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted
directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant
Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the
complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the
heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the
damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by
the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and
the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each
other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the
record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and
otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of
competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly
authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish
priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil
law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also
because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage
law in force at the time) expressly provided that —
76
 SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are
the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent.
(Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal
requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil
effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which
provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage
shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several
of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed,
the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person
who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so,
and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of
their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved
(Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448).
It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of
the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's
parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover,
the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment
and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage
she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to
have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for
argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's
consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage
remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never
done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First
Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved
under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was
issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She
was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that
term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast
to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of
divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV,
Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that
"the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a
foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a
patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view
of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in
a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign
divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn
abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
77
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez
should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the
policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance
of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court
originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union
to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It
follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her
denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a
wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging
immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell
Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an
invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of
this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our
laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not
recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became
effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding
absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject
prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of
1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of
these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular
interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it
results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated
in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance.
The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is
limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural
children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born
of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten
from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not
involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition
that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies
an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the
first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so
declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the
status of a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the
territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in
the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales,
58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands
are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of
the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature
if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such
laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr.
Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the
affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her
husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be
merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own
letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta,"
78
Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the
defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused
by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity"
[sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta,
and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been
accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good
manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents
of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the
previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the
marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto
Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That
the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to
assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided
by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections.
Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was
in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their
daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to
divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent
divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she
was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with
alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives,
which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law
distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in
the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction
between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for
alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct,
as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or
her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he
acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's
marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the
marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to
interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's
welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining
of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet
or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable
for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good
faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection
and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child
away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay
away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been
applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is
equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial
or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured
her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest
and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not
have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless
in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not
established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor
Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into
account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in
damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure
was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's
part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is
evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against
public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry
under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of
the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes
rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the
79
opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral
damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr.
Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the
same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have
wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same
could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in
present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in
the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of
any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court,
therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-
appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys'
fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by
way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed
after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled
to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to
the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a
person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal
separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one
consort entitles the other to recover damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one
consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives
on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of

legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

80
 Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE;

DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST
DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers
as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50
O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks
unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the
then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor
que han de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),
reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the
Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks
Republic of the Philippines to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by
SUPREME COURT Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such
Manila donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of
our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities
EN BANC attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.

G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971 2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE
WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of validity of
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee. not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between
81
him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962.
She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to
one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the
other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are
called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses
during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now
appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena,
maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without
benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was
void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that
it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained
the latter’s stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in
character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A
1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the
then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is
indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion
reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls
within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3
Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision must be
reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in
plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix
Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did
assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and
her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when
the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of
facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by
their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased
Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix
Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant,
Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20,
1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the
donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was
made during the common law relationship as husband and wife between the
defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done
were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena
died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the
property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of
the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in
1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon’"5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff.
It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil
Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the
donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on
February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet
married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only
when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers
as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals
decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the
old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the
Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato
amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter
virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
82
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion.
for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so Without pronouncement as to costs.
that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo,
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of
those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage Teehankee, J, took no part.
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike
demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage." 9

2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above

pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It
would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a
laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be
nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with
disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should
not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the
principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is
as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language
used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the
language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que
ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.’’ 10

3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant

Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in
the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff,
as the surviving sister, to the other half.11

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the
complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void,
with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the
property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court

83
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997
ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner,
vs.
CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA
CRUZ, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled "Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia)
Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz" dated June 22, 1994 involving the
ownership of two parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of
petitioner and private respondent's legitimate spouse.
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took
private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as a wife at the
Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the
wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's
only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in
1964 and during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn he stayed in
Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The
trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to
divorce Carlina in Hawaii.1 When he returned for good in 1972, he refused
to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his
second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein
petitioner.2 Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural
land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of 10,080
square meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736
covering said rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on
September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT No.
143120 covering said property was later issued in her name.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of
Donation as a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed
by the latter.3 The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal
property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia
Palang.4
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang,
born on December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint.5 Two years later, on February 15,
1981, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la
Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted the case at bar, an action for
recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-
4265). Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house
and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by
Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered
by TCT No. 101736 is registered in their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she
had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang.
She added that the house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole
property, having bought the same with her own money. Erlinda added
that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the
latter had already donated their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30,
1989 dismissing the complaint after declaring that there was little
evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal
property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to provide
84
for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher Palang,
Miguel's illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the decision reads.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered —
1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the
residential lot located at Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as
evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including the old house
standing therein;
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that
piece of agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters and as evidenced
by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay;
4. Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his
deceased father, Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the
agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736 in the name of Miguel Palang,
provided that the former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days
after this decision becomes final and executory, a quit-claim
forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation to
Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all conjugal properties of her
parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated
October 30, 1975, otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel Palang
will have to be settled in another separate action;
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. The Court
of Appeals rendered its decision on July 22, 1994 with the following
dispositive portion;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision in
hereby REVERSED and another one entered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in
question;
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the
properties in question to herein plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in lieu
thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs-
appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs.7
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the
validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland and the house
and lot, the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the
second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone. Second, petitioner contends that
respondent appellate court erred in not declaring Kristopher A. Palang as
Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel's
estate. Third, respondent court erred, according to petitioner, "in not
finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristopher A.
Palang or Christopher A. Palang should be considered as party-defendant
in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199.8
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent
provisions of law and jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition and
affirms the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property
subject of this action. Petitioner assails the validity of the deeds of
conveyance over the same parcels of land. There is no dispute that the
transfer of ownership from the original owners of the riceland and the
house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes, respectively,
were valid.
85
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and
Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family
Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973,
said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de
facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by
this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the
party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of
equal shares.9
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is
engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store10 but
failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the
subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance,
May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel
Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government.
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she
contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
property,11 there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before
Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought,
said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the
operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when
they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced,
we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before
they started living together. In any case, even assuming that the subject
property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership
would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the
purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis
to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the
riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the
conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private
respondent Carlina Palang.
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed
to donate their conjugal property in favor of their daughter Herminia in
1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their
compromise agreement "in effect partakes the nature of judicial
confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and the
termination of the conjugal partnership."12 Separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements.13 The judgment which resulted
from the parties' compromise was not specifically and expressly for
separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for
P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The
testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for
the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun
testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price
and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee.14
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but
one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law
because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage
at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover,
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition
against donations between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage,15 for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would
turn out to be better than those in legal union.16
86
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an
illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of
respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in making
pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch
as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of
illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and
claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a
special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated
in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and
possession."17

As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang

should be considered as party-defendant in the case at bar following the
trial court's decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been
impleaded as party defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the
court's jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad litem.18 The trial
court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was,
therefore, not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda cannot be
called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar.
Petitioner adds that there is no need for Kristopher to file another action
to prove that he is illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid multiplicity
of suits.19 Petitioner's grave error has been discussed in the preceding
paragraph where the need for probate proceedings to resolve the
settlement of Miguel's estate and Kristopher's successional rights has
been pointed out.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned

decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

87
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 23703 September 28, 1925
HILARIO GERCIO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE OF CANADA, ET AL., defendants.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE OF CANADA, appellant.
Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins and Brady and Jesus Trinidad for appellant.
Vicente Romualdez, Feria and La O and P. J. Sevilla for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The question of first impression in the law of life insurance to be here
decided is whether the insured — the husband — has the power to change
the beneficiary — the former wife — and to name instead his actual wife,
where the insured and the beneficiary have been divorced and where the
policy of insurance does not expressly reserve to the insured the right to
change the beneficiary. Although the authorities have been exhausted, no
legal situation exactly like the one before us has been encountered.
Hilario Gercio, the insured, is the plaintiff. The Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada, the insurer, and Andrea Zialcita, the beneficiary, are the
defendants. The complaint is in the nature of mandamus. Its purpose is to
compel the defendant Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada to change the
beneficiary in the policy issued by the defendant company on the life of
the plaintiff Hilario Gercio, with one Andrea Zialcita as beneficiary.
A default judgment was taken in the lower court against the defendant
Andrea Zialcita. The other defendant, the Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada, first demurred to the complaint and when the demurrer was
overruled, filed an answer in the nature of a general denial. The case was
then submitted for decision on an agreed statement of facts. The judgment
of the trial court was in favor of the plaintiff without costs, and ordered
the defendant company to eliminate from the insurance policy the name
of Andrea Zialcita as beneficiary and to substitute therefor such name as
the plaintiff might furnish to the defendant for that purpose.
The Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada has appealed and has assigned three
errors alleged to have been committed by the lower court. The appellee
has countered with a motion which asks the court to dismiss the appeal of
the defendant Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, with costs.
As the motion presented by the appellee and the first two errors assigned
by the appellant are preliminary in nature, we will pass upon the first.
Appellee argues that the "substantial defendant" was Andrea Zialcita, and
that since she was adjudged in default, the Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada has no interest in the appeal. It will be noticed, however, that the
complaint prays for affirmative relief against the insurance company. It
will be noticed further that it is stipulated that the insurance company has
persistently refused to change the beneficiary as desired by the plaintiff.
As the rights of Andrea Zialcita in the policy are rights which are
enforceable by her only against the insurance company, the defendant
insurance company will only be fully protected if the question at issue is
conclusively determined. Accordingly, we have decided not to accede to
the motion of the appellee and not to order the dismissal of the appeal of
the appellant.
This brings us to the main issue. Before, however, discussing its legal
aspects, it is advisable to have before us the essential facts. As they are
stipulated, this part of the decision can easily be accomplished.
On January 29, 1910, the Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada issued
insurance policy No. 161481 on the life of Hilario Gercio. The policy was
what is known as a twenty-year endowment policy. By its terms, the
insurance company agreed to insure the life of Hilario Gercio for the sum
of P/2,000, to be paid him on February 1, 1930, or if the insured should
die before said date, then to his wife, Mrs. Andrea Zialcita, should she
survive him; otherwise to the executors, administrators, or assigns of the
insured. The policy also contained a schedule of reserves, amounts in cash,
paid-up policies, and renewed insurance, guaranteed. The policy did not
include any provision reserving to the insured the right to change the
beneficiary.
88
On the date the policy was issued, Andrea Zialcita was the lawful wife of
Hilario Gercio. Towards the end of the year 1919, she was convicted of the
crime of adultery. On September 4, 1920, a decree of divorce was issued
in civil case no. 17955, which had the effect of completely dissolving the
bonds of matrimony contracted by Hilario Gercio and Andrea Zialcita.
On March 4, 1922, Hilario Gercio formally notified the Sun Life Assurance
Co. of Canada that he had revoked his donation in favor of Andrea Zialcita,
and that he had designated in her stead his present wife, Adela Garcia de
Gercio, as the beneficiary of the policy. Gercio requested the insurance
company to eliminate Andrea Zialcita as beneficiary. This, the insurance
company has refused and still refuses to do.
With all of these introductory matters disposed of and with the legal
question to the forefront, it becomes our first duty to determine what law
should be applied to the facts. In this connection, it should be remembered
that the insurance policy was taken out in 1910, that the Insurance Act.
No. 2427, became effective in 1914, and that the effort to change the
beneficiary was made in 1922. Should the provisions of the Code of
Commerce and the Civil Code in force in 1910, or the provisions of the
Insurance Act now in force, or the general principles of law, guide the
court in its decision?
On the supposition, first, that the Code of Commerce is applicable, yet
there can be found in it no provision either permitting or prohibiting the
insured to change the beneficiary.
On the supposition, next, that the Civil Code regulates insurance contracts,
it would be most difficult, if indeed it is practicable, to test a life insurance
policy by its provisions. Should the insurance contract, whereby the
husband names the wife as the beneficiary, be denominated a
donation inter vivos, a donation causa mortis, a contract in favor of a third
person, or an aleatory contract? The subject is further complicated by the
fact that if an insurance contract should be considered a donation, a
husband may then never insure his life in favor of his wife and vice versa,
inasmuch as article 1334 prohibits all donations between spouses during
marriage. It would seem, therefore, that this court was right when in the
case of Del Val vs. Del Val ([1915]), 29 Phil., 534), it declined to consider
the proceeds of the insurance policy as a donation or gift, saying "the
contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the
proceeds thereof is determined by special laws which deal exclusively
with that subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly
and specifically to life-insurance contracts or to the destination of life-
insurance proceeds. . . ." Some satisfaction is gathered from the
perplexities of the Louisiana Supreme Court, a civil law jurisdiction,
where the jurists have disagreed as to the classification of the insurance
contract, but have agreed in their conclusions as will hereafter see. (Re
Succession of Leone Desforges [1914], 52 L.R.A. [N.S.], 689; Lambert vs
Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia and L'Hote & Co.
[1898], 50 La. Ann., 1027.)
On the further supposition that the Insurance Act applies, it will be found
that in this Law, there is likewise no provision either permitting or
prohibiting the insured to change the beneficiary.
We must perforce conclude that whether the case be considered as of
1910, or 1914, or 1922, and whether the case be considered in the light of
the Code of Commerce, the Civil Code, or the Insurance Act, the
deficiencies in the law will have to be supplemented by the general
principles prevailing on the subject. To that end, we have gathered the
rules which follow from the best considered American authorities. In
adopting these rules, we do so with the purpose of having the Philippine
Law of Insurance conform as nearly as possible to the modern Law of
Insurance as found in the United States proper.
The wife has an insurable interest in the life of her husband. The
beneficiary has an absolute vested interest in the policy from the date of
its issuance and delivery. So when a policy of life insurance is taken out by
the husband in which the wife is named as beneficiary, she has a
subsisting interest in the policy. And this applies to a policy to which there
are attached the incidents of a loan value, cash surrender value, an
automatic extension by premiums paid, and to an endowment policy, as
well as to an ordinary life insurance policy. If the husband wishes to retain
to himself the control and ownership of the policy he may so provide in
the policy. But if the policy contains no provision authorizing a change of
beneficiary without the beneficiary's consent, the insured cannot make
such change. Accordingly, it is held that a life insurance policy of a
89
husband made payable to the wife as beneficiary, is the separate property
of the beneficiary and beyond the control of the husband.
As to the effect produced by the divorce, the Philippine Divorce Law, Act
No. 2710, merely provides in section 9 that the decree of divorce shall
dissolve the community property as soon as such decree becomes final.
Unlike the statutes of a few jurisdictions, there is no provision in the
Philippine Law permitting the beneficiary in a policy for the benefit of the
wife of the husband to be changed after a divorce. It must follow,
therefore, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, that if a policy is
taken out upon a husband's life the wife is named as beneficiary therein,
a subsequent divorce does not destroy her rights under the policy.
These are some of the pertinent principles of the Law of Insurance. To
reinforce them, we would, even at the expense of clogging the decision
with unnecessary citation of authority, bring to notice certain decisions
which seem to us to have controlling influence.
To begin with, it is said that our Insurance Act is mostly taken from the
statute of California. It should prove of interest, therefore, to know the
stand taken by the Supreme Court of that State. A California decision oft
cited in the Cyclopedias is Yore vs. Booth ([1895]), 110 Cal., 238; 52 Am.
St. Rep., 81), in which we find the following:
. . . It seems to be the settled doctrine, with but slight dissent in the
courts of this country, that a person who procures a policy upon
his own life, payable to a designated beneficiary, although he pays
the premiums himself, and keeps the policy in his exclusive
possession, has no power to change the beneficiary, unless the
policy itself, or the charter of the insurance company, so provides.
In policy, although he has parted with nothing, and is simply the
object of another's bounty, has acquired a vested and irrevocable
interest in the policy, which he may keep alive for his own benefit
by paying the premiums or assessments if the person who effected
the insurance fails or refuses to do so.
As carrying great weight, there should also be taken into account two
decisions coming from the Supreme Court of the United States. The first
of these decisions, in point of time, is Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Company vs Schaefer ([1877]), 94 U.S., 457). There, Mr. Justice Bradley,
delivering the opinion of the court, in part said:
This was an action on a policy of the court, in part said: July 25,
1868, on the joint lives of George F. and Francisca Schaefer, then
husband and wife, payable to the survivor on the death of either.
In January, 1870, they were divorced, and alimony was decreed
and paid to the wife, and there was never any issue of the
marriage. They both subsequently married again, after which, in
February, 1871, George F. Schaefer died. This action was brought
by Francisca, the survivor.
xxx xxx xxx
The other point, relating to the alleged cessation of insurable
interest by reason of the divorce of the parties, is entitled to more
serious consideration, although we have very little difficulty in
disposing of it.
It will be proper, in the first place, to ascertain what is an insurable
interest. It is generally agreed that mere wager policies, that is,
policies in which the insured party has no interest in its loss or
destruction, are void, as against public policy. . . . But precisely
what interest is necessary, in order to take a policy out of the
category of mere wager, has been the subject of much discussion.
In marine and fire insurance the difficulty is not so great, because
there insurance is considered as strictly an indemnity. But in life
insurance the loss can seldom be measured by pecuniary values.
Still, an interest of some sort in the insured life must exist. A man
cannot take out insurance on the life of a total stranger, nor on that
of one who is not so connected with him as to make the
continuance of the life a matter of some real interest to him.
It is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own
life and in that of his wife and children; a woman in the life of her
husband; and the creditor in the life of his debtor. Indeed it may
be said generally that any reasonable expectation of pecuniary
benefit or advantage from the continued life of another creates an
insurable interest in such life. And there is no doubt that a man
90
 may effect an insurance on his own life for the benefit of a relative
or fried; or two or more persons, on their joint lives, for the benefit
of the survivor or survivors. The old tontines were based
substantially on this principle, and their validity has never been
called in question.
xxx xxx xxx
The policy in question might, in our opinion, be sustained as a joint
insurance, without reference to any other interest, or to the
question whether the cessation of interest avoids a policy good at
its inception. We do not hesitate to say, however, that a policy
taken out in good faith and valid at its inception, is not avoided by
the cessation of the insurable interest, unless such be the
necessary effect of the provisions of the policy itself. . . .
. . . .In our judgment of life policy, originally valid, does not cease
to be so by the cessation of the assured party's interest in the life
insured.
Another controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court is that of
the Central National Bank of Washington City vs. Hume ([1888], 128 U.S.,
134). Therein, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, as the organ of the court,
announced the following doctrines:
We think it cannot be doubted that in the instance of contracts of
insurance with a wife or children, or both, upon their insurable
interest in the life of the husband or father, the latter, while they
are living, can exercise no power of disposition over the same
without their consent, nor has he any interest therein of which he
can avail himself; nor upon his death have his personal
representatives or his creditors any interest in the proceeds of
such contracts, which belong to the beneficiaries to whom they
are payable.
It is indeed the general rule that a policy, and the money to become
due under it, belong, the moment it is issued, to the person or
persons named in it as the beneficiary or beneficiaries, and that
there is no power in the person procuring the insurance, by any
act of his, by deed or by will, to transfer to any other person the
interest of the person named.
A jurisdiction which found itself in somewhat the same situation as the
Philippines, because of having to reconcile the civil law with the more
modern principles of insurance, is Louisiana. In a case coming before the
Federal Courts, In re Dreuil & Co. ([1915]), 221 Fed., 796), the facts were
that an endowment insurance policy provided for payment of the amount
thereof at the expiration of twenty years to the insured, or his executors,
administrators, or assigns, with the proviso that, if the insured die within
such period, payment was to be made to his wife if she survive him. It was
held that the wife has a vested interest in the policy, of which she cannot
be deprived without her consent. Foster, District Judge, announced:
In so far as the law of Louisiana is concerned, it may also be
considered settled that where a policy is of the semitontine
variety, as in this case, the beneficiary has a vested right in the
policy, of which she cannot be deprived without her consent.
(Lambert vs Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann., 1027; 24 South.,
16.) (See in same connection a leading decision of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, Re Succession of Leonce Desforges, [1914], 52
L.R.A. [N.S.], 689.)
Some question has arisen as to the power of the insured to destroy the
vested interest of the beneficiary in the policy. That point is well covered
in the case of Entwistle vs. Travelers Insurance Company ([1902], 202 Pa.
St., 141). To quote:
. . . The interest of the wife was wholly contingent upon her
surviving her husband, and she could convey no greater interest
in the policy than she herself had. The interest of the children of
the insured, which was created for them by the contract when the
policy was issued; vested in them at the same time that the
interest of the wife became vested in her. Both interests were
contingent. If the wife die before the insured, she will take nothing
under the policy. If the insured should die before the wife, then the
children take nothing under the policy. We see no reason to
discriminate between the wife and the children. They are all
payees, under the policy, and together constitute the assured.
91
 The contingency which will determine whether the wife, or the
children as a class will take the proceeds, has not as yet happened;
all the beneficiaries are living, and nothing has occurred by which
the rights of the parties are in any way changed. The provision that
the policy may be converted into cash at the option of the holder
does not change the relative rights of the parties. We agree
entirely with the suggestion that "holder" or "holders", as used in
this connection, means those who in law are the owners of the
policy, and are entitled to the rights and benefits which may
accrue under it; in other words, all the beneficiaries; in the present
case, not only the wife, by the children of the insured. If for any
reason, prudence required the conversion of the policy into cash,
a guardian would have no special difficulty in reasonable
protecting the interest of his wards. But however that may be, it is
manifest that the option can only be exercised by those having the
full legal interest in the policy, or by their assignee. Neither the
husband, nor the wife, nor both together had power to destroy the
vested interest of the children in the policy.
The case most nearly on all fours with the one at bar is that of Wallace vs
Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. ([1906], 97 Minn., 27; 3 L.R.A. [N.S.],
478). The opinion there delivered also invokes added interest when it is
noted that it was written by Mr. Justice Elliott, the author of a text on
insurance, later a member of this court. In the Minnesota case cited, one
Wallace effected a "twenty-year endowment" policy of insurance on his
life, payable in the event of his death within twenty years to Emma G.
Wallace, his wife, but, if he lived, to himself at the end of twenty years. If
Wallace died before the death of his wife, within the twenty years, the
policy was payable to the personal representatives of the insured. During
the pendency of divorce proceedings, the parties signed a contract by
which Wallace agreed that, if a divorce was granted to Mrs. Wallace, the
court might award her certain specified property as alimony, and Mrs.
Wallace agreed to relinquish all claim to any property arising out of the
relation of husband and wife. The divorce was granted. An action was
brought by Wallace to compel Mrs. Wallace to relinquish her interest in
the insurance policy. Mr. Justice Elliott said:
As soon as the policy was issued Mrs. Wallace acquired a vested
interest therein, of which she could not be deprived without her
consent, except under the terms of the contract with the insurance
company. No right to change the beneficiary was reserved. Her
interest in the policy was her individual property, subject to be
divested only by her death, the lapse of time, or by the failure of
the insured to pay the premiums. She could keep the policy alive
by paying the premiums, if the insured did not do so. It was
contingent upon these events, but it was free from the control of
her husband. He had no interest in her property in this policy,
contingent or otherwise. Her interest was free from any claim on
the part of the insured or his creditors. He could deprive her of her
interest absolutely in but one way, by living more than twenty
years. We are unable to see how the plaintiff's interest in the
policy was primary or superior to that of the husband. Both
interests were contingent, but they were entirely separate and
distinct, the one from the other. The wife's interest was not
affected by the decree of court which dissolved the marriage
contract between the parties. It remains her separate property,
after the divorce as before. . .
. . . . The fact that she was his wife at the time the policy was issued
may have been, and undoubtedly was, the reason why she was
named as beneficiary in the event of his death. But her property
interest in the policy after it was issued did not in any reasonable
sense arise out of the marriage relation.
Somewhat the same question came before the Supreme Court of Kansas
in the leading case of Filley vs. Illinois Life Insurance Company ([1914]), 91
Kansas, 220; L.R.A. [1915 D], 130). It was held, following consideration
extending to two motions for rehearing, as follows:
The benefit accruing from a policy of life insurance upon the life
of a married man, payable upon his death to his wife, naming her,
is payable to the surviving beneficiary named, although she may
have years thereafter secured a divorce from her husband, and he
was thereafter again married to one who sustained the relation of
wife to him at the time of his death.
The rights of a beneficiary in an ordinary life insurance policy
become vested upon the issuance of the policy, and can thereafter,
92
 during the life of the beneficiary, be defeated only as provided by
the terms of the policy.
If space permitted, the following corroborative authority could also be
taken into account: Joyce, The Law of Insurance, second edition, vol. 2, pp.
1649 et seq.; 37 Corpus Juris, pp. 394 et seq.; 14 R.C.L., pp. 1376 et
seq.; Green vs. Green ([1912], 147 Ky., 608; 39 L.R.A. [N.S.],
370); Washington Life Insurance Co. vs. Berwald ([1903], 97 Tex.,
111); Begley vs. Miller ([1907]), 137 Ill., App., 278); Blum vs. New York L.
Ins. Co. ([1906], 197 Mo., 513; 8 L.R.A. [N.S.], 923; Union Central Life Ins.
Co. vs. Buxer ([1900], 62 Ohio St., 385; 49 L.R.A., 737); Griffith vs. New York
Life Ins. Co. ([1894], 101 Cal., 627; 40 Am. St. Rep., 96); Preston vs. Conn.
Mut. L. Ins. Co. of Hartford ([1902]); 95 Md., 101); Snyder vs. Supreme Ruler
of Fraternal Mystic Circle ([1909], 122 Tenn. 248; 45 L.R.A. [N.S.],
209); Lloyd vs. Royal Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. ([1917], 245 Fed., 162); Phoenix
Mut. L. Ins. Co. vs. Dunham ([1878], 46 Conn., 79; 33 Am. Rep., 14); McKee
vs. Phoenix Ins. Co. ([1859], 28 Mo., 383; 75 Am. Rep., 129); Supreme
Council American Legion of Honor vs. Smith and Smith ([1889], 45 N.J. Eq.,
466); Overhiser vs. Overhiser ([1900], 63 Ohio St., 77; 81 Am. St. Rep., 612;
50 L.R.A., 552); Condon vs. New York Life Insurance Co. ([1918], 183 Iowa,
658); with which compare Foster vs. Gile ([1880], 50 Wis., 603) and Hatch
vs. Hatch ([1904], 35 Tex. Civ. App., 373).
I agree with the majority of the court, that the judgment of the lower court
should be revoked, but for a different reason. In my judgment, the
question presented by the plaintiff is purely an academic one. The
purpose of the petition is to have declared the rights of certain persons in
an insurance policy which is not yet due and payable. It may never become
due and payable. The premiums may not be paid, thereby rendering the
contract of insurance of non-effect, and many other things may occur,
before the policy becomes due, which would render it non effective. The
plaintiff and the other parties who are claiming an interest in said policy
should wait until there is something due them under the same. For the
courts to declare now who are the persons entitled to receive the amounts
due, if they ever become due and payable, is impossible, for the reason
that nothing may ever become payable under the contract of insurance,
and for many reasons such persons may never have a right to receive
anything when the policy does become due and payable. In my judgment,
the action is premature and should have been dismissed.

On the admitted facts and the authorities supporting the nearly

universally accepted principles of insurance, we are irresistibly led to the
conclusion that the question at issue must be answered in the negative.

The judgment appealed from will be reversed and the complaint ordered
dismissed as to the appellant, without special pronouncement as to the
costs in either instance. So ordered.

Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Avanceña, C.J., concurs in the result.
Romualdez, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

JOHNSON, J., concurring in the result.

93
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29593 December 29, 1928
PAULINA GARCIA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO SANGUIL, ALEJANDRO SANGUIL and SIXTO
JOAQUIN, defendants-appellants.
Salvador Barrios for appellant Joaquin.
Bautista and Bautista for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
It appears from the record that until June 13, 1923, Alejandro and Roberto
Sanguil and one Jose Flores were the owners of the rice mill, the letter
having invested P4,500 in the mill and each of the others having
contributed P10,500. On the date mentioned, Alejandro Sanguil executed
a deed of donation, absolute and irrevocable, of his share in the rice mill
in favor of the plaintiff. Subsequent thereto, but on the same day,
Alejandro and the plaintiff were married. The marriage did not prove a
success, and in January, 1925, the spouses separated. Roberto Sanguil was
then the manager of the rice mill, and the plaintiff made demand upon him
for her share of the profits of the business, but Roberto refused to comply
with her demand, and the plaintiff thereupon brought the present action
for the dissolution of the partnership and for an accounting of its profits
from June 13, 1923. At the same she brought another action against
Alejandro Sanguil for a maintenance allowance, and by an order issued on
March 30, 1925, Alejandro was ordered to pay P30 a month for her
maintenance pendente lite. On August 20, 1925, the defendant Sixto
Joaquin brought an action against Alejandro Sanguil on a promissory note
for P15,000, and six days later Alejandro filed an answer, which in effect
amounted to a confession of judgment, and consequently the Court of First
Instance rendered such judgment upon the pleadings. Execution was
thereupon levied on the property of Alejandro Sanguil as well as on the
share of the herein plaintiff in the rice mill, and at the execution sale the
property levied upon was bid in by Joaquin.
Upon trial of the present case the court below rendered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and held that by virtue of the donation made on June 13,
1923, she was the absolute and exclusive owner of the share in the rice
mill mentioned in the donation and that she was entitled to the dividends
and profits of the share from the date of the filing of the complaint; that
the said share was parephernal property of the plaintiff; and that the sale
of the aforesaid share, under the execution levied in the action brought by
Sixto Joaquin, was null and void. It was therefore ordered that the
defendant Roberto Sanguil, as manager of the rice mill, should within the
period of fifteen days after the decision became final, present the accounts
of the profits and losses resulting from the operation of the rice mill
subsequent to January 31, 1925, in which account the dividends and
profits delivered to Alejandro Sanguil and Sixto Joaquin from said date
should be specified for the purpose of determining the sums due the
plaintiff. The court further ordered Alejandro Sanguil to pay the costs of
the action. From this judgment all of the defendants appealed.
The appellants' principal contention is that the donation above-
mentioned was made during the marriage of the spouses and that it
therefore is null and void under article 1334 of the Civil Code. The deed of
donation has not been forwarded to this court, and, in determining the
question, we must therefore rely on the findings of the court below upon
that point. In this decision the court says:
As a question of fact, the court finds that a preponderance of the
evidence shows that the deed of donation was executed moments
before the celebration of the civil marriage on June 13, 1923. In
said document, Alejandro Sanguil states that he is widower, and it
also appears therein that Paulina Garcia is unmarried and 22
years of age; that Alejandro Sanguil was a shareholder in the rice
mill question to the extent of P10,500; and that Paulina Garcia,
having agreed to accept Alejandro Sanguil as husband, that it to
say reason of the union agreed upon, the said Alejandro Sanguil
made donation absolute and irrevocable to his future wife of all
the rights, shares, interest, and utility in the rice mill in question.
94
Upon the facts so found, it is clear that the donation was executed before
he marriage and that therefore article 1334 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to the case. As a donation by reason of marriage, it is governed
by the provisions of articles 1327-1333 of said Code. Article 1393 cited by
the appellant has, as far as we can see, no bearing upon the question; that
article relates to conjugal property and does not prohibit donations by
reason of marriage. The other contentions of the appellants deserved no
discussion.

The appealed judgment is affirmed with the costs against the appellants
jointly and severally. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.

95
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 102726 May 27, 1994
TSHIATE L. UY and RAMON UY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD CALAUNAN-UY, and THE
ESTATE OF MENILO B. UY, SR., REPRESENTED BY MENILO C. UY, JR.,
NILDA C. UY, MELVIN C. UY and MERLITO C. UY, respondents.
Abad, Santos and Associates for petitioners.
Cristino C. Abasolo and Jose C. Cordova for Natividad Calaunan-Uy.
VITUG, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision, dated
23 September 1991, of respondent Court of Appeals, which has reversed
the questioned order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati, Metro
Manila.
The facts, hereunder recited, are culled from the findings of the Court of
Appeals.
Private respondent Natividad Calaunan-Uy was the common-law wife of
the late Menilo B. Uy, Sr., for about thirty-six (36) years. Their union bore
four children — Melito, Jr., Nilda, Melvin and Merlito — all surnamed Uy.
On
31 October 1990, soon after the death of Menilo Uy, Sr., herein petitioners
Tshiate Uy and Ramon Uy initiated before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 65, Makati, Metro Manila. Special Proceedings No. M-2606,
entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Letters of Administration of the
Estate of Menilo B. Uy, Sr." On 28 February 1991, private respondent filed
a motion to hold the special proceedings in abeyance. The day before, or
on 27 February 1991, private respondent filed with the RTC, Branch 58,
Makati, Civil Case No. 91-573 for "Partition of Properties Under Co-
ownership," against the Estate of Menilo Uy, Sr. (supposedly represented
by their four children).
On the day of trial in Civil Case No. 91-573, or on 23 April 1991, the parties,
upon the suggestion of the trial court, submitted a Compromise
Agreement. On 24 April 1991, a judgment, based on that compromise, was
rendered, and a writ of execution was issued on 15 May 1991. On 24 May
1991, petitioner Tshiate Uy filed an omnibus motion, alleging that by
virtue of a Hong Kong marriage, she was the surviving legal spouse of
Menilo, Sr. She prayed that she and her son Ramon Uy be allowed to
intervene in the civil case, submitting at the same time their answer in
intervention. The intervenors contended, among other things, that the
judgment upon the compromise was a patent nullity. On 10 June 1991, the
trial court issued an order allowing the intervention and setting aside the
"compromise judgment." Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration; it was denied by the trial court in its order of 08 July
1991. A petition for certiorari was filed with respondent appellate court,
which, on 23 September 1991, promulgated its decision, the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the
orders of respondent court dated June 10, 1991 and July 8,
1991 are hereby SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1
A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
appellate court in its resolution of 06 November 1991.
On 02 January 1992, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed
with this Court, asserting that:
The finding and the conclusion of the respondent Court of
Appeals that Judge Zosimo Angeles of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 58, erred in setting aside the
Judgment by Compromise in Civil Case
No. 91-573 because the same was already final and in fact
96
 partly executed is contrary to law and jurisprudence to the
effect that a Judgment void
ab initio is non-existent and cannot acquire finality; and
The finding and conclusion of the respondent Court of
Appeals to the effect that the intervention of petitioner in
Civil Case No. 91-573 came too late is contrary to the
ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 93 SCRA 238.2
The appeal has merit.
The action for partition in Civil Case No. 91-573 is predicated on an
alleged co-ownership between private respondent Natividad Calaunan-
Uy and deceased Menilo, Sr., of property evidently acquired during the
period of their common-law relationship. The governing provisions,
applicable to their case, are now found in Article 147 and Article 148 of
the Family Code, considering that Menilo Uy, Sr., died on 27 September
1990, well after the effectivity of Executive Order No. 209 (The Family
Code of the Philippines) on 03 August 1988. Hence —
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry,
and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent
of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share
shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In
the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even
if both parties are in bad faith.
Parenthetically, closely intertwined with the legal questions posed by the
parties are factual issues which are yet to be determined in Special
97
Proceedings No.
M-2606 filed by herein petitioners.
Respondent Court of Appeals set aside the orders of the trial court on two
points: That —
(1) The intervention came too late, citing Section 2, Rule 12, of the Revised
Rules of Court; and
(2) The court a quo ignored the rule on finality of judgments.
Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Intervention. — A person may, before or during a
trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to
intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.
The case Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,3 may not be on all
fours to the case at bench but the rationale behind the decision
can well be applicable. Citing Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-
General,4 this Court held:
It is quite clear and patent that the motion for intervention
filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where
trial has already been concluded, a judgment thereon had
been promulgated in favor of private respondent and on
appeal by the losing party, the Director of Lands, the same
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant
petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already
submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are
obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period
prescribed under the aforecoded Section 2, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules
therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the
whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers
of the court fully and completely available for justice. The
purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper
aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder
and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing.
In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the
strict application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice
to, or the alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will
lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants,
to their successors-in-interest and to all purchasers for
value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud,
falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors'
claims be proven to be true. For it cannot be gainsaid that
if the petition for reconstitution is finally granted, the
chaos and confusion arising from a situation where the
certificates of title of the movants covering large areas of
land overlap or encroach on properties the title to which
is being sought to be reconstituted by private respondent,
who herself indicates in her Opposition that, according to
the Director of Lands, the overlapping embraces some 87
hectares only, is certain and inevitable. The aggregate area
of the property claimed by respondent covering Lot 1 and
Lot 2 is 1,435,062 sq. meters which is situated in a fast-
growing, highly residential sector of Metro Manila where
growth and development are in rapid progress to meet the
demands of an urbanized, exploding population.
Industries, factories, warehouses, plants, and other
commercial infrastructures are rising and spreading
within the area and the owners of these lands and the
valuable improvements thereon will not simply fold their
hands but certainly will seek judicial protection of their
98
 property rights or may even take the law into their own
hands, resulting to multiplicity of suits.

Section 7, Rule 3, of the Revised Rules of Court defines indispensable

parties to be "(p)arties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action . . . ." Even private respondents, in their complaint
in Civil Case No. 91-573, have acknowledged that petitioners "claim some
interest in the Estate of Menilo B. Uy, Sr."5 The trial court itself, in setting
aside its previous judgment upon compromise, has expressed "that the
intervenors have legal interest in the matter in litigation," a statement
which we find hard to brush aside. In the interest of adjudicating the
whole controversy, petitioners' inclusion in the action for partition, given
the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the
proper disposition of the case. It is a settled rule that without the presence
of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment of the court
cannot attain real finality.6

Private respondents argue that their failure to implead petitioners in the

complaint for partition has been cured by the filing of
petitioners' omnibus motion asking leave to intervene and attaching
thereto an answer in intervention. Private respondents overlook the fact
that the motion has been filed subsequent to the judgment based upon the
compromise agreement (among private respondents themselves) that did
not include, and thereby cannot be held to bind, petitioners7

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE

and a new one is entered REINSTATING the order, dated 10 June 1991, of
the trial court.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

99
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000
JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L.
JARDELEZA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals and its resolution denying reconsideration2 reversing that of the
Regional Trial Court, Iloilo, Branch 323 and declaring void the special
proceedings instituted therein by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda
L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose condition of her husband, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of the court, to dispose of their conjugal
property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and son in law, for the
ostensible purpose of "financial need in the personal, business and
medical expenses of her ‘incapacitated’ husband."
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza (herein respondent)
on the one hand, against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and
brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza (herein
petitioners) on the other hand. The controversy came about as a result of
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which
left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza
and husband of herein private respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
"Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior
Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on
June 6, 1991, filed a petition (Annex "A") before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City,
Branch 25, where it was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4689, in the
matter of the guardianship of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. The petitioner
averred therein that the present physical and mental incapacity of Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. prevent him from competently administering his
properties, and in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the
Jardelezas’ real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-
appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed therein
that Letters of Guardianship be issued in favor of herein private
respondent Gilda Ledesma Jardeleza, wife of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. It
was further prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third
persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the improvements thereon,
located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337.
"A few days later, or on June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza
herself filed a petition docketed as Special Proceeding NO. 4691, before
Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of
administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same
(Annex "B"). Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical
and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then confined for
intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctor’s Hospital. She
signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of administration
of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husband’s medical
treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to
several hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed
to sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its
improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell
said property.
"The following day, June 14, 1991, Branch 32 of the R.T.C. of Iloilo City
issued an Order (Annex "C") finding the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 to
be sufficient in form and substance, and setting the hearing thereof for
June 20, 1991. The scheduled hearing of the petition proceeded, attended
by therein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza, her counsel, her two children,
namely Ernesto Jardeleza, Jr., and Glenda Jardeleza Uy, and Dr. Rolando
Padilla, one of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s attending physicians.
100
"On that same day, June 20, 1991, Branch 32 of the RTC of Iloilo City
rendered its Decision (Annex "D"), finding that it was convinced that
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale of Lot No. 4291
and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting
expenses for treatment and Hospitalization. The said court also made the
pronouncement that the petition filed by Gilda L. Jardeleza was "pursuant
to Article 124 of the Family Code, and that the proceedings thereon are
governed by the rules on summary proceedings sanctioned under Article
253 of the same Code x x x.
"The said court then disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, there being factual and legal bases to the petition dated
June 13, 1991, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
"1) declaring Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., petitioner’s husband, to be
incapacitated and unable to participate in the administration of conjugal
properties;
"2) authorizing petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza to assume sole powers of
administration of their conjugal properties; and
"3) authorizing aforesaid petitioner to sell Lot No. 4291 of the Cadastral
Survey of Iloilo, situated in Iloilo City and covered by TCT No. 47337
issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza and the
buildings standing thereof.
"SO ORDERED.
"On June 24, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed his
Opposition to the proceedings before Branch 32 in Spec. Proc. Case No.
4691, said petitioner being unaware and not knowing that a decision has
already been rendered on the case by public respondent.
"On July 3, 1991, herein petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for
reconsideration of the judgment in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 and a motion for
consolidation of the two cases (Annex "F"). He propounded the argument
that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers
of administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was
essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with
the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the
Family Code. It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in
the Revised Rules of Court which require procedural due process,
particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. On the other
hand, even if Gilda Jardeleza’s petition can be prosecuted by summary
proceedings, there was still a failure to comply with the basic
requirements thereof, making the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a
defective one. He further alleged that under the New Civil Code, Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. had acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner, and that
these rights cannot be impaired or prejudiced without his consent.
Neither can he be deprived of his share in the conjugal properties through
mere summary proceedings. He then restated his position that Spec. Proc.
No. 4691 should be consolidated with Spec. Proc. No. 4689 which was filed
earlier and pending before Branch 25.
"Teodoro Jardeleza also questioned the propriety of the sale of Lot No.
4291 and the improvements thereon supposedly to pay the accumulated
financial obligations arising from Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s hospitalization.
He alleged that the market value of the property would be around Twelve
to Fifteen Million Pesos, but that he had been informed that it would be
sold for much less. He also pointed out that the building thereon which
houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s
industry, labor and service to his fellowmen. Hence, the said property has
a lot of sentimental value to his family. Besides, argued Teodoro Jardeleza,
then conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all financial
obligations. He mentioned that apart from sufficient cash, Jardeleza, Sr.
owned stocks of Iloilo Doctors’ Hospital which can be off-set against the
cost of medical and hospital bills. Furthermore, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on
installment basis. Moreover, two of Ernesto Jardeleza Sr.’s attending
physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for their
professional services.
"On July 4, 1991, Teodoro Jardeleza filed in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 a
supplement to his motion for reconsideration (Annex "G"). He reiterated
his contention that summary proceedings was irregularly applied. He also
101
noted that the provisions on summary proceedings found in Chapter 2 of
the Family Code comes under the heading on "Separation in Fact Between
Husband and Wife" which contemplates of a situation where both spouses
are of disposing mind. Thus, he argued that were one spouse is "comatose
without motor and mental faculties," the said provisions cannot be made
to apply.
"While the motion for reconsideration was pending, Gilda Jardeleza
disposed by absolute sale Lot No. 4291 and all its improvements to her
daughter, Ma. Glenda Jardeleza Uy, for Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000.00), as evidenced by a Deed Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1991
executed between them (p. 111, Rollo). Under date of July 23, 1991, Gilda
Jardeleza filed an urgent ex-parte motion for approval of the deed of
absolute sale.
"On August 12, 1991 Teodoro Jardeleza filed his Opposition to the motion
for approval of the deed of sale on the grounds that: (1) the motion was
prematurely filed and should be held in abeyance until the final resolution
of the petition; (2) the motion does not allege nor prove the justifications
for the sale; and (3) the motion does not allege that had Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr. been competent, he would have given his consent to the sale.
"Judge Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto of Branch 32 of the respondent
Court, who had penned the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 4691 had in the
meantime formally inhibited herself from further acting in this case
(Annex "I"). The case was then reraffled to Branch 28 of the said court.
"On December 19, 1991, the said court issued an Order (Annex "M")
denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and approving
respondent Jardeleza’s motion for approval of the deed of absolute sale.
The said court ruled that:
"After a careful and thorough perusal of the decision, dated June 20, 1991,
the Motion for Reconsideration, as well as its supplements filed by
"oppositor", Teodoro L. Jardeleza, through counsel, and the opposition to
the Motion for Reconsideration, including its supplements, filed by
petitioner, through counsel, this Court is of the opinion and so holds, that
her Honor, Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto, Presiding Judge of Branch
32, of this Court, has properly observed the procedure embodied under
Article 253, in relation to Article 124, of the Family Code, in rendering her
decision dated June 20, 1991.
"Also, as correctly stated by petitioner, through counsel, that "oppositor"
Teodor L. Jardeleza does not have the personality to oppose the instant
petition considering that the property or properties, subject of the
petition, belongs to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Ernesto and
Gilda Jardeleza, who are both still alive.
"In view thereof, the Motion for Reconsideration of "oppositor" Teodoro
L. Jardeleza, is hereby denied for lack of merit.
"Considering the validity of the decision dated June 20, 1991, which
among others, authorized Gilda L. Jardeleza to sell Lot No. 4291 of the
Cadastral Survey of Iloilo, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
47337 issued in the names of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., and Gilda L. Jardeleza
and the building standing thereon, the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Approval of Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 23, 1991, filed by petitioner,
through counsel, is hereby granted and the deed of absolute sale, executed
and notarized on July 8, 1991, by and between Gilda L. Jardeleza, as
vendor, and Ma. Glenda Jardeleza, as vendee, is hereby approved, and the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, is directed to register the sale and issue
the corresponding transfer certificate of title to the vendee.
"SO ORDERED."4
On December 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
reversing the appealed decision and ordering the trial court to dismiss the
special proceedings to approve the deed of sale, which was also declared
void.5
On December 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration,6 however, on March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion, finding no cogent and compelling reason to disturb the
decision.7
Hence, this appeal.8
102
The issue raised is whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of
Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular accident,
rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could
not manage their conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers
of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family
Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more
than twelve million pesos, with the approval of the court in a summary
proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for
the amount of eight million pesos.
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article
124 of the Family Code are not applicable. Because Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. was
unable to take care of himself and manage the conjugal property due to
illness that had rendered him comatose, the proper remedy was the
appointment of a judicial guardian of the person or estate or both of such
incompetent, under Rule 93, Section 1, 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Indeed, petitioner earlier had filed such a petition for judicial
guardianship.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides as follows:
"ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
wife for a proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
"In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (165a)."
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code.
The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or
separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or
cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this
case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who
was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a
diagnosis of brain stem infarct.9 In such case, the proper remedy is a
judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal
property, the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of
administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the
Rules of Court.10
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such
administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for
the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95,
1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under
the Family Code.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under
the Revised Rules of Court.1âwphi1 Indeed, the trial court did not even
observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to
the incapacitated spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the
petition should not be granted.
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to
be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due
process. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this Court is that a denial
of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch
of the government the impress of nullity.11 A decision rendered without
due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or
collaterally.12 "A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a
103
party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard."13 "A void decision
may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or collaterally, by
means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked."14

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G. R. SP No. 26936, in toto.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,

concur.

104
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND
MAXIMO VITUG, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the
spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code
apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of
the widow? This is the issue posed in this petition to review on certiorari
of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 60903 which is an
action for reconveyance and damages. *
On November 28, 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador
M. Vitug, mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) several parcels
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2289 —
Pampanga to guarantee the loan granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla
and Pedro Bacani in the amount of P40,900.00 which was duly registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. 1
On December 1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also mortgaged in favor of
PNB certain properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888-Pampanga to
guarantee the payment of the loan account of her son Salvador Vitug in
the amount of P35,200.00, which mortgage was duly registered in the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga. 2
The above-mentioned Transfer Certificates of Titles covering said
properties were all in the name of Donata Montemayor, of legal age,
Filipino, widow and a resident of Lubao, Pampanga at the time they were
mortgaged to PNB 3 and were free from all hens and encumbrances. 4
Salvador Vitug failed to pay his account so the bank foreclosed the
mortgaged properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888. They were
sold at public auction on May 20, 1968 in which the PNB was the highest
bidder. The titles thereto were thereafter consolidated in the name of
PNB.
Likewise, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani failed to settle their
accounts with the PNB so the latter foreclosed the properties covered by
TCT No. 2889 which were sold at public auction and likewise PNB was the
buyer thereof. On August 30, 1968, a certificate of sale was issued by the
Register of Deeds covering said properties in favor of the PNB. When the
title of the PNB was consolidated a new title was issued in its name. 5
On September 2, 1969, the PNB sold the properties covered by TCT Nos.
2887 and 2888 — Pampanga to Jesus M. Vitug, Anunciacion V. de Guzman,
Prudencia V. Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V. Gutierrez in those
names the corresponding titles were issued. 6
During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times. His first wife
was Gervacia Flores with whom he had 3 children, namely, Victor, Lucina
and Julio all surnamed Vitug. Victor now dead is survived by his 5
children: Leonardo, Juan, Candida Francisco and Donaciano, an surnamed
Vitug. Juan Vitug is also dead and is survived by his only daughter
Florencia Vitug.
The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor with whom
he had 8 children, namely, Pragmacio, Maximo, Jesus, Salvador, Prudencio
and Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, the late Enrique Vitug represented
by his wife Natalia Laquian, and the late Francisco Vitug who is survived
by 11 children, namely, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio,
Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus and Luz.
Clodualdo Vitug died intestate on May 20, 1929 so his estate was settled
and distributed in Special Proceeding No. 422 in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga wherein Donata Montemayor was the
Administratrix. 7
Meanwhile, on May 12,1958, Donata Montemayor executed a contract of
lease of Lot No. 24, which is covered by TCT No. 2887-R in favor of her
105
children Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. This lease was I
extended on August 31, 1963. By virtue of a general power of attorney
executed by Donata Montemayor on Sept. 19, 1966 in favor of Pragmacio THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
Vitug, the latter executed a contract of lease on Sept. 19, 1967 of the said APPLYING TO THE CASE AT BAR THE RULING OF THIS
lot in favor of Maximo Vitug. 8 HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN FLORENCIA VITUG VS.
DONATA MONTEMAYOR, ET AL., 91 PHIL. 286 (1953)
On March 21, 1970 Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an action for BECAUSE:
partition and reconveyance with damages in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the A. BETWEEN A PROVISION OF A SPECIAL
intestate estate of Donata Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr., LAW AND THE JUDICIAL
Salvador, Natalia, Prudencia, Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, Antonio, INTERPRETATION AND/OR
Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio APPLICATION OF A PROVISION OF A
Jesus and Luz, all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB. GENERAL LAW, THE FORMER PREVAILS.

The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the B. THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS IS
conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo NOT A MECHANICAL FORMULA OF
Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the ADHERENCE.
mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and
void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, L-5297 decided by C. PNB WAS NOT A PARTY, AND HAD NO
this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for partition and liquidation KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABOVECITED CASE.
of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were found to be
conjugal in nature. D. SIMILARLY, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND
MAXIMO VITUG WERE NOT PARTIES IN
In a decision of Sept. 15, 1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint SAID CASE.
with costs against the plaintiffs and ordered them to pay attorney's fees
of P5,000.00 to the defendant's counsel. Plaintiffs then interposed an II
appeal to the Court of Appeals, wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on May 20, 1981, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RECOGNIZING THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision CERTIFICATE, OF TITLE, AS PROVIDED IN ACT 496, AS
appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and AMENDED (THE LAND REGISTRATION).
another one entered in accordance with the tenor of the
prayer of appellant's complaint with the modification that III
the sale at public auction of the 22 parcels be considered
valid with respect to the 1/2 thereof. No costs. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
IGNORING THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF OWNERSHIP OF
Hence the herein petition for certiorari filed by the PNB raising the DONATA MONTEMAYOR OVER THE PROPERTIES WHICH
following assignments of error: WERE REGISTERED EXCLUSIVELY IN HER NAME WHEN

106
 PRIVATE RESPONDENTS (PRAGMACIO VITUG AND
MAXIMO VITUG), AS LESSEES, ENTERED INTO A
CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH DONATA MONTEMAYOR AS
THE OWNER-LESSOR.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT PNB WAS A MORTGAGEE IN BAD
FAITH.
The petition is impressed with merit.
When the subject properties were mortgaged to the PNB they were
registered in the name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the
torrens certificate of title covering said properties the mortgage loan
applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgages were
duly constituted and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds.
In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB had
the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more.
On its face the properties are owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow.
The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said registered
owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and
encumbrances covering the same.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a
registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate
of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the
party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man make such inquiry. 9
A torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land
covered by a final degree of registration. 10 Once the title is registered the
owner may rest assured without the necessity of stepping into the portals
of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of
losing his land. 11
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the
husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the
properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already
a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only
and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said
spouse. 12 And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the
rights of innocent third parties are involved. 13
The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title
of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a
mortgagee in goodfaith for at the time the mortgages covering said
properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title
of the mortgagor. 14
True it is that in the earlier cases decided by this Court, namely Vitug VS.
Montemayor decided on May 15, 1952, which is an action for recovery of
possession of a share in said parcels of land, 15 and in the subsequent
action for partition between the same parties decided on Oct. 20,
1953, 16 this court found the 30 parcels of land in question to be conjugal
in nature and awarded the corresponding share to the property of
Florencia Vitug, an heir of the late Clodualdo Vitug from the first marriage.
In said cases this Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. In the
dispositive part of the decision of the trial court it made the observation
that "but from the conduct of Clodualdo Vitug and Donata Montemayor
during the existence of their marital life, the inference is clear that
Clodualdo had the unequivocal intention of transmitting the full
ownership of the 30 parcels of land to his wife Donata Montemayor, thus
considering the 1/2 of the funds of the conjugal property so advanced for
the purchase of said parcels of land as reimbursible to the estate of
Clodualdo Vitug on his death. 17 That must be the reason why the
property was registered in the name of Donata Montemayor as widow
after the death of Clodualdo Vitug. 18
107
At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and for SO ORDERED.
partition are real actions, however, they are actions in personam that bind
only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. 19 The PNB not Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa and Cruz, JJ., concur.
being a party in said cases is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it
appear that the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the Paras, J., concur in the result.
above describe mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal
nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgage
applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without
requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners thereof.
Moreover, when said properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was
a purchaser for value in good faith. So its right thereto is beyond
question. 20

Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title
of Donata Montemayor to the said properties. They never raised the
conjugal nature of the property nor took issue as to the ownership of their
mother, Donata Montemayor, over the same. Indeed private respondents
were among the defendants in said two cases wherein in their answers to
the complaint they asserted that the properties in question are
paraphernal properties belonging exclusively to Donata Montemayor and
are not conjugal in nature. 21 Thus they leased the properties from their
mother Donata Montemayor for many years knowing her to be the owner.
They were in possession of the property for a long time and they knew
that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB and thereafter
were sold at public auction, but they did not do anything. 22 It is only after
17 years that they remembered to assert their rights. Certainly, they are
guilty of laches. 23

Moreover, as correctly held by the lower court. Pragmacio and Maximo

Vitug as occupants and lessees of the property in question cannot now
dispute the ownership of their mother over the same who was their
lessor. 24

WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is

hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to pay
attomey's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount
of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.

108
 Republic of the Philippines "(a) ORDERING the latter to reconvey to plaintiffs Lot 448-B-7
SUPREME COURT covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-65893 Registry of
Manila Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City located at Divisoria, Cagayan de Oro
FIRST DIVISION City, in his name without any consideration; and

G.R. No. 153447 February 23, 2004 "(b) ORDERING defendant to choose his 500 square-meter
portion on the lot of plaintiffs at Bontola, Macasandig, Cagayan de
VICENTE G. VILLARANDA, petitioner, Oro City. After he shall have chosen his 500 square meter portion
vs. of the lot of plaintiff, plaintiff shall thru a surveyor, segregate this
Spouses HONORIO G. VILLARANDA and ANA MARIA Y. VILLARANDA; portion. After the subdivision plan shall have been approved by
and COLORHOUSE LABORATORIES, INC., respondents. the Executive Director of the DENR, Region 10, Cagayan de Oro
City, to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of defendant over
DECISION this 500 square-meter portion of his land located at Bontola,
Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City, also without consideration;
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"(c) With this judgment, plaintiffs and intervenor may now
Without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of consummate their transaction.
conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not void,
but merely voidable. "WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS."5

The Case The Facts

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
challenging the October 25, 2001 Decision2 and the April 23, 2002
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55810. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, the present appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the judgment appealed from AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
shall be taxed against appellant."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
This controversy revolves around a Deed of Exchange executed by and
between two brothers, herein Petitioner Vicente Villaranda and Private
Respondent Honorio Villaranda.
A 471-square-meter parcel of land located at Divisoria, Cagayan de Oro
City, was left to the two brothers and their eight other siblings by their
parents. Estate Administrator Bebiano Luminarias leased 124 square
meters of the property to Honorio starting on May 1, 1976, until May 31,
1986. Vicente, on the other hand, inherited 64.22 square meters of the
property that had not been leased to Honorio.6

The trial court’s Decision that was affirmed by the CA had disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against defendant:
On July 6, 1976, the two brothers executed the assailed Deed of Exchange.
Under this instrument, Vicente agreed to convey his 64.22-square-meter
portion to Honorio, in exchange for a 500-square-meter property in
Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City, which was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2138.7

109
After the execution of the Deed, Honorio took possession of the 64.22-
square-meter lot and constructed a building thereon.8
Years later, on April 6, 1992, a subdivision plan for Lot 448-B was
completed, in pursuit of which TCT No. T-65893 for the 64.22 square-
meter share of Vicente was issued in his name and designated as Lot 448-
B-7. The other heirs were issued their own TCTs for their respective
shares.9
Honorio and his wife, Respondent Ana Maria Y. Villaranda, then brought
an action for specific performance10 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cagayan de Oro City (Branch 24) to compel Vicente to comply with his
obligations under the Deed of Exchange. The spouses alleged that they
could not fully use or dispose of their Macasandig property, because
Vicente had yet to identify and delineate his undivided 500- square-meter
portion of the property. They asked the court to compel him to do so, as
well as to convey to them the 64.22-square-meter Divisoria lot, in
compliance with his obligations under the Deed.11
During the pendency of the case, Honorio conditionally sold the Divisoria
lot to Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc. which, by virtue thereof, intervened
in the civil case.12
Vicente did not deny that he had entered into the Deed of Exchange with
Honorio. The former, however, averred that he was not bound
thereby,13 contending that because the property had not been delivered,
the Deed had not been consummated. Moreover, he claimed that the Deed
had already been revoked by both parties.14 According to him, he,
together with his co-heirs, requested Honorio to agree to its rescission,
because the considerations therein were iniquitous. Honorio agreed,
provided certain conditions he had disclosed were met.15 Vicente
contended that he had complied with those conditions; and that,
therefore, he and respondent spouses had already revoked the Deed of
Exchange.
During pretrial, the parties stipulated the following facts: (a) the existence
and due execution of the Deed of Exchange; (b) the identity of the parties;
(c) the existence of TCT No. T-65893, which had been registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City in the name of petitioner; and
(d) the physical possession by Colorhouse, through Honorio, of the 64.22-
square-meter Divisoria lot.16 As already stated, the trial court ruled in
favor of respondent spouses.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA held that the provisions of the Civil Code were
applicable to the case at bar, since the Deed of Exchange had been entered
into prior to the enactment of the Family Code.17 Thus, the absence of the
wife’s signature on the Deed made it only voidable,18 not void.
The CA further found that Ana was aware of the execution of the
Deed,19 and yet she brought no action for its annulment within ten (10)
years from its execution. Her omission or refusal to rescind it, as well as
her act of joining her husband in filing the case for specific performance,
points to the conclusion that she assented to the Deed.20
The CA also ruled that the spouses’ cause of action had accrued, not from
the date of the execution of the Deed, but only from the moment Vicente
refused to cause the transfer of his title to Honorio, some two months
before the filing of the present case. It was only then that the prescriptive
period commenced to run.21
Further, the CA held that as regards the capacity of the parties to enter
into the Deed of Exchange, the only time to be reckoned with was the
moment of its execution.22 Honorio acquired his American citizenship
only in September 1992, which was years thereafter.23 The CA further
explained that according to the 1987 Constitution, a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who had lost Philippine citizenship may own private
lands.24
Finally, the appellate court ruled that the circumstances at the time the
parties entered into the Deed showed that the consideration was not
altogether unconscionable as to warrant voiding the Contract.25
Hence, this Petition.26
The Issues
110
In his Memorandum,27 petitioner raises two issues for our consideration:
I.
"Whether there was a perfected and consummated deed of exchange on
account of the following:
a) There was no specific identification and delineation of
the object of the Deed of Exchange and that there was a
condition precedent for petitioner to examine and accept
the specific area to effect the exchange;
b) There was a need for another contract to be executed in
order to identify the object of the exchange;
c) There was no acceptance and actual delivery of the 500
square meters lot to petitioner at any given time;
II.
Whether the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by the wife of
Respondent Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and enforceable."28
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Perfection and Consummation of the Deed of Exchange
Petitioner argues that the Contract was not perfected or consummated
because, at the time of its execution, its object was not determinate or at
least not determinable without need for a new agreement between the
parties, as mandated by the provisions of the law on sales.29 He argues
that, first, he has to make an ocular inspection of the area; second, the
particular 500-square-meter portion of the Macasandig lot that is the
object of the Deed still has to be particularly identified and delineated;
third, the finally determined portion is still subject to the acceptance and
agreement of the parties; and lastly, absent a delineation of the specified
portion, no delivery -- which is essential to the perfection of the contract
-- is possible.30 He further contends that, at best, he merely gave a
qualified acceptance amounting to a counter-offer, which was contingent
upon the final delineation and acceptance of the 500-square-meter
portion.31
Respondent spouses, on the other hand, argue that petitioner should not
be allowed to adopt a new theory of the case by impugning the validity of
the Deed based on a different ground that was not alleged in the pleadings
or raised before the lower and the appellate courts.32
In any event, respondent spouses contend that the Deed contains all the
essential elements of a contract --consent, object and
consideration.33 They insist that what needs to be executed is not another
contract to give effect to their original agreements, but one in the nature
of a partition agreement.34 They aver that the Deed is akin to a contract of
co-ownership, because it involves the conveyance of an undivided interest
over land. Further agreement between the parties is necessary only to
effect partition of the properties and thus terminate the existing co-
ownership.35
Respondent Colorhouse raises the same issues as those brought up by
respondent spouses. It adds that when petitioner asked that the
agreement be revoked, he was estopped from claiming its non-perfection,
because revocation presupposes the existence of a valid contract.36
Petitioner’s contentions must fail. It is well-settled that points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be -- and ordinarily will not be -- considered by a reviewing
court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.37 Basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised
for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel.38
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule.39 Though not raised
below, the following issues may be considered by the reviewing court:
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, as this issue may be raised at
111
any stage; plain error;40 jurisprudential developments affecting the
issues; or the raising of a matter of public policy.41
Too late in the day is petitioner’s argument that the Deed of Exchange is
null and void on the ground that the object of the contract is not
determinate or at least determinable. Considering that this issue does not
fall under any of the enumerated exceptions, there is no cogent reason for
the Court to pass upon it.
Second Issue:
Absence of Spouse’s Signature
Petitioner also contends that the Deed of Exchange is null and void
because the signature of Honorio’s wife, Ana, does not appear on the
instrument.42 To support his argument, he cites the Family Code; as well
as Garcia v. Court of Appeals43 and Nicolas v. Court of Appeals,44 in which
the Court declared the Deeds of Sale void because of the absence of the
wives’ conformity to the disposition of the conjugal properties involved
therein.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the absence of the signature
of Ana on the Deed does not prove lack of her consent thereto, because a
contract may validly exist even if the parties have not reduced their
stipulations to writing.45 Too, assuming that her consent to the Deed is
lacking, such fact would not render the agreement void, but merely
voidable.46
Indeed, petitioner’s contention is untenable. The Deed was entered into
on July 6, 1976, while the Family Code took effect only on August 3, 1998.
Laws should be applied prospectively only, unless a legislative intent to
give them retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used.47 Hence, the provisions of the Civil Code, not the
Family Code,48 are applicable to the present case. The Macasandig lot was
part of Honorio and Ana’s conjugal properties. The relevant provisions of
the Civil Code on the disposition of real properties of the conjugal
partnership are the following:
"Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. x x x
"Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property
fraudulently alienated by the husband."
According to Article 166, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. This
provision, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 173 of the
same Code. The latter states that an action to annul an alienation or
encumbrance may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and
within ten years from the transaction questioned. Videlicet, the lack of
consent on her part will not make the husband’s alienation or
encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but
merely voidable.49 Hence, the Deed is valid until and unless annulled.
In this case, the records show no evidence that any action to annul the
transfer made by Honorio was ever brought by Ana within ten years from
"the transaction questioned." Her right to bring an action to invalidate the
contract has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and
enforceable.
Moreover, in Papa v. Montenegro,50 the Court explained that the legal
prohibition against the disposition of conjugal property by one spouse
without consent of the other has been established for the benefit, not of
third persons, but only of the other spouse for whom the law desires to
save the conjugal partnership from damages that might be caused. Not
being the proper party, Vicente cannot avail himself of the remedy
prescribed by Article 173.
112
Furthermore, his reliance on Garcia v. Court of Appeals and Nicolas v.
Court of Appeals is misplaced. Unlike the present case, the cited cases
involve a Petition brought by one of the spouses for the annulment of the
contracts entered into by the other spouse. Additionally, we must point
out that contrary to petitioner’s contention, the contracts involved therein
were not void ab initio, but merely voidable.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Decision

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna,

JJ., concur.

113
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 122857 March 27, 1998
ROY NICOLAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division) and BLESILO
F.B. BUAN, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in its decision1 dated August 16, 1995 overturning the
decision2 dated May 31, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch
165, by ordering the dismissal of petitioner's complaint against private
respondent for lack of merit.
On February 19, 1987, petitioner Roy Nicolas and private respondent
Blesito Buan entered into a Portfolio Management Agreement,3 wherein
the former was to manage the stock transactions of the latter for a period
of three months with an automatic renewal clause. However, upon the
initiative of the private respondent the agreement was terminated on
August 19, 1987, and thereafter he requested for an accounting of all
transactions made by the petitioner.
Three weeks after the termination of the agreement, petitioner demanded
from the private respondent the amount of P68,263.67 representing his
alleged management fees covering the periods of June 30, July 31 and
August 19, 1987 as provided for in the Portfolio Management Agreement.
But the demands went unheeded, much to the chagrin of the petitioner.
Rebuffed, petitioner filed a complaint4 for collection of sum of money
against the private respondent before the trial court. In his
answer,5 private respondent contended that petitioner mismanaged his
transactions resulting in losses, thus, he was not entitled to any
management fees.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff,
herein petitioner, thus:
In View Of All The Foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff as follows:
1. The amount of P68,263.67 for the management fees of plaintiff.
2. The amount of P8,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
3. Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Dismayed, private respondent appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals. Finding merit in his case, the appellate court reversed the trial
court's finding and ruled against the petitioner, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision should be, as it is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and as a consequence thereof,
appellee's complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals on November 29, 1995.6
Due to the sudden reversal of events, petitioner is now before us assailing
the Court of Appeals' ruling alleging that it misappreciated the evidence
he presented before the trial court.
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals opined that:
114
 The lower court simply made a sweeping statement that the Atty. Blesilo Buan
profits were generated by appellee's (Petitioner herein)
transactions, making appellant (Private respondent herein) liable for the Period Ended June 30, 1987
for the payment of the money demanded by appellee on the basis
of self-serving profit and loss statements submitted as evidence Shares Issue Profit Loss
by appellee. Other than these pieces of evidence, the trial court
offered no satisfactory reason why the sum demanded by appellee 1,500 PLDT P7,265.62
be paid.
5,000 ATLAS 4,609.38
We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
2,000 SMC 11,477.50
Under the Portfolio Management Agreement, it was agreed that private
respondent would pay the petitioner 20% of all realized profits every end 5,000 ATLAS 1,450.00
of the month as his management fees. The exact wording of the provision
reads: 5,000 ATLAS 3,906.25
xxx xxx xxx 5,000,000 SEAFRONT 11,487.50
3. For his services, the INVESTOR agrees to pay the PORTFOLIO 1,000 SMC 5,247.50
MANAGER 20% of all realized profits every end of the month.
2,000 SMC 5,895.00
Evidently, the key word in the provision is "profits." Simply put, profit has
been defined as "the excess of return over expenditure in a transaction or
1,000 SMC 12,242.50
series of transactions"7 or the "series of an amount received over the
amount paid for goods and services."8
————— —————
To begin with, petitioner has the burden to prove that the transaction
realized gains or profits to entitle him to said management fees, as P 36,351.87 P27,229.38
provided in the Agreement. Accordingly, petitioner submitted the profit
and loss statements9 for the period of June 30, July 31 and August 19, Trading Profit P 9,122.49
1987, showing a total profit of P341,318.34, of which 20% would
represent his management fees amounting to P68,263.70. x .2

For clarity these documents are reproduced hereunder: —————

Profit & Loss Statement P1,824.5010

of Profit & Loss Statement

115
of Shares Issue Proceeds Cost Profit (Loss)

Atty. Blesilo Buan 6,000 BENGUET P754,560.00 706,440.00 P48,120.00

for the Period Ended July 31, 1987 5,000 GLO 189,131.25 202,606.02 (13,474.77)

Shares Issue Profit Loss —————

22,300,000 BASIC P222,963.75 Net Profit P34,645.23

400 PLDT 35,372.50 x .2

5,700 GLO 32,347.50 —————

1,700 SMC 9,350.00 P 6,929.0512

27,000 AC 16,216.87 In according no probative value to these documents, the Court of Appeals
declared that:
————— ————
Exhibits "C", "D" and "E" likewise cannot be relied upon to prove
P306,900.62 9,350.00 that profits were indeed realized. At most, these are self serving
evidence which do not carry much weight. There is no question
Net Trading Profit P297,550.62 that the profit and loss statements are relevant to the issue at
hand. But as to whether or not these statements induce belief as
x .2 to the existence or non-existence of profits generated by appellee,
call for a minute examination of these documents. It should be
————— emphasized that the fees being collected by appellee does not only
spring from the rendition of services per se. The Portfolio
P59,510.1211 Management Agreement requires that service fees be based on the
profits realized out of the stock transactions of appellee in behalf
of appellant. The profit and loss statements presented do not
Profit & Loss Statement
sufficiently prove the existence of such profits.
of
The mere fact that evidence is admissible does not necessarily
mean that it is also credible (People vs. Agripa, 208 SCRA 589).
Atty. Blesilo Buan The statements, covering the months of June, July and up to 19
August 1987, simply tabulate the number of shares acquired from
for the Period Ended August 19, 1987 each company, a column for profit and the last column for loss.

116
 The statements were not authenticated by an auditor, nor by the
person who caused the preparation of the same.13
The analysis of the evidence made by the Court of Appeals deserves our
concurrence. A cursory reading of these purported profit and loss
statements immediately raises doubts as to the veracity of the entries
stated therein.
Admittedly, like any services rendered or performed, stock brokers are
entitled to commercial fees or compensation pursuant to the Revised
Securities Act Rule 19-13, which reads:
RSA Rule 19-13. Charges for Services Performed.
Charges by brokers or dealers, if any, for service performed,
including miscellaneous services such as collection of monies due
for principal, dividends, interests, exchange or transfer of
securities, appeals, safekeeping or custody of securities, and other
services, shall be reasonable and not unfairly discriminatory
between customers.14
Moreover, the same law provides that any fee or commission must be with
due regard to relevant circumstances.15
Unfortunately, the profit and loss statements presented by the petitioner
are nothing but bare assertions, devoid of any concrete basis or specifics
as to the method of arriving at the amounts indicated in the documents.
In fact, it did not even state when the stocks were purchased, the type of
stocks (whether Class "A" or "B" or common or preferred) bought, when
the stocks were sold, the acquisition and selling price of each stock, when
the profits, if any, were delivered to the private respondent, the cost of
safekeeping or custody of the stocks, as well as the taxes paid for each
transaction. With respect to the alleged losses, it has been held that where
a profit or loss statement shows a loss, the statement must show income
and items of expense to explain the method of determining such
loss.16 However, in the instant petition, petitioner hardly elucidated the
reasons and the factors behind the losses incurred in the course of the
transactions.
In short, no evidentiary value can be attributed to the profit and loss
statements submitted by the petitioner. These documents can hardly be
considered a credible or true reflection of the transactions. It is an
incomplete record yielding easily to the inclusion or deletion of certain
matters. The contents are subject to suspicion since they are not reflective
of all pertinent and relevant data. Thus, even assuming the admissibility
of these alleged profit and loss statements, they are devoid of any
evidentiary weight, for the amounts are conclusions without premises, its
bases left to speculation, conjectures, assertions and guesswork.
As regards Exhibit "B,"17 We quote with approval the Court of Appeals'
finding, thus:
There is no question that appellant secured the services of
appellee as portfolio manager, evidenced by the Portfolio
Management Agreement (Exh. A). Pursuant to the Agreement,
appellee entered into several transactions from 19 February 1987
up to 19 August 1987 or a period of six months. Thereafter, the
agreement was not renewed by appellant. The ledger of accounts
(Exhibit "B") presented by appellee as proof of the transactions
entered into only shows the following data: (1) dates in which the
stocks were acquired; (2) classified the acquired stocks to be in
long or short term trading; (3) the price of each stock; (4) which
company's stocks were acquired; and, (5) the total amount paid
for each stock. It does not show how much profit was realized
from each transaction.
In sum, we find that petitioner has not proven the amounts indicated
adequately. His testimony explaining the bases for the management fees
demanded by him are nothing more than a self-serving exercise which
lacks probative value. There were no credible documentary evidence (e.g.
receipts of the transactions, order ticket, certificate of deposit; whether
the stock certificates were deposited in a bank or professional custodian,
and others) to support his claim that profits were indeed realized. At best,
his assertions are founded on mere inferences and generalities. There
must be more convincing proof which in this case is wanting.
To our mind, petitioner's complaint is similar to an action for damages,
wherein the general rule is that for the same to be recoverable it must not
117
only be capable of proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable SO ORDERED.
degree of certainty, and courts, in making the awards, must posit specific
facts which could afford sufficient basis for measuring compensatory or Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
actual damages.18 Since petitioner could not present any credible
evidence to substantiate his claims, the Court of Appeals was correct in
ordering the dismissal of his complaint.

Lastly, the futility of petitioner's action became more pronounced by the

fact that he traded securities for the account of others without the
necessary license from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Clearly, such omission was in violation of Section 19 of the Revised
Securities Act which provides that no broker shall sell any securities
unless he is registered with the SEC. The purpose of the statute requiring
the registration of brokers selling securities and the filing of data
regarding securities which they propose to sell, is to protect the public
and strengthen the securities mechanism. 19

American jurisprudence emphasizes the principle that:

. . . , an unlicensed person may not recover compensation for

services as a broker where a statute or ordinance requiring a
license is applicable and such statute or ordinance is of a
regulatory nature, was enacted in the exercise of the police power
for the purpose of protecting the public, requires a license as
evidence of qualification and fitness, and expressly precludes an
unlicensed person from recovering compensation by suit, or at
least manifests an intent to prohibit and render unlawful the
transaction of business by an unlicensed person.20

We see no reason not to apply the same rule in our jurisdiction. Stock
market trading, a technical and highly specialized institution in the
Philippines, must been trusted to individuals with proven integrity,
competence and knowledge, who have due regard to the requirements of
the law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court

of Appeals dated August 16, 1995 as well as the Resolution dated
November 29, 1995 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

118
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45418 October 30, 1980
TEOFISTA P. TINITIGAN, EFREN TINITIGAN, ELSA TINITIGAN and
SEVERINO TINITIGAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
SEVERINO TINITIGAN, SR. and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45574. October 30, 1980.*
PENTEL MERCHANDISING CO., INC. and TEOFISTA PAYURAN
TINITIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE PEDRO C. NAVARRO, CHIU
CHIN SIONG and SEVERINO TINITIGAN SR., respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Two petitions are herein filed to review on certiorari the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated June 1, 1976 in CA-G.R. No. 05387- SP docketed as
L-45418 and L-45574 respectively, affirming the order of respondent
Judge Pedro C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig,
Branch II in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975. On March 25,
1975, petitioners Pentel Merchandising Co., Inc. (Pentel for short) and
Teofista Payumo Tinitigan (Payuran for short) entered into a contract of
lease of a residential house whereby for a term of four years Payumo shall
lease to Pentel the premises at 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15923, at a rental of P1,500.00 per month
with option to buy the same within the term of the lease for P350,000.00
[pp. 13-16, rec].
On April 22, 1975, Payumo and her three children, Efren, Elsa, and
Severino Jr., all surnamed Tinitigan, leased to United Electronics
Corporation a factory building together with the portion of land on which
it is erected covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 160998 situated
in Banwag, Parañaque, Rizal (pp. 17-20, rec., L-45418).
In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr. (Tinitigan for
short), husband of Payumo and private responded herein, was not
secured. Consequently, on May 22, 1975, Severino Tinitigan Sr., as
conjugal partner and shareholder of Molave Development Corporation
which is a family corporation filed a complaint captioned "Annulment of
Ownership and Contract of witness Pre-Injunction" in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Pasig, 7th Judicial District (pp. 23-27, rec.). This case
docketed Civil Case No. 21277 and which was assigned to Branch II
presided by the Honorable Judge Pedro C. Navarro principally sought to
annul the contract of lease executed by Payumo in favor of United
Electronics Corporation The property involved in this contract is entirely
different from that leased to Pentel with option to buy.
The complaint, however, was later amended with leave of court granted
by order of August 20, 1975, to include in the prayer the following:
... 2. to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from
encumbering or disposing properties in the name of the
Molave Development Corporation or those in the name of
Severino Tinitigan Sr. and Teofista Payuran; ...
In the same order, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II enjoined petitioner from
doing any "act to dispose, mortgage or otherwise encumber the
properties described in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint" and set the
case for hearing on the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September
5, 1975. Paragraphs 7 and 8 pertain to the factory building and the land
on which it is erected covered by TCT No. 160998 (p. 151, rec.).
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction the issue of the contract of
lease of lot covered by TCT 160998 which was the main object of the
complaint was settled amicably. Severino Tinitigan Sr., however, on
September 17, 1975, filed a motion seeking judicial approval of sale of a
two-storey residential house and a lot which are conjugal properties
located at 205 Loring St., Pasay City, covered by TCT No. 15923 (pp. 28-
34, rec.). The house is tenanted by Quintin Lim Eng Seng (Quintin Lim for
119
short) who is President and General Manager of Pentel. Tinitigan
contends that the proposed sale of the property for P300,000.00 to
Quintin who was given priority right to purchase, was necessary to pay
outstanding conjugal obligations that were overdue in the amount of
P256,137.79 and to forestall the foreclosure of mortgaged conjugal
property. Earlier, the same property had been leased by Payumo to Pentel
with an option to buy for P350,000.00.
On September 29, 1975, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II issued an order
granting Tinitigan "authority to sell the house and lot at No. 205 Loring
St., Pasay City covered by TCT No. 15923 in favor of Quintin Lim, if he is a
Filipino citizen, for P300,000.00" (pp. 35-37, rec.,).
An urgent motion for reconsideration was filed by Payumo and children
alleging among others that the sale would result in substantial and
tremendous losses because the property sought to be sold is a suitable
condominium and/or hotel site and would, therefore, command a higher
price (pp. 56-57, rec.).
On October 9, 1975, merely two days after the motion for reconsideration
of the September 29, 1975 order was filed in the CFI of Rizal, Branch II,
the wife Payumo filed against her husband Tinitigan a complaint for legal
separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership, docketed as Civil Case
No. 4459-P before Branch XXVIII of the Court of First Instance of Rizal at
Pasay City presided by the Honorable Judge Enrique A. Agana (pp. 17-21,
rec.).
On October 29, 1975, the Pasay Court after noting that "the parties had
agreed to the continuation of the administration of said conjugal
properties by plaintiff (wife) Teofista P. Tinitigan," appointed her
administrative of the conjugal properties subject to the following
conditions:
1) that all and any disposition and/or encumbrance of the
real estate belonging to the conjugal partnership shall be
subject to the approval of the court;
2) that all rentals accruing from the properties in Angeles
Civil shall be collected by the defendant Severino Tinitigan
for his subsistence and support; and
3) that the disposition of the property located at Loring St.,
Pasay City, shall be subject to the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Rizal" [P. 22, rec.].
In Civil Case No. 21277 however, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, presided by
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the September 29, 1975 order for lack of merit.
Further, the court stated that "the defendants (petitioners) have not even
shown that there are offers from other sources willing to buy the property
for more than P300.000.00 (p. 92, rec.)
On November 22, 1975, a notice of appeal was filed by petitioners Payumo
and children appealing the order of November 3, 1975, it being allegedly
final in nature in so far as the disposition of the Pasay property is
concerned and there being no further issue left between the parties (pp.
72-73, rec.).
By a deed of absolute sale dated January 16, 1976 (pp. 38-44, rec.). the
husband Tinitigan apparently sold for P315,000.00 the Pasay property
not to Quintin Lim as contained in the order of the court in Civil Case No.
21277, but to herein private respondent Chiu Chin Siong (Chiu for short)
who obtained a title thereto. Pursuantly, TCT No. 20031 was issued
cancelling TCT No. 15923.
On February 23, 1976, a motion for the approval of the sale to Chiu was
filed by respondent Tinitigan in the CFI of Rizal, Branch 11 (pp. 203-205,
rec.).
On March 3, 1976, the said court issued an order approving the sale
executed by Severino Tinitigan Sr. in favor of Chiu covering the parcel of
land at 206 Loring St., San Rafael District, Pasay City, for and in
consideration of the sum of Three Hundred Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P315,000.00) [pp. 206-207, rec.).
120
In a decision dated April 8, 1976, the same court denied the appeal filed
by petitioners Payumo and children on the ground that the order
appealed from is merely interlocutory and cannot, therefore, be the
subject of appeal. Furthermore, it stated that "the sale in favor of Chiu Chin
Siong is a right pertaining to the plaintiff under Article 171 of the Civil
Code and the exercise cise of said right is justifiable to relieve the rest of
the conjugal properties from mortgage obligations which are in danger of
foreclosure" (p. 90, rec.).
On May 17, 1976, Payumo and children filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction against respondents Tinitigan and the Honorable
Pedro C. Navarro in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 05387
assuming the orders of respondent Judge and praying that a restraining
order be issued immediately enjoining respondent Severino Tinitigan Sr.
from selling or disposing of the disputed property and if already sold to
declare the sale null and void. Petitioners likewise prayed that the order
of the lower court dismissing the appeal based on the grounds aforestated
be declared a nullity and that the appeal be given due course (pp. 45-49,
rec.).
On June 1, 1976, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision upholding the
orders of respondent Judge, particularly, the orders of September 29,
1975 approving the sale of the conjugal property in Pasay City, to quote:
The ground for opposition to the sale is a claim that the
property is a 'choice lot' within 'the tourist belt and its
potentials for a hotel or condominium site is very
promising' (Ibid. p. 4). It does sound good but too abstruse
to meet the immediate need for the liquidation of a big
conjugal liability and to avoid foreclosure and loss of the
properties mortgaged. Besides the sale to liquidate the
conjugal liability finds support from the provisions of
Articles 161 and 171 of the Civil Code. We also see from
the record before us that petitioner Teofista P. Tinitigan
has filed a complaint for legal separation and dissolution
of the conjugal partnership in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch XXVIII in Pasay City, under Civil Case No.
4459-P. Private respondent agreed to the appointment of
petitioner Teofista P. Tinitigan as administrative on
certain conditions, which was approved by the Court
(Ibid., p. 30). One of these is that the disposition of the
property in question shall be subject to the decision of the
CFI of Rizal, Brapeh II in Pasig (Ibid., p. 30). As stated
above, respondent Judge, presiding over Branch II of the
CFI of Rizal appellant proved the sale of the conjugal
property in question to liquidate certiorari conjugal
obligations (Ibid., pp- 17-19). ...
But the petitioners would, nevertheless compel us to allow
their appeal from the order dated September 29, 1975
approving the sale of the conjugal property in Pasay City
in order to liquidate certiorari conjugal obligations (Ibid.,
p. 17) on the ground that the order dated November 3,
1975 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order
dated September 29, 1975 is already final (Ibid., p. 4, par.
14). But the respondent Judge hold the questioned order
as merely interlocutory (Ibid., p. 57). We sustain the
respondent Judge. ... The fact that what was resolved by
the respondent Court was a mere motion for judicial
authority to sell conjugal property to liquidate certiorari
conjugal obligations (Ibid., p. 8) indicates that the order
granting the motion (Ibid., p. 17) is interlocutory. The
rationale underlying the rule that an interlocutory order
is not appealable is basically the avoidance of multiplicity
of appeals in a single case which could considerably delay
the final disposition of the case (People vs. Rodriguez 24
SCRA 163, 167) [pp. 93-97, rec.).
Thereafter, on July 19, 1976, private respondent Chiu filed before the City
Court, Branch III, at Pasay City, presided by judge Pablo M. Malvar, a
compliant for unlawful detainer seeking an order to compel defendant
therein, Quintin C. Lim to vacate the premises in question (pp. 331-335,
rec.).
On July 26, 1976, Quintin C. Lim filed his answer with motion to dismiss
denying that he 'was the lessee of the properly and moving to dismiss the
detainer action for lack of jurisdiction, the issue of ownership not being
121
capable of decision without resolving the issue of ownership pending in
other courts (pp. 346-352, rec.).
On January 5, 1977, a petition for review docketed as L-45418 was filed
with this Court by Payumo and her three children praying for the issuance
of a writ of certiorari directed to the Court of Appeals, and commanding it
to send to this Court for review and determination the records and
proceedings of Civil Case No. 21277 assigned to the CFI of Rizal in Pasig,
Branch II, presided by respondent Judge Navarro. The main allegations of
the petition are: lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court since it
did not have judicial authority to authorize the sale of the conjugal
property in Civil Case No. 21277 considering that the complaint in the said
case referred to other properties to the exclusion of the one authorized to
be sold; and abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal since the order
authorizing the sale of the Loring property was not merely interlocutory
but one that was final and appealable.
On February 15, 1976, another petition was filed with this Court, this time
by Pentel and Payuran, against respondents Court of Appeals. Honorable
Pedro C. Navarro, Chiu Chin Siong and Severino Tinitigan Sr. The petition,
docketed as L-45574, seeks to review on certiorari the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 05387-SP dated June 1, 1976 and order of
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975 on
the ground that the said decision and order are void.
Petitioners assigr. the following errors as grounds for the allowance of
writ, to wit:
(1) The questioned order authorizing Severino Tinitigan
Sr., to sell the property in question is void because
(a) Tinitigan Sr. had no authority to sell the premises, they
being under the administration of Payuran;
(b) Respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over
the premises and could not grant Tinitigan authority to
sell them;
(c) The sale of the property was expressly authorized in
favor of Quintin Lim, not respondent Chiu;
(d) Pentel, whose President and General Manager is
Quintin Lim, had the option to buy the premises; and
(2) The Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in
denying Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale
of the property here involved.
On February 23, 1977, this Court, after deliberating on the petition filed
in case G.R. No. L-45574 resolved without giving due course thereto to
require the respondents to comment and to take up L-45574 with L-
45418 since both involve the same Court of Appeals decision (p. 107, rec.).
During the pendency of these petitions, the Pasay Court in the legal
separation case (Civil Case No. 4459-P), issued an order dated August 29,
1977 dissolving the conjugal partnership between Tinitigan and Payumo
and approving the partition of their properties pursuant to an agreement
(pp. 319-325, rec.). The Loring property was adjudicated in favor of the
wife Payuran.
In consequence, defendant-respondent filed a motion to exclude TCT
15923 from the list of properties that should belong to Payumo (pp. 208-
210, rec.). An amended motion was subsequently filed on October 25,
1977 praying that the order of August 29, 1977 be amended in such a way
that the award of the Loring property be conditioned upon the final
outcome of the cases pending before this Court (pp. 326-328, rec.).
Pursuant to said motion, the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City issued
an order dated November 22, 1977 in part stating that the "award of the
Loring St., Pasay City property under TCT No. 15923 in favor of the
plaintiff in the order of the court dated August 29, 1977 is understood to
the subject to the outcome of the cases now pending before the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-45418 and G.R. No. L-45574" (pp. 329-330, rec.).
Notwithstanding these proceedings, the City Court of Pasay, Branch III in
the unlawful detainer case, presided by Judge Malvar, issued a decision
dated January 18, 1978 ordering the defendant Quintin Lim and all
122
persons claiming under him to vacate the premises in question and to pay
the corresponding rentals thereof to the plaintiff Chiu at the rate of
P1,500.00 per month from January 16, 1976, until the defendant and all
persons claiming under him actually vacate the said premises (pp. 367-
371, rec.).
For this reason, Payuran, on February 14, 1978, filed a motion for leave to
apply for a writ of injunction to enjoin execution of the decision of Judge
Malvar in the unlawful detainer case and to prohibit further proceedings
therein (pp. 259-273, rec.).
This Court, on February 22, 1978, issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Malvar from conducting further proceedings and from
executing the decision dated January 18, 1978 (pp. 372-374, rec.).
The issues in both L-45418 and L-45574 related primarily to the question
of validity of the challenged order dated September 29, 1975 issued by
respondent Judge Navarro of the CFI of Rizal, Branch II, in Pasig and the
decision of respondent Court of Appeals.
WE pursue our discussion on the merits of the case as predicated on
grounds raised in the assignment of errors.
Petitioners argue that the order authorizing Tinitigan to sell the Loring
property is void; firstly, because Tinitigan had no authority to sell the
premises, they being under the administration of Payuran. This
contention is without legal basis. Article 165 of the New Civil Code decrees
that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership." This
is the general rule. Although Article 168 of the same Code provides that
"the wife may by express authority of the husband embodied in a public
instrument, administer the conjugal partnership property" and scattered
provisions in the Code likewise speak of administration by the wife
pursuant to a judicial decree, the said provisions are not applicable in the
instant case. The judicial decree dated October 29, 1975 appointing
Payumo as administrative of the conjugal partnership cannot be treated
as an exception because it was issued only after the CFI of Rizal, Branch II
had granted Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring property. Besides,
the appointment of Payumo as administrative was not absolute as it was
made subject to certain conditions agreed upon by the parties. Although
the claim by Payumo that she was actually administering their conjugal
properties even prior to this controversy may have some color of truth in
it; legally, however, such fact is not enough to make her administratix of
the conjugal partnership for absent a public instrument or a judicial
decree, administration still pertains to the husband as explicitly set forth
in Article 165 (supra).
As held in the case of Ysasi vs. Fernandez (23 SCRA 1079, 1083 [June 25,
1968]).
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. This is a right clearly granted to him by law.
More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is
not entitled — as of right — to joint administration. The
husband may even enforce right of possession against the
wife who has taken over the administration without his
consent. And the wife may be punished for contempt for
her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets. She may
be required to render full and complete accounting of such
properties.
Necessarily, the conclusion is that Tinitigan Sr. had not ceased being the
administrator of their conjugal properties at the time the motion for
judicial approval of sale was granted. Being administrator, however, does
not give him outright authority to alienate or encumber conjugal assets.
This kind of transactions requires the express or implied consent of the
wife subject to certain exceptions. Thus, Article 166 of the New Civil Code
provides —
Unless the wife has been declared a noncompos mentis or
a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in
a leprosarium the husband cannot alienate or encumber
any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her
conscience the court may compel her to grant the same.
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the
conjugal partnership before the effective date of this Code
(Emphasis supplied).
123
This was precisely the reason why respondent Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial
approval of sale of the Loring property. The filing of the said motion was,
in fact, directed by a legal provision since it became almost impossible for
private respondent to obtain his wife's consent to the sale which
transaction has not proven to be fraudulent. As the evidence warrants, the
sale was necessary to answer for a big conjugal liability which might
endanger the family's economic standing. Actually, this is one instance
where the wife's consent is not required and impliedly, no judicial
intervention is necessary. According to Article 171 of the New Civil Code,
"the husband may dispose of the conjugal partnership for the purposes
specified in Articles 161 and 162." In general, these articles deal with the
obligation of the conjugal partnership. Specifically, Article 161, paragraph
1 provides that "the conjugal partnerships shall be liable for all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose,
in the case where she may legally bind the partnership."
It must be noted that Payumo did not dispute the existence of these
conjugal liabilities. What she questioned, in reality, was the propriety of
the sale of the disputed property, which, according to petitioners, has
bright prospects of development and market value appreciation in the
future. It was a 'choice lot' as termed by them. Nevertheless, the sale was
the surest and the most practical means resorted to by respondent
Tinitigan Sr. to save them from a serious financial setback. This
consideration cannot be sidestepped by speculative allegations.
Moreover, petitioners offer no acceptable and practical solution to
remedy this contingency.
Secondly, petitioners contend that the questioned order is void because
respondent Judge had not acquired jurisdiction over the premises and
could not grant Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell them. They would seem to
capitalize on the fact that the complaint in Civil Case No. 21277
particularly mentioned only the lot covered by TCT No. 160998 leased to
United Electronics Corporation. Petitioners failed to note, however, that
in the amended complaint, respondents prayed among others "to restrain
the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff from encumbering or disposing
properties in the name of the Molave Development Corporation or those
in the name of Severino Tinitigan Sr, and Teofista Payuran." This, in effect,
brings the Loring property by TCT No. 15923 within the jurisdiction of the
court which issued the order. Certainly, a motion in relation thereto is but
proper. Furthermore, it is worth repeating that the said motion to seek
judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent amounts to compliance
with legal requirement delineated in Article 166, supra. The issuance of
the order dated September 29, 1975 was, henceforth, pursuant to a validly
acquired jurisdiction, in keeping with a well-entrenched principle that
"jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined
by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein - a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial.
Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we
to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely upon the defendant. But it is necessary that jurisdiction be
properly involved or called into activity by the firing of a petition,
complaint or other appropriate pleading. Nothing can change the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. None of the parties to the
litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate when it shall be removed.
That power is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the
legislature may change" (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I,
1970 ed., pp. 37-38).
In addition, records further disclose that the action for legal separation
and dissolution of conjugal partnership was filed almost right after the
order of September 29, 1975 in Civil Case No. 21277 was issued. As can
be gleaned from the facts, the filing of Civil Case No. 4459-P was
apparently a tactical maneuver intended to frustrate the order of
September 29, 1975 issued by respondent Judge Navarro granting
Tinitigan Sr. authority to sell the Loring property. Aptly, however, the
order of October 29, 1975 made the appointment of Payumo as
administrative subject to the condition "that the disposition of the
property located at Loring St., Pasay City shall be subeject to the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch II, Pasig, Rizal." There can be
no clearer indication of the validity of the questioned order, as far as
jurisdiction is concerned, than the latter court's own recognition of the
jurisdiction priorly acquired by the court issuing it. The well-settled rule
that "jurisdiction once acquired continues until the case is finally
terminated" is hereby observed (Republic vs. Central Surety and Ins. Co.,
25 SCRA 641[1968]). "The jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state
124
of facts existing at the time it is invoked, and if the jurisdiction once
attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent
happening of events, although they are of such a character as would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first innocence, will not
operate to oust jurisdiction almdy attached" (Ramos vs. Central Bank of
the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565, 583 [1971]).
Consequently, there is no merit in the assertion of petitioner that it is the
Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, Branch XXVIII which should
have assumed jurisdiction over the disputed property upon the filing of
the complaint for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership
To permit this would result in the disregard of the order of September 29,
1975 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Pasig, Branch II. Not
even the court whose jurisdiction is being invoked sanctions this seeming
attempt to contravene sound doctrines and long-standing principles.
Thirdly, petitioners question the validity of the order appellant proving
the sale of the Loring property on the ground that the sale was expressly
authorized in favor of Quintin Lim and not respondent Chiu. Obviously,
this is but a collateral issue. It is noteworthy that the motion was filed in
order to secure judicial approval of sale in lieu of marital consent as
Payumo would not grant the same. The order, therefore, was not intended
to vest Quintin Lim exclusive right to purchase the Loring property but
rather it was intended to grant Tinitigan Sr. authorized to sell the same.
To construe otherwise would defeat the purpose for which the motion
was filed. The fact that Quintin Lim was favored as buyer is merely
incidental, it having been made pursuant to the desire of respondent
Tinitigan Sr. premised on the former's interest over the disputed property
as tenant therein. Quintin Lim, however, did not manifest his ability and
willingness to buy the property. He had practically every opportunity
prior to the sale in favor of Chiu to exercise his pre-emptive right but he
failed to exercise the same for one reason or another. The urgency of the
need to settle pressing conjugal obligations prompted respondent
Tinitigan Sr. to look for other buyers who could immediately pay for the
property Chiu, to whom the property was subsequently offered,
immediately paid the full amount of P315,000.00 upon the court's
approval of the sale in his favor on March 3, 1976. This March 3, 1976
order is a reaffirmation of the order of September 29, 1975.
Fourthly, petitioners assail the validity of the order on purely
circumstantial ground — that Pentel whose President and General
Manager is Quintin Lim, had the option to buy the premises. While this
may be so, petitioners seem to have neglected that the contract of lease
between Payumo and Pentel with option to buy has been entered into in
violation of Civil Code provisions. A close scrutiny of the facts would
reveal that Payumo has contravened the law by encumbering the disputed
property as well as other conjugal properties without her husband's
consent. Article 172 of the new Civil Code provides that "the wife cannot
bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in
cases provided by law." Granting arguendo that she is the administrative
still her act of leasing the lots covered by TCT No. 15923 and TCT No.
160998 is unjustified, being violative of Article 388 of the new Civil Code
which states that "the wife who is appellant pointed as an administrative
of the husband's property cannot alienate or encumber the husband's
property or that of the conjugal partnership without judicial authority."
Consequently, Payuran's unauthorized transaction cannot be invoked as
a source of right or valid defense. True, the contract may bind persons
parties to the same but it cannot bind another not a party thereto, merely
because he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof (Manila Port Service vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 1214, 1217).
So goes the "res inter alios acta nobis nocet, nec prodest," which means that
a transaction between two parties ought not to operate to the prejudice
of a third person.
Finally, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals erred as a matter
of law in denying Payuran's petition to enjoin or set aside the sale of the
Loring property. This argument, however, is unsubstantiated. The facts as
when as the evidence presented by both parties leave no other recourse
for the respondent Court of Appeals except to apply the pertinent legal
provisions respecting the matter. Whether the order authorizing the sale
of the Loring property is interlocutory or not, becomes of no moment in
view of the conclusion aforesaid.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE PETITIONS IN THESE
TWO CASES ARE HEREBY DENIED AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS DATED JUNE 1, 1976 AND THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT
JUDGE DATED SEPTEMBER 29, 1975 ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED. WITH
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONERS IN BOTH CASES.
125
SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro * and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

126
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG (with aliases
JOSE JO and CONSING), respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with
three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, the
herein petitioner, claims to be his legal wife whom he begot a daughter,
Monina Jo. The other women and their respective offspring are not parties
of these case.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation
of conjugal property, docketed as Civil Case No. 51, in addition to an
earlier action for support, also against him and docketed as Civil Case No.
36, in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35.
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On November 29, 1983,
Judge German G. Lee, Jr. rendered an extensive decision, the dispositive
portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing arguments and
considerations, this court hereby holds that the plaintiff
Prima Partosa was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang,
alias Consing, and, therefore, is entitled to support as the
lawfully wedded wife and the defendant is hereby ordered
to give a monthly support of P500.00 to the plaintiff Prima
Partosa, to be paid on or before the 5th day of every
month, and to give to the plaintiff the amount of
P40,000.00 for the construction of the house in
Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental where she may live
separately from the defendant being entitled under the
law to separate maintenance being the innocent spouse
and to pay the amount of P19,200.00 to the plaintiff by
way of support in arrears and to pay the plaintiff the
amount of P3,000.00 in the concept of attorney's fees.
As will be noticed, there was a definite disposition of the complaint for
support but none of the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property.
Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling
of the trial court in the complaint for support. 1 The complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause of action
and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by
Article 178 of the Civil Code.
When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came
to this Court for relief. The private respondent's petition for review
on certiorari was dismissed for tardiness in our resolution dated
February 17, 1988, where we also affirmed the legality of the marriage
between Jose and Prima and the obligation of the former to support her
and her daughter.
This petition deals only with the complaint for judicial separation of
conjugal property.
It is here submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that: a) the
judicial separation of conjugal property sought was not allowed under
Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code; and b) no such separation was
decreed by the trial court in the dispositive portion of its decision.
The private respondent contends that the decision of the trial court can
longer be reviewed at this time because it has a long since become final
and executory. As the decretal portion clearly made no disposition of Civil
Case No. 51, that case should be considered impliedly dismissed. The
petitioner should have called the attention of the trial court to the
omission so that the proper rectification could be made on time. Not
127
having done so, she is now concluded by the said decision, which can no
longer be corrected at this late hour.
We deal first with the second ground.
While admitting that no mention was made of Civil Case No. 51 in the
dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court, the petitioner argues
that a disposition of the case was nonetheless made in the penultimate
paragraph of the decision reading as follows:
It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in
question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the
defendant in this case, subject to separation of property
under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code, which
is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
The petitioner says she believed this to be disposition enough and so did
not feel it was necessary for her to appeal, particularly since the order
embodied in that paragraph was in her favor. It was only when the
respondent court observed that there was no dispositive portion
regarding that case and so ordered its dismissal that she found it
necessary to come to this Court for relief.
The petitioner has a point.
The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar
as it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.
The drafting of the decision was indeed not exactly careful. The
petitioner's counsel, noting this, should have taken immediate steps for
the rectification for the omission so that the ruling expressed in the text
of the decision could have been embodied in the decretal portion. Such
alertness could have avoided this litigation on a purely technical issue.
Nevertheless, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed
to prevail over considerations of substantive justive. After all, the
technical defect is not insuperable. We have said time and again that
where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or a mistake in the
dispositive portion of the decision, this Court may clarify such an
ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment have become
final. 2 In doing so, the Court may resort to the pleading filed by the parties
and the findings of fact and the conclusions of law expressed in the text or
body of the decision. 3
The trial court made definite findings on the complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property, holding that the petitioner and the
private respondent were legally married and that the properties
mentioned by the petitioner were acquired by Jo during their marriage
although they were registered in the name of the apparent dummy.
There is no question therefore that the penultimate paragraph of the
decision of the trial court was a ruling based upon such findings and so
should have been embodied in the dispositive portion. The respondent
court should have made the necessary modification instead of dismissing
Civil Case No. 51 and thus upholding mere form over substance.
In the interest of substantive justice, and to expedite these proceedings,
we hereby make such modification.
And now to the merits of Civil Case No. 51.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
separation of the parties was due to their agreement and not because of
abondonment. The respondent court relied mainly on the testimony of the
petitioner, who declared under oath that she left Dumaguete City, where
she and Jo were living together "because that was our agreement." It held
that a agreement to live separately without just cause was void under
Article 221 of the Civil Code and could not sustain any claim of
abandonment by the aggrieved spouse. Its conclusion was that the only
remedy availabe to the petitioner was legal separation under Article 175
of the Civil Code, 4 by virtue of which the conjugal partnership of property
would be terminated.
The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted
Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She submits that the
agreement between her and the private respondent was for her to
temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her
pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to
128
separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement was
repudiated and ended in 1942, when she returned to him at Dumaguete
City and he refused to accept her.
The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife
without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal
partnership, except that:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just
cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for
a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal
partnership property or separation of property.
The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the
Family Code, which states:
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other
or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family,
the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property, of for
authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to martial, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abondoned the other when he
or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention
of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal
dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within
the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no
intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abondonment by a spouse of the other without just
cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her
obligations to the family without just cause, even if she
said spouse does not leave the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although
able to do so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations,
duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. 6 This idea is
clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a
spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the
conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning."
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had
already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their
conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita.
The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that
he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover,
beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for
support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support
to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the
refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner,
sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation
of their conjugal property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by
Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply
with his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart form
refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete
City, Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring
many children by them. It was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and
their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against him for
support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which
129
actions, significantly, he even denied being married to her. The private may have been registered in the name of other persons in violation of the
respondent has not established any just cause for his refusal to comply Anti-Dummy Law.
with his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.
The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital
Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an
Code, providing as follows: accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his
promise to their of his eternal love and care.
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
respondent court is MODIFIED. Civil Case No. 51 is hereby decided in
xxx xxx xxx favor the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, and the conjugal property of the
petitioner and the private respondent is hereby ordered divided between
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been them, share and share alike. This division shall be implemented by the
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is trial court after determination of all the properties pertaining to the said
highly improbable. conjugal partnership, including those that may have been illegally
registered in the name of the persons.
The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case
before us although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we SO ORDERED.
held in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals: 7
Padilla, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that
an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will
dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the
term of such disposition, and not according to the law
prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed
judgement. The court will therefore reverse a judgement
which was correct at the time it was originally rendered
where, by statute, there has been an intermediate change
in the law which renders such judgement erroneous at the
time the case was finally disposed of on appeal.

The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on

the finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the private
respondent is indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should
now be divided between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that
they were acquired during coverture and so belong to the spouses half
and half. As the private respondent is a Chinese citizen, the division must
include such properties properly belonging to the conjugal partnership as

130
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 102126 March 12, 1993
ANGELICA LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF CIPRIANO PEDROSA represented by Nelson
Jimena, Honorable Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon in her
capacity as Presiding Judge-Designate, Branch 51, RTC, Bacolod
City, respondents.
Hector P. Teodosio of Defensor and Teodocio Law Office for petitioner.
Edmundo G. Manlapao for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing an order
dated 24 January 1991 issued by herein respondent presiding judge-
designate Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 51 which considered the supplemental action for
partition (after annulment of the marriage) as terminated due to the death
of one of the spouses (husband) and the pendency of intestate
proceedings over his estate.
Petitioner Angelica Ledesma's marriage to Cipriano Pedrosa was declared
a nullity by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 51 on 8
February 1984 in Civil Case No. 1446.1 The dispositive portion of the
order annulling the marriage also provided thus:
. . . that the properties acquired by plaintiff Cipriano
Pedrosa and defendant Angelica Ledesma at the time they
were living together as common-law husband and wife is
(sic) owned by them as co-owners to be governed by the
provisions on co-ownership of the civil code; that the
properties acquired by plaintiff and defendant after their
marriage was solemnized on March 25, 1965, which was
annulled by this Court in the above-entitled proceeding,
forms (sic) part of the conjugal partnership and upon
dissolution of the marriage, to be liquidated in accordance
with the provision of the civil code.2
Surprisingly it took some time before the next order implementing the
above disposition was issued on 4 May 1989, the pertinent part of which
reads:
. . . . It appearing from the records that the court has to
verify and determine the correct inventory of the
properties of Cipriano Pedrosa and Angelica Ledesma, the
parties, including the receiver, through their respective
attorneys, are ordered to submit their respective
inventory, if one has not been submitted yet, before June
1, 1989. . . . .3
Pending receipt by the court of the ordered inventory, Cipriano Pedrosa
died. A separate petition for the probate of his last will and testament was
filed.4 Nelson Jimena was named executor and substituted Pedrosa in the
partition proceedings (Civil Case No. 1446).
Due to disagreement of the parties on the characterization of the
properties, the court in the partition proceedings ordered (30 March
1990) the submission of comments, objections and manifestations on the
project of partition submitted by the parties. During a lull in the
proceedings, the presiding judge also passed away. On 24 January 1991
the following now-questioned order was issued by the herein respondent
presiding-judge designate who took over:
It is informed by Atty. Pio Villoso that insofar as the status
of this case is concerned, the plaintiff who has long been
dead, was substituted by the administrator, now the
plaintiff Nelson Jimena, and Atty. Vicente Sabornay, as the
receiver. Furthermore, the judgment as to the annulment
of the marriage had already been rendered partially by
131
 then Presiding Judge Quirino Abad Santos, Jr., on February
8, 1984. What is being litigated here by the parties affects
the property division to dissolve the partnership.
However, the plaintiff died and an intestate proceeding is
now pending before Branch 43 whereby the said Nelson
Jimena was actually the appointed administrator, and who
was substituted as plaintiff in this case.
With all these informations, and considering the nature of
the action, the Court finds the substitution of the original
plaintiff improper, as the defendant herein can pursue her
claim over the properties before the intestate proceedings
being instituted. Action for intervention in order that the
judgment in this particular proceeding can be
implemented, can be raised in the intestate Court.
Likewise, the appointment of the receiver conflicts with
that of the judicial administrator considering that with the
filing of the intestate case, the properties of the deceased
plaintiff are in custodia legis and this Court losses
jurisdiction in determining further the distribution of the
properties.
In view of the above, without prejudice to the defendant's right to file as
intervenor in the intestate proceedings with the judgment annulling the
marriage, the proceedings becomes moot and academic with the
pendency of the intestate proceeding before Branch 43. This case is
therefore deemed TERMINATED.5
With the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the
respondent court, this special civil action was initiated.
Petitioner argues that respondent judge reneged in the performance of a
lawful duty when she refrained from rendering a decision in the partition
case (Civil Case No. 1446) and considered the same closed and
terminated, due to the pendency of intestate proceedings over the
deceased husband's estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159).6 It is likewise erroneous,
petitioner contends, to rule that petitioner's remedy is a motion for
intervention in said intestate proceedings to implement judgment in the
marriage-annulment case, since petitioner has already presented all her
evidence in the annulment case to prove which properties acquired
during the marriage pertain to her.
The case of Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals,7 where a similar issue was
involved — the husband having died after the legal separation of the
spouses had been finally decreed but before the actual liquidation of their
community of properties — is on point. The Court therein said:
WE do not find merit in petitioner's submission that the
questioned decision had not become final and executory
since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
gains or the absolute community of property as among the
effects of the final decree of legal separation. Article 106 of
the Civil Code thus reads:
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation
shall have the following effects:
1) The spouses shall be entitled to live
separately from each other, but the
marriage bonds shall not be severed;
2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the
absolute conjugal community of property
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, without
prejudice to the provisions of Article 176;
xxx xxx xxx
The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and
liquidation of the property regime of the spouses upon
finality of the decree of legal separation. Such dissolution
and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final
decree. This legal effect of the decree of legal separation
ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable
132
incident of, the judgment decreeing legal separation for
the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the
conjugal assets.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the decision of the trial court dated January 4, 1973
decreeing the legal separation between then spouses
Antonio Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana
Macadangdang had long become final and executory and
the division of the conjugal property in a "supplemental
decision" is a mere incident of the decree of legal
separation.
Since We have ruled on the finality of the judgment
decreeing the spouses' legal separation as of January 4,
1973, the remaining issue for Our resolution is the final
disposition of their conjugal partnership of gains which
partnership, by reason of the final decree, had been
automatically dissolved. The law (Article 106, 107 of the
Civil Code) clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of
legal separation on the conjugal property.
The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who
was declared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before
the liquidation of the conjugal property is effected, poses
a new problem which can be resolved simply by the
application of the rules on intestate succession with
respect to the properties of the deceased petitioner.
Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of gains under the aforecited
provisions of the Civil Code would be applied effective
January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation
became final. Upon the liquidation and distribution
conformably with the law governing the effects of the final
decree of legal separation, the law on intestate succession
should take over in the disposition of whatever remaining
properties heave been allocated to petitioner. This
procedure involves details which properly pertain to the
lower court.
The properties that may be allocated to the deceased
petitioner by virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal
assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of
intestate succession in Special Proceedings No. 134.
The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with equal
reason, the doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage
annulment which is the situation at bar. The respondent presiding judge
is directed to decide the partition (liquidation) case (Civil Case No. 1446)
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of this decision to determine
which of the properties of the conjugal partnership should be adjudicated
to the husband and the wife. This is but a consequence or incident of its
decision rendered in the same case annulling the marriage. Petitioner's
letters to the Court indicate that she is seventy (70) years of age and the
prolonged action for partition (liquidation) has taken a toll on her
resources. Justice and equity demand the disposition of her case with
dispatch. Any properties that may be adjudicated to the deceased husband
Pedrosa can then be distributed in accordance with his last will and
testament in the special proceedings involving his estate (Sp. Proc. No.
4159).
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Judge's order dated 24 January 1991
considering Civil Case No. 1446 closed and terminated for being moot and
academic is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge or whoever
may have succeeded her is ordered to decide said action for partition
(liquidation) within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
133
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 132803 August 31, 1999
JESSIE V. PISUEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING and AQUILINO VILLAR Represented by
Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Real property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal.
Such prima facie presumption, however, can be overturned by a cadastral
courts' specific finding, which has long become final, that the lot in
question was paraphernal in character. The title to the entire property
shall pass by operation of law to the buyer once the seller acquires title
over it by hereditary succession, even if at the time of the execution of the
deed of sale, the seller owned only a portion of the property.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the
February 26, 1997 Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
39955,2 as well as its February 12, 1998 Resolution denying
reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed in toto the ruling3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-5462, which
disposed as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court renders
judgment:
1. Declaring the "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" by Felix Villar and
Catalina Villar in favor of Agustin Navarra, defendant's
predecessor-in-interest, as valid with respect to the one-half share
of the whole Lot. No. 1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan,
Capiz, located at Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan,
Province of Capiz, which is registered in the name of Petra Unating
married to Aquilino Villar under Original Certificate of Title No.
RO-6316 (18422) while the other half belongs to the plaintiffs as
Heirs of Aquilino Villar;
2. Dismissing the complaint for lack of merits;
3. Dismissing parties' claim for damages and attorney's fees.
No costs.
The Facts
The present case is rooted in an action for recovery of (1) possession and
ownership of a parcel of land, as well as (2) a sum of money and damages.
Before the RTC of Roxas City on May 15, 1989, this case was originally
filed against herein petitioner, Jessie Pisueña, by herein respondents, the
heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar represented by Salvador Upod
and Dolores Bautista.4
The CA adopted the trial court's summation of the facts as follows:5
The lot in dispute, known as Lot 1201, Cadastral 228 of the
Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz, located at Barangay Cabugao,
Municipality of Ivisan, Province of Capiz, is a registered land in the
name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar under Original
Certificate of Title No. 18422, containing an area of 83,536 square
meters, more or less. Petra Unating died on October 1, 1948 while
Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953. The spouses had two
[legitimate] children, namely Felix Villar and Catalina Villar. Felix
Villar died on October 24, 1962, while Catalina Villar died on
February 21, 1967.1âwphi1.nêt
For the purpose of this case, Felix Villar is represented by Dolores
Villar Bautista, the eldest of his four children while Catalina Villar
is represented by Salvador Villar Upod, the eldest of her three (3)
children, all as plaintiffs [herein respondents].
134
Defendant [herein petitioner], Jessie Pisueña, is the son-in-law of
Agustin Navarra who was once a [m]unicipal [m]ayor of the
Municipality of Ivisan. Agustin Navarra died on October 30, 1958.
The land in question was a subject of court litigations between
Dolores Bautista and Salvador Upod on one hand, and defendant
Jessie Pisueña on the other. Thus, when Salvador Upod filed a
petition for reconstitution of its title in Reconstitution Case No.
1408 before Branch I, then Court of First Instance of Capiz,
defendant Jessie Pisueña filed his opposition. Nevertheless, the
title was reconstituted in the name of the registered owners
pursuant to the resolution of the court dated August 6, 1980 and
it now has a reconstituted title under OCT No. RO-6316 (18422)
in the name of the original registered owners.
Defendant Jessie Pisueña filed a petition for the surrender of
withheld owner's duplicate certificate of title under Special Case
No. 4610 against Salvador Upod, et. al. for [Quieting] of Title and
Damages with Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction before
this court then presided by Hon. Odon C. Yrad, Jr. who dismissed
said complaint on August 27, 1984.
Plaintiffs' evidence further show[s] that Salvador Upod and
Dolores Bautista filed a complaint for ejectment with damages
against defendant Jessie, Pisueña and Norberto Tugna before, the
Municipal Court of Ivisan as Civil Case No. 94.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs [respondents herein] contend that during the lifetime of
the registered owners, Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, they
enjoyed the absolute ownership and possession of Lot No. 1201.
However, sometime in 1950 (after the death of Petra Unating on
October 1, 1948) Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership
agreement for ten (10) years with Agustin Navarra involving the
swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of around four
(4) hectares. It was agreed that the area of around three (3)
hectares shall further be developed into a fishpond while about
one (1) hectare shall be converted into a fishpond with the
investment capital of Agustin Navarra. Whatever excess there was
in the capital so invested shall be used to make the fishpond
productive. Parties agreed that the net income after deducting
expenses shall be divided equally between Aquilino Villar and his
co-heirs on one hand and Agustin Navarra on the other. The
upland portion of the land was not included in the transaction,
hence it remained in the possession of the plaintiffs. While alive,
Agustin Navarra, who managed the partnership, religiously gave
Aquilino Villar and his co-heirs their share. This arrangement
continued until Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953.
Thereafter, his share in the income of the partnership was
delivered by Agustin Navarra to Felix Villar and Catalina Villar.
Since Agustin Navarra died in 1958, Felix and Catalina Villar
repossessed the land in question. They maintained their
possession up to the time Felix and Catalina Villar died.
Thereafter, the children of Felix and Catalina Villar continued the
possession of their predecessor-in-interest until the defendant
disturbed their possession sometime in 1974. However, in 1975,
they regained physical possession of the disputed area. From
1975, there were intermittent disturbances and intrusions of their
physical possession of the land in dispute by the defendant
particularly the fishpond portion consisting of about four (4)
hectares more or less which resulted [in] the filing of cases against
one and the other as earlier stated.
Sometime in 1982, the defendant in the company of several men
including policemen, wrested physical possession from the
plaintiffs which possession of the defendant continued up to the
present. Hence, this complaint for its recovery particularly the
fishpond portion.
On the other hand, defendant counters that the whole land in
dispute was sold by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin
Navarra on February 2, 1949. The contract in Spanish captioned
"ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA" to evidence such sale was
duly notarized by Jose Villagracia, Notary Public, and was entered
in his Notarial Register as Document No. 517; Page 7; Book IV;
Series of 1949.
135
 On December 31, 1968, which [was] more than ten (10) years
after the death of Agustin Navarra on October 30, 1958, his heirs
executed a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition and Deed of Sale of the
land in question in favor of the Spouses Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie
Navarra. The document was notarized by Jose P. Brotarly, Notary
Public, and docketed in his notarial register as Document No. 409;
Page 83; Book No. VI; Series of 1968. From the time of the sale up
to the present, the fishpond portion was in the possession of the
spouses Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra. However, the upland
portion is in the possession of Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista
by mere tolerance of the defendant. The latter denies any
partnership agreement o[n] the fishpond portion by Agustin
Navarra, their predecessor-in-interest, and the plaintiffs.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 24, 1992, the trial court ruled that since the disputed lot was the
conjugal property of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, its
purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra could be
considered valid. The court, however, ruled that its validity pertained only
to the share of the late Petra Unating, considering that at the time of the
sale, Aquilino Villar was still alive. It likewise held that the respondents,
as heirs of Aquilino Villar, were entitled to his one-half share in the
disputed lot.
Before the Court of Appeals, Dolores Bautista, and Salvador Upod assailed
the trial court's ruling upholding the validity of the Escritura de Venta
Absoluta. Jessie Pisueña, on the other hand, questioned the court's
conclusion that the subject lot was conjugal. He claimed that it was
paraphernal, and that the Deed of Sale transferred the whole lot to Agustin
Navarra, his predecessor-in-interest.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling in toto, holding that
the disputed lot belonged to the conjugal partnership of Petra Unating and
Aquilino Villar, viz.:
Anent the first issue, defendant argues that Lot. 1201 was a
paraphernal property of Petra Unating. In support of his
argument, he mentions the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Capiz in Reconstitution Case No. 1408, where in the dispositive
portion thereof, said court ordered the reconstitution of the
Original and Owner's copy of the Original Certificate of Title
covering Lot 1201 "in the name of Petra Unating, 40 years old,
married to Aquilino Villar, Filipino and residents of Ivisan, Capiz,
having inherited said lot from her mother Margarita Argamaso."
He further argues that the mention of the name Aquilino Villar in
the certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Petra Unating and the same could not convert the property into a
conjugal one.
We are not persuaded. The lower court rejected the statement of
the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Reconstitution Case No.
1408 that Lot 1201 was inherited by Petra Unating from her
mother. We agree with the lower court when it found the phrase
"having inherited said lot from her mother Margarita Argamaso"
as a mere obiter, a finding of fact which we find no justifiable
reason to set aside. It must be considered that the authority of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz to declare Lot 1201 as having been
inherited by Petra Unating from her mother is doubtful. We quote
the pertinent ruling of the lower court, thus:
Reconstitution of a certificate of title [denotes] restoration
of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or
destroyed in its original form and condition. It is limited to
the reconstitution of the certificate as it stood at the time
of its loss or destruction and should not be stretched to
include later changes which alter or affect the title of the
registered owner. The original registered owner of Lot
1201 being Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. [That
t]he title should be reconstituted in the same names and
findings of said court as to the ownership of the land as
paraphernal property of Petra Unating is an obiter. It
therefore did not decide whether Lot 1201 is a
paraphernal or a conjugal property of the registered
owners.
136
 We further agree with the lower court when it held that "in the
absence [o]f any evidence o[f] any system [o]f property relation
between Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, it is presumed that it
is one of conjugal partnership." Besides, it appears that Lot 1201
was acquired during the marriage of the Spouses Petra Unating
and Aquilino Villar, since the Original Certificate of Title indicates
that Lot 1201 was registered in the name of Petra
Unating, married to Aquilino Villar. Thus, the property is
presumed conjugal.
In resolving the question of presumption of conjugality, the
Supreme Court had occasion to rule that:
The presumption is a strong one. As stated in Camia de
Reyes v. Reyes de Ilano (63 Phil. 629, 639), "it is sufficient
to prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal
property." And in Laluan v. Malpaya (65 Phil 494, 504), we
stated, "proof of acquisition of the property in dispute
during the marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative." (Mendoza vs. Reyes, 124 SCRA
154; emphasis supplied).
Additionally, defendant Pisueña, who brought up the question of
Lot 1201 being the paraphernal property of Petra Unating failed
to adduce convincing and concrete evidence that would rebut the
presumption of conjugality of the subject lot. Moreover, it is
settled that registration alone of the property in the name of one
of the spouses does not destroy the conjugal nature of the
property. (Mendoza vs. Reyes, supra and Bucoy vs. Paulino, 23
SCRA 248).
The Court of Appeals also rejected Salvador Upod's attack on the Escritura
de Venta Absoluta, reasoning that the Deed of Sale was duly notarized and
that no evidence was presented to rebut its due execution, validity and
admissibility as evidence. Furthermore, the appellate court noted that the
respondents were aware of the nature and the content of the assailed
Deed, and that they did not object to its translation given in the trial court.
Likewise, the CA debunked Upod's contention that Pisueña's cause of
action had prescribed. It ruled:
On the fourth issue, plaintiff Salvador Upod contends that
defendant Pisueña could no longer enforce his right since Article
1144 of the Civil Code provides that an action based upon a
written contract must be brought within ten years from the time
the right of action accrues.
The contention is not meritorious. It is obvious that the above-
mentioned article does not apply in the case at bench since
defendant Pisueñas [was] not the one who filed the complaint.
Furthermore, defendant is in possession of the fishpond portion
of the property in dispute. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the
aforementioned article is applicable, the claim of defendant
Pisueña has not yet prescribed. Defendant Pisueña obtained his
right over Lot 1201 by virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
and Deed of Sale dated December 31, 1968. In 1974, within the ten
year prescriptive period, he filed his Answer to the complaint for
ejectment filed by plaintiffs[,] (Exh. "G") raising therein his
ownership over Lot 1201. Also, he filed his Opposition (Exh. "U")
to the petition for reconstitution filed by plaintiff Salvador Upod.
To our minds, this action and [the] leadings filed by defendant
Pisueña interrupted the prescriptive period.
Anent the fifth issue, plaintiff Salvador Upod posits that the trial
court failed to consider the decision of this court dated January 31,
1985 in AC-UDK Sp. No. 2273 which passed upon the defendant-
appellant's rights over the subject property.
A perusal of this Court's decision in said case (Exh. "P") shows
that, contrary to plaintiffs['] allegation, this Court thru Mr. Justice
Purisima did not pass upon the rights of defendant Pisueña over
Lot 1201. We take note that while the "petition for Review" of the
defendant was dismissed by this Court, the dismissal was
anchored on the ground that 1) Petition for Review was not the
appropriate remedy; 2) the summary proceedings for the
surrender of the owner's duplicate provided for under Section
107 of P.D. 1529 or Section 112 of Act 496 is unavailing as there
137
 [exist] serious conflicting claims of ownership; and 3) the
ordinary civil action for quieting of title to Lot 1201 is not the
proper remedy, since it is only the registered owner of the
property affected who can sue as plaintiff. Clearly, the dismissal of
said petition did not have any effect on the present case.
xxx xxx xxx
However, we agree with the plaintiffs' statement that the law
applicable is the Old Civil Code, considering that Petra Unating
died in 1948 before the effectivity in 1950 of the New Civil Code.
Suffice it to say that we agree with the lower court when it ruled
citing Prades vs. Tecson (49 Phil 479) and Rodriguez
v. Borromeo (43 Phil 479) that "when a spouse dies and the
conjugal assets are not liquidated, a co-ownership over said assets
may be formed among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the
decedent." Absent any showing that there are debts and charges
against the conjugal assets, we therefore declare Aquilino Villar,
the surviving spouse of Petra Unating, as the owner of the
undivided one-half of their conjugal property, while their
children, Felix and Catalina Villar, are the owners of the other
undivided half, pursuant to Article 1426 of the Old Civil Code. . . .
In all, the CA agreed with the trial court that the disputed lot should be
divided equally between the heirs of Petra Unating on the one hand, and
Jessie Pisueña on the other.
Asserting full ownership over the disputed property and claiming that the
CA erred in ruling that Felix and Catalina could have sold only their one-
half share in the property, Petitioner Pisueña filed this Petition for
Review.6
Issues
Petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following specific errors:
I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of
the lower court that the phrase "having inherited said lot from her
mother Margarita Argamaso" [i]s a mere obiter.
II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Lot 1201
belongs to the conjugal [partnership] of Petra Unating and
Aquilino Villar.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
Both the CA and the RTC held that the disputed lot was conjugal and
dismissed, as obiter, the phrase "having inherited said lot from her [Petra
Unating's] mother, Margarita Argamaso" found in the dispositive portion
of the Decision of the Court of First Insurance (CFI) of Capiz in
Reconstitution Case No. 1408. They explained that the CFI had no
authority to include the phrase, because the only objective of
reconstitution was to "restore the certificate covering the property as it
stood at the time of its loss or destruction, and should not be stretched to
include later changes which alter of affect the title of the registered
owner."7
We do not agree. It must be emphasized that the dispositive portion of the
1930 Decision, which was rendered by the same CFI of Capiz acting as a
cadastral court, already contained the questioned phrase. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the CFI in 1980 exceeded its authority when it ordered
the reconstitution, in Petra Unating's name, of the original certificate of
title covering the disputed lot or in stating therein that she had inherited
it from her mother. After all, such disposition was copied from the same
court's 1930 Decision, as evidenced by an authentic copy of it on file with
the Bureau of Lands in Capiz.
Cadastral proceedings are proceedings in rem; like ordinary registration
proceedings, they are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure
and evidence.8 A cadastral decree and a certificate of title are issued only
after the applicants prove that they are entitled to the claimed lots, all
parties are heard, and evidence is considered.
138
Thus, the finding of the cadastral court that Petra Unating inherited the
lot in question from her mother cannot be dismissed as an obiter, which
is "an observation by the court not necessary to the decision
rendered."9 The conclusion of the cadastral court was found in the
dispositive portion of its Decision, and it was material to the nature of
Petra Unating's ownership of the lot. Furthermore, it was based on the
evidence presented by the parties and considered by the said court. In any
event, it must be pointed out that the Decision became final a long time
ago, and a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding, or any other in
rem proceeding for that matter, is binding and conclusive upon the whole
world.10 Therefore, the lot in dispute can properly be considered as a
paraphernal property of Petra Unating.11
Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be
conjugal. However, this prima facie presumption cannot prevail over the
cadastral court's specific finding, reached in adversarial proceedings, that
the lot was inherited by Petra Unating from her mother. Noteworthy is the
fact that the parties do not assail the validity of the cadastral court's
Decision. The 1980 reconstitution of the title to the lot in the name of
"Petra Unating, 40 years old, married to Aquilino Villar, Filipino and
resident of Ivisan, Capiz, having inherited said lot from her mother
Margarita Argamaso . . ." was notice to the world, including her heirs and
successors-in-interest, that it belonged to Petra as her paraphernal
property. Thus, the words "married to" were merely descriptive of Petra
Unating's status at the time the lot was awarded and registered in her
name.12
Second Issue:
Efficacy of the Escritura de Venta Absoluta
Petitioner Jessie Pisueña traces his claim over the disputed lot to his
father-in-law, Agustin Navarra, who in turn acquired it on February 4,
1949 from Felix and Catalina Villar, Petra Unating's children. His claim is
evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale written in Spanish,
captioned Escritura de Venta Absoluta. Private Respondent Salvador
Upod, on the other hand, asserts that both the trial and the appellate
courts erred in admitting the Deed, citing Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, which provides:
Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted
as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or
Filipino. To avoid interruption of the proceedings, parties or their
attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before
trial.
We do not agree. Instead, we uphold the Court of Appeals' disquisition,
which we quote:
The assertion is without merit. The aforementioned rule is not
always taken literally so long as there was no prejudice caused to
the opposing party (People v. Salison, G.R. No. 115690, February
20, 1996). The records show that there was no prejudice caused
to the plaintiffs who appear to be familiar with the contents or the
nature of Exhibit "1". As proof thereof, they even questioned the
defendant on the subject document. Importantly, when required
by the court to comment on the English translation of Exhibit "1"
(p. 316, records) plaintiffs did not bother to comment giving rise
to the presumption that the translation submitted was correct (p.
340, records). Hence, the court a quo did not err in admitting
the Escritura de Venta Absoluta.13
Furthermore, the respondents were not able to impugn the due execution
and validity of the notarized Deed.
Neither are we persuaded by Upod's argument that the petitioner's right
has prescribed under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.14 It is undisputed that
he was already in possession of the fishpond when the present case was
filed.
Petitioner and His Wife Are Owners of the Disputed Lot
As already shown, the disputed lot was paraphernal. Since Petra Unating
did not leave any other property, will or debt upon her demise in 1948,
the property in question was thus inherited by her children, Felix and
Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino Villar.15 The two children were
entitled to the two-thirds of their mother's estate,16 while the husband
was entitled to the remaining one-third.17
139
By virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina effectively
transferred to Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, their title over their
two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However, they could not have
disposed of their father's share in the same property at the time, as they
were not yet its owners. At the most, being the only children, they had an
inchoate interest in their father's share.
When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-third
share in the disputed property, Felix and Catalina's inchoate interest in it
was actualized, because succession vested in them the title to their
father's share and, consequently, to the entire lot. Thus, that title passed
to Agustin Navarra, pursuant to Article 1434 of the present Civil Code,
which was already in force at the time of Aquilino's death in 1953. This
provision reads:
When a person who is not the owner of the thing sells or alienates
or delivers it, and later, the seller or grantor acquires title thereto,
such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
The aforequoted article was applied in Llacer v. Muñoz,18 Estoque
v. Pajimula,19 Bucton v. Gabar20 and Quijada v. Court of Appeal.21 In each of
these cases, the Court upheld the validity of the sale by one who
previously did not have, but who subsequently acquired, title to the
property sold.
Thus, although Felix and Catalina Villar were not yet the owners of the
remaining one third of the disputed lot when they sold to Agustin Navarra
on February 4, 1949, they became its owners upon their father's death on
January 14, 1953. Pursuant to Article 1434, the title to the lot passed to
Agustin Navarra.22 It must be noted that at the time Felix and Catalina
executed the Deed of Sale covering the disputed lot, they intended to sell
the entire lot, not just their interest therein, as can be gleaned from a
pertinent portion of the Deed, the English translation of which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
DESCRIPTION
A piece of mangrove and coconut grove land (Lot. No. 1201 of
Cadastre of Ivisan), and its improvements, situated in the
Municipality of Ivisan, Capiz; that is bounded N to Dapdap Creek;
E. to Lot No. 1196, Sunsunan Creek; and S to Lots Nos. 1239 and
1151; and W to Dapdap Creek YB B.M. No. 21; and containing an
area of Eighty Three Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Six square
meters (83,536 sq. mts.) more or less; declared under Tax No. 609
and valued/appraised at P490.00.
xxx xxx xxx
And finally, we make known, that from/on this date we hand over
the said property, its possession/holding and absolute dominion
of the aforesaid piece of land to the buyer, namely Mr. Agustin
Navarra, his heirs and assignees, free from liens and
liabilities/obligations, and of such title we promise and assure to
defend now and always against all possible just claims/demands
and claimants or those that may present them.
xxx xxx x x x23
Consequently, upon the death of Aquilino Villar, the ownership of the
whole of Lot No. 1201 became vested in Jessie Pisueña and his wife.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision
is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jessie Pisueña and his wife, Rosalie Navarra, are
hereby declared the owners of Lot. No. 1201, Cadastral 228 of the
Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz. The Register of Deeds of Capiz is AUTHORIZED
to cancel the Original Certificate of Title in the name of Petra Unating and
to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Spouses Jessie
Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
140
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31618 August 17, 1983
EFREN R. MENDOZA and INOCENCIA R. DE MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
PONCIANO S. REYES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-31625 August 17, 1983
JULIA R. DE REYES, petitioner,
vs.
PONCIANO S. REYES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Conrado B. Enriquez and Elpidio G. Navarro for petitioners.
Pacifico M. Castro for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Questioned in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari is the
decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court,
reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch. The dispositive portion of the appellate decision reads:
WHEREFORE, (a) the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed; (b) the deed of sale executed by appellee Julia de
Reyes on March 3, 1961 in favor of appellees Efren V.
Mendoza and Inocencia R. Mendoza, covering lots 5 and 6,
Block No. 132 of Subdivision Plan Psd. 14841, situated at
Retiro Street, Quezon City, is hereby declared null and void
with respect to one- half share of appellant therein; (c) the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to
cancel TCT Nos. 5611 0 and 56111, now covering said lots,
and to issue, in lieu thereof, certificates of title in favor of
appellant Ponciano S. Reyes for one-half (1/2) pro-
indiviso and the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia
Mendoza for one-half (1/2) also pro-indiviso; (d) the
appellees Mendozas are hereby ordered to pay unto the
appellant the accrued rentals of style properties in
litigation due to the share corresponding to said appellant,
at the rate of P350.00 a month from March 3, 1961 until
the finality of this decision, with legal interest thereon;
and (e) said appellees are likewise ordered to pay unto the
appellant the amount of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00)
PESOS as attorney's fees, plus the costs in both instances.
This case originated with the filing of a complaint by Ponciano S. Reyes
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal docketed as Civil Case No. Q-6905,
for the annulment of a deed of sale of two parcels of land with their
improvements, executed by his wife, Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the
spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees.
Ponciano S. Reyes averred that said properties were conjugal properties
of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by
herself" and without his knowledge or consent.
Petitioners Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza alleged in their
answer that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia R. de
Reyes and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for
adequate consideration. In a separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De Reyes,
supported the spouses Mendozas' contentions.
In its decision, the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the complaint
and declared the properties in question exclusive and paraphernal
properties of petitioner Julia R. De Reyes. It ruled that she could validly
dispose of the same without the consent of her husband and that the
Mendozas are innocent purchasers.
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the court a
quo.
141
The petitioners filed separate petitions for review on certiorari. Efren V.
Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza raised the following assignments
of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED NOT MERELY IN GIVING
CREDENCE, BUT IN FACT IN CONSIDERING AT ALL,
PROOF OF THE ALLEGED CONJUGAL CHARACTER OF THE
PROPERTIES l-, QUESTION, AND IN NOT INVOKING THE
DOCTRINE -E OF ESTOPPEL TO RULE OUT ANY AND ALL
SUCH PROOF ALTOGETHER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
PETITIONERS GUILTY OF BAD FAITH IN PURCHASING
THE PROPERTIES LITIGATED FOR WITHOUT EVIDENCE
OF SUCH FACT BEING PRESENTED AND, ON THE
STRENGTH MERELY OF A SIMPLE PRESUMPTION
UNWARRANTEDLY DRAWN FROM ONE OF ITS OWN
OBSCURE AND HARDLY AUTHORITATIVE RULINGS, AND
AGAINST ABUNDANT, POSITIVE AND UNCONTRADICTED
PROOF OF GOOD FAITH.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED UPON EQUITABLE
GROUNDS IN, IN EFFECT, GIVING JUDICIAL FLAT To THE
UNJUST ENRICHMENT OR BENEFIT OF ONE PERSON AT
THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER OR OTHERS.
On the other hand, Julia R. De Reyes made the following assignments of
errors in her petition for review.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES OF THE RESPONDENT PONCIANO S. REYES
AND THE PETITIONER IN SPITE OF THE CATEGORICAL
JUDICIAL DECLARATION AND ADMISSION BY SAID
RESPONDENT THAT THE SAID PROPERTIES ARE THE
EXCLUSIVE AND PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES OF HIS
WIFE, THE PETITIONER HEREIN.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING DECIDED
THE CASE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS ON THE MATTER IN THE SENSE,
PARTICULARLY, THAT THE ACT AND DECLARATION OF
A PARTY AGAINST HIS INTERESTS CAN NOT BE
CONTRADICTED BY HIM, AND IN SO DOING THE
DECISION AMOUNTED TO SANCTIONING A PERJURED
TESTIMONY.
On the first issue regarding the alleged paraphernal character of the
disputed properties, we find that the records sustain the findings of the
Court of Appeals
The fact are:
xxx xxx xxx
... Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes-to be herein referred
to as Ponciano and Julia alone for brevity-were married in
1915. The properties in question consisting of Lots 5 and
6, Block No. 132, situated at Retiro Street, Quezon City-
plus the buildings erected thereon, were bought from J. M.
Tuason & Co., represented by Gregorio Araneta, Inc. to be
herein mentioned as "Araneta"-February, 1947 on
installment basis. (Testimony of Julia, t.s.n., p. 74,
February 15, 1963). The first installment on Lot No. 5 was
P69.96 and on Lot No. 6 was P102.00 (Exh. 'H' and
uncontradicted testimony of Ponciano, t.s.n., p. 4, July 20,
1964).
The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of the
installments to Araneta due to lack of money (t.s.n., pp. 5-
7, July 20, 1964) so they had to borrow money from the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation-herein after referred
142
to as RFC for short. Thus, on November 26, 1948, they
jointly obtained a loan of P12,000.00 from the RFC for the
following exclusive purposes only: 'to complete the
construction of one-storey residential building on 9th
Street, La Loma Quezon City; and to pay the balance of the
price of the lot offered as security' which is Lot 5, (Deed of
Mortgage, Exh. 'A') l'). Out of this loan, the amount of
P5,292.00 was paid to Araneta as price of Lot 5. The
corresponding deed of absolute sale thereof was executed
by Araneta on November 27, 1948 (Exh. 'A'). On October
2, 1952, the spouses secured an additional loan of
P8,000.00 from the RFC 'to pay the balance of the lot
herein offered (Lot No. 6) as additional security, and to
defray the expenses incurred in the repairs of the building'
as the deed of mortgage so recites (Exh. 'B- l'). From the
amount of this loan, the sum of P7,719.60, as price of Lot
No. 6, was paid and the deed of absolute sale was forthwith
executed by Araneta (Exh. 'B'). In the deed of sale, the
vendee named is 'Julia de Reyes'. Her signatures appear
over the caption vendee and those of Ponciano under the
phrase: 'with my marital consent.
As a result of these sales, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
8550 (Exh. 'F') and 19998 (Exh. 'G') were issued for Lots 5
and 6, respectively, by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, in the name of "JULIA REYES married to PONCIANO
REYES." The mortgage contracts (Exhs. 'A-1' and 'B-1')
executed by the spouses in favor of the RFC were duly
registered and annotated on the said transfer Certificates
of Title (Exhs. 'F' and 'G').
As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a house and later
a camarin on the two lots. The camarin was leased as a
school building to the Quezon City Elementary School of
La Loma for the period of two years (1950-51) at P500.00
a month. When the school was transferred to another
place, the camarin was leased on December 10, 1952 to
Mr. and Mrs. Mendoza, appellees, for ten years at P600.00
a month for the first year and P700.00 for the remaining
nine years. The contract of lease was signed by Julia as
lessor, with the marital consent of Ponciano. The camarin
was converted into a movie house and used as such by the
lessees. (Exh. 'G').
In spite of the good rentals they had been receiving for the
building, the spouses failed to pay seasonably their
obligations to the RFC so, as late as November 28, 1958,
they had to ask for an extension of 5 years from the
Development Bank of the Philippines or DBP, as successor
of the RFC, for the payment of an outstanding balance of
P7,876.13 (Exh. 'D').
On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending
his farm in Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold absolutely the lots
in question, together with their improvements to
appellees Mendozas for the sum of P80,000.00 without the
knowledge and consent of Ponciano (Exh. 'I'-Mendoza). At
the same time the spouses were living separately and
were not in speaking terms. By virtue of such sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 561 10 and 56111 were
subsequently issued in the name of the Mendozas.
The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which
provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership
property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
xxx xxx xxx
The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be
overcome by one who contends that the disputed property is paraphernal
Article 160 provides:
143
 ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The presumption is a strong one. As stated in Camia de Reyes v. Reyes de
Ilano (63 Phil. 629, 639), "it is sufficient to prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage in order that the same may be deemed
conjugal property." And in Laluan v. Malpaya (65 SCRA 494, 504) we
stated, "proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the marriage
suffices to render the statutory presumption operative."
There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous
title during the marriage. But were the funds used to buy the lot and build
the improvements at the expense of the common fund?
The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses
from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the
Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the
wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the
partnership.
As stated in Castillo, Jr. vs. Pasco (1 1 SCRA 102, 107):
... The position thus taken by appellants is meritorous, for
the reason that the deeds show the loans to have been
made by Dr. Nicanor Jacinto and by Gabriel and
Purificacion Gonzales, to both spouses Marcelo Castillo
and Macaria Pasco, as joint borrowers. The loans thus
became obligations of the conjugal partnership of both
debtor spouses and the money loaned is logically conjugal
property.
Citing Palanca v. Smith Bell & Co. (9 Phil. 13 1) interpreting Par. 3, Article
1401 of the old Civil Code, the Court in Castillo v. Pasco stated:
If money borrowed by the husband alone on the security
of his wife's property is conjugal in character, a
fortiori should it be conjugal when borrowed by both
spouses. The reason obviously is that the loan becomes an
obligation of the conjugal partnership which is the one
primarily bound for its repayment.
To rebut the presumption and the evidence of the conjugal character of
the property, the petitioners have only the testimony of Julia de Reyes to
offer.
Mrs. Reyes testified that she bought the two parcels of land on installment
basis and that the first payment of a little less than P2,000.00 came from
her personal funds: The receipt issued by Araneta, however, shows that
the first installment on one lot was only P69.96 and on the other lot,
P102.00. Mrs. Reyes also testified that she paid the entire purchase price
and the construction of the buildings from her personal funds and money
borrowed from the Philippine National Bank. The mortgage contracts,
however, show that the properties were paid out of the loan from RFC.
As a matter of fact, Mrs. Reyes' testimony about a loan from Mrs. Rosa
Borja, the sale of a lot in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija given by her mother, and the
loan from PNB only emphasize the conjugal nature of the disputed
properties because she stated that these sums were also used to put up
their gravel and sand business, a poultry farm, and a banana plantation
plus a jeepney transportation line although according to her, every
business venture handled by her husband failed. The two were
establishing businesses and buying properties together as husband and
wife, in happier times.
The Court of Appeals ruled upon the testimony of Julia De Reyes as
follows:
Julia's testimony that she had sold her Cabiao property to
Rosa Borja is not supported by the deed of sale (Exh. 'I')
which shows that the property was sold to Encarnacion
Goco and Mariano Robles. Again, her claim that said
Cabiao property was donated to her by her mother is
negated by the deeds of sale (Exhs. 'J' and 'K') which show
that said property was donated to her and her two
brothers, Pablo and Jose del Rosario, who afterwards sold
their participation thereof to the spouses, Ponciano and
Julia.
144
 Her claim of exclusive ownership is further belied by the
Income Tax Returns (Exhs. 'N' to 'N'- 3') which she herself
prepared and filed in behalf of the conjugal partnership
wherein she made the statement that the rentals paid by
her co-appellees were income of the conjugal partnership;
and by the Income Tax Returns (Exhs. 'O' to '0-4') also filed
by her for the conjugal partnership, were she made to
appear the properties in question as capital assets of the
conjugal partnership. It should be noted that Julia did not
care to deny the truth of said statements. Neither did she
endeavor to offer any explanation for such damaging
averments.
Petitioners also raised the issue of estoppel in their assignments of errors.
They alleged:
Even so, petitioners would have small legal cause to
dispute the respondent Court's giving credence to the
husband's pretensions did there not also exist in the
record plain and indisputable evidence that he had on a
former occasion both solemnly confirmed the paraphernal
character of the very properties now in question and
disclaimed the existence of any conjugal partnership
funds or properties of himself and his wife. (Petitioner's
Brief, L-31616, p. 7).
It turns out that in 1948, Ponciano Reyes was sued in the then Municipal
Court of Manila for ejectment from a leased hotel that he was then
operating. Judgment was rendered against Reyes in favor of the lessors,
the brothers named Gocheco Having failed in a bid to garnish the rentals
of the disputed buildings because the municipal court stated that it had no
jurisdiction to decide the paraphernal or conjugal nature of the
properties, the Gocheco brothers filed Civil Case No. 24772 for revival of
judgment with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
It was in this latter case where Mr. Reyes stated in his special defenses
that he and his wife never had any kind of fund which could be called
conjugal partnership funds, that they acted independently from one
another whenever either one engaged in any business, and-
That the herein plaintiff has not limited his action in the
present case against defendant Ponciano S. Reyes as he did
in the original case above-mentioned, that is, Civil Case No.
7524 of the Manila Municipal Court which the instant case
derived from, but has included the defendant's wife Julia
Reyes, with the only intended purpose and design of going
over and against the paraphernal properties of said Julia
Reyes. (par. 4, Special Defenses, Answer, Exh. II;
Petitioner's Brief, L-31618, pp. 9-10).
Article 1437 of the Civil Code on estoppel involving immovable property
provides:
Art. 1437. When in a contract between third persons
concerning immovable property, one of them is misled by
a person with respect to the ownership or real right over
the real estate, the latter is precluded from asserting his
legal title or interest therein, provided all these requisites
are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful
concealment of facts known to the party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should
act upon the facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true
facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance
with the representation.
The principle of estoppel rests on the rule that whenever a party has, by
his declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led the
other to believe a particular thing true and to act, upon such belief he
cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it. (Sotto v. Teves, 86 SCRA 154.)
145
Estoppel can only be invoked between the person making the
misrepresentation and the person to whom it was addressed. It is
essential that the latter shag have relied upon the misrepresentation and
had been influenced and misled thereby.
There is no showing that the respondent had intentionally and
deliberately led the petitioners Mendozas to believe what was contained
in the pleading, "Exh. 11", and to make them act upon it. As observed by
the respondent, they were not even a party in the case where the said
pleadin was filed. Neither is there any assertion by the Mendozas that the
said pleading was shown to them or that they happened to see it or to have
any knowledge about it before they purchased the properties in question.
The alleged representation was never addressed to the petitioners, much
less made with the intention that they would act upon it. Moreover, there
is no specific and clear reference to the disputed lots as paraphernal in the
cited answer. The petitioners cannot invoke estoppel in these petitions.
May the Mendoza spouses be considered buyers in good faith?
The proof that the petitioners in L-31618 are purchasers in good faith
comes from the testimony of Mrs. Inocencia Mendoza herself. Mrs.
Mendoza testified that Mrs. Julia R. De Reyes assured her that the
properties were paraphernal that her lawyer verified the titles being in
the name of Mrs. Julia R. De Reyes, and that she never dealt with Mr.
Ponciano Reyes when she and her husband were still renting the
properties they later purchased. On cross-examination, Mrs. Mendoza
admitted that she learned of the RFC mortgage when the lots were about
to be purchased.
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal and the
fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses
does not destroy its conjugal nature. (Bucoy v. Paulino, 23 SCRA 249).
Section 46 of P.D. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, reiterates the
proviso in Section 70 of the former Land Registration Act that registration
cannot be construed to relieve registered land or the owners thereof from
any rights incident to the relation of husband and wife. (See also: Marigsa
v. Macabuntoc 17 Phil. 107, 109; Romero de Pratts v. Menzi & Co., Inc., 53
Phil. 51, 54; Padilla v. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377, 382-384; Vitug v. Montemayor,
91 Phil. 286, 290, 291, citing Guinguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144; Sideco v.
Aznar, 92 Phil. 952, 961-962, citing Flores v. Flores, 48 Phil. 288; Guinoo
v. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 235, 238; Silos v. Ramos, 97 Phil. 263,
270, citing Commonwealth v. Sandiko 72 Phil. 258, 260; and Alvarez v.
Espiritu, 14 SCRA 893).
If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the
name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither
does registration in the name of the wife. Any person who buys land
registered in the married name of the wife is put on notice about its
conjugal nature.
The mortgage contracts (Exhs. "A-1 " and "B-1 ") executed by the spouses
Ponciano S. Reyes and Julia Reyes in favor of RFC were duly registered in
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and seasonably annotated on
transfer certificates of title Nos. 8550 (Exh. "F") and 19998 (Exh. "G"),
which were issued in the name of Julia Reyes "married to Ponciano
Reyes". Their dates of inscription were November 29, 1948 and October
11, 1952, respectively. On December 10, 1952, the lots and the building
were leased by Julia, with the marital consent of Ponciano to the
petitioners Mendozas The contract of lease was registered in the Registry
of Deeds and was annotated in the transfer certificates of title on May 5,
1952. At that time, the RFC mortgages were already noted at the back of
the transfer certificates of title. The petitioners, therefore, are
unquestionably charged with notice of the existence and contents of said
mortgages, their joint execution by the spouses Ponciano Reyes and Julia
Reyes and the application of the loans to the payment to Araneta of the
purchase price of the lots in question.
Furthermore, the consent of the Ponciano Reyes to the mere lease of the
properties was demanded by the Mendozas allegedly for their own
protection, yet when it came to the deed of sale which entailed a greater
transfer of rights such consent was not required.
The final argument refers to the alleged unjust enrichment by Ponciano
Reyes if the deed of sale is nullified This petitioners admit that the benefit
including that represented by one-half of the purchase price, accrued not
to the respondent but to his wife. Since Mr. Reyes did not receive any part
of the proceeds of the sale and his wife has been aligning herself with the
146
Mendoza couple, there could be no unjust enrichment as alleged. The
assignments of errors have no merit.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are hereby DENIED

for lack of merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ.,

concur.

147
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18032 November 23, 1922
ELISEO SANTOS, as administrator of Estanislao Santos, plaintiff-
appellant,
vs.
PABLO BARTOLOME, as administrator of Marcela Tizon, defendant-
appellee.
Ramon Diokno, M. Buyson Lampa, and Pedro de Leon for appellant.
Francisco, Lualhati and Del Rosario for appellee.
STREET, J.:
The questions involved in this appeal arise in connection with the
liquidation of the community estate pertaining to the spouses Estanislao
Santos and Marcela Tizon, both of whom are now deceased, and whose
respective estates are now represented before the court by Eliseo Santos,
as administrator of Estanislao Santos, and Pablo Bartolome, as
administrator of Marcela Tizon. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the
question here presented are these: Estanislao Santos and Marcela Tizon
were united in marriage many years ago and lived together as man and
wife in the Province of Pampanga until in the year 1914, when Estanislao
Santos died. The widow, Dña. Marcela Tizon, survived until December,
1917, when she also died. No children appear to have been born to the
pair, and the persons now interested in their properties are the collateral
heirs of the two spouse respectively.
After the death of Estanislao Santos the community property pertaining
to the two spouses came into the possession and under the control of his
administrator, Eliseo Santos, with corresponding duty to collect assets,
pay off the debts, and liquidate the estate according to law. In connection
with the discharge of these duties, said administrator also came into the
possession of certain property pertaining to the widow in her own right,
which he managed to the same extent as the community property itself.
In the course of the proceedings conducted as aforesaid for the settlement
of the estate of Estanislao Santos, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
by order of June 12, 1921, ordered Eliseo Santos, as administrator, to
submit a project for a division of the property pertaining to the estate; and
pursuant to this order the said Eliseo Santos presented such a project,
accompanied by a general inventory. In Base II of this project were
included seven items, lettered respectively (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), ( f ), and
(g), representing certain sums which, it was submitted, constituted valid
charges against Marcela Tizon in the liquidation of the ganancial property.
A more detailed statement concerning these items will be necessary later.
Suffice it at this point to say that opposition to the allowance of these
charges against Marcela Tizon was made by Pablo Bartolome, as her
administrator. At the same time said administrator submitted a counter-
project of partition in which these items were eliminated.
When the two opposing projects of division came under the consideration
of the trial judge, his Honor admitted the property of items (a) and (b) in
the project of partition submitted by Eliseo Santos, and he accordingly
allowed those items as valid charges against Marcela Tizon, though it is
erroneously supposed in the appellant's assignment of errors that he had
disallowed those items. The other items, included in Base II of the same
project and lettered respectively (c), (d), (e), ( f ), and (g), were
disallowed. In thus rejecting the project of Eliseo Santos and adopting the
counter-project of Pablo Bartolome to the extent stated, his Honor
proceeded on the idea that, even assuming the facts regarding these items
to be as claimed, they did not constitute legal charges against Marcela
Tizon; and he accordingly disallowed the same without giving to the
administrator of Estanislao Santos an opportunity to prove said claims in
fact.
From the action thus taken, Eliseo Santos, as administrator appealed, and
in this appeal the heirs of Estanislao Santos have joined. In the form in
which the case is thus brought before us it is apparent that, if we should
arrive at the conclusion that any of the items (c), (d), (e), ( f ), and (g)
represent claims which as a matter of law could constitute valid charges
against Marcela Tizon in the settlement of the ganancial estate, the order
148
appealed from should be reversed as to such item or items and the cause
remanded in order that proof may be submitted with respect thereto.
Four legal questions are thus presented which must be considered in turn.
The first relates to item (c), representing P1,292, said to have been paid
by Estanislao Santos out of the community property to redeem certain
lands belonging to his wife (Marcela Tizon), situated in Bacolor,
Pampanga, which lands had been sold, prior to the marriage, under a
contract of sale with pacto de retro.
Assuming the facts as to this items to be as thus suggested, there can be
no doubt that the amount thus paid out to effect the redemption of the
property should be deducted from the community assets in liquidation,
thereby in effect charging one-half thereof against the portion pertaining
to Marcela Tizon. It is undeniable that when the property to which
reference is here made was redeemed, it remained, as it had been before,
the particular property of Marcela Tizon, for if the right of redemption
pertained to her, so also must the property belong to her after
redemption. (Civ. Code, arts. 1337-2; 1396-3.) And of course where
community assets have been used to effect the redemption, the
community estate becomes creditor to the extent of the amount thus
expended. It follows that, in the liquidation of the community property,
account should be taken of this obligation (arts. 1404, 1419, Civ. Code).
As already stated, the item (c), now under consideration, is identical in
character with items (a) and (b), which were allowed without question by
the trial judge; and the only reason suggested for making any distinction
between this and the items (a) and (b) is that the latter had been
recognized by Judge Moir of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in a
prior litigation between the guardian of Marcela Tizon, then still living,
and the administrator of Estanislao Santos. Into the details of that
proceeding it is unnecessary here to enter. It is enough to say that the
validity of the claim constituting item (c) in the project of division now
under consideration was in no wise brought in question in that litigation
and the fact that it was not recognized in Judge Moir's decision is
immaterial. It results that his Honor the trial judge, erred in the court
below in holding that item (c) could not constitute a legal charge against
the interest of Marcela Tizon in the proceedings for the liquidation of the
ganancial estate of the spouses Estanislao Santos and Marcela
Tizon.lawph!l.net
The second point to be considered relates to item (d) representing the
sum of P3,000, said to have been expended out of the community assets
for the construction of an irrigation system upon the lands of Marcela
Tizon, resulting in an appreciation of their value to the extent of 300 per
centum. In respect to this item also, it is evident that the trial judge fell
into error in holding the claim to be inadmissible against the estate of
Marcela Tizon. An irrigation system beneficial to real property is a useful
expenditure with the contemplation of article 1404 of the Civil Code and,
if financed from the community assets, is chargeable against the party
benefit when the time comes for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
The third point to be considered relates to item (e), representing the sum
of P7,140.97, expended by Eliseo Santos, as administrator of Estanislao
Santos, for the support and maintenance of Marcela Tizon during the
period that elapsed between the death of Estanislao Santos and that of
Marcela Tizon herself. It is undeniable that the expense of the
maintenance and support of Marcela Tizon, during widowhood, and while
the conjugal partnership had not as yet been liquidated, was properly
borne by the administrator of the deceased husband, but this expenditure
was in the nature of a mere advancement and under article 1430 of the
Civil Code is to be deducted from the share pertaining to the heirs of
Marcela Tizon in so far as it exceeds what they may have been entitled to
as fruits or income. It results that there was error in the disallowance of
this item. We should add, however, that when this claims is again brought
under the consideration of the trial judge, the administrator of Estanislao
Santos should be required to show the source, or sources, from which the
funds used for the maintenance and support of Marcela Tizon were
derived; and if it should appear that any part thereof was derived from
the net income of the proper property of Marcela Tizon, such amount
should not be charged against her heirs, in conformity with the precept of
the article above cited.
The last point to be considered relates to items ( f ), and (g), representing
expenditures of the sums of P1,034.95 and P209.85, respectively. The first
of these represents the costs of purchase, transportation, and erection of
149
a grave stone of Italian marble, placed to the memory of Marcela Tizon.
The second represents the cost of a memorial crown on a porcelain frame,
wit gold lettering, dedicated to the memory of Marcela Tizon. As we
understand the record, these expenditures were incurred just after the
death of Marcela Tizon and at the request of her own administrator, Pablo
Bartolome, there being a verbal agreement between the two
administrator to the effect that Eliseo Santos should advance the
necessary sums for these expenditures, the same to be subsequently
reimbursed by Pablo Bartolome, as administrator of Marcela Tizon. There
can be no doubt whatever as to the property of allowing these items
against the estate of Marcela Tizon in the liquidation of the partnership
property; and his Honor, the trial judge, was mistaken in rejecting the
same.

From an observation contained in the appealed decision we infer that the

action of the trial judge in rejecting the various claims to which reference
has been made was based in part on the idea that said claims should have
been submitted to the committed appointed to appraise the property and
allow claims against the estate of Marcela Tizon in administration, in
conformity with the requirements of section 695, and related provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure. This suggestion is in our opinion untenable
as regards all of said items. Items ( f ) and (g) were not proper to be
submitted to the committee because they relate to expenditures made
after the death of Marcela Tizon; and as regard the other items the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring the presentation of
claims to the committee are not pertinent to proceedings for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

From what has been said it results that the judgment appealed from must
be reversed, and the clause will be remanded for further proceedings in
conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered, without express
pronouncement as to costs.

Araullo, C. J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez,

JJ., concur.

150
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18833 August 14, 1965
HONESTO ALVAREZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PEDRO K. ESPIRITU, defendant-appellee.
Arturo Agustines for plaintiffs-appellants.
Alberto Aguilar for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
The resolution of the issues presented depends on a determination of
whether Lot No. 292 of the Tala Estate was the paraphernal property of
the late Consolacion Evangelista, or whether it was property of her
conjugal partnership with Pedro K. Espiritu.
The lot in question, with an area of 2 hectares, 76 acres and 2 hectares, is
located in Caloocan, Rizal (now Caloocan City). It originally formed part of
the Friar Lands administered under Act No. 1120.
On June 29, 1910, the Director of Lands issued Sales Certificate No. 479 in
favor of Consolacion Evangelista, by virtue of which the government
agreed to sell the lot for P242.04. Under the terms of this certificate, the
amount of P60.04, which had been paid as rentals, was credited in favor
of Consolacion Evangelista and the balance of P182 was to be paid in 18
annual installments, the first installment of P12 to be paid on July 1, 1910
and the rest to be paid every year thereafter in 17 equal installments of
P10 each.
On June 13, 1923, Consolacion Evangelista married Pedro K. Espiritu.
During their marriage, the installments on the price of the lot were paid
with conjugal funds and by 1927 payment on all the installments was
completed. On November 18, of that year, Consolacion Evangelista signed
a deed entitled "Assignment of Sales Certificate No. 279" which recites as
follows:
This agreement, made in duplicate between Consolacion Evangelista, as
ASSIGNOR, and Pedro K. Espiritu as ASSIGNEE.
WITNESSETH: that the said ASSIGNOR, for and in consideration of
the sum of P_______, 1 receipt whereof is acknowledged, hereby
sells, assigns, and transfers to the said ASSIGNEE all right, and
interest in and to lot 292 of the said Estate, acquired under and by
the terms of sales certificate numbered 479 dated June 29, 1910,
together with all buildings and improvements on the said lot
belonging to the said ASSIGNOR.
The said ASSIGNEE hereby accepts the said assignment and
transfer and expressly agrees to be bound by and to keep and
perform all the covenants and condition expressed in the said sale
certificate to be kept and performed by the VENDEE therein.
Following the approval of this assignment by the Director of Lands, the lot
was registered in the name of the spouses and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 14527 was issued to them.
On February 7, 1946, the spouses sold a half portion of the lot to Aniceto
Martin for P3,000, reserving to themselves the right to redeem it within
12 years. However, before they could exercise their right of redemption,
Consolacion Evangelista died on February 21, 1949, leaving a will in
which she bequeathed to her husband her half interest in the remaining
unsold portion of Lot No. 292. She was survived by her husband, Pedro K.
Espiritu, and by plaintiffs Nicasio and Asuncion Evangelista (her brother
and sister, respectively), Honesto and Josefina Alvarez (children of her
deceased sister Eduviges) and Arsenio Evangelista (son of her deceased
brother Rufino).
Pedro K. Espiritu filed Special Proceedings No. 502 in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan for the settlement of his wife's estate. The will was
allowed and Pedro K. Espiritu was appointed executor upon the filing of a
151
bond. Instead of filing a bond and qualifying as executor, Espiritu asked
the court to convert the proceedings into a summary settlement of the
estate on the ground that the value of the properties did not exceed
P3,000. The court granted his motion, heard the case and on November
15, 1954, issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads in part
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby distributes summarily the estate
left by the deceased Consolacion Evangelista and hereby
adjudicates aforesaid estate in accordance with the will, Exhibit C,
of said deceased in the following manner, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) to Pedro K. Espiritu; of legal age, Filipino, married to
Florentina Lopez, and resident of Mabolo, Polo, Bulacan, the
following properties:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) All the one-fourth (1/4) share of the deceased Consolacion
Evangelista in the parcel of land known as Lot No. 292 of the Tala
Estate situated in the Barrio of Llano, Caloocan, Rizal, and
described in Land Tax Declaration No. 12913 (Exhibit B-2), of said
municipality; ... .
Meanwhile, Aniceto Martin, the vendee a retro of the undivided other half
of Lot No. 292, died. His children executed a document on December 4,
1957, stating that "prior to July 7, 1951" Pedro K. Espiritu had paid P3,000
to their father but that death prevented the latter from executing the
corresponding deed of resale. For this reason, they were reconveying to
Pedro K. Espiritu "all their rights, interest, participation and ownership of
whatever nature in said Lot No. 292 (1/2) of the Tala Estate Subdivision
described in T.C.T. No. 14527 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, subject
matter of the Pacto de Retro Sale."
On January 8, 1959, the plaintiffs brought this action against Pedro K.
Espiritu. While their original claim was that the lot was conjugal and,
therefore, they were entitled to one-half (1/2) of it, plaintiffs later
amended their complaint and alleged that the lot was the paraphernal
property of Consolacion Evangelista which she brought to her marriage
with Pedro K. Espiritu. They, therefore, contended that, as heirs of
Consolacion Espiritu, they were entitled to three fourths (3/4) of the lot,
only one-fourth (1/4) having been disposed of in the will. On the other
hand, Pedro K. Espiritu claimed that the lot was their conjugal property,
one-half of which was his share, in addition to one-fourth given to him in
his wife's will. He subsequently died and his second wife, Florentina
Lopez, who is also the administratrix of his estate, substituted for him as
defendant in this case.
On January 5, 1961, the lower court rendered a decision declaring Pedro
K. Espiritu the owner of the entire lot. It explained thus:
... . It is well settled that the property becomes conjugal if the funds
paid by the husband in the later installments were for the purpose
of the acquisition for the partnership the husband acting in his
capacity as administrator of the same. And there is overwhelming
evidence to support this conclusion. The deceased Consolacion
Evangelista had the installments paid by the conjugal funds and
her intention to have it paid not for her exclusive benefit but for
that of the partnership is abundantly demonstrated in the
instruments she executed. The final deed of conveyance was
executed in the name of both spouses and the Torrens Title issued
in their names jointly. In the Deed of Pacto de Retro she alluded to
the land as property owned in common by her and her husband
and not as exclusive property. The real estate taxes were paid out
of the conjugal funds. Again, this intention is clear and manifest
with the subsequent execution of the Deed of Assignment
purportedly conveying the lot in question in favor of the spouses
jointly. Without necessarily passing upon the validity and effect of
said deed, the same indubitably demonstrates the intended
change of the character of the property in question. Finally, in her
last will and testament, Consolacion expressly declared said lot to
be conjugal property.
The Court, therefore, finds and so holds that the lot in question is
conjugal property, both spouses being entitled to an undivided
half share. So that on Feb. 7, 1946, when the same was sold
152
 on pacto de retro, one-half thereof was alienated, of which both
spouses have an undivided equal share (i.e., one-fourth each). The
remaining unsold half, consists of again an undivided equal share
in favor of both spouses (i.e., one-fourth each). This explains why
in the will, Consolacion only bequeathed 1/4 of the lot in favor of
her husband, obviously because she believed that the other
remaining one-fourth is the share of the husband in the conjugal
property.
The whole one-half portion, therefore, remaining prior to the
redemption of the lot in 1957 belongs to the defendant Pedro K.
Espiritu. On the other hand, the Court believes that the other half
portion subsequently redeemed by Pedro K. Espiritu in 1957 with
his own exclusive money also pertains to him in full ownership.
This is the only just and equitable conclusion considering that in
1949 when Consolacion died, the conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved, and considering further that the spouses
manifestly considered the lot in question to have been absolutely
alienated without any intention to redeem the same, and that it
was only in 1947 when the redemption period had almost expired
that the husband on second thought believed it profitable to
redeem the land with his own money and for his own exclusive
benefit. ... .
Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court. Citing the case of Director of Lands
v. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806, they contend that ownership of Lot No. 292 vested
in Consolacion Evangelista upon the issuance to her in 1910 of a sales
certificate, with the result that the lot had become her property long
before her marriage in 1923 to Pedro K. Espiritu.
The point is well taken. Indeed, in Director of Lands v. Rizal, this Court
ruled that under the Friar Lands Act No. 1120, the equitable and beneficial
title to the land passes to the purchaser the moment the first installment
is paid and a certificate of sale is issued. The reservation of the title in
favor of the government, which refers to the bare, naked title, is made
merely for the protection of its interest so that the lot may not be disposed
of by the purchaser before the price is paid in full. But outside of this
protection, the government retains no right as an owner.
Even more in point is the case of Lorenzo v. Nicolas, 91 Phil. 686, in which
this Court held that friar lands bought by a woman before her marriage
were her paraphernal properties, although some of the installments on
their price were paid for with conjugal funds during their marriage. The
conjugal partnership would only be entitled to reimbursement for the
expenses, (Civil Code Art. 1410)
And what of the assignment of the sale certificate which Consolacion
Evangelista made to her husband and herself and the subsequent
registration of the lot in their names? Neither can avail the defendant any.
The assignment of the sales certificate shows very clearly that the lot was
Consolacion Evangelista's exclusive property, else why would she have to
make the assignment? Such an assignment is void — a patent nullity — in
view of articles 1334 and 1458 which prohibit donations and sales
between spouses during the marriage. (See e.g., Uy Coque v. Navas L.
Sioca, 45 Phil. 430).
The lower court's reliance on the certificate of title being issued in the
names of the spouses is misplaced, because sec. 70 of Land Registration
Act provides that "nothing contained in this Act shall in any way be
construed to relieve registered land or the owners thereof from any rights
incident to the relation of husband and wife." Because of the feeling of
trust existing between spouses, certificates of title are often secured in the
names of both, or of either, regardless of the source of the purchase
money. It is thus but fair that on liquidation of the partnership, the trust
should be recognized and enforced, so that the real ownership of the
property may be established. The principle, that a trustee who takes a
Torrens Title in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration, is one of the well-known limitations upon the finality of a
decree of title. (Paterna Vda. de Padilla v. Bibby de Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
Nor do we agree with the lower court's reasoning that because Pedro K.
Espiritu redeemed one-half (1/2) of the lot with his own money, after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, he thereby became its
owner. Lot No. 292 being the paraphernal property of Consolacion
Evangelista before the sale, its redemption must be deemed as having
revested its ownership in the heirs of Consolacion Evangelista. (See
Guinto v. Lim Bonfing, 48 Phil. 884; Santos v. Bartolome, 44 Phil. 76) What
153
Espiritu had on the portion so redeemed was merely a lien for the amount
paid by him.
It is contended, however, that the probate court's order summarily
distributing the estate of Consolacion Evangelista is conclusive on the
conjugal character of Lot No. 292.
The argument has no merit. The general rule is that questions of title to
property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings. The
probate court can decide only provisionally questions of title to property
for the purpose of inclusion into, or exclusion from, the inventory, without
prejudice to a final determination of the question in a separate action. It
is only when the parties interested are all heirs and they agree to submit
to the probate court the question as to title to property that the probate
court may definitely pass judgment thereon. (3 Moran Comments on the
Rules of Court 427 [1963 ed.]) That is why, in Bernardo v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963, we upheld the power of the probate
court to adjudicate in the testate proceedings the question as to whether
the properties therein involved belonged to the conjugal partnership or
to the deceased exclusively.
In this case, however, there is no such agreement among the heirs to
submit for determination of the probate court the question of whether or
not Lot No. 292 was conjugal partnership property. If this point was at all
considered by the probate court of Bulacan, it was only provisionally, for
inventory purposes, and certainly without prejudice to the final
determination of the question in a separate action such as this one.
We, therefore, hold that Lot No. 292 was the paraphernal property of
Consolacion Evangelista. Since only one-fourth (1/4) of this lot had been
given by will, there still remains undisposed three-fourths (3/4) of the
same.
Under the rules of intestacy of the Spanish Civil Code, 2 one-half (1/2) of
the portion remaining belongs to the plaintiffs as collateral relatives and
the other half belonged in usufruct to Pedro K. Espiritu as surviving
spouse. (Art. 953 in relation to art. 837) 3 Nicasio and Asuncion
Evangelista who are the brother and sister of the deceased, respectively,
inherit per capita; while Josefina Alvarez, Honesto Alvarez and Arsenio
Evangelista, who are her niece and nephew, respectively, inherit per
stirpes. In addition, these collateral relatives are entitled to the corpus or
capita of the other half held in usufruct by Pedro K. Espiritu. Upon the
death of Espiritu on August 21, 1959, this usufruct terminated. (Sp. Civil
Code art. 513[1])
The usufruct of the husband during his life should be fixed conformably
with article 838 which states:
The usufructuary rights of the surviving spouse may be satisfied
by the settlement upon him or her by the heirs of a life annuity or
the income from some specific property, or by the payment of
money, as may be determined by agreement between the parties,
or, in default of such agreement, by judicial decision.
Until this has been done the usufructuary interest of the surviving
spouse shall constitute a lien upon all the property of the estate.
For this reason, this case should be returned to the lower court for the
purpose of determining the usufructuary legitime of Pedro K. Espiritu. In
addition, the lower court should determine and settle the following: (1)
the amount advanced by the conjugal partnership for the payment of
installments falling due during the marriage. (2) the amount paid by
Pedro K. Espiritu in redeeming Lot No. 292 after it had been sold under a
deed of pacto de retro; (3) the amount of taxes paid on the property by the
conjugal partnership; and (4) the value of the fruits received by the
husband over and above the value of his usufruct.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and the case is
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in conformity
with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.
154
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 2904 January 11, 1907
LUIS LIM, administrator, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ISABEL GARCIA, widow of Hilario Lim, defendant-appellee.
Marshall Dawson for appellant.
F. W. Redding for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga distributing the estate of Hilario Lim, deceased, on the
consolidated petition of Luis Lim, administrator, the children of Hilario
Lim, deceased, and the defendant Isabel Garcia, his widow.
Hilario Lim died intestate some time in the year 1903, leaving a widow
and nine children and an interest in an estate valued at some 50,000
pesos.
The trial court was of opinion that the entire estate as shown in the
inventory prepared by the administrator was conjugal property, except a
house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of 10,000
pesos which, it was admitted, had been brought to the marriage by the
said Hilario Lim, and except, furthermore, 700 pesos, the purchase price
paid by said Lim for a certain lot which it was also admitted had been
brought by him to his marriage, and which was sold in the course of the
administration of his estate, together with the improvements made
thereon during the period of coverture.
Counsel for the administrator, and for the surviving children, contends
that none of the said property should be treated as the property of the
conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased Hilario Lim,
brought to the marriage property worth more than double the amount of
the intestate estate, and the defendant, his widow, brought nothing to the
conjugal partnership, either at the time of the marriage or at any time
thereafter.
The trial court was of opinion that the evidence offered in support of this
contention was no sufficient to overcome the presumption established in
article 1407 of the Civil Code, which provides that all the estate of the
married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property
(bienes gananciales) unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the
separate estate of the husband or the wife, and we think after a careful
examination of the record that this finding must be sustained.
The setting aside of 700 pesos (which appears to have been taken as the
value of the lot sold during the administration) as the separate property
of the husband who brought the lot to the marriage, and the treatment of
the balance of the price received for this lot, together with the buildings
thereon, as conjugal partnership property, it appearing from the record
that these buildings were constructed out of the conjugal partnership
funds, was in entire accordance with the provisions of article 1404, which
provides that "the buildings erected during coverture on land belonging
to one of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership
property, after allowing the owner of the land the value thereof."
The foregoing disposes of all the errors assigned by counsel for the
appellant, except the alleged error of the trial court in refusing to order
the inclusion in the inventory of the estate of the deceased of three parcels
of land, held in the name of the appellee and claimed as her separate
estate. It is contended by the appellant that these parcels of land were
conveyed to the appellee during the coverture by the said Hilario Lim
either as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that in either in event
such conveyance was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458
of the Civil Code.
It appears from the evidence, however, that these parcels of land were not
acquired by the appellee by conveyance from her husband, and that they
were in fact conveyed to her by third parties by way of exchange for
certain property inherited by her from her father's estate during the
155
coverture, and they are, therefore, her separate property under the
provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1396, which provides that property
acquired by exchange for other property belonging separately to one of
the married couple is the separate property of the owner of the property
for which it is exchanged.

The trial court speaks of this property as dowry of the appellee, but there
is nothing in the record which tends to prove that it was acquired as a part
of her dowry, and indeed the evidence strongly supports the presumption
that it was and continued to be a part of her separate estate
(paraphernalia) which never acquired the "dotal" character. For the
purpose of this decision, however, it is not necessary to determine the
precise character of the estate of the appellee in this property because
there can be no double that it was her separate estate, and whether dowry
or paraphernalia, the trial court properly excluded it from the inventory
of the property of the deceased which was to be distributed among his
legitimate heirs.

No error was assigned by either party touching the amount of the

usufructuary interest in the estate of her husband allowed to the widow
by the trial court, and we can not, therefore, review the action of the trial
court in this connection.

The judgment of the trial court should be and is hereby affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twelve
days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days
thereafter the record remanded to the court below for proper action. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

156
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38052 December 23, 1933
CONCEPCION ABELLA DE DIAZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERLANGER & GALINGER, INC., ET AL., defendants.
ERLANGER & GALINGER, INC., appellant.
Vicente Ribaya and J.A. Wolfson for appellant.
Manly and Reyes and Norberto Romualdez for appellee.
HULL, J.:
Erlanger & Galinger, Inc., secured a judgment in civil case No. 3722 of the
Court of First Instance of Albay against Domingo Diaz, the husband of the
plaintiff herein, and on an execution issued to enforce the above-
mentioned judgment, the sheriff levied on certain properties.
Plaintiff thereupon brought this action in the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur alleging that the properties which had been levied upon
were her own paraphernal property.
The court issued a temporary injunction and after hearing, declared that
the properties levied upon were paraphernal, that the obligation which
was the basis of the judgment was a personal obligation of the husband,
and that under article 1386 of the Civil Code, the fruits of the paraphernal
property of the wife were exempt from execution in this case. The court
held that all the property was unlawfully levied upon and made the
preliminary injunction permanent.
Defendant appeals, and the first question for consideration is whether
buildings erected on paraphernal property of the wife with the private
funds of the wife are exempt from execution for the debts contracted by
the husband. Article 1404 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1404. Any useful expenditures made for the benefit of the
separate property or either one of the spouses by means of
advances made by the partnership, or by the industry of the
husband or wife, are partnership property.
Buildings constructed during the marriage on land belonging to
one of the spouses shall also belong to the partnership, but the
value of the land shall be paid to the spouse owning the same.
We shall not disturb the findings of fact of the trial court that a commercial
building, the camarin, and the granary, the buildings in dispute, were
build on the lands of appellee with the appellee's own personal money. At
first view there is no limitation on the second paragraph of the above-
quoted article, but Manresa in his Commentaries, volume 9, page 608,
holds that if the building is constructed by the owner of the land with her
private money, the building does not belong to the partnership but to the
owner of the land, and no reason occurs to us why such holding is not a
correct and just interpretation of this section. We therefore concur with
the trial court that these buildings are not subject to levy and sale in this
case.
As to the items of palay and lumber, we are not convinced from the
evidence that they belong exclusively to appellee, but on then contrary,
we believe that they are part of the conjugal property (article 1407, Civil
Code). Likewise, as to the Buick automobile. While it may be true that at
the time of their marriage, the wife had an automobile, that automobile
has long since passed out of existence, and the mere fact that each
successive car was turned in as part of the purchase price of a new car,
would not make every automobile in the future paraphernal, but on the
contrary, it becomes conjugal and responsible for the debts of the
partnership.
As above stated, the trial court relied to a great extent in its judgment on
article 1386 of the Civil Code which reads:
157
 ART. 1386. The fruits of the paraphernal property cannot be will be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for action
subject to the payment of personal obligations of the husband, in conformity with this opinion. No expression as to costs. So ordered.
unless it be proved that such obligations were productive of some
benefit to the family. Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

It will therefore be necessary to consider briefly the transaction out of

which arose the judgment, the basis of the existing writ of execution. The
husband, Domingo Diaz, while a member of the Legislature, secured the
passage of Act. No. 2644 granting to his brother a franchise to construct
and operate an electric light plant at Tabaco, Albay. Domingo Diaz
purchased from Erlanger & Galinger, Inc., machinery and equipment for
the construction and installation of the plant, and judgment was obtained
by Erlanger & Galinger, Inc., against Diaz for the balance of the purchase
price.

Appellee contends that she was opposed to her husband's going into the
electric light business and that therefore the business was a personal one
of his and not an enterprise of the conjugal partnership. Such contention
is fundamentally erroneous. The husband, as the manager of the
partnership (article 1412, Civil Code), has the right to embark the
partnership in an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain, and the fact
that the wife may not approve of a venture does not make it a private and
personal one of the husband.

The obligation, not being a personal one of the husband, article 1386 has
no application, and any property belonging to the conjugal partnership
must be held liable to seizure.

In the preliminary injunction which was made permanent by the trial

court, appellant and the sheriff were forbidden to attempt to collect by
legal process any of the rents or fruits of the paraphernal property. As the
fruits of the paraphernal property belonged to the conjugal partnership,
they are responsible for the debts of that partnership. The injunction is
too broad and must be modified.

The judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur is affirmed

so far as it relates to the ownership of the buildings. As to the other items,
including the rents of the paraphernal property, it is reversed. The case

158
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 73733 December 16, 1986
EPIFANIA MAGALLON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSALINA L. MONTEJO, in her Official Capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, Branch XXI,
CONCEPCION LACERNA, ELECERIA LACERNA and PURITA
LACERNA, respondents.
Latasa, Cagas and Aranune Law & Surveying Office for petitioner.
Alberto Lumakang for private respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The petition before this Court sinks the annulment of a writ of execution
issued by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 727 of her court (RTC
Davao del Sur). Said case was instituted by the plaintiffs (private
respondents herein) against Martin Lacerna to compel partition of parcel
of land located in Barrio Kasuga Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur,
to which said defendant had perfected a claim by homestead. The
plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin Lacerna and his
wife, Eustaquia Pichan, who died in 1953, asserted a right to one-half of
the land as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin.
While said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia
Pichan — although he admitted living with her without benefit of
marriage until she allegedly abandoned him — as well as paternity of two
of the plaintiffs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the Trial
Court gave his denials no credence. Said Court, on the basis of the evidence
presented to it, found that Martin had in fact been married to Eustaquia,
and that the plaintiffs were his children with her. The Trial Court further
found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a
patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. On the
basis of these findings, the plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of
the land claimed by them. 1
Martin Lacerna appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court AC-G.R. No.
59900-R). That Court affirmed, in a Decision promulgated on August 31,
1984 which has since become final.2
It appears that at the time the case was brought, and while it was being
heard in the Trial Court, no certificate of title to the land had yet been
issued to Martin Lacerna, although he had already complied with all the
conditions necessary to a grant thereof. Original Certificate of Title No. P-
11 568 (issued on the basis of Homestead Patent No. 148869) was issued
only on November 22, 1978, while Lacerna's appeal was pending in the
Intermediate Appellate Court. While it is not disputed that said certificate
of title refers to the same land homesteaded by Lacerna during his
coverture with Eustaquia Pichan, for reasons to which the record before
the Court offers no clear clue, it states on its face that it is issued in the
name of " ... MARTIN LACERNA, Filipino, of legal age, married to Epifania
Magallon ... ," the latter being the present petitioner.3
It appears further that on November 26, 1985, after the confirmative
Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court had become final and
executory, the respondent Judge, on motion of the plaintiffs issued an alias
writ of execution commanding the Provincial Sheriff::
... to order the defendant Martin Lacerna to divide and
partition the property located at Casuga, Magsaysay,
Davao del Sur, consisting of 10 hectares designated as Lot
No. 5098 Cad. No. 275 covered by H.A. No. 20-13378 (E-
20-12748), ½ of which is the share of Eustaquia Pichan in
the conjugal property, and plaintiffs being Pichan's
children are also entitled thereto; and deliver portion of 5
hectares of the aforedescribed lot to the plaintiffs as their
share to satisfy the said judgment and your fees thereon. 4
Apparently, said writ was served on both Martin Lacerna and petitioner
herein, for on December 17, 1985, the latter filed with the Trial Court a
"Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution" alleging that the land
subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and Martin Lacerna
159
under a certificate of title (OCT No. P-11568) ... issued way back 1978 (sic)
without legal impediments, and ... now incontestable," as well as ... valid,
binding and legal unless declared otherwise in an independent
proceedings, ... and praying that ... the property of herein intervenor be
excluded from the enforcement of the writ of execution." 5 Said motion
was denied, as also was a motion for reconsideration of the order of
denial. Hence, the present petition.
The facts found by the lower courts which, in view of the finality of the
latter's decisions, are binding upon this Court and can no longer be
controverted, as wen as the pertinent allegations of the petition, leave no
doubt that the land in question, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal
partnership of Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan, the plaintiff's
mother, and should have been titled in the names of said spouses, was,
through fraud or mistaken, registered in the names of Martin Lacerna and
petitioner herein, Epifania Magallon In such a situation, the property
should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust
for the party rightfully entitled thereto. The Civil Code provides that:
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee
of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes. 6
The provision restates one of the principles upon which the general law
of trust is founded, expressed in equity jurisprudence thus:
A constructive trust is a creature of equity, defined supra
(sec. 15) as a remedial device by which the holder of legal
title is held to be a trustee for the benefit of another who
in good conscience is entitled to the beneficial interest. So.
the doctrine of constructive trust is an instrument of
equity for the maintenance of justice, good faith, and good
conscience, resting on a sound public policy requiring that
the law should not become the instrument of designing
persons to be used for the purpose of fraud. In this respect
constructive trusts have been said to arise through the
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel or under
the broad doctrine that equity regards and treats as done
what in good conscience ought to be done.
Where, through a mistake of fact, title to, and apparent
ownership of, property rightfully belonging to one person
is obtained by another, a constructive trust ordinarily
arises in favor of the rightful owner of such property
It is a general principle that one who acquires land or
other property by fraud, misrepresentation, imposition, or
concealment, or under any such other circumstances as to
render it inequitable for him to retain the property, is in
equity to be regarded as a trustee ex maleficio thereof for
a person who suffers by reason of the fraud or other
wrong, and is equitably entitled to the property, even
though such beneficiary may never have any legal estate
therein. It is to be observed, however, that in the absence
of equitable considerations or a fiduciary relationship,
fraud alone, either actual or constructive, will not give rise
to a trust, since, as has been pointed out, if it were
otherwise all persons claiming property under defective
titles would be trustee for the 'true' owners.7
Under proper circumstances, mistake, although
unconnected with fraud, will warrant relief under the
Code providing that one who gains a thing by fraud,
accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust,
or other wrongful act is, unless he has come better title
thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained for the
benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it. 8
As stated by Justice Cardozo, a constructive trust is the
formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression and when property has been acquired in such
circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in
good conscience retain the beneficial interest; equity
converts him into a trustee. 9
160
In an early case in this jurisdiction, land of the plaintiff had, by mistake,
been included in the title of an adjoining owner who was afterwards sued
by his creditors, the latter obtaining writs of execution and procuring
their annotation on said title. In an action by the plaintiff to enjoin the sale
of his property, annul the levies thereon and secure a new title without
those encumbrances, this Court affirmed judgment of the lower court in
the plaintiff's favor, despite the fact that he had done nothing to protect
his interests in the land during a period of almost six years following the
issuance of the decree of registration in favor of the adjoining owner. The
Court, noting that the titular (ostensible) owner had never laid claim to
the property mistakenly registered in his name and that he had in fact
acquiesced to judgment in a separate action declaring the plaintiff the real
owner of the property, refused to apply the one-year limitation period for
disputing the title and held that in the circumstances, the former merely
held title to the property in trust for the plaintiff. 10
In Bueno vs. Reyes, 11 where property belonging to an ancestor of whom
plaintiffs' parents were the intestate heirs was, though mistake or in bad
faith, registered in cadastral proceedings in the name of other parties who
had no right thereto, this Court reaffirmed the principles already cited,
holding that:
If any trust can be deduced at all from the foregoing facts
it was an implied one, arising by operation of law not from
any presumed intention of the parties but to satisfy the
demands of justice and equity and as a protection against
unfair dealing or downright fraud. Indeed, in this kind of
implied trust, commonly denominated constructive, as
distinguished from resulting, trust, there exists a certain
antagonism between the cestui que trust and the trustee.
Thus, for instance, under Article 1456 of the Civil Code, 'if
property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.' In a number of cases this Court has held
that registration of property by one person in his name,
whether by mistake or fraud, the real owner being another
per- son, impresses upon the title so acquired the
character of a constructive trust for the real owner, which
would justify an action for reconveyance. 12
Clearly, therefore, the petitioner herein, as the trustee of a constructive
trust, has an obligation to convey to the private respondents that part of
the land in question to which she now claims an ostensible title, said
portion rightfully pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her
share in the conjugal partnership with Martin Lacerna.
The question is whether that obligation may be enforced by execution in
the action at bar, which was brought and prosecuted to judgment against
Martin Lacerna only, without impleading the petitioner. 13 Stated
otherwise, is petitioner bound by final judgment rendered in an action to
which she was not made a party?
There are no clear precedents on the matter in our law. Reference to
American law for any persuasive ruling shows that even there the
question seems to be an open one.
"The authorities are in conflict as to whether a wife, not a party to an
action is bound by a judgment therein for or against her husband with
respect to community or homestead property or property held as an
estate in entirety.
Community property. It has been held that a judgment against the
husband in an action involving community property, is conclusive on the
wife even if she is not a party, but it has also been held that a judgment
against either husband or wife with respect to community property in an
action to which the other spouse is not a party does not prevent the other
spouse from subsequently having his or her day in court, although, of
course, a judgment against both husband and wife is binding on both.
Estate by entirety. It has been both affirmed and denied that a wife is in
such privity with her husband in respect of property held by them as an
estate in entirety that a judgment for or against him respecting such
property in a suit to which she is not a party is binding on her.
Homestead. A judgment affecting a homestead is, according to some
authorities, not binding on a spouse who is not a party to the action in
161
which it is rendered, unless the homestead is community property or the
homestead claim or interest would not defeat the action; but, according to
other authorities, where the husband sets up and litigates a claim for the
homestead, an adjudication for or against him is binding on the wife. 14
As to her community interest in real property, a wife is in
privity with her husband and is represented by him in an
action as fully as though she had expressly been made a
party thereto. Cutting vs. Bryan, 274 P. 326, 206 Cal. 254,
certiorari denied 50 S. Ct. 16, 280 U.S. 556,74 L.Ed 611. 15
In the particular circumstances obtaining here, the Court can as it does in
good conscience and without doing violence to doctrine, adopt the
affirmative view and hold the petitioner bound by the judgment against
Martin Lacerna, despite her not having in fact been impleaded in the
action against the latter. This ruling presumes that petitioner is, as she
claims, the legal wife of Lacerna though, as observed by the Intermediate
Appellate Court, no marriage contract was presented by Lacerna to prove
his marriage to the petitioner either before or after the death of Eustaquia
Pichan. Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the
land other than by virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere
mistress, she cannot pretend to any right thereto.
But whether the petitioner is a lawful wife or a mere "live-in" partner, the
Court simply cannot believe that she never became aware of the litigation
concerning the land until presented with the writ of execution. What is far
more probable and credible is that she has known of the lawsuit since
1956 when Martin Lacerna "married" her. 16 Her silence and inaction
since then and until barely a year ago bespeak more than anything else, a
confession that she had and has no right to the land and no defense to offer
to the action, either on her part or on the part of Martin Lacerna. Had she
even the semblance of a right, there is no doubt she would have lost no
time asserting it.
From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the petitioner relies
mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the land
carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named therein, Martin
Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on the certificate of title has
been established by evidence no longer disputable as resulting from a
mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud. Moreover, on the
authority of Litam vs. Rivera 17 and Stuart vs. Yatco, 18 the phrase "married
to Epifania Magallon written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said
certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin
Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the
land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna and petitioner hereyn. Neither can
petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 of the Civil
Code that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal
partnership, there being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin
Lacerna except that which arises by implication from the aforestated
entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that
the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been perfected
during Martin Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the
private respondents. The ruling in Maramba vs. Lozano 19 that the
presumption does not operate where there is no showing as to when
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired applies with even greater
force here.
The writ of execution, however, must be set aside, though not for the
reasons urged in the petition. The judgment of the respondent Trial Court
which was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court merely declared
the private respondents entitled to one-half of the land in question,
without specifically ordering partition and delivery to them of said half
portion. A writ of execution cannot vary the terms of the judgment it is
issued to satisfy, or afford relief different from, or not clearly included in,
what is awarded by said judgment. Even if the judgment in question is
construable as authorizing or directing a partition of the land, the
mechanics of an actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court which does not contemplate or provide for
the intervention of the sheriff in the manner prescribed in the writ
complained of.
Both the Trial Court, in rendering the judgment in question, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court, in affirming the same, appear to have
overlooked the fact that the surviving spouse is the legal and compulsory
heir of the deceased husband or wife; otherwise, consistent with the
finding that the half portion of the land sued for pertained to the late
Eustaquia Pichan as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin
Lacerna, they should have ruled that Martin Lacerna concurred with the
162
three private respondents in the succession to said portion, each of them
taking an equal share. 20 Unfortunately, said error is beyond review
because Martin Lacerna allowed the judgment to become final and
executory without raising that point of law, even on appeal.

WHEREFORE, the writ of execution complained of is set aside and

annulled. Instead of enforcing said writ, the respondent Trial Court is
ordered to effect the partition of the land in question in accordance with
the terms of its now final and executory decision and the provisions of
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. No pronouncement as to costs in this
instance.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

163
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009
PHILIP MATTHEWS, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Court of Appeals
(CA) December 19, 2003 Decision1 and July 14, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59573. The assailed decision affirmed and upheld the June 30,
1997 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan
in Civil Case No. 4632 for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease
with Damages.
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British
subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina.4 On
June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from
Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at
Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of
₱129,000.00.5 The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.6 Joselyn and
Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements
thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist
resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.7 All required permits and
licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna
Celestino, Joselyn’s sister.8
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away
with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain,
sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third
parties with respect to their Boracay property.9
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as
lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease10 (Agreement) involving the
Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of
₱12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before
a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and
renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.1avvphi1
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into
by Joselyn without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin instituted an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with
Damages11 against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his
funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay
property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn’s husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner
in defeault. On March 14, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment by default
declaring the Agreement null and void.12 The decision was, however, set
aside by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 34054.13 The CA also ordered the RTC to
allow the petitioner to file his Answer, and to conduct further
proceedings.
In his Answer,14 petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn.
Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the Boracay property, he found
it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as appearing
in the Agreement, Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating
his knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the
agreement entered into by his wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped
from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
There being no amicable settlement during the pre-trial, trial on the
merits ensued.
On June 30, 1997, the RTC disposed of the case in this manner:
164
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. The Agreement of Lease dated July 20, 1992 consisting of eight
(8) pages (Exhibits "T", "T-1", "T-2", "T-3", "T-4", "T-5", "T-6" and
"T-7") entered into by and between Joselyn C. Taylor and Philip
Matthews before Notary Public Lenito T. Serrano under Doc. No.
390, Page 79, Book I, Series of 1992 is hereby declared NULL and
VOID;
2. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff the sum of SIXTEEN THOUSAND (₱16,000.00) PESOS as
damages representing unrealized income for the residential
building and cottages computed monthly from July 1992 up to the
time the property in question is restored to plaintiff; and
3. Defendants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (₱20,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, for attorney’s fees and other incidental
expenses.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC considered the Boracay property as community property of
Benjamin and Joselyn; thus, the consent of the spouses was necessary to
validate any contract involving the property. Benjamin’s right over the
Boracay property was bolstered by the court’s findings that the property
was purchased and improved through funds provided by Benjamin.
Although the Agreement was evidenced by a public document, the trial
court refused to consider the alleged participation of Benjamin in the
questioned transaction primarily because his signature appeared only on
the last page of the document and not on every page thereof.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner still failed to obtain a favorable decision.
In its December 19, 2003 Decision,16 the CA affirmed the conclusions
made by the RTC. The appellate court was of the view that if, indeed,
Benjamin was a willing participant in the questioned transaction, the
parties to the Agreement should have used the phrase "with my consent"
instead of "signed in the presence of." The CA noted that Joselyn already
prepared an SPA in favor of Benjamin involving the Boracay property; it
was therefore unnecessary for Joselyn to participate in the execution of
the Agreement. Taken together, these circumstances yielded the
inevitable conclusion that the contract was null and void having been
entered into by Joselyn without the consent of Benjamin.
Aggrieved, petitioner now comes before this Court in this petition for
review on certiorari based on the following grounds:
4.1. THE MARITAL CONSENT OF RESPONDENT BENJAMIN
TAYLOR IS NOT REQUIRED IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE
DATED 20 JULY 1992. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT HIS
CONSENT IS REQUIRED, BENJAMIN TAYLOR IS DEEMED TO
HAVE GIVEN HIS CONSENT WHEN HE AFFIXED HIS SIGNATURE
IN THE AGREEMENT OF LEASE AS WITNESS IN THE LIGHT OF
THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SPOUSES
PELAYO VS. MELKI PEREZ, G.R. NO. 141323, JUNE 8, 2005.
4.2. THE PARCEL OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE AGREEMENT OF
LEASE IS THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF JOCELYN C. TAYLOR, A
FILIPINO CITIZEN, IN THE LIGHT OF CHEESMAN VS. IAC, G.R. NO.
74833, JANUARY 21, 1991.
4.3. THE COURTS A QUO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED ARTICLE 96 OF
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH IS A PROVISION
REFERRING TO THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY. THE
PROPERTY REGIME GOVERNING THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF
BENJAMIN TAYLOR AND JOSELYN TAYLOR IS THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS BECAUSE THEY WERE MARRIED ON 30
JUNE 1988 WHICH IS PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
FAMILY CODE. ARTICLE 96 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THIS CASE.
4.4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE EXECUTION OF
NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS.
4.5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO PASS
UPON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT
165
 THAT IT WAS NOT CONTESTED AND DESPITE THE
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING SAID CLAIM.17
The petition is impressed with merit.
In fine, we are called upon to determine the validity of an Agreement of
Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the
consent of her British husband. In addressing the matter before us, we are
confronted not only with civil law or conflicts of law issues, but more
importantly, with a constitutional question.
It is undisputed that Joselyn acquired the Boracay property in 1989. Said
acquisition was evidenced by a Deed of Sale with Joselyn as the vendee.
The property was also declared for taxation purposes under her name.
When Joselyn leased the property to petitioner, Benjamin sought the
nullification of the contract on two grounds: first, that he was the actual
owner of the property since he provided the funds used in purchasing the
same; and second, that Joselyn could not enter into a valid contract
involving the subject property without his consent.
The trial and appellate courts both focused on the property relations of
petitioner and respondent in light of the Civil Code and Family Code
provisions. They, however, failed to observe the applicable constitutional
principles, which, in fact, are the more decisive.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:18
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.1avvphi1
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited
constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands.19 The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.20 Our fundamental law cannot be
any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved
only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital
of which is owned by Filipinos.21
In Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 cited in Muller v. Muller,23 we had the
occasion to explain the constitutional prohibition:
Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with
respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources
in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino
citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of
aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that Section 5 is included in Article
XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Section 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through
which agricultural resources may leak into alien’s hands. It would
certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming
private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including
residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that
"aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and
houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and
cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any
area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries,
schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds,
airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant’s
words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General’s Brief, p. 6) That this is
obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond
question.24
166
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to
acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only in
constitutionally recognized exceptions.25 There is no rule more settled
than this constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to
circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a
long line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve
the above constitutional provision. We had cases where aliens wanted
that a particular property be declared as part of their father’s
estate;26 that they be reimbursed the funds used in purchasing a property
titled in the name of another;27 that an implied trust be declared in their
(aliens’) favor;28 and that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of
consent.29
In Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui,30 Felix Ting Ho, a Chinese citizen, acquired a
parcel of land, together with the improvements thereon. Upon his death,
his heirs (the petitioners therein) claimed the properties as part of the
estate of their deceased father, and sought the partition of said properties
among themselves. We, however, excluded the land and improvements
thereon from the estate of Felix Ting Ho, precisely because he never
became the owner thereof in light of the above-mentioned constitutional
prohibition.
In Muller v. Muller,31 petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and
respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany. During the
subsistence of their marriage, respondent purchased a parcel of land in
Antipolo City and constructed a house thereon. The Antipolo property
was registered in the name of the petitioner. They eventually separated,
prompting the respondent to file a petition for separation of property.
Specifically, respondent prayed for reimbursement of the funds he paid
for the acquisition of said property. In deciding the case in favor of the
petitioner, the Court held that respondent was aware that as an alien, he
was prohibited from owning a parcel of land situated in the Philippines.
He had, in fact, declared that when the spouses acquired the Antipolo
property, he had it titled in the name of the petitioner because of said
prohibition. Hence, we denied his attempt at subsequently asserting a
right to the said property in the form of a claim for reimbursement.
Neither did the Court declare that an implied trust was created by
operation of law in view of petitioner’s marriage to respondent. We said
that to rule otherwise would permit circumvention of the constitutional
prohibition.
In Frenzel v. Catito,32 petitioner, an Australian citizen, was married to
Teresita Santos; while respondent, a Filipina, was married to Klaus Muller.
Petitioner and respondent met and later cohabited in a common-law
relationship, during which petitioner acquired real properties; and since
he was disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines, respondent’s
name appeared as the vendee in the deeds of sale. When their relationship
turned sour, petitioner filed an action for the recovery of the real
properties registered in the name of respondent, claiming that he was the
real owner. Again, as in the other cases, the Court refused to declare
petitioner as the owner mainly because of the constitutional prohibition.
The Court added that being a party to an illegal contract, he could not
come to court and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who
loses his money or property by knowingly engaging in an illegal contract
may not maintain an action for his losses.
Finally, in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 petitioner (an
American citizen) and Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that
was later registered in the latter’s name. Criselda subsequently sold the
land to a third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The
petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not give his
consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his
(petitioner’s) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and
his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,
vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution;
thus, the sale as to him was null and void.
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin
has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from
acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that
Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said
property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we
sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition.
By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust
was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be
167
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he Associate Justice
had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease
of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was ATTESTATION
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial the Court’s Division.
interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as
to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
permit him to have.34 Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and
petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. CERTIFICATION
Thus, we uphold its validity.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
other issues raised by the petitioner. Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 19, 2003 Decision and
July 14, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59573, REYNATO S. PUNO
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the Chief Justice
complaint against petitioner Philip Matthews.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

168
 Republic of the Philippines The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
SUPREME COURT
Manila It appears that on May 10, 1977, the private respondent
Norma Sarmiento sued her husband, the petitioner Cesar
FIRST DIVISION Sarmiento, for support. The case was filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and later assigned
G.R. No. 75410 August 17, 1987 to Regional Trial Court, Branch XLVII, presided over by
Judge Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, after the reorganization of
CESAR SARMIENTO, petitioner, the Judiciary in 1983. On March 1, 1984, Judge Ordoñez-
vs. Benitez rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. RICARDO D. DIAZ as which reads:
the Presiding Judge of Branch XXVII of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and NORMA DIAZ WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
SARMIENTO, respondents. rendered ordering the defendant, Cesar
Sarmiento, to pay his plaintiff-wife, Norma
No. 75409 August 17, 1987 Sarmiento, the sum of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00) monthly as support
CESAR SARMIENTO, petitioner, commencing on May 10, 1977 up to March,
vs. 1984, which shall be paid thirty (30) days
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. REGINA G. after the Decision shall have become final
ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXVII of the and executory and the monthly support,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, starting April 1984, shall be deposited
NORMA SARMIENTO, LORNA SARMIENTO and LERMA with the Cashier of the Regional Trial
SARMIENTO, respondents. Courts, City Hall, Manila within the first
five (6) days of April 1984 and every
PARAS., J.: month thereafter from which plaintiff-wife
or her duly authorized representative may
withdraw the same. Support; shall be
This is a petition to review and reverse the decision * dated June 13, 1986
Immediately payable, notwithstanding
of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-
G.R. SP Nos. 09159 and 09160 denying the petition for certiorari and any appeal which may be interposed by
prohibition for lack of merit and correspondingly dismissing these cases. defendant.

The facts of the aforecited cases will be presented separately since they Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Cashier of the Regional Trial Courts of City
involve different proceedings heard before different branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Hall, Manila, for his information and
guidance.
G.R. No. 75409
On April 9,1984 the private respondent moved for
execution of the judgment pending appeal The petitioner
169
actually filed a notice of appeal four days later on April 13.
On May 3, 1984, Judge Ordoñez-Benitez issued the
following order:
Acting on the "Motion for Execution of
Decision Pending Appeal dated April 9,
1984, and the Notice of Appeal filed by the
defendant on April 13, 1984, the
Philippine National Bank is hereby
directed that no amount due the defendant
be released without authority from this
Court and until final disposition of said
case.
Let a copy of this Order be directed to the
Philippine National Bank for its guidance
and information.
On May 29, 1985 the private respondent filed a motion to
require the Philippine National Bank to deliver to the
private respondent the accrued support out of the
retirement benefits due to the Petitioner as a former
employee of the PNB.
The petitioner prays —
That a restraining order and/or writ of pre
injunction forthwith issue, ENJOINING
AND PROHIBITING the respondent JUDGE
REGINA G. ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ and all the
respondents in Civil-Case No. E-02184,
their agents and employees, and all
persons acting for them or on their behalf,
from enforcing, executing or otherwise
giving force and effect to
the Decision (Annex "A " hereof, and
the Order Annex "B hereof). "
On June 13, 1966, the Court of Appeals found petitioner's appeal
unmeritorious and thus dismissed the same. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Hence this petition.
G.R. No. 75410
The Court of Appeals sums up the facts as follows:
It appears that, on August 1, 1984, the private respondent
brought another action against the petitioner for a
declaration that the retirement benefits due the petitioner
from the PNB were conjugal and that 50% thereof
belonged to the private respondent as her share. The case
was assigned to Branch XXVII of the RTC of Manila,
presided over by Judge Ricardo Diaz. The petitioner filed
an answer in which he contended that the complaint did
not state a cause of action' that there was another action
peding between him and the plaintiff and that the plaintiff
did not exhaust administrative remedies before bringing
the suit. However, the trial court refused to dismiss the
complaint because the grounds cited were not
indubitable. The case was therefore set for pre-trial
conference. For failure of the petitioner to appear at the
pretrial conference on December 19, 1985, the trial court
declared him as in default. Thereafter, on February 20,
1986, judgment was rendered as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, ordering
defendant Philippine National Bank to
desist and refrain from releasing to
defendant Cesar Sarmiento all monetary
benefits and emoluments which may be
due him by reason of his retirement from
service, but instead, to deliver one-half
(1/2) thereof to the herein plaintiff; and if
170
 in the event that all such monetary
benefits and emoluments, for one reason
or another, had already been paid to
defendant Cesar Sarmiento, said
defendant is hereby ordered to pay
plaintiff one-half (1/2) of whatever
monetary benefits, emoluments and
pivileges he received from defendant
Philippine National Bank by reason of his
retirement. Likewise, defendant Cesar
Sarmiento is hereby ordered the costs of
suit.'
On April 21, 1986, the private respondent moved for the
immediate execution of the judgment in her favor, on the
ground that any appeal that the petitioner might take
would merely be dilatory in the light of the admission in
his answer. The petitioner filed an opposition to the
motion wherein he manifested that he was not going to
appeal the decision of the trial court but that he would
instead filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the trial coourt.
Petitioner appealed the February 20, 1986 decision of respondent Judge
Diaz to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The assailed decision denied the above petition.
Hence, this joint petition.
Petitioner's averments can be narrowed down to the following:
1. The order of May 3, 1984 of respondent Judge Ordonez-Benitez,
prohibiting the Philippine National Bank to release any amount of the
retirement gratuity due the petitioner without the trial court's approval
is contrary to law, because retirement benefits are exempt from
execution.
2. Since the trial court had refused to give the course to his appeal, he was
justified in resorting to the extra-ordinary legal remedies of certiorari and
prohibition.
3. The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 of respondent Judge
Diaz also ordering the PNB to desist from releasing to petitioner any
portion of his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half thereof to herein
private respondent is contrary to law.
From the foregoing, it can be gauged that what petitioner principally
questions or protests against is respondent appellate court's failure
(actually refusal to resolve the issue on whether or not the retirement
benefits due the petitioner from the PNB are subject to attachment,
execution or other legal process).
Private respondent, however, claims that the issues raised by petitioner
before respondent Court of Appeals were issues relating to the merits of
the cases then pending with respondents Judge Ordonez-Benitez and
Judge Diaz and hence the said issues were proper subject of an appeal,
which remedy was already availed of by petitioner in both cases. She
likewise submits that since no question of jurisdiciton or abuse of
discretion had been raised and substantiated in the petitions before the
respondent Court of Appeals, said appellate court was legally justified in
dismissing the petition.
Just as We have dealt with the facts of these two cases, We now intend to
resolve their issues and questions also separately.
G.R. No. 75409
We do not find merit in petitioner's contention that simply because the
trial court had refused to give due course to his appeal, he was already
justified in resorting to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari and
prohibition. What the respondent Court of Appeals found in this regard
need not be further elaborated upon.
Said appellate court ruled:
171
 Under BP 129, sec. 39, no record on appeal is required to
take an appeal. Nor is an appeal bond required. (Interim
Rules, sec. 18) A notice of appeal is sufficient. Unlike
before, where approval of the record on appeal and the
appeal bond was required before the appeal was
perfected, under the present rule, the appeal is perfected
upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by a party by
the mere filing of a notitce of appeal (Interim Rules, sec.
23). The approval of the court is not required. This means
that within 30 days after the perfection of the appeal, the
original record should be transmitted to the Intermediate
Appellate Court. If the clerk neglects the performance of
this duty, the appellant should ask the court to order the
clerk. It does not seem that the petitioner has done this,
and it may even be that he is liable for failure to prosecute
his appeal. (Rule 46, sec. 3; Rule 50, sec. 1 [c].
On the allegation of petitioner that it is not the appellant but the appellee's
duty to make the clerk of court of the trial court transmit the record on
appeal to the appellate court, respondent Court of Appeals aptly points to
the rullings under Rule 46, sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It has been held that, while it is the duty of the clerk of the
Court of First Instance to immediately transmit to the
clerk of the Supreme Court a certified copy of the bill of
exceptions, (now, record on appeal) it is also the duty of
the appellant to cause the same to be presented to the
clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty days after its
approval. He cannot simply fold his arms and say that it is
the duty of the Clerk of Court First Instance under the
provisions of section 11, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to
transmit the record of appeal to the appellate court. It is
appellant's duty to make the clerk act and, if necessary,
procure a court order to compel him to act. He cannot idly
sit by and wait till this is done. He cannot afterwards wash
his hands and say that delay in the transmittal of the
record on appeal was not his fault. For, indeed, this duty
imposed upon him was precisely to spur on the slothful. (2
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 480 [1979])."
Evidently, petitioner had no valid excuse to resort to the extraordinary
writ of certiorari and prohibition when appeal had been available to him
and which he, in fact, already initiated but did not pursue.
Petitioner, in questioning the Order of May 3, 1984 of respondent Judge
Ordoñez-Benitez, claims that such order contravenes the law exempting
retirement gratuity from legal process and liens. We find merit in
petitioner's stand in the light of the explicit provisions of Sec. 26 of CA 186,
as amended, which read as follows:
Sec. 26. Exemption from legal process and liens. No policy
of life insurance issued under this Act, or the proceeds
thereof, when paid to any member thereunder, nor any
other benefit granted under this Act, shall be liable to
attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized,
taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal or equitable
process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of
such member, of his beneficiary, or any other person who
may have a right thereunder, either before or after
payment; nor shall the proceeds thereof; when not made
payable to a named beneficiary, constitute a part of the
estate of the member for payment of his debt; Provided,
however, That this section shall not apply when
obligation, associated or bank or other financial instituted,
which is hereby authorized.
The aforecited freeze order of respondent Judge Benitez (directing PNB
not to release any portion of the retirement benefits due the petitioner)
falls squarely within the restrictive provisions of the aforequoted section.
Notably, said section speaks of "any other benefit granted under this Act,"
or "other process" and "applied by any legal or equitable process or
operation of law." This assailed order clearly violates the aforestated
provision and is, therefore, illegal and improper.
G.R. No 75410
Re the petition for certiorari and prohibition, the appellate court in
dismissing the same, said:
172
 But in this case, the petitioner could have appealed from
the decision of Judge Diaz. Instead, he announced he was
not going to appeal. He was going to file a petition for
certiorari and prohibition as he in fact did in this case. This
certainly cannot be done, even under the most liberal view
of practice and procedure. Especially can this not be done
when the questions raised do not relate either to errors of
jurisdiction or to grave abuse of discretion but, if at all, to
errors of judgment.

The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 of respondent Judge Diaz
which ordered then defendant PNB to desist and refrain from releasing to
petitioner all monetary benefits and emoluments due him as retirement
benefits and to deliver one-half thereof to private respondent also comes
within the prohibition imposed by Sec. 26, as amended, of the GSIS
Charter. This, in effect, is also a freeze order.

The directive to deliver one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits to

private respondent makes the default judgment doubly illegal because
retirement benefits have been adjudged as gratuities or reward for
lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be treated as
separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are
given gratis by the government because of previous work (like the
retirement pay of a provincial auditor in Mendoza vs. Dizon, L-387,
October 25, 1956) or that of a Justice of the Peace (Elcar vs. Eclar, CA-40
O.G. 12th Supp. No. 18, p. 86), this is a gratuity and should be considered
separate property (Art. 148, Civil Code).

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. Let the
records be remanded to the trial courts of origin for further proceedings.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz, and Gancayco, JJ., concur

173
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 70082 August 19, 1991
SPOUSES RICKY WONG and ANITA CHAN, LEONARDO JOSON,
JUANITO SANTOS, EMERITO SICAT and CONRADO
LAGMAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ROMARICO
HENSON, respondents.
Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioners.
Benjamin Dadios and Bausa, Ampil, Suarez, Paredes & Bausa for private
respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Submitted for adjudication in the instant petition for review on certiorari
is the issue of whether or not the execution of a decision in an action for
collection of a sum of money may be nullified on the ground that the real
properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged exclusive
properties of a husband who did not participate in his wife's business
transaction from which said action stemmed.
Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda on January
6, 1964.1 They have three children but even during the early years of their
marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living
separately. The former stayed in Angeles City while the latter lived in
Manila. During the marriage or on January 6, 1971, Romarico bought a
1,787 square-meter parcel of land in Angeles City for P11,492 from his
father, Dr. Celestino L. Henson2 with money borrowed from an officemate.
His father need the amount for investments in Angeles City and Palawan.3
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an
agreement with Anita Chan whereby the latter consigned to Katrina
pieces of jewelry for sale valued at 199,895 Hongkong dollars or
P321,830.95.4 When Katrina failed to return the pieces of jewelry within
the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their
value.
On September 18, 1972, Katrina issued in favor of Anita Chan a check for
P55,000 which, however, was dishonored for lack of funds. Hence, Katrina
was charged with estafa before the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga and Angeles City, Branch IV.5 After trial, the lower court
rendered a decision dismissing the case on the ground that Katrina's
liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa was committed
by the issuance of the check in payment of a pre-existing obligation.6
In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her husband Ricky Wong filed
against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for
collection of a sum of money also in the same branch of the aforesaid
court.7 The records of the case show that Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. filed an
answer with counterclaim but only in behalf of Katrina. When the case
was called for pre-trial, Atty. Albino once again appeared as counsel for
Katrina only. While it is true that during subsequent hearings, Atty.
Expedite Yumul, who collaborated with Atty. Albino, appeared for the
defendants, it is not shown on record that said counsel also represented
Romarico. In fact, a power of attorney which Atty. Albino produced during
the trial, showed that the same was executed solely by Katrina.8
After trial, the court promulgated a decisions9 in favor of the Wongs. It
ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay the Wongs HK$199,895.00
or P321,830.95 with legal interest from May 27, 1975, the date of filing of
the complaint, until fully paid; P20,000 as expenses for litigation; P15,000
as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.
A writ of execution was thereafter issued. Levied upon were four lots in
Angeles City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950, 30951,
30952 and 30953 all in the name of Romarico Henson ... married to
Katrina Henson.10
The public auction sale was first set for October 30, 1977 but since said
date was declared a public holiday, Deputy Sheriff Emerito Sicat reset the
sale to November 11, 1977. On said date, the following properties
174
registered in the name of Romarico Henson "married to Katrina Henson"
were sold at public auction: (a) two parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 with respective areas of 293
and 289 square meters at P145,000 each to Juanito L. Santos,11 and (b)
two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30952
and 30953 with respective areas of 289 and 916 square meters in the
amount of P119,000.00 to Leonardo B. Joson.12
After the inscription on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 of the levy
on execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224, the property covered
by said title was extrajudicially foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Porac,
Pampanga on account of the mortgage loan of P8,000 which Romarico and
Katrina had obtained from said bank. The property was sold by the sheriff
to the highest bidder for P57,000 on September 9, 1977. On September
14, 1978, Juanito Santos, who had earlier bought the same property at
public auction on November 11, 1977, redeemed it by paying the sum of
P57,000 plus the legal interest of P6,840.00 or a total amount of
P63,840.00.13
About a month before such redemption or on August 8, 1 978, Romarico
filed an action for the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 as
well as the writ of execution, levy on execution and the auction sale
therein in the same Court of First Instance.14 Romarico alleged that he was
"not given his day in court" because he was not represented by counsel as
Attys. Albino and Yumul appeared solely for Katrina; that although he did
not file an answer to the complaint, he was not declared in default in the
case; that while Atty. Albino received a copy of the decision, he and his
wife were never personally served a copy thereof; that he had nothing to
do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize her to
enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution
and sold at public auction by the sheriff were his capital properties and
therefore, as to him, all the proceedings had in the case were null and void.
On November 10, 1978, the lower court issued an order restraining the
Register of Deeds of Angeles City from issuing the final bill of sale of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30950 and 30951 in favor of Juanito
Santos and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 30952 and 30953 in favor of
Leonardo Joson until further orders of the court.15 On January 22, 1979,
upon motion of Romarico, the court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the sheriff from approving the final bill of sale of the
land covered by the aforementioned certificates of title and the Register
of Deeds of Angeles City from registering said certificates of title in the
names of Santos and Joson until the final outcome of the case subject to
Romarico's posting of a bond in the amount of P321,831.00.16
After trial on the merits, the lower court17 rendered a decision holding
that Romarico was indeed not given his day in court as he was not
represented by counsel nor was he notified of the hearings therein
although he was never declared in default. Noting that the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence
adduced at the trial in said case do not show that Romarico had anything
to do with the transactions between Katrina and Anita Chan, the court
ruled that the judgment in Civil Case No. 2224 "is devoid of legal or factual
basis which is not even supported by a finding of fact or ratio decidendi in
the body of the decision, and may be declared null and void ... pursuant to
a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court to the effect that the Court of
First Instance or a branch thereof, has authority and jurisdiction to try and
decide an action for annulment of a final and executory judgment or order
rendered by another court of first instance or of a branch thereof (Gianan
vs. Imperial, 55 SCRA 755)."18
On whether or not the properties lenied upon and sold at public auction
may be reconveyed to Romarico, the court, finding that there was no basis
for holding the conjugal partnership liable for the personal indebtedness
of Katrina, ruled in favor of reconveyance in view of the jurisprudence that
the interest of the wife in the conjugal partnership property being
inchoate and therefore merely an expectancy, the same may not be sold
or disposed of for value until after the liquidation and settlement of the
community assets. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against all the defendants, as
follows:
(a) The Decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and
Angeles City, Branch IV, rendered in Civil Case No. 2224, entitled
"RICKY WONG, ET AL. vs. KATRINA PINEDA HENSON and
175
ROMARICO HENSON", is hereby declared null and void, only as far
as it affects plaintiff herein Romarico Henson;
(b) The Writ of Execution, levy in execution and auction sale of the
conjugal property of the spouses Romarico Henson and Katrina
Pineda Henson which were sold at public auction on November
11, 1977, without notice to plaintiff herein, by Deputy Sheriff
Emerito Sicat, are likewise declared null and void and of no force
and effect;
(c) Defendants Emerito Sicat and Conrado Lagman, in their official
capacity as Sheriff and Register of Deeds, respectively, are
enjoined permanently from issuing and/or registering the
corresponding deeds of sale affecting the property;
(d) The aforementioned buyers are directed to reconvey the
property they have thus purchased at public auction to plaintiff
Romarico Henson;
(e) As far as the claim for reimbursement filed by Juanito Santos
concerning the redemption of the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 30951 from the Rural Bank of Porac, which
foreclosed the same extrajudicially, is concerned, plaintiff
Romarico Henson may redeem the same within the period and in
the manner prescribed by law, after the corresponding deed of
redemption shall have been registered in the Office of the Registry
of Deeds for Angeles City;
(f) Defendants Spouses Ricky Wong and Anita Chan are, with the
exception of the defendants Juanito Santos, Leonardo Joson,
Sheriff and Register of Deeds, are ordered jointly and severally, to
pay the plaintiff Romarico Henson the sum of P10,000.00,
corresponding to the expenses of litigation, with legal interest
thereon from the time this suit was filed up to the time the same
shall have been paid, plus P5,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, and
the costs of suit; and
(g) The counterclaims respectively filed on behalf of all the
defendants in the above-entitled case are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The defendants appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. In its
decision of January 22, 198519 the said court affirmed in toto the decision
of the lower court. It added that as to Romarico, the judgment in Civil Case
No. 2224 had not attained finality as the decision therein was not served
on him and that he was not represented by counsel. Therefore, estoppel
may not be applied against him as, not having been served with the
decision, Romarico did not know anything about it. Corollarily, there can
be no valid writ of execution inasmuch as the decision had not become
final as far as Romarico is concerned.
On whether the properties may be levied upon as conjugal properties, the
appellate court ruled in the negative. It noted that the properties are
Romarico' s exclusive capital having been bought by him with his own
funds. But granting that the properties are conjugal, they cannot answer
for Katrina's obligations as the latter were exclusively hers because they
were incurred without the consent of her husband, they were not for the
daily expenses of the family and they did not redound to the benefit of the
family. The court underscored the fact that no evidence has been
submitted that the administration of the conjugal partnership had been
transferred to Katrina either by Romarico or by the court before said
obligations were incurred.
The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
appellate court but the same was denied for lack of merit on February 6,
1985.20
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners contend
that, inasmuch as the Henson spouses were duly represented by Atty.
Albino as shown by their affidavit of August 25, 1977 wherein they
admitted that they were represented by said counsel until Atty. Yumul
took over the actual management and conduct of the case and that Atty.
Albino had not withdrawn as their counsel, the lower court "did not
commit an error" in serving a copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 2224
only on Atty. Albino. Moreover, during the 2-year period between the
filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2224 and the public auction sale
on November 11, 1977, Romarico remained silent thereby making him in
estoppel and guilty of laches.
176
Petitioners further aver that there being sufficient evidence that the
auction sale was conducted in accordance with law, the acts of the sheriffs
concerned are presumed to be regular and valid. But granting that an
irregularity consisting of the non-notification of Romarico attended the
conduct of the auction sale, the rights of Santos and Joson who were "mere
strangers who participated as the highest bidders" therein, may not be
prejudiced. Santos and Joson bought the properties sincerely believing
that the sheriff was regularly performing his duties and no evidence was
presented to the effect that they acted with fraud or that they connived
with the sheriff. However, should the auction sale be nullified, petitioners
assert that Romarico should not be unduly enriched at the expense of
Santos and Joson.
The petitioners' theory is that Romarico Henson was guilty of laches and
may not now belatedly assert his rights over the properties because he
and Katrina were represented by counsel in Civil Case No. 2224. Said
theory is allegedly founded on the perception that the Hensons were like
any other ordinary couple wherein a spouse knows or should know the
transactions of the other spouse which necessarily must be in interest of
the family. The factual background of this case, however, takes it out of
said ideal situation.
Romarico and Katrina had in fact been separated when Katrina entered
into a business deal with Anita Wong. Thus, when that business
transaction eventually resulted in the filing of Civil Case No. 2224,
Romarico acted, or, as charged by petitioners, failed to act, in the belief
that he was not involved in the personal dealings of his estranged wife.
That belief was buttressed by the fact that the complaint itself did not
mention or implicate him other than as the husband of Katrina. On
whether Romarico was also represented by Atty. Albino, Katrina's
counsel, the courts below found that:
... Atty. Albino filed an Answer with Counterclaims dated July 25,
1975 solely on behalf of defendant Katrina Henson. The salutary
statement in that Answer categorically reads: ... COMES NOW THE
DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON by and through undersigned
counsel, in answer to plaintiffs' complaint respectfully alleges: ... .
That Answer was signed by GREGORIO ALBINO, JR., over the
phrase COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON.
Again, when Civil Case No. 2224 was called for pre-trial on
November 27, 1975, before then Presiding Judge Bienvenido
Ejercito, it is clearly stated on page 2 of the day's stenographic
notes, under "APPEARANCES that Atty. Albino, Jr. appeared as
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT KATRINA HENSON". And when the
case was called, Atty. Jose Baltazar, Sr. appeared for the plaintiffs
while Atty. Albino categorically appeared "FOR DEFENDANT
KATRINA HENSON".
It might be true that in subsequent hearings, Atty. Expedito Yumul
'appeared as counsel for the defendants,' but the whole trouble is
that he never expressly manifested to the Court that he was
likewise actually representing defendant "ROMARICO HENSON",
for it cannot be disputed that Atty. Yumul only entered his
appearance in collaboration with Atty. Albino (see p. 2 tsn, January
26, 1976, Espinosa), who in turn entered his initial appearance
during the pre- trial, and through the filing of an Answer, for
defendant KATRINA HENSON. As a matter of fact, the Power of
Attorney which Atty. Albino produced during the pre-trial was
executed solely by defendant KATRINA HENSON. Accordingly, as
collaborating counsel, Atty. Yumul cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered as duly authorized to formally appear
likewise on behalf of defendant ROMARICO HENSON for whom
principal counsel of record Atty. Gregorio Albino, Jr. never made
any formal appearance. On this score, it is not amiss to state that
"A spring cannot rise higher than its source:.
Now, what about that statement in the aforementioned joint
affidavit of the spouses KATRINA HENSON and ROMARICO
HENSON, to the effect that our first lawyer in said case was Atty.
Gregorio Albino, Jr., and sometime later Atty. Expedito B. Yumul
took over ...
That statement which plaintiff ROMARICO HENSON was made to
sign by Atty. Yumul on August 25,1977, after the filing of this case,
allegedly for the purpose of dissolving the writ of execution, as
177
claimed in paragraph XIV of the complaint herein, and is
satisfactorily explained by both plaintiff herein and his wife, while
on cross-examination by Atty. Baltazar, Sr., and We quote:
Q So, the summons directed your filing of your Answer for
both of you, your wife and your good self?
A Yes, sir but may I add, I received the summons but I did
not file an answer because my wife took a lawyer and that
lawyer I think will protect her interest and my interest
being so I did not have nothing to do in the transaction
which is attached to the complaint.' (TSN, Jan. 14, 1980,
pp. 52-53).
That plaintiff never appeared in Civil Case No. 2224, nor
was he therein represented by counsel was impliedly
admitted by defendants' counsel of records thru a
question he propounded on cross, and the answer given
by Katrina Pineda, to wit:
Q How about your husband, do you remember if he
physically appeared in that Civil Case No. 2224, will you
tell us if he was represented by counsel as a party
defendant?
A No, sir, he did not appear.
Q You are husband and wife, please tell us the reason why
you have your own counsel in that case whereas Romarico
Henson did not appear nor a counsel did not appear in that
proceedings (TSN, Feb. 25,1980, pp. 6-7).
xxx xxx xxx
A Because that case is my exclusive and personal case, he
has nothing to do with that, sir. (TSN, Feb. 25, 1980, p. 9).
(Rollo, pp. 17-20)
Hence, laches may not be charged against Romarico because, aside from
the fact that he had no knowledge of the transactions of his estranged wife,
he was also not afforded an opportunity to defend himself in Civil Case No.
2224.21 There is no laches or even finality of decision to speak of with
respect to Romarico since the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 is null and
void for having been rendered without jurisdiction for failure to observe
the notice requirements prescribed by law.22 Failure to notify Romarico
may not be attributed to the fact that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2224
acted on the presumption that the Hensons were still happily married
because the complaint itself shows that they did not consider Romarico as
a party to the transaction which Katrina undertook with Anita Wong. In
all likelihood, the plaintiffs merely impleaded Romarico as a nominal
party in the case pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court.
Consequently, the writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico as
he has not yet had his day in court23 and, necessarily, the public auction
sale is null and void.24 Moreover, the power of the court in the execution
of judgments extends only over properties unquestionably belonging to
the judgment debtor.25
On the matter of ownership of the properties involved, however, the Court
disagrees with the appellate court that the said properties are exclusively
owned by Romarico.1âwphi1 Having been acquired during the marriage,
they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership26 even
though Romarico and Katrina had been living separately.27
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned by
Romarico.28 While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties
with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he
obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then
the money is part of the conjugal assets29 and not exclusively his. Proof on
this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the
determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during
covertrue, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the
purchase.
178
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's
indebtedness may not be paid for with them her obligation not having
been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the
conjugal partnership.30 In addition to the fact that her rights over the
properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such
indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the
trial.31
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988), a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only
when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family or
when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary
for the support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper
sum;32 when the administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred
to the wife by the courts33 or by the husband34 and when the wife gives
moderate donations for charity.35 Having failed to establish that any of
these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the conjugal
assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.
Petitioners' contention that the rights of Santos and Joson as innocent
buyers at the public auction sale may not be prejudiced, is, to a certain
extent, valid. After all, in the absence of proof that irregularities attended
the sale, the same must be presumed to have been conducted in
accordance with law. There is, however, a peculiar factual circumstance
that goes against the grain of that general presumption the properties
levied upon and sold at the public auction do not exclusively belong to the
judgment debtor. Thus, the guiding jurisprudence is as follows:
The rule in execution sales is that an execution creditor acquires
no higher or better right than what the execution debtor has in the
property levied upon. The purchaser of property on sale under
execution and levy takes as assignee, only as the judicial seller
possesses no title other than that which would pass by an
assignment by the owner. "An execution purchaser generally
acquires such estate or interest as was vested in the execution
debtor at the time of the seizure on execution, and only such
interest, taking merely a quit-claim of the execution debtor's title,
without warranty on the part of either the execution officer or of
the parties, whether the property is realty or personalty. This rule
prevails even if a larger interest in the property was intended to
be sold. Accordingly, if the judgment debtor had no interest in the
property, the execution purchaser acquires no interest therein."
(Pacheco vs. Court of Appeals, L-48689, August 31, 1987, 153
SCRA 382, 388-389 quoting Laureano vs. Stevenson, 45 Phil. 252;
Cabuhat vs. Ansery, 42 Phil. 170; Fore v. Manove, 18 Cal. 436 and
21 Am. Jur., 140-141. Emphasis supplied.)
Applying this jurisprudence, execution purchasers Santos and Joson
possess no rights which may rise above judgment debtor Katrina's
inchoate proprietary rights over the properties sold at public auction.
After all, a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell and
the buyer can, as a consequence, acquire no more that what the seller can
legally transfer.36 But, inasmuch as the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 is
void only as far as Romarico and the conjugal properties are concerned,
the same may still be executed by the Spouses Wong against Katrina
Henson personally and exclusively. The Spouses Wong must return to
Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson the purchase prices of P145,000 and
P119,000 respectively, received by said spouse from the public auction
sale.
The redemption made by Santos in the foreclosure proceeding against
Romarico and Katrina Henson filed by the Rural Bank of Porac, should,
however, be respected unless Romarico exercises his right of redemption
over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 30951 in
accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the appellate court and the lower court in
Civil Case No. 28-09 are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications
above stated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
179
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989
MOISES JOCSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO
VASQUEZ, respondents.
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Officers for petitioner.
Gabriel G. Mascardo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. No. 63474,
promulgated on April 30, 1980, entitled "MOISES JOCSON, plaintiff-
appellee, versus AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ and ERNESTO VASQUEZ,
defendant-appellants," upholding the validity of three (3) documents
questioned by Moises Jocson, in total reversal of the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, which declared them as null and
void; and of its resolution, dated September 30, 1980, denying therein
appellee's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the
only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina.
Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate
being settled. Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1,
1972.
As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the validity of
three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These
documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez
what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-
third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails
these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the
properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and
Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
The documents, which were presented as evidence not by Moises Jocson,
as the party assailing its validity, but rather by herein respondents, are
the following:
1) "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," marked as Exhibit 3 (pp.
12-13, Records) for the defendant in the court a quo, dated
July 27, 1968. By this document Emilio Jocson sold to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez six (6) parcels of land, all located
at Naic, Cavite, for the sum of ten thousand P10,000.00
pesos. On the same document Emilio Jocson
acknowledged receipt of the purchase price, thus:
Na ngayon, alang-alang sa halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG
PISO (P10,000) salaping Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng
buong kasiyahan loob at ang pagkakatanggap ay aking
hayagang inaamin sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, sa
aking anak na si Agustina Jocson, na may sapat na gulang,
mamamayang Pilipino, asawa ni Ernesto Vasquez, at
naninirahan sa Poblacion, Naic, Cavite, ay aking ipinagbile
ng lubusan at kagyat at walang ano mang pasubali ang
nabanggit na anim na pirasong lupa na nasa unang dahon
ng dokumentong ito, sa nabanggit na Agustina Jocson, at
sa kaniyang tagapagmana o makakahalili at gayon din nais
kong banggitin na kahit na may kamurahan ang ginawa
kong pagbibile ay dahilan sa ang nakabile ay aking anak na
sa akin at mapaglingkod, madamayin at ma-alalahanin, na
tulad din ng isa ko pang anak na lalaki. Ang kuartang
tinanggap ko na P10,000.00, ay gagamitin ko sa aking
katandaan at mga huling araw at sa aking mga ibang
mahahalagang pangangailangan. [Emphasis supplied]
180
Na nais ko ring banggitin na ang ginawa kong ito ay hindi
labag sa ano mang batas o kautusan, sapagkat ang aking
pinagbile ay akin at nasa aking pangalan. Ang mga lupang
nasa pangalan ng aking nasirang asawa ay hindi ko
ginagalaw ni pinakikialaman at iyon ay dapat na hatiin ng
dalawa kong anak alinsunod sa umiiral na batas (p. 13,
Records.)
2) "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan,"dated July 27,1968,
marked as Exhibit 4 (p. 14, Records). On the face of this
document, Emilio Jocson purportedly sold to Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez, for the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS, two rice mills and a camarin (camalig)
located at Naic, Cavite. As in the first document, Moises
Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:
'Na alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG LIBONG PISO
(P5,000.00) salaping Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng buong
kasiyahan loob sa aking anak na Agustina Jocson .... Na ang
halagang ibinayad sa akin ay may kamurahan ng kaunti
ngunit dahil sa malaking pagtingin ko sa kaniya ... kaya at
pinagbile ko sa kaniya ang mga nabanggit na pagaari kahit
na hindi malaking halaga ... (p. 14, Records).
3) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
Adjudication with Sale, "dated March 9, 1969, marked as
Exhibit 2 (p. 10-11, Records), whereby Emilio Jocson and
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, without the participation and
intervention of Moises Jocson, extrajudicially partitioned
the unsettled estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing the
same into three parts, one-third (1/3) each for the heirs of
Alejandra Poblete, namely: Emilio Jocson, Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez and Moises Jocson. By the same
instrument, Emilio sold his one- third (1/3) share to
Agustin for the sum of EIGHT THOUSAND (P8,000.00)
PESOS. As in the preceding documents, Emilio Jocson
acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:
Now for and in consideration of the sum of only eight
thousand (P8,000.00) pesos, which I, the herein Emilio
Jocson had received from my daughter Agustina Jocson, do
hereby sell, cede, convey and transfer, unto the said
Agustina Jocson, her heirs and assigns, administrators and
successors in interests, in the nature of absolute and
irrevocable sale, all my rights, interest, shares and
participation, which is equivalent to one third (1/3) share
in the properties herein mentioned and described the one
third being adjudicated unto Agustina Jocson and the
other third (1/3) portion being the share of Moises Jocson.
(p. 11, Records).
These documents were executed before a notary public. Exhibits 3 and 4
were registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite on July
29, 1968 and the transfer certificates of title covering the properties
therein in the name of Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," were
cancelled and new certificates of title were issued in the name of Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez. Exhibit 2 was not registered with the Office of the
Register of Deeds.
Herein petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27,
Rollo) on June 20,1973 with the then Court of First Instance of Naic, Cavite
(docketed as Civil Case No. TM- 531), and which was twice amended. In
his Second Amended Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein
petitioner assailed the above documents, as aforementioned, for being
null and void.
It is necessary to partly quote the allegation of petitioner in his complaint
for the reason that the nature of his causes of action is at issue, thus:
8. [With regard the first document, that] the defendants,
through fraud, deceit, undue pressure and influence and
other illegal machinations, were able to induce, led, and
procured their father ... to sign [the] contract of sale ..., for
the simulated price of P10,000.00, which is a
consideration that is shocking to the conscience of
ordinary man and despite the fact that said defendants
have no work or livelihood of their own ...; that the sale is
181
 null and void, also, because it is fictitious, simulated and
fabricated contract x x x (pp. 52-53, Record on Appeal).
[Emphasis supplied]
xxx xxx xxx
12. [With regards the second and third document, that
they] are null and void because the consent of the father,
Emilio Jocson, was obtained with fraud, deceit, undue
pressure, misrepresentation and unlawful machinations
and trickeries committed by the defendant on him; and
that the said contracts are simulated, fabricated and
fictitious, having been made deliberately to exclude the
plaintiff from participating and with the dishonest and
selfish motive on the part of the defendants to defraud him
of his legitimate share on said properties [subject matter
thereof]; and that without any other business or
employment or any other source of income, defendants who
were just employed in the management and administration
of the business of their parents, would not have the sufficient
and ample means to purchase the said properties except by
getting the earnings of the business or by simulated
consideration ... (pp. 54-55, Record on Appeal). [Emphasis
supplied]
Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between a father and
daughter who are living under the same roof, especially so when the
father has no need of money as the properties supposedly sold were all
income-producing. Further, petitioner claimed that the properties
mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of
Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot
validly sell (pp. 53, 57, Record on Appeal). As far as Exhibit 2 is concerned,
petitioner questions not the extrajudicial partition but only the sale by his
father to Agustina of the former's 1/3 share (p. 13, Rollo).
The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner (pp. 59-
81, Record on Appeal). It declared that the considerations mentioned in
the documents were merely simulated and fictitious because: 1) there
was no showing that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez paid for the properties; 2)
the prices were grossly inadequate which is tantamount to lack of
consideration at all; and 3) the improbability of the sale between Emilio
Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, taking into consideration the
circumstances obtaining between the parties; and that the real intention
of the parties were donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson from
participating in the estate of his parents. It further declared the properties
mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 as conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of "Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" and ordered that the properties
subject matter of all the documents be registered in the name of herein
petitioners and private respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a
decision (pp. 29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the trial court's and ruled
that:
1. That insofar as Exhibits 3 and 4 are concerned the
appellee's complaint for annulment, which is indisputably
based on fraud, and undue influence, is now barred by
prescription, pursuant to the settled rule that an action for
annulment of a contract based on fraud must be filed
within four (4) years, from the discovery of the fraud, ...
which in legal contemplation is deemed to be the date of
the registration of said document with the Register of
Deeds ... and the records admittedly show that both
Exhibits 3 and 4, were all registered on July 29, 1968,
while on the other hand, the appellee's complaint was filed
on June 20, 1973, clearly beyond the aforesaid four-year
prescriptive period provided by law;
2. That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, are
decisively not simulated or fictitious contracts, since
Emilio Jocson actually and really intended them to be
effective and binding against him, as to divest him of the
full dominion and ownership over the properties subject
of said assailed contracts, as in fact all his titles over the
same were all cancelled and new ones issued to appellant
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez ...;
182
 3. That in regard to Exhibit 2, the same is valid and
subsisting, and the partition with sale therein made by and
between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez,
affecting the 2/3 portion of the subject properties
described therein have all been made in accordance with
Article 996 of the New Civil Code on intestate succession,
and the appellee's (herein petitioner) remaining 1/3 has
not been prejudiced (pp. 41-42, Rollo).
In this petition for review, Moises Jocson raised the following assignments
of errors:
1. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SUIT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF
CONTRACTS FILED BY PETITIONERS WITH THE TRIAL
COURT IS "BASED ON FRAUD" AND NOT ON ITS
INEXISTENCE AND NULLITY BECAUSE OF IT'S BEING
SIMULATED OR FICTITIOUS OR WHOSE CAUSE IS
CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND GOOD CUSTOMS?
II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY
PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION?
III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN NOT DECLARING AS INEXISTENT AND NULL AND VOID
THE CONTRACTS IN QUESTION AND IN REVERSING THE
DECLARING DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT? (p. 2, Rollo)
I.
The first and second assignments of errors are related and shall be jointly
discussed.
According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes of action
were based on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, a contract
tainted by vitiated consent, as when consent was obtained through fraud,
is voidable; and the action for annulment must be brought within four
years from the time of the discovery of the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4, Civil
Code), otherwise the contract may no longer be contested. Under present
jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the
time the convenant was registered with the Register of Deeds (Gerona vs.
De Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3
and 4 were registered on July 29, 1968 but Moises Jocson filed his
complaint only on June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar
as these documents were concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had
prescribed.
If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in assailing
the questioned documents, We would have sustained the above
pronouncement. But it is not so. As pointed out by petitioner, he further
assailed the deeds of conveyance on the ground that they were without
consideration since the amounts appearing thereon as paid were in fact
merely simulated.
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without cause
produce no effect whatsoever. A contract of sale with a simulated price is
void (Article 1471; also Article 1409 [3]]), and an action for the
declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (Article 1410, Civil Code; See
also, Castillo v. Galvan, No. L-27841, October 20, l978, 85 SCRA 526).
Moises Jocsons saction, therefore, being for the judicial declaration of
nullity of Exhibits 3 and 4 on the ground of simulated price, is
imprescriptible.
II.
For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely academic.
The burden of proof in showing that contracts lack consideration rests on
he who alleged it. The degree of proof becomes more stringent where the
documents themselves show that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the
price, and more so where the documents were notarized, as in the case at
bar. Upon consideration of the records of this case, We are of the opinion
that petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the questioned documents
are without consideration.
Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had no other
source of income other than what she derives from helping in the
183
management of the family business (ricefields and ricemills), and which
was insufficient to pay for the purchase price, was contradicted by his own
witness, Isaac Bagnas, who testified that Agustina and her husband were
engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice (p. 10, t.s.n., January 14,
1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his wife testified that they did
not know whether or not Agustina was involved in some other business
(p. 40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p. 36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974).
On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in the business
of buying and selling palay and rice even before her marriage to Ernesto
Vasquez sometime in 1948 and continued doing so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n.,
March 15, 1976). Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a
contract is with a consideration (Article 1354, Civil Code), it is clear that
petitioner miserably failed to prove his allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of alleged
inadequacy of price. To begin with, there was no showing that the prices
were grossly inadequate. In fact, the total purchase price paid by Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez is above the total assessed value of the properties alleged
by petitioner. In his Second Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged that
the total assessed value of the properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was
P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the purchase
price paid was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the latter for the
1/3 share of Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal properties of his wife,
Alejandra Poblete. And any difference between the market value and the
purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight, may
not be so shocking considering that the sales were effected by a father to
her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into consideration
(Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-46430-31, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA
332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a contract of sale,
except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really
intended a donation or some other act or contract (Article 1470, Civil
Code) and there is nothing in the records at all to indicate any defect in
Emilio Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale between a father
and his daughter is purely speculative which has no relevance to a
contract where all the essential requisites of consent, object and cause are
clearly present.
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits 3
and 4, that the properties subject matter therein are conjugal properties
of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that
since the properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3
were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete," the certificates of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E', to
"J', pp. 4-9, Records) were enough proof to show that the properties
covered therein were acquired during the marriage of their parents, and,
therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal
properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23
SCRA 637, 644, We held that:
Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal
assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a modicum of
evidence, although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of
the New Civil Code which provides that ... . As interpreted
by this Court, the party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de
Ilano [62 Phil. 629, 639], it was held that "according to law
and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the
Property was acquired during the marriage in order that
the same may be deemed conjugal property." In the recent
case of Maramba vs. Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June 29,
1967, 20 SCRA 474], this Court, thru Mr. Justice
184
 Makalintal, reiterated that "the presumption under Article
160 of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during
the marriage," and then concluded that since "there is no
showing as to when the property in question was
acquired...the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone
is determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar, since there
is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were
acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of
the husband alone is an indication that the shares belong
exclusively to said spouse.'
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de Leon vs.
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, No. L-24571, December 18, 1970, 36
SCRA 289, and later in Torela vs. Torela, No. 1,27843, October 11, 1979,
93 SCRA 391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the
presumption under Article 160 he must first present proof that the
disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson
and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which
petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is
no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one
already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the
properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was
still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as
married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their
face, that the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered
owner. This is so because the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra
Poblete' are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson Litam v.
Rivera, 100 Phil. 354; Stuart v. Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27, 1962, 4 SCRA
1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-73733, December 16, 1986, 146
SCRA 282). In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held that
registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not
negate the possibility of it being conjugal (See Bucoy vs. Paulino, No. L-
25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248). But this ruling is not inconsistent
with the above pronouncement for in those cases there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed
conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the marriage
of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse
party having presented proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs-
Reyes, No. L-31618, August 17, 1983, 124 SCRA 154).
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented sufficient
proof to show that the disputed properties were acquired during his
parents' coverture. We would have ruled that the properties, though
registered in the name of Emilio Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in
view of the presumption under Article 160. There being no such proof, the
condition sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not
exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3 are the
exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.
There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which
are the subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the
exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on
petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
185
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24173 November 24, 1925
In re will of Jose Flores, deceased. SOTERO FLORES and AGUEDA
FLORES, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GERARDO FLORES, opponent-appellant.
M. H. de Joya, Jose Ma. T. Reyes and Eustaquio M. Banzali for petitioners
and appellants.
Felix B. Bautista for opponent-appellant.
STREET, J.:
On October 13, 1919, the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Pampanga admitted to probate the will of one Jose Flores, formerly a
resident of the barrio of Santa Rita, in the municipality of Macabebe,
Province of Pampanga, who had died on May 6, 1919, at the advanced age
of about 89 years. Rafael Flores, a brother of the deceased, was named in
the will as executor and by him the petition which resulted in the probate
of the will was presented. But Romulo Macalino succeeded later to the
office of administrator.
It appears that in life Jose Flores had been three times married, and he left
children surviving him from each of said marriages. By his first wife,
Angela Payuyu, he had three children named respectively Catalina,
Apolonia and Eleuterio Flores. The last named died before his father,
leaving three children, to wit, Virginia, Donata and Manuel Flores. By his
second wife, Jose Flores had two children, both of whom are still living,
namely, Sotero and Agueda Flores. By his third wife, he also had two
children named Gerardo and Elcredo (or Alfredo), but the last named died
before the testator.
In the course of the settlement of the estate various questions have arisen
with reference to the nature of the property to be divided and the
respective interest of the different sets of children therein, but for the
purposes of this appeal attention will be directed only to the contention
over the claims of the two surviving children of the second marriage,
Sotero Flores and Agueda Flores, who figure in this proceeding as
appellants.
It appears that the deceased lived about twenty-four years with his
second wife, and the property with which we are here concerned was
acquired during the said marriage. In so far as appears from this record
the conjugal partnership between Jose Flores and his second wife, Maria
Agustin, has never been formally liquidated, and in conformity with well-
established precedents it is proper to have said partnership liquidated by
the testator's executor or administrator, that is, in the present proceeding.
In view of this situation the two children of the second marriage, now
appellants, insisted in the lower court that all of the property acquired by
the testator during his second marriage pertained to the conjugal
partnership that had existed between him and his second wife, and they
maintained that said partnership should be liquidated and that the half
pertaining to their mother should be segregated before any general
distribution of the estate should occur. This general idea seems to have
been admitted in a qualified way by the court below in its decision of
February 4, 1925, and reiterated in its order of March 11, 1925, denying a
motion for reconsideration; but error is assigned to its pronouncement
with respect to the lands included in a Torrens certificate of title (Exhibit
D-1). This feature of the appeal is, we think, well grounded.
From the Exhibit D, which is a certified copy of the decision in a
registration proceeding, it appears that the lands covered by the
certificate of title (Exhibit D-1) had been purchased by Jose Flores on
September 15, 1902, or in the lifetime of his second wife, Maria Agustin.
After her death Flores instituted proceedings to register said lands and
procured the Torrens certificate of title thereto in his sole name. This had
the effect, so the court seems to have supposed, of making these lands the
exclusive property of Flores and of extinguishing their character as
conjugal property of the prior marriage. To hold otherwise, said his
Honor, would have the effect of revising the decree of the land court and
impairing a title which that court had decreed to Flores.
186
This idea is clearly incorrect. Thus surviving husband is ex-officio suggested is a fact that cannot be questioned, but as we gather from the
manager, or administrator, of the conjugal estate. He has the power to appealed orders the intention of the court was to reserve this point until
alienate the property for the purpose of liquidating the estate and the final project of liquidation and partition of the whole estate of Jose Flores
purchaser under him undoubtedly gets valid title (Nable Jose vs. Nable should be presented. While something would probably have been gained
Jose, 41 Phil., 713). But as long as the husband retains the property in in the way of clarifying the situation by entering into this question at an
whatever form, he holds it in the character of administrator and is earlier stage of the proceedings, the court cannot be put in error in having
virtually a trustee for those interested in the conjugal partnership. Nor merely postponed entering into this contention until a later stage of the
does the obtaining of a Torrens title in any wise change the situation. In proceedings.
section 70 of the Land Registration Act (No. 496), it is, among other things,
expressly declared that nothing contained in this Act shall in any way be For the reasons stated the order appealed from will be modified by
construed to relieve registered land or the owners thereof from any rights declaring that the lands covered by Torrens certificate of title Exhibit D-1,
incident to the relation of husband and wife or to change or affect in any like the other properties mentioned in Nos. 1-8, inclusive, of the decision
other way any other rights or liabilities created by laws and applicable to of February 4, 1925, pertain to the conjugal partnership of Jose Flores
unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act. It is with his second wife, Maria Agustin. In other respects the orders appealed
needless to say that there is no express provision anywhere in the Act from are affirmed. So ordered, without special pronouncement as to costs.
which has the effect of extinguishing the responsibility of the husband
with respect to the conjugal estate or which would enable him, by taking Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-
a Torrens title, to escape from his responsibility as administrator and Real, JJ., concur.
liquidator. Furthermore, in Severino vs. Severino (44 Phil. 343), it is
clearly shown that the registration of property in the name of one who
holds in a trust character does not extinguish the trust or destroy the
rights of the beneficiary. His Honor was therefore in error in this case in
supposing that the Torrens certificate of title (Exhibit D-1), covering lands
which had been acquired during the second marriage had changed in any
way the character of the property as ganacial property of the spouses in
said marriage. The first assignment error is therefore well taken in so far
as it relates to the ruling of the court with respect to the character of said
property. Property acquired during marriage pertains to the conjugal
partnership regardless of the form in which the title is then or there
afterwards taken. lawph!1.net

With respect to the second contention of the appellants, it appears that

their attorney was desirous of presenting proof with respect to the dates
upon which the deceased had contracted the various debts admitted by
the committee on claims as valid charges against his estate; and it is said
that the appellants were prepared to show that these debts had all been
contracted during his third marriage and hence could not constitute a
proper charge against the conjugal property pertaining to the second
marriage. That the appellants have a right to submit proof for the purpose
187
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9374 February 16, 1915
FRANCISCO DEL VAL, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANDRES DEL VAL, defendant-appellee.
Ledesma, Lim and Irureta Goyena for appellants.
O'Brien and DeWitt for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city
of Manila dismissing the complaint with costs.
The pleadings set forth that the plaintiffs and defendant are brother and
sisters; that they are the only heirs at law and next of kin of Gregorio
Nacianceno del Val, who died in Manila on August 4, 1910, intestate; that
an administrator was appointed for the estate of the deceased, and, after
a partial administration, it was closed and the administrator discharged
by order of the Court of First Instance dated December 9, 1911; that
during the lifetime of the deceased he took out insurance on his life for the
sum of P40,000 and made it payable to the defendant as sole beneficiary;
that after his death the defendant collected the face of the policy; that of
said policy he paid the sum of P18,365.20 to redeem certain real estate
which the decedent had sold to third persons with a right to repurchase;
that the redemption of said premises was made by the attorney of the
defendant in the name of the plaintiff and the defendant as heirs of the
deceased vendor; that the redemption of said premises they have had the
use and benefit thereof; that during that time the plaintiffs paid no taxes
and made no repairs.
It further appears from the pleadings that the defendant, on the death of
the deceased, took possession of most of his personal property, which he
still has in his possession, and that he has also the balance on said
insurance policy amounting to P21,634.80.
Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance policy belonged to the
estate of the deceased and not to the defendant personally; that, therefore,
they are entitled to a partition not only of the real and personal property,
but also of the P40,000 life insurance. The complaint prays a partition of
all the property, both real and personal, left by the deceased; that the
defendant account for P21,634.80, and that that sum be divided equally
among the plaintiffs and defendant along with the other property of
deceased.
The defendant denies the material allegations of the complaint and sets
up as special defense and counterclaim that the redemption of the real
estate sold by his father was made in the name of the plaintiffs and himself
instead of in his name alone without his knowledge or consent; and that
it was not his intention to use the proceeds of the insurance policy for the
benefit of any person but himself, he alleging that he was and is the sole
owner thereof and that it is his individual property. He, therefore, asks
that he be declared the owner of the real estate redeemed by the payment
of the P18,365.20, the owner of the remaining P21,634.80, the balance of
the insurance policy, and that the plaintiff's account for the use and
occupation of the premises so redeemed since the date of the redemption.
The learned trial court refused to give relief to either party and dismissed
the action.
It says in its opinion: "This purports to be an action for partition, brought
against an heir by his coheirs. The complaint, however, fails to comply
with Code Civ., Pro. sec. 183, in that it does not 'contain an adequate
description of the real property of which partition is demanded.' Because
of this defect (which has not been called to our attention and was
discovered only after the cause was submitted) it is more than doubtful
whether any relief can be awarded under the complaint, except by
agreement of all the parties."
This alleged defect of the complaint was made one of the two bases for the
dismissal of the action.
188
We do not regard this as sufficient reason for dismissing the action. It is
the doctrine of this court, set down in several decisions, Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. Rep., 504, that, even though the complaint
is defective to the extent of failing in allegations necessary to constitute a
cause of action, if, on the trial of the cause, evidence is offered which
establishes the cause of action which the complaint intended to allege, and
such evidence is received without objection, the defect is thereby cured
and cannot be made the ground of a subsequent objection. If, therefore,
evidence was introduced on the trial in this case definitely and clearly
describing the real estate sought to be partitioned, the defect in the
complaint was cured in that regard and should not have been used to
dismiss the action. We do not stop to inquire whether such evidence was
or was not introduced on the trial, inasmuch as this case must be turned
for a new trial with opportunity to both parties to present such evidence
as is necessary to establish their respective claims.
The court in its decision further says: "It will be noticed that the provision
above quoted refers exclusively to real estate. . . . It is, in other words, an
exclusive real property action, and the institution thereof gives the court
no jurisdiction over chattels. . . . But no relief could possibly be granted in
this action as to any property except the last (real estate), for the law
contemplated that all the personal property of an estate be distributed
before the administration is closed. Indeed, it is only in exceptional cases
that the partition of the real estate is provided for, and this too is evidently
intended to be effected as a part of the administration, but here the
complaint alleges that the estate was finally closed on December 9, 1911,
and we find upon referring to the record in that case that subsequent
motion to reopen the same were denied; so that the matter of the personal
property at least must be considered res judicata (for the final judgment
in the administration proceedings must be treated as concluding not
merely what was adjudicated, but what might have been). So far,
therefore, as the personal property at least is concerned, plaintiffs' only
remedy was an appeal from said order."
We do not believe that the law is correctly laid down in this quotation. The
courts of the Islands have jurisdiction to divide personal property
between the common owners thereof and that power is as full and
complete as is the power to partition real property. If an actual partition
of personal property cannot be made it will be sold under the direction of
the court and the proceeds divided among the owners after the necessary
expenses have been deducted.
The administration of the estate of the decedent consisted simply, so far
as the record shows, in the payment of the debts. No division of the
property, either real or personal, seems to have been made. On the
contrary, the property appears, from the record, to have been turned over
to the heirs in bulk. The failure to partition the real property may have
been due either to the lack of request to the court by one or more of the
heirs to do so, as the court has no authority to make a partition of the real
estate without such request; or it may have been due to the fact that all
the real property of decedent had been sold under pacto de retro and that,
therefore, he was not the owner of any real estate at the time of his death.
As to the personal property, it does not appear that it was disposed of in
the manner provided by law. (Sec. 753, Code of Civil Procedure.) So far as
this action is concerned, however, it is sufficient for us to know that none
of the property was actually divided among the heirs in the administration
proceeding and that they remain coowners and tenants-in- common
thereof at the present time. To maintain an action to partition real or
personal property it is necessary to show only that it is owned in common.
The order finally closing the administration and discharging the
administrator, referred to in the opinion of the trial court, has nothing to
do with the division of either the real or the personal property. The heirs
have the right to ask the probate court to turn over to them both the real
and personal property without division; and where that request is
unanimous it is the duty of the court to comply with it, and there is nothing
in section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits it. In such
case an order finally settling the estate and discharging the administrator
would not bar a subsequent action to require a division of either the real
or personal property. If, on the other hand, an order had been made in the
administration proceedings dividing the personal or the real property, or
both, among the heirs, then it is quite possible that, to a subsequent action
brought by one of the heirs for a partition of the real or personal property,
or both, there could have been interposed a plea of res judicata based on
such order. As the matter now stands, however, there is no ground on
which to base such a plea. Moreover, no such plea has been made and no
evidence offered to support it.
189
With the finding of the trial court that the proceeds of the life-insurance
policy belong exclusively to the defendant as his individual and separate
property, we agree. That the proceeds of an insurance policy belong
exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose
life was insured, and that such proceeds are the separate and individual
property of the beneficiary, and not of the heirs of the person whose life
was insured, is the doctrine in America. We believe that the same doctrine
obtains in these Islands by virtue of section 428 of the Code of Commerce,
which reads:
The amount which the underwriter must deliver to the person
insured, in fulfillment of the contract, shall be the property of the
latter, even against the claims of the legitimate heirs or creditors
of any kind whatsoever of the person who effected the insurance
in favor of the former.
It is claimed by the attorney for the plaintiffs that the section just quoted
is subordinate to the provisions of the Civil Code as found in article 1035.
This article reads:
An heir by force of law surviving with others of the same character
to a succession must bring into the hereditary estate the property
or securities he may have received from the deceased during the
life of the same, by way of dowry, gift, or for any good
consideration, in order to compute it in fixing the legal portions
and in the account of the division.
Counsel also claim that the proceeds of the insurance policy were a
donation or gift made by the father during his lifetime to the defendant
and that, as such, its ultimate destination is determined by those
provisions of the Civil Code which relate to donations, especially article
819. This article provides that "gifts made to children which are not
betterments shall be considered as part of their legal portion."
We cannot agree with these contentions. The contract of life insurance is
a special contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is
determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. The
Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specifically to life-
insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds. That
subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of Commerce which provides
for the terms of the contract, the relations of the parties and the
destination of the proceeds of the policy.
The proceeds of the life-insurance policy being the exclusive property of
the defendant and he having used a portion thereof in the repurchase of
the real estate sold by the decedent prior to his death with right to
repurchase, and such repurchase having been made and the conveyance
taken in the names of all of the heirs instead of the defendant alone,
plaintiffs claim that the property belongs to the heirs in common and not
to the defendant alone.
We are not inclined to agree with this contention unless the fact appear or
be shown that the defendant acted as he did with the intention that the
other heirs should enjoy with him the ownership of the estate — in other
words, that he proposed, in effect, to make a gift of the real estate to the
other heirs. If it is established by the evidence that that was his intention
and that the real estate was delivered to the plaintiffs with that
understanding, then it is probable that their contention is correct and that
they are entitled to share equally with the defendant therein. If, however,
it appears from the evidence in the case that the conveyances were taken
in the name of the plaintiffs without his knowledge or consent, or that it
was not his intention to make a gift to them of the real estate, then it
belongs to him. If that facts are as stated, he has two remedies. The one is
to compel the plaintiffs to reconvey to him and the other is to let the title
stand with them and to recover from them the sum he paid on their behalf.
For the complete and proper determination of the questions at issue in
this case, we are of the opinion that the cause should be returned to the
trial court with instructions to permit the parties to frame such issues as
will permit the settlement of all the questions involved and to introduce
such evidence as may be necessary for the full determination of the issues
framed. Upon such issues and evidence taken thereunder the court will
decide the questions involved according to the evidence, subordinating
his conclusions of law to the rules laid down in this opinion.
We do not wish to be understood as having decided in this opinion any
question of fact which will arise on the trial and be there in controversy.
190
The trial court is left free to find the facts as the evidence requires. To the
facts as so found he will apply the law as herein laid down.

The judgment appealed from is set aside and the cause returned to the
Court of First Instance whence it came for the purpose hereinabove
stated. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., and Carson, J., concur.

Torres, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

ARAULLO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result and with the reasoning of the foregoing decision,
only in so far as concerns the return of the record to the lower court in
order that it fully and correctly decide all the issues raised therein, allow
the parties to raise such questions as may help to decide all those involved
in the case, and to present such evidence as they may deem requisite for
a complete resolution of all the issues in discussion, because it is my
opinion that it is inopportune to make, and there should not be made in
the said majority decision the findings therein set forth in connection with
articles 428 of the Code of Commerce and 1035 of the Civil Code, in order
to arrive at the conclusion that the amount of the insurance policy
referred to belongs exclusively to the defendant, inasmuch a this is one of
the questions which, according to the decision itself, should be decided by
the lower court after an examination of the evidence introduced by the
parties; it is the lower court that should make those findings, which ought
afterwards to be submitted to this court, if any appeal be taken from the
judgment rendered in the case by the trial court in compliance with the
foregoing decision.

191
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 156125 August 25, 2010
FRANCISCO MUÑOZ, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA RAMIREZ and ELISEO CARLOS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Francisco Muñoz, Jr. (petitioner) to challenge the decision2 and
the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57126.4 The
CA decision set aside the decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 166, Pasig City, in Civil Case No. 63665. The CA resolution denied
the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized
below.
Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-square meter
residential house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street, Mandaluyong
City (subject property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
7650 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the name of the
petitioner.6
The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT
No. 1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos
(respondents).7
On April 6, 1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee,
mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with Erlinda’s consent, to the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a ₱136,500.00 housing loan,
payable within twenty (20) years, through monthly salary deductions of
₱1,687.66.8 The respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)-square
meter, two-story residential house on the lot.
On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the
petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992,
executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a
stated consideration of ₱602,000.00.9
On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC
for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was
no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring
the title to the petitioner’s name were falsified.
The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them a
₱600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the
petitioner gave Erlinda a ₱200,000.0010 advance to cancel the GSIS
mortgage, and made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage
contract; the petitioner promised to give the ₱402,000.00 balance when
Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and
submits an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights
to the subject property; with the ₱200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS
₱176,445.2711 to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427;12 in May
1992, Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but
returned Eliseo’s affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseo’s affidavit was unsigned,
the petitioner refused to give the ₱402,000.00 balance and to cancel the
mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda return the ₱200,000.00 advance;
since Erlinda could not return the ₱200,000.00 advance because it had
been used to pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept the title; and in 1993,
they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioner’s
name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their name.
The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged
that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused
their offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying
capacity and were unwilling to pay the incidental charges; the sale was
192
with the implied promise to repurchase within one year,13 during which
period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents would lease
the subject property for a monthly rental of ₱500.00;14 when the
respondents failed to repurchase the subject property within the one-year
period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name on July
14, 1993;15 when the respondents failed to pay the monthly rentals
despite demand, he filed an ejectment case16 against them with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, on
September 8, 1993, or sixteen days before the filing of the RTC case for
annulment of the deed of absolute sale.
During the pendency of the RTC case, or on March 29, 1995, the MeTC
decided the ejectment case. It ordered Erlinda and her family to vacate the
subject property, to surrender its possession to the petitioner, and to pay
the overdue rentals.17
In the RTC, the respondents presented the results of the scientific
examination18 conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation of
Eliseo’s purported signatures in the Special Power of Attorney19 dated
April 29, 1992 and the Affidavit of waiver of rights dated April 29,
1992,20 showing that they were forgeries.
The petitioner, on the other hand, introduced evidence on the
paraphernal nature of the subject property since it was registered in
Erlinda’s name; the residential lot was part of a large parcel of land owned
by Pedro Ramirez and Fructuosa Urcla, Erlinda’s parents; it was the
subject of Civil Case No. 50141, a complaint for annulment of sale, before
the RTC, Branch 158, Pasig City, filed by the surviving heirs of Pedro
against another heir, Amado Ramirez, Erlinda’s brother; and, as a result of
a compromise agreement, Amado agreed to transfer to the other
compulsory heirs of Pedro, including Erlinda, their rightful shares of the
land.21
THE RTC RULING
In a Decision dated January 23, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It
found that the subject property was Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal
property that was inherited from her father. It also upheld the sale to the
petitioner, even without Eliseo’s consent as the deed of absolute sale bore
the genuine signatures of Erlinda and the petitioner as vendor and
vendee, respectively. It concluded that the NBI finding that Eliseo’s
signatures in the special power of attorney and in the affidavit were
forgeries was immaterial because Eliseo’s consent to the sale was not
necessary.22
The respondents elevated the case to the CA via an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.
THE CA RULING
The CA decided the appeal on June 25, 2002. Applying the second
paragraph of Article 15823 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon.
Fortun,24 the CA held that the subject property, originally Erlinda’s
exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it was
used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds
– Eliseo’s monthly salary deductions; the subject property, therefore,
cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without Eliseo’s consent, pursuant to
Article 12425 of the Family Code. Thus, the CA declared void the deed of
absolute sale, and set aside the RTC decision.
When the CA denied26 the subsequent motion for reconsideration,27 the
petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA misapplied the second paragraph of
Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas28 because the
respondents admitted in the complaint that it was the petitioner who gave
the money used to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427; Article
12029 of the Family Code is the applicable rule, and since the value of the
house is less than the value of the lot, then Erlinda retained ownership of
the subject property. He also argues that the contract between the parties
was a sale, not a mortgage, because (a) Erlinda did not deny her signature
in the document;30 (b) Erlinda agreed to sign a contract of lease over the
subject property;31 and, (c) Erlinda executed a letter, dated April 30, 1992,
confirming the conversion of the loan application to a deed of sale.32
193
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The respondents submit that it is unnecessary to compare the respective
values of the house and of the lot to determine ownership of the subject
property; it was acquired during their marriage and, therefore,
considered conjugal property. They also submit that the transaction
between the parties was not a sale, but an equitable mortgage because (a)
they remained in possession of the subject property even after the
execution of the deed of absolute sale, (b) they paid the 1993 real property
taxes due on the subject property, and (c) they received ₱200,000.00 only
of the total stated price of ₱602,000.00.
THE ISSUE
The issues in the present case boil down to (1) whether the subject
property is paraphernal or conjugal; and, (2) whether the contract
between the parties was a sale or an equitable mortgage.
OUR RULING
We deny the present Petition but for reasons other than those advanced
by the CA.
This Court is not a trier of facts. However, if the inference, drawn by the
CA, from the facts is manifestly mistaken, as in the present case, we can
review the evidence to allow us to arrive at the correct factual conclusions
based on the record.33
First Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.34
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential
lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership.35 Pursuant to Articles 9236 and 10937 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the
marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the
exclusive property of each spouse.38 The residential lot, therefore, is
Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.
The CA, however, held that the residential lot became conjugal when the
house was built thereon through conjugal funds, applying the second
paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas.39 Under
the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code, a land that originally
belonged to one spouse becomes conjugal upon the construction of
improvements thereon at the expense of the partnership. We applied this
provision in Calimlim-Canullas,40 where we held that when the conjugal
house is constructed on land belonging exclusively to the husband, the
land ipso facto becomes conjugal, but the husband is entitled to
reimbursement of the value of the land at the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
The CA misapplied Article 158 of the
Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas
We cannot subscribe to the CA’s misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the
Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas.
As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code,
its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189)
should have governed their property relations. However, with the
enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions
on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been
superseded by those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133).
Article 105 of the Family Code states:
xxxx
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall
also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between
spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
194
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256.
Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the
provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect
to rights then already vested.
Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil
Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at
the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or
both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and
any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at
the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses
shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the
value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement;
otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-
spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement.41
In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan
through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 198942 to April 30,
1992,43 Eliseo paid about ₱60,755.76,44 not the entire amount of the GSIS
housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the
₱176,445.2745 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992.
Considering the ₱136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly
reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably
more than the ₱60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary
deductions.
Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property
of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written
consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding
that Eliseo’s signatures in the special power of attorney and affidavit were
forgeries was immaterial.
Nonetheless, the RTC and the CA apparently failed to consider the real
nature of the contract between the parties.
Second Issue:
Sale or Equitable Mortgage?
Jurisprudence has defined an equitable mortgage "as one which although
lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded
by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge
real property as security for a debt, there being no impossibility nor
anything contrary to law in this intent."46
Article 1602 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when a contract,
regardless of its nomenclature, may be presumed to be an equitable
mortgage: (a) when the price of a sale with right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate; (b) when the vendor remains in possession as
lessee or otherwise; (c) when upon or after the expiration of the right to
repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or
granting a new period is executed; (d) when the purchaser retains for
himself a part of the purchase price; (e) when the vendor binds
himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other case
where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties
is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the
performance of any other obligation. These instances apply to a
contract purporting to be an absolute sale.47
For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Article 1602
of the Civil Code, two (2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties
entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and, (b) that
their intention was to secure an existing debt by way of a mortgage. Any
of the circumstances laid out in Article 1602 of the Civil Code, not the
concurrence nor an overwhelming number of the enumerated
circumstances, is sufficient to support the conclusion that a contract of
sale is in fact an equitable mortgage.48
Contract is an equitable mortgage
In the present case, there are four (4) telling circumstances pointing to the
existence of an equitable mortgage.
195
First, the respondents remained in possession as lessees of the subject
property; the parties, in fact, executed a one-year contract of lease,
effective May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993.49
Second, the petitioner retained part of the "purchase price," the petitioner
gave a ₱200,000.00 advance to settle the GSIS housing loan, but refused
to give the ₱402,000.00 balance when Erlinda failed to submit Eliseo’s
signed affidavit of waiver of rights.
In Lustan v. CA,55 where we established the reciprocal obligations of the
parties under an equitable mortgage, we ordered the reconveyance of the
property to the rightful owner therein upon the payment of the loan
within ninety (90) days from the finality of the decision.56
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby DENY the present
petition. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 57126 are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

Third, respondents paid the real property taxes on July 8, 1993, despite
the alleged sale on April 30, 1992;50 payment of real property taxes is a
usual burden attaching to ownership and when, as here, such payment is
coupled with continuous possession of the property, it constitutes
evidence of great weight that the person under whose name the realty
taxes were declared has a valid and rightful claim over the land.51
Fourth, Erlinda secured the payment of the principal debt owed to the
petitioner with the subject property. The records show that the petitioner,
in fact, sent Erlinda a Statement of Account showing that as of February
20, 1993, she owed ₱384,660.00, and the daily interest, starting February
21, 1993, was ₱641.10.52 Thus, the parties clearly intended an equitable
mortgage and not a contract of sale.
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 30, 1992 is hereby
declared an equitable mortgage; and
2. The petitioner is obligated to RECONVEY to the respondents the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7650 of the
Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, UPON THE PAYMENT OF
₱200,000.00, with 12% legal interest from April 30, 1992, by
respondents within NINETY DAYS FROM THE FINALITY OF THIS
DECISION.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

That the petitioner advanced the sum of ₱200,000.00 to Erlinda is ARTURO D. BRION
undisputed. This advance, in fact, prompted the latter to transfer the Associate Justice
subject property to the petitioner. Thus, before the respondents can
recover the subject property, they must first return the amount of WE CONCUR:
₱200,000.00 to the petitioner, plus legal interest of 12% per annum,
computed from April 30, 1992. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
We cannot sustain the ballooned obligation of ₱384,660.00, claimed in the
Statement of Account sent by the petitioner,53 sans any evidence of how
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
this amount was arrived at. Additionally, a daily interest of ₱641.10 or
Associate Justice Associate Justice
₱19,233.00 per month for a ₱200,000.00 loan is patently unconscionable.
While parties are free to stipulate on the interest to be imposed on
monetary obligations, we can step in to temper the interest rates if they MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
are unconscionable.54 Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
196
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

197
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998
AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO
MAGSAJO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION
CHING, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted
by the husband alone are considered "for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership" which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a
surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said
provision?
These are the issues which we will resolve in this petition for review.
The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of the respondent
Court of Appeals in "Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching
vs. Ayala Investment and Development Corporation, et. al.," docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 29632,1 upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 168, which ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of
respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the
payment of the debts secured by respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
A chronology of the essential antecedent facts is necessary for a clear
understanding of the case at bar.
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as AIDC). As added security for the
credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements on December 10, 1980
and on March 20, 1981 making himself jointly and severally answerable
with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for
sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch VIII, entitled
"Ayala Investment and Development Corporation vs. Philippine Blooming
Mills and Alfredo Ching," docketed as Civil Case No. 42228.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-
husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests.
Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 42228, upon motion of
AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon
AIDC's putting up of an P8,000,000.00 bond, a writ of execution dated May
12, 1982 was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr., Deputy
Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil Case No. 42228, caused the
issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale
dated May 20, 1982 on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner
Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.
On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of injunction against
petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch
XIII, to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the
judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that,
among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said
conjugal partnership. 2 Upon application of private respondents, the
lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner
Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution
and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals,3 questioning the order of the lower court enjoining the sale.
Respondent Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order on
June 25, 1982, enjoining the lower court4 from enforcing its Order of June
198
14, 1982, thus paving the way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondents-spouses conjugal properties.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being the only bidder,
was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo, which was
registered on July 2, 1982. Upon expiration of the redemption period,
petitioner sheriff issued the final deed of sale on August 4, 1982 which
was registered on August 9, 1983.
In the meantime, the respondent court, on August 4, 1982, decided CA-
G.R. SP No. 14404, in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in this case is
granted and the challenged order of the respondent Judge
dated June 14, 1982 in Civil Case No. 46309 is hereby set
aside and nullified. The same petition insofar as it seeks to
enjoin the respondent Judge from proceeding with Civil
Case No. 46309 is, however, denied. No pronouncement is
here made as to costs. . . . 5
On September 3, 1983, AIDC filed a motion to dismiss the petition for
injunction filed before Branch XIII of the CFI of Rizal (Pasig) on the ground
that the same had become moot and academic with the consummation of
the sale. Respondents filed their opposition to the motion arguing, among
others, that where a third party who claim is ownership of the property
attached or levied upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that
in this case, two (2) of the real properties are actually in the name of
Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to Civil Case No. 42228.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, trial on the merits
proceeded. Private respondents presented several witnesses. On the
other hand, petitioners did not present any evidence.
On September 18, 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision declaring
the sale on execution null and void. Petitioners appealed to the
respondent court, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 29632.
On April 14, 1994, the respondent court promulgated the assailed
decision, affirming the decision of the regional trial court. It held that:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was
for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
petitioners-appellees.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the applicable law, whether it is Article 161 of the
New Civil Code or Article 1211 of the Family Code-suffice
it to say that the two provisions are substantially the same.
Nevertheless, We agree with the trial court that the Family
Code is the applicable law on the matter . . . . . . .
Article 121 of the Family Code provides that "The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: . . . (2) All debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated Administrator-Spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains . . . ." The burden of proof
that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. In the case at bar, respondent-appellant
AIDC failed to prove that the debt was contracted by
appellee-husband, for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the appeal. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED in toto.6
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
respondent court in a Resolution dated November 28, 1994.7
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner contends that the "respondent
court erred in ruling that the conjugal partnership of private respondents
is not liable for the obligation by the respondent-husband."
199
Specifically, the errors allegedly committed by the respondent court are
as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE OBLIGATION INCURRED
RESPONDENT HUSBAND DID NOT
REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT
HUSBAND IN SECURING THE SUBJECT
LOAN IS NOT PART OF HIS INDUSTRY,
BUSINESS OR CAREER FROM WHICH HE
SUPPORTS HIS FAMILY.
Petitioners in their appeal point out that there is no need to prove that
actual benefit redounded to the benefit of the partnership; all that is
necessary, they say, is that the transaction was entered into for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. Thus, petitioners aver that:
The wordings of Article 161 of the Civil Code is very clear:
for the partnership to be held liable, the husband must
have contracted the debt "for the benefit of the
partnership, thus:
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1) all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband
for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership . . . .
There is a difference between the phrases: "redounded to
the benefit of" or "benefited from" (on the one hand) and
"for the benefit of (on the other). The former require that
actual benefit must have been realized; the latter requires
only that the transaction should be one which normally
would produce benefit to the partnership, regardless of
whether or not actual benefit accrued.8
We do not agree with petitioners that there is a difference between the
terms "redounded to the benefit of" or "benefited from" on the one hand;
and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same thing.
Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are
similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the other
hand, Article 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of
personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they
redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen, the terms are used
interchangeably.
Petitioners further contend that the ruling of the respondent court runs
counter to the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Cobb-Perez
vs. Lantin,9 that the husband as head of the family and as administrator of
the conjugal partnership is presumed to have contracted obligations for
the benefit of the family or the conjugal partnership.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the case of Cobb-Perez is not
applicable in the case at bar. This Court has, on several instances,
interpreted the term "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
In the cases of Javier vs. Osmeña, 10 Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger,
Inc., 11 Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin 12 and G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, cited by the petitioners, we held that:
13
The debts contracted by the husband during the marriage
relation, for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes toward the support of
his family, are not his personal and private debts, and the
products or income from the wife's own property, which,
like those of her husband's, are liable for the payment of
the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from the
payment of such debts. (Javier)
The husband, as the manager of the partnership (Article
1412, Civil Code), has a right to embark the partnership in
200
 an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain, and the fact
that the wife may not approve of a venture does not make
it a private and personal one of the husband. (Abella de
Diaz)
Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of
the industry or profession by which he contributes to the
support of the family, cannot be deemed to be his
exclusive and private debts. (Cobb-Perez).
. . . if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of
his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate
business, the conjugal partnership must equally bear the
indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted
to the prejudice of his family. (G-Tractors)
However, in the cases of Ansaldo vs. Sheriff of Manila, Fidelity Insurance &
Luzon Insurance Co.,14 Liberty Insurance Corporation
vs. Banuelos, 15 and Luzon Surety Inc. vs. De Garcia, 16 cited by the
respondents, we ruled that:
The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of
the assets of the conjugal partnership, are subject to the
payment of the debts and expenses of the spouses, but not
to the payment of the personal obligations (guaranty
agreements) of the husband, unless it be proved that such
obligations were productive of some benefit to the family."
(Ansaldo; parenthetical phrase ours.)
When there is no showing that the execution of an
indemnity agreement by the husband redounded to the
benefit of his family, the undertaking is not a conjugal debt
but an obligation personal to him. (Liberty Insurance)
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership
under Article 161 of the new Civil Code is liable only for
such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the
requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly
accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a
conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate
the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the
family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the
power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to
the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. (Luzon
Surety, Inc.)
From the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of this Court, we can derive the
following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he
directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own
business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term . . . .
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual
benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is
apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature
of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the
loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or
does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations
on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that
contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context
of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." The contract
of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a
husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it
is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented
to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.
Thus, the distinction between the Cobb-Perez case, and we add, that of the
three other companion cases, on the one hand, and that of Ansaldo,
Liberty Insurance and Luzon Surety, is that in the former, the husband
201
contracted the obligation for his own business; while in the latter, the
husband merely acted as a surety for the loan contracted by another for
the latter's business.
The evidence of petitioner indubitably show that co-respondent Alfredo
Ching signed as surety for the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM.
petitioner should have adduced evidence to prove that Alfredo Ching's
acting as surety redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
reason for this is as lucidly explained by the respondent court:
The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was
for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming
Mills and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
petitioners-appellees. Philippine Blooming Mills has a
personality distinct and separate from the family of
petitioners-appellees — this despite the fact that the
members of the said family happened to be stockholders
of said corporate entity.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, lies with
the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. In the case at
bar, respondent-appellant AIDC failed to prove that the
debt was contracted by appellee-husband, for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of gains. What is apparent
from the facts of the case is that the judgment debt was
contracted by or in the name of the Corporation Philippine
Blooming Mills and appellee-husband only signed as
surety thereof. The debt is clearly a corporate debt and
respondent-appellant's right of recourse against appellee-
husband as surety is only to the extent of his corporate
stockholdings. It does not extend to the conjugal
partnership of gains of the family of petitioners-appellees.
. . . . . .17
Petitioners contend that no actual benefit need accrue to the conjugal
partnership. To support this contention, they cite Justice J.B.L. Reyes'
authoritative opinion in the Luzon Surety Company case:
I concur in the result, but would like to make of record
that, in my opinion, the words "all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership" used in Article 161 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines in describing the charges and obligations for
which the conjugal partnership is liable do not require
that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the conjugal
partnership from the husband's transaction; but it suffices
that the transaction should be one that normally would
produce such benefit for the partnership. This is the ratio
behind our ruling in Javier vs. Osmeña, 34 Phil. 336, that
obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his
profession are collectible from the conjugal partnership.
The aforequoted concurring opinion agreed with the majority decision
that the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety
agreement which was clearly for the benefit of a third party. Such opinion
merely registered an exception to what may be construed as a sweeping
statement that in all cases actual profit or benefit must accrue to the
conjugal partnership. The opinion merely made it clear that no actual
benefits to the family need be proved in some cases such as in the Javier
case. There, the husband was the principal obligor himself. Thus, said
transaction was found to be "one that would normally produce . . . benefit
for the partnership." In the later case of G-Tractors, Inc., the husband was
also the principal obligor — not merely the surety. This latter case,
therefore, did not create any precedent. It did not also supersede the
Luzon Surety Company case, nor any of the previous accommodation
contract cases, where this Court ruled that they were for the benefit of
third parties.
But it could be argued, as the petitioner suggests, that even in such kind
of contract of accommodation, a benefit for the family may also
result, when the guarantee is in favor of the husband's employer.
202
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits the respondent family
would reasonably anticipate were the following:
(a) The employment of co-respondent
Alfredo Ching would be prolonged and he
would be entitled to his monthly salary of
P20,000.00 for an extended length of time
because of the loan he guaranteed;
(b) The shares of stock of the members of
his family would appreciate if the PBM
could be rehabilitated through the loan
obtained;
(c) His prestige in the corporation would
be enhanced and his career would be
boosted should PBM survive because of
the loan.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the
Civil Code. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It
cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.
In all our decisions involving accommodation contracts of the
husband, 18 we underscored the requirement that: "there must be the
requisite showing . . . of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses" or "benefits to his family" or "that such obligations
are productive of some benefit to the family." Unfortunately, the petition
did not present any proof to show: (a) Whether or not the corporate
existence of PBM was prolonged and for how many months or years;
and/or (b) Whether or not the PBM was saved by the loan and its shares
of stock appreciated, if so, how much and how substantial was the
holdings of the Ching family.
Such benefits (prospects of longer employment and probable increase in
the value of stocks) might have been already apparent or could be
anticipated at the time the accommodation agreement was entered into.
But would those "benefits" qualify the transaction as one of the
"obligations . . . for the benefit of the conjugal partnership"? Are indirect
and remote probable benefits, the ones referred to in Article 161 of the
Civil Code? The Court of Appeals in denying the motion for
reconsideration, disposed of these questions in the following manner:
No matter how one looks at it, the debt/credit
respondents-appellants is purely a corporate debt granted
to PBM, with petitioner-appellee-husband merely signing
as surety. While such petitioner-appellee-husband, as
such surety, is solidarily liable with the principal debtor
AIDC, such liability under the Civil Code provisions is
specifically restricted by Article 122 (par. 1) of the Family
Code, so that debts for which the husband is liable may not
be charged against conjugal partnership properties.
Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit — "The payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to
the benefit of the family.
Respondents-appellants insist that the corporate debt in
question falls under the exception laid down in said Article
122 (par. one). We do not agree. The loan procured from
respondent-appellant AIDC was for the sole advancement
and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-
appellees.
. . . appellee-husband derives salaries, dividends benefits
from Philippine Blooming Mills (the debtor corporation),
only because said husband is an employee of said PBM.
These salaries and benefits, are not the "benefits"
contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code.
The "benefits" contemplated by the exception in Article
122 (Family Code) is that benefit derived directly from the
use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate
loan extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by
petitioner-appellee-husband or his family. The alleged
benefit, if any, continuously harped by respondents-
appellants, are not only incidental but also speculative. 19
203
We agree with the respondent court. Indeed, considering the odds
involved in guaranteeing a large amount (P50,000,000.00) of loan, the
probable prolongation of employment in PBM and increase in value of its
stocks, would be too small to qualify the transaction as one "for the
benefit" of the surety's family. Verily, no one could say, with a degree of
certainty, that the said contract is even "productive of some benefits" to
the conjugal partnership.
We likewise agree with the respondent court (and this view is not
contested by the petitioners) that the provisions of the Family Code is
applicable in this case. These provisions highlight the underlying concern
of the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the
husband's duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate
it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the
obligations entered into by one of the spouses must be those that
redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the
partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family is benefited."20
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions
of the Civil Code which prohibits any of the spouses to donate or convey
gratuitously any part of the conjugal property. 21 Thus, when co-
respondent Alfredo Ching entered into a surety agreement he, from then
on, definitely put in peril the conjugal property (in this case, including the
family home) and placed it in danger of being taken gratuitously as in
cases of donation.
In the second assignment of error, the petitioner advances the view that
acting as surety is part of the business or profession of the respondent-
husband.
This theory is new as it is novel.
The respondent court correctly observed that:
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, hence the cited cases of Cobb-Perez
vs. Lantin; Abella de Diaz vs. Erlanger & Galinger; G-
Tractors, Inc. vs. CA do not apply in the instant case.
Signing as a surety is not embarking in a business.22
We are likewise of the view that no matter how often an executive acted
or was persuaded to act, as a surety for his own employer, this should not
be taken to mean that he had thereby embarked in the business of
suretyship or guaranty.
This is not to say, however, that we are unaware that executives are often
asked to stand as surety for their company's loan obligations. This is
especially true if the corporate officials have sufficient property of their
own; otherwise, their spouses' signatures are required in order to bind
the conjugal partnerships.
The fact that on several occasions the lending institutions did not require
the signature of the wife and the husband signed alone does not mean that
being a surety became part of his profession. Neither could he be
presumed to have acted for the conjugal partnership.
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment
of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to
the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a
corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the
benefit of the family.
On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity, the assailed decision
should be upheld as we now uphold it. This is, of course, without prejudice
to petitioner's right to enforce the obligation in its favor against the PBM
receiver in accordance with the rehabilitation program and payment
schedule approved or to be approved by the Securities & Exchange
Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is hereby, DENIED
for lack of merit.
204
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

205
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and
ROMULO NICOL, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47029 and its Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
The case stemmed from the following factual backdrop:
On 30 April 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado (petitioners) filed a
complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol (Erlinda) with Branch 19 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case
No. 84-33. Said action originated from Erlinda Nicol’s civil liability arising
from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners.
On 6 April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to
pay damages. The dispositive portion reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff[s] and
against defendant ordering the latter to pay the former the amount of
thirty thousand (₱30,000.00) pesos as moral damages, five thousand
(₱5,000.00) pesos as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, another five
thousand (₱5,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages and the cost of suit.2
Said decision was affirmed, successively, by the Court of Appeals and this
Court. It became final and executory on 5 March 1992.
On 14 October 1992, the trial court issued a writ of execution, a portion of
which provides:
Now, therefore, you are commanded that of the goods and chattels of the
defendant Erlinda Nicol, or from her estates or legal heirs, you cause the
sum in the amount of forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00), Philippine
Currency, representing the moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses and exemplary damages and the cost of suit of the plaintiff aside
from your lawful fees on this execution and do likewise return this writ
into court within sixty (60) days from date, with your proceedings
endorsed hereon.
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found whereof to satisfy this
execution and lawful fees thereon, then you are commanded that of the
lands and buildings of said defendant you make the said sum of money in
the manner required by the Rules of Court, and make return of your
proceedings with this writ within sixty (60) days from date.3
Finding Erlinda Nicol’s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the
judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on
execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. The notice of levy
was annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125322.
On 20 November 1992, a notice of sheriff’s sale was issued.
Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an
affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the
deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriff’s indemnity bond.
The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder.
On 4 February 1993, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners.
Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol (respondent), the
husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of
sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the
deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the
206
defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and
execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of
Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there was no proper publication
and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that
his property which was valued at ₱500,000.00 was only sold at a "very
low price" of ₱51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda
Nicol was only ₱40,000.00. The case was assigned to Branch 21 of the
RTC of Imus, Cavite.
In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of
execution. Citing De Leon v. Salvador,4 petitioners claimed that
respondent should have filed the case with Branch 19 where the
judgment originated and which issued the order of execution, writ of
execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriff’s sale.
In an Order5 dated 18 April 1994, the RTC dismissed respondent’s
complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the defendants, any flaw in the
implementation of the writ of execution by the implementing sheriff must
be brought before the court issuing the writ of execution. Besides, there
are two (2) remedies open to the plaintiff, if he feels that the property
being levied on belongs to him and not to the judgment debtor. The first
remedy is to file a third-party claim. If he fails to do this, a right is reserved
to him to vindicate his claim over the property by any proper action. But
certainly, this is not the proper action reserved to the plaintiff to vindicate
his claim over the property in question to be ventilated before this court.
As earlier stated, this case should have been addressed to Branch 19, RTC
Bacoor as it was that court which issued the writ of execution.6
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied on 26 July 1994.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held
that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 21 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on 23 August 2000.
Hence, the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Court of Appeals.
A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-
judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where
the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of
judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an
independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.8
Nowhere in the petition was it shown that the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals was questioned. The issue devolves on whether the husband of
the judgment debtor may file an independent action to protect the
conjugal property subject to execution. The alleged error therefore is an
error of judgment which is a proper subject of an appeal.
Nevertheless, even if we were to treat this petition as one for review, the
case should still be dismissed on substantive grounds.
Petitioners maintain that Branch 19 retained jurisdiction over its
judgment to the exclusion of all other co-ordinate courts for its execution
and all incidents thereof, in line with De Leon v. Salvador. Petitioners
insist that respondent, who is the husband of the judgment debtor, is not
the "third party" contemplated in Section 17 (now Section 16), Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, hence a separate action need not be filed. Furthermore,
petitioners assert that the obligation of the wife redounded to the benefit
of the conjugal partnership and cited authorities to the effect that the
husband is liable for the tort committed by his wife.
207
Respondent on the other hand merely avers that the decision of the Court
of Appeals is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with law
and jurisprudence.9
Verily, the question of jurisdiction could be resolved through a proper
interpretation of Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.
If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment
obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto
or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title,
and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof
upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a
bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a
sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of
disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court
issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or
keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the
action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the filing of the bond.
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from
vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the
judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate action
against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious
claim.
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond shall
not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for
damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor
General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the
court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may be
appropriated for the purpose. (Emphasis Supplied)
Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party claimant or to
a stranger to the foreclosure suit against the sheriff or officer effecting the
writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the
judgment creditor, a third-party claimant may also resort to an
independent separate action, the object of which is the recovery of
ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as
damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property. If a
separate action is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in
a forum of competent jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from
the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even before or without
need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ.101awphi1.zw+
A third-party claim must be filed a person other than the judgment debtor
or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-
party claim.
This leads us to the question: Is the husband, who was not a party to the
suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other
spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?"
In determining whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the
character of the property must be taken into account. In Mariano v. Court
of Appeals,11 which was later adopted in Spouses Ching v. Court of
Appeals,12 this Court held that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot
be deemed a "stranger" to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his
wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.13 On the other hand, in Naguit v. Court of Appeals14 and Sy v.
Discaya,15 the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action
wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in
bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over
his exclusive or paraphernal property.lawphil.net
Pursuant to Mariano however, it must further be settled whether the
obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not.
Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal
liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. We do not agree.
208
There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article DANTE O. TINGA
122 of the Family Code16 explicitly provides that payment of personal Associate Justice
debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they WE CONCUR:
redounded to the benefit of the family.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by Associate Justice
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the Acting Chairperson
absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the
exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not TERESITA LEONARDO DE
accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
CASTRO**
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the Associate Justice
Associate Justice
liability of the debtor-spouse.
ARTURO D. BRION
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the
Associate Justice
civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
ATTESTATION
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal
obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.17 consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
In Guadalupe v. Tronco,18 this Court held that the car which was claimed
by the third party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
upon to enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third person, the third- Associate Justice
party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation which is personal to Acting Chairperson, Second Division
the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his
separate property. CERTIFICATION

Hence, the filing of a separate action by respondent is proper and
jurisdiction is thus vested on Branch 21. Petitioners failed to show that
the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding
the case to Branch 21 for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

209
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 102692 September 23, 1996
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJO M. VINLUAN, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a husband be held liable for the debts of his wife which were incurred
without his consent and which did not benefit the conjugal partnership?
May a judgment declaring a wife solely liable, be executed
upon conjugal property, over the objection of the husband?
These are the main questions raised in the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks nullification
of the Decision 1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 19178 of the Court of Appeals, 2 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED, and the orders dated July 24, 1989 and October 4, 1989 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, in Civil Case No. 4186, as well
as the notices of levy issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal dated
February 8, 1989, are hereby declared null and void and set aside. No
costs.
The Facts
This case was initiated in the trial court by a complaint 3 filed by petitioner
against spouses Delilah A. Vinluan, owner of Vinluan Enterprises, and her
husband Capt. Alejo M. Vinluan (the private respondent before us), for
collection of a sum of money with damages, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4186 and tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
137. 4 The respondent appellate Court found the antecedent facts, to be as
follows: 5
The plaintiff-respondent Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Incorporated
(hereinafter referred to as the corporation) is engaged in the
manufacturing and selling of various cosmetics, health, and body care
products, as well as medical drugs. On several occasions in the year 1982,
the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of the plaintiff-
respondent corporation, as she was also engaged in the business of
retailing Johnson products, among others. The defendants, under the
name and style of "Vinluan Enterprises," thus incurred an obligation of
Two Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Pesos and
Eighty-Nine (P235,880.89) Centavos, for which she issued seven (7)
Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates.
When presented on their respective due dates, however, the checks given
in payment of the obligation bounced and were dishonored for having
been drawn against insufficient funds.
Several demands thereafter for payment were to no avail, despite the
accommodations given by the plaintiff-respondent corporation by
granting several extensions to the defendant spouses to settle the
obligation. It was only on January 5, 1983 that the defendants made a
partial payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, thereby reducing
their principal obligation to P230,880.89. When no further payments
were made to settle the obligation despite repeated demands, the
plaintiff-respondent corporation was constrained to file a complaint
(Annex "A") on June 8, 1983 against defendant spouses Vinluan, for
collection of the principal obligation plus interest, with damages. Filed
before the respondent Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 137, it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4186.
After trial on the merits, on February 5, 1985, the respondent court
rendered its Decision (Annex "C"), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the defendant
DELILAH A. VINLUAN to pay plaintiff Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc, the
sum of P242,482.40 with interest and penalty charges at the rate of 2%
per month from 30 January 1983 until fully paid, and the sum of
P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs.
210
Defendants' counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of sufficient merit.
In arriving at the sole liability of defendant Delilah A. Vinluan, the trial
court found after "meticulous scrutiny and careful evaluation of the
evidence on record" that there was "no privity of contract, whether direct
or indirect, between plaintiff and defendant-husband regarding the
obligations incurred by defendant-wife." According to the trial court, "(i)n
fact, the acts performed, and the statements made, by defendant-husband,
and from which plaintiff derived the notion that said defendant is a co-
owner of VINLUAN ENTERPRISES, took place after the obligation
involved in this action had been incurred or contracted by the defendant-
wife, albeit without the husband's knowledge or consent, as there was no
allegation in the complaint that said obligations were incurred by
defendant-wife with her husband's consent, or that it was incurred for the
benefit of the family. . . ." 6
The trial court also found that private respondent never intimated in his
conversations or meetings with, or in any of his letters to, petitioner that
"he was a co-owner of VINLUAN ENTERPRISES, much less did he
represent himself as such co-owner, to the plaintiff and to plaintiff's
counsel . . . ." When private respondent personally negotiated with
petitioner and proposed a settlement of the subject obligations, these
actuations were not to be considered as admission of co-ownership of
VINLUAN ENTERPRISES for "(a)fter all, common sense and our inborn
mores of conduct dictate that a husband must give aid and comfort to his
distressed wife." 7 The trial court further held that the defendant spouses
had sufficiently established that the defendant wife was sole owner of the
business venture, that the conjugal partnership never derived any benefit
therefrom, and that the same closed due to continued losses. In sum, the
court a quo held that private respondent could not legally be held liable
for the obligations contracted by the wife.
Thus, the court below issued a writ of execution 8 on February 3, 1989,
directing the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to execute the judgment on
the properties of the defendant-wife. However, the two notices of levy on
execution 9 issued on February 8, 1989 covered not only her exclusive or
paraphernal properties, but also the real and personal properties of the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Vinluan. The next day, her husband
(herein private respondent) filed a third-party claim 10 seeking the lifting
of the levy on the conjugal properties, followed by another third-party
claim reiterating the same demand with threat of possible lawsuit.
Subsequently, petitioner corporation filed a motion dated February 14,
1989 asking the court to fix the value of the properties levied upon by the
sheriff. In response to the third-party claims of private respondent, a
comment and/or opposition dated March 6, 1989 was filed by petitioner.
Private respondent moved on July 1, 1989 to quash the levy on execution
on the ground that the notices of levy on execution did not conform to the
final decision of the court and to the writ of execution. As expected,
petitioner opposed the motion. On July 24, 1989, the trial court issued the
first assailed Order fixing the value of the levied personal properties at
P300,000.00, and denying the third-party claim and the motion to quash
the levy on execution. Citing the last sentence of Article 117 11 of the Civil
Code, the court a quo ruled that: 12
Since Alejo Vinluan did not seek the intervention of the Court to air his
objections in his wife's engaging in business, coupled by the fact that he
made several representations for the settlement of his wife's account,
Alejo Vinluan's consent thereto became evident. As such, even his own
capital may be liable, together with the conjugal and paraphernal
property (I Paras 363, 1987 ed., p. 6; Art. 6-10, Code of Commerce).
Withal, Article 172 of the New Civil Code categorically declares that —
The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's
consent, except in the cases provided by law.
Granting arguendo that Alejo Vinluan did not give his consent, expressly
or impliedly, the paraphernal and conjugal property may still be held
liable but not his capital (I Paras 363, 1978 ed.).
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the abovequoted first order (on
the ground that it directly contravened the decision itself which had
already become final and executory) was denied via the second contested
Order dated October 4, 1989, where the trial court ruled: 13
The Court finds untenable movant-defendant's assertion that Art. 172 of
the New Civil Code is not in point. The consent of the husband is indeed
vital in determining what properties shall be subsidiarily liable in the
211
event the paraphernal properties of Delilah Vinluan should turn out to be
insufficient to cover the judgment debt, as fully explained in the Order
dated 24 July 1989.
Art. 122 of the Family Code which party provides that —
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife
before or during the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of
the family.
xxx xxx xxx
is not applicable in that —
This Code (Family Code) shall have
retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws (Art.
255, Family Code; emphasis
supplied).
Plaintiff (petitioner herein), having acquired a vested right prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, said code is not a propos (sic). Even
granting arguendo that the same is befitting, movant defendant failed to
realize that although Delilah Vinluan suffered losses in her legitimate
business, the experience she has gained redounded to the benefit of the
family, and as such, the conjugal partnership must bear the indebtedness
and losses (I Paras 464, 1981 ed.). Moreover, had the business Delilah
Vinluan engaged in been a success, all profits would have been considered
conjugal; it is therefore but fair that the risks of the business should be
borne by the conjugal partnership (Miravite, Bar Review Materials in
Commercial Law, 1986 ed., p. 89; J.N. Nolledo, Commercial Law Reviewer,
1986 ed., pp. 6, 7; U.P. Law Complex, Answers to Bar Questions In
Commercial Law, 1986 ed., pp. 174, 175; Vitug, Commercial Law
Reviewer, 1984, ed., p. 5).
There is a wide-embracing oversight when movant-defendant asserted
that to hold the conjugal partnership property liable for the indebtedness
incurred solely by his wife would in effect modify the Decision dated 5 Feb
1985 which is now final and executory. As afore-discussed, the conjugal
property is subsidiarily liable.
As indicated above, the private respondent elevated the matter to
the respondent appellate Court, charging the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its own final
judgment. The respondent Court upheld the private respondent in
its now-assailed Decision, and denied herein petitioner's
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner is now
before us seeking review under Rule 45.
The Issues
Petitioner raised the following "issues of law" for consideration of this
Court, to wit: 14
1. Whether or not the decision of the honorable trial court
dated February 5, 1985 exonerating (sic) defendant
husband, private respondent herein, from the obligation
contracted by the wife in the pursuit of her business also
absolves the conjugal partnership from liability.
2. Whether or not the subsequent order of the honorable
trial court dated July 24, 1989 and October 4, 1989 is a
reversal of its own original decision as found out by the
honorable public respondent.
The pivotal issues in this case may be re-stated thus: whether or not the
order of the trial court denying private respondent's third-party claim and
motion to quash levy on execution in effect amended the dispositive
portion of the trial court's decision which had long become final and
executory, and if so, whether same is proper or not. These issues shall be
ruled upon together.
The Court's Ruling
212
Petitioner contends 15 that the purpose of impleading private respondent
as co-defendant in petitioner's complaint was to bind not only the
defendant-spouses' conjugal partnership but also private respondent's
capital. The trial court resolved that it was not necessary that private
respondent (as husband) be joined as party-defendant in the suit below.
Inasmuch as it appeared from the allegations in the complaint that private
respondent may be a co-owner of Vinluan Enterprises, the trial court
nonetheless did not exclude private respondent but passed upon the issue
of such co-ownership to determine whether he may be held liable in the
same manner as his wife. Petitioner insists that the trial court in its
decision merely made a finding that the private respondent husband was
not a co-owner of the business venture of his wife, which conclusion
("exoneration") only exempted his capital from the adjudged liability, but
not the conjugal properties of the spouses. Petitioner further argues that
nowhere in the trial court's decision can there be found any
pronouncement absolving the conjugal property from liability, contrary
to the findings of the respondent Court.
Also, petitioner reasons that the enforcement of the decision against the
conjugal property is merely compliance with law, and that this Court in a
long line of cases 16 held that a judgment is not confined to what appears
upon the face of the decision but also those necessarily included therein
or necessary thereto. 17 Additionally, petitioner pleads that the trial
court's order did not modify its final and executory decision but only
clarified an ambiguity in the decision as to what properties are liable. As
authority, it cites Republic vs. De los Angeles. 18
Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.
Respondent Court correctly ruled that the trial court cannot, in the guise
of deciding the third-party claim, reverse its final decision. Commenting
on the trial court's very patent "about-face" on the issues of consent of the
husband, benefit to the family, and the husband's liability for obligations
contracted by his wife, the appellate Court held, and we quote: 19
We see in these stark contradictions an attempt by the respondent Court
to reverse itself, even when the decision sought to be executed had
already become final. The respondent Court has no authority to modify or
vary the terms and conditions of a final and executory judgment (Vda. de
Nabong vs. Sadang, 167 SCRA 232) and this attempt to thwart the rules
cannot be allowed to pass. Even if the respondent Court feels that it
needed to reverse its findings to correct itself, the decision, whether
erroneous or not, has become the law of the case between the parties
upon attaining finality (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37). the respondent
Court has no choice but to order the execution of the final decision
according to what is ordained and decreed in the dispositive portion of
the decision (National Steel Corp. vs. NLRC, 165 SCRA 452).
The dispositive portion of the decision charges the defendant Delilah
Vinluan alone to pay the plaintiff corporation, having already declared
that the defendant-husband cannot be held legally liable for his wife's
obligations. Perhaps, when it was later discovered that the defendant
Delilah Vinluan did not have sufficient property of her own to settle the
obligation, the conjugal properties of the defendant-spouses became the
object of the levy. But in order to bind the conjugal partnership and its
properties, the New Civil Code provides that the debts and obligations
contracted by the husband (or the wife) must be for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership (Article 161, par. 1); and that the husband must
consent to his wife's engaging in business (Article 117).
Thus, we see a belated effort on the part of the respondent Court to
reverse itself by declaring that the obligations incurred by the defendant
wife redounded to the benefit of the family and that the defendant
husband had given his consent, in order to bind the conjugal partnership.
As We stated earlier, this cannot be done because the decision, along with
the respondent Court's original findings, had already become final and
indisputable. The respondent Court already found that the defendant
husband did not give his consent; neither did the obligation incurred by
the defendant wife redound to the benefit of the family. Hence, the
conjugal partnership, as well as the defendant husband, cannot be held
liable. As originally decreed by the Court, only the defendant wife and her
paraphernal property can be held liable. Since the power of the court in
execution of judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone (Republic vs. Enriquez, 166 SCRA
608), the conjugal properties and the capital of the defendant husband
cannot be levied upon.
213
The settled rule is that a judgment which has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any
respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes — all the issues
between the parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest. 20 This is
meant to preserve the stability of decisions rendered by the courts, and to
dissuade parties from trifling with court processes. One who has
submitted his case to a regular court necessarily commits himself to abide
by whatever decision the court may render. Any error in the decision
which has not been considered in a timely motion for reconsideration or
appeal cannot be impugned when such error becomes apparent only
during execution. This rule applies with more force in the case of to
decision judge who has limited prerogative during execution of the
judgment. For as correctly held by herein public respondent, aside from
ordering the enforcement of the dispositive portion of the decision, the
trial judge can do nothing about the errors in the ratiocination of the
decision or even alter the dispositive portion by mere order issued
subsequent to the finality of the decision. The issue having been laid to
rest, the court cannot on the pretext of determining the validity of the
third-party claim and the motion to quash levy on execution alter the
scope of the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be implemented.
Petitioner's arguments notwithstanding, the trial court's order cannot be
said to be merely clarificatory in nature. There is no ambiguity at all in the
decision, for it categorically declared defendant Delilah A. Vinluan solely
liable, without any recourse provided against her husband. Thus, the case
of Republic vs. Delos Angeles, 21 holding that doubtful or
ambiguous judgments are to have a reasonable intendment to do justice
and avoid wrong, does not apply here. as was later held in Filinvest Credit
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 22 "(w)here there is an ambiguity, a
judgment shall be read in connection with the entire record and construed
accordingly. In such a case, it is proper to consider the pleadings and the
evidence." (Emphasis supplied). But the text of the trial court's decision
points to no other person liable but Delilah Vinluan, and in fact made a
rather lengthy discussion on the exemption from liability of the conjugal
partnership; hence, there can be no ambiguity to speak of in the decision.
And even more clearly, the body of the decision of the trial court expressly
exempted private respondent from liability by categorically ruling that
"the defendant-husband cannot, together, with co-defendant, legally be
held liable for the obligations contracted by the wife." 23 Further, the trial
court expounded: 24
. . . . What is more, it is an admitted fact that the subject
obligations had partially been paid by the defendant-wife
herself. Thus, plaintiff implicitly averred that "defendant
Delilah Vinluan, ding business under the name and style of
VINLUAN ENTERPRISES is one of the various customers
of the plaintiff's products' (Cf. p. 1, Plaintiff's Pre-Trial
Brief); that "Delilah Vinluan . . . purchased different
Johnson products . . . , thus incurring an obligation of
P235,880.89" (Cf. par. III, Complaint); that "defendant
Delilah Vinluan tried to pay (her) obligations . . . when she
issued Philippine Banking Checks . . . , but which checks
upon presentment to the Bank were dishonored for the
reason "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds" (Cf. par. V, id.);
that " . . . , defendant Delilah A. Vinluan appealed to the
company and also represented that she be given an
opportunity to settle the accountability" (Cf. par. VI, id.);
that "defendant sent a letter to the company where she
alleged that payment cannot be made because they are
"victims of some bad practices in the trade and that they
are working on some means to settle their accounts and
all that they ask is time to settle." (Cf. par. VI, id.).
We take this occasion to reiterate the ruling of this Court in an early
case 25 that litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
it being essential to the effective and efficient administration of justice
that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through
a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Hence, courts must
guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result, for,
constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown
upon any attempt to prolong them. Furthermore, public policy and sound
practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law.
And this is better observed if the court executing the judgment would
refrain from creating further controversy by effectively modifying and
altering the dispositive portion of the decision, thus further delaying the
satisfaction of the judgment. No matter how just the intention of the trial
214
court, it cannot legally reverse what has already been settled. Holding the
conjugal partnership liable in the order after the finality of the decision is
evidently not just correcting a mere clerical error; it goes into the merits
of the case. And this is prohibited by the rules and jurisprudence.
We have elsewhere ruled that "should judgment of lower courts — which
may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals — become final
and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal,
they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then,
no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a
higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other
official, branch or department of Government." 26
. . . (N)othing is more settled in the law than that when a
final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the Court
rendering it or by the highest Court of land. They only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors
or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, and, of course, where the
judgment is void.
were to be levied upon. There was no mention even of
conjugal properties. Hence, in levying on the properties
that did not exclusively belong to the judgment debtor, the
notices of levy failed to conform to the decree of the
decision, and are, therefore, irregular and contrary to the
Rules (Canlas vs. CA, 164 SCRA 160).
It is a rule firmly established in our jurisprudence that a sheriff is not
authorized to attach or levy on property not belonging to the judgment
debtor. 29 A sheriff even incurs liability if he wrongfully levies upon the
property of a third person. 30 A sheriff has no authority to attach the
property of any person under execution except that of the judgment
debtor. The sheriff maybe liable for enforcing execution on property
belonging to a third party. 31 If he does so, the writ of execution affords
him no justification, for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of
the writ.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the herein petition
is hereby DENIED, and the Decision of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment or alteration which

substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose." 27

The respondent Court also commented on the sheriff's actuations as

follows: 28

Furthermore, it is the duty of the sheriff to ensure that

only that portion of the decision ordained and decreed in
the dispositive part should be the subject of the execution
(Cunanan vs. Cruz, 167 SCRA 674). The writ of execution
itself states that only the properties of the defendant wife
215
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160708 October 16, 2009
PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID
D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE,
INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA
ABRILLE, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:
For review are the Decision1 dated February 21, 2002 and the
Resolution2 dated October 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 54560. The appellate court modified the Decision3 dated September
26, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 15.
Simply stated, the facts as found by the Court of Appeals4 are as follows:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are
husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the
instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land
denominated as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision,
Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro
acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his
name under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on
Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early 1980’s but the
spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and
an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann
was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and
the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and
the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary
Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro
nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s consent,
as evidenced by a Deed of Sale5 dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said
deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four
children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the
Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in
connivance with petitioners6 began transferring all their belongings from
the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they
were stopped from entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening
under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but
police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter.
Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to
her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents
Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale,
Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction7 against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas)
in the RTC of Davao City.
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own
money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house
and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina,
examined the titles when they bought the property.
On September 26, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of herein respondent
Mary Ann P. Villa Abrille as follows:
216
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The sale of lot 8 covered by TCT No. 26471 by defendant Pedro
Abrille appearing in the Deed of Sale marked as Exh. "E" is void as
to one half or 277.5 square meters representing the share of
plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille.
2. That sale of Lot 7 covered by TCT No. [88674] by defendant
Pedro Villa Abrille in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A") is valid as to one
half or 277.5 square meters of the 555 square meters as one half
belongs to defendant Pedro Abrille but it is void as to the other
half or 277.5 square meters as it belongs to plaintiff Mary Abrille
who did not sell her share nor give her consent to the sale.
3. That sale of the house mentioned in the Deed of Sale (Exh. "A")
is valid as far as the one half of the house representing the share
of defendant Pedro Abrille is concerned but void as to the other
half which is the share of plaintiff Mary Abrille because she did not
give her consent/sign the said sale.
4. The defendants shall jointly pay the plaintiffs.
4. A. Seventeen Thousand Pesos (₱17,000.00)
representing the value of the movables and belonging[s]
that were lost when unknown men unceremoniously and
without their knowledge and consent removed their
movables from their house and brought them to an
apartment.
4. B. One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 100,000.00) to
plaintiff Mary Abrille as moral damages.
4. C. Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) to each of the four
children as moral damages, namely:
a) Ingrid Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00), b) Ingremark Villa Abrille – Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00), c) Ingresoll Villa Abrille – Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and d) Ingrelyn Villa Abrille
– Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
5. Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) as exemplary damages by
way of example and correction for the public good.
6. The costs of suit.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 26471 in favor of defendants
spouses Wilfredo and Patrocinia Ravina is declared valid.
2. The sale of lot covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of said
defendants spouses Ravina, together with the house thereon, is
declared null and void.
3. Defendant Pedro Abrille is ordered
to return the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT
No. 88674 and the house thereon to co-defendants spouses
Ravina.
4. Defendants spouses Ravina [a]re ordered to reconvey the lot
and house covered by TCT No. 88674 in favor of spouses Pedro
and Mary Villa Abrille and to deliver possession to them.
5. Plaintiffs are given the option to exercise their rights under
Article [450] of the New Civil Code with respect to the
improvements introduced by defendant spouses Ravina.
6. Defendants Pedro Villa Abrille and spouses Ravina are ordered
to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs as follows:
a) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) to
plaintiff Mary Villa Abrille as moral damages.
217
 b) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages
to each of the four children, namely: Ingrid Villa Abrille,
Ingremark Villa Abrille, Ingresoll Villa Abrille and Ingrelyn
Villa Abrille.
c) Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) as exemplary damages by
way of example and correction for the public good.
SO ORDERED.9
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed
this petition. Petitioners argue that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED x x x THE SALE OF
LOT COVERED BY TCT NO. 88674 IN FAVOR OF SPOUSES RAVINA,
TOGETHER WITH THE HOUSE THEREON, AS NULL AND VOID SINCE IT IS
CLEARLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS
PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE NOT INNOCENT
PURCHASERS FOR VALUE, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND
EVIDENCE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS
PATROCIN[I]A RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA ARE LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES, THE SAME BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.10
In essence, petitioners assail the appellate court’s declaration that the sale
to them by Pedro of the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 is null and void.
However, in addressing this issue, it is imperative to determine: (1)
whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive
property of Pedro or conjugal property, and (2) whether its sale by Pedro
was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent.
Petitioners assert that the subject lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was the
exclusive property of Pedro having been acquired by him through barter
or exchange.11 They allege that the subject lot was acquired by Pedro with
the proceeds of the sale of one of his exclusive properties. Allegedly, Pedro
and his sister Carmelita initially agreed to exchange their exclusive lots
covered by TCT No. T-26479 and TCT No. T-26472, respectively. Later,
however, Pedro sold the lot covered by TCT No. T-26472 to one Francisca
Teh Ting and purchased the property of Carmelita using the proceeds of
the sale. A new title, TCT No. T-88674, was issued thereafter. Thus,
petitioners insist that the subject lot remains to be an exclusive property
of Pedro as it was acquired or purchased through the exclusive funds or
money of the latter.
We are not persuaded. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife."
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471,
which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him
before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-
88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann.
No evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired
through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of
the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject
property is exclusively owned by Pedro.12 Petitioners’ bare assertion
would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674,
acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal.
Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even
obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.1avvphi1
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article
124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done
218
(a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of
one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family
Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is
explicit:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from
the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may
be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.)
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10)
years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the
Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the
conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the
wife is null and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the
husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal
property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without
the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is
annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the
date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute
the case.13
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale
within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house
and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a
property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of
freely without Mary Ann’s consent.
On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are
buyers in good faith.14 Accordingly, they need not inquire whether the lot
was purchased by money exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the
common fund of the spouses and may rely on the certificates of title.
The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property.15 To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a
person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the
seller need only show that he relied on the face of the seller’s certificate of
title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and
occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code,
he must show that he inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell in order to
establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.161avvphi1
In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and
his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the
time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary
Ann’s conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that
petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive
property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann’s lawyer of her
objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property
without Mary Ann’s written consent. Moreover, the respondents were the
ones in actual, visible and public possession of the property at the time
the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew
that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet
they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners
cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith.
219
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been
given is proper. The relationship between the parties in any contract even
if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by
good faith and fair dealing.17 Hence, in consonance with justice and equity
and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense, we
sustain the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to return to petitioner
spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-
88674 and the house thereon.
latter for the damages caused.23 It is patent in this case that petitioners’
alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.
WHEREFORE, we deny the instant petition for lack of merit. The Decision
dated February 21, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements SO ORDERED.
for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As
correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time Acting Chief Justice
when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued introducing
improvements during the pendency of the action.18 WE CONCUR:

Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, "(h)e CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what Associate Justice
is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."19
ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to
Associate Justice Associate Justice
respondents is not supported by the evidence on record.20

The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent ROBERTO A. ABAD
and her children were removed from the family home deserves our Associate Justice
condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while respondent was out and her
children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the CERTIFICATION
petitioners21 surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to
another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas. conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person Division.
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
faith."22 When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with Acting Chief Justice
such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, Republic of the Philippines
any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that SUPREME COURT
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the Baguio City
220
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 178902 April 21, 2010
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners,
vs.
CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R.
CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a
challenged affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim
valid consent, loss of right to declare nullity of sale, and prescription.
The Facts and the Case
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar,
Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T.
Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale.1 But Tarciano did not for
the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.
Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet
at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the
documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty.
Plagata prepared2 dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly
stated that it was to take effect in six months.
The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down
payment of ₱60,000.00 for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within
six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and
secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario),
to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes
spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional
₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded
in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply
with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the
lot without any further formality and payment.
The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then
worked on the other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he
went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an
affidavit of consent.3 As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty.
Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11,
1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale4 in favor of the Fuentes
spouses. They then paid him the additional ₱140,000.00 mentioned in
their agreement. A new title was issued in the name of the spouses5 who
immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990
Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months
afterwards.
Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely,
respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R.
Cristobal, together with Tarciano’s sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented
by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action
for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes
spouses before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil
Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since
Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her signature on
the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the
property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the
Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.6
The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata
who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her
residence in Paco, Manila, on September 15, 1988. He admitted, however,
that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months later on
January 11, 1989.7 All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the
claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it.
Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground
of fraud had already lapsed.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts
at the trial. Comparing Rosario’s standard signature on the affidavit with
221
those on various documents she signed, the Rocas’ expert testified that
the signatures were not written by the same person. Making the same
comparison, the spouses’ expert concluded that they were.8
On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It
ruled that the action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the
Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or fraud, already prescribed under
Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its discovery. In this case,
the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date the
deed of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title
was issued. Here, the Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years
after the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.9
Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the
fraud. Mere variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof
of forgery.10 The RTC ruled that, although the Rocas presented a
handwriting expert, the trial court could not be bound by his opinion since
the opposing expert witness contradicted the same. Atty. Plagata’s
testimony remained technically unrebutted.11
Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization of the
affidavit of consent did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require
spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to be valid. Neither does the
irregularity vitiate Rosario’s consent. She personally signed the affidavit
in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA
found sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty.
Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Quezon City.
Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing the questioned signature
with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant variance between
them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years
since 1958 also reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been
forged.
Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that
their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an
action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may
be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the
transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in
1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.
Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and
Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the
spouses to reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest
computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. Since the
Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under
Article 448 of the Civil Code to payment of the value of the improvements
they introduced on the lot. The CA did not award damages in favor of the
Rocas and deleted the award of attorney’s fees to the Fuentes spouses.13
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court
by petition for review.14
The Issues Presented
The case presents the following issues:
1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent
to her husband Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the
Fuentes spouses was forged;
2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of
that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and
3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not
had, could bring the action to annul that sale.
The Court’s Rulings
First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on
the document of consent had been forged. For, if the signature were
genuine, the fact that she gave her consent to her husband’s sale of the
conjugal land would render the other issues merely academic.
The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed
a marked difference between her signature on the affidavit of
222
consent15 and her specimen signatures.16 The CA gave no weight to Atty.
Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Manila on
September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in the jurat
that Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.
The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature
strokes on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her
specimen signatures, on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter
stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were written is also
remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.
Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time
that she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore,
reliable standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no
evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that accounted
for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent.
Notably, Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years
since 1958. And she resided so far away in Manila. It would have been
quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk
that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for
it.
What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of
consent. That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and
signed it in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata
testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her
residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a defective
notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with
the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of
Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses
honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent
does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.
Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies
to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and
Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the
Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of
conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article
165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership,
Article 16617 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property
without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s
consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario
the right to have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years
from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand,
after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that
Tarciano fraudulently sold. Thus:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI,
Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and
Wife.18 Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to
already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested
rights.19 Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. (n)
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses
on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was
already the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code
does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may
223
assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:
Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. x x x
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or
inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And
this rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision
of law,20 as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other
spouse’s written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by
ratification or prescription.21
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken
to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to
declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been
given under it.22 This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code
does not prescribe. Thus:
Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe.
Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano
sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written consent. The passage of
time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the
transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring
an action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent
during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently,
the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years
of the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.
The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to
them based on fraud and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive
period should be that which applies to fraudulent transactions, namely,
four years from its discovery. Since notice of the sale may be deemed given
to the Rocas when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989,
their right of action already prescribed in 1993.
But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes
spouses in that they appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an
honest belief that Rosario’s written consent to the sale was genuine. They
had four years then from the time they learned that her signature had
been forged within which to file an action to annul the sale and get back
their money plus damages. They never exercised the right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent
upon a false representation that the property would go to their children,
not to strangers, and it turned out that this was not the case, then she
would have four years from the time she discovered the fraud within
which to file an action to declare the sale void. But that is not the case here.
Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was
simply not obtained at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her
written consent was void. Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is
not forgery but the lack of written consent of their mother to the sale. The
forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.
Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose
consent was not obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to
declare void her husband’s sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in
1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale
declared void is forever lost?
The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning.
Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario
despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of the
property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.23 As lawful owners, the Rocas
224
had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person
from its enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1
In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled,
among other things, to recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the
₱200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid,
chargeable against his estate.
Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in
entering the land and building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom
the parties mutually entrusted with closing and documenting the
transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s signature on the affidavit of
consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer
had violated his commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing
that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no
evidence that they had a premonition that the requirement of consent
presented some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly made a 30 percent down
payment on the selling price months earlier on the assurance that it was
forthcoming.
Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes
spouses that everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a
deed of absolute sale in their favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid
the balance due him. And, acting on the documents submitted to it, the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the names of the
Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses
entered the property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good
faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation
to pay for their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a
final judgment against them.24 What is more, they are entitled under
Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the
property with a right of retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the
works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall
pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the
Civil Code,25 of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the
improvements or paying the increase in value which the property may
have acquired by reason of such improvements.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH
MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531
dated February 27, 2007 as follows:
1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca
executed in favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L.
Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that
the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of
the latter spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are DECLARED
void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to
reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano
T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel;
3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R.
Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner
spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the ₱200,000.00 that the
latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11,
1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate;
4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R.
Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their
option, to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia
Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements
225
 on the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have
acquired by reason of those improvements, with the spouses MARIANO C. DEL
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is CASTILLO
Associate Justice
made; and Associate Justice

5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
DIRECTED to receive evidence and determine the amount of JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JR.
indemnity to which petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Fuentes are entitled.

SO ORDERED. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice CERTIFICATION

WE CONCUR: Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
REYNATO S. PUNO consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
Chief Justice the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
CONCHITA CARPIO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
MORALES
JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-

NACHURA DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Manila
Associate Justice Associate Justice
FIRST DIVISION

226
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law, an alleged
error committed by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539.
Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law
that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological
incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971.
Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22
June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-
12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the hearing
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court,1 in its decision
of 29 July 1994, granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent
Consuelo Gomez-Valdez is hereby declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital
obligations;
(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin
and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to
stay with.
Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of
their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the
children who are in the custody of the other.
(3) The petitioner and the respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty
(30) days from notice of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry
of marriages.2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision
directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She
asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure
for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio
Valdez, herein petitioner.
In an order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following
clarification:
Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their "family home" and all their properties for
that matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in common
by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on ownership found
in the Civil Code shall apply.3 (Emphasis supplied.)
227
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family
dwelling, the trial court said:
Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no
application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
community of property.4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was
denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the Family Code should be held controlling: he argues that:
I they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the
parties are psychologically incapacitated.
II
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the
Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases
where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the
spouses.
III
Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared
void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
IV
It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the
children wish to stay.5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases;6 it provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof in the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,
the share of the party in bad faith in the ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or
waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
228
 the forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first
paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"7 of
the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household."8 Unlike
the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the substance and to the above extent,
has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now
expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act intervivos his or her
share in co-ownership property, without consent of the other, during the
period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or
her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in
default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still
in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation9 or declaration of nullity of the
marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry
or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and
wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who
has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the
parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a
nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental
and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all
their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in
the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them,
the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51
and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12 of the Family Code, should
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case
until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph
of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95)
of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse
of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The
latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old
doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and
no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring
for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of
the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away
with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is
not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles
229
41 15 and 42, 16 of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to
be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property
relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case,
the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family
Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2,
of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property
regime of the spouses.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October

1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.

Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 143297 February 11, 2003

230
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and
ALEXANDER V. MIAT, petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43053, entitled "Romeo V. Miat vs.
Spouses Virgilio and Michelle Castro, Moises B. Miat and Alexander V.
Miat," dated November 29, 1999.1
The evidence shows that the spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought
two (2) parcels of land during their coverture. The first is located at Wawa
La Huerta, Airport Village, Parañaque, Metro Manila2 and covered by TCT
No. S-33535.3 The second is located at Paco, Manila,4 and covered by TCT
No. 163863.5 Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had two (2) children:
Romeo and Alexander.
While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the Parañaque
and Paco properties would be given to Romeo and Alexander.6 However,
when Moises returned in 1984, he renegotiated the agreement with
Romeo and Alexander. He wanted the Parañaque property for himself but
would leave the Paco property to his two (2) sons. They agreed.7
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on
installment basis on May 17, 1977.8 However, it was only on December 14,
1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance.9 He secured the title over the
property in his name as a widower.10 According to Romeo, Moises violated
the agreement that their (Romeo’s and Alexander’s) names would be
registered in the title once the balance was paid.11 Upon demand, Moises
gave the owner’s duplicate of the Paco property title to Romeo.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property. They paid its realty
taxes and fire insurance premiums.12 In early August 1985, Alexander and
his first wife left the house for personal reasons. In April 1988, Alexander
agreed to sell to Romeo his share in the Paco property for ₱42,750.00.13 He
received a partial payment of ₱6,000.00 from Romeo.14 Nonetheless, he
never executed a deed of assignment in favor of Romeo, as he "had lots of
work to do and had no time and x x x there [wa]s nothing to worry [as]
the title [wa]s in [Romeo’s] possession."15
In February 1988, Romeo learned from his godmother in his wedding,
Mrs. Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio Castro, that she had
given Moises ₱30,000.00 as downpayment for the sale by Moises of the
Paco property to her son Virgilio.16
On December 1, 1988, Romeo was brought by petitioner Virgilio Castro to
the chambers of Judge Anunciacion of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila where the status of the Paco property was discussed.17 On
December 16, 1988, he received a letter from petitioner Castro’s lawyer
asking for a conference. Romeo was informed that the Paco property had
been sold to Castro by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated December
5, 198818 for ninety-five thousand (₱95,000.00) pesos.19
Ceferino Miat, brother of petitioner Moises,20 testified that even before the
death of Concordia21 there was already an agreement that the Paco
property would go to Romeo and Alexander.22 This was reiterated at the
deathbed of Concordia.23 When Moises returned to Manila for good, the
agreement was reiterated24 in front of the extended Miat family
members.25 Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally26 divided the Paco
property between themselves.27 Later, however, Alexander sold his share
to Romeo.28 Alexander was given ₱6,000.00 as downpayment. This was
corroborated by Pedro Miranda and Virgilio Miat. Miranda worked with
Moises at the Bayview Hotel and the Hotel Filipinas.29 His wife is the
cousin of Romeo and Alexander.30 Virgilio is the brother of Moises.
Moises confirmed that he and his wife Concordia bought the Paco
property on installment from the Fraval Realty, Inc. There was still a
balance of ₱12,000.00 on the lot at the time of his wife’s death.31 He paid
₱3,500.00 in 198132 and ₱8,500.00 in 1984.33 He registered the title in his
name. Romeo then borrowed the title as he was going to mortgage it to his
friend Lorenzo.34
Later, Moises ran into financial difficulties and he mortgaged for
₱30,000.00 the Paco property to the parents of petitioner Virgilio
231
Castro.35 He informed Romeo and Alexander that he would be forced to
sell the Paco property if they would not redeem the mortgage. He
accompanied his children to the Manila City Hall to discuss its sale with a
judge and a lawyer. Also present in the meeting were petitioner Virgilio
Castro and his parents. After the conference, he proceeded to sell the
property to the petitioners-spouses Castro.36
Alexander testified that after the sale, his father got one-third (1/3) of the
proceeds while he received two-thirds (2/3). Romeo did not get a single
centavo but was given the right to till their Nueva Ecija property.37 From
his share of the proceeds, Alexander intended to return to Romeo the
₱6,000.00 given him earlier by the latter. He considered the money to be
a personal debt due Romeo, not Romeo’s downpayment of his share in the
Paco property.38
The buyer of the property, petitioner Virgilio P. Castro, testified that he
informed Romeo that his father Moises was selling the Paco property.
Romeo replied: "Bahala siya."39 The second time he informed Romeo
about the pending sale was when he brought Romeo, Alexander and
Moises to Judge Anunciacion to "consult him [as to] who has [the] right
over the [Paco] property."40 He further declared that he "went to the
Metropolitan Trial Court because [he] wanted to be sure whether [he]
could buy the property."41 During the meeting, he was told by Romeo that
the Paco property was already given to him (Romeo) by Moises. He
admitted knowing that the title to the Paco property was in the possession
of Romeo.42 However, he proceeded with the sale. Moises assured him that
he would be able to get the title from Romeo.43
These events precipitated the case at bar. Romeo filed an action to nullify
the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses; to compel Moises and
Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco
property to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price; and to
make them pay damages.44
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,45 which in its
dispositive portion states as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders the
following: 1) Defendant Alexander V. Miat to execute a deed of sale of his
share in the property upon payment by plaintiff Romeo of the balance of
the purchase price in the sum of ₱36,750.00; 2) Plaintiff Romeo V. Miat to
recognize as valid the sale of defendant Moises’ share in the house and lot
located at No. 1495-C Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; 3) the dismissal of
defendants’ counter-claim; and 4) defendants to pay the costs of suit."
Both parties appealed to Court of Appeals. On November 29, 1999, the
appellate Court modified the Decision as follows:46
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED as follows:
(1) The deed of sale entered into between defendants-appellants
Moises Miat and spouses Virgilio and Michelle Castro is hereby
NULLIFIED.
(2) Defendant-appellants Moises Miat and Alexander Miat are
ordered to execute a deed of conveyance over the Paco property
with TCT No. 16383 (sic) in favor of plaintiff-appellant Romeo
Miat, upon payment by Romeo Miat of the balance of the purchase
price in the sum of ₱36,750.00.
(3) Defendants-appellants are ordered, jointly and severally, to
pay plaintiff-appellant attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱30,000.00
and to pay the costs of suit."
Reconsideration was denied on May 17, 2000.
Hence, this petition where the petitioners assign the following errors:
"THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND DID
PETITIONERS AN INJUSTICE IN MODIFYING OR REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED MARCH 17, 1993 WHICH
ORDERED RESPONDENT ROMEO MIAT TO RECOGNIZE AS VALID THE
DEED OF SALE ENTERED INTO BETWEEN PETITIONERS MOISES MIAT
AND SPS. VIRGILIO AND MICHELLE CASTRO PERTAINING TO
PETITIONER MOISES MIAT’S SHARE IN THE HOUSE AND LOT LOCATED
IN PACO, MANILA, WHEN IT DECLARED SAID DEED OF SALE NULLIFIED.
232
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING OR UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION ORDERING
ALEXANDER MIAT AND INCLUDING MOISES MIAT TO EXECUTE A DEED
OF CONVEYANCE OVER THE PACO PROPERTY WITH TCT NO. 16383 IN
FAVOR OF ROMEO MIAT UPON PAYMENT BY THE LATTER OF THE
BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE IN THE SUM OF ₱36,750.00.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FURTHER
ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY RESPONDENT, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY, ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱30,000.00 AND
AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUO’S ORDER FOR THE PETITIONERS TO PAY
THE COST OF SUIT."47
The issues can be simplified thus:
1. Whether the Paco property is conjugal or capital;
2. Whether there was a valid oral partition covering the said
property; and
3. Whether the spouses Castro were buyers in good faith.
I registered in the exclusive name of Magdalena Clemente. The Court ruled
The petitioners contend that the Paco property is the capital property of
Moises. They allege that the spouses Moises and Concordia purchased the
property on installment basis in 1977 but stress that it was Moises who
paid the balance of twelve thousand (₱12,000.00) pesos in 1984. At that
time, Concordia had long been dead. She died in 1978.
We disagree.
Since Moises and Concordia were married before the effectivity of the
Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil Code apply.
Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code48 provides as follows:
"The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses; x x x."
The records show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title
during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly conjugal
property.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides
that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife." This article does not require proof that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even
when the manner in which the property was acquired does not
appear.49 1a\^/phi1.net
Petitioners’ reliance on Lorenzo vs. Nicolas50 is misplaced. That case
involved two (2) parcels of land that Magdalena Clemente purchased on
installment and started paying for when she was not yet married to
Manuel Lorenzo. When she married Manuel Lorenzo she continued to pay
the installments in her own name. Upon completion of payment, the deed
of final conveyance was executed in her sole favor and the land was
that the two (2) parcels of land were the paraphernal properties of
Magdalena Clemente, thus:
"x x x the fact that all receipts for installments paid even during the
lifetime of the late husband Manuel Lorenzo were issued in the name of
Magdalena Clemente and that the deed of sale or conveyance of parcel no.
6 was made in her name in spite of the fact that Manuel Lorenzo was still
alive shows that the two parcels of land belonged to Magdalena
Clemente."51 (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during
their marriage — Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has
to be considered as conjugal.
Likewise, Jovellanos vs. Court of Appeals52 cited by the petitioners is
inapropos. In said case, Daniel Jovellanos, while he was still married to his
233
first wife, Leonor Dizon, entered into a "contract of lease and conditional This agreement was attested to by the extended Miat Family members in
sale" with Philamlife. He continued paying the rental after the death of his a document marked as Exhibit "D," which reads as follows:57
first wife and during the subsistence of his marriage with his second wife,
Anette Jovellanos. He completed the payment during the existence of his
second marriage. The Court ruled that the property belonged to the
conjugal partnership with the second wife as Daniel Jovellanos "acquired
ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount hence,
although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, "Pebrero 18, 1989
1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that the Philamlife executed the deed
of absolute sale thereof in his favor. x x x Since as early as 1967, he was SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily
belonged to his conjugal partnership with his second wife."53 In the case
SA MGA KINAUUKULAN,
at bar, Moises and Concordia executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. The
contract is one of sale — the title passed to them upon delivery of the Paco
Kami, na nakalagda sa ibaba, ay nanunumpa sa harapan ng Punong
property.54 In fine, title was gained during the conjugal partnership.
Barangay, na si G. REYNALDO P. WONG:
II
Na kami ay mga saksi sa kasunduan nina G. MOISES B. MIAT, asawa ng
yumao na, na si Gng. CONCORDIA VALENZUELA MIAT, at mga anak
The next issue is whether the oral partition between Moises and his sons,
nitong sina G. ROMEO V. MIAT at G. ALEXANDER V. MIAT:
Romeo and Alexander, involving the said property is valid. In ruling in
favor of its validity which we affirm, the appellate court relied on a portion
Na ang kasunduan ay ang mga sumusunod:
of Moises’ letter to Romeo, which reads as follows:55
1. Na ang pag-aaring lupa (132 sq. m.) ng mag-asawa
"KAYA PAG-USAPAN LANG NINYONG MABUTI ANG ANONG BALAK AT
(MOISES at CONCORDIA) sa Airport Village sa Parañaque,
GUSTO NINYONG PAGHATI SA BAHAY, AT YAN AY PAGPAPASIYAHAN KO
Metro Manila ay mapupunta kay G. MOISES B. MIAT;
KONG (sic) MAKAKABUTI SA INYONG DALAWA. AT WALA AKONG HIGIT
NA PAPABURAN SA INYONG DALAWA PAREHO KAYONG MAHAL SA
AKIN, HINDI AKO TULAD SA IBANG MAGULANG NA HINDI PAREHO ANG 2. Na ang pag-aaring lupa at bahay (70 sq. m.) ng mag-
PAGTINGIN SA MGA ANAK. ANG BAHAY56 AY PARA SA INYONG DALAWA, asawa ring nabanggit ay sa magkapatid na ROMEO at
LALO NA NGAYONG MAY ASAWA NA KAYONG PAREHO. x x x" [All caps in ALEXANDER mapupunta at ito ay nasa address na 1495-
the original] C FABIE, PACO, MANILA.

Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, testified that before Concordia died, MGA SUMUMPA:58
there was an agreement that the Parañaque property would go to Moises
while the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This was
reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia. When Moises returned to Manila (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
for good, the agreement was affirmed in front of the extended Miat family 1) Ceferino B. Miat 6) Lorenzo C. Valenzuela
members. Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally divided the Paco property (kapatid ni Moises) (kapatid ni Concordia)
between them. Later, Alexander sold his share to Romeo.
234
 as downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco property.
(Sgd.) (Sgd.) Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda,
2) Avelina J. Miat 7) Patricio C. Valenzuela who testified regarding the sale of Alexander’s share to Romeo, were
(asawa ni Ceferino) (kapatid ni Concordia) intensely questioned by petitioners’ counsel.60 1awphi1.nét

In the recent case of Pada-Kilario vs. Court of Appeals, we held:61

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
3) Virgilio Miat 8) Victor C. Valenzuela "[N]o law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be
(kapatid ni Moises) (kapatid ni Concordia) registered in order to be valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the
Revised Rules of Court that a partition be put in a public document and
registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
(Sgd.) constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
(Sgd.)
4) Aurea Miat-Joson partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined
9) Elsa P. Miranda
(kapatid ni Moises) when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into
consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different
(Sgd.) from those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing
5) Jose A. Joson can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the
(asawa ni Aurea) partition to be valid. The partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document so as to be effective as regards the heirs
(Sgd.) that participated therein. The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil
REYNALDO P. WONG Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
Kapitan ng Barangay modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property,
must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-
Sta. Maria, Licab, N.E."(emphasis supplied) compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the
acts of the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of
The consideration for the grant to Romeo and Alexander of the Paco Frauds under Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition
property was best expressed by Moises himself in his letter to Romeo, among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property,
which reads as follows: considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the
other but rather, a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property
"Labis akong nagpapasalamat at nauunawaan ninyo ang mga pagkakamali that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and
ko at mga kasalanan kong nagawa sa inyong mag-iina, huwag kayong mag- receives the inheritance. x x x."
alala at lahat nang naipundar namin nang (sic) inyong nanay ay sa inyong
dalawang magkapatid mapupunta."59 III

We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not The appellate court also correctly held that the petitioners-spouses Castro
covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, were not buyers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys
Alexander accepted the six thousand (₱6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo property and pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or
235
before any notice of some other person’s claim on or interest in it. The rule Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
is settled that a buyer of real property, which is in the possession of
persons other than the seller, must be wary and should investigate the
rights of those in possession.1a\^/phi1.net Otherwise, without such
inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith.62

This finding of the appellate court that the Castro spouses were not buyers
in good faith is supported by evidence. Petitioner Virgilio Castro admitted
in his testimony that Romeo told him that Moises had given the Paco
property to them. In fact, they consulted Judge Anunciacion on who had
the right to the property — Moises or Romeo. As well pointed out by the
appellate court:

"In the case at bench, the said spouses have actual knowledge of the
adverse claim of plaintiff-appellant. The most protuberant index that they
are not buyers in good faith is that before the sale, Virgilio Castro talked
with Romeo Miat on the supposed sale. Virgilio testified that together with
Romeo, Alexander and Moses Miat, they went to Judge Anunciacion of
Manila in order to find out if Romeo has a right over the property. Romeo
told Virgilio in that meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property
by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that
he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and Romeo then insisted
that he is the owner of the property.

xxxxxxxxx Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
"Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the Manila
property, they being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of
another person’s possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully THIRD DIVISION
pretend to be an innocent purchaser for value."63
G.R. No. 97898 August 11, 1997
It is abundantly clear that the petitioners-spouses Castro did not buy the
Paco property in good faith. They have no right to the property. FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner,
vs.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV No. 43053 COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC., respondents.
is affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
SO ORDERED.

236
May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment
issued before the effectivity of the Family Code be executed on a house
and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code?
State of the Case
This is the principal question posed by petitioner in assailing the Decision
of Respondent Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 18906 promulgated on
February 21, 1990 and its Resolution promulgated on March 21, 1991,
affirming the orders issued by the trial court commanding the issuance of
various writs of execution to enforce the latter's decision in Civil Case No.
53271.
The Facts
Petitioner Florante F. Manacop2 and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March
10, 1972 a 446-square-meter residential lot with a bungalow, in
consideration of P75,000.00.3 The property, located in Commonwealth
Village, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 174180.
On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Merchantile, Inc. filed a
complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc.
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an
indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and
his company entered into a compromise agreement with private
respondent, the salient portion of which provides:
c. That defendants will undertake to pay the amount of
P2,000,000.00 as and when their means permit, but
expeditiously as possible as their collectibles will be
collected. (sic)
On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the
aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply
with the agreement in good faith. On July 15, 1986, private respondent
filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted on September
23, 1986. However, execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually,
the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of
petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were
sold at public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly
issued by the sheriff.
On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the
alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce
them on the ground that the judgment was not yet executory. They alleged
that the compromise agreement had not yet matured as there was no
showing that they had the means to pay the indebtedness or that their
receivables had in fact been collected. They buttressed their motion with
supplements and other pleadings.
On August 11, 1989, private respondent opposed the motion on the
following grounds: (a) it was too late to question the September 23, 1986
Order considering that more than two years had elapsed; (b) the second
alias writ of execution had been partially implemented; and (c) petitioner
and his company were in bad faith in refusing to pay their indebtedness
notwithstanding that from February 1984 to January 5, 1989, they had
collected the total amount of P41,664,895.56. On September 21, 1989,
private respondent filed an opposition to petitioner and his company's
addendum to the motion to quash the writ of execution. It alleged that the
property covered by TCT No. 174180 could not be considered a family
home on the grounds that petitioner was already living abroad and that
the property, having been acquired in 1972, should have
been judicially constituted as a family home to exempt it from execution.
On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to quash the
writ of execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by
petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and his company had
not paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables
amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had
become final and executory. It also ruled that petitioner's residence was
not exempt from execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home,
pursuant to the Civil Code.
Hence, petitioner and his company filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari assailing the lower court's Orders of September 23,
1986 and September 26, 1989. On February 21, 1990, Respondent Court of
Appeals rendered its now questioned Decision dismissing the petition
237
for certiorari. The appellate court quoted with approval the findings of the
lower court that: (a) the judgment based on the compromise agreement
had become final and executory, stressing that petitioner and his
company had collected the total amount of P57,224,319.75 but still failed
to pay their indebtedness and (b) there was no showing that petitioner's
residence had been duly constituted as a family home to exempt it from
execution. On the second finding, the Court of Appeals added that:
. . . . We agree with the respondent judge that there is no
showing in evidence that petitioner Mañacop's residence
under TCT 174180 has been duly constituted as a family
home in accordance with law. For one thing, it is the clear
implication of Article 153 that the family home continues
to be so deemed constituted so long as any of its
beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 actually resides
therein. Conversely, it ceases to continue as such family
home if none of its beneficiaries actually occupies it. There
is no showing in evidence that any of its beneficiaries is
actually residing therein. On the other hand, the unrefuted
assertion of private respondent is that petitioner Florante
Mañacop had already left the country and is now, together
with all the members of his family, living in West Covina,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Petitioner and his company filed a motion for reconsideration of this
Decision on the ground that the property covered by TCT No. 174180 was
exempt from execution. On March 21, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered
the challenged Resolution denying the motion. It anchored its ruling
on Modequillo v. Breva,4 which held that "all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code."
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to this case, the Court of Appeals
explained:
The record of the present case shows that petitioners
incurred the debt of P3,468,000.00 from private
respondent corporation on February 18, 1982 (Annex "A",
Petition). The judgment based upon the compromise
agreement was rendered by the court on April 18, 1986
(Annex "C", ibid). Paraphrasing the aforecited Modequillo
case, both the debt and the judgment preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Verily, the
case at bar does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Undeterred, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari arguing that the Court of Appeals misapplied Modequillo. He
contends that there was no need for him to constitute his house and lot as
a family home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a resident
of the same property from the time "it was levied upon and up to this
moment."
The Issue
As stated in the opening sentence of this Decision, the issue in this case
boils down to whether a final and executory decision promulgated and a
writ of execution issued before the effectivity of the Family Code can be
executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said
Code.
The Court's Ruling
We answer the question in the affirmative. The Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error. On the contrary, its Decision and
Resolution are supported by law and applicable jurisprudence.
No Novel Issue
At the outset, the Court notes that the issue submitted for resolution in
the instant case is not entirely new. In Manacop v. Court of
Appeals,5 petitioner himself as a party therein raised a similar question of
whether this very same property was exempt from preliminary
attachment for the same excuse that it was his family home. In said case,
F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. filed a complaint for a sum of money. As an incident in
the proceedings before it, the trial court issued writ of attachment on the
said house and lot. In upholding the trial court (and the Court of Appeals)
238
in that case, we ruled that petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987
or prior to the effectively of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Hence,
petitioner's family home was not exempt from attachment "by sheer force
of exclusion embodied in paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited
in Modequillo," where the Court categorically ruled:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the
same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil
Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus,
the creditors should take the necessary precautions to
protect their interest before extending credit to the
spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the
family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises
before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborer, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under
the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under
Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home
upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4,
one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987
(1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home
from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1960 is not
well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the
provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences
insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles
152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all
existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code,
are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code, Article 162 does not state
that provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money
judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on
March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered
by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.6 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Article 153 of the Family Code
Has No Retroactive Effect
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in holding that his residence
was not exempt from execution in view of his failure to show that the
property involved "has been duly constituted as a family home in
accordance with law." He asserts that the Family Code
239
and Modequillo require simply the occupancy of the property by the
petitioner, without need for its judicial or extrajudicial constitution as a
family home.7
Petitioner is only partly correct. True, under the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988,8 the subject property became his family home
under the simplified process embodied in Article 153 of said code.
However, Modequillo explicitly ruled that said provision of the Family
Code does not have retroactive effect. In other words, prior to August 3,
1988, the procedure mandated by the Civil Code9 had to be followed for a
family home to be constituted as such. There being absolutely no proof
that the subject property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home, it follows that the law's protective mantle cannot be availed
of by petitioner. Since the debt involved herein was incurred and the
assailed orders of the trial court issued prior to August 3, 1988, the
petitioner cannot be shielded by the benevolent provisions of the Family
Code.
List of Beneficiary-Occupants Restricted
to Those Enumerated in the Code
In view of the foregoing discussion, there is no reason to address the other
arguments of petitioner other than to correct his misconception of the
law. Petitioner contends that he should be deemed residing in the family
home because his stay in the United States is merely temporary. He
asserts that the person staying in the house is his overseer and that
whenever his wife visited this country, she stayed in the family home. This
contention lacks merit.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by
the owner thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That
which is "actual" is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. 10 Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of
the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
"beneficiaries" enumerated by Article 154 of the Family Code.
Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is
the head of the family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who
depend upon the head of the family for lead support.
This enumeration may include the in-laws where the family home is
constituted jointly by the husband and wife. 11 But the law definitely
excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries
contemplated by the Code. Consequently, occupancy of a family home by
an overseer like Carmencita V. Abat in this case 12 is insufficient
compliance with the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit. This
Decision is immediately executory. Double costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29771 May 29, 1987
CONSOLACION LUMAHIN DE APARICIO, Accompanied by her
husband BENITO APARICIO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
HIPOLITO PARAGUYA, defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J:
240
Trinidad Montilde, a young lass of Tubigon, Bohol had a love affair with a
priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she
was almost four (4) months pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace
from the public she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Father
Lumain solemnized their marriage on March 4, 1924. 1 They never lived
together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days after the
marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown by her
birth certificate her registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. 2 On
October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left a last will and testament
wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted her
as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests.3 This
was duly probated in the Court of First Instance of Bohol on June 11, 1938
and on appeal it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 4
Soon after reaching the age of majority Consolacion filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Bohol against Hipolito Paraguya for the recovery
of certain parcels of land she claims to have inherited from her father Fr.
Lumain and for damages. After trial on the merits a decision was rendered
on July 6, 1962, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment:
(a) Declaring that plaintiff is entitled to the possession of
the third parcel of land described in the 6th amended
complaint, with all the improvements. If defendant
Hipolito Paraguya is possessing this property, he is hereby
ordered to vacate it and deliver its possession to plaintiff;
(b) Declaring defendant Hipolito Paraguya owner of the
second parcel of land described in the 6th amended
complaint, with all the improvements. If plaintiff is
possessing this land or any portion thereof, she is hereby
ordered to vacate said property and to deliver its
possession to defendant Paraguya;
(c) Declaring defendant Hipolito Paraguya owner of
Portions B and A of the sketch Exhibit E-1, with all the
improvements. If plaintiff is possessing these portions or
any part thereof, she is hereby ordered to vacate the same
and to deliver its possession to defendant Hipolito
Paraguya;
(d) Declaring that plaintiff shall be entitled to the
possession of Portions H, F and G, of Sketch Exhibit E-1,
with all the improvements. If defendant is possessing
these portions or any part thereof, he is hereby ordered to
vacate them and to deliver the possession thereto plaintiff
Consolacion Lumain Aparicio; and
(e) Sentencing plaintiff to pay the Court the docketing fees
and all other legal expenses.
The present judgment is rendered without special
pronouncement as to costs.5
Not satisfied therewith, the defendant now interposed this appeal to the
Court of Appeals alleging the trial court committed the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION
OF PORTION G OF THE SKETCH EXHIBIT "E-I," WITH ALL
THE IMPROVEMENTS.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE IS A NATURAL CHILD OF THE
LATE REV. FR. FELIPE LUMAIN.
III
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE IS LIABLE TO PAY THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FOR MORAL DAMAGES AS
ALLEGED IN THE COUNTER-CLAIM. 6
241
In a resolution of September 27, 1968, the Court of Appeals forwarded the
records of this case to this Court as appellant does not question the
findings of facts of the court a quo but only the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom.7
The undisputed findings of facts of the trial court are:
It is a fact admitted in the evidence of both parties that the
spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare were the
owners of the parcels of land Identified as first, second and
third parcels in the sixth amended complaint.
The testimonial evidence has established the following
facts.
The spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare and
their children Rev. Fr. Felix Lumain and Macario Lumain
are dead. This fact is corroborated by the following death
certificates:
(a) Exhibit I — death certificate showing that on August
20, 1929 Roman Lumain, husband of Filomena Cosare,
was buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Tubigon, Bohol;
(b) Exhibit J — death certificate showing that Filomena
Cosare, wife of Roman Lumain, was buried on October 6,
1934 in the Catholic Cemetery of Tubigon, Bohol;
(c) Exhibit K — death certificate showing that Rev. Fr.
Felipe Lumain, son of Roman Lumain and Filomena
Cosare, was buried on November 3, 1936 in the Catholic
Cemetery of Tubigon, Bohol;
(d) Exhibit L — death certificate showing that Macario
Lumain, husband of Ceferina Falcon and son of the
spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare, was buried
on May 20, 1941 in the Catholic Cemetery of Tubigon,
Bohol.
It appears proven at the same time that Ceferina Falcon de
Lumain died on June 29, 1953, as shown by Exhibit M.
Several witnesses had declared that the spouses Roman
Lumain and Filomena Cosare were possessing as owners
and enjoying the products of the three parcels of land
described in the complaint; that after their death, it was
their two children Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and Macario
Lumain who succeeded them in the possession of the same
property.
Defendant Paraguya disclaims no right over the third
parcel of land described in the 6th amended complaint. As
a matter of fact, in the course of the trial the Court
rendered judgment declaring plaintiff Consolacion
Lumain Aparicio owner of said property. This judgment,
however, was set aside because plaintiff's counsel
manifested that he would present evidence for damages,
in connection with this property which, according to
plaintiff, had been possessed by defendant Paraguya.
Defendant claims right over the second parcel of land
described in the 6th amended complaint, alleging that he
had bought it from the late Roman Lumain, the admitted
original owner. In support of his contention, defendant
offered in evidence Exhibit 7 which is a deed of pacto de
retro sale for the sum of P l 70. The parcel of land sold in
this document is described as follows:
Por el Noreste linda con el terreno del
vendedor, por el Sureste con el de Macario
Lumain, por Suroeste con el del vendedor
y por el Noroeste con el del mismo
vendedor y con el rio Bateria.
If the boundaries of the land mentioned in Exhibit 7 were
compared with the boundaries of the second parcel of land
described in the 6th amended complaint, one would not
hesitate to conclude that this parcel of land described in
242
the complaint is the same property sold to defendant
Hipolito Paraguya on August 1, 1928, for the sum of
Pl70.00, by means of Exhibit 7.
It is true that vendor Roman Lumain reserved the right to
repurchase the property at any time, but in the light of the
provisions of Article 1508 of the old Civil Code which is the
law applicable to the case, it is obvious that Roman Lumain
and his heirs have lost the right to redeem the property.
Article 1508 of the old Civil Code provides:
The right referred to in the next preceding
article, in default of an express agreement
shall endure four years, counted from the
date of the contract.
Should there be an agreement, the period
shall not exceed ten years.
Although the area of the land mentioned in Exhibit 7 is
13,000 square meters, while the area of the land described
as Parcel 2 is 14 ares and 64 centares or 1,464 square
meters, we think that this discrepancy is just a result of
mistake. Our Supreme Court ruled that the correct
boundaries of a land prevail over the discrepancy as
regards its area.
We, therefore, conclude that the property described as
second parcel of land in the 6th amended complaint
belongs to defendant Hipolito Paraguya.
Although Exhibit 7 is a private document we entertain no
doubt as to its authenticity established by testimonial
evidence of defendant. Moreover, Macario Lumain, son of
Roman Lumain, had signed as instrumental witness to this
document and if we compared his signature on Exhibit 7
with his signatures on the documents Exhibits C- 1, C-2, C-
3, C-4 and C-5 offered in evidence by plaintiff, there would
be no doubt that the signature affixed on Exhibit 7 is the
authentic signature of Macario Lumain.
In connection with this case, the Court issued on August 7,
1952 the following order (Exh. D):
When this case was called today, Atty.
Diosdado R. Delima and Conrado D.
Marapao, counsel for the parties,
submitted the following agreement:
Comes the undersigned attorney and
respectfully proposes for an appointment
of a Commissioner of the Court for the
following purposes:
1. To localize Parcel II of the Second
Amended Complaint under Tax No. 6862
superseded by Tax No. 20836 in the name
of Roman Lumain;
2. To localize all the portions in the said
parcel which are claimed by Hipolito
Paraguya and to make a sketch of the
portions showing its relative positions
with one another, showing its dimensions
in meters, and showing its relative
position in relation to the whole parcel;
3. To localize the portion in same parcel
which are claimed by Ceferina Falcon and
to make a sketch of the said portion
showing its dimensions in meters and
showing further its relative position in
relation to the whole parcel.
The expenses of the Commission of the
court to be shared pro rata by Consolacion
243
 Lumain Vallesteros, Ceferina Falcon and
Hipolito Paraguya.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that
the above enumerated proposals be
granted by the Court and a Commissioner
duly appointed to carry out.
Tagbilaran, Bohol, August 7,1952.
I AGREE:
(Sgd.) CONRADO MARAPAO
Attorney for the Defendants
Ceferina Falcon and Hipolito
Paraguya
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the court hereby appoints Mr. Genaro
Galon as Commissioner in charge to localize the properties
in accordance with the foregoing agreement. Mr. Galon
shall submit his report within the period of fifteen days.
Before making this localization, Mr. Galon shall notify the
attorneys of both parties two weeks in advance.
By agreement of the parties, the trial of this case is hereby
postponed until further assignment.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open Court, Tagbilaran, Bohol, August 7, 1952.
In compliance with this order, the appointed
commissioner Genaro Galon submitted his report (Exhibit
E); and attached thereto is the sketch marked Exhibit E-1.
According to the report (Exhibit E), the land covered by
tax declaration No. 20836-which is the first parcel of land
described in the 6th amended complaint is represented in
the sketch Exhibit E-1 by the space enclosed within the
black lines. For clarification purposes the Court had
marked with letters H, B, A, G and F the portions enclosed
within the black lines.The space marked letter C, outside
the black lines, represents the land of Macario Lumain,
acquired later by defendant Hipolito Paraguya.
Defendant Paraguya offered in evidence Exhibit 5, a deed
of pacto de retro sale executed in his favor by the late
Macario Lumain on December 6, 1937. This document
describes the following parcel of land:
El citado terreno es parte de la Declaracion
No. 20836 a nombre de mi difunto padre
Roman Lumain y linda por el Noreste con
el del vendedor y mide 39.30 metros; por
el Sureste finda con el del mismo vendedor
y mide 67.90 metros; por el Suroeste linda
con la carretera provincial y mide 27.00
metros y por el Noroeste que tiene cinco
lados linda con el del mismo vendedor y
mide por dichos cinco lados 81-60 metros.
If we linked the land described in Exhibit 5 with Portion A
of the sketch Exhibit E-1, which portion, according to the
report of Commissioner Galon, was indicated by
defendant Paraguya as property belonging to him, we
would find that the land described in Exhibit 5 is the same
Portion A of the sketch Exhibit E-1, taking into account the
length of the sides of Portion A and the length of the sides
of the land sold under Exhibit 5. Portion A is precisely the
portion claimed by defendant, according to
Commissioner's report.
The authenticity of the signature of Macario Lumain on
Exhibit 5 has been established by witnesses, and
244
corroborated by documents Exhibits C- 1, C- 2, C-3, C-4
and C-5 offered in evidenced by plaintiff.
The includible conclusion, therefore, is that Portion A of
the sketch Exhibit E-1 was bought by defendant Hipolito
Paraguya from Macario Lumain. Let us not lose sight of the
fact that the land described in Exhibit 5 and Portion A of
the sketch Exhibit E-I have Identical descriptions: On the
NE is bounded by the land of Macario Lumain which was
inherited by him from his father; on the SE by the same
vendor Macario Lumain and provincial road; and on the
NW by the same vendor. Macario Lumain has also lost the
right to repurchase.
The report of the commissioner Exhibit E also states that
defendant Hipolito Paraguya claimed to be the owner of
Portion B of the sketch Exhibit E-1. During the trial,
Hipolito Paraguya maintained that on August 28, 1948 he
bought from Raymundo Garduque a parcel of land by
means of Exhibit 6- A. This document describes the
property as follows:
Este terreno es parte de la Declaracion No.
20836 a nombre del difunto Roman
Lumain. Y linda por el Norte, con el del
difunto Macario Lumain; por el Este con el
del difunto Roman Lumain; por el Sur, con
la Carretero Provincial; y por el Oeste, con
el del mismo difunto Roman Lumain.
Defendant Paraguya further maintains that Raymundo
Garduque had bought this property from Roman Lumain
by means of Exhibit 6 which is translated into English in
Exhibit 6-1. Exhibit 6-1 describes the property sold by
Roman Lumain to Raymundo Garduque as follows:
On the North, it is bounded by the rice field
of Macario Lumain which adjoins the
parcel of rice field of the vendor; on the
East, land of vendor; on the South, is
Provincial Road; and on the West, it is
bounded by the land of the vendor.
If we link the description of Exhibit 6-1 with the
description of Portion B of the sketch Exhibit E-I, there
would be no doubt that this Portion B is the same land sold
by Roman Lumain to Raymundo Garduque, by means of
Exhibit 6, bearing in mind that the boundaries of Portion
B tally with the boundaries of the land described in Exhibit
6. We, therefore, conclude that Portion B also belongs to
defendant Hipolito Paraguya.
The report of the commissioner Exhibit E reads as follows:
En complimiento a la orden de este
Juzgado de fecha 7 de Agosto, 1952 en la
causa arriba titulada el que subscribe
como commissionado en dicho asunto,
previa notificacion por escrito a ambas
partes y a sus respectivos Abogados, se
contituyo al barrio de Tangnan, Tubigon,
Bohol para localizar el terreno bajo
declaracion Tax No. 20836 a nombre de
Roman Lumain y de las porciones
reclamadas por Hipolito Paraguya y
Ceferina Falcon Vda. de Lumain, y con
asistencia de las partes se prodedio la
localizacion de los mismos, de cuyo
resultado, tiene la honra de someter a Su
Senoria el adjurito croquis con los
siguientes:
1. que la porcion limitada con lineas de
tinta negra representa el terreno indicado
por la demandante Consolacion M.
Vallesteros, como terreno de Roman
Lumain, bajo declaracion Tax No. 20836.
245
 2. Que la pintada con lapiz encarnado
representa la reclamada por Hipolito
Paraguya bajo declaraciones Tax Nos.
13497 y 13919 de Hipolito Paraguya.
3. Que la pintada con lapiz azul,
representation el terreno reclamado por
Ceferino Falcon Vda. de Lumain.
4. Que la manchada con puntitos de lapiz
azul, representa la porcion reclamada por
Hipolito Paraguya, que segun el lo adquirio
de Pelagio Torrefranca.
5. Que la porcion comprendida entre lineas
de tinta negra angulos, A, B y C,
representation el terreno descrito en la
declaracion Tax No. 6862 en nombre de
Roman Lumain de Acuerdo con su croquis
correspondiente.
Es todo lo que al que subscribe puede
informar a Su Senoria para su
consideracion y efectos procedentes.
Respetuosamente sometido.
Tagbilaran, Bohol. 22 de Septiembre, 1952.
Defendant Hipolito Paraguya claims right over portion G
of the Sketch Exhibit E-1, which portion is within the space
enclosed within the black lines of the sketch Exhibit E-1.
Hipolito Paraguya maintains that he had bought this
Portion G from Pelagio Torrefranca by means of a
document which was lost. He offered, however, in
evidence Exhibits 8 and 9, statements of the sister and
brother of the deceased Pelagio Torrefranca to the effect
that the latter had sold a parcel of land to Hipolito
Paraguya.
But if we examine the sketch Exhibit E-1 we will find that
the land of Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of
Roman Lumain enclosed within the black lines. The land
of Pelagio Torrefranca is even intercepted by other lands
belonging to Juan Acidillo and Valerio Roba. If we also
examine the plan Exhibit 1 1 of the land of Roman Lumain
sureyed by a survevor, we will find that the land of Roman
Lumain is bounded on the North by Valerio Roba and Jorge
Acidillo. The land of Pelagio Torrefranca is not mentioned
and possibly it is on the North of the lands of Valerio Roba
and Jorge Acidillo.
Consequently, the land bought by defendant Hipolito
Paraguya from Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of
Roman Lumain described in the plan Exhibit 11. It must
not be forgotten that this plan was offered in evidence by
defendant.
In the light of the foregoing, we conclude that out of the
first parcel of land described in the 6th amended
complaint defendant had only acquired Portions A and B
described in the plan Exhibit E-1.
We do not overlook the fact that Macario Lumain, as co-
owner of the first parcel of land described in the 6th
amended complaint could not select any portion thereof
as his own, as long, as there was no actual partition of the
property. We believe, however, that it would be more
advantageous to the plaintiff to disregard this procedure,
since a partition would be more costly for her, for in such
case defendant would claim reimbursements for
necessary and useful expenses. Moreover, the sales took
place almost 10 years before the filing of the complaint,
and it would be unjust for defendant Paraguya to suffer
the adverse effects of the laches committed by plaintiff.
246
Plaintiff maintains that she is entitled to inherit the
property of the deceased Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain on the
ground that she had been recognized as daughter of the
latter in his testament Exhibit A-1 which has been duly
probated by this Court and the Court of Appeals, as shown
from Exhibit A- 2.
Defendant, on the other hand, maintains that plaintiff is
not entitled to inherit the property of the deceased Rev. Fr.
Felipe Lumain for the reason that she is an adulterous
child. He further maintains that the acknowledgment of
plaintiff by the late Fr. Felipe Lumain is null and void she
being not a natural child of the latter. In support of this
contention, defendant offered in evidence Exhibit 2 which
is the marriage certificate of Anastacio Mamburao and
Trinidad Montilde, mother of plaintiff. According to this
certificate, the marriage of both spouses took place on
March 4, 1924. Defendant also offered in evidence Exhibit
I showing that plaintiff was born on September 12, 1924.
Taking into account both documents, it can be said that
plaintiff was born six months after her mother's marriage
to Anastacio Mamburao. During the trial Trinidad
Montilde declared that she had never lived together with
her husband and at present the latter is living with
another woman.
Bearing in mind the date of the birth of plaintiff, it is
evident that her mother Trinidad Montilde was still single
at the time she was conceived. It is a legal presumption
that plaintiff is the daughter of the spouses Anastacio
Mamburao and Trinidad Montilde, but bearing in mind
that this presumption is disputable and was successfully
overcome by Trinidad Montilde, plaintiff's mother, we find
no other avenue than to declare that plaintiff is a natural
child of the late Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain. Consequently, she
can be acknowledged by the latter as his own child.
But in the remote possibility that plaintiff is not a natural
child of the deceased Fr. Felipe Lumain, we still maintain
that, under the latter's will (Exhibit A-1), she is entitled to
claim the disputed property, she having been instituted in
the will as universal heir. This document contains the
following provisions:
4. — Dono tambien a la mencionada nina,
Consolacion M. Lumain, mi homestead
consistentente en una parcela de terreno
de 24 hect. situada en el barrio de
Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol, con todas sus
mejoras; todas Acciones e interesesen la
JAGNA ELECTRIC SERVICE CO., Jagna
Bohol; todos los bienes muebles e
inmuebles que me corespondan de la
herencia de mis padres; y todoes los
bienes e intereses que yo consiga en lo
futuro (The following words are written in
pencil without initial of the testator: Estoy
asegurado por la Insular Life Assurance
Co. en la cantidad de Dos Mil Pesos, y la
beneficiaria de mi Poliza es la misma
consolacion.)
Is plaintiff entitled to claim the entire first parcel of land
described in the 6th amended complaint? Let us not forget
that the spouses Roman Lumain and Filomena Cosare died
leaving two legitimate children: Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain
and Macario Lumain. Let us not either forget that Fr.
Lumain died ahead of Macario Lumain. Under the
circumstances, therefore, Fr. Lumain did not become the
owner of the share of Macario Lumain, he having died
ahead of the latter. Macario Lumain could not either
inherit the share of his brother, because the latter had
instituted the plaintiff as his legal heir. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, cannot inherit the property of the deceased
Macario Lumain in view of the following provisions of
Article 943 of the old Civil Code:
247
 A natural or a legitimated child has no
right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or
mother who has acknowledged it; nor
shall such children or relatives so inherit
from the natural or legitimated child.
In the light of the foregoing, it is obvious that, after the
death of Fr. Felipe Lumain, plaintiff and Macario Lumain
became co-owners of all the properties left by their
deceased parents. Consequently, plaintiff is only an owner
of one-half (1/2) undivided share of said properties and
the remaining undivided half belongs to the heirs of the
late Macario Lumain who took no intervention in this case.
And because of this fact, the Court can not render a
judgment determining the ownership of the property in
question, on account of the fact that the heirs of the
deceased Macario Lumain are not parties to this case.
Considering, nevertheless, that a co-owner can file an
action to recover the possession of a property from any
stranger, the Court believes that this aspect can be
determined by the Court in its judgment.
It appears from the record that plaintiff was exempted
from payment of legal fees on account of her alleged
poverty. But it appears from the evidence that she is not a
pauper, she having several properties not involved in the
present action. She shall therefore, be sentenced to pay the
Court the docketing fees and all other legal expenses.
Plaintiff's evidence regarding damages is insufficient, for
the reason that this court can not determine exactly the
source of those damages. As may be seen from this
decision, plaintiff had filed six complaints and had been
changing the lands she was claiming, as well as the
defendants, thus showing that she had filed at random her
actions. Because of this, the Court cannot determine what
property shall be the basis of damages and who are the
persons liable. 8
Under the first assigned error appellant contends that portion G of the
sketch Exhibit E-1 with all the improvements belongs to him and that he
is entitled to its possession. In support thereof appellant argues —
This particular portion of land known as portion G of the
sketch Exhibit 'E-1' declared in the name of the real owner
of the defendant-appellant herein under Tax Dec. No. R-
13497, (Exhibit '9-b') formerly under Tax Dec. No. 23216
(Exhibit '9-a') in the name of the former owner Rev. Father
Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land in question. (See IV
last paragraph of p. 23 & 24; letter B last paragraph of p.
31 and letter C lst paragraph of p. 32, Record on Appeal;
(See also IV 2nd paragraph of p. 41, Record on Appeal).
We find support in this contention from the report of the
Commissioner (Exhibit "E") in paragraph 2 and 4 of said
report: (See Record on Appeal, pp. 59-60).
Par. 2 of the Commissioner's Report (Exhibit "E") states:
Que la pintada con lapiz encarnado,
representa la reclamada por Hipolito
Paraguya bajo declaraciones Tax Nos.
13497 y 13919 de Hipolito.' (p. 60, Record
on Appeal)
Par. 4 of the said Commissioner's Report (Exhibit'E')
states:
Que la manchada con puntitos de lapiz
azul, representa la porcion reclamada por
Hipolito Paraguya, que segun el lo adquirio
de Pelagio Torrefranca (P. 60, Record on
Appeal)
248
The name of Pelagio Torrefranca or the land of Pelagio
Torrefranca is not mentioned because the Blueprint (Exh.:
"11") was made long time ago in 1910 before Pelagio
Torrefranca bought the land from Valerio Roba. (the
former owner).
Exh.: "11" is offered in evidence by the defendant Hipolito
Paraguya to show to the Court that the land of Pelagio
Torrefranca, Identified as G (in Exh. "E-l") is outside the
land of Roman Lumain as can be seen by comparing the
blueprint (Exh. "11") and the sketch (Exh. "E-l").
If the land of Pelagio Torrefranca which is now owned by
the defendant Hipolito Paraguya (Letter G in Exh. "E-l") is
outside the land of Roman Lumain (outside of heavy lines
of Blueprint Exh. "11" and sketch of Galon Exh. "E-l") then
the plaintiff can not be given such land for she is only
claiming interest in and to that parcel of land of Roman
Lumain bearing Tax No. 20836. In the original complaint
as well as the several amended complaints, the six
amended complaint and supplemental complaint Tax Dec.
No. 23216 of the late Rev. Father Pelagio Torrefranca
(now owned by defendant-appellant Paraguya, Letter G in
Exh. "E-l") is not included. Tax No. 23216 has been revised
to R-13497 in defendant-appellant's name. Still this land
Identified as Letter G in Exh. "E-1" now under Tax Dec. No.
R-13497 is not included in all the plaintiffs' complaint (see
Exhibits "9-a" and "9-b," 10 and 10-a to 10-g).
In the Blueprint (Exh. "11") the name of Valerio Roba
appeared as the owner of that parcel known as Portion G
(as shown in Exh. "E-1") for at that time in 1910 Valerio
Roba was still the owner. The blueprint (Exh. "11") was
made and surveyed in 1910. But after 1910 Pelagio
Torrefranca acquired this land (Portion G) from Valerio
Roba. This particular Portion G is now declared under Tax
Dec. No. R- 13497 in the name of defendant-appellant
Hipolito Paraguya and formerly declared under Tax Dec.
No. 23216 in the name of the former owner Pelagio
Torrefranca (See Exhibits "9-a", "9-b", "l0" and "10-a" to
"10-g" and Exhibits "8" and "9").
The Court should take notice that the land in the name of
former owner Valerio Roba (known as Portion G in Exhibit
"E-l") is the land acquired and owned by Rev. Father
Pelagio Torrefranca and later sold by Rev. Father Pelagio
Torrefranca to the defendant-appellant Hipolito Paraguya
is outside the land (outside the Black Lines of Exhibits "11"
and "E-1") of the late Roman Lumain as shown in the blue
print (Exhibit "ll") a map of the land of the late Roman
Lumain made and surveyed in 1910. There is no question
therefore that this Portion G (shown in Exh. "E-l") is not
the land of the late Roman Lumain, hence outside the land
in question. The Court has no jurisdiction over this land
Portion G as shown in Exhibit "E- l" for it is not a part of
the land of Roman Lumain whose properties are the ones
in question (See Exhibits "11" and "E-1" — These two
Exhibits "11" and "E-1" should be compared as they are
closely connected to each other.)
This is supported by the findings of the Lower Court found
on page 61, lst Sentence of the 3rd Paragraph of the
Decision, (p. 61 Record on Appeal) which states: 'But if we
examine the sketch Exhibit 'E-l' we will find the land of
Pelagio Torrefranca is outside the land of Roman Lumain
enclosed within the black lines.' And on page 62, 1st
Sentence of the 1st Paragraph of the Decision (p. 62,
Record on Appeal) which states: 'Consequently, the land
bought by defendant Hipolito Paraguya from Pelagio
Torrefranca is outside the land of Roman Lumain
described in the plan Exhibit 11. 9
We find the contention to be well-taken. Appellees confirmed that said
portion G of Exhibit E-1 which appellant bought from Pelagio Torrefranca
is outside the land of Roman Lumain enclosed with black lines of Exhibit
E- I, and thus is outside the land of Roman Lumain as described in Exhibit
11. 10
249
Under the second assigned error appellant points out that appellee
Consolacion Lumain is the legitimate child of spouses Anastacio
Mamburao and Trinidad Montilde as she was born on September 12,
1924, 192 days after the marriage of said spouses citing the provision of
Article 255 of the Civil Code (then Article 108 of the Spanish Civil Code)
— of legitimacy under the provisions of Article 109 of the Spanish Civil Code,
ART. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty
days following the celebration of the marriage and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted
other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband's having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Appellant further argues there is no evidence of physical impossibility on
the part of husband Anastacio to have access to his wife Trinidad in the
first 120 days of the 300 days which preceded the birth of the child. Under
Article 115 of the Spanish Civil Code, now Article 265 of the Civil Code, it
is provided that:
The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record
of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic
document or a final judgment. (Italics supplied.)
Appellant concludes appellee Consolacion is the legitimate child of said
Mamburao spouses as shown by the birth certificate. 11
Appellant also avers that the declarations of Trinidad Montilde against the
legitimacy of appellee Consolacion cannot prevail over the presumption
now Article 256 of the Civil Code.
However, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of
appellee Consolacion in this case. In the last will and testament of Fr.
Lumain he not only acknowledged appellee Consolacion as his natural
daughter but designated her as his only heir. Said will was duly probated
in Court. As Fr. Lumain died without any compulsory heir, appellee
Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as duly instituted in his
will. 12 One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his
estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed.13
The third assigned error wherein appellant contends appellee should pay
him moral damages is obviously without merit. Appellee merely pursued
an honest claim to the property in question. No bad faith had been
imputed nor had the alleged damages suffered been established. The
essential ingredient of moral damages is proof of bad faith and the fact
that moral damages was suffered as shock, mental anguish, or anxiety
although the amount of damages suffered need not be shown. 14
WHEREFORE, with the only modification that portion G of sketch Exhibit
E-1 and its improvement of the questioned property is hereby declared to
be owned by appellant who is entitled to its possession, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
250
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987

JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad

litem, ARLENE S. SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
JAO, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

No. 51078-R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s action
251
for recognition and support against private respondent, and from the
respondent Court"s resolution, dated 11 October 1978, denying
petitioner"s motion for reconsideration of said decision.
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor,
represented by her mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a
case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity
so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of the
trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, held 21 January 1969,
indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico
V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.1
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but
upon plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second motion for reconsideration,
it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child
of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure
to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there was no
showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the
conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should have
been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial
court"s decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears
undisputed that JAO was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle and
Sirloin, Bay Side Club, by Melvin Yabut. After this meeting, JAO
dated and courted ARLENE. Not long thereafter, they had their
first sexual intercourse and subsequently, they lived together as
husband and wife. ...
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO accompanied
ARLENE to the Marian General Hospital for medical check-up and
her confinement was with JAO"s consent. JAO paid the rentals
where they lived, the salaries of the maids, and other household
expenses. ...
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on August
16, 1968, after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy, which indicates
that ARLENE must have conceived JANICE on or about the first
week of December, 1967. "Thus, one issue to be resolved in this
appeal is whether on or about that time, JAO and ARLENE had
sexual intercourse and were already living with one another as
husband and wife.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO
sometime in the third or fourth week of November, 1967 at the
Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after several dates, she had
carnal knowledge with him at her house at 30 Long beach,
Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the evening of November 30, 1967,
and that he started to live with her at her dwelling after December
16, 1967, the date they finished their cruise to Mindoro Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE at
the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains that this
was on December 14, 1967 because the day following, he and his
guests: ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi Crescini and Charlie Litonjua
went to Mindoro by boat. He dated ARLENE four times in January,
1968. He remembered he had carnal knowledge of her for the first
time on January 18, 1968, because that was a week after his
birthday and it was only in May, 1968 that he started cohabiting
with her at the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in resolving
the paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood grouping tests
conducted by the NBI and which resulted in the negative finding
that in a union with ARLENE, JAO could not be the father of
JANICE.
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the NBI is
not in a position to determine with mathematical precision the
issue of parentage by blood grouping test, considering the rulings
of this Court ... where the blood grouping tests of the NBI were
252
admitted; especially where, in the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo
Sunico who conducted the test and it appears that in the present
case, the same Dr. Sunico approved the findings and report. ... In
Co Tao vs. Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had
given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping test.
Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the NBI to
conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as early as the
1950"s.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be stated as
follows:
Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis
of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged
father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not
the father of the child. But group blood testing cannot show
that a man is the father of a particular child, but at least
can show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many
states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and
the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity
where the results of the test, made in the prescribed
manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity.
This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the
Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and
intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where
the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting
with the results of the test.
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to
prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility
that the alleged father or any one of many others with the
same blood type may have been the father of the child. But
the Uniform Act recognizes that the tests may have some
probative value to establish paternity where the blood
type and the combination in the child is shown to be rare,
in which case the judge is given discretion to let it in (I
Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups, scientific
opinion is now in accord in accepting the fact that there is
a causative relation between the trait of the progenitor
and the trait of the progeny. In other words, the blood
composition of a child may be some evidence as to the
child"s paternity. But thus far this trait (in the present
state of scientific discovery as generally accepted) can be
used only negatively i.e. to evidence that a particular man
F is not the father of a particular child C. (I Wigmore on
Evidence 3rd Ed., pp. 610-611).
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency of the
blood test, JANICE claims that probative value was given to blood
tests only in cases where they tended to establish paternity; and
that there has been no case where the blood test was invoked to
establish non-paternity, thereby implying that blood tests have
probative value only when the result is a possible affirmative and
not when in the negative. This contention is fallacious and must
be rejected. To sustain her contention, in effect, would be
recognizing only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood
grouping test itself for if the result were negative, the test is
regarded worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As an admitted test,
it is admissible in subsequent similar proceedings whether the
result be in the negative or in the affirmative. ...
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to
petitioner"s contention that JAO"s actions before and after JANICE was
born were tantamount to recognition. Said the respondent appellate
court:
On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not recognize her
as his own. In fact, he filed a petition that his name as father of
JANICE in the latter"s certificate of live birth be deleted,
evidencing his repudiation, rather than recognition. The mere acts
of JAO in cohabiting with ARLENE, the attention given to her
during her pregnancy and the financial assistance extended to her
cannot overcome the result of the blood grouping test. These acts
of JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE as
his own as the possession of such status cannot be founded on
253
conjectures and presumptions, especially so that, We have earlier
said, JAO refused to acknowledge JANICE after the latter"s birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on paragraph
2 of Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the New Civil Code
which provides: "When the child is in continuous possession of
status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter.
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs 3 or 4
of said article which states:
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when
the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father.
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have been
conceived from November 20, 1967 to December 4, 1967. Indeed,
ARLENE claims that her first sexual intercourse with JAO was on
November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it was one week after
January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy paragraph 3 as above-
quoted, JANICE must have been conceived when ARLENE and JAO
started to cohabit with one another. Since ARLENE herself
testified that their cohabitation started only after December 16,
1967, then it cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived
during this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie.
Necessarily, recognition cannot be had under paragraph 4 as
JANICE has no other evidence or proof of her alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical time
of conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two other men:
"Oying" Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was not even
rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut, who
introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club. Moreover, the
testimony of ARLENE is not wholly reliable. When the trial court
said that "the Court is further convinced of plaintiff"s cause by
ARLENE"s manner of testifying in a most straight-forward and
candid manner," the fact that ARLENE was admittedly a movie
actress may have been overlooked so that not even the trial court
could detect, by her acts, whether she was lying or not.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and
a new one entered dismissing plaintiff-appellee"s complaint.
Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility and
conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-
paternity.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence,
to, affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an action
for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In said case, the NBI
expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood groups and
types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the child." From this
statement the defendant contended that the child must have been the
child of another man. The Court noted: "For obvious reasons, the NBI
expert cannot give assurance that the appellant was the father of the child;
he can only give his opinion that he is a "possible father." This possibility,
coupled with the other facts and circumstances brought out during the
trial, tends to definitely establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the
child Manuel."3
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping
tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in their
conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of
disputed parentage has already become an important legal procedure.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping
tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to
paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that
the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not
the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the
alleged father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that of
the alleged father.4
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests
results to prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in several
254
cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin5 the positive results of blood tests excluding
paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper safeguards were
drawn around the testing procedures, were recognized as final on the
question of paternity. In Cuneo v. Cuneo6 evidence of non-paternity
consisting of the result of blood grouping tests was admitted despite a
finding that the alleged father had cohabited with the mother within the
period of gestation. The Court said that the competent medical testimony
was overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony
would be tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated,
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result was to deny progress.7 This
ruling was also echoed in Clark v. Rysedorph,8 a filiation proceeding where
an uncontradicted blood grouping test evidence, excluding paternity, was
held conclusive.9 Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests
is also in force in several states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood
tests as proof of non-paternity, thus —
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in
man which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the
presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not
indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that they
are of different types will indicate the impossibility of one being
the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father and the
alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be
father and child by consanguinity. The Courts of Europe today
regard a blood test exclusion as an unanswerable and
indisputable proof of non-paternity. 12
Moreover,
The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed father
cannot be a ground for compulsory recognition if such
cohabitation could not have produced the conception of the child.
This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation took place
outside of the period of conception of the child. Likewise, if it can
be proved by blood tests that the child and the supposed father
belong to different blood groups, the cohabitation by itself cannot
be a ground for recognition. 13
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests
in the instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI personnel
who performed the tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. Her
allegations, in this regard, appear to be without merit. The NBI"s forensic
chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has had extensive
practice in this area for several years. The blood tests were conducted six
(6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized blood grouping systems,
the MN Test and the ABO System,14 under witness and supervision.15
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been
a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years
after the first blood test, she, represented by her mother, declined to
undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their allegations, even
as Jao was willing to undergo such a test again.16 1avvphi1
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and
holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the case at
bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao
vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been presented showing any
defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate
safeguards for the proper conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is
to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as heretofore
quoted, which are binding on this Court, we do not find it necessary to
further pass upon the issue of recognition raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
255
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994

ARTEMIO G. ILANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO,
represented by her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

Ernesto P. Pangalangan for petitioner.

Eduardo S. Rodriguez for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

256
After the great flood, man was commanded to go forth, be fertile, multiply
and fill the earth. Others did not heed the sequence of this command
because they multiply first and then go. Corollarily, it is now
commonplace for an abandoned illegitimate offspring to sue his father for
recognition and support.
The antecedent facts are narrated in the trial court's decision, as follows:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as
secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. Petitioner was one of the clients of
Atty. Virata. On several occasions, she and petitioner took lunch together.
In less that a year's time, she resigned from her work.
Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as
Namarco distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same
business and they renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her
his unsold allocation of goods. Later, he courted her more than four years.
Their relationship became intimate and with his promise of marriage,
they eloped to Guagua, Pampanga in April, 1962. They stayed at La Mesa
Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company branch
office, of which he is the president and general manager. He came home
to her three or four times a week.
The apartment was procured by Melencio Reyes, Officer-in-Charge of the
Filipinas Telephone Company branch office. He also took care of the
marketing and paid rentals, lights and water bills.1 Unable to speak the
local dialect, Leoncia was provided also by Melencio with a maid by the
name of Nena. Petitioner used to give her P700.00 a month for their
expenses at home.
In June, 1962, Leoncia, who was conceiving at that time, was fetched by
petitioner and they transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City. In October,
1962, she delivered a still-born female child at the Manila Sanitarium. The
death certificate was signed by petitioner.2 Thereafter, while they were
living at Highway 54, Makati, private respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was
born on December 30, 1963 also at the Manila Sanitarium. Her birth was
recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano, child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de
los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano.3 Leoncia submitted receipts issued by
the Manila Sanitarium to show that she was confined there from
December 30, 1963 until January 2, 1964 under the name of Mrs. Leoncia
Ilano.4
The support by petitioner for Leoncia and Merceditas was sometimes in
the form of cash personally delivered by him, thru Melencio, thru Elynia
(niece of Leoncia)5 or thru Merceditas herself;6 and sometimes in the form
of a check like Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532,7 the
signature appearing thereon having been identified by Leoncia as that of
petitioner because he often gives her checks which he issues at home and
saw him sign the checks.8 Both petitioner and his daughter admitted that
the check and the signature are those of the former.9
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and
wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas
was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report
Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods10 as her parent. Those
signatures were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas because he
signed them in their residence in their presence and of Elynia.11 Since
Merceditas started to have discernment, he was already the one whom
she recognized as her Daddy.12 He treated her as a father would to his
child. He would bring home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He
would take her for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to
sleep.13
When petitioner ran as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite, he
gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with
best regards, Temiong."14
In May, 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia
and petitioner. She accompanied her aunt when she started having labor
pains in the morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after five
o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child,
Leoncia was still unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse
sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in
the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning for his
signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to
Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving early the following morning.
257
Prior to the birth of Merceditas, Elynia used to accompany her aunt and
sometimes with petitioner in his car to the Manila Sanitarium for prenatal
check-up. At times, she used to go to his office at 615 Sales St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila, upon his instructions to get money as support and sometimes he
would send notes of explanation if he cannot come which she in turn gave
to her aunt.15 They stayed at 112 Arellano St., then Sta. Cruz, Manila in
1966 before they finally transferred to Gagalangin in 1967. Petitioner
lived with them up to June, 1971 when he stopped coming home.
Petitioner's defense was a total and complete denial of any relationship
with Leoncia and Merceditas. He disowned the handwritten answers and
signatures opposite column 16 of the death certificate of a female child
surnamed Ilano, although in column 13 thereof opposite father's name the
typewritten name, Artemio G. Ilano, appears. He also denied the following:
all the notes alleged to have been received from him by Elynia for delivery
to Leoncia; the signatures appearing in Merceditas' Report Card; and
being the source of a photo of himself with a handwritten dedication. He
admitted that Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 including the
signature is his. He was sick on December 30, 1963 and was hospitalized
on January 7, 1964.16 He does not understand why this case was filed
against him.17
Melencio admitted that he was the one who procured the apartment for
Leoncia, leased it in his name, paid the rentals and bought the necessities
therefor. He and Leoncia lived together and shared the same bed. They
later transferred to San Juan St., Pasay City and to Highway 54, Makati. He
stopped visiting her in March or April, 1963 because he planned to get
married with another which he eventually did in September, 1963.
Diosdado Datu, fish vendor, usually delivered to the apartment fishes
ordered by Melencio which were received by Leoncia.
Nilda Ilano Ramos, daughter of petitioner, does not know Leoncia; neither
has she been brought to their family home in Imus, Cavite. On December
30, 1963, her father was at their home because he got sick on December
25, 1963 and was advised to have a complete bed rest. Her father was
hospitalized on January 7, 1964. She denied that her father was at the
Manila Sanitarium on December 30, 1963; that he fetched a certain
woman on January 2, 1964, at the Manila Sanitarium because he was at
their home at that time; and that her father lived with a certain woman in
1963 up to June, 1971 because all this time he was living with them in
Imus, Cavite. He was working and reporting to the office everyday and
when he goes to Guagua or Manila on business, her mother or brother
goes with him.
Victoria J. Ilano, petitioner's wife, further corroborated the previous
testimonies about petitioner's sickness on December 30, 1963 and
hospitalization on January 7, 1964. It could not be true that her husband,
during the years 1963 to 1968, lived three (3) times a week with a certain
Leoncia de los Santos because her husband never slept out of their house
and that in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of the
Filipinas Telephone Company he does not go to Guagua even once a year
because they have a branch manager, Melencio Reyes.
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties,
the trial court was not fully satisfied that petitioner is the father of
Merceditas, on the basis of the following:
1) petitioner and Leoncia were not in cohabitation during the period of
Merceditas' conception;
2) testimony of Melencio that he frequented the apartment where Leoncia
was living, took care of all the bills and shared the same bed with her;
3) the birth certificate of Merceditas was not signed by petitioner;
4) petitioner denied his signature in the monthly report card of
Merceditas; and
5) there is no clear and sufficient showing that support was given by
petitioner to Merceditas.
Thus it rendered judgment on April 24, 1981 dismissing the complaint.18
Fortunately for private respondent, respondent Court of Appeals did not
share the same view as the trial court. A review of the testimonial and
documentary evidenced adduced by private respondent led respondent
258
court to the firm conclusion that petitioner is her father, entitling her to
support. The dispositive portion of its decision dated December 17, 1991
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED
and judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiff
MERCEDITAS S. ILANO as the duly acknowledged and
recognized illegitimate child of defendant ARTEMIO G.
ILANO with all the right appurtenant to such status.
Defendant is directed to pay the plaintiff support in
arrears at the rate of EIGHT HUNDRED (P800.00) PESOS a
month from the date of the filing of the complaint on
August 16, 1972 up to August 15, 1975; ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1975 to
August 15, 1978; ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
(P1,300.00) PESOS a month from August 16, 1978 to
August 15, 1981; and ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(P1,500.00) a month from August 16, 1981 up to the time
she reached the age of majority on December 30, 1984.
Defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees plus the costs.
SO ORDERED.19
The motion for reconsideration was denied in the resolution dated
February 26, 1992. 20
Hence, the present petition.
We shall resolve the following pertinent errors allegedly committed by
respondent court:
1) in awarding "back support" even in the absence of recognition or of a
judgment declaring petitioner father of Merceditas with finality;
2) in not ruling that an adulterous child cannot file an action for
recognition; and
3) in deciding matters of substance manifestly against established
decisions of this Court.
Petitioner argues that since the complaint against him has been dismissed
by the trial court, therefore was absolutely no obligation on his part to
give support to Merceditas. It would have been only from the date of the
judgment of the trial court that support should have commenced, if so
granted. Under the law in force when the complaint was filed, an
adulterous child cannot maintain an action for compulsory recognition. In
order that the birth certificate may constitute a voluntary recognition, it
must be signed by the father. Equivocal act, such as signing under the
caption "parent" in the report card, is not sufficient. Merceditas has never
been to the family home of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to
his family; nor brought around town by him, treated as his child,
introduced to other people as his child, led people to believe that she was
part of his family.
The petition utterly lacks merit.
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate
children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were
generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by
fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the
time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, new Civil
Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry
each other on account of certain legal impediments.21 Since petitioner had
a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was
conceived,22 she is a spurious child. In this regard, Article 287 of the Civil
Code provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance
with Article 26923 and other than natural children by legal fiction are
entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in the Civil
Code. The Civil Code has given these rights to them because the
transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not
be visited upon them. They were born with a social handicap and the law
should help them to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the
259
misdeeds of their parents.24 However, before Article 287 can be availed
of, there must first be a recognition of paternity25 either voluntarily or by
court action. This arises from the legal principle that an unrecognized
spurious child like a natural child has no rights from his parents or to their
estate because his rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship
but from his acknowledgment by the parent. In other words, the rights of
an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his
parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or
acknowledged as such a child.26 The relevant law on the matter is Article
283 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged
to recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of
the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuos possession of status of
a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter
or of his family;
(3) When the child was conceived during the time when
the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father.
While the aforementioned provision speaks of the obligation of the father
to recognize the child as his natural child, for the purpose of the present
case, petitioner is obliged to recognize Merceditas as his spurious child.
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 289 of the Civil
Code which provides:
Art. 289. Investigation of the paternity or maternity of
(other illegitimate) children . . . under the circumstances
specified in articles 283 and 284.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, respondent court found, as it is
likewise our finding, that private respondent's evidence to establish her
filiation with and the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be
ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed
testimony of Melencio and the inherently weak denials of petitioner:
Significantly, the Court a quo believed that plaintiff's
mother and defendant carried an intimate relations. It
nonetheless was not satisfied that defendant is the father
of the plaintiff because it is not convinced that her mother
and defendant were in cohabitation during the period of
her conception, and took into account the testimony of
Melencio S. Reyes who frequented the apartment where
Leoncia de los Santos was living and who positively
testified that he took care of all the bills and that he shared
the same bed with plaintiffs mother.
The court a quo completely ignored the fact that the
apartment at Guagua was rented by the defendant, and
that Melencio Reyes, who was a mere employee and
godson of the defendant with a monthly salary of P560.00
was a mere subaltern of the latter, and only frequented the
place upon instruction of the defendant to take care of the
needs of the plaintiff.
As pointed out by appellant, Leoncia and Artemio stayed
in an apartment at the back of the Guagua Telephone
System owned by and of which Artemio was the General
Manager (TSN, p. 46, 8/18/73) and Melencio was the
Officer-in-Charge in the absence of Artemio whose
residence and main office was in Cavite. There, for the first
time, Leoncia met Melencio (TSN, pp. 3-4, 1/25/74). The
apartment in Guagua was rented in the name of Melencio.
As Leoncia does not speak the Pampango dialect (TSN, p.
50, 8/18/73), Artemio gave Leoncia the instruction to call
upon Melencio for whatever Leoncia needs (TSN, pp. 11-
12, 1/25/74). Thus, it was Melencio who procured all the
supplies and services needed in the apartment for which
procurement Melencio gives to Leoncia the corresponding
260
receipts of payment for liquidation of cash advances
Artemio or the Guagua Telephone System or Leoncia
herself, gives to Melencio (Exhs. A, A-1 to 14; TSN, p. 32,
8/13/73; TSN, pp. 7, 12 and 14, 1/25/74).
"Mayroon akong nakitang bahay na mayayari malapit sa
At the Guagua apartment, Artemio would visit Leoncia municipio ng Makati. Ipakikita ko sa iyo kung papayag ka.
three of four times a week and sleeps there (TSN, p. 47,
8/13/73). Artemio was giving Leoncia an allowance of Sabihin mo kay Miling kung hindi ka aalis diyan bukas ay
P700.00 a month (TSN, p. 38, 7/18/73). pupunta ako.

Leoncia got pregnant and Artemio found it difficult to Walang makitang bahay sa San Juan.
commute between Cavite and Guagua so that in June 1962,
Artemio transferred Leoncia to Calle San Juan, Pasay City
(TSN, pp. 19-20, 7/18/73) where they were known as
husband and wife (id. p. 41). In leaving Guagua for San
Juan, Pasay City, Leoncia was fetched by Artemio in a car
driven by Artemio himself. (pp. 9-11, Appellant's Brief)

Even as Artemio and Leoncia lived and transferred to Exh. "F-2"

several places heretofore mentioned, Melencio continued
to be a trusted man Friday of Artemio who would deliver "Ne, sa Viernes ay pupunta ako dian marami akong
notes (Exhs. "F", "F-1" and "F-3") and money from Artemio ginagawa.
to Leoncia. For reference, among the notes identified by
Leoncia as having come from defendant were the
following:

Exh. "F-1"

"Dear Ne,
Exh. "F-3"
Magsimula akong makausap ni Gracing ay nagkaroon ako
ng diferencia sa paa at ngayon ay masakit pa. "Ne, si Miling ay bukas pupunta dito ay sa tanghali ay
pupunta ako diyan (11:30 am). Wala akong pera ngayon
Si Miling ay ngayon lamang nakarating dito kung hindi ka kaya bukas na, sigurado yon.
aalis diyan ay si Miling na lamang ang utusan mo sa Makati
kung may kailangan ka dian.

S
g
261

Exh. "F-4"
"Dear Ne, Pacencia ka na at hindi ako nakapaglalakad
gawa ng mataas ang dugo, kaya minsan-minsan lamang
ako makapunta sa oficena.
Ibigay mo ang bayad sa bahay sa Sabado ng umaga,
pipilitin kong makarating dian sa Jueves.
The address "Ne" in the beginning of these notes refer to
Leoncia whose nickname is "Nene" but which Artemio
shortens to "Ne". Miling is the nickname of Melencio. The
"Gracing" mentioned in Exh. "F-1" refers to Gracia delos
Santos, a sister-in-law of Leoncia who was with Artemio
when Leoncia was removed from the hospital during the
birth of Merceditas. (pp. 17-19, Appellant's Brief). These
tiny bits of evidence when pieced together ineluctably
gives lie to defendants' diversionary defense that it was
with Melencio S. Reyes with whom the mother lived with
during her period of conception.
The attempt of Melencio S. Reyes to show that he was the
lover of Leoncia being in the apartment and sharing the
same bedroom and the same bed hardly inspires belief.
xxx xxx xxx
Undoubtedly, the role played by Melencio S. Reyes in the
relationship between Leoncia and appellant (sic) was that
of a man Friday although appellant (sic) would not trust
him to the hilt and unwittingly
. required him to submit to
Leoncia an accounting
" of his expenditures
(Exhs. A, A-1 to A-14) for cash advances given to him by
Leoncia, Artemio or Guagua Telephone System which
would not have been the case, if it were true that there was
an intimate relationship between him and plaintiff's
mother.
Evidently, following the instruction of his employer and
Godfather, Melencio foisted on the court a quo the
impression that he was the lover and paramour of Leoncia
but since there was really no such relationship, he could
not state the place in San Juan
S or Highway 54 where he
took Leoncia, nor how longg they stayed there belying his
pretense (sic) of an intimate
n relationship with plaintiffs
mother.27 .
"
Having discredited the testimonies of petitioner and Melencio,
respondent court then applied paragraph (2) of Article 283:
The court a quo did not likewise consider the evidences as
sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in continuous
possession of status of a child in view of the denial by
appellee of his paternity, and there is no clear and
sufficient evidence that the support was really given to
plaintiff's mother. The belated denial of paternity after the
action has been filed against the putative father is not the
denial that would destroy the paternity of the child which
had already been recognized by defendant by various
positive acts clearly evidencing that he is plaintiff's father.
A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot
be withdrawn. A mere change of mind would be
incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person,
the permanence of which affects public interest. Even
when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the
revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself
(1 Tolentino, pp. 579-580, 1983 Ed.).
262
To be sure, to establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential
requirements. "Continuous" does not, however, mean that
the concession of status shall continue forever but only
that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The
possession of such status means that the father has
treated the child as his own, directly and not through
other, spontaneously and without concealment though
without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate) (J.B.L.
Reyes and R.C. Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol.
1, 1964 ed., pp. 269-270 citing Coquia vs. Coquia, CA 50,
O.G. 3701) There must be a showing of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as
his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal
affection and care. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983 ed., p. 602). (Mendoza vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991.)
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of
Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital.
Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal
examination by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After
delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in a
car owned and driven by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of "Ilano" since birth
without any objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that
since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had
always known and called Artemio as her "Daddy" (TSN,
pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was
at home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for
a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with
Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father
should do for his child — bringing home goodies, candies,
toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys
which Artemio gives Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39,
5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the
child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such.
Special attention is called to Exh. "E-7" where Artemio was
telling Leoncia the need for a "frog test" to know the status
of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for
Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form
of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru
Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. "E-2" and "E-3",
and "D-6"), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40,
5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the
Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. "G")
and the signature appearing therein which was identified
by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives
her checks and Artemio would write the check at home
and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73).
Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and
signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as
husband and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the
father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in
Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School, Artemio signed
the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. "H") for the
fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. "H-1" and "H-2")
as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of
Artemio were both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas
(sic) because Artemio signed Exh. "H-1" and
"H-2" at their residence in the presence of Leoncia,
Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN,
p. 28, 10/1/73). . . .
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board
of Cavite, Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the
following dedication: "To Nene, with best regards,
Temiong". (Exh. "I"). (pp. 19-20, Appellant's Brief)
263
 The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not
sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence indubitably
showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The
entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and
Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not
mean that Leoncia is not appellee's daughter. This
particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio
himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a
mere dressmaker, had long beforehand diabolically
conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who
claims to be a total stranger to be a total stranger, was the
father of her child, and in the process falsified the latter's
signatures and handwriting.28
Granting ex gratia argument that private respondent's evidence is not
sufficient proof of continuos possession of status of a spurious child,
respondent court applied next paragraph (4) of Article 283:
. . . plaintiffs testimonial and documentary evidence . . . (is)
too replete with details that are coherent, logical and
natural which cannot be categorized as mere fabrications
of an inventive and malicious mind of which Leoncia de los
Santos was not shown to possess.
The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from
the genesis of the relationship between Leoncia and
appellee, their living together as circumstances of
plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and
supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the
testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no
room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be
infirmed by his belated denials.
Notably, the court a quo did not consider plaintiff's
evidence as lacking in credibility but did not deem as
convincing proof that defendant is the father since the
Certificate of Live Birth was not signed by appellee and
since the monthly report card is not sufficient to establish
recognition, considering the denial of the defendant of his
signature appearing thereon.
While defendant's signature does not appear in the
Certificate of Live Birth, the evidence indubitably
disclose(s) that Leoncia gave birth on December 30, 1963
to Merceditas (sic) at 4:27 p.m. at the Manila Sanitarium.
Artemio arrived at about 5:00 (TSN, p. 25, 5/17/74). At
about 7:00 p.m., a nurse came (id. p. 26) who made
inquiries about the biodata of the born child. The inquiries
were directed to Artemio in the presence of Elynia who
heard the answers of Artemio which the nurse took down
in a sheet of paper (id. p. 28). The inquiries were about the
name of the father, mother and child. After the interview
the nurse told them that the information has to be
recorded in the formal form and has to be signed by
Artemio (id. p. 30) but because there is no office, as it was
past 7:00 p.m., the nurse would just return in the morning
for Artemio's signature. Artemio gave the instruction to
the nurse to give the biodata to Leoncia for her signature
as he was leaving very early the following morning as in
fact Artemio left at 5:00 a.m. of December 31, 1963 (id. p.
33). Artemio stayed in the hospital in the evening of
December 30, 1963 (id. p. 26). As pointed out in Castro
vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656:
The ruling in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar
of Manila (102 Phil. 1050 [1958]
and Berciles v. Government Service
Insurance System (128 SCRA 53 [1984]
that if the father did not sign in the birth
certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, register, or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity does
not apply to this case because it was
Eustaquio himself who went to the
municipal building and gave all the data
about his daughter's birth. . . .
264
 . . . the totality of the evidence, as pointed to above, is more
than sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
appellee is the father of the plaintiff Merceditas (sic) Ilano.
As elucidated in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, Supra:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . although Teopista has failed to show that she was in
open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has
nevertheless established that status by another method.
What both the trial court and the respondent did not take
into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to
establish his claimed affiliation by "any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according
to the Civil Code, . . . Such evidence may consist of his
baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.29
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that
practically covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any
other evidence or proof" that the defendant is the father is broad enough
to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the
evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not
sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still
be enough under the last paragraph.30 This paragraph permits hearsay
and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect
to illegitimate filiation.31
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the
spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding
support to her, respondent court took into account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from
the time the person who has a right to recover the same
needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. (Article
203, Family Code of the Philippines.)
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972.
Plaintiff, having been born on December 30, 1963, was
about nine (9) years old at the time and was already of
school age spending about P400.00 to P500.00 a month
for her school expenses alone, while defendant was
earning about P10,000.00 a month. She attained the age of
majority on December 30, 1984 (Article 234, Supra). She
is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of
twelve (12) years, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days,
which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the first three
(3) years; and considering the declining value of the peso
as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated
increase of P1,000.00 a month for the next three (3) years;
P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding three (3) years; and
P1,500.00 a month for the last three (3) years, four (4)
months and fourteen (14) days until she attained the age
of majority.
This being an action for legal support, the award of
attorney's fees is appropriate under Article 2208 (6) of the
Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable
under the given facts and circumstances that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.32
We concur with the foregoing disposition, in the absence of proof that it
was arrived at arbitrarily.
The other allegation of petitioner that the appeal was prosecuted almost
ten years after the decision of the trial court was rendered does not
deserve any consideration because it appears that it is being raised for the
first time in this petition.33
265
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated December 17, 1991 and its resolution dated
February 26, 1992 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 85723 June 19, 1995

BIENVENIDO RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CLARITO AGBULOS, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised

Rules of Court of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 2,
1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 14276, which allowed, in an action for compulsory

266
recognition, the testimony of the mother of a natural child on the identity
of the putative father.
I We find that had the appellate court sanctioned the trial court's
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support
was brought before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Baguio-Benguet,
by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez,
petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas
Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination,
she was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father but
the defendant's counsel raised a timely objection which the court
sustained.
The plaintiff filed before this Court a petition for review
on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516 entitled Clarito
Agbulos v. Hon. Romeo A. Brawner and Bienvenido Rodriguez." On March
18, 1988, this Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
SP No. 14276), which promulgated the questioned Decision dated
November 2, 1988.
II
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner alleged that the
Court of Appeals erred: (1) in not dismissing the petition for certiorari on
the ground that the order of the trial court disallowing the testimony of
Felicitas Agbulos Haber was interlocutory and could not be reviewed
separately from the judgment; and (2) in reversing the said order and
allowing the admission of said testimony.
As a rule, errors of judgment or of procedure, not relating to the court's
jurisdiction nor involving grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable
by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court (Villalon v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 443 [1986]). However, there are
exceptions to said rule. For instance, certiorari is justified in order to
prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, where the trial judge
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may
be danger of failure of justice. Certiorari may also be availed of where an
appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient (Presco v. Court of
Appeals, 192 SCRA 232 [1990]; Saludes v. Pajarillo, 78 Phil. 754 [1947]).
disallowance of the testimony of plaintiff's mother, private respondent
would have been deprived of a speedy and adequate remedy considering
the importance of said testimony and the erroneous resolution of the trial
court.
On the merits of his petition, petitioner contended that Felicitas Agbulos
Haber should not be allowed to reveal the name of the father of private
respondent because such revelation was prohibited by Article 280 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article provided:
When the father or the mother makes the recognition
separately, he or she shall not reveal he name of the
person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he
or she state any circumstance whereby the other party
may be identified.
On the other hand, private respondent argued that his mother should be
allowed to testify on the identity of his father, pursuant to paragraph 4,
Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provided:
In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to
recognize the child as his natural child:
(1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of
the conception;
(2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of
a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter
or of his family;
267
 (3) When the child was conceived during the time when
the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules.
Private respondent cannot invoke our decision in Navarro v. Bacalla, 15
SCRA 114 (1965). While we ruled in Navarro that the testimony of the
mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be used to establish his paternity,
such testimony was admitted during the trial without objection and the
defendant accepted the finding of the trial court that he was the father of
the plaintiff.
In the case at bench, petitioner timely objected to the calling of the mother
of private respondent to the witness stand to name petitioner as the father
of said respondent.
Likewise, in Navarro we clearly stated:
We are not ruling whether the mere testimony of the
mother, without more, is sufficient to prove the paternity
of the child. Neither are we ruling on the scope of Art. 280,
New Civil Code which enjoins the mother in making a
separate and voluntary recognition of a child from
revealing the name of the father, specifically, as to whether
the mother's testimony identifying the father is admissible
in an action to compel recognition if and when a timely
objection to such oral evidence is interposed (at p. 117).
Navarro, therefore, is not the end but only the beginning of our quest,
which felicitously was reached with our conclusion that the prohibition in
Article 280 against the identification of the father or mother of a child
applied only in voluntary and not in compulsory recognition. This
conclusion becomes abundantly clear if we consider the relative position
of the progenitor of Article 280, which was Article 132 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889, with the other provisions on the acknowledgement of
natural children of the same Code.
Article 132 was found in Section I (Acknowledgment of Natural Children),
Chapter IV (Illegitimate Children), Title V (Paternity and Filiation), Book
First (Persons) of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889.
The first article in said Section provided:
Art. 129 — A natural child may be acknowledged by the
father and mother jointly or by either of them alone.
The next article provided:
Art. 130 — In case the acknowledgment is made by only
one of the parents, it shall be presumed that the child is a
natural one if the parent acknowledging it was, at the time
of the conception, legally competent to contract marriage.
The article immediately preceding Article 132 provided:
Art. 131 — The acknowledgment of a natural child must
be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other
public document.
Article 132 of the Spanish Civil Code provided:
When the acknowledgment is made separately by the
father or the mother, the name of the child's other parent
shall not be revealed by the parent acknowledging it, nor
shall any circumstance be mentioned by which such
person might be recognized.
268
 No public officer shall authenticate any document drawn
in violation of this provision and should he do so
notwithstanding this prohibition shall be liable to a fine of
from 125 to 500 pesetas, and the words containing such
revelation shall be striken out.
Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines was found in Section 1
(Recognition of Natural Children), Chapter 4 (Illegitimate Children), Title
VIII (Paternity and Filiation) of said Code. The whole section was repealed
by the Family Code.
The first article of this section was Article 276 which was a reproduction
of Article 129 of the Spanish Civil Code. The second article was Article 277
which was a reproduction of Article 130 of the Spanish Civil Code. The
third article was Article 278 which was a reproduction of Article 131 of
the Spanish Civil Code.
However, unlike in the Spanish Civil Code, wherein the progenitor of
Article 280 followed immediately the progenitor of Article 278, a new
provision was inserted to separate Article 280 from Article 278. The new
provision, Article 279, provided:
A minor who may contract marriage without parental
consent cannot acknowledge a natural child, unless the
parent or guardian approves the acknowledgment, or
unless the recognition is made in the will.
If the sequencing of the provisions in the Spanish Civil Code were
maintained in the Civil Code of the Philippines, and Article 280 was
numbered Article 279, it becomes clear that the prohibition against the
identification by the parent acknowledging a child of the latter's other
parent refers to the voluntary recognition provided for in Article 278.
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is of the view that the prohibition in Article
280 does not apply in an action for compulsory recognition. According to
him:
The prohibition to reveal the name or circumstance of the
parent who does not intervene in the separate recognition
is limited only to the very act of making such separate
recognition. It does not extend to any other act or to cases
allowed by law. Thus, when a recognition has been made
by one parent, the name of the other parent may be
revealed in an action by the child to compel such other
parent to recognize him also (I Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 590
[1985]).
Justice Eduardo Caguioa also opines that the said prohibition refers
merely to the act of recognition. "It does prevent inquiry into the identity
of the other party in case an action is brought in court to contest
recognition on the ground that the child is not really natural because the
other parent had no legal capacity to contract marriage" (I Comments and
Cases on Civil Law 380 [1967] citing In re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167
[1915]).
We have not lost sight of our decision in Infante v. Fiqueras, 4 Phil. 738
(1905), where we rejected the testimony of the mother of a child that the
defendant was the father of the plaintiff. The action for recognition in that
case was brought under Article 135 of the Spanish Civil Code, which
limited actions to compel recognition to cases when an indubitable
writing existed wherein the father expressly acknowledged his paternity
and when the child was in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child of the defendant father justified by the conduct of the father
himself or that of his family.
The action filed by private respondent herein was brought under Article
283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which added new grounds for
filing an action for recognition: namely,
xxx xxx xxx
3) When the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father.
269
Likewise, the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff in Infante was not
admissible under the procedural law then in force, which was the Law of
Bases of May 11, 1888. Said law in pertinent part provided:
No se admitira la investigation de la paternidad si no en
los casos de delito o cuando existe escrito del padre en el
que conste su voluntad indubitada de reconnocer per suyo
al hijo, deliberadamente expresada con ese fin, o cuando
medie posesion de estado. Se permitira la investigacion de
la maternidad.
Traditionally, there was a free inquiry into the paternity of children
allowed by French royal decrees but the investigation of paternity was
forbidden by the French Revolutionary Government in order to repress
scandal and blackmail. This prohibition passed to the French Civil Code
and from it to the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 (I Reyes and Puno, An Outline
of Philippine Civil Code 266 [4th ed.]).
Worth noting is the fact that no similar prohibition found in Article 280 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines has been replicated in the present Family
Code. This undoubtedly discloses the intention of the legislative authority
to uphold the Code Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children.
Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
were repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children (Art. 175).
Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by
any of the following:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a,
267a)
Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article
283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that filiation may be proven by
"any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial
court is DIRECTED to PROCEED with dispatch in the disposition of the
action for compulsory recognition.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
270
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused

Constable Ruel C. Prieto were charged with the crime of rape committed
against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in a complaint dated on May 24,
1991, signed by her mother, Mrs. Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:
271
 That during the period between the last week of March
1989 and the first week of April 1989, in Barangay Lower
Lamac, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have
(sic) carnal knowledge with Sandra Salcedo,
complainant's daughter, a woman who is a mongoloid and
so weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable of giving
rational and legal consent. 1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged and due trial ensued.
The facts as established by evidence are as follows:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid
and daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a
mind of a five-year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed up.
Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed herself by
motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis
Occidental. Four security men were assigned to him, two of whom were
accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.
The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son
Alexander and wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers'
quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in
Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was occupied by Col.
Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the lower storey had two (2) rooms,
one of which was occupied by the four security men and the other by
Alexander Salcedo and his wife.
It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs.
Salcedo then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup.
Medication was given to Sandra but her condition did not improve. Sandra
became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming
out from the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan,
bastos." 2
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition, brought her to
Regina Hospital. Sandra was able to relieve herself the following day but
still remained moody and irritable. She refused to take a bath in spite of
scoldings from her mother. She did not want to eat and whenever she did,
she would vomit.
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup.
Dr. Conol, the examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a
Medical Technologist, conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that
Sandra was pregnant. 3 Mrs. Pastora Salcedo could not believe that her
daughter was pregnant and so she brought Sandra to Madonna and Child
Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and OB-GYNE Specialist,
examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultra-sound examination.
The results were positive. The fetus' gestational age was equivalent to
17.1 weeks. 4 Another ultra-sound examination at the United Doctors
Medical Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on September 11, 1989 confirmed
that she was indeed pregnant. 5
On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named
Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the filing of the complaint 6 by Mrs. Pastora Salcedo.
During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures
of different persons were laid on the table and Sandra was asked to pick
up the pictures of her assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures of
Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 7 Later, Sandra was brought out of the
investigation room to a police line-up of ten people, including Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her assailants.
Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.8
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-
law, Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the
persons who sexually molested her. 9
Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually
molested her. Sandra revealed that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto
272
were the ones who raped her. Sandra demonstrated how she was raped.
First, her thighs were touched, then she was hugged and her panty was
taken off. A push and pull movement followed. 10 Celsa testified that she
was present when the victim demonstrated how she was sexually abused
by the two accused, including the way her nipples were touched saying
"dito hawak," and holding her breasts to emphasize. She likewise went
through the motion of removing her panty, uttering at the same time
"hubad panty."
Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel
Prieto as the persons who raped her and said she wished them dead, as
they did something bad to her. 11 She once again demonstrated how she
was sexually abused. She held her two thighs with her two hands next to
her sexual organ saying, "panty" and then placed her hand on her breast
and gestured as if she were sucking. She also touched her private organ
and made a push and pull movement. 12
During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood
Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended
party, her child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test
conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a
type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and
accused-appellant type "O".
Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it
was impossible for them to have committed the crime of rape.
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of
the crime charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on
reasonable doubt, stating that he "has a different type of blood with (sic)
the child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is "A", while that of child Jacob
Salcedo is
type "O".
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the
information, and pursuant to the provisions of Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the
commission of the crime, said accused Moreno Tumimpad
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA; to indemnify the offended girl, Sandra Salcedo,
in the amount of P20,000.00; and to suffer the other
accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay the
costs of the proceedings.
On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby
declared ACQUITTED from the charge.
SO ORDERED. 13
Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:
1. The lower court erred in not appreciating the
impossibility of committing the offense charged without
detection.
2. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-
appellant base on major blood grouping test known as
ABO and RHS test, not a paternal test known as
chromosomes or HLA test.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have
committed the crime of rape because most of the time he and his co-
accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on inspection tours
while the victim was always in the company of her mother. He further
contends that it was likewise impossible for Sandra, if she had really been
molested, not to have shouted out of pain, she being a virgin. As if adding
insult to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra's brother,
Cristopher Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could have raped her.
We are not convinced.
273
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection
tours but sometimes they were left behind and would play pingpong or
card games with Sandra at the ground floor of the house. While Sandra
was always with her mother, there were times when she was left alone in
the house with the accused. 14
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:
Q How many security men remain if you
can recall when your husband reported for
work?
A Two (2).
Q Who were these security men who
remained?
A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.
Q How about the 2 other security men
Tanggan and Colaljo?
A My husband sent (sic) them for an
errand and sometime they used to go with
my husband to the office.
Q Every time when your husband is out
what they do while they were (sic) at the
headquarter?
A I saw them sleeping and sometime they
were playing at the porch with my
daughter Sandra playing pingpong and
sometime they were listening music.
Q Where did they play usually take place?
A Living room. 15
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a
while ago when you were at the
headquarters you were able to do your
choirs, (sic) doing laundry jobs in the
second storey of your house. Do you know
where is your daughter Sandra at that
time?
A Yes, she spent her time at the second
floor.
Q What part of the ground floor she used
(sic) to stay?
A Because she is found (sic) of music she
stay in the living room.
Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?
A Moreno and Prieto.
Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused
playing with your daughter?
A Yes, playing pingpong and playing
cards. 16
The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant
Moreno Tumimpad as one of the perpetrators of the crime. First, during
the investigation conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled out accused-
appellant and his co-accused from among the thirty (30) pictures of
different persons shown to her. Second, at the police lineup of several
persons, likewise conducted by the CIS, Sandra once again unerringly
pointed accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who raped her.
Third, in open court, Sandra without hesitation, pointed to accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
274
The following is the victim's own testimony: The witness touching her private parts.

PROS. RAMOS: Q When this push and pull movement was

being made, did you see a man's organ?
Will you please demonstrate before this
Honorable Court what Moreno and Ruel A Yes sir.
did to you?
Q Where did you see this male organ?
RECORD:
A Witness touching her private part.
The witness when she stood up held both
her thighs (sic) with her two hand (sic) Q Who did this to you, who removed your
down to her sexual organ saying a word panty?
"panty" and she placed her hand on her
breast and did something as if sucking and A Moreno and Ruel.
held her private part (sic) and did a push
and pull movement and she cried. Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?

Q When you said that there was a push and A Yes.

pull movement of the body and when this
was being done did you feel pain? Q Did you see his sex organ?

A Yes pain. A The witness touching her private parts.

Q What part of your body is painful? Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he
taken (sic) off his pants?
RECORD:
A Yes.
The witness touching her private parts.
Q Did you see his sex organ?
Q Did you also see blood on your sexual
organ? A Yes, witness again touching her private
part.
A Yes.
Q Both of them?
Q Where did you see these blood?
A Yes.
RECORD:
275
Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos
(sic) your panty? point to accused Moreno Tumimpad)?

A Moreno. A Moreno.

Q In your house? RECORD:

A Yes. The witness pointing to a certain person

who is standing and when asked what is
Q What part of your house did Moreno and his name, he readily answered that he is
Ruel remove your panty? Moreno Tumimpad.

A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove PROS. RAMOS:

panty.
Who is that person standing besides
Q What part of the ground floor, was it Moreno?
outside or inside the room?
A Joel.
A In the room.
PROS. RAMOS:
Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside
the courtroom now, can you point to them? If your honor please, she could not
pronounced (sic) well the word Ruel but
A Yes. the way she called this name is Joel which
refers to the same person who is one of the
Q Will you please point to them? accused in this case. 17

PROS. RAMOS: Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that Sandra
demonstrated to her how she was ravished by the two accused, thus:
May we request the accused to stand up
your honor? Q Now, will you please tell us what did
Sandra Salcedo told (sic) you as to how she
RECORD: was abused?

Both accused stood up from where they A By what she had stated there were also
were sitting inside the courtroom. actions that she made.

PROS. RAMOS:
276
Q Will you please demonstrate to this
Honorable Court how did Sandra Salcedo
was abused as narrated or demonstrated
to you by Sandra Salcedo?
A According to her she was held in her
thigh and then she was hugged and then
the panty was taken off and making a push
and pull movement (witness
demonstration by holding her thigh)?
Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and
demonstrated to you how she was abused.
What else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she
had told you any more matter?
A She did not say anything more.
Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to
talk or say anything else. What happened
next?
A Then it was Celsa who asked her.
Q Where were you when Celsa asked
Sandra Salcedo?
A I was just beside her.
Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo
refused to talk, Celsa did the questioning,
did you hear the question being asked by
Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?
A Yes.
Q And what was the question being asked
by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?
A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what
other things that these two had done to
her?
Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell
you as to what was done to her?
A By way of talking and action.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra
Salcedo?
A He (sic) answered it by action and
talking.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra
Salcedo as related by her to Celsa through
words and action?
RECORD:
The witness demonstrated by holding his
(sic) nipple going down to her thigh.
Q What else had transpired next?
A No more.
Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo
mentioned the names of accused Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto, have you
observed whose names was usually
mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?
A She mentioned first the name of Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel.
Q And what happened after that?
277
 A I informed my mother-in-law of what
Sandra Salcedo had told us.
Q When did you tell your mother-in- law
about what Sandra Salcedo told you and
Celsa?
A That very evening sir. 18
Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his
conviction was based on the medical finding that he and the victim have
the same blood type "O".
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial
evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was
adduced as evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of
many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19:
Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the analysis
of blood samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged
father, it can be established conclusively that the man is
not the father of a particular child. But group blood testing
cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many
states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and
the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity
where the results of the test, made in the prescribed
manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternity.
This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the
Court may scientifically be completely accurate, and
intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where
the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting
with the results of the test. The findings of such blood tests
are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they
show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one
of many others with the same blood type may have been
the father of the child.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 2115. November 27, 1990.]
FELICIDAD BARIÑAN TAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. GALILEO J.
TROCIO, Respondent.
Jose A. Tolentino, Jr., for complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; DISBARMENT OF LAWYERS; CHARGE OF
IMMORALITY, NOT ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — The issue for
determination is whether or not Respondent should be disbarred for
immoral conduct. This, in turn, hinges on the question of whether he had,
in fact, sexually assault the Complainant, as a consequence of which the
latter begot a child by him. We find insufficient basis to sustain
Complainant’s charge. The outrage allegedly took place during the last
week of April, 1971. Yet, no criminal charge was filed, and it was only
about eight years later, on 5 November 1979, that an administrative
complaint was presented before this Court. Complainant’s explanation
that Respondent’s threat to cause the deportation of her alien husband
should she report to anyone made her desist from filing a charge is not
278
credible as she had admitted having lost contact with her husband when
he learned of respondent’s transgression that very same evening (p. 3,
TSN, 16 October 1980, p. 46, Rollo). The fear that she speaks of, therefore,
had become inexistent. Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind
of the Court is the fact that after the alleged incident, she continued having
dealings with the Respondent as if nothing had happened. Thus, by
Respondent’s own account, which was left uncontroverted by the
Complainant, the former assisted her mother and sisters prosecute a
robbery case. Then in March, 1976, she secured respondent’s services in
claiming indemnity from three insurance companies when a fire burned
the school down. Finally, respondent was retained as a collaborating
attorney by complainant’s family in an inheritance case. These
subsequent dealings are far from being the normal reaction of a woman
who has been wronged. Complainant’s contention that Respondent
continued supporting the child for several years for which reason she
desisted from charging him criminally, has not been substantiated. Truth
to tell, the fact that she kept her peace for so many years can even be
construed as a condonation of his alleged "immoral conduct." It is likewise
strange that an unwanted son, as the child would normally have been,
should, of all names, be called "Jewel."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; PROOF OF FILIATION;
UNUSUAL CLOSENESS AND PHYSICAL LIKENESS, CONSIDERED
INCONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE. — The testimonies of Complainant and
witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness
between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys,
are not convincing enough to prove paternity, as Complainant would want
us to believe. The same must be said of Exhibits A, A1, B and B1, which are
pictures of Jewel and the Respondent showing allegedly their physical
likeness to each other. Such evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity,
and much less would it prove violation of Complainant’s person and
honor.
3. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATE CHILDREN; PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY, NOT
OVERCOME BY ADEQUATE AND CONVINCING PROOF IN THE CASE AT
BAR. — More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock
of Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be in favor
of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible.
From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by
adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth
certificate the legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan
Le Pok.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint, filed on 9 November 1979, complainant Felicidad
Bariñan Tan seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Galileo J. Trocio for
immorality and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
Complainant, owner and directress of Harlyn Vocational School in Baroy,
Lanao del Norte, declares that sometime in April, 1971, at about 8:30 PM,
after classes were dismissed, respondent, who is the legal counsel of the
school, overpowered her inside the office and, against her will, succeeded
in having carnal knowledge of her. As a result, she begot a son on 5
February 1972 whom she named and registered as Jewel Tan. She avers
that respondent used to support Jewel but subsequently lost interest in
doing so thereby neglecting to defray the needed expenses for Jewel’s
well-being. Complainant also alleges that the respondent threatened her
with the deportation of her alien husband if she complained to the
authorities since she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operating the
vocational school. This threat, aside from the fact that Complainant is a
married woman with eight children and a school directress at the time of
the sexual assault, made her desist from filing a charge against
the Respondent. However, after eight years and thorough soul-searching,
she decided to file this administrative complaint.
Respondent, in his Answer, admits having acted as a lawyer of the
vocational school. In fact, he contends that he had also served as the
lawyer of the Complainant, her family and her parents-in-law. Thus, in
1971, he helped prosecute a case for robbery committed against
Complainant’s mother and sisters. Also, in March of 1976, when a fire of
unknown origin gutted the school, he assisted the complainant in
collecting P10,000.00 from FGU Insurance Group, and P40,000.00 from
Fortune Insurance Corporation as indemnities. With regard to the same
case, he also represented complainant in a suit involving a P130,000.00
claim against the Workmen’s Insurance Corporation before the then Court
279
of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. Then in 1978, he was retained as a
collaborating attorney by Complainant’s family in an inheritance case.
Further, her father-in-law had always consulted him in matters affecting
the former’s store.
But respondent vehemently denies that he had sexually assaulted the
Complainant. He argues that her motivation in filing this charge was to get
even with him after having been humiliated when he declined her request
to commit a "breach of trust." He states that in the inheritance case he
handled for her family, Complainant insisted that he report to her mother
and sisters that he had charged a fee of P15,000.00 instead of the
P2,500.00 he actually received so that she could pocket the difference. He
refused and told the Complainant to look for another lawyer. She tried
twice to make peace with him but was unsuccessful. Rebuffed, she
promised to get even with him. Thus, this complaint.
Another reason why Complainant filed the present case, respondent
claims, is to escape her indebtedness to him representing his services as
legal counsel of the school which were unpaid since 1974 and the
accumulated honoraria from her fire insurance claims. These obligations
were left unpaid despite demand made when respondent learned that
Complainant had sold a piece of land in Agusan.
On 2 June 1980, the Court, acting upon the Complaint and the Answer
already filed, referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On 19 August 1980, said Office, upon the request of the Complainant that
the investigation be held in Lanao del Norte as she and her witnesses
could not afford to come to Manila, referred the case to the Provincial
Fiscal of said province for the necessary proceedings.
Between September and October of 1980, hearings were conducted on the
case. In a Report and Recommendation, dated 16 January 1981, the
Provincial Fiscal stated that respondent failed to attend the hearing
despite the issuance of subpoena; that there was prima facie evidence
showing that respondent had committed acts violative of his professional
decorum; and, that he was recommending disciplinary action against him.
The records of the case were then forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor
General.
On 1 September 1982, the Office of the Solicitor General returned the
records to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte for re-investigation on
the ground that the investigation was conducted in the absence of
respondent, who did not appear despite subpoenas sent to him. Thus,
further proceedings were conducted by the Provincial Fiscal wherein
Respondent was allowed to submit a sworn letter, dated 13 December
1985, amplifying on the defenses contained in his Answer.
On 13 February 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte issued a
Resolution adopting his previous Report and Recommendation of 16
January 1981, which found prima facie evidence to hold Respondent
administratively liable. On the same day, the records of the case were
referred back to the Office the Solicitor General.
On 16 May 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General came up with its own
Report recommending that Respondent be disbarred for gross immoral
conduct. On 17 July 1986, as directed by the Court, the Solicitor General
filed a formal Complaint for disbarment against Respondent. On 29 May
1990, the case was raffled to this Second Division and was included in the
latter’s agenda on 13 June 1990.
Respondent has filed an Answer, Complainant her Reply, while
Respondent’s Rejoinder, as required by the Court, was received on 3
October 1990. The required pleadings being complete, this case is now
ripe for resolution.
The issue for determination is whether or not Respondent should be
disbarred for immoral conduct. This, in turn, hinges on the question of
whether he had, in fact, sexually assault the Complainant, as a
consequence of which the latter begot a child by him.
We find insufficient basis to sustain Complainant’s charge.
The outrage allegedly took place during the last week of April, 1971. Yet,
no criminal charge was filed, and it was only about eight years later, on 5
November 1979, that an administrative complaint was presented before
this Court. Complainant’s explanation that Respondent’s threat to cause
280
the deportation of her alien husband should she report to anyone made
her desist from filing a charge is not credible as she had admitted having
lost contact with her husband when he learned of respondent’s
transgression that very same evening (p. 3, TSN, 16 October 1980, p. 46,
Rollo). The fear that she speaks of, therefore, had become inexistent.
Another factor that engenders doubt in the mind of the Court is the fact
that after the alleged incident, she continued having dealings with the
Respondent as if nothing had happened. Thus, by Respondent’s own
account, which was left uncontroverted by the Complainant, the former
assisted her mother and sisters prosecute a robbery case. Then in March,
1976, she secured respondent’s services in claiming indemnity from three
insurance companies when a fire burned the school down. Finally,
respondent was retained as a collaborating attorney by complainant’s
family in an inheritance case. These subsequent dealings are far from
being the normal reaction of a woman who has been wronged.
Complainant’s contention that Respondent continued supporting the
child for several years for which reason she desisted from charging him
criminally, has not been substantiated. Truth to tell, the fact that she kept
her peace for so many years can even be construed as a condonation of
his alleged "immoral conduct." It is likewise strange that an unwanted son,
as the child would normally have been, should, of all names, be called
"Jewel."
During the investigation before the Provincial Fiscal, the complainant,
aside from herself, presented two other witnesses, Eleuteria Garcia and
Marilou Pangandaman, both her domestic help, to testify. Among the
three, it was Eleuteria who tried to establish the manner in which the
sexual assault took place. Thus:
"x x x
"Q You stated in your affidavit marked Annex A that you heard Felicidad
Bariñan Tan shouted (sic) for help on the evening of last week of April,
1971, can you tell me or do you know why Mrs. Tan shouted for help?
"A Yes sir. When I responded to the shout for help of Tan I noticed that
Atty. Galileo Trocio, hurriedly left the office leaving behind Mrs. Felicidad
Bariñan Tan.
"Q Did you ask Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan why she was shouting for help?
"A Before I could ask her the reason why she shouted for help, she told me
and Marilou Pangandaman that she was sexually abused by Atty. Galileo
J. Trocio.
"Q What did you notice of Mrs. Felicidad Bariñan Tan when you responded
to her shout for help?
"A She was crying and trying to fix her dress.." . . (p. 52-53, Rollo)."
However, how near to the crime scene said witness was, considering that
it allegedly happened in school premises, has not been shown. Her
credibility is thus also put in issue.
The testimonies of Complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman,
another maid, to show unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel,
like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to
prove paternity, as Complainant would want us to believe. The same must
be said of Exhibits A, A1, B and B1, which are pictures of Jewel and the
Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other. Such
evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and much less would it prove
violation of Complainant’s person and honor.
More importantly, Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of
Complainant and her husband and the presumption should be in favor of
legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible.
From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been overcome by
adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth
certificate the legitimate child of the Complainant and her husband, Tan
Le Pok.
WHEREFORE, this Complaint for disbarment must be, and is hereby
DISMISSED, for lack of convincing substantiation.
SO ORDERED.
281
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39948 February 28, 1985

ALFONSO COLORADO, ANTONIO COLORADO, PORFIRIO COLORADO,

EUFROCINIA VDA. DE COLORADO, and her children MINERVA
COLORADO CORPUZ, JOHN DOE "ROMY" CORPUZ, AMADOR
COLORADO, ARCHIMEDES COLORADO, GERONIMO COLORADO and
the minors AYEC and MARILOU, both surnamed COLORADO,
represented herein by their mother EUFROCINIA VDA. DE
COLORADO as Guardian ad-litem as HEIRS OF THE LATE LEONARDO
COLORADO, DOLORES PASCUAL VDA. DE COLORADO and her
children ISMAEL COLORADO, REBECCA P. COLORADO and the
minors MILAGROS, CORAZON and FE all surnamed COLORADO,
represented by their mother, DOLORES PASCUAL VDA. DE
COLORADO as Guardian, ad-litem as HEIRS OF THE LATE JUAN
COLORADO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN COLORADO, HERMOGENES BATTAD,
CRISTINA AQUIZAP, NIEVES AQUIZAP, REGINO AQUIZAP, JR., PAZ
ESPERANZA AQUIZAP DE LEON and FELICIDAD
AQUIZAP, respondents.

Jorge M. Juco for petitioners.

282
Alberto, Salazar & Associates for respondents.
CUEVAS, J.:
Appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals
(now Intermediate Appellate Court) in CA-G.R. No. 49528-R.
entitled "Gregorio Corpuz, et al." vs. Carmen Colorado, et al.", dated
October 4, 1974 which modified the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Zambales (now Regional Trial Court) in Civil Case No. 163-I,
by declaring that petitioners Leonardo, Alfonso, Juan Antonio and Porfirio
all surnamed Colorado, are not the legitimated children of the late
Flaviano Colorado.
Petitioners Leonardo, Alfonso, Juan, Antonio and Porfirio (all surnamed
Colorado) are the natural children of Flaviano Colorado and Juliana del
Rosario. The eldest, Leonardo, was born on May 16, 1915; while the
youngest, Porfirio on July 8, 1922. Before he died on August 31, 1922,
Flaviano Colorado married Juliana del Rosario in articulo mortis on
August 30, 1922.
Aside from the abovenamed children, Flaviano had four daughters by two
previous marriages: Victoria Colorado, by his first wife, Agustina Sales,
Carmen Colorado, Andrea Colorado and Fortunata Colorado, by his
second wife, Felipa Beltran who died on July 27, 1913.
When Flaviano Colorado died intestate on August 31, 1922, he left several
properties, among which are the two parcels of land described in
paragraph 6 of the complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of
Zambales which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 163-I for
"Partition and Delivery of Shares of Two Parcels of Land." These two
parcels of land have been in the possession of Carmen Colorado from the
time of Flaviano's death. In 1925, the properties left by Flaviano Colorado
were orally partitioned among his widow. Juliana del Rosario, and his
children Victoria Colorado, Carmen Colorado, Andrea Colorado, Fortunata
Colorado, Leonardo Colorado, Alfonso Colorado, Juan Colorado, Antonio
Colorado and Portrio Colorado. The last five, being then minors, were
represented by their mother Juliana. They all took delivery and
possession of their respective shares. The two parcels subject of the
complaint in the Trial Court were assigned to Carmen Colorado and her
sisters Andrea and Fortunata (who died single and without a will on
December 16, 1933).
Claiming that the properties left by his father Flaviano had not yet been
partitioned among his heirs, Antonio Colorado on January 27, 1967 sold
to Gregorio Corpuz his supposed undivided share over the two parcels in
question. On February 10, 1967, Dolores Vda. de Colorado (widow of Juan
Colorado), acting for and in behalf of her children, also sold their shares
over these same (two) parcels to Gregorio Corpuz. Thereafter, Gregorio
Corpuz advised Carmen Colorado of the sale and demanded that the two
parcels be partitioned and to deliver to him the shares of Antonio and Juan
Colorado. Carmen Colorado refused, claiming that these properties belong
exclusively to her and her late sisters as their share in the extrajudicial
partition in 1923 of the properties left by their late father Flaviano
Colorado. As a result of Carmen's refusal to honor and recognize the sale
and partition of the two parcels of land in her possession, Gregorio Corpuz
instituted a complaint against her, Civil Case No. 163-I, before the Court
of First Instance of Zambales.
After trial, the then Court of First Instance ruled, among other things, that
Leonardo, Alfonso, Juan, Antonio and Porfirio all surnamed Colorado, are
the legitimated children of Flaviano Colorado and Juliana del Rosario, that
Carmen Colorado-Battad and the heirs of Andrea Colorado Aquizap are
the pro-indiviso owners of the two parcels of land described in the
complaint; declared the deeds of sale executed by Antonio Colorado,
Rebecca P. Colorado and Dolores Pascual Vda. de Colorado in favor of
Gregorio Corpuz as null and void insofar as they affect the 3rd party
plaintiffs and the parcels of land in question; and dismissed the plaintiffs'
complaint. 1
Their motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision having been
denied, defendants interposed an appeal therefrom to the then Court of
Appeals, raising two issues only, namely: (1) that the lower court erred in
finding that Leonardo, Alfonso, Juan, Antonio and Porfirio are the
legitimated children of Flaviano Colorado by his subsequent marriage to
Juliana del Rosario; and (2) in concluding that there is lack of evidence to
support the counterclaim of defendants and the intervenors. 2 The Court
of Appeals sustained the Trial Court on the first assignment of error but
overruled the second.
283
Hereunder is the pertinent portion of the appellate court's disposition of
the aforesaid issues, to which we fully concur —
It will be noted that the lower court, finding that Leonardo,
Alfonso, Juan, Antonio and Porfiro all surnamed Colorado,
are the legitimated children of the late Flaviano Colorado
by his subsequent marriage to Juliana del Rosario, leaned
heavily on the certification of the local Civil Registrar of
San Marcelino, Zambales: that according to the Civil
Registry of Marriage, Book No. 1, Page No. 55, Register No.
42, on file in that office, Flaviano Colorado was married to
Juliana del Rosario on August 30, 1922, by a Priest named
Valeriano Canonizado (Exhibit "B"); the affidavit of Gerino
Alvarez and Aniceto Beltran who deposed and said that
they were actually present and witnessed the marriage
ceremony performed by Father Valeriano Canonizado,
contracted by Flaviano Colorado and Juliana del Rosario
Vda. de Colorado (Exhibit "EE"); the certificate of death
where it appears that the deceased Colorado was married
to Juliana del Rosario (Exhibit "GG"); and a family
photograph of Flaviano Colorado showing therein Juliana
del Rosario, Victoria Colorado, Carmen Colorado,
Fortunata Colorado, Andrea Colorado, Alfonso Colorado
and Leonardo Colorado (Exhibits "A" to "A-8").
The eldest son of the late Flaviano Colorado and Juliana del
Rosario was Leonardo who was born on May 16, 1915 and
their Youngest son was Porfirio who was born on July 8,
1922, and was already about two (2) months old when
Flaviano Colorado and Juliana del Rosario were married
on August 30, 1922. For sometime before May, 1915,
Flaviano was a widower.
The law in force at the tune of the birth of the five sons of
Flaviano Colorado and Juliana del Rosario was the Spanish
Civil Code. Since the status of the child is determined by
the law in force at the time of its birth, the Spanish Civil
Code, particularly its Articles 121, 131 and 133, is the
governing law on legitimation by subsequent marriage.
Those articles are worded, as follows:
Art. 121. Children shall be considered as
legitimated by a subsequent marriage only
when they have been acknowledged by the
parents before or after the celebration
thereof.
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural
child must be made in the record of birth,
in a with or in some other public document.
Art. 133. The approval of the court shall be
necessary to the acknowledgment of a
minor unless such acknowledgment be
made in a certificate of birth or in a will.
(Emphasis supplied)
The formalities for a valid acknowledgment of a natural
child are provided for in Article 131 of the Spanish Civil
Code. According to that Article such acknowledgment
'must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some
other public document.' It is clear that the legitimation of
natural children does not take place by mere subsequent
marriage between the parents.
The record shows that in the Register of Births on file in
the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of San Marcelino,
Zambales, the birth of Leonardo Colorado (Exhibit "E"),
Alfonso Colorado (Exhibit "E-1"), Juan Colorado (Exhibit
"E-2"), Antonio Colorado (Exhibit "E-3"), and Porfirio
Colorado (Exhibit "E-4") was reported only on March 6,
1923, after about a year from the date of the death of
Flaviano Colorado. In their record of birth it does not
appear that Flaviano Colorado made acknowledgment,
and there is nothing in the record to show that Flaviano
Colorado signed any document pertaining to their status.
Since no acknowledgment with respect to them was made
284
 by Flaviano Colorado in their certificate of birth or in some
other public document and that he died without a win
where the acknowledgment could be made, they cannot be
considered as legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
their parents.
Plaintiffs-appellees and third party defendants- appellees
cited the compromise agreement of the parties (Exhibit
"U") filed in Civil Case No. 4 of the lower court, where the
legitimacy of the five Colorado brothers is admitted, and
invoked the doctrine of estoppel. The law on estoppel has
no application when the compromise agreement is relied
upon to establish civil status because no compromise can
be made with respect to civil status of persons. ...
The Court of Appeals then finally decreed —
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED,
in the sense that it is declared that Leonardo, Alfonso,
Juan, Antonio and Porfirio all surnamed Colorado, are not
the legitimated children of the late Flaviano Colorado by
the subsequent marriage of the latter to Juliana del
Rosario and, therefore, not entitled to inherit from said
Flaviano Colorado. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED in all other respects. 3
From the said decision as modified, petitioners appealed to this Court on
the sole issue — of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying
the formal requisites for acknowledgment of natural children as specified
by Articles 131 and 133 to the legitimation of natural children by
subsequent marriage of their parents as provided for by Articles 120 to
125 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Petitioners argue that the acknowledgment of the five (5) Colorado
brothers (petitioners) should be considered under Article 121 which falls
under Chapter III (on legitimated children) covering Arts. 119 to 128 of
the said Code and not under Arts. 131 and 133 which falls under Chapter
IV on illegitimate children. In support of their aforesaid submittal, they
cite the case of Obispo vs. Obispo, 99 Phil. 960.
Petitioners' reliance on the aforecited case is misplaced.
The aforesaid Obispo case involved the questioned legitimation of
Remedios Obispo who was born out of wedlock on August 5, 1921, the
daughter of Sebastian Obispo and Fructuosa Labrador who, at the time of
her conception and birth, were free to marry as in fact they did marry on
February 4, 1924 before the Justice of the Peace of Botolan, Zambales. The
issue of whether said Remedios Obispo was legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of her parents (Sebastian Obispo and Fructuosa
Labrador) arose because of the challenge against Remedios' right to
inherit from her late father Sebastian Obispo who, in turn inherited
several parcels from his late father Francisco Obispo. After trial, the Court
of First Instance of Zambales rendered judgment holding that Remedios
Obispo y Labrador was the natural child of the late Sebastian Obispo and
Fructuosa Labrador, duly acknowledged and legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of her parents and as such is entitled to inherit from
both her father and grandmother Dorotea Apostol.
Olimpia Obispo, the defendant against whom the action to recover
possession of the five (5) parcels in dispute was brought by Remedios
Obispo, appealed the aforesaid judgment to the Court of Appeals, claiming
that Remedios Obispo could not be deemed legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of her parents because she was not duly acknowledged by her
father either in the record of her birth or in a will, nor was she, being then
a minor, acknowledged with judicial approval, as provided for in Article
133 of the old Civil Code.
In support of her contention that lack of judicial approval of
acknowledgment of the minor Remedios Obispo as natural child made
under oath on October 17, 1940 before Justice of the Peace of Cabukay,
Zambales by her father Sebastian Obispo, prevents her from acquiring the
condition or status of legitimated child by subsequent marriage,
petitioners cite Article 121 of the old Civil Code which provides -
Children shall be considered as legitimated by a
subsequent marriage only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents before or after the
celebration thereof.
285
and it was therein held —
... For the validity or legality of an acknowledgment of a
minor natural child by any of his natural parents, under
the provisions of Art. 133 of the old Civil Code, judicial
approval thereof was necessary. Art. 133 of the old Civil
Code comes under Chapter IV, Title V, Book 1, that deals
with illegitimate children and acknowledgment of natural
children, whereas Article 121 of the same Code comes
under the preceding chapter that treats of legitimated
children. The acknowledgment required in Article 121 is
not the same as that required in Article 133 when the
natural child to be acknowledged is a minor. The
acknowledgment under the former article does not need
judicial approval.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
From this it may inferred that the judicial approval of an
acknowledgment of a minor natural child for the purpose
of legitimation by marriage of the natural parents is not
necessary ...
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
We are of the opinion that the acknowledgment under
oath of minor Remedios Obispo as natural child of
Sebastian Obispo made by the latter on 17 October 1940
before a justice of the peace (Exhibit E) did not need
judicial approval for her to acquire the status of
legitimated child by the marriage of her natural parents. 4
As it is, appellants failed to consider that Article 133 of the old Civil Code
which fails under Chapter IV, Title V, Book I thereof, deals not only with
"Illegitimate Children" but also of "Acknowledgment of Natural Children"
which is Section 1 of the Chapter IV dealing with illegitimate children. It
will be noted. that acknowledged natural children are placed in the same
class or category as illegitimate children. And this is so, because unless the
parents of the acknowledged natural child subsequently marry each
other, the child although acknowledged, remains illegitimate.
The child being illegitimate does not however, preclude his being
acknowledged either jointly by his parents or by anyone of them under
Article 129 which provides —
Article 129. A natural child may be acknowledged by the
father and mother jointly or by either of them alone.
In case of separate acknowledgment, Article 132 provides —
Article 132. When the acknowledgment is made
separately by the father or the mother, the name of the
child's other parent shall not be revealed by the parent
acknowledging it, nor shall any circumstance be
mentioned by which such person might be recognized.
Article 121 properly falls under Chapter III on "legitimated children"
because in this instance the parents of the child marry each other and the
marriage legitimated the acknowledged natural child. In other words, the
parents should be married to each other in order to effect the legislation
of their acknowledged natural children. And once legitimated, the child
becomes legitimate child. Since parents marry each other, the
acknowledgment of the natural children need no judicial approval. This is
exactly what this Court held in that Obispo case. The acknowledgment
required by Article 121 must be made in the manner provided for by
Article 131 which states — "the acknowledgment of a natural child must
be made in the record of birth in a will, or in some other public
documents,"
286
Coming now to the case at bar, the evidence do not show that Flaviano
Colorado, during his lifetime, has formally acknowledged the five
Colorado brothers as his natural children in any of the manner prescribed
by Article 131. True enough, he lived with them under the same roof
together with his older children by previous marriages. But, Under the
Spanish Civil Code, recognition by the parents to be valid must be Republic of the Philippines
expressed or formal not tacit or implicit. Under the law prior to the SUPREME COURT
Spanish Civil Code, tacit acknowledgment was sufficient; but since the Manila
enactment of the Code acknowledgment must be effected as prescribed
by Article. 131. 5 Acknowledgment by the parents is the conditional SECOND DIVISION
compliment of the natural filiation of a child born out of wedlock before
such child can be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents
under Article 121 of the Spanish Civil Code. 6
G.R. No. 112229 March 18, 1997
Petitioners vainly attempted to prove that Flaviano Colorado
acknowledged the five brothers by presenting the photograph 7 showing RAYMOND PE LIM, petitioner,
Flaviano Colorado together with Juliana del Rosario and his children vs.
Victoria Colorado, Carmen Colorado, Fortunata Colorado, Andrea COURT OF APPEALS, JOANNA ROSE C. PE LIM, Minor represented by
Colorado, Alfonso Colorado and Leonardo Colorado, such photo gives her Natural Mother and Guardian, MARIBEL CRUZ y
them no support whatsoever in the light of Article 131. Not being a record TAYAG, respondents.
of birth nor a will, nor a public document, it does not suffice for the
purpose. At most, it merely serves as a basis for compulsory recognition
ROMERO, J.:
and not as evidence of acknowledgment. Besides, family pictures do not
constitute proof of filiation. 8 Not even the insurance policy taken by
Flaviano Colorado naming his sons as beneficiaries since it does not come All too often, immature men who allow their emotions to hold sway over
within the purview of recognition. 9 their rational minds come to grief when their passions cool off, but not
before inflicting irreparable psychic and spiritual damage on their victims
and the fruits of their wanton acts. As they sow the proverbial "wild oats,"
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision appealed
they are heedless of the dire consequences they heap on their heads.
from is hereby AFFIRMED.
When the inevitable confrontation explodes and they are helpless to
extricate themselves from the messy situation arising from their
Costs against petitioners.
wrongdoing, eventually they invoke the help of the courts as their final
arbiter.
SO ORDERED.
Before us is one of those cases where a man woos a maid, succeeds in
Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and Escolin JJ., concur. seducing and impregnating her, only to disclaim the paternity of the child
when made to account for his misdeeds.
Aquino, J., I concur in the result on the authority of Madridejo vs, De Leon,
55 Phil. 1.

287
DNA,1 being a relatively new science, it has not as yet been accorded
official recognition by our courts. Paternity will still have to be resolved
by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal
and written, by the putative father.
This petition for review on certiorari sprang from a complaint filed by
Maribel Cruz for child support on behalf of her daughter, private
respondent Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim, against petitioner Raymond Pe Lim
who, Maribel claims, is Joanna's father.
Maribel's story unfolds, thus:
Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She also
worked as a receptionist at Tonight's Club and Resthouse along Roxas
Blvd., Manila. She met petitioner during her first night on the job.
Petitioner wooed her and Maribel reciprocated his love. They soon lived
together, with petitioner paying the rentals in a succession of apartments
in Cubao, Quezon City, Tambo, Paranaque and Makati, Metro Manila.
Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already pregnant, and returned to
Manila in October of the same year.
The couple never married because petitioner claimed that he was not
financially stable. On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to their
daughter at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. The bills for Maribel's
three-day confinement at the hospital were paid for by Raymond and he
also caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the
child's birth certificate. After Joanna Rose's birth, the love affair between
Maribel and petitioner continued.
Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noted that petitioner's feelings
toward her started to wane. He subsequently abandoned her and Joanna
Rose. Maribel tried to support herself by accepting various jobs and with
occasional help from relatives, but it was never enough. She asked
petitioner for support but, despite promises to do so, it was never given.
Maribel then filed a complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for support.
Petitioner, on the other hand, has a different version: He claims that in
1978, he went to Tonight's Club and Resthouse along Roxas Boulevard,
Manila to relax after a hard day's work. There he met Maribel, a pretty and
aggressive hospitality girl. Raymond observed that while she had a
pleasing personality, she seemed to be quite experienced because she
started to kiss him on the cheeks and neck, whispering to him that they
could go anywhere and rest. Raymond declined to take Maribel up on her
offer saying that he only wanted someone to talk to. They became friends
after that first meeting, and while he often saw her, there was no intimacy
between them. He did admit giving Maribel sizeable tips because she
confided in him that she needed money.
Raymond alleged that he was not Maribel's only customer at the club. In
1980, she left for Japan to work as an entertainer.
In 1981, she returned to Manila pregnant, and appealed to Raymond for
help because she claimed that she could not face her relatives in her
condition. Raymond got her an apartment and paid its rentals until she
gave birth to a baby girl on January 17, 1982. Raymond admits paying the
hospital bills but claims that Maribel was supposed to pay him back for it.
When she failed to do so, Raymond stopped seeing her.
Raymond denies being the father of Maribel's child, claiming that they
were only friends and nothing more.
The trial court rendered a decision on June 10, 1971, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering herein
defendant, Raymond Pe Lim to give support to his natural
daughter, minor Joanna Rose Pe Lim in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Philippine Currency, per
month for the support, maintenance, education and well-
being of said child, the same to be paid on or before the 5th
day of each month and monthly thereafter starting June,
1991, until the said minor Joanna Rose Pe Lim, shall have
reached the age of majority.
The defendant is further ordered to pay the plaintiff the
sum of Seven Thousand Five Hundred (P7,500.00) Pesos,
288
 Philippine Currency, for attorney's fees and other
litigation expenses.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner then elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the trial court's findings.
Petitioner now argues before the Court that there is no clear and
convincing evidence on record to show that there was actual cohabitation
between him and Maribel. In fact, petitioner infers that Maribel became
pregnant only when she went to Japan. In short, he denies that he is the
father of Joanna Rose. He further questions the awarded support of
P10,000.00 per month, saying that the same is beyond his means,
considering that he has a family to support.
We find no merit in this petition.
In Alberto v. Court of Appeals,2 we said:
When a putative father manifests openly through words
and deeds his recognition of a child, the courts can do no
less than confirm said acknowledgment. As the immortal
bard Shakespeare perspicaciously said: "Let your own
discretion be your tutor; suit the action to the word, the
word to the action."
The evidence in the instant case shows that petitioner considered himself
to be the father of Joanna Rose as shown by the hand-written letter he
wrote to Maribel:
Hi Love,
I wrote you this letter because I would like to erase from
your mind the thought of why I can not ever [sic] you
marriage right now is because I have no longer love or care
for both Joanna & you.
Last night when we talked things over, I was in a stage
wherein everything was happening so fast that I was
running out of time & works (sic) to make you understand
me through this letter I would like to explain my side in a
more detailed way and I hope you could understand.
You know love, the main root of the problem of why
marriage is impossible for us right now is not what my
parents or my family circle will say about you, but
the financial side of it. Okay, let say I did marry you right
now disregarding my financial stability. Sooner or later
they will come to know of it and I am sure that they will
not consent it. I have no alternative but to leave them & to
stick it up with you. This is where the financial side comes
in. I can't allow myself walking away from my family
making them think that I can stand on my own two feet
but the truth of the matter is not and seeing both of you
suffer for only one stupid mistake which is I was not yet
financially ready to face the consequence.
My plan is that if you could only stick it out with me until I
am ready to face whatever consequence that might occur
during our life or relation as husband and wife. You have
already tried it before, why can't you stress it a little
longer. In return, I promise to be a loving & caring husband
& father to both of you.
Love, I really don't want you to be taken away from me by
anyone, whether he be single or married. This is the
reason why I am still trying to convince you. But if you
really have decided things up and really determined to
push through with it. I guess I just have to respect your
decision. Just remember I wish you the best of luck and
take extra-care of yourself & Joanna.
289
 Remember, if the time comes when things get rough for
you and you have no one to turn to, don't hesitate to call
on me. I am very much willing to be at your side to help
you.
I love you very much!
From the tenor of the letter and the statements petitioner made therein
it is clear that, contrary to his vehement assertion that he and Maribel
were just friends, they were actually lovers.
In an earlier letter, this time sent to Maribel while she was in Japan,
petitioner lovingly told her to take care of herself because of her
"situation," obviously referring to the state of pregnancy of Maribel:
Hi Love,
Do you know how glad I was to receive a letter from you
yesterday? At least now I'm a little bit at ease to know
that everything is fine with you.
Love, in your letter you seem so much concern (sic) about
my situation once here. I really appreciate it, but please
don't give too much thought about it because I'm
physically o.k. here. The important thing is that don't think
too much and have a lot of rest during your spare
time especially in the situation you're in now. If you are
feeling homesick just go out with your friends and try to
enjoy yourself to the fullest while you are there.
Love, you said in your letter that you regret very much
your going there & wishes (sic) that you have not left
anymore. I understand your feelings to what had
happened after you told me about it in the telephone.
xxx xxx xxx
Love, I miss you so much that I always re-read those
letters you had send me very often. At night I always think
of you and the times we're together before going to sleep.
xxx xxx xxx (Empahsis supplied)
It was only after petitioner separated from Maribel that he started to deny
paternity of Joanna Rose. Until he got married to another woman, he did
not object to being identified as Joanna Rose's father as disclosed in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The evidence on record reveals that he even got
a copy of the said Certificate when Joanna Rose started schooling, as
shown by a receipt in his name from the San Juan Municipal Office. His
belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence which
establishes beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner is indeed the father
of Joanna Rose. 3
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
Article 172 of the Family Code states:
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of
the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
290
 (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a).

This article adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code that filiation
may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father."4

Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters Republic of the Philippines
to Maribel vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself SUPREME COURT
on various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and the Certificate of Live Manila
Birth say it all. Accordingly, his suit must fail.
SECOND DIVISION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. G.R. No. 121027 July 31, 1997

SO ORDERED. CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners,

vs.
Regalado, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.

Mendoza, J., took no part. REGALADO, J.:

The present appeal by certiorari seeks the reversal of the judgment

rendered by respondent Court of Appeals on June 30, 19951 which
affirmed the Order of December 3, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 98, granting herein private respondent's
Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence filed in Civil Case No. Q-88-1054 pending
therein.

The present appellate review involves an action for reconveyance filed by

herein petitioners against herein private respondent before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as the aforesaid Civil Case
No. Q-88-1054, over a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon
located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and which was originally
owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. It
appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece
and nephew, respectively, of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero
who is the sister of petitioner's father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or
descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and

291
herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3,
1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right
of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her
surviving spouse, Martin, executed on September 15, 1986 an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement2 adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir,
the land in dispute which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
66886, as a consequence of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 358074
was issued in the name of Martin Guerrero. On January 2, 1988, Martin
Guerrero sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and
thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 was issued in the
latter's name.
Martin Guerrero died on October 25, 1988. Subsequently, herein
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance on November 2, 1988,
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in
question by right of representation.
At the pre-trial conference, the following issues were presented by both
parties for resolution:
(1) whether or not the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are
the nephew and niece of the late Teodora Dezoller;
(2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to inherit by
right of representation from the estate of the late Teodora
Dezoller;
(3) whether or not defendant (herein private respondent)
must reconvey the reserved participation of the plaintiffs
to the estate of the late Teodora Dezoller under Section 4,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court which was duly annotated on
the title of the defendant;
(4) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to damages,
moral and exemplary, plus attorney's fees for the willful
and malicious refusal of defendant to reconvey the
participation of plaintiffs in the estate of Teodora Dezoller,
despite demands and knowing fully well that plaintiffs are
the niece and nephew of said deceased; and
(5) whether or not the subject property now in litigation
can be considered as conjugal property of the spouses
Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.3
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as
the lone witness, with the following documentary evidence offered to
prove petitioners' filiation to their father and their aunt, to wit: a family
picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller;
certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and
Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of Hermogenes Dezoller and
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth
of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and
Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date and place of birth of Corazon
and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga
attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora
Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of Martin and Teodora
Guerrero.4 Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a
written offer of these exhibits to which a Comment5 was filed by herein
private respondent.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiff's Evidence
on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation
with the deceased Teodora Guerrero in accordance with Article 172 of the
Family Code. It is further averred that the testimony of petitioner Corazon
Dezoller Tison regarding her relationship with her alleged father and aunt
is self-serving, uncorroborated and incompetent, and that it falls short of
the quantum of proof required under Article 172 of the Family Code to
establish filiation. Also, the certification issued by the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental is merely proof of the
alleged destruction of the records referred to therein, and the joint
affidavit executed by Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar certifying to the
date, place of birth and parentage of herein petitioners is inadmissible for
being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-
examination.6
292
On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the
demurrer to evidence and dismissing the complaint for reconveyance.7
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the
documentary evidence presented by herein petitioners, such as the
baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this
appeal.
We find for petitioners.
The bone of contention in private respondent's demurrer to evidence is
whether or not herein petitioners failed to meet the quantum of proof
required by Article 172 of the Family Code to establish legitimacy and
filiation. There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue
on petitioner's legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their
filiation with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by
petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not per
se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to
note, however, that the rulings of both lower courts in the case are
basically premised on the erroneous assumption that, in the first place,
the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an action for
reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have
the onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation.
We disagree on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have
regrettably overlooked the universally recognized presumption on
legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.8 And well
settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and
within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which
provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the
husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint
before the competent court; any contest made in any other
way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code.
Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to "the action to impugn the
legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the
husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the
present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170,
the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer
be brought. The status conferred by the presumption,
therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned.
The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of
a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty
for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle
any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the
evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily
be facts occurring during the period of the conception of
the child, may still be easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife
293
 produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that
infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his
heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.9
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children
of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present
action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further
consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to impugn
the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently
continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the
burden of proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of
the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent who is
disputing the same. This fact alone should have been sufficient cause for
the trial court to exercise appropriate caution before acting, as it did, on
the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the issues for
resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose
favor the presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to
establish that fact, and in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the
party denying it must bear the burden of proof to overthrow the
presumption. 10 The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear
that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming
illegitimacy. 11 And in order to destroy the presumption, the party against
whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the
contrary.12
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 13 and
unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may
stand in lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. 14 Perforce, a
presumption must be followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the
theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and
unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal presumption of its
truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 15
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing
evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to
evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact.
Indeed, she overlooked or disregarded the evidential rule that
presumptions like judicial notice and admissions, relieve the proponent
from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged and such facts are
thereby considered as duly proved.
II. The weight and sufficiency of the evidence regarding petitioner's
relationship with Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, whose estate is the subject
of the present controversy, requires a more intensive and extensive
examination.
Petitioners' evidence, as earlier explained, consists mainly of the
testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison, the baptismal, death and marriage
certificates, the various certifications from the civil registrar, a family
picture, and several joint affidavits executed by third persons all of which
she identified and explained in the course and as part of her testimony.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship
between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison
to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime
in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 16 Such
a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the
declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to
the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that
the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration,
but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements.
What remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the
other documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding
the pedigree of petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is
necessary to present evidence other than such declaration.
294
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when
the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration
itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be
supported by evidence aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up
a claim through, but not from, the declarant and to
establish the admissibility of a declaration regarding
claimant's pedigree, he may not do by declarant's own
statements as to declarant's relationship to the particular
family. The reason is that declarant's declaration of his
own relationship is of a self-serving nature. Accordingly
there must be precedent proof from other sources that
declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of
the particular family; otherwise the requirement to
admissibility that declarant's relationship to the common
family must appear is not met. But when the party
claiming seeks to establish relationship in order to claim
directly from the declarant or the declarant's estate, the
situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite
different. In such case the declaration of the decedent,
whose estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one
who claims his estate, is admissible without other proof of
the fact of relationship. While the nature of the declaration
is then disserving, that is not the real ground for its
admission. Such declarations do not derive their
evidential value from that consideration, although it is a
useful, if not an artificial, aid in determining the class to
which the declarations belong. The distinction we have
note is sufficiently apparent; in the one case the
declarations are self-serving, in the other they are
competent from reasons of necessity. 17 (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks
recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but
not from the declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship
of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the
declaration itself. There must be some independent proof of this fact. 18 As
an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the
declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where
it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to
establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other
member of the family. 19
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one
instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be
relaxed. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the
declarant herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and
constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact
that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being
such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of
receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. 20 More importantly,
there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute
that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on the
sole basis of the decedent's declaration and without need for further proof
thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. As held in one case, 21 where the subject of the declaration is the
declarant's own relationship to another person, it seems absurb to
require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof of the
very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary
proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
Applying the general rule in the present case would nonetheless produce
the same result. For while the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we
are however of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by
reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection
thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. 22 It is elementary
that an objection shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in
evidence, 23 otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, 24 since
the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. 25
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., 26 it has been repeatedly laid
down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the
295
admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise it
will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the
question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from
the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may
be inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with
the statute is a waiver if the provisions of the law. That objection to a
question put to a witness must be made at the time the question is asked.
An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of incompetency,
taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. 27 Thus, for instance,
failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is
in a position to object, is a waiver of any objections thereto. 28
The situation is aggravated by the fact that counsel for private respondent
unreservedly cross-examined petitioners, as the lone witness, on the
documentary evidence that were offered. At no time was the issue of the
supposed inadmissibility thereof, or the possible basis for objection
thereto, ever raised. Instead, private respondent's counsel elicited
answers from the witness on the circumstances and regularity of her
obtention of said documents: The observations later made by private
respondent in her comment to petitioners' offer of exhibits, although the
grounds therefor were already apparent at the time these documents
were being adduced in evidence during the testimony of Corazon Dezoller
Tison but which objections were not timely raised therein, may no longer
serve to rectify the legal consequences which resulted therefrom. Hence,
even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of herein private
respondent's failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and
considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein asserted. 29
Accordingly, the Certificate of Marriage (Exhibit S) wherein it is indicated
that the parents of Teodora Dezoller are Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia
Calpo, as well as the Certificates of Baptism of Teodora Dezoller 30 (Exhibit
H) and Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit J) which both reflect the names of
their parents as Isabelo Dezoller and Cecilia Calpo, to show that
Hermogenes Dezoller is the brother of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; and
the Death Certificate of Hermogenes Dezoller (Exhibit K) the entries
wherein were made by petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison as his daughter,
together with the Joint Affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar
(Exhibits N and P), to prove that herein petitioners are the children of
Hermogenes Dezoller — these can be deemed to have sufficiently
established the relationship between the declarant and herein
petitioners. This is in consonance with the rule that a prima facie showing
is sufficient and that only slight proof of the relationship is
required. 31 Finally, it may not be amiss to consider as in the nature of
circumstantial evidence the fact that both the declarant and the claimants,
who are the subject of the declaration, bear the surname Dezoller. 32
III. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by
which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters
of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter
by representation, if they survive with their uncles or
aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, and illegitimate children and their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews
and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or theirs children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject
property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin
Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to
jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only
validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire
property to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and
296
private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an undivided
one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.

All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to

plaintiff's evidence should have been, as it is hereby, denied. Nonetheless,
private respondent may no longer be allowed to present evidence by Republic of the Philippines
reason of the mandate under Section 1 of revised Rule 3 of the Rules of SUPREME COURT
Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the Manila
order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right
to present evidence." 33 SECOND DIVISION

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private
respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein,
respectively.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 72078 June 27, 1994
EUTIQUIO MARQUINO and MARIA TERENAL-MARQUINO Survived
by: LUZ. T. MARQUINO, ANA T. MARQUINO and EVA T.
MARQUINO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FIRST CIVIL CASES
DIVISION, BIBIANA ROMANO-PAGADORA, Survived By: PEDRO
PAGADORA, EMY R. PAGADORA, JUNE R. PAGADORA, EDGAR R.
PAGADORA, MAY R. PAGADORA, MAGO R. PAGADORA, ARDEN R.
PAGADORA, and MARS R. PAGADORA, respondents.

Lenin R. Victoriano for petitioners.

Herminiano D. Silva for respondents.

PUNO, J.:

For resolution are the following issues: (1) the effect of the death of the
natural child during the pendency of her action for recognition; and (2)
the effect of the death of the putative parent also during the pendency of
the case.

The facts are as follows:

297
Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed Civil Case No. 5197, an action
for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and
Damages against petitioner Eutiquio Marquino on January 10, 1971
before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Also
impleaded as defendants, were Maria Terenal-Marquino, wife of Eutiquio
Marquino, and their legitimate children Luz, Ana, and Eva, all surnamed
Terenal-Marquino.
The records show that Bibiana was born on December 2, 1926 at Piapi,
Dumaguete City, of Gregoria Romano and allegedly of Eutiquio
Marquino.1 At that time, Eutiquio was still single. Bibiana became
personally known to the Marquino family when she was hired as domestic
helper in their household at Luke Wright Street, Dumaguete City. She
always received financial assistance from them. Thus, she claimed that
she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged
natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of her father and his family.
The Marquinos, on the other hand, strongly denied her allegations.
During the pendency of the case and before respondent Bibiana could
finish presenting her evidence, she died on March 17, 1979. On March 23,
1979, her heirs were ordered substituted for her as parties-plaintiffs. On
May 17, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They averred that the
action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs being a personal
act.2 The trial court dismissed the case.
Respondents appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court
(now Court of Appeals). On August 20, 1983, Eutiquio Marquino died
while the case was pending appeal. On June 17, 1985, respondent court
invoking the case of Banaga vs. Pascacio, (No. 4848-R, July 31, 1954, 50
O.G. No. 12, p. 5908) reversed the controverted order. It ruled:
[A]fter the death of the natural child, the heirs of said
deceased natural child, cannot bring the action to compel
recognition, but may however, continue the action already
filed to compel recognition.
xxx xxx xxx
Summarizing, We hold that the death of the putative
parent while the case against him for recognition of his
alleged child is pending will not extinguish the action but
the same can be continued with the heirs substituted for
said deceased parents because:
a) the law does not require that the case be
brought and decided while the putative
parent is alive;
b) that would be adding another requisite
for the action which is not sanctioned by
the law or jurisprudence;
c) it would be unfair to the plaintiff child to
have his action for recognition depend on
the speed of the Court in disposing of the
case and on a fortuitous event. This is
because if the court takes, let us say, 10
years to decide the case, the chances that
the defendant parent would survive the
case is very much less, especially if he was
already of advanced age at the time the
action is brought;
d) there are no compelling reasons not to
allow substitution of the deceased parent
with his heirs, for with the death of the
defendant parent, the effects of
recognition will practically be limited to
successional rights.
WHEREFORE, finding merit in this appeal, we hereby SET
ASIDE the Order of the trial Court dated August 13, 1983
and remand the case to the Court of origin for continuation
of the trial by the heirs of plaintiff against the heirs of
defendant Eutiquio Marquino, without pronouncement as
to costs.
298
 SO ORDERED.3
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied on May 19, 1985.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners hold respondent court to be in error, in these respects:
I The rationale for the rule is to give the alleged parents opportunity to be
IN RULING THAT AFTER THE DEATH OF THE NATURAL
CHILD, THE HEIRS OF SAID DECEASED NATURAL CHILD,
CANNOT BRING THE ACTION TO COMPEL RECOGNITION,
BUT THEY MAY HOWEVER, CONTINUE THE ACTION
ALREADY FILED TO COMPEL RECOGNITION.
II
IN RULING THAT THE DEATH OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT
WHILE THE CASE AGAINST HIM FOR RECOGNITION OF
HIS ALLEGED CHILD IS PENDING WILL NOT EXTINGUISH
THE ACTION BUT THE SAME CAN BE CONTINUED WITH
THE HEIRS SUBSTITUTED FOR SAID DECEASED
PARENT.4
The Court writes finis to this controversy after twenty-three (23) years of
protracted litigation.
The first issue to be resolved is whether or not the right of action to
compel recognition is intransmissible in character.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides that an action for recognition of
natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from
the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from
discovery of the document.
heard. The reason for the exceptions is to protect the heirs. 5
In Conde vs. Abaya,6 we held that the right of action for the
acknowledgment of natural children to which Article 285 (Article 137, Old
Civil code) refers, can never be transmitted. The reason is that the code
makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception. 7
In the case at bench, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural child. She was
born out of wedlock on December 2, 1926, of Gregoria Romano and
allegedly of Eutiquio Marquino who at that time was single. Bibiana sued
for compulsory recognition while Eutiquio was still alive. Sadly, she died
on March 17, 1983 before she could present her proof of recognition. Her
death tolled the action considering its personal nature and
intransmissibility. As explained in the case of Conde vs. Abaya,8 viz.:
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct
interpretation that the right of action to secure
acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed
to be transmitted, independently, as a rule to his heirs,
while the right to claim legitimacy from his predecessor is
not expressly, independently, or, as a general rule
conceded to the heirs of the legitimate child, but only
relatively and as an exception. Consequently, the
pretension that the right of action on the part of the child
to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation is
transmitted to his descendants, is altogether unfounded.
No legal provision exists to sustain such pretension, nor
can an argument of presumption be based on the lesser
claim when there is no basis for the greater one, and when
it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is
placing the heirs of the natural child on a better footing
299
 than the heirs of the legitimate one, when, as a child is not
better than, nor even equal to, that of a legitimate child.
This ruling was reiterated in the recent case of Heirs of Raymundo
C. Banas vs. Heirs of Bibiano Banas9 thus:
Granting that, after the death of Bibiano Banas Raymundo
could file an action for compulsory recognition against
Bibiano's heirs, still plaintiffs-appellants cannot invoke
Raymundo's right to file such action, because it is not
transmissible to the natural child's heirs; the right is
purely a personal one to the natural child.
The second issue for resolution is whether or not after the death of the
putative father the action for recognition of a natural child can be
continued against the heirs of the former.
We rule against its continuance. In an action for compulsory recognition,
the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent
himself.10 The need to hear the side of the putative parent is an
overwhelming consideration because of the unsettling effects of such an
action on the peace and harmonious relationship in the family of the
putative parent. For this reason, Article 285 provides only two (2)
exceptions when an action for recognition transcends the death of the
putative parent. Neither of these exceptions obtains in the case at bench.
Firstly, the death of Eutiquio did not occur during the minority of Bibiana.
In fact, she was already forty-five (45) years old when the recognition case
was filed on January 10, 1971. Secondly, no document was discovered,
before unknown, in which Bibiana was expressly acknowledged as a
natural child. Consequently, the respondent court erred in ruling that the
action can still be continued against the heirs of Eutiquio.11
Our public policy at that time supports the rule limiting actions for
recognition during the lifetime of the presumed parents, to quote:
Public policy, indeed public necessity, demands that
before an illegitimate child be admitted into a legitimate
family, every requisite of the law must be completely and
fully complied with. No one should ever be permitted
upon doubtful evidence to take from legitimate children
the property which they and their parents have, by
industry, fidelity, and frugality, acquired. To do so would
in many instances where the legitimate children had
"labored unsparingly in order that they might have the
comforts of life and joys of home," be manifestly contrary
to every plainest principles of justice. And again, if this can
ever be done upon oral testimony alone, after the lips of
the alleged father and mother have been closed by death,
such testimony must be clear, strong, and convincing.12
Our law providing for the intransmissibility of an action for recognition,
however, has been superseded by the New Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988. Under Article 173 of the Family Code, it is now
provided:
The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
(5) years within which to institute the action.
The action commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
(Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this provision, the child can bring the action during his or her
entire lifetime (not during the lifetime of the parents) and even after the
death of the parents. In other words, the action does not prescribe as long
as he lives.13
Be that as it may, Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect so as to apply to the case at bench because it will
prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time
of the death of their father, Eutiquio Marquino. "Vested right" is a right in
property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open
to doubt or controversy.14 It expresses the concept of present fixed
interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected
against arbitrary State action.15
300
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 1985 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 5197 of the
then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22523 September 29, 1967

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, EDWIN VILLA Y

MENDOZA. LUIS E. SANTOS, JR. and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

A. E. Dacanay for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.

ANGELES, J.:

An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
in Special Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the
spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the
minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.

The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder sister may adopt a younger
brother.

The trial court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:

301
 A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the parents of
the minor to be adopted are also the parents of the petitioner-wife.
The minor, therefore, is the latter's legitimate brother.
In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an incongruous
situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a legitimate brother of the
petitioner-wife, will also be her son. In the opinion of the court,
that incongruity not neutralized by other circumstances absent
herein, should prevent the adoption.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision but the same was
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The facts are not disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on
January 8, 1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years
old, be declared their (petitioner's) son by adoption. Evidence was
presented that the order setting the case for hearing has been duly
published, Exhibit A. There having been no opposition registered to the
petition, the petitioners were permitted to adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos,
residing in the City of Manila. They were married in 1957 and have
maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their
own blood. Neither spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate,
acknowledged natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any
one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin
Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia
Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa
Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business
interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant,
and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of
Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-
petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly earning
of about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza was born on May 22, 1958,
Exhibit C. He was a sickly child since birth. Due to the child's impairing
health his parents entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and
brought him up for the years thereafter, and as a result, there developed
between the petitioners and the child, a deep and profound love for each
other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily
given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and
submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that
they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child
by the petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law, and none has been pointed
to Us by the Office of the Solicitor General who argues for the State in this
case, that relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited from adopting
one another. The only objection raised is the alleged "incongruity" that
will result in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the adopted, in the
circumstance that the adopted who is the legitimate brother of the
adopter, will also be her son by adoption. The theory is, therefore,
advanced that adoption among people who are related by nature should
not be allowed, in order that dual relationship should not result, reliance
being made upon the views expressed by this Court in McGee vs. Republic.
L-5387, April 29, 1954, 94 Phil. 820.1awphîl.nèt
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E. McGee married to a Filipina by
whom he had one child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of two
minor children of the wife had by her first husband. The lower court
granted the petition of McGee to adopt his two minor step-children. On
appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We said:
The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship of paternity
and filiation where none existed before. Where therefore the
relationship of parent and child already exists whether by blood
or by affinity as in the case of illegitimate and step-children, it
would be unnecessary and superfluous to establish and super
impose another relationship of parent and child through adoption.
Consequently, an express authorization of law like article 338 is
necessary, if not to render it proper and legal, at least, to remove
any and all doubt on the subject matter. Under this view, article
338 may not be regarded as a surplusage. That may have been the
reason why in the old Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its
provisions regarding adoption, authority to adopt a step-child by
302
 a step-father was provided in section 766 notwithstanding the
general authorization in section 765 extended to any inhabitant of
the Philippines to adopt a minor child. The same argument of
surplusage could plausibly have been advanced as regards section
766, that is to say, section 766 was unnecessary and superfluous
because without it a step-father could adopt a minor step-child
anyway. However, the inserting of section 766 was not entirely
without reason. It seems to be an established principle in
American jurisprudence that a person may not adopt his own
relative, the reason being that it is unnecessary to establish a
relationship where such already exists (the same philosophy
underlying our codal provisions on adoption). So some states have
special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such as a
grandfather adopting a grandchild and a father adopting his
illegitimate or natural-child.
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a study of American
precedents would reveal that there is a variance in the decisions of the
courts in different jurisdictions regarding, the matter of adoption of
relatives. It cannot be stated as a general proposition that the adoption of
a blood relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in many states of
the Union, no restriction of that sort is contained in the statutes
authorizing adoption, although laws of other jurisdiction expressly
provide that adoption may not take place within persons within a certain
degree of relationship (1 Am. Jur. 628-629). Courts in some states hold
that in the absence of express statutory restriction, a blood relationship
between the parties is not a legal impediment to the adoption of one by
the other, and there may be a valid adoption where the relation of parent
and child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d 869). Principles vary
according to the particular adoption statute of a state under which any
given case is considered. It would seem that in those states originally
influenced by the civil law countries where adoption originated, the rules
are liberally construed, while in other states where common law
principles predominate, adoption laws are more strictly applied because
they are regarded to be in derogation of the common law.
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not
adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not
among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code
names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption
is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law. Article 338,
on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural
father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or mother,
and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of
course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited
even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and
child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be allowed
when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in
these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among
relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that
relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law.
The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of
paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate
children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such
children by person who can properly rear and educate them (In re
Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
With respect to the objection that the adoption in this particular case will
result in a dual relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother
will also be the son of the adopting elder sister, that fact alone should not
prevent the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction of law.
The relationship established by the adoption is limited to the adopting
parents and does not extend to their other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a
relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of
the legitimate children which they may have after the adoption except
that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of
adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted considered as
descendants of the adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p. 652,
citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp
& Wolff 177; Muñoz P. 104). So even considered in relation to the rules on
succession which are in pari materia, the adoption under consideration
would not be objectionable on the ground alone of the resulting
relationship between the adopter and the adopted. Similar dual
relationships also result under our law on marriage when persons who
are already related, by blood or by affinity, marry each other. But as long
as the relationship is not within the degrees prohibited by law, such
303
marriages are allowed notwithstanding the resulting dual relationship.
And as We do not find any provision in the law that expressly prohibits
adoption among relatives, they ought not to be prevented.

For all the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is set
aside, and the petition for the adoption of the subject minor, granted. No
pronouncement as to costs. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Manila
Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69,
Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A.
CLOUSE, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

R.M. Blanco for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the

Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding
No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named
Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law.

The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private

respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens
to adopt under Philippine Law.

There is no controversy as to the facts.

304
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to
adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private
respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the
petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of
Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is
a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn,
a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn
became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam.
They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present,
Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of
private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His
mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the
Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the
petition for adoption.
Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will redound
to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered
a decision on June 20, 1990, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption
filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse and
decrees that the said minor be considered as their child by
adoption. To this effect, the Court gives the minor the
rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners.
Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON ALCALA
CLOUSE.
The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his
natural parents and vests parental authority to the herein
petitioners and makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to
Article 36 of P.D. 603 as amended, the decree of adoption
shall be effective as of the date when the petition was filed.
In accordance with Article 53 of the same decree, let this
decree of adoption be recorded in the corresponding
government agency, particularly the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte where the minor was born.
The said office of the Local Civil Registrar is hereby
directed to issue an amended certificate of live birth to the
minor adopted by the petitioners.
Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the
petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of the
Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Merida, Leyte.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for
relief, contending:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND EVELYN CLOUSE,
BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW.
We rule for petitioner.
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents
spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly
enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.:
(3) An alien, except:
305
 (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate
child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing
exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoption as may be provided by law.
There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not
qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional
cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America.
In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent
Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1988.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to
qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a
former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother.
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor
alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by
the husband and wife. It reads:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except
in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition
that must be read along together with Article 184.3
The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603
(The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that husband and wife
"may" jointly adopt.4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17,
1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband
and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an alien.5 It was so crafted
to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code
reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly
adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint
adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.6 This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal
situation.7 As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.8
In a distinctly similar case, we held:
As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree
No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses
to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law
was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty.
Article 185 thereof expresses the necessity for a joint
adoption by the spouses except in only two instances —
(1) When one spouse seeks
to adopt his own
illegitimate child; or
306
 (2) When one spouse seeks
to adopt the legitimate
child of the other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code,
on the parental authority, can aptly find governance.
Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one
spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, jointly
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in
accordance with this Code.9
Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its
interpretation. There is only room for application.10
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that
objective.11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the
welfare of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and
happy life.12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the
child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases.13 Executive
Order 209 likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be
adopted should be the paramount consideration. These considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would
justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by
private respondents who are aliens.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated on February 20, 1990 1 which affirmed in toto the decision
of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City 2 granting the
petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat,
petitioner seeks the reversal thereof in the present petition for review
on certiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt
Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her
family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court
of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386. 3
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing
307
on March 28, 1988. 4 The order was duly published, with copies thereof
seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social
worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the
bulletin board of the court and in the other places it had required for that
purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. 5
Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at
the hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with
that of her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted
in the proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor
child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations
of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural
parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the
spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of
the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of
the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Regional
Office, Region V, Legaspi City, and the Local Civil Registrar
of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision. 6
Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier
stated, affirmed the aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this
present petition with the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the
petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and
2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt
Jason Condat in favor of spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and
Zenaida C. Bobiles. 7
The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C.
Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential
Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a
petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of
them. However, after the trial court rendered its decision and while the
case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No.
209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new
law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for
adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the
Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that
the Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat
by the mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-
inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect,
hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be
taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must
be aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or
a special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this objection has been
raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we
shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated
assignment of errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of
appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that
such retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. 9 The term expresses
the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately
308
just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny. 10 Vested rights
include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand,
but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has
vested. 11
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right
to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband
therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her
explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof,
her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already
vested and cannot be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new
law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No.
1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with
the governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.12 We do
not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an
exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local
and foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise
that Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural
statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense
that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to
future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat
procedural steps completed before their enactment. 13
Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and
procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending
proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment
although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only
procedural steps taken after their enactment. 14
The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect
pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes
them from its operation, is not so extensive that it may be used to validate
or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure
must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises.15
The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of
a case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A
petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law
which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition
for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the
law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction
and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. 16 To repeat, the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether
in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 17
On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family
Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have
modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of
private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a
petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly,
reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the
petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to
the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof,
shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The
pertinent parts of his written consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I
mutually desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON
CONDAT, still a minor being six (6) years old, likewise
residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also
in the Philippines;
309
 3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for
Adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations court, now the Regional
Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am
giving my lawful consent to this adoption of said minor
child, JASON CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES,
and I have continuously reared and cared for this minor
child, JASON CONDAT since birth;
6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a
kind of maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very
own, exercising therein the care, concern and diligence of
a good father toward him;
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF
CONSENT for whatever it is worth in the premises as to
the matter of adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT,
by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me,
DIOSCORO C. BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis
supplied.) 18
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony
in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he
must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his
part sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the
text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the
formal requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must
not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to
procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not
apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled
rule therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure
leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted
child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the
adoption. 19 The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that there need
not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements
to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in
such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its
intention and beneficial results or to invalidate proceedings where every
material requirement of the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring
the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight
defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for
declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to
approach the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found
that there was a substantial compliance with the statute. 20 The technical
rules of pleading should not be stringently applied to adoption
proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should
contain facts relating to the child and its parents, which may give
information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as
a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will confer
jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging
all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction. 21
In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the
interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount
consideration. 22 The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in
proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by
another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is
charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring
those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish
that end. 23 Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound
discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance
with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the
parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of
310
grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will
not be disturbed. 24
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree
of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with
the consent of his natural parents. 25 The representative of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly
recommended the approval of the petition for adoption 26 and the trial
court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons,
especially since the child had been living with the adopting parents since
infancy. 27 Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent
of the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the
petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found
and aptly stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances
of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine, 28 We are
of the opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a
quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and
the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life." 29
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed
to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in
the person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons
to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote
and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 30
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA
SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by
her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their
capacity to inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The
petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the
exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and
Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died
on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981.
Their properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and
Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together
with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
311
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court
of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson,
who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents'
lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint,
this time for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay,
Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil
Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children
and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such,
they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right
of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the
basis of practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of
Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated
March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by
her birth certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three
children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed
Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs
of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence,
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were
consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the
respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541),
the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case
No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is
MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo Sayson are
disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the
deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is
affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari.
Reversal of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it
disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent
law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the
exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not
legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27,
1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth
of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision
is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt
"(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one
Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that
she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The
petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the
ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the
time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that
Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to
challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and
executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners
were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal
the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified
Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In
fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
312
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal
knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about
TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order of
Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court
about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew
the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a
petition for the revocation or rescission of the adoption
(although the birth of a child is not one of those provided
by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption).
The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of
the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid,
outstanding and binding to the present, the same not
having been revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for
adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not
disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in
their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing
the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or
not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a
presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the
judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional
facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350,
pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of
the necessary facts and the burden of
proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot
be considered void merely because the fact
needed to show statutory compliance is
obscure. While a judicial determination of
some particular fact, such as the
abandonment of his next of kin to the
adoption, may be essential to the exercise
of jurisdiction to enter the order of
adoption, this does not make it essential to
the jurisdictional validity of the decree
that the fact be determined upon proper
evidence, or necessarily in accordance
with the truth; a mere error cannot affect
the jurisdiction, and the determination
must stand until reversed on appeal, and
hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If
this were not the rule, the status of
adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be
the same at all investigations, and might be
regarded with different effect by different
tribunals, and the adoption might be held
by one court to have been valid, while
another court would hold it to have been
of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the
trial courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained.
Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the
prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the
birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be
refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the
case at bar.
313
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita
Abila was understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested
party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition
for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that
it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it,
however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court
of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety
of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot
be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does
not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more
fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the
child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be
attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by
law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the
intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following
Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without
distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come
from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting
parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends
first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that
one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to
his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their
continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law,
by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place
and the degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were living or
if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by
the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented
but the one who the person represented would have
succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants
of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall
inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus
the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent
her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her
grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share
her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be
equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and
Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true
314
that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have
the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only
the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the
blood relatives of either party. 14 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the Manila
adopted children and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no SECOND DIVISION
obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The
Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996
the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents'
intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ,
children of the deceased Teodoro. Executor, petitioner,
vs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners. PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE
RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the
decision dated November 10, 1994 and the resolution dated January 5,
1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.

The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a
holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his
three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator
bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and
named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.2

On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash
component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private

315
respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unbeknown
reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the
probate of his father's holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario
Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz,3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the
will was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and
lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator
bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline4 —
was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with
the Branch Clerk of Court the rental deposit and payments totalling
P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property.
In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of
P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent after deducting
P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the
real estate taxes on the real properties of the estate. The probate court
approved the release of P7,722.00.6
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the
will. Consequently, the probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will
to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The
letters testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond
Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed
for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of
Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a
"Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance
of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release
of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically
the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance
with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for
release of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of
petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent
payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the
three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of
P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his
opposition to respondent Montes's motion for release of rent payments
which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise
reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he
was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact that
the lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed for
another year.7
Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22,
1993, ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount
as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to
collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court,
however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes
and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date
of first publication of the notice to creditors.8 The court stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the
parties the court resolves to allow Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz
to take possession of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk
of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only such amount as may
be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and
316
 allowances for support of Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are subject to collation and
deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and
insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar
Ruiz-Montes and the above-named heirs, the same is hereby
reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6)
months from the date of first publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered
to submit an accounting of the expenses necessary for
administration including provisions for the support Of Maria
Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and Maria Angeli
Ruiz before the amount required can be withdrawn and cause the
publication of the notice to creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent judge, the appellate
court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court's order in a
decision dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution dated January 5,
1995.11
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER
OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH
156, DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE
COURSE AND IS EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE
EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE
HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT,
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE,
TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND (3)
PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN
DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS
AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the
will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and obligations,
has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate
for the support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of
the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of
the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the
settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor
or incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances
for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that
the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance
because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal
age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly
states "children" of the deceased which excludes the latter's
grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should
not be limited to the "minor or incapacitated" children of the deceased.
Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in
force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse
and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment,
are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.14 The law
is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right
to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.15
317
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support
from the funds of the decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the
allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.16 It
was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's
order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles
of the bequeathed properties to private respondents six months after the
date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to
properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate
which is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. —
Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its
discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just,
permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the
controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees,
upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these
Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration the
allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to
the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign
the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming
them and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and
such persons may demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other person having
the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs.18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate
properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges,
expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments to the private
respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication
of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to
creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left
no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been
paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that
must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to
meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of
the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release
of the titles six months after admitting the will to probate. The probate of
a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity21 and
settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions
of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the
will has been authenticated.23
318
The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by
petitioner before the probate court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to
his motion for release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of the
August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's
will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime
as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a
controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their
distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear
and decide the same as in ordinary cases.26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order
deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal
properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the
possession and management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court
explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay
debts, and to administer estate not willed. — An executor or
administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the
clerk of court, he had been previously granted by the probate court certain
amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the
estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved
again for the release of additional funds for the same reasons he
previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to
submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before
releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited
with it only a portion of the one-year rental income from the Valle Verde
property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of
the lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the
properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not
been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of his
father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he
is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his
parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an
inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which
are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety
and justness.32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed
with the modification that those portions of the order granting an
allowance to the testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the
titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and
set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings
below.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
319
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

OF MINOR ANGELIE ANNE C. CERVANTES, NELSON L. CERVANTES
and ZENAIDA CARREON CERVANTES, petitioners,
vs.
GINA CARREON FAJARDO and CONRADO FAJARDO, respondents.

Yolanda F. Lim for petitioners.

Voltaire C. Campomanes for respondents.

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court over the
person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. In a resolution, dated 5
October 1987, the Court resolved to issue the writ returnable to the
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig at the hearing of 12 October
1987 at 8:30 a.m. Said Judge was directed to hear the case and submit his
report and recommendation to the Court.

On 3 December 1987, said Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig

submitted to the Court his report and recommendation, also dated 3
December 1987.

320
It appears that the minor was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents
Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and
wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister
and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes
and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of the child
when she was barely two (2) weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the
adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by
respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987. 1
The appropriate petition for adoption (Sp. Proc. No. 057-B) was filed by
herein petitioners over the child before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Fourth Judicial District, Branch 67 which, on 20 August 1987, rendered a
decision 2 granting the petition. The child was then known as Angelie
Anne Fajardo. The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental
authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and
maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents
and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of herein
petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate ." 3
Sometime in March or April 1987, the adoptive parents, herein petitioners
Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would
get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede to the demand.
As a result, on 11 September 1987, while petitioners were out at work, the
respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioners'
residence in Angono, Rizal, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so
by her mother. Respondent Gina Carreon brought the child to her house
in Parañaque. Petitioners thereupon demanded the return of the child, but
Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child
for adoption and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had
executed was not fully explained to her. She sent word to the petitioners
that she will, however, return the child to the petitioners if she were paid
the amount of P150,000.00.
Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on
the adoption and submitted a report thereon to the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal in the adoption case, testified on 27 October 1987 before the
Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig in connection with the
present petition. She declared that she had interviewed respondent Gina
Carreon on 24 June 1987 in connection with the contemplated adoption
of the child. During the interview, said respondent manifested to the social
worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners. 4
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother
shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply
where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. 5 In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost
consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from
this criterion. 6
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a
woman other than respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the
latter is a common-law husband and wife relationship. His open
cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor
that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an
upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had
previously given birth to another child by another married man with
whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and
vanished. For a minor (like Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a
sister whose "father" is not her true father, could also affect the moral
outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who
are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and
socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a future better
than what the natural mother (herein respondent Gina Carreon), who is
not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man,
can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents
over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of
the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over
the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. 7 The adopting
321
parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child 8 and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.9

ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge, Regional

Trial Court of Pasig, Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is GRANTED. The Republic of the Philippines
custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted SUPREME COURT
to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and respondents are Manila
ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners
immediately upon notice hereof This resolution is immediately executory. THIRD DIVISION

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
concur. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.

MELO, J.:

This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship which

went sour. The innocent victims are two children horn out of the same
union. Upon this Court now falls the not too welcome task of deciding the
issue of who, between the father and mother, is more suitable and better
qualified in helping the children to grow into responsible, well-adjusted,
and happy young adulthood.

Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first

met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the
National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local
hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a
nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In 1984,
Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita
then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife.
On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. On
October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines,
Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United
States, their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald
Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.

322
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate
sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he
was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other
hand, contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive
jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by
Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to
California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long
distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-
petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because
Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid
of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was
actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. (Per Judge Harriet O.
Demetriou, Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-222, Rollo). Teresita,
meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992
and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two
petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole
proceedings now reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus.
It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald
and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with
rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by
the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with
Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial court's
decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to
Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main
contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of
the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in speculations
and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous conclusion that custody of the
children should be given to respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over
the children through an automatic and blind application of the
age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education
and property of the children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child
under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of the Code Commission
which drafted Article 213 that a child below seven years still needs the
loving, tender care that only a mother can give and which, presumably, a
father cannot give in equal measure. The commentaries of a member of
the Code Commission, former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy,
in a textbook on the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy
believes that a child below seven years should still be awarded to her
mother even if the latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her husband.
This is on the theory that moral dereliction has no effect on a baby unable
to understand such action. (Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of
law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should
apply to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody
shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple
determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over
323
seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's
interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure
the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that
consideration. In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we laid
down the rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody of minors,
the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and
moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents", and
in Medina vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502 [1969]), where custody of the minor
was given to a non-relative as against the mother, then the country's
leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the
custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic
principle that "in all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children, the latter's welfare
shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines. Art.
363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under
seven may be ordered separated from the mother (do).
This is as it should be, for in the continual evolution of
legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life and
death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was
virtually a chattel of his parents into a radically different
institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and
doctrines. The obligational aspect is now supreme. As
pointed out by Puig Pena, now "there is no power, but a
task; no complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties;
no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor."
As a result, the right of parents to the company and
custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper
discharge of parental duties to provide the children with
adequate support, education, moral, intellectual and civic
training and development (Civil Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes
that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is
not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is
over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by
that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit
and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems
fit under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years
of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while
Reginald reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Both are studying in
reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent children, quite
capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would
want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the
court to investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental
authority and custodial responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the
records to discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying
whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed
statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable to ordinary
or common situations. The seven-year age limit was mechanically treated
as an arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong
presumption.
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at least,
her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a
mother separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a
result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than the
feelings and future, the best interests and welfare of her children. While
the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature,
either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain
if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater
than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and
other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the
paramount consideration.
324
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional
trial court because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and
considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of
custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child
psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting
her from the Assumption College where she was studying. Four different
tests were administered. The results of the tests are quite revealing. The
responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing the
psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things
revealed by Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging
and kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and worked for her
father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the telephone. She
tended to be emotionally emblazed because of constant fears that she may
have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United States
to live with her mother. The 5-1/2 page report deals at length with
feelings of insecurity and anxiety arising from strong conflict with the
mother. The child tried to compensate by having fantasy activities. All of
the 8 recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind
chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that her welfare will
be best served by staying with them (pp. 199-205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the
purpose of securing the travel clearance required before minors may go
abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the
child Rosalind refused to go back to the United States and be reunited with
her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached
to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The child was found
suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The
application for travel clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206-
209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age reference in
the law applies to the date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
filed, not to the date when a decision is rendered. This argument is flawed.
Considerations involving the choice made by a child must be ascertained
at the time that either parent is given custody over the child. The matter
of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given
custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter
of custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v.
Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the
benefit, and the good of the child must be determined as of the time that
either parent is chosen to be the custodian. At the present time, both
children are over 7 years of age and are thus perfectly capable of making
a fairly intelligent choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful
reunion in the trial court, with the children crying, grabbing, and
embracing her to prevent the father from taking them away from her. We
are more inclined to believe the father's contention that the children
ignored Teresita in court because such an emotional display as described
by Teresita in her pleadings could not have been missed by the trial court.
Unlike the Justices of the Court of Appeals Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P.
Bersamin personally observed the children and their mother in the
courtroom. What the Judge found is diametrically opposed to the
contentions of respondent Teresita. The Judge had this to say on the
matter.
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner [Teresita]
in similar light, or with more understanding, especially as
her conduct and demeanor in the courtroom (during most
of the proceedings) or elsewhere (but in the presence of
the undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her
ebulent temper that tended to corroborate the alleged
violence of her physical punishment of the children (even
if only for ordinary disciplinary purposes) and emotional
instability, typified by her failure (or refusal?) to show
deference and respect to the Court and the other parties
(pp. 12-13, RTC Decision)
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and impartiality of
the expert witnesses. Respondent court, in turn, states that the trial court
should have considered the fact that Reynaldo and his sister, herein
petitioner Guillerma Layug, hired the two expert witnesses. Actually, this
was taken into account by the trial court which stated that the allegations
of bias and unfairness made by Teresita against the psychologist and
social worker were not substantiated.
325
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and competence of
the expert witnesses and the objectivity of the interviews were unshaken
and unimpeached. We might add that their testimony remain
uncontroverted. We also note that the examinations made by the experts
were conducted in late 1991, well over a year before the filing by Teresita
of the habeas corpus petition in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations
were at that time not intended to support petitioners' position in
litigation, because there was then not even an impending possibility of
one. That they were subsequently utilized in the case a quo when it did
materialize does not change the tenor in which they were first obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must be
construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor of any of
the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of the issue before
it. The persons who effected such examinations were presented in the
capacity of expert witnesses testifying on matters within their respective
knowledge and expertise. On this matter, this Court had occasion to rule
in the case of Sali vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI expert
examines certain contested documents, at the request, not
of a public officer or agency of the Government, but of a
private litigant, does not necessarily nullify the
examination thus made. Its purpose, presumably, to assist
the court having jurisdiction over said litigation, in the
performance of its duty to settle correctly the issues
relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private
individual may examine the same, if there are facts within
his knowledge which may help, the court in the
determination of said issue. Such examination, which may
properly be undertaken by a non-expert private
individual, does not, certainly become null and void when
the examiner is an expert and/or an officer of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon, et
al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352 [1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert
testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose
upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the
case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert
testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial
court to decide, considering the ability and character of
the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight
and process of the reasoning by which he has supported
his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom
he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative
opportunities for study and observation of the matters
about which he testifies, and any other matters which
reserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the
expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances in the case and when common knowledge
utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling
effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the
credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his
testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose
ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the opportunity to
assess the witnesses' character and to observe their respective demeanor
that the trial court opted to rely on their testimony, and we believe that
the trial court was correct in its action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez
stated that Rosalind and her aunt were about to board a plane when they
were off-loaded because there was no required clearance. They were
referred to her office, at which time Reginald was also brought along and
interviewed. One of the regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job
appears to be the interview of minors who leave for abroad with their
parents or other persons. The interview was for purposes of foreign travel
by a 5-year old child and had nothing to do with any pending litigation. On
cross-examination, Social Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of the
326
minor's hatred for her mother was based on the disclosures of the minor.
It is inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez would
compromise her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a person
of her position in the course of doing her job by falsely testifying just to
support the position of any litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude graduate in
Psychology and an M.A. degree holder also in Psychology with her thesis
graded "Excellent". She was a candidate for a doctoral degree at the time
of the interview. Petitioner Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the
interview but Ms. Macabulos services were secured because Assumption
College wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not
because of any litigation. She may have been paid to examine the child and
to render a finding based on her examination, but she was not paid to
fabricate such findings in favor of the party who retained her services. In
this instance it was not even petitioner Reynaldo but the school
authorities who initiated the same. It cannot be presumed that a
professional of her potential and stature would compromise her
professional standing.
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying
Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting marriage with
another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love
affair with one of the Reynaldo's fellow NSC employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with
necessities and conveniences commensurate to their
social standing because she does not even own any home
in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.
It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the compelling
reasons under the law which would justify depriving her of custody over
the children; worse, she claims, these findings are non-existent and have
not been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of a child
under 7 years of age not to be separated from the mother, without
considering what the law itself denominates as compelling reasons or
relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In the Unson III case, earlier
mentioned, this Court stated that it found no difficulty in not awarding
custody to the mother, it being in the best interest of the child "to be freed
from the obviously unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had
placed herself . . . might create in the moral and social outlook of [the child]
who was in her formative and most impressionable stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over
7 years of age. They understand the difference between right and wrong,
ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests would be
better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and
a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to
show that Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family
Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of
attention and care which the mother is not in a position to extend.
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not
supported by the records. The findings of the trial court are based on
evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado
on December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's Memorandum;
p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a year later, she had already
driven across the continental United States to commence living with
another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh. The two were married
on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this
matter of her having contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo,
Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told
Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was
raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC
lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were given credence, it
adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this Court about
327
Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against privacy. Confiding to
one's potential rapist about a prior marriage is not a very convincing
indication that the potential victim is averse to the act. The implication
created is that the act would be acceptable if not for the prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only
much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who
had driven three days and three nights from California, who went straight
to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed and,
who immediately thereafter started to live with him in a relationship
which is marital in nature if not in fact.
Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the various
witnesses that while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit
relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of
petitioner Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio had been
assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in the project in
Pittsburgh and was staying with Reynaldo, his co-employee, in the latter's
house. The record shows that the daughter Rosalind suffered emotional
disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging
and kissing a boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was
Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children, bound for California.
When Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines, Teresita
followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel, staying in one
room and taking breakfast together. More significant is that letters and
written messages from Teresita to Perdencio were submitted in evidence
(p.12, RTC Decision).
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to
another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious
nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over seven years old
and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of
the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind.
This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from
the records appears to have become final (pp. 210-222, Rollo).
Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the
role of a sole parent and substitute mother because his job is in the United
States while the children will be left behind with their aunt in the
Philippines is misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or
was a temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel
mill component and various equipment needed by the National Steel
Corporation in the Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there
is nothing to keep him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30,
1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion of his assignment
abroad and of his permanent return to the Philippines (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The
children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent
with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements
found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The
presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies
as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption
should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond
the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling
reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother.
The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother
and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in
Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its
Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and
Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No
special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Romero, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
328
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34079 November 2, 1982

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner

vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch III, and FELICISIMA
VELARDE, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Perfecto O. Palma for respondent Velarde.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside the
Decree dated May 4, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
in Special Proceeding No. 1115 entitled "Felicisima Velarde vs. The Civil
Registrar of Naga City and Lee Tieng" and the Order dated August 26,
1971 of the same Court. Said decree ordered certain corrections to be
made in the registry of births of Ruben Lee, Rolando Lee and Romeo Lee,
minor children of petitioner, now respondent Felicisima Velarde,
affecting, among other things, their legitimacy, filiation and citizenship, as
well as the civil status of Velarde and the name of the father of the minors.
The aforementioned order, on the other hand, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines.

Hereinbelow is the statement of the case in the Solicitor General's brief

which sufficiently summarizes the proceedings in the lower court: 1

On March 12, 1970, Felicisima Velarde filed with the Court

of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Special Proceedings No.
1115 for correction of certain entries in the birth

329
certificates of her minor children Ruben, Cynthia,
Reyneldo, Roger, Rolando and Romeo, all surnamed Lee in
the Civil Registry of births for Naga City.
The petition alleged that petitioner Felicisima Velarde and
Lee Tieng, one of the respondents therein, had been
having together as common-law spouses and without
benefit of marriage since June, 1952 up to the filing of the
petition; that as a result of such cohabitation, petitioner
gave birth to the aforementioned minor children, which
facts of birth were duly recorded in the Office of the Civil
Registrar for the City of Naga; that the children's father
Lee Tieng is familiarly called "Uping", his Christian name
is "Alipio," and his mother's family name is "Wee", and
because of these different names of Lee Tieng, his name
was differently recorded in the birth certificates of
petitioner's children; that when petitioner's oldest child
Ruben Lee was born, petitioner told the attending nurse
that she and Lee Tieng were married, without knowing
that the information was to be used to fill up her child's
birth certificate, with the result that in the birth certificate
of said child, her civil status was indicated as "married",
and the child was indicated as 'legitimate" and a "Chinese"
citizen; that in the certificates of birth of petitioner's other
children Cynthia, Reynaldo, Roger, Rolando and Romeo,
petitioner was likewise` recorded as "married" instead of
"single", in order to conform to the previous entries made
in the birth certificate of her oldest child Ruben Lee, and
all said children were likewise recorded as "legitimate"
and "Chinese" citizens; that petitioner was likewise
erroneously indicated as "Chinese" instead of "Filipina" in
the birth certificates of her two sons Roger Lee and Romeo
Lee, while her maternal surname was erroneously spelled
"Olbila" and "Orbita"in the birth certificates of her two
sons Roger Lee and Rolando Lee, respectively, when it
should have been "Orbita"; that there was need to correct
the erroneous entries in the birth certificates of
petitioner's children to make them conform with the facts
and to avoid difficulties in the school records of said
children (and) when they start to exercise their duties as
citizens of the Philippines; and that there were no other
persons who had or claimed any interest in the subject
matter of said petition for correction of entries in the Civil
Registry.
Petitioner Velarde, therefore, prayed that the trial court
order the following corrections to be made in the records
of the Civil Registry of Naga City.
(1) RUBEN LEE, Register No. 600, series of 1953—Change
his nationality from "Chinese" to "Filipino";
Change the answer to the question on whether he is a
legitimate son, from "Yes" to "No',;
Change the name of his father from "Lee Uping" to "Lee
Tieng";
Change the civil status of mother from "married" to
single";
(2) CYNTHIA LEE, Register No. 1777, series of 1954 —
Change her nationality from "Chinese" to "Filipino";
Change the answer to the question on whether she is a
legitimate daughter, from "Yes" to "No";
Change the first name of the father from "Lee Uping " to
"Lee Tieng"
Change the civil status of the mother from "married" to
"single";
(3) REYNALDO LEE, Register No. 282, series of 1958—
Change the answer to the question on whether he is a
legitimate son, from "Yes" to "No";
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Change the "First" name of the father from "Ting" to
"Tieng";
Change "June 8, 1952, Naga City" in the space for the date
and place of marriage of parents, to "Not applicable";
(4) ROGER LEE, Register No. 1952, series of 1959—
Change the answer to the question on whether he is a
legitimate son, from "Yes" to "No";
Change the "First" name of the father from "Ting" to
"Tieng" ;
Change the "Middle" name of the mother from "Olbila" to
"Olbita";
Change the nationality of the mother from "Chinese" to
"Filipino";
Change "June 27, 1953, Naga City", in the space for date
and place of marriage of parents to "Not applicable";
(5) ROLANDO LEE, Register No. 531, series of 1961—
Change the answer to the question on whether he is a
legitimate son, from "Yes" to "No";
Change the "First" name of the father from "Alipio to
"Tieng" ;
Change the "Middle" name of the mother from "Orbita" to
"Olbita";
Change "June 22,1953, Naga City, Cam. Sur" in the space
for the date and place of marriage of parents to "Not
applicable".
(6) ROMEO LEE, Register No. 1269, series of 1964—
Change the answer to the question of whether he is a
legitimate son from "Yes" to "No";
Change the nationality of the mother from "Chinese" to
"Filipina" ;
Change "June 22, 1953, Naga City, Cam. Sur" in the space
for date and place of marriage of parents to "Not
applicable.
(Annex " A " of Petition for Review on certiorari)
On April 13, 1970, the lower court issued an Order finding
the petitioner to be sufficient in form and substance, and
requiring the publication of the notice thereof (Annex " B
", Id.).
On May 15, 1970, the Republic of the Philippines filed its
opposition to the petition, alleging that the changes in the
civil registry sought therein are not merely clerical,
innocuous or visible to the eye, but vital and substantial,
and for this reason, they cannot be made in a summary and
non-adversary proceeding under Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, but must be threshed out in the
appropriate proceedings wherein the parties who may be
affected by the entries in question are notified or
represented. Petitioner cited pertinent decisions of this
Honorable Court to support its opposition (Annex "C", Id.).
In a letter dated May 14, 1970, undersigned counsel for
the oppositor Republic of the Philippines requested the
City Fiscal of Naga City to "represent this Office at the
hearing" of the said petition (Annex "D", Id.).
On May 27, 1970, Felicisima Velarde filed her reply to the
Republic's Opposition, contending that the petition filed
by her under Rue 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is an
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adversary proceedings for the corrections in the civil
registry sought in her petition (Annex "E", Id,),
After hearing, the lower court issued a Decree dated May
4, 1971, directing the correction of the entries in the Civil
Registry of Birth for Naga City "in accordance with the
prayer embodied in the petition. " A copy of said decree
was received on May 14, 197 1, by the City Fiscal of Naga
City who in turn endorsed the same to undersigned
counsel, and said copy of Decree was received by
undersigned counsel only on May 31, 1971 under a lst
indorsement from the City Fiscal of Naga dated May
25,1971 (Annex "F", Id.).
In said decree, the respondent Court considered the
alleged errors in the birth certificates of the children of
petitioner (now respondent) Felicisima Velarde with
respect to her middle name as well as the name of the
children's supposed father Lee Tieng as not substantial
and which may be granted summarily under Article 412 of
the Civil Code. With respect to the alleged errors in the
same birth certificates pertaining to Velarde's status
(from "married" to "single"), her children's filiation (from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate"), and her nationality (from
"Chinese" to "Filipino"), the lower court admitted them to
be substantial errors, but it nevertheless ordered their
correction because in its opinion, to deny said correction
might deprive the minors "of possessing their true and
correct status before Philippine society" and because the
petitioner had no "sinister desire" nor "motive ulterior" in
seeking the correction of the said alleged errors (Annex "G
", Id.).
On June 21, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decree,
alleging (1) that according to settled jurisprudence, only
harmless or innocuous errors, or those visible to the eyes
or obvious to the understanding, may be corrected under
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, for which reason
the corrections ordered by the lower court to be made in t
the Civil Registry (except that with respect to the error in
the name of petitioner, which is merely clerical), cannot be
allowed in the present proceedings, said errors "not being
harmless or innocuous but vital and substantial, affecting
as they do the status and citizenship of the persons
involved"; and (2) "that assuring that the errors in
question were committed in good faith, and that petitioner
is equally in good faith in filing this petition under Rule
108 for the correction thereof, said errors cannot be
corrected in this summary non-controversial proceeding
but can be threshed out only in the appropriate adversary
action wherein all affected parties are notified and
represented. Decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court
were cited by oppositor Republic to support the foregoing
propositions (Annex "H", Id.).
On July 29, 1971, herein oppositor Republic filed an
"Addendum to Motion for Reconsideration", informing the
lower court that in a recently promulgated consolidated
decision of this Honorable Supreme Court (Benito Go vs.
Civil Registrar of Malabon, L-29544; Jose Go, Jr. vs. Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, L-29637; Demetria Deiparine vs.
Republic, L-30227; Felicidad Castaneda vs. Republic, L-
30228; Local Civil Registrar of Manila vs. Hon. Luis B.
Reyes, et al., L-30991; and Republic vs. Pilar Capalla, L-
31075, May 31, 1971), this honorable Court again
reaffirmed its consistent ruling "that only clerical errors of
a harmless or innocuous nature; not those involving civil
status, nationality or citizenship, which are substantial
and/or controversial", may be corrected under the
provisions of said Art. 412 of the Civil Code in relation to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court" (Annex "l", Id.).
On August 26, 1971, respondent Court issued an Order
denying the Republic's motion for reconsideration "for
lack of merit" and for having been filed out of time, copy of
which Order was received by petitioner on August 31,
1971 (Annex "J", Id.).
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 From the aforementioned decree dated May 4, 197 1, and
order dated August 26, 197 1, the oppositor Republic of
the Philippines appealed this Honorable Court by a
petition for review on certiorari.
The assignments of errors are listed as follows:
I. he lower court erred in ordering corrections in the Civil Registry of Naga
City Affecting the civil status, filiation and citizenship of the persons
involved under (the) Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court. 2
II. The lower court erred in considering the supposed good faith of
respondent Felicisima Velarde in filing the petition in Special Proceedings
No. 1115 as a justifiable reason for correction of vital and substantial
errors in the Civil Registry under Rule 108. 3
III. The lower court erred in holding that the alleged errors in the name of
the father of respondent Velarde's children in their birth certificates are
merely clerical or typographical which are correctible under Article 412
of the Civil Code and/or Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 4
IV. The lower court erred in ignoring precedents laid down by this
Honorable Court which preclude corrections of substantial matters in the
Civil Registry under Rule 108. 5
V. The lower court erred in holding that the motion of petitioner Republic
of the Philippines for Reconsideration of the Decree in Special
Proceedings No.1115 was filed out of time, 6
Felicisima Velarde added in her counter-statement of the case that after
the respondent Court issued on August 26, 1971 an order denying the
Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, an election case was filed on
September 23, 1971 in a separate branch (Branch 11) of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, namely: Election Case No. 1, entitled "Andres
Regalado vs. Felicisima Velarde" contesting her right to vote. She alleged
that after notifying all interested parties (including the City Fiscal and the
Civil Registrar of the City of Naga, a member of the Board of Election
Inspectors of Precinct No. 76 of Naga City, the children of Felicisima
Velarde and Lee Tieng, and Bartolome Velarde) the aforementioned
Election Case No. 1 was tried on October 20 and 22, 1971. Thereafter, a
decision thereon was rendered on October 23, 1971 finding that she and
Lee Tieng are not married:
Both the testimony of Felicisima Velarde and Lee Tieng in
Special Proceedings No. 1115 of this Court (Exh. "11-a")
and Bartolome Velarde, father of respondent, convinced
this Court that Felicisima Velarde and Lee Tieng are not
married; that they are having as common-law husband
and wife, and nothing more. This being so, Felicisima
Velarde remains a Filipino citizen, she being the natural
born citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, and
therefore, is entitled to be registered as voter and to vote. 7
Accordingly, she added a sixth issue to be resolved in this petition for
review, to wit:
Whether or not the proceedings in Election Case No. I has
met the suggested requirement for an adversary
proceeding to resolve the questions of civil status,
marriage and citizenship and can thus be the basis for
upholding the correction of substantial errors in the Civil
Registry of Naga City. 8
In line with the numerous decisions of this Court on the matter of
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry, We must reverse
the judgment under review except insofar as it allowed (a) the change of
the middle name of the mother from "Olbila" to "Olbita" in the birth
certificate of Roger Lee and (b) the change also of the middle name of the
mother from "Orbita" to "Olbita" in the birth certificate of Rolando Lee.
The law on the matter of said cancellation or correction is Article 412 of
the New Civil Code which provides: "No entry in the civil registry shall be
changed or corrected, without a judicial order." This legal provision has
been invariably interpreted since 1954 in the case of Ty Kong Tin vs.
Republic 9 as an authority for the Court to direct the correction of mistakes
that are clerical in nature, i.e. those harmless and innocuous changes, such
as, correction of a name that is clearly misspelled, occupation of the
parents, etc. 10 or those that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the
333
understanding or "an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing." 11 It does not extend to important controversial
matters, such a those which affect the civil status or the nationality or
citizenship of the persons involved.
On the other hand, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
procedural law on the matter and as such is limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412. Said the Supreme Court in Chua Wee vs.
Republic, 38 SCRA 409, speaking thru Justice Makasiar:
From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30,
1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court
on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court
prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization
to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations
in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil
Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides
for such procedure which should be limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the
matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108,
like all other provisions of the Rules of Court, was
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-
making authority under Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such rules of court "shall
not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights." If
Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which are
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby
become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or
modifying substantive rights, which changes are not
authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.
The doctrine enunciated in Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, supra, was reiterated
in at least 12 cases, starting from Ansaldo vs. Republic and ending with Tan
vs. Republic. One of the latest cases, a 1977 decision, Republic vs.
Castaneda, Jr., reaffirmed the Ty Kong Tin ruling, citing 8 other decisions
starting from Dy Oliva vs. Republic and ending with Republic vs. Amores.
(See Celestial vs. Republic, 102 SCRA 666, 668, Fernando, C.J., ponente).
In Republic vs. Caparosso, 107 SCRA 67, 71, the long line of cases
upholding the doctrine set forth in the Ty Kong Tin decision is listed
therein, which was promulgated August 31, 1981. And the latest is the
case of Mariano Wong, et al., vs. Republic, G. R. No. 29376, July 30, 1982,
where, notwithstanding the dissenting opinion of Justice Pacifico P. De
Castro and the separate concurring opinion in the result of Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, the majority steadfastly adhered to the prevailing rule.
Moreover, We have held in Reyes vs. Republic, 12 SCRA 376, Chua Wee vs.
Republic, supra and Republic vs. CFI of Davao, 92 SCRA 632 that Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court may not be relied upon to effect changes in
citizenship not only because it merely prescribes the judicial procedure
on the matter but also because it limits the entries subject to cancellation
or correction to those enumerated in Section 2 of Rule 108. The changes
in citizenship are limited only to election, loss or recovery thereof, as
shown below:
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.—
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the
civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgment
or annulments of -marriage; (o judgment declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
(1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
change of name.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the good faith or bad faith of the
respondents in filing their petition for correction of entries in the Civil
Registry or the prejudicial results that the denial of their petitions would
cause them, have never been considered by this Court as material and
pertinent in allowing the corrections sought. As correctly contended by
the Solicitor General, the issue in previous cases before this Court as is the
issue in the present case, is one of the proper remedy or procedure for the
334
correction of the entries in the civil registry sought by respondent
Velarde, and on this issue, trial courts and the parties are bound by and
must comply with the rulings repeatedly reiterated and decided by this
Court.
We, therefore, find and rule that the respondent court erred as pointed
out by the Solicitor General under the first and second assignments of
error.
As to the third assignment of error, We hold that the alleged errors in the
name of the father of respondent Velarde's children in their birth
certificates are not clerical or typographical. The names "Lee Uping,"
"Alipio Lee" and "Ting Wee Lee" are substantially different from the
supposed true name of the father "Lee Tieng" and can easily refer to
different persons.
We also rule that the lower Court erred in holding that the motion for
reconsideration of the Republic of the Philippines was filed out of time.
Respondent Judge evidently counted the thirty-day period of the Republic
within which to file a motion for reconsideration or to perfect its appeal
from the date the City Fiscal of Naga received a copy of the decree on May
14, 1971. The Republic's thirty-day period should, however, be counted
from May 31, 1971 when a copy of said decree was received by the Office
of the Solicitor General thru a referral by the City Fiscal of Naga City. The
filing of the Republic of its motion for reconsideration on June 21, 1971
was, therefore, well within the reglementary period which expired only
on June 30, 1971.
It is true that the letter of the Solicitor General dated May 14, 1970
requested the City Fiscal to represent said office and that it specifically
instructed him that "if the petition is granted inspite of our opposition,
please do not fail to appeal therefrom within the reglementary period."
But said letter request did not thereby constitute the City Fiscal as the
counsel of record nor even as an alternate counsel of the Republic. In fact,
the precise request in said letter was for the City Fiscal to represent the
Office of the Solicitor General not the Republic, which clearly implied that
the Solicitor General remains the counsel of record who is duly authorized
to receive notices on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
The foregoing is in accordance with the pronouncement of this Court
in Republic vs. Chiu, 12 SCRA 352, and Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, 17 SCRA
535, to wit:
... , notwithstanding the delegation to the City Attorney of
the duty to appear at and attend the hearing in this case,
the Solicitor General remained the counsel of record for
the opposition. This is not a case where a party litigant is
represented by two 'lawyers, notice to one of whom is
notice to the client. Here, the City Attorney did not appear
as counsel for the Republic, but merely as representative
of the Solicitor General who, as stated, remained the
counsel of record for the Republic.
Anent the sixth issue additionally raised by appellee on whether Election
Case No. 1, a case contesting her right to vote, has met the suggested
requirement for an adversary proceeding, We rule in the negative because
the Republic of the Philippines was not notified of Election Case No. 1. It
may be true that the City Fiscal and the City Registrar of Naga City had
been notified of this case but it cannot be said that notice to either or both
officials is notice to the Republic, since both officials can represent only
the City of Naga.
Moreover, there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules, for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. (Danilo Channie
Tan vs. Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960; Palaran vs. Republic, L-15047.
Jan. 30, 1962; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, L-15775, April 29, 1961; Tan vs.
Republic, L-16108, October 31, 1961; Santiago vs. Commissioner, I,14653,
Jan. 31, 1963; Commissioner vs. Domingo, L-21274, July 31, 1963; Lao Yap
Dick, et al. vs. Republic, L-19107-09, Sept. 30, 1964; In re Mallari, Adm.
Case No. 533, April 29, 1968; Lee v. Commissioner of Immigration, 42
SCRA 561; Wong Sau Mei vs. Republic, 38 SCRA 26; Soria vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213).
WHEREFORE, the Decree dated May 4, 1971 and the Order dated August
26, 1971 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE except insofar as it allowed (a) the change of
the middle name of the mother from "Olbila" to "Olbita" in the birth
certificate of Roger Lee and (b) the change also of the middle name of the
335
mother from "Orbita" to "Olbita" in the birth certificate of Rolando Lee. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DE CASTRO, J., dissenting:
I vote to grant the petition for correction of entries in toto.
1. Rule 108 was promulgated precisely to provide the proper and
adequate remedy to make available, in its full extent, the benefits of Article
412 of the Civil Code which are not in express terms limited to correcting
only harmless and innocuous clerical errors nor to proceedings that are
merely summary in nature. If by judicial interpretation, said Article was
held to allow correction of only clerical errors, not one affecting status,
and that proceedings thereunder are purely summary, it is because of the
lack of a proceeding deemed appropriate and adequate to guard against
improper change of status that might prejudice the interests of third
parties. With the promulgation of Rule 108, which requires notice and
publication, I would hold that correction of an erroneous entry, even if the
same is not merely an innocuous clerical error, may be justified, as long as
the evidence warrants. For it would be preposterous to think that after
the rule that no more than mere clerical errors may be corrected under
Article 412 has become well-settled upon a legal pronouncement that
proceedings thereunder are merely summary in character, Rule 108 was
still provided with no apparent purpose other than to make more
expensive the correction of mere clerical errors which, before its
promulgation, was already possible under a less expensive and a simple
summary proceeding. Thus, as I have stressed in my dissenting opinion in
Wong v. Republic, G.R. No. L-29376, promulgated on July 30, 1982, if the
correction sought merely involves the rectification of mere clerical
harmless errors, a summary proceeding without need of complying with
the requirements of Rule 108 will suffice. But if the correction affects
substantial errors, compliance with the requisites prescribed in Rule 108
becomes imperative. In either case, Article 412 is the basis for the
correction.
2. It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered
unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more than mere
harmless clerical error, as ;t would thereby increase of modify substantive
rights which the Constitution expressly forbids because Article 412 of the
Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be implemented by Rule 108,
allows only the correction of innocuous clerical errors not those affecting
the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong
Case, Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere
implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors.
Upon a consideration of this fact, it would be reasonable and justified to
rule that Article 412 contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of
whatever nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided for,
as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108.
3. It is worth emphasizing that proceeding for the correction of erroneous
entry should not be considered as establishing one's status in a legal
manner conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, for as provided by
Article 410 of the Civil Code, "the books making up the civil register and
all documents relating thereto ... shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained." Hence, the status as corrected would not have a
superior quality for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction should
not imply a change of status but a mere rectification of error to make the
matter corrected speak for the truth. There is, therefore, no increase or
diminution of substantive right, as is the basis for holding that Rule 108
would be unconstitutional if held to allow correction of more than mere
harmless and innocuous clerical errors.
4. With respect to Election Case No. 1, wherein private respondent's right
to vote was contested and which case was decided in her favor after the
trial court found that she is not married to Lee Tieng but that they are
merely living as common-law husband and wife, and nothing more, hence,
she "remains a Filipino citizen, she being the natural born citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines, and therefore, is entitled to be registered as
voter and to vote," mere failure to notify the Solicitor General, as counsel
for the Republic, of the proceedings had therein is not fatal because
proceedings of such nature and character does not necessarily require the
336
presence of the Solicitor General. The decision is sufficient evidence to
justify the correction, which in any case, as has just been stressed, is not a
conclusive adjudication of the status. It is a mere correction of an entry
with evidentiary value as it would have had, were the entry correct from
the beginning.

Abad Santos, J., I vote with Justice de Castro. Substantial mistakes in the Civil
Registry should be allowed after adversary proceedings regardless of Art.
412 of the Civil Code or Rule 108.

337