ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January
16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging
evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his
vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the
crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap,
after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be
the subject of judicial review

intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession
of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question;
involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require
the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8
of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise
call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct
calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were
present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing
material relevant issues—President Estrada is deemed to have resigned— constructive
resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service
of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during
and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R.
178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No.
83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is
that both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has
clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft
and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting
president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of
public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also,
since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that
Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced
the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases
against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would
really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned
with justice and less with prosecution.
PEOPLE v. QUIDATO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., accused-appellant.
Topic: Disqualifications as a witness; when it applies.
FACTS:
Accused Bernardo Quidato Jr was accused of parricide. He and two co-conspirators allegedly
attacked with a bolo and iron bars hack and stab the victim, Bernardo Quidato Sr., appellant’s
father and namesake, which caused the victim’s untimely demise.
Among those presented as witness were accused’s wife and brother. Also presented were the
extrajudicial confessions of appellant’s two other co-accused. Appellant’s wife testified that
while the accused were drinking tuba she overheard them saying that they were planning to go
to the victim’s house on the night of the incident in order to “get money” and that she had no
idea
https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-
21/50352247_534431...oh=c2c14c6c2fb78de6bc52922dfcaa10dc&oe=5C597314&dl=1
04/02/2019, 3G38 PM Page 5 of 47
of what later transpired. Appellant objected to his wife’s testimony as it was prohibited by the
rule on marital disqualification. Appellant likewise denies the allegations of his co-accused who
in their extrajudicial confession pointed to the participation of appellant.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions should be given credence as they were obtained
in violation of the constitutional right of appellant to confront witnesses.
2. Whether or not the testimony of appellant’s wife is disqualified.
HELD:
1. NO. They should not be given credence, and indeed, appellant should be acquitted. The
prosecution relied heavily on appellant’s co-accused’s affidavits. However, the failure to
present the affiants in the witness stand gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is
hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the
averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding,
being inadmissible hearsay. “The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are
not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an
opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.”
Section 30, Rule 130 is not applicable in this case because it refers to confessions made during
the existence of the conspiracy. In this case, the conspiracy had clearly ended by the time the
confession was made.
2. YES. The testimony of appellant’s wife must be disregarded. As correctly observed by the
court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not
https://z-p3-cdn.fbsbx.com/v/t59.2708-
21/50352247_534431...oh=c2c14c6c2fb78de6bc52922dfcaa10dc&oe=5C597314&dl=1
04/02/2019, 3G38 PM Page 6 of 47
precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused, but not where the
testimony will be used against the accused-husband directly or indirectly.
DECISION:
Given the inadmissibility of accused’s wife’s testimony and the extrajudicial confession of co-
accused, the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.
Feria vs CA, GR No. 122954, February 15, 2000; 525 SCRA 525_digested
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings –Habeas Corpus)
Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the judgment, was
lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the
SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement
on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of
his constitutional right to due process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the
proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the
court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as
required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered
by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the
contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the
existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final
judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Issue: WON there is legal basis
to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal records.
Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and
determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under
lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive
penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioner’s claim is
anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention,
notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial
court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which
serves as the legal basis for his detention.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner
who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is,
where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner,
it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent
effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the
return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has
the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its
judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.
People vs. Adriano, G.R. No. L-477, June 30, 1947
SEPTEMBER 13, 2018
FACTS:

Apolinar Adriano was charged with treason due to his membership with the Makapili, an
organization of Filipino traitors established to assist the Japanese armed forces against the
United States and the Philippines.

The prosecution presented the following pieces of evidence:

Adriano, as part of Makapili, participated in raids done by Japanese soldiers.

Adriano and other Makapilis have their headquarters in the enemy garrison in Gapan.
Adriano was in Makapili uniform and drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese leader.
When US forces liberated Gapan, Adriano retreated with the Japanese forces to the mountains,
before surrendering to the American forces.
Notably, all these acts were not supported by two witnesses, except for the fact that Adriano is
part of the Makapili and seen in Makapili uniform carrying arms, on which all witnesses agree.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether membership in Makapili in itself is treasonous – YES.

2. Whether the two-witness rule was fulfilled – NO.

RATIO:

1. Mere membership in Makapili is treasonous.

The mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both adherence to the
enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will, membership in
the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for which the
organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were “to accomplish the fulfillment
of the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;”
“to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon influence
in East Asia;” “to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese Army and
Navy in the Philippines;” and “to fight the common enemies.” Adherence, unlike overt acts,
need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be
gathered from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the
circumstances surrounding the act.

At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary,
except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle
or committed nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was
committed if he placed himself at the enemy’s call to fight side be side with him when the
opportune time came even though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by
its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in
the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at war. It
furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces augmented, and his courage
was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the accused and his kind
who were ready to strike at their own people. The practical effect of it was no different from
that of enlisting in the invader’s army.

2. Prosecution failed to comply with the two-witness rule.

Membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two

witnesses.

Here, there are no two witnesses to same overt act. The witnesses all testified to different
overt acts.

The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance
from American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation has been placed on
the two-witness principle by American courts, and authoritative text writers have commented
on it.

Citing Wigmore on Evidence: Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act;
or, if it is separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act.

Cramer v. US: The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason
prosecution is that it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding
that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and
word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of
two witnesses.
People vs Sion

[G.R. No. 109617. August 11, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE SION @ JUNIOR,JOHNNY JUGUILON,

EDONG SION, FELIX SION @ ELLET, and FEDERICO DISU @ MIGUEL, accused. FELIPE SION @
JUNIOR and FEDERICO DISU @ MIGUEL, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In its decision[1] in Criminal Case No. D-10796 dated 20 January 1993, but promulgated on 8
February 1993, Branch 44 (Dagupan City) of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region
decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Felipe Sion alias Junior and Federico Disu alias Miguel
Disu guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of Murder pursuant to Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, and in view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance
of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the two accused are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify jointly the heirs of the
victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Accused Felipe Sion alias Junior and Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu are ordered to pay jointly
the heirs of the victim the sum of P11,910.00 as actual damages.

SO ORDERED.

Felipe Sion alias Junior, whose full name is Felipe Rodriguez Sion, Jr.[2] (hereafter appellant
Sion), and Federico Disu alias Miguel (hereafter appellant Disu), seasonably appealed therefrom
to this Court[3] in view of the penalty imposed.[4]

The case against appellants commenced with the filing of a criminal complaint for Murder[5] on
19 November 1991 in Criminal Case No. 2141 (SF-91) before the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto in the Province of Pangasinan. Charged with appellants therein
were Johnny Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias Ellet, and four (4) other John Does. After
appropriate preliminary examination, Judge Sergio Garcia of said court issued a warrant for the
arrest of the accused. No bail was fixed for their temporary liberty.[6] However, the warrant
was served only on appellant Disu, while the rest then remained at large. Upon appellant Disu's
motion for bail, to which Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Restituto Dumlao, Jr., recommended that
bail be fixed at P40,000.00 for said accused only, the court fixed said accused's bail at such
amount; and upon filing and approval of the bail bond, appellant Disu was ordered released.[7]
Subsequently, one Atty. Fernando Cabrera filed, for the rest of the accused, a motion to reduce
the bail from P40,000.00 to P20,000.00.[8] As Provincial Prosecutor Dumlao agreed to a
reduction of P10,000.00, the court granted the motion and fixed bail at P30,000.00. None of
them, however, filed a bail bond.
For failure of the accused to submit the required counter-affidavits, the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, finding probable cause against all the accused for the crime of murder on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution, ordered the transmittal of the record of the case, including the
bail bond of accused Federico Disu, to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan for
appropriate action.[9]

On 21 January 1992, an Information[10] was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), First
Judicial Region, in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, against appellants Sion and Disu and Johnny
Juguilon, Edong Sion, Felix Sion alias "Ellet," and four (4) unidentified persons (designated as
John, Peter, Richard and Paul Doe), accusing them of the crime of murder committed as
follows:

That on or about October 16, 1991 in the evening at Brgy. Binday, municipality of San Fabian,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with stones and a bladed weapon conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hurl with stones, attack and stab Fernando
Abaoag inflicting upon him the following injuries:

- stab wound 1 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11 ICS, mid axillary area slanting
upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung

- stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 , inch in depth

- stab wound 1 inches in width, 1 in depth mid scapular area, left

- contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow

which caused his instant death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. D-10796 and assigned to Branch 44 thereof.

On 2 June 1992, accused Sion was arrested.[11] Then on 10 June 1992, the RTC annulled and
voided the bail earlier granted to appellant Disu by MCTC Judge Sergio Garcia for lack of proper
hearing, denied the motion for bail filed by appellant Sion and ordered their detention in
jail.[12]

Since only appellants Sion and Disu were arrested, the case proceeded against them only. Upon
arraignment, both pleaded not guilty to the charge and waived pre-trial.[13]
The prosecution's witnesses were: Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag, the brother and the wife of the
victim, respectively; Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, San Fabian Municipal Health Officer; Rosendo
Imuslan, barangay captain of Barangay Binday; and SPO1 Ricardo Abrio. On the other hand, the
defense presented as its witnesses appellant Disu; appellant Sion; Corazon Sion, wife of
appellant Sion; and Dr. Leopoldo Manalo.

The evidence for the prosecution as established by the testimonies of its witnesses is partly
summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee, as follows:

On or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of October 16, 1991, Cesar Abaoag was at the barangay
road in front of his house situated in Binday, San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was with his elder
brother Carlos Abaoag and Ricardo Manuel (p.6, TSN, August 20, 1992) when all of a sudden,
Ronnie Manuel arrived coming from the west complaining that he was being chased by Felipe
Sion and Johnny Juguilon (p.7, TSN, id.). On that same occasion, Fernando Abaoag also arrived
at the scene. He said to Ronnie, "why Ronnie, you are making trouble again." The latter
answered, "I am not making trouble uncle because while I was inside the house of Eling
Alcantara, Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon were trying to stab me. (p.8, TSN, id.). Seconds later,
Felipe Sion and Johnny Juguilon appeared and started throwing stones. Fernando Abaoag told
them to stop throwing stones but before they desisted and left, one of them uttered "even you
Andong, you are interfering, you will also have your day, vulva of your mother, you Abaoag[s]"
(pp. 9-10, id.) Apparently, the utterance was directed against Fernando Abaoag whose
nickname is Andong.

Subsequently thereafter, at about 9:00 o'clock on that same evening, Cesar Abaoag while inside
his house lying down on his bed heard the sound of stone throwing at the nearby house of his
brother Fernando. He went out to see who were throwing stones (p.14, TSN, id.). When already
near the house of Lolly Galdones, Cesar Abaoag saw his brother Fernando already outside his
house. He also saw Johnny Juguilon, one of the members of the group of stone throwers, hurl a
big stone against Fernando. Upon being hit on the left eyebrow, Fernando turned his back
towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion and Miguel Disu who were also throwing stones towards his
direction. On the other hand, appellant Felipe Sion, who was near the victim, with a very sharp
double bladed dagger, stabbed Fernando, first on the left side just below the armpit, then on
the left waistline and finally on the right side of the neck below the jaw (pp. 18-19, TSN, id.).

Cesar tried to extend help to his brother but Miguel Disu hurled a stone on him which landed
on his right side below the armpit. When he heard Felipe Sion shouting to his companions
saying, "we will also kill Cesar," Cesar desisted in helping his brother (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.).
Instead, he ran to his brother's house and informed Felicitas, the wife, about the helpless
condition of Fernando (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.) Upon being informed, Felicitas, accompanied by
Carlos Abaoag, went to the place of the incident. The assailants were no longer there. She only
saw her husband lying prostate on the ground very weak in the state of dying. When she
inquired what happened, Fernando answered "naalaak" which in English means "I was hit" (pp.
4-5, TSN, July 27, 1992). Fernando told his wife that his assailants were Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu,
Edong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion (p.6, TSN, id.)
The victim was rushed to St. Blaise Hospital in San Fabian but he was pronounced dead on
arrival (pp. 24-25, TSN, August 20, 1992).

Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, a Municipal Health Officer of San Fabian, Pangasinan conducted post
mortem examination (Exh. A) on the body of the victim. The result of his findings showed that
Fernando Abaoag sustained the following injuries, to wit:

"1) stab wound 1 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11, ICS, mid axillary area
slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung

2) stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 inches in width, 1- inch in depth

3) stab wound 1 inches in width, 1 in depth mid scapular area, left

4) contusion superimposed abrasion left eyebrow."[14]

Dr. Manalo further testified that the stab wounds were caused by a sharp-pointed instrument,
possibly a dagger, with the first wound hitting the lower lobe of the left lung causing severe
bleeding and its eventual collapse. He determined the cause of death to be hemorrhagic shock
secondary to multiple stab wounds.[15]

Barangay Captain Imuslan testified that he and Kagawad Fernando Gatchalian, on the night of
the incident, found a small bolo and a bloodied double-bladed weapon (dagger) near the scene
of the crime.[16] Cesar Abaoag recognized this weapon as the one used by appellant Sion in
stabbing the victim.[17] On her part, Felicitas Abaoag declared that she spent more than
P11,000.00 for the wake and burial of her husband whose death saddened her, she being left
alone to take care of their children.[18]

In his defense, appellant Sion, brother and cousin of accused Edong[19] Sion and Felix Sion alias
"Ellet," respectively, admitted that on the night in question, he participated in a stone-throwing
incident and "free-for-all rumble" between his group (the Sions and Johnny Juguilon) on one
hand, and the Abaoags and Manuels, on the other. However, he professed his innocence,
claiming that it was his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed the victim.[20] His
version of the incident was summarized by the trial court, thus:

On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 p.m., he, together with Johnny Juguilon went to the house
of Eling Alcantara as he wanted to talk with his son, his friend. Ronnie Manuel was already
there when they arrived. While at the place, Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel came out and
started fighting with each other. Ronnie Manuel ran and proceeded to the place of his cousin.
He was pacifying Johnny Juguilon and Ronnie Manuel but Johnny Juguilon threw stones at
Ronnie Manuel. At this point, Fernando Abaoag intervened in the quarrel saying, "vulva of your
mother Johnny, you are too much, you will also have your day." Johnny Juguilon answered
"vulva of your mother Andoy, do not interfere because you are not our enemy." After the
verbal exchange, he took Johnny Juguilon to their (Sion's) house....At about 9:00 p.m., that
same evening, they stoned their house, its sides and the stairs. He and Idong and Johnny
Juguilon looked for Cesar Abaoag, Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Manuel, Andong Abaoag and two (2)
other companions. They were at the place of Marta Soriano. After that, they still threw stones
towards them. There was a free for all rumble between Ronnie Manuel, Ricky Manuel, the
Abaoags and Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon, Ellet Sion and himself, in front of the house of Loly
Galdones. He denied the testimony of Cesar Abaoag that he stabbed Fernando Abaoag three
times and before he was stabbed Johnny Juguilon stoned him (Fernando Abaoag). It was Idong
Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed Fernando Abaoag. After Fernando Abaoag was stabbed,
they ran away. His group also ran away. He went home and rushed towards Johnny Juguilon
because he was stabbed. He brought Juguilon to the St. Blaise Clinic and Hospital. He did not
report the incident to Barangay Captain Rosendo Imuslan. On October 17, 1:00 p.m., he
presented himself to Kagawad Lagman who brought him to the Police Station. ...[21]

In his defense, appellant Disu offered denial and alibi. He declared that he had no participation
in the killing of Fernando Abaoag, and during the whole night of 16 October 1991, while the
quarrel, stoning and stabbing incidents in question were taking place, he was resting and
sleeping in the house of his employer, Felicidad Gatchalian, after driving the latter's jeepney the
entire day. However, before proceeding home from work that afternoon, he went to the store
of Oping Juguilon to buy cigarettes and dropped by the house of appellant Sion where he
stayed for about five minutes. He only learned about the killing the following morning when he
was told that he was one of the suspects. He was arrested about a month after the
incident.[22]

On rebuttal, Cesar Abaoag refuted the testimony of appellant Sion. Cesar asserted that neither
his brothers, the Manuels nor himself threw stones at Sion's house; there was no free-for-all
fight between the Sions and the Abaoags; Johnny Juguilon and Edong Sion merely threw stones
at, but did not stab Fernando Abaoag; and it was only appellant Sion who stabbed Fernando
Abaoag.[23]

After the conclusion trial, the court granted appellants' motion to file a memorandum within
fifteen days. Despite the extension given, appellants' counsel did not file the memorandum.
Thus, in its order of 11 December 1992, the trial court declared the case submitted for
decision.[24]

On 8 February 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision,[25] the dispositive portion quoted
in the introductory paragraph of this ponencia.

As to the culpability of appellants Sion and Disu, the trial court found:

The defense of accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu and Felipe Rodriguez Sion, Jr. deserve
scant consideration. Cesar Abaoag narrated in detail how his brother Fernando Abaoag was
stoned by accused Johnny Juguilon, Federico Disu and Felix Sion and how accused Felipe Sion
stabbed Fernando Abaoag three times. Cesar Abaoag saw Johnny Juguilon throw stone hitting
the left eyebrow of Fernando Abaoag, and when his brother (Fernando Abaoag) turned left,
accused Federico Disu alias Miguel Disu, Idong Sion and Felix Sion simultaneously threw stones
toward him (Fernando Abaoag). Then, at a distance of two (2) meters, Cesar Abaoag saw
accused Felipe Sion stab Fernando Abaoag three times, hitting the left side below the armpit,
then on the left waistline and the right side of the neck below the jaw of the deceased with the
use of a sharp double bladed dagger.

Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two meters away
when he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a light
illuminating the place of the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and Loly
Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D).

The narrations of Cesar Abaoag are bolstered by the testimony of Dr. Leopoldo Manalo, the
doctor who conducted the postmortem examination on the cadaver of Fernando Abaoag. Dr.
Manalo stated that stab wound 1 inches in width, 9 inches in depth between 10-11 ICS, mid-
axillary area slanting upwards hitting the left lobe of the lung is located below the left armpit.
The second stab wound, stab wound right lateral side of the neck 1 inches in width, 1 in depth,
is located at the right side of the nec[k] at the back. The doctor stated that the wounds were
caused possibly by a dagger.

Finally, it is well to quote the statement uttered by Fernando Abaoag in the presence of
Felicitas Abaoag, to wit: naalaak, which means, I was hit, take note of this because I cannot
survive these injuries of mine. Fernando Abaoag told Felicitas Abaoag, Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu,
Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion stabbed him. (2-12 tsn July 27, 1992). This is a dying
declaration because it was made under a consciousness of impending death (Section 37, Rule
130, Rules of Court).[26]

The trial court likewise found that conspiracy was duly established by the prosecution, thus:

As stated in the decision, accused Johnny Juguilon threw stone, hitting the left eyebrow of
Fernando Abaoag, and Edong Sion, Felix Sion and Federico (Miguel) Disu simultaneously threw
stones upon the deceased, while accused Felipe Sion alias Junior stabbed him (victim) three
times, resulting in the latters death.[27]

It then appreciated against appellants (a) the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the
attack was so sudden that the victim had no time to defend himself; and (b) the generic
aggravating circumstance of cruelty, because there were three stab wounds and the first
wound -- which caused severe bleeding and collapse of the lung and the death of Fernando
Abaoag -- was deliberately augmented by inflicting the other wounds which are unnecessary for
its commission.[28] It did not, however, appreciate evident premeditation, for lack of
substantial evidence;[29] nor give the benefit of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant Sion
since his surrender was merely "forced by circumstances" as he "presented himself to Kagawad
Lagman because he was suspected as one of the persons who stabbed the victim."[30]
Appellants, through counsel, seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal.[31]

In their eight-page Appellants' Brief, filed by counsel de oficio Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio,[32]
appellants plead for their acquittal, contending that the trial court erred: (1) in convicting them
of murder; (2) in taking into account the aggravating circumstance of cruelty; (3) in ruling that
conspiracy was established; (4) in not appreciating the presence of voluntary surrender; and (5)
in disregarding the defense of appellant Sion that it was Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who
were responsible for the death of Fernando Abaoag.

In support of their first assigned error, appellants attack the identification made of them by
prosecution witnesses. They claim that if witness Cesar Abaoag actually saw appellant Sion stab
the victim, then Cesar should have immediately informed Felicitas Abaoag, the victims wife, of
this fact. Cesar's failure was then unusual and unnatural. Then, too, Felicitas Abaoag's
testimony on her husband's alleged dying declaration was "not specific" as far as the assailants'
identities were concerned because the victim merely said "naalaak" ("I was hit"), without
identifying appellant Sion as the one who stabbed him; and, her claim that her husband
identified all the five (5) accused as the ones who "stabbed" him is "an impossibility."
Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were limited to relatives of the victims; "other vital
witnesses" -- such as Marta Soriano, Lolly Galdones or Eling Alcantara -- should have been
presented to corroborate the biased testimonies of Cesar and Felicitas Abaoag.

Appellants further contend that: (1) there was no treachery since the stabbing of the victim was
not "sudden;" (2) cruelty was not proven because "there is no clear testimony" that the first
stab wound was fatal and the second and third wounds were "unnecessary"; (3) conspiracy
cannot be deduced from the mere fact that all the accused threw stones at the victim before
the stabbing; (4) appellant Sion voluntarily surrendered even before the police started
investigating the case when he was not yet a suspect; and (5) appellant Sion could not have
testified that it was Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon who stabbed the victim if such were not
true, considering that the former is his brother and the latter his barriomate; and (6) appellant
Sion bore no grudge against the victim and did not escape.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, in its Brief for the Appellee, supports the
trial court's findings and conclusions, except as to the appreciation of cruelty, which it concedes
to be erroneous.

Our careful review of the record of the evidence adduced by the parties convinces us that
prosecution witness Cesar Abaoag positively identified appellants as being present during the
incident in question and saw appellant Sion stab the victim thrice. As correctly found by the trial
court:

Cesar Abaoag could not be mistaken in the identification because he was two meters away
when he saw the accused Felipe Sion stab his brother, and, moreover, there was a light
illuminating the place of the incident coming from the houses of Marta Soriano and Loly
Caldones. Cesar Abaoag identified the dagger (Exhibit D).
Cesar Abaoag also saw the rest of the accused, including appellant Disu, throwing stones at the
victim. He was definite, however, that it was only accused Johnny Juguilon who was able to hit
the victim at the left eyebrow. The three stab wounds inflicted by appellant Sion and the injury
at the left eyebrow caused by the stone thrown by Juguilon jibed with the post mortem findings
of Dr. Manalo as he described the injury on the left eyebrow as contusion superimposed
abrasion left eyebrow.[33] If Cesar had any ulterior motive to testify against appellant Disu, he
could have declared that it was Disu, and not Juguilon, who hit the victim with a stone. Cesar
then honestly narrated what he observed.

That Cesar did not at once inform Felicitas Abaoag that it was appellant Sion who stabbed her
husband, was not proof, as appellants suggest, that Cesar was absent from the crime when it
was committed. Cesars presence was admitted by appellant Sion himself on direct examination,
thus:

Q Did you see Cesar Abaoag on that occasion anywhere near Fernando Abaoag when you said
he was stabbed by Johnny Juguilon and Idong Sion?

A Yes, sir.[34]

Furthermore, Cesar satisfactorily explained his failure to forthwith inform Felicitas of this fact.
At that time, Cesar himself was running away from the accused who had hit him with a stone.
His pressing concern then was to get someone to help his wounded brother; besides, he was
scared of accused Felix Sion, uncle of appellant Sion, who was a "notorious character in their
neighborhood.[35] It is settled that delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of a crime, if
sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness nor destroy its probative
value.[36] In any event, in his sworn statement[37] which was submitted on 22 October 1991
before Judge Sergio Garcia, he narrated what he had witnessed and mentioned appellants Sion
and Disu as among the perpetrators of the crime.

The identifications of appellants and their co-accused were further bolstered by the declaration
made by the victim to his wife, Felicitas Abaoag. The trial court correctly characterized this as a
dying declaration,[38] having been made under the consciousness of impending death. The
victim was already weak when his wife saw him and he knew that he would not survive the
injuries he sustained; he even died a few minutes later while on the way to the hospital.[39]
When Felicitas saw her husband, he told her what had happened to him, who caused his
injuries and that he did not expect to live, thus:

Q. What happened next after that when you met your husband?

A. I immediately asked him what happened to him.

Q. And what was the answer of Fernando Abaoag?

A. He said, naalaak, which means, I was hit.

COURT:

Q. Did you ask him why he said naalaak?

A. He said he was stabbed and he was injured.

Q. What do you mean by word naalaak?

A. I was hit.

COURT:

Proceed.

PROSECUTOR DUMLAO:

Q. Do you know the reason why he was hit?

A. What I understand is that in the course of his pacifying the trouble between his nephew and
the rest, he was stabbed, sir.

Q. Aside from the statement of your husband Fernando Abaoag that he was hit, what else did
he say, if you know?

A. He said, take note of this because I know I cannot survive with these injuries of mine.

COURT:

Q. What else did he tell you aside from that?

A. He said, remember that in case I cannot survive with the injuries that I sustained, the men
who stabbed me are Felipe Sion, Miguel Disu, Idong Sion, Johnny Juguilon and Felix Sion,
sir.[40] (underscoring supplied)

We find these statements given by the victim to his wife to have met the requisites of a dying
declaration under Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: (a) death is imminent and
the declarant was conscious of that fact; (b) the preliminary facts which bring the declaration
within its scope must be made to appear; (c) the declaration relates to the facts or
circumstances pertaining to the fatal injury or death; and (d) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he survived.[41] Dying declarations are admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule because of necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the
declarants death renders impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that
there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; and trustworthiness, for it is made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every hope of this world is gone; when
every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful
consideration to speak the truth.[42] We find no ulterior motive on the part of Felicitas to
fabricate the declarations of her husband.

We likewise find to be without basis appellants claim that all the prosecution witnesses were
biased due to their relation to the victims family. Plainly, witnesses Imuslan (the barangay
captain) and Dr. Manalo were not related to the victim, while the relationship of witnesses
Cesar Abaoag and Felicitas Abaoag to the victim, as brother and wife, respectively, neither
disqualified them as witnesses nor rendered their testimony unworthy of belief. It is not to be
lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to
avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they believe to be innocent
thereof.[43] A witness' relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would
even render the same more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in
vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[44]

Neither was the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses, such as those mentioned
by the appellants, fatal to the cause of the People. It is well-settled that the decision as who to
present as witnesses for the prosecution is addressed to the sound discretion of the prosecutor
handling the case and the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a
plausible defense.[45] The prosecution is not obliged to present all possible witnesses,
especially if their testimony will only serve to corroborate that of another eyewitness'
testimony, in which case the former may very well be dispensed with considering that the
testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, would suffice.[46]

The trial court correctly rejected appellant Sions defense that it was not he who stabbed the
victim, but his brother Edong Sion and Johnny Juguilon, both of whom fled after the incident.
Constituting a mere denial of Cesar Abaoag's positive testimony that it was appellant Sion who
stabbed the victim, such must fail in light of the settled rule of evidence that positive testimony
is stronger than negative testimony.[47] Moreover, the claim was made rather late in the day,
casting serious doubt as to its veracity. From the time that appellant Sion presented himself to
Kagawad Lagman and the police authorities on 17 October 1991, and during his subsequent
incarceration, he never told anyone nor made any statement that he was not the one who
stabbed the victim; he did not even so inform his close relatives, not even his wife who visited
him in jail.[48] Also, during the preliminary investigation, when he had the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits and other evidence to refute the charges, he did not care to dispute
the statements of Felicitas and Cesar Abaoag identifying him and detailing his participation in
the crime.[49] He raised this claim for the first time only during his testimony in court almost
one (1) year after the stabbing incident and his initial surrender, and notably, only after the
hope of apprehending Idong Sion and Johnny Juguilon, together with the other accused,
already seemed remote. Such failure to immediately disclose the information as soon as he was
implicated in the crime and his prolonged silence on a vital matter hardly inspire belief, being
unnatural and inconsistent with ordinary habits of men and common experience.

That appellant Sion did not flee, unlike his brother Edong and Johnny Juguilon, neither proved
his innocence. Non-flight -- unlike flight of an accused which validly serves as a badge of guilt --
is simply inaction which may be due to several factors; hence, it should not be construed as an
indication of innocence.[50]

Appellant Sion's claim of lack of ill-feeling or grudge against Fernando Abaoag was belied and
contradicted by his admission in court that just before the stabbing of the victim, he and his co-
accused hurled stones at and fought with the Abaoags, including Fernando, whom he blamed
for allegedly stoning his house.[51] It is also belied by his actuation and utterance made earlier
in the evening of 16 October 1991 when Fernando Abaoag interfered in the quarrel between
appellant Sion and Fernando's nephew, Ronnie Manuel, which prompted appellant Sion and
Johnny Juguilon to curse and warn Fernando, thus: "even you Andong [Fernando Abaoag] you
are interfering, you are siding with your nephew Ronnie Manuel, you have also your day.... you
Abaoags."[52] Appellant Sion also admitted that he "had an ill-feeling towards" Ronnie Manuel,
the victim's nephew, because "he was making trouble" inside his jeepney "5 days before the
incident."[53]

In light of the positive identification of appellants, appellant Disus alibi must fail.

It is settled that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate; it cannot prevail
over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by credible witnesses that an
accused perpetrated the crime.[54] We are unable to discern any plausible reason, and
appellant Disu does not offer any, why he should be falsely implicated by Cesar Abaoag and
mentioned in the victim's dying declaration as one of the victim's assailants, if appellant Disu
was not actually present during the incident and had no participation in the commission of the
crime. As to his motive or lack thereof, appellant Disu claims that he had no misunderstanding
with Fernando Abaoag or his family.[55] However, Felipe Sion, Jr., disclosed that appellant Disu
was close to the Sion clan, which explains why appellant Disu sympathized with and joined the
Sions and Juguilon in assaulting the victim: Federico Disu was Sion Jr.'s jeepney conductor for
five (5) months, the latter teaching the former how to drive for three (3) months; and when
Disu became a driver himself, they had the same route and saw each other every day at the
poblacion.[56] Disu even admitted that in the afternoon of 16 October 1991, after 5:00 p.m., he
"dropped by" the house of Felipe Sion, which he often did before.[57]

We now rule on the presence or absence of conspiracy. There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.[58] Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary; it may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest.[59] Once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of
all.[60]
In this case, appellants and the other accused were already at the barangay road of Binday,
near the houses of Lolly Galdones and Marta Soriano, when Fernando Abaoag, who was looking
for the persons who just stoned his house several times, and Cesar Abaoag, arrived.
Immediately, Johnny Juguilon threw a stone at Fernando hitting him on the left eyebrow; then,
Edong and Felix Sion and appellant Disu, "simultaneously" threw stones, also at Fernando. As
Fernando turned away from his assailants, appellant Sion rushed and stabbed the victim three
(3) times, even as the latter raised his arms saying, "I will not fight back." When Cesar Abaoag
tried to help his brother Fernando, appellant Disu threw and hit Cesar with a stone. Appellant
Sion then commanded his companions to also kill Cesar, prompting the latter to run away. Then
the assailants fled, leaving behind a small bolo and a dagger. The confluence of their acts
indubitably manifested a community of interest and unity of purpose and design to take
Fernando Abaoag's life.

We also find to be unsupported by evidence, appellants' claim, through the testimony of

appellant Sion, that the fatal stabbing of Fernando Abaoag was a result of a free-for-all rumble,
thereby possibly tempering their liability to that of causing death in a tumultuous affray under
Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code, which carries a penalty lower than that for homicide.[61]
In this case, it was ascertained beyond doubt that appellant Sion inflicted the fatal stab wounds;
hence this claim must be rejected.

Having resolved appellants' liability for Fernando Abaoag's death, we now rule on the
circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime.

In convicting appellants of murder, the trial court considered the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, opting to disregard the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, which was
likewise alleged in the information. Here, as the prosecution failed to prove the essential
elements of evident premeditation, viz: (a) the time when appellants determined to commit the
crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination; and (c) a sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the
consequences of their act.[62]

We disagree, however, with the trial court's finding as regards the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. Under the law, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly or specifically to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.[63] We find no clear and convincing evidence of
treachery. Cesar Abaoag's testimony as to how his brother was attacked lacks sufficient detail
showing conclusively that the mode and manner of the assault rendered the victim entirely
defenseless. He merely testified that when he and his brother proceeded west of the barangay
road of Binday, he saw Johnny Juguilon stone his brother and hit him on the left eyebrow.
Fernando Abaoag then turned to the left with his back towards Felix Sion, Edong Sion, Miguel
Disu and the four (4) other unidentified companions, who then "simultaneously" threw stones
at Fernando. "Seconds later," Cesar saw appellant Sion holding a very sharp double bladed
dagger and stab his brother three (3) times; Fernando Abaoag, when stabbed, "was just
standing and said `I will not fight.'"[64] They were six (6) meters away from Johnny Juguilon
when the latter first hurled a stone at Fernando which signaled the other accused to do the
same.[65]

Considering therefore the distance between the assailants and the victim when the attacked
commenced, and the fact that there were two (2) waves of stoning which preceded the
stabbing of the victim, these should have sufficiently forewarned him of the greater danger
which loomed and prompted him to escape. Moreover, in light of the absence of clear details
showing conclusively that the stabbing was inflicted from behind or the victim was entirely
helpless when stabbed, we are not prepared to conclude that the attack was "so sudden and
unexpected" as to render the victim entirely defenseless. Treachery cannot qualify the killing to
murder when the victim was forewarned of the attack by the assailant, or when the attack was
frontal, or the attack was not so sudden as to have caught the deceased completely
unaware.[66] Furthermore, the evidence does not disclose that the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by appellants.

Absent then of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed was homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

The trial court likewise erred in appreciating against appellants the generic aggravating
circumstance of cruelty,[67] based solely on the fact that the victim was stabbed thrice, with
the first stab wound hitting the lower left lung causing severe bleeding and its collapse. In fact,
appellee concedes this error of the trial court. Cruelty cannot be appreciated in absence of any
showing that appellants, for their pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly
and painfully and inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain; and, the mere fact that
wounds in excess of what was indispensably necessary to cause death were found on the body
of the victim does not necessarily imply that such wounds were inflicted with cruelty and with
the intention of deliberately intensifying the victim's suffering.[68] In the instant case, the
evidence only shows that the three (3) stab wounds were delivered in succession, nothing
more.

We agree with appellants that appellant Sion is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, which requires that "the offender voluntarily surrendered
himself to a person in authority."[69] Its requisites are: (a) the offender had not been actually
arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent;
and (c) the surrender was voluntary.[70] For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be
spontaneous and show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the
authorities, either: (1) because he acknowledges his guilt; or (2) because he wishes to save
them the trouble and expense incidental to his search and capture.[71]

As shown by the records, in the afternoon of 17 October 1991, appellant Sion "presented"
himself to Kagawad Modesto Lagman who, in turn, "escorted and surrendered" him to the
police in the poblacion.[72] His admission that he surrendered because he was already
suspected as one of the perpetrators of the crime does not make his surrender "forced by
circumstances" as ruled by the trial court. His arrest at that time was neither imminent nor
inevitable. At the time of his surrender, no warrant of arrest against him had yet been issued,
the same having been issued only on 19 November 1991.[73] In fact, he was released from
custody after a few days, and was ordered committed to jail only sometime in June 1992, after
his motion for bail was denied by the trial court on 10 June 1992 and was thus taken into
custody.[74] This subsequent fact should not diminish nor erase the favorable effect of Felipe
Sion Jr.'s voluntary surrender on 17 October 1991. As has been held, whatever the accused's
reason for surrendering -- either the fear of reprisal from victim's relatives or, in this case, his
knowledge that he was already a suspect of the crime -- does not gainsay the spontaneity of the
surrender, nor alter the fact that by giving himself up, he saved the State the time and trouble
of searching for him until arrested.[75]

We disagree with Appellees submission that there was no voluntary surrender because
appellant Sion surrendered to a mere barangay "Kagawad" or Sangguniang Barangay member,
and not to the police authorities, implying that the former is not a person in authority.[76] This
ignores Section 388 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which expressly provides, in part,
that "[f]or purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay
members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as
persons in authority in their jurisdictions...."[77] This law expands the definition of a person in
authority under the Revised Penal Code, wherein among the barangay officials, only the
barangay captain or chairman, now called Punong Barangay, is expressly considered a person in
authority, as provided in Article 152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the Punong Barangay, the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay, or Kagawads, and members of the Lupong Tagapayapa
are now considered not merely as agents of, but as persons in authority.[78]

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 44 (Dagupan City) the Regional Trial Court of
the First Judicial Region in Criminal Case No. D-10796 is MODIFIED. As modified, appellants
FELIPE SION, ALIAS JUNIOR or FELIPE RODRIGUEZ, JR. and FEDERICO DISU, ALIAS MIGUEL are
hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of HOMICIDE as
defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, with the former entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
they are sentenced, respectively, to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8)
years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum, and an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, with all the accessory penalties
therefor, and subject to the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Except as so
modified, the rest of the challenged judgment stands.

Costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.
People v Amaca 277 SCRA 215 Digest
People vs. Amaca
GR No. 110129 August 11, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:

Offer of compromise in Criminal Cases; Res Gestae

Facts:

1. Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang” were charged for shooting Wilson Vergara.
During the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar Pialago, a resident physician on duty when
the victim was brought to the hospital after the shooting. The doctor testified that he was able
to attend to the victim who had undergone a surgical operation conducted by another doctor.
At that time, the major organs of the victim were no longer functioning normally, while his
pancreas was likewise injured due to the 2 gunshot wounds at his back. The victim was
admitted at 10:45PM but expired the following evening at 10PM. According to Dr. Pialago, even
with immediate medical attention, the victim could not survive the wounds he sustained.

2. Another witness testified, PO Mangubat, a police officer , who interviewed the victim
(Wilson Vergara) right after the shooting. Mangubat testified that he saw the victim already on
board a Ford Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim
about the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon
query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon
being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die. He was able to reduce
into writing the declaration of the victim and made latter affixed his thumb mark with the use
of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor.

3. Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted
from further prosecution of the case. the former because of the "financial help" extended by
the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had already "consented to the
amicable settlement of the case." Despite this, the Department of Justice found the existence
of a prima facie case based on the victim's ante mortem statement.

4. The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of the victim's ante mortem statement to
Police Officer Mangubat positively identifying accused. The dying declaration was deemed
sufficient to overcome the accused’s defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance
of the victim's mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined to make a
finding on the civil liability of the appellant.

Issue: 1) Whether or not offer of compromise is admissible against the accused

YES. The "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise may be deemed as additional
proof to demonstrate appellant's criminal liability. The victim's mother desisted from
prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial help" extended to her family by the
accused-appellant.

It is a well-settled rule that that the desistance of the victim's complaining mother does not bar
the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to
pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce
the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil
indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that
neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to include
a finding of civil liability. But the heirs, if there are any may file an independent civil action to
recover damages for the death of Wilson Vergara.

Issue (2): Whether or not the dying declaration of victim should be admitted

YES. The victim’s dying declaration is admissible.

A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of
his impending death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his
foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death, every motive for
falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the

truth." This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the declaration
conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have been a competent witness had
he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarant's death is
the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. All these concur in the
present case.

Finally, Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his
duty. There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which
shows any semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Amaca. Even the
accused testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat and
knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against him.

Declarant is a competent witness

The serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said
injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of his ability to perceive and
to identify his shooter.

Homicide only not murder

Appellant may be held liable only for homicide since treachery was not alleged in the
Information, while evident premeditation and night time, although duly alleged, were not
satisfactorily proven. The Information readily reveals that the killing was qualified only by
evident premeditation. Treachery was not alleged in the information. It is necessary to qualify
the crime to murder. Treachery is an element of the crime. The Constitution requires that the
accused must be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation against him."The failure
to allege treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the prosecution.
Moreover, treachery and night time may not be considered even as generic aggravating
circumstances, because there is nothing in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to
convincingly show that the accused-appellant consciously and purposely adopted (1) such
means of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2) the darkness of night to facilitate the
commission of the crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade capture.