https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?

R=19800013796 2019-09-19T11:00:05+00:00Z

NASA Conference Publication 2120

Resource Management on the

Flight Deck
Proceedings of a NASA/Industry Workshop
Held at
San Francisco, California
June 26-28, 1979

March 1980

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration
NASA Conference Publication 2120

Resource ent on the

Flight Deck
Proceedings of a NASAAndustry Workshop
Held at
San Francisco, California
June 26-28, 1979
Edited by
George E. Cooper
Maurice D. White, G. E. Cooper Associates, Saratoga, California
John I<. Lauber, Ames Research Center, M o f f e t t Field, California

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, California 94035
 PREFACE

The f o s t e r i n g of i n c r e a s e d awareness and u s e of a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s by

a i r c r e w s under h i g h workload c o n d i t i o n s i s becoming a m a t t e r of g r e a t e r
concern t o t h e a i r l i n e s . New r e s e a r c h and t r a i n i n g programs t o enhance
aircrew c a p a b i l i t i e s are being developed , l a r g e l y independently, by t h e
v a r i o u s o r g a n i z a t i o n s involved. The t i m i n g appeared a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a n
exchange of i d e a s and i n f o r m a t i o n t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e s e a c t i v i t i e s , and,
a c c o r d i n g l y , a NASA-Industry Workshop devoted t o Resource Management on t h e
F l i g h t Deck w a s organized by G. E. Cooper A s s o c i a t e s f o r t h e A v i a t i o n S a f e t y
Research O f f i c e of Ames Research Center. The Workshop w a s h e l d a t t h e J a c k
Tar H o t e l i n San F r a n c i s c o , C a l i f o r n i a , June 26-28, 1979. P a r t i c i p a n t s
included s e n i o r o f f i c e r s of major a i r l i n e s who are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r aircrew
t r a i n i n g ; r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of c o g n i z a n t government a g e n c i e s ; and s p e c i a l i s t s
i n human f a c t o r s work a s i t a p p l i e s t o aircrew o p e r a t i o n s .

T h i s r e p o r t p r e s e n t s t h e proceedings of t h e Workshop. I n some cases

t h e p a p e r s a r e t a k e n from a v e r b a t i m t r a n s c r i p t of t h e proceedings; i n o t h e r
cases, t h e y r e p r e s e n t formal s u b m i t t a l s . John K. Lauber, Ames Research
Center, NASA, and Capt. A. A. F r i n k , Pan American World A i r l i n e s , w e r e
cochairmen of t h e Workshop.

The Workshop comprised f o u r s e s s i o n s :

S e s s i o n 1. Formal p r e s e n t a t i o n s by n o n i n d u s t r y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on t h e
background and human f a c t o r s a s p e c t s of t h e problem.

S e s s i o n 2 . Formal p r e s e n t a t i o n s by a i r l i n e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s d e s c r i b i n g
c u r r e n t i n d u s t r y approaches t o t r a i n i n g f o r r e s o u r c e management.

S e s s i o n 3 . Small-group d i s c u s s i o n s and a n a l y s e s by p a r t i c i p a n t s , aimed

a t developing c o n c l u s i o n s and recommendations f o r e f f e c t i v e r e s o u r c e
management t r a i n i n g . R e s u l t s w e r e r e p o r t e d t o assembled p a r t i c i p a n t s by
chairmen of t h e i n d i v i d u a l groups. A g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n of working group
r e p o r t s i s included.

Session 4 . Summary of t h e Workshop.

iii
 ' CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE .............................................................. iii

SESSION 1. BACKGROUND AND HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM....... 1

Resource Management on t h e F l i g h t Deck: Background and

Statement of t h e Problem
John K. Lauber ............!................................... 3

S o c i a l Psychology on t h e F l i g h t Deck
Robert L. Helmreich..................... ...................... 17

A v i a t i o n Accidents and t h e "Theory of t h e S i t u a t i o n "

Lee Bolman.................................................... 31

SESSION 2. CURRENT INDUSTRY APPROACHES TO RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

TRAINING.......................................................... 59

F l i g h t C r e w S e l e c t i o n a t United A i r l i n e s
C a p t . W i l l i a m Traub........................................... 61

B r i t i s h Airways' Pre-Command T r a i n i n g Program

Capt. L. F. J. Holdstock. ..................................... 76

Upgrade and I n t e r p e r s o n a l S k i l l s T r a i n i n g a t American A i r l i n e s

Capt. W. W. E s t r i d g e and J. L. Mansfield...................... 87

Captains' T r a i n i n g a t S w i s s a i r
Capt. N. Grob................................................. 97

Line-Oriented F l i g h t T r a i n i n g
C a p t . Berton E. Beach......................................... 107

F l i g h t Manager and Check-Airman T r a i n i n g

Capt. J. E. Carroll........................................... 119

L e f t Seat Command a n d / o r Leadership? F l i g h t Leadership T r a i n i n g

and Research a t North C e n t r a l A i r l i n e s
Capt. G r a m e r C. F o s t e r and Michael C. Garvey..... ............. 133

SESSION 3. THE WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

TRAINING -
NASA/INDUSTRY WORKING GROUP MEETINGS.................. 147

INTRODUCTION
Capt. A. A. F r i n k , Chairman................................... 149

V
 CONTENTS (Concluded)
Page

GROUP REPORTS ( i n o r d e r of p r e s e n t a t i o n )

Group 5 . Recurrent T r a i n i n g and Line Operation

.
Capt Ron S e s s a ..................................... 152

Group 1 . S e l e c t i o n and I n i t i a l T r a i n i n g
- . .
Capt. R E Cwmp ................................... 156

Group 2 . Recurrent T r a i n i n g and Line Operation

. .
R C Houston ....................................... 161

Group 3 . T r a n s i t i o n and Upgrade T r a i n i n g

. . . .
Capt L F J Holdstock. ........................... 165

Group 4 . S e l e c t i o n and I n i t i a l T r a i n i n g
.
Capt Berton Beach .................................. 169

Group 6 . T r a n s i t i o n and Upgrade T r a i n i n g

........................................
Lawson White 173

PANEL DISCUSSION .................................................. 178

SESSION 4 . CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................ 193

S W R Y OF THE WORKSHOP
.
Charles E B i l l i n g s ........................................... 194

CLOSING REMARKS
. . .
Capt A A Frink ............................................ 203

APPENDIX A . WORKSHOP PARTTCIPANTS .................................... 205

APPENDIX B . SUPPLEMENTARY WQRKING PAPERS ............................. 207

I n i t i a l Upgrading from C o p i l o t t o C a p t a i n
. .
Capt G GrUnewald ............................................ 209

Training
Capt ..
.R
Economic and S a f e t y C o n s i d e r a t i o n s
E. Norman. Jr ........................................ 221

C a l c u l a t e d R i s k or Blind Assumption?
Gerard M. Bruggink ............................................ 227

Managing Emergencies i n Jet T r a n s p Q r t O p e r a t i o n s

Gerard M. Bruggink ............................................ 233

APPENDIX C . INSTRUCTIONS FOR WORKING GROUPS .......................... 245

 SESSION 1

BACKGROUND AND HUMAN FACTORS ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

John K. Lauber, Chairman

Resource Management on t h e F l i g h t Deck:

Background and Statement of t h e Problem

John K. Lauber, Ames Research Center, NASA

S o c i a l Psychology on t h e F l i g h t Deck

Robert L. Helmreich, U n i v e r s i t y of Texas

Aviation Accidents and t h e "Theory of t h e S i t u a t i o n "

L e e Bolman, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y

1
 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ON THE FLIGHT DECK:

BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

John K. Lauber
*

INTRODUCTION

The t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s paper i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d : one of t h e

p r i n c i p a l c a u s e s of i n c i d e n t s and a c c i d e n t s i n c i v i l j e t t r a n s p o r t o p e r a t i o n s
i s t h e l a c k of e f f e c t i v e management of a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s by t h e f l i g h t - d e c k
crew. It i s f u r t h e r argued t h a t p r e s e n t aircrew t r a i n i n g programs could b e
augmented t o improve f l i g h t - d e c k management. The purpose of t h i s paper i s t o
d i s c u s s p r e v i o u s r e s e a r c h and o t h e r d a t a t h a t l e a d t o t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s , and
t o p r e s e n t some c o n c e p t s t h a t h e l p t o d e f i n e t h e problem and t o s u g g e s t some
p o s s i b l e approaches toward i t s s o l u t i o n .

THE PILOT INTERVIEW STUDY

The p r e s e n t human-factors-in-aviation-safety r e s e a r c h program a t A m e s

Research Center w a s begun i n 1973. I n a n e f f o r t t o i d e n t i f y t h e most
r e l e v a n t and p r e s s i n g r e s e a r c h i s s u e s , and t o l e a r n more about t h e human
f a c t o r s problems encountered d u r i n g r o u t i n e l i n e o p e r a t i o n s , NASA conducted
s t r u c t u r e d , c o n f i d e n t i a l i n t e r v i e w s w i t h a i r l i n e crewmembers. T h i s i n t e r -
view problem, which w a s conducted w i t h t h e f u l l c o o p e r a t i o n of management and
union r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , r e s u l t e d i n a number of i n t e r e s t i n g i s s u e s being
brought t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e NASA r e s e a r c h team. O f most d i r e c t i n t e r e s t
h e r e w e r e i s s u e s r e l a t e d t o c r e w t r a i n i n g and, s p e c i f i c a l l y , t r a i n i n g f o r new
c a p t a i n s . G e n e r a l l y , t h o s e p i l o t s who mentioned t r a i n i n g d u r i n g t h e i n t e r -
views expressed s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e t r a i n i n g t h e y receive i n t h e t e c h n i c a l
a s p e c t s of f l y i n g and i n f l y i n g s k i l l s . The d i f f i c u l t y r e l a t e d more t o
i s s u e s such as how t o b e a more e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r , and how t o a c h i e v e more
e f f e c t i v e crew c o o r d i n a t i o n and improved communication w i t h i n t h e c o c k p i t .
One new c a p t a i n s t a t e d t h e problem as f o l l o w s : "My company t r a i n s p i l o t s
very w e l l , but not captains - command t r a i n i n g i s needed." A flight
e n g i n e e r f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t " P i l o t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y c a p t a i n s , ought t o be g i v e n
.
s p e c i f i c t r a i n i n g i n human behavior and human r e l a t i o n s h i p s . . t h e r e is t o o
much emphasis on t h e t e c h n i c a l s i d e of f l y i n g , and t o o l i t t l e upon t h e s e
' s o f t e r ' i s s u e s . " Many o t h e r comments w e r e r e c e i v e d t h a t p o i n t e d t o a
g e n e r a l f e e l i n g among f l i g h t crewmembers t h a t t h e r e i s a need f o r t r a i n i n g
i n areas o t h e r t h a n manual c o n t r o l and systems o p e r a t i o n s .

"Ames Research Center, NASA, Mof f e t t F i e l d , C a l i f o r n i a .

3
 FULL-MISSION SIMULATION STUDY

The next major s t i m u l u s f o r conducting t h e r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g

research came from a f u l l - m i s s i o n s i m u l a t i o n study conducted by R u f f e l l Smith
and c o l l e a g u e s ( r e f . 1 ) . That s t u d y , which made u s e of a B-747 t r a i n i n g
s i m u l a t o r , analyzed t h e frequency and kinds of e r r o r s committed by q u a l i f i e d
l i n e crews d u r i n g a simulated r o u t i n e l i n e t r i p segment, and d u r i n g a segment
i n which a mechanical problem w a s introduced t h a t n e c e s s i t a t e d a n engine
shutdown and a d i v e r s i o n from t h e o r i g i n a l f l i g h t p l a n . A l l normal communica-
t i o n s were s i m u l a t e d , as w e l l a s o t h e r f a c t o r s t h a t a r e known t o be d i s -
t r a c t i n g , b u t n o t i n h e r e n t l y dangerous. For example, d u r i n g t h e more
d i f f i c u l t second segment, a c a b i n a t t e n d a n t f r e q u e n t l y c a l l e d t h e c o c k p i t
v i a t h e crew interphone t o make v a r i o u s r e q u e s t s o r a s k q u e s t i o n s of t h e
f l i g h t c r e w . Other elements of t h e s i m u l a t i o n included ATC s e r v i c e s , weather,
closed runways a t t h e d i v e r s i o n a i r p o r t , and an i n o p e r a t i v e a u t o p i l o t , which
f u r t h e r i n c r e a s e d p i l o t workload. The s c e n a r i o s were c o n s t r u c t e d i n such a
way t h a t good crew c o o r d i n a t i o n , c o c k p i t communications, decisionmaking,
and planning s k i l l s w e r e r e q u i r e d , but n o t so complex as t o preclude an
e n t i r e l y s a f e o p e r a t i o n provided t h e s e s t e p s were taken.

Twenty v o l u n t e e r l i n e crews f l e w t h e s e simulated t r i p s . The v a r i e t y of

behavior observed w a s most i l l u m i n a t i n g . Problems were observed i n com-
munication, decisionmaking, crew i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e g r a t i o n , and i n an a r e a
subsequently c a l l e d "resource management." S p e c i f i c a l l y i t appeared t o
R u f f e l l Smith and h i s c o l l e a g u e s t h a t one of t h e major v a r i a b l e s t h a t
influenced how e f f e c t i v e l y and s a f e l y a crew handled t h e problem s i t u a t i o n s
presented them w a s t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s i n i d e n t i f y i n g and u t i l i z i n g t h e
v a r i o u s material and human r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o them. The e f f e c t s of
s t r o n g l e a d e r s h i p , o r t h e l a c k t h e r e o f , were r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t , and g r e a t l y
influenced t h e frequency and s e v e r i t y of t h e e r r o r s observed.

Events surrounding one p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n of t h e high workload

s c e n a r i o w e r e p a r t i c u l a r l y i l l u m i n a t i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e r e s o u r c e manage-
ment i s s u e . Because of t h e f o r c e d d i v e r s i o n , i t was necessary t o dump f u e l
i n o r d e r t o reduce t h e a i r c r a f t g r o s s weight t o an a c c e p t a b l e v a l u e f o r
landing. During t h e f u e l dump procedure, which p l a c e s a p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy
load on t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r , t h e c a b i n a t t e n d a n t c a l l e d t h e f l i g h t engineer
w i t h a r e q u e s t t o c a l l i n a l i s t of passenger names s o t h a t s u i t a b l e con-
n e c t i o n s t o t h e i r d e s t i n a t i o n s could be made. Many of t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s
attempted t o comply w i t h t h i s r e q u e s t , and t h e subsequent d i v e r s i o n of
a t t e n t i o n from t h e f u e l dumping procedure l e d t o some i n t e r e s t i n g e r r o r s ,
i n c l u d i n g one i n s t a n c e of a 100,000 lb e r r o r i n c a l c u l a t i n g t h e a i r c r a f t
g r o s s weight. Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t h e r e , however, were t h e v a r i o u s ways
d i f f e r e n t c a p t a i n s managed t h e s i t u a t i o n , and t h e e f f e c t of t h i s on t h e k i n d s
and f r e q u e n c i e s of e r r o r s committed. I n some i n s t a n c e s , t h e c a p t a i n played
a v e r y active management r o l e by s e t t i n g p r i o r i t i e s and d i r e c t i n g t h e f l i g h t
engineer t o postpone the c a l l t o the company u n t i l a f t e r t h e f u e l dump and
o t h e r more important o p e r a t i o n a l requirements were m e t . In these instances,
r e l a t i v e l y few e r r o r s were observed. In o t h e r cases, however, t h e c a p t a i n

4
e i t h e r f a i l e d t o n o t e t h e r e q u e s t from t h e c a b i n a t t e n d a n t , o r d i d n o t h i n g
t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e s i t u a t i o n . Many e r r o r s w e r e noted i n t h e s e circum-
s t a n c e s , and i t w a s t h i s s p e c i f i c series of o b s e r v a t i o n s t h a t l e d most
d i r e c t l y t o t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e management behavior as being a
most important v a r i a b l e i n f l i g h t - d e c k o p e r a t i o n s and t o t h e subsequent
e f f o r t t o s t i m u l a t e t h e development of improved t r a i n i n g f o r r e s o u r c e
management s k i l l s .

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA

I n o r d e r t o g a i n more i n s i g h t i n t o t h e r e s o u r c e management problem and

t o o b t a i n r e s o u r c e material t h a t might b e used i n a r e s o u r c e management
t r a i n i n g program, NASA p r o j e c t p e r s o n n e l undertook a review and a n a l y s i s of
j e t t r a n s p o r t a c c i d e n t s . On t h e b a s i s of t h i s review, more t h a n 60 a c c i d e n t s
i n t h e p e r i o d 1968-1976 w e r e i d e n t i f i e d i n which r e s o u r c e management problems
played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e (see t a b l e 1 f o r a complete l i s t ) . Some examples
follow.

I n December 1972, a wide-body t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t crashed i n t h e

Everglades n e a r M i a m i w h i l e t h e f l i g h t crew w a s a t t e m p t i n g t o r e p l a c e a
f a u l t y nose g e a r l i g h t . The subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l e d t h e f o l l o w i n g
sequence of e v e n t s as r e p o r t e d i n t h e o f f i c i a l a c c i d e n t r e p o r t :

A t 2336:04 t h e c a p t a i n i n s t r u c t e d t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r , who was f2yin.g the

a i r c r a f t [ i t a l i c s added], t o engage t h e a u t o p i l o t .

A minute l a t e r :

The f i r s t o f f i c e r s u c c e s s f u l l y removed t h e n o s e g e a r l i g h t l e n s
assembly, b u t i t jammed when h e attempted t o r e p l a c e i t .

A t 2338:34, t h e c a p t a i n a g a i n d i r e c t e d t h e second o f f i c e r t o
descend i n t o t h e forward e l e c t r o n i c s bay and check t h e a l i g n -
ment of t h e nose g e a r i n d i c e s .

From 2338:56 t o 2341:05, t h e c a p t a i n and t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r

d i s c u s s e d t h e f a u l t y nose g e a r p o s i t i o n l i g h t l e n s assembly
and how i t might have been i n s e r t e d i n c o r r e c t l y .

A t 2340:38, a half-second C-Chord which i n d i c a t e d a d e v i a t i o n

of +/-250 f t from t h e s e l e c t e d a l t i t u d e sounded i n t h e c o c k p i t .
No crew member commented on t h e C-chord. No p i t c h change t o
c o r r e c t f o r t h e l o s s of a l t i t u d e w a s recorded.

A t 2342:12...the a i r c r a f t crashed i n t o t h e Everglades.

5
The NTSB r e p o r t co

r o u t i n e of f l c t i o n s u s u a l l y do no
the other f l i c a u s e of t h e i r shor
o r t h e i r r o u t i n e i n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e f l y i n g t a s k . However,
t h e f o l l o w i n g took p l a c e i n t h i s a c c i d e n t :

1. The approach and l a n d i n g r o u t i n e w a s i n t e r r u p t e d by

a n abnormal g e a r i n d i c a t i o n .

2 . The a i r c r a f t was flown t o a s a f e a l t i t u d e , and t h e

a u t o p i l o t w a s engaged t o reduce workload, but positive
deZegation of a i r c r a f t controZ was not accompZished [ i t a l i c s
added].

3 . The nose g e a r p o s i t i o n l i g h t l e n s assembly w a s removed

and i n c o r r e c t l y r e i n s t a l l e d .

4 . The f i r s t o f f i c e r became preoccupied [ i t a l i c s added]

w i t h h i s a t t e m p t s t o remove t h e jammed l i g h t assembly.

5. The c a p t a i n divided h i s attention [ i t a l i c s added]

between a t t e m p t s t o h e l p t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r and o r d e r s t o t h e
o t h e r crewmembers t o t r y o t h e r approaches t o t h e problem.

6. The f l i g h t crew devoted approximately 4 min t o t h e

d i s t r a c t i o n , w i t h minimal r e g a r d f o r o t h e r f l i g h t requirements.

And f i n a l l y :

The c a p t a i n f a i l e d t o a s s u r e that a p i l o t w a s monitoring t h e

p r o g r e s s of t h e a i r c r a f t a t a l l times.

I n t h e same month as t h a t i n which t h e p r e v i o u s a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d , a

B-737 crashed s h o r t of t h e runway a t Midway a i r p o r t i n Chicago. A s i n t h e
previous a c c i d e n t , a minor mechanical m a l f u n c t i o n d i s t r a c t e d t h e f l i g h t
crew s u f f i c i e n t l y s o t h a t p o s i t i o n awareness w a s a p p a r e n t l y l o s t . The air-
c r a f t c r o s s e d t h e F i n a l Approach F i x 700 f t above t h e published minimum
c r o s s i n g a l t i t u d e , w i t h t h e a i r c r a f t n o t configured f o r t h e landing.

The o f f i c i a l a c

The preponderanc tes t h a t t h e r u s h of c o c k p i t

activities duri d e s c e n t caused a breakdown of t h e
safeguards inhe ask-sharing of a crew. The e r r o r -
provoking env ir o m e s t a g e f o r t h e crew's f a i l u r e t o
n o t i c e t h a t t h e s p o i l e r s w e r e s t i l l extended a t l e v e l - o f f and
t o arrest t h e r a p i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n of a i r s p e e d t h a t followed.

6
 Although a g r e a t e r p o r t i o n of t h i s a n a l y s i s d e a l s w i t h t h e
e v e n t s surrounding t h e l e v e l - o f f , t h e board wishes t o
emphasize t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t sequence w a s t r i g g e r e d by the
captain's f a i l u r e t o exercise positive f l i g h t management
earlier during the approach [ i t a l i c s added].
I n s t i l l a n o t h e r j e t t r a n s p o r t a c c i d e n t , t h e NTSB wrote:

C o n t r i b u t i n g c a u s a l f a c t o r s were...the c a p t a i n ' s f a i l u r e
t o d e l e g a t e any meaningful r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o t h e c o p i l o t
which r e s u l t e d i n a l a c k of e f f e c t i v e t a s k s h a r i n g d u r i n g
t h e emergency.

A f t e r a more r e c e n t a c c i d e n t i n which a c a r g o l i n e r c r a s h e d i n t o h i g h t e r r a i n
w h i l e t h e f l i g h t c r e w w a s a t t e m p t i n g t o r e s o l v e a mechanical problem, t h e
NTSB wrote:

S i n c e t h i s t y p e of s i t u a t i o n is dynamic because t h e a i r c r a f t
must b e flown w h i l e t h e m a l f u n c t i o n is r e s o l v e d , i t f o l l o w s
t h a t t h e c a p t a i n must manage the f l i g h t crew [ i t a l i c s added]
i n a manner which w i l l i n s u r e a b s o l u t e s a f e o p e r a t i o n of t h e
a i r c r a f t d u r i n g t h e i n t e r i m . . . I t remains t h a t t h e c a p t a i n ' s
f i r s t and foremost r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s t o i n s u r e s a f e o p e r a t i o n
of the a i r c r a f t . To a c h i e v e t h i s o b j e c t i v e , h e must r e l e g a t e
other a c t i v i t i e s accordingly.

These a c c i d e n t s s h a r e some common f a c t o r s , each of which is a n element of

t h e r e s o u r c e management problem. L i s t e d below are t h e most f r e q u e n t l y
observed problems i n t h e s e a c c i d e n t s .

- P r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h minor mechanical problems

*Inadequate leadership

* F a i l u r e t o d e l e g a t e t a s k s and a s s i g n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s

' F a i l u r e t o set p r i o r i t i e s

Inadequate m o n i t o r i n g

*Failure t o u t i l i z e available data

* F a i l u r e t o communicate i n t e n t and p l a n s

C o l l e c t i v e l y , t h e i t e m s l i s t e d above s u g g e s t a d e f i n i t i o n of " r e s o u r c e
management" and a l s o s u g g e s t some p o s s i b l e t r a i n i n g o b j e c t i v e s t h a t should b e
addressed by any r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g program. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o
n o t e t h a t t h e s e f a c t o r s were a l s o observed i n t h e R u f f e l l Smith s t u d y , and
are a l s o common f e a t u r e s of t h e a i r c r a f t i n c i d e n t d a t a d i s c u s s e d below.

7
 AIRCRAFT INCIDENT DATA

I n a d d i t i o n t o reviewing t h e t r a n s p o r t a c c i d e n t r e c o r d , a s e a r c h of t h e
A v i a t i o n S a f e t y Reporting System d a t a b a s e w a s conducted. The o b j e c t i v e s of
t h i s s e a r c h were similar t o t h e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e a c c i d e n t a n a l y s i s , namely,
t o o b t a i n a d d i t i o n a l d a t a t h a t f u r t h e r r e f i n e our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of r e s o u r c e
management as i t a p p l i e s t o f l i g h t - d e c k o p e r a t i o n s , and t o f i n d material
t h a t may have e d u c a t i o n a l v a l u e . A t t h e t i m e t h e s e a r c h w a s conducted, t h e
ASRS d a t a b a s e c o n t a i n e d n e a r l y 7,000 r e p o r t s . The s e a r c h , which covered j e t
t r a n s p o r t o p e r a t i o n s o n l y , recovered 670 i n c i d e n t r e p d r t s t h a t were r e l e v a n t
t o t h e i s s u e of r e s o u r c e management. Some t y p i c a l examples of ASRS i n c i d e n t
r e p o r t s follow.

During t h e c a p t a i n ' s PA t a l k t o t h e p a s s e n g e r s , w e r e c e i v e d a
change of heading and a l t i t u d e from 9,000 up t o 14,000. The
c a p t a i n s t a r t e d t h e climb and changed power w h i l e t a l k i n g .
When h e f i n i s h e d t a l k i n g , t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r s a i d t o t u r n l e f t
t o 160". The c a p t a i n turned t h e a i r c r a f t and k e p t climbing--
16,000 f t w a s i n t h e a l t i t u d e reminder window. W e l e v e l e d
o f f a t 16,000 and c a l l e d d e p a r t u r e c o n t r o l and r e q u e s t e d h i g h e r .
We w e r e advised t h a t w e should b e on Center frequency. W e
c a l l e d C e n t e r , and h e asked i f t h i s w a s our f i r s t c a l l . W e s a i d
y e s , and Center asked f o r our a l t i t u d e . W e r e p l i e d 16,000, and
Center s a i d w e should be a t 14,000, b u t t o climb i n s t e a d t o
FL230. We d i d . W e d o n ' t know who p u t 16,000 i n t h e window of
of t h e a l t i t u d e reminder; w e could n o t recall any c o n v e r s a t i o n
about changing t o Center. I f e e l that i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e
c a p t a i n misunderstood t h e 160 as a n a l t i t u d e i n s t e a d of a heading
and p u t 160 i n t h e a l t i t u d e reminder. F i r s t o f f i c e r w a s busy
w i t h something else and d i d n ' t see t h e wrong a l t i t u d e i n t h e
window. N e i t h e r t h e c a p t a i n nor t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r remember p u t t i n g
160 i n t h e window.

Another r e p o r t which i l l u s t r a t e s a n o t h e r a s p e c t of t h e problem w a s

r e c e i v e d from a n a i r l i n e c a p t a i n :

Our a i r c r a f t a r r i v e d i n Omaha. I went i n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n s

o f f i c e t o check t h e weather. On, r e t u r n i n g t o t h e a i r c r a f t
I asked t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r i f w e had a n ATC c l e a r a n c e . H e
r e p l i e d t h a t w e d i d . I asked him what i t w a s . He said,
"Cleared as f i l e d , m a i n t a i n 5,000, expect 11,000 10 min a f t e r
departure." Our f l i g h t p l a n s are a l l Center-stored and I
asked him how w e w e r e f i l e d so t h a t I could v e r i f y t h e
r o u t i n g I had on my Center-stored f l i g h t p l a n . The f i r s t
o f f i c e r ' s "as f i l e d " w a s t h e same as mine, namely, V159 STJ
d i r e c t MCI. The d e p a r t u r e went normally. W e were handed
o f f t o Center (Minneapolis) as I f l e w t h e a i r c r a f t on t h e
p r e v i o u s r o u t i n g t o 11,000 f t . We c r o sed OMA VOR and
proceeded on c o u r s e V159. Approximately 25 m i l e s from OMA

8
 VOR, Center asked i f w e w e r e f l y i n g t h e Omaha 1 Arrival. I
answered t h a t w e w e r e n ' t , that i t w a s my u n d e r s t a n d i n g w e
were c l e a r e d V159. H e s a i d t h a t w e w e r e n ' t , b u t t h a t w e
could work i t o u t w i t h Kansas C i t y . Handoff w a s e f f e c t e d ,
and Kansas C i t y turned u s t o 165" and v e c t o r e d u s t o t h e
approach g a t e a t MCI. I a g a i n asked t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r f o r t h e
c l e a r a n c e t h a t h e copied. H e s a i d t h a t i t w a s h i s m i s t a k e ,
t h a t h e d i d n o t know what a n "Omaha 1 Arrival" meant, t h a t
he checked my approach p l a t e s and h i s , and t h a t n e i t h e r of
u s had a n Omaha SID by t h a t name, so h e ignored i t b u t r e a d
t h e c l e a r a n c e back w i t h o u t mentioning t h e SID and t h a t
c l e a r a n c e d e l i v e r y accepted t h e read-back. Furthermore, he
s a i d t h a t he d i d n o t t h i n k t o a s k m e about t h e Omaha 1
a r r i v a l when I r e t u r n e d t o t h e a i r c r a f t . I f e l t l i k e I had
been s o l d down t h e river by an o t h e r w i s e v e r y t r u s t w o r t h y ,
competent f i r s t o f f i c e r . C l e a r l y , he made a s e r i o u s m i s t a k e ,
as I suppose I d i d i n n o t checking t h e c l e a r a n c e w i t h
c l e a r a n c e d e l i v e r y . To do s o , however, would s u r e l y l e a v e your
f i r s t o f f i c e r w i t h t h e f e e l i n g t h a t "This guy d o e s n ' t t r u s t me,"
which i s now t h e case. But on t h e o t h e r hand, t r u s t and co-
o r d i n a t i o n are d e f i n i t e l y n e c e s s a r y f o r a s a f e o p e r a t i o n .
While cross-check i s a h e a l t h y worthwhile c o c k p i t a c t i v i t y , i t
becomes counter-productive when one crewmember f e e l s t h a t
" I ' m g e t t i n g a check r i d e " from t h e o t h e r crewmembers. For
t h i s r e a s o n , I probably won't q u e s t i o n t h e n e x t c l e a r a n c e I
g e t from t h i s o r any o t h e r f i r s t o f f i c e r , b u t I'll be uneasy.
The nagging f e a r t h a t he may have miscopied o r misunderstood
w i l l b e i n t h e back of my mind. Many of our days r e q u i r e 1 4 h r
i n t h e c o c k p i t , and t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l needs of crewmembers
n e c e s s i t a t e t h a t a l l are n o t going t o be p r e s e n t i n t h e c o c k p i t
at all times.

One o t h e r element of t h e problem w a s observed i n b o t h t h e f u l l - m i s s i o n

s i m u l a t i o n s t u d y and i n t h e a c c i d e n t d a t a . The f o l l o w i n g r e p o r t i l l u s t r a t e s
problems t h a t can s t e m from p e r s o n a l i t y c l a s h e s i n t h e c o c k p i t :

The c e i l i n g w a s below minimums, r e p o r t e d as 200 f t , , 3 / 4 m i l e s

v i s i b i l i t y . Winds w e r e v a r i a b l e from a crosswind t o a t a i l w i n d
( p o s s i b l e wind s h e a r ) , and t h e r e were thunderstorms, r a i n , and
t u r b u l e n c e . W e were h o l d i n g about 20 m i l e s o u t of Boston.
Because the v i s i b i l i t y w a s l e g a l , approach c o n t r o l w a s c l e a r i n g
a i r p l a n e s f o r approaches. A c o u p l e d i d g e t i n , b u t w i t h a l l
t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , I decided n o t t o make a n approach. Now, my
c o p i l o t is a v e r y experienced p i l o t (which most of them are
nowadays) - h e became a c o c k p i t lawyer. H e wanted t o g e t home,
he questioned a l l my d e c i s i o n s , a c t u a l l y t r y i n g t o i n t i m i d a t e
m e , demanding e x p l a n a t i o n s of e v e r y t h i n g I s a i d . W e were v e r y
busy changing h o l d i n g p o i n t s , a l t i t u d e s , changing a l t e r n a t e s ,
r e f i g u r i n g f u e l , e t c . H e w a s making t h e whole j o b h a r d e r . I
decided a n approach w a s n o t t h e b e s t t h i n g , and went t o t h e

9
 a l t e r n a t e . There seem t o b e a l o t of c o p i l o t s t a k i n g over t h e
c o c k p i t . Now t h e r e must b e c a p t a i n s a l l o w i n g t h i s , because I
see a l o t of my c o p i l o t s t r y i n g t o r u n my c o c k p i t l a t e l y . I
do t h i n k t h a t t h e r e are c a p t a i n s who a l l o w t h e c o p i l o t t o in-
t imida t e them.

Miles Murphy, one of t h e NASA p r o j e c t p e r s o n n e l , undertook a d e t a i l e d

a n a l y s i s of a sample of 250 of t h e 670 r e p o r t s . On t h e b a s i s of t h e s e d a t a ,
Murphy developed t h e a n a l y s i s of s k i l l s , o r g a n i z a t i o n and p r o c e s s
v a r i a b l e s , and r e s o u r c e s summarized i n t a b l e 2. It c a n be s e e n t h a t t h e s e
c a t e g o r i e s could be a p p l i e d t o t h e j e t t r a n s p o r t a c c i d e n t d a t a d i s c u s s e d
above o r t o t h e d a t a o b t a i n e d by R u f f e l l Smith. It i s a l s o a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e t a b l e might p r o v i d e t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r a n approach t o
developing e f f e c t i v e r e s o u r c e management behavior - these are t h e s k i l l s
t h a t should b e t r a i n e d .

APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM

T r a i n i n g , which i s t h e f o c u s of t h i s workshop, i s o n l y one of s e v e r a l

p o s s i b l e approaches t o t h e problem. O t h e r s , which could be undertaken
s e p a r a t e l y o r i n tandem w i t h t h e t r a i n i n g approach, i n c l u d e s a f e t y awareness
p u b l i c a t i o n s and programs, and t h e a d o p t i o n of some o p e r a t i o n a l procedures
t h a t might h e l p t o avoid s i t u a t i o n s such as t h o s e seen i n i n c i d e n t s and
a c c i d e n t s . Some of t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s are b r i e f l y d i s c u s s e d below.

It i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a major s t e p forward may be t a k e n by programs t h a t

c r e a t e a n awareness of t h e problem by f l i g h t - d e c k crewmembers. A v i a t i o n has
t r a d i t i o n a l l y used "hangar f l y i n g " a s a n informal b u t important s o u r c e of
o p e r a t i o n a l and s a f e t y r e l a t e d i n f o r m a t i o n . F l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s n e w s l e t t e r s ,
f l i g h t s a f e t y b u l l e t i n s , and similar material may b e v e r y e f f e c t i v e i n
c r e a t i n g more u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e problem and developing e f f e c t i v e s o l u t i o n s .
Much of t h i s material could b e developed from i n c i d e n t d a t a r e p o r t e d t o t h e
ASRS and from a i r c r a f t a c c i d e n t d a t a . It i s d i f f i c u l t t o assess t h e
e f f e c t i v e n e s s o r completeness of t h i s approach b e c a u s e of i t s v o l u n t a r y
n a t u r e (on t h e p a r t of i n d i v i d u a l p i l o t s ) . However, t h e s e programs are
r e l a t i v e l y i n e x p e n s i v e and probably c o s t e f f e c t i v e .

Another approach t h a t might b e used i s t h e a d o p t i o n of some o p e r a t i o n a l

g u i d e l i n e s o r r u l e s t h a t if a p p l i e d p r o p e r l y by crewmembers might assist
t h e crew i n e x e r c i s i n g proper f l i g h t - d e c k r e s o u r c e management L i s t e d below
are some examples of o p e r a t i n g r u l e s that could b e a p p l i e d t o f l i g h t
o p e r a t i o n s . These are p r e s e n t e d as examples o n l y , and i t must b e understood
t h a t t h e y have n o t been reviewed o r e v a l u a t e d . They are intended t o provoke
d i s c u s s i o n and t o s t i m u l a t e t h e development of new i d e a s and approaches.

1. I n any abnormal s i t u a t i o n , p o s i t i v e d e l e g a t i o n of f l y i n g and

monitoring r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s must b e t h e t o p p r i o r i t y a c t i o n i t e m .

10
 2. P o s i t i v e d e l e g a t i o n of monitoring r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i s as important
as p o s i t i v e d e l e g a t i o n of f l y i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .

3 . The p i l o t f l y i n g must n o t a t t e m p t t o perform secondary t a s k s (e.g.,

PA announcements) d u r i n g dynamic f l i g h t s i t u a t i o n s ( e . g . , climbing, descending,
turning).

4 . Whenever t h e r e a r e c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of f a c t , f o r
example, c l e a r a n c e s , e x t e r n a l s o u r c e s of i n f o r m a t i o n must b e used t o r e s o l v e
t h e c o n f l i c t . Never r e l y on t h e "confidence" of y o u r s e l f o r a f e l l o w c r e w -
member t o r e s o l v e a m b i g u i t i e s o r c o n f l i c t s .

5. Whenever t h e r e i s c o n f l i c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from two s o u r c e s , o r in-

formation of q u e s t i o n a b l e v a l i d i t y from one s o u r c e , cross-checking from an
independent s o u r c e is a n e c e s s i t y .

6 . I f any crewmember h a s a doubt about a c l e a r a n c e , procedure, o r

s i t u a t i o n , h e o r s h e must make t h a t doubt known t o t h e o t h e r crewmembers.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

T h i s paper has attempted t o d e f i n e a s p e c i f i c problem, namely, t h a t

t h e r e i s a demonstrated requirement t o improve t h e a b i l i t i e s of f l i g h t - d e c k
crewmembers t o i d e n t i f y and u t i l i z e o r manage t h e r e s o u r c e s t h a t are
a v a i l a b l e t o them. Furthermore, t h e paper h a s attempted t o i d e n t i f y some of
t h e s p e c i f i c s k i l l s r e q u i r e d , and t o s u g g e s t , i n g e n e r a l terms, t h e
d i r e c t i o n s which might b e taken t o a d d r e s s t h e problem. A l l of t h i s material
is intended t o s e r v e as background, t o set t h e s t a g e f o r t h e remainder of
t h i s conference. Much remains t o be done t o develop s p e c i f i c recommenda-
t i o n s f o r what s k i l l s need t o be t r a i n e d and how such t r a i n i n g should be
conducted; t h e s e a r e t h e o b j e c t i v e s of t h i s workshop, and each of you w i l l
p l a y a major r o l e i n a c h i e v i n g t h o s e o b j e c t i v e s . To assist you, w e have
arranged f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n s - two c o n c e p t u a l p a p e r s from t h e
academic world, and a series of p r e s e n t a t i o n s from your i n d u s t r y , d e s c r i b i n g
v a r i o u s approaches c u r r e n t l i being t a k e n t o develop l e a d e r s h i p and management
s k i l l s i n l i n e p i l o t s . The material p r e s e n t e d i n t h e s e p a p e r s i s intended t o
serve as a d d i t i o n a l f u e l - t o s t i m u l a t e t h e flow of i d e a s and c o n c e p t s t h a t
might b e a p p l i e d t o t h e problems d e s c r i b e d i n t h i s paper. W e have t h u s f a r
only d e f i n e d a problem - t h e s o l u t i o n s must come from you.

11
 TABLE 1. - AIRLINE ACCIDENTS

Date Operat i o n Site

U.S. a i r l i n e accidents
1. 06/22/68 JL DC-8 San F r a n c i s c o , CA
2. 01/20/70 TI DC-9 Harlingen, TX
3. 02/01/70 NC CV-580 Detroit, M I
4. 07/27/70 FT DC-8 Okinawa
5. 09/08/70 DL DC-9 L o u i s v i l l e , KY
6. 09/08/70 TV DC-8 Jamaica, NY
7. 09/29/70 BN B-720 Dallas, TX
8. 12/28/70 TQ B-727 S t . Thomas, V . I .
9. 01/11/71 DL DC-9 Jackson, MS
10. 02/17/71 so DC-9 G u l f p o r t , MS
11. 03/19/71 UA B-727 Denver, CO
12. 06/06/71 RW DC-9 Duarte, CA
13. 06/07/71 AL CV-500 New Haven, CT
14. 07/19/71 UA B-737 P h i l a d e l p h i a , PA
15. 07/23/71 UA B-747 Chicago, I L
16. 07/30/71 PA B-747 San F r a n c i s c o , CA
17. 08/04/71 co B-707/CNA Compton, CA
18. 09/04/71 wc B-727 Juneau, AK
19. 12/21/71 EA B-727 Atlanta, GA
20. 03/03/72 MO FH-2 27B Albany, NY
21. 05/18/72 EA DC-9 F t . Lauderdale, FL
22. 06/14/72 so DC-9 Chicago, I L
23. 09/01/72 Tw B-747 Jamaica, NY
24. 12/08/72 UA B-737 Chicago, I L
25. 12/12/72 Tw B-707 Jamaica, NY
26. 12/19/72 EA L-1011 M i a m i , FL
27. 12/20/72 NC DC-9/DL CV-880 Chicago, I L
28. 01/12/73 EA L-1011 M i a m i , FL
29. 04/10/73 EA B-727 Toledo, OH
30. 07/31/73 DL DC-9 Boston, MA
31. 09/08/73 wo DC-8 King Cove, AK
32. 12/17/73 EA DC-9 Greensboro, NC
33. 01/16/74 Tw B-707 Los Angeles, CA
34. 01/17/74 Tw B-707 Indianapolis, I N
35. 01/30/74 PA B-707 Pago Pago, Samoa
36. 07/03/74 DL L-1011 Atlanta, GA
37. 09/11/74 EA DC-9 C h a r l o t t e , NC
38. 12/01/74 Tw B-727 Berryville, VA
39. * 12/01/74 Nw B-727 T h i e l l s , NY
40. 03/31/75 WA B-737 Casper, WY
41. 06/24/75 EA B-7 27 Jamaica, NY
42. 12/12/75 EA B-727 Raleigh, NC
43. 04/27/76 AA B-727 S t . Thomas, V . I .
44. 12/12/76 wc B-727 Ketchikan, AK

12
 TABLE 1. - Concluded

Date Operat i o n Site

Foreign a i r l i n e a c c i d e n t s
1. 01/05/70 Spantax CV-990 Stockholm, Sweden
2. 09/15/71 AZ DC-8 Jamaica, NY
3. 01/22/72 PK B-720B Ankara, Turkey
4. 01/29/71 CP/TN DC-8/B-727 Sydney, A u s t r a l i a
5. 06/14/72 JL DC-8 Delhi, I n d i a
6. 06/18/72 BE Trident P a r i s , France
7. 11/28/72 JL DC-8 Moscow, USSR
8. 03/12/73 WO/SN DC-8/CRV Land's End, England
9. 03/05/73 I B DC-g/Spantax CV-990 Nantes , France
10. 06/23/73 LL DC-8 Jamaica, NY
11. 07/11/73 RG 3-707 P a r i s , France
12. 08/13/73 A0 CRY Coruna , Spain
13. 06/17/73 IB DC-10 Boston, MA
14. 06/06/74 B r i t . A i r Tours B-707 Crete
15. 06/21/74 DX B-727 Luton, England
16. 09/05/74 BA B-747 Nairobi, Kenya
17. 12/04/74 Mart i n a i r , DC- 8 S r i Lanka
18. 05/11/76 BA B-747 Kuala Lumpur
I

13
 TABLE 2. - CLASSIFICATION OF IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS

I. S o c i a l and communication s k i l l s
Strained s o c i a l relations
Assert i v e n e s s
N o n v e r i f i c a t i o n of communications
Unnecessary communications
Withhold i n g communicat i o n s
Assumptions about o t h e r understanding
Assumptions about meaning
Assumptions about message

11. Leadership and management s k i l l s

Delegation of a u t h o r i t y
Erosion of a u t h o r i t y
C a p t a i n ' s t r u s t - d o u b t dilemma
Lack of d e c i s i v e command
D i s c i p l i n e and l e a d e r s h i p i n applying r e g u l a t i o n s
Casualness i n c o c k p i t
Crew coordination
Time structuring, p r i o r i t i e s

111. Planning, problem s o l v i n g , and d e c i s i o n s k i l l s

Inadequate planning
Information r e t r i e v a l ,
Q u a l i t y and t i m e l i n e s s of information
C r e d i b i l i t y of information
Problem s o l v i n g s t r a t e g i e s
Staying ahead of t h e problem ( c r i s e s p r e v e n t i o n )
Decision under stress
Group t h i n k

IV. Role
Def i n i t i o n / u n d e r s tanding (p i l o t -cop i l o t )
Command r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of c a p t a i n when f i r s t o f f i c e r f l y i n g
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 1st o f f i c e r when c a p t a i n d e v i a t e s from s a f e
o r l e g a l practices
Reduced command o p t i o n s
Workload
Task a l l o c a t i o n
Monitoring
Backup
Gal l o u t s

14
 TABLE 2 . - Concluded
I. Resources
Human Material
Individual differences i n Facilities
knowledge, p r o f i c i e n c y , Availability
experience, motivation, Adequacy
stress r e a c t i o n Human e n g i n e e r i n g
Fatigue Equipment
Availability
Access
Ad equa c y
Human e n g i n e e r i n g
Automatics v s manual
Textual information
Availability
Access
Adequacy
Human e n g i n e e r i n g
Environmental i n f o r m a t i o n
Availability
Adequacy

15
 REFERENCES

1. R u f f e l l Smith, H. P.: A Simulator Study of t h e I n t e r a c t i o n of P i l o t

Workload w i t h E r r o r s , V i g i l a n c e , and Decisions. NASA TM-78482, 1979.

16
 S o c i a l Psyc eck

Robert L . Helmreich *

Abstract

Social psychological and personality factors that can

influence resource management on the flight deck are

discussed. It i s argued that personality and situational

factors intersect to determine crew responses and that

assessment of performance under full crew and mission

c o n d i t i o n s can provide the most v a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n about

relevant factors. The p o s s i b i l i t y of t r a i n i n g procedures to

improve performance on these dimensions is d i s c u s s e d .

NASA research has developed a strong case for the need to

understand and improve resource management on the flight deck.

Examination of data from f u l l mission simulations, as well as from

transcripts of a c c i d e n t r e p o r t s and ASRS i n c i d e n t r e p o r t s , convincingly

documents how less t h a n optimal management and utilization of human

resources in t h e c o c k p i t can lead t o d i s a s t r o u s outcomes. Considering

f l i g h t crews as small groups, a number of s o c i a l psychologica

can be isolated that are r e l e v a n t t o crew performance. These would

ers group relations, and communications

ay t o l o o k a t e f l i g h t deck from erspective

*University of Texas a t Austin.

17
of a p e r s o n a l i t y and s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t

Much o f my own research over t h e past 15 years has dealt with

s i t u a t i o n a l and personality determinants of crew performance under

c o n d i t i o n s of high stress. My research a c t i v i t i e s have dealt largely

with t h e Navy and NASA's s p a c e program rather t h a n commercial a v i a t i o n ,

but I hope t o argue convincingly t h a t t h e psychological f a c t o r s involved

are h i g h l y similar.

By way of preface, I would like to say a few words about

psychology's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o understanding crew performance. Everyone,

of c o u r s e , i s aware of t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n human f a c t o r s research h a s made

to technical performance. P e r s o n a l i t y psychology h a s c o n c e n t r a t e d on

t h e development o f psychometric i n s t r u m e n t s f o r personnel s e l e c t i o n and

for t h e p r e d i c t i o n of performance and/or adjustment. S o c i a l psychology

has focused on group processes relevant to individual and crew

performance. Before attempting to argue t h a t s o c i a l and p e r s o n a l i t y

psychology contribute t o this area, it might be worthwhile to

explore some o f t h e r e a s o n s why i t has n o t been h e a v i l y u t i l i z e d .

One problem w i t h p e r s o n a l i t y assessment h a s been a s t r o n g emphasis

on screening o u t u n l i k e l y or psychopathological c a n d i d a t e s r a t h e r t h a n

seleetinq p r o s p e c t s with o p t i m a l psychological characteristics. Part

of the problem comes from a l a c k o f consensus r e g a r d i n g j u s t what an

optimum psychological p r o f i l e c o n s i s t s o f . Further, one must decide

what the criteria for validation o f s e l e c t i o n procedures should be.

Should one look a t s u c c e s s f u l l i n e o p e r a t i o n over an extended period or

at performance i n emergency s i t u a t i o n s , or a t some weighted combination

o f these and o t h e r measures? I w i l l r e t u r n 30 t h e q u e s t i o n o f r e a c t i o n s

18
i n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s later.

S o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s , on t h e o t h e r hand, have tended to ignore

personality variables and to concentrate on tightly controlled

l a b o r a t o r y experiments. Such s t u d i e s may have great scientific rigor,

but t h e consumers of research have r i g h t l y questioned t h e g e n e r a l i t y of

such research t o t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s of real world problems such as combat

or aviation.

But perhaps t h e most s e r i o u s f a i l i n g i n our approach t o complex

problems of crew performance comes from i g n o r i n g t h e f a c t t h a t behavior

i s a f u n c t i o n of t h e m r a ctian of p e r s o n a l i t y and s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s .

What I mean i s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t behavior i n any g i v e n s i t u a t i o n i s

J o i n t l y determined by an i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r s o n a l i t y and by t h e nature of

the situation. The personality type associated with the best

performance i n one s e t t i n g could be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h failure i n another.

As I have noted, personality p s y c h o l o g i s t s have c o n c e n t r a t e d on

p e r s o n a l i t y t y p o l o g i e s rather t h a n the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f p e r s o n a l i t y t y p e s

in a range o f s i t u a t i o n s while s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s have been e q u a l l y

c a v a l i e r i n i g n o r i n g t h e impact of p e r s o n a l i t y i n situations, focusing

almost completely on s p e c i f y i n g t h e aspects of t h e p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n

a s s o c i a t e d w i t h b e h a v i o r a l outcomes.

Examination of t h e f i e l d suggests t h a t a h e a l t h y awareness of these

problems has developed along with much more sophisticated methodologies,

t h a t e n a b l e t h e examination of complex s i t u a t i o n s i n a r i g o r o u s manner.

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , we have o n l y begun t o demonstrate what we can do w i t h o u r

newly-gained e x p e r t i s e . I n t h e remainder of my presentation, I will

discuss some of t h e p e r s o n a l i t y and s i t u a t i a n a l v a r i a b l e s t h a t I see as

19
c r u c i a l f o r r e s o u r c e management i n a v i a t i o n . As an a s i d e , l e t me note

that I am aware of t h e s e v e r e c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t o p e r a t e on any l a r g e

o r g a n i z a t i o n involved w i t h selection and maintenance of high level

personnel. The person with the best psychological p r o f i l e may be

d e f i c i e n t p h y s i c a l l y o r may lack t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e on any combination

of the above. Once s e l e c t e d , a r i g i d s e n i o r i t y s y s t e m can o v e r - r i d e

o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n crew composition, The c h a l l e n g e is to obtain

t h e optimal outcome w i t h i n t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s .

A large number of personality dimensions have been specified

through research, many w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e o v e r l a p . Obviously, one must

choose by some means t h e s u b s e t of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s deemed relevant to

the s i t u a t i o n a t hand. I n our research, w e have begun w i t h performance

and group adjustment and have worked toward t h e isolation of relevant

trait clusters. L e t me d e s c r i b e t h e p o s s i b l e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f two t r a i t

dimensions a c r o s s s e v e r a l h y p o t h e t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s . We have found two

dimensions to be strongly and widely related t o group and i n d i v i d u a l

reactions. The first c l u s t e r can be called i n s t r u m e n t a li t y o r goal

orientation. The second cluster can be called e x m e s si v i t v o r group

orientation. Persons high on t h i s dimension tend t o be s e n s i t i v e t o t h e

f e e l i n g s of o t h e r s and i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y warm.

How t h e o r e t i c a l l y should these dimensions relate to flight-deck

performance? I n r o u t i n e f l y i n g one would e x p e c t a moderate r e l a t i o n s h i p

between performance and goal orientation and a minimal relationship

between performance and group o r i e n t a t i o n . One could p r e d i c t , however,

t h a t t h o s e high i n group o r i e n t a t i o n would establish warmer and more

e f f e c t i v e working and p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h a l l co-workers.

20
 I n t h e case o f 4 J l d i v i d W performance in emergencies, I would

expect the highly goal oriented individual to excel. I n general,

i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y would seem a good c a n d i d a t e as a s e l e c t i o n measure and

expressivity a nice, but n o n - e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r . V a l i d a t i o n using l i n e

performance and s i m u l a t o r performance i n emergencies should verify the

relevance of goal orientation and t h e lesser importance o f group

orientation.

However, from the perspective of resource management and the

c o n t e n t i o n t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o r t i o n of a c c i d e n t s i n v o l v e s a f a i l u r e

t o work optimally as a team, a different approach i s suggested.

Validation of predictors of crew performance, to the best o f my

knowledge, t y p i c a l l y involve assessing the reactions of a

complete crew d u r i n g conditions of work overload o r o t h e r i n - f l i g h t

crises. I t is my t h e s i s t h a t v a l i d a t i o n under these conditions might

suggest a d i f f e r e n t c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f optimal p e r s o n a l characteristics.

I would argue t h a t when t o t a l crew response t o crisis i s examined, the

best outcome (operationally defined as optimal responses to the

s i t u a t i o n by a l l crew members) might b e i n crews where the captain in

particular was high in both goal and group orientation. Such

i n d i v i d u a l s might b e expected t o be both competent i n dealing with the

technical aspects of the problem attuned t o t h e r e a c t i o n s and

performance o f o t h e r s .

My i n t e r e s t here is n o t t o develop a n argument f o r t h e a d o p t i o n of

a new s e t o f p e r s o n a l i t y measures, Rather, I am t r y i n g t o stress t h a t

i f t h e premise t h a t r e s o u r c e management and a s s o c i a t e d group performance

are i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r s t o e f f i c i e n t l i n e o p e r a t i o n , then t h e

21
e v a l u a t i o n o f U d i v i d u performance may f a i l to capture the crucial
dimensions o f crew behavior i n s t r e s s f u l s i t u a t i o n s .

I cannot resist a n aside on t h e personality issue, however. In

d i s c u s s i n g r e s o u r c e management and f l i g h t crew performance w i t h a number

o f e x p e r t s , one o f t h e major p o i n t s which emerged spontaneously was the

"problem of the macho pilot.I1 This has a l s o been an i s s u e o f some

importance w i t h a s t r o n a u t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the reluctance to accept

females and to shift t o a d i f f e r e n t mode o f o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e space

shuttle. I won't g e t i n t o t r y i n g t o define "macho" because I think

definitions o f t h i s t y p e o f i n d i v i d u a l a r e widely s h a r e d . We have been

concerned w i t h t h i s p e r s o n a l i t y t y p e in our research, expecially in

evaluating relations between the sexes and their relation to

performance. S u f f i c e i t t o s a y t h a t t h e p e r s o n a l i t y c o n s t e l l a t i o n which

most closely approximates t h e macho image i s t h e h i g h l y instrumental-low

e x p r e s s i v e one.

Turning t o more g e n e r a l social psychological f a c t o r s which may

influence crew performance, l e t me first d e f i n e t h e s o c i a l epvironment

o f t h e f l i g h t deck. Although t h e primary group o f i n t e r e s t c o n s i s t s o f

the Captain, First Officer and F l i g h t Engineer, t h e c r i t i c a l s o c i a l

network is larger and more complex. In thinking about social

i n t e r a c t i o n i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o i n c l u d e t h o s e i n v o i c e communication and

i n t e r m i t t e n t direct contact. Thus t h e system should i n c l u d e A i r Traffic

Controllers, Company Operations, the Cabin C r e w and i n d i r e c t l y , t h e

passengers.

The A i r Traffic C o n t r o l l e r is a central figure in the social

network and h i s r o l e i n f l i g h t deck o p e r a t i o n should be considered. For

22
example, take t h e r e c e n t s t u d y o f p o t e n t i a l accidents by NASA around

which there h a s been c o n t r o v e r s y (as w r i t t e n up, for example, r e c e n t l y

in &jsug 1. One i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e data i s that there may be a

greater risk o f c o l l i s i o n , as measured by i n c i d e n t r e p o r t s , when under

direct control. Without becoming embroilpd i n arguments about t h e need

f o r c o n t r o l and d i f f e r e n c e s i n r i s k a t v a r i o u s l o c a t i o n s , it seems worth

noting t h a t a line of social psychological research would predict

decreased vigilence under positive control. T h i s research h a s t o do

w i t h d i f f u si O r l ef r e s D o n s i b i l i t e . This series of investigations was

stimulated by the observed phenomenon o f i n d i v i d u a l s failinn t o take

a c t i o n i n emergencies o r r e d e f i n i n g the situation as non-threatening

when o t h e r s are p r e s e n t and c a p a b l e of t a k i n g a c t i o n . The most widely

c i t e d example i s t h e murder o f K i t t y Genovese outside her apartment.

She was stabbed repeatedly over a 30 minute period w h i l e 38 people

watched and called t h e p o l i c e , I n d i v i d u a l s i n such s i t u a t i o n s may

have a diminished sense of responsibility, feeling, perhaps

unconsciously, t h a t o t h e r s w i l l handle t h e incident. It is possible

t h a t being under p o s i t i v e c o n t r o l leads t o reduced v i g i l a n c e on the p a r t

o f crews, even though t h e y are f u l l y aware of t h e i r responsibility for

t h e aircraft .
Indeed, t h e i n c r e a s i n g automation o f aircraft f u n c t i o n s may serve

the undesired function of reducing t h e crew's s e n s e o f autonomy and

personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I n a recent interview, a senior Captain made

the following comments: "We are t h e best t r a i n e d instrument p i l o t s i n

t h e world, b u t we're n o t t r a i n i n g t o look o u t t h e window any more. It's

easy t o go cross-country on radar, and have somebody else do e v e r y t h i n g

23
f o r you. Sometimes we s a y t o each o t h e r up there t h a t t h e j a n i t o r could

f l y t h e p l a n e as w e l l as we do!"

I n a similar v e i n , c o n s i d e r t h e social p s y c h o l o g i c a l ramifications

of data from the f u l l m i s s i o n s i m u l a t i o n s t u d y conducted by R u f f e l l

Smith. The data suggest a higher error rate when a particular

crewmember i s i n a s t a t e o f work overload. I n many c o n t i n u i n g abnormal

s i t u a t i o n s o r emergencies, such as engine failure, in addition to

dealing with the operation of the aircraft, it is necessary to

c o o r d i n a t e t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e c a b i n crew and to communicate with the

passengers. In several instances, for example, the assumption of

c o n t r o l of the aircraft by the Captain w h i l e attempting t o make

important overall decisions concerning t h e f l i g h t was associated w i t h

serious errors.

I f i n d no r e a s o n t o q u e s t i o n t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of these findings.

Indeed, I would expect such outcomes t o be more f r e q u e n t i n emergencies

d u r i n g l i n e o p e r a t i o n s t h a n d u r i n g s i m u l a t i o n s because o f t h e objective

danger.

What are some of t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of overload on pilots during

non-routine flying conditions? From a p s y c h o l o g i c a l viewpoint, t h e

leader, decisionmaker is the least appropriate person to be

overburdened. Given that research shows a narrowing o f p e r c e p t u a l

a t t e n t i o n under stress, one can argue t h a t i t i s probably n o t o p t i m a l t o

involve the Captain i n multi-processing a v a r i e t y of tasks--such as

f l y i n g t h e p l a n e , c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e flight and cabin

crew, and making t h e u l t i m a t e d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g a c t i o n s t o b e t a k e n .

It is l i k e l y t h a t t h e q u a l i t y of each of these activities w i l l be

24
degraded i f a l l are undertaken simultaneously.

Another psychological f a c t o r can add t o t h e burden on t h e Captain.

This is increased dependency of crew members on t h e Captain under

stress. I n o u r research on groups under stress and i n a number o f o t h e r

studies, group members are s e e n t o become i n c r e a s i n g l y dependent on t h e

leader mder high stress c o n d i t i o n s . Thus, t h e Captain is likely to

bear additional responsibility for monitoring and directing the

performance of the crew. Conversely, by failing t o monitor the

responsibilities of o t h e r crew members d u r i n g t h e c r i t i c a l p e r i o d , t h e

Captain may s e r i o u s l y overload o t h e r crew members. An example of the

negative effects o f overload on t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r was n i c e l y shown i n

t h e R u f f e l l Smith study.

Along w i t h i n c r e a s e d dependency under stress, crew members may a l s o

experience a diminished s e n s e o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n an emergency, p l a c i n g

Y

more of t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e Captain. T h i s could

be intensified if the Captain relieves t h e F i r s t Officer o f f l y i n g

responsibility. Indeed, t h e e x e r c i s e o f l e a d e r s h i p by the Captain in

c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s probably r e p r e s e n t s a clear example o f a p e r s o n a l i t y

by s i t u a t i o n i n t e r a c t i o n . As a n hypothesized example, t h e a u t h o r i t a r i a n

type of i n d i v i d u a l may be g e n e r a l l y d i s l i k e d as a Captain i n normal

operations. Such a n i n d i v i d u a l may, on the o t h e r hand, t a k e charge v e r y

effectively in emergencies and be well suited to coping with t h e

dependency of crew members. The d e m o c r a t i c , # s o c i a l l y concerned leader

might be highly valued during r o u t i n e o p e r a t i o n s , b u t f i n d it more

d i f f i c u l t t o assume a s t r o n g l e a d e r s h i p r o l e when t h e s i t u a t i o n demands

it. It i s p o s s i b l e t h a t s p e c i f i c t r a i n i n g i n r o l e performance conducted

25
w i t h groups under simula

'ng and a high density of n

t h a t breakdowns i n t h e processing of important communications could p l a y

a significant role in crew e r r o r s . An important t a s k o f t h e Captain

would a p p e a r t o b e maintaining c l o s e s u p e r v i s i o n o f a l l communications,

eliminating unnecessary communications and e n s u r i n g t h a t a l l c r i t i c a l

data are understood. This is obviously an implicit part of the

Captain's r o l e , b u t I would b e t a t a n k o f gas t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t number

of communication breakdowns can b e observed under high workload and

emergency s i t u a t i o n s .
. Another t y p e o f p e r s o n - s i t u a t i o n i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t I t h i n k i s l i k e l y

to emerge concerns situations involving crews with a female member.

From my own research assessing t h e performance of women in demanding

roles under high stress, 1 have every reason to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e

i n d i v i d u a l performance o f female f l i g h t crew members w i l l be equal to

e competence of females,

26
f u r t h e r work overloads. I n t h e case o f a female Captain, the junior

male crew may a t t e m p t t o u s u r p t h e C a p t a i n ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . If t h i s

sounds far-fetched, i t can b e pointed o u t that such o c c u r r e n c e s were

noted among several all-male crews in the R u f f e l l Smith s t u d y . A

similar complaint about a t tempted take-over of Captain's

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s by a v e r y s e n i o r F i r s t Officer can b e found i n t h e ASRS

reports. I n any e v e n t , I would a r g u e t h a t as women become more widely

i n t e g r a t e d i n t o crews, t h e q u e s t i o n o f crew c o o r d i n a t i o n under s t r e s s f u l

c o n d i t i o n s should be i n v e s t i g a t e d w i t h high p r i o r i t y . Our friend the

"macho p i l o t " i s l i k e l y t o p l a y t h e p i v o t a l r o l e i n such s c e n a r i o s . The

following r e l e v a n t views were a t t r i b u t e d t o a p i l o t i n a r e c e n t s t o r y i n

the Washington Post. "He d i d s a y t h a t even though t h e men p i l o t s d o n ' t

s l a n d e r t h e i r female co-workers when f l y i n g , most would r a t h e r not fly

w i t h a woman. He added t h a t being a p i l o t c a l l s f o r and a t t r a c t s a v e r y

powerful, i f n o t 'macho' , personality."

On a more n e g a t i v e n o t e , I would l i k e t o mention a l i n e o f research

that has been quite influential in organizations. This is the

examination o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between group c o h e s i v e n e s s (defined as

the mutual a t t r a c t i o n of group members and their s e n s e of group

membership) and performance. I n g e n e r a l , it has been noted t h a t highly

c o h e s i v e crews also show s u p e r i o r performance. T h i s h a s l e d t o a number

o f a t t e m p t s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l settings t o i n s t i t u t e t r a i n i n g programs t o

improve group climate and cohesiveness w i t h t h e assumption t h a t improved

group r e l a t i o n s w i l l lead t o improved performance. The results have

been d i s t i n c t l y mixed. Our research w i t h well-motivated p r o f e s s i o n a l

crews ( i n this case with Aquanauts working underwater in a very

27
structured environment during Project Tektite) suggests a rather

d i f f e r e n t sequence o f c o u r s e s . In looking at performance and group

climate over extended p e r i o d s o f time we found t h a t p o s i t i v e changes i n

crew performance l e d t o more group cohesiveness w h i l e positive changes

in cohesiveness had 1 1 ~i n f l u e n c e on performance. This suggests t h a t

many t r a i n i n g programs have been dealing with effects rather than

causes. In other words, training efforts could more p r o f i t a b l y be

d i r e c t e d toward f a c i l i t a t i n g group performance, 'in which case group

relations should b e q u i t e good. A p a r t of such t r a i n i n g might i n c l u d e

emphasis on how personality types influence group performance in

d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of s i t u a t i o n s .

I have o n l y touched on a few instances where I feel social

psychological f a c t o r s may have a significant impact on f l i g h t deck

performance. I f e e l s t r o n g l y , though, t h a t a case i s developing f o r t h e

importance o f human r e s o u r c e management f o r s a f e t y i n f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s .

I would s u g g e s t t h a t a two-tiered approach to the issue might be

optimal,

F i r s t , I feel t h a t a d d i t i o n a l data on the influence of social

f a c t o r s on performance d u r i n g work overload and emergency s i t u a t i o n s are

needed. C o n t r o l l e d data o f t h i s s o r t can b e s t be o b t a i n e d during full

mission simulations. However, an important a d d i t i o n a l s o u r c e o f data

would be the social psychological analysis of cockpit and flight

recorder data from a c c i d e n t s where NTSB i n v e s t i g a t i o n h a s concluded t h a t

crew e r r o r has played a s i g n i f i c a n t part..

Assuming that unequivocal evidence can be amassed showing

decrements in performance and less t h a n optimal r e a c t i o n s t o abnormal

28
s i t u a t i o n s as a f u n c t i o n o f s o c i a l psychological f a c t o r s , i t should be

quite feasible to develop t r a i n i n g procedures t o h e l p crews cope w i t h

s u c h s i t u a t i o n s more e f f e c t i v e l y and even to improve person/situation

fit. In my opinion, mission s i m u l a t i o n s w i t h e x t e n s i v e c r i t i q u e s o f

group as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l performance would be the most impactful

means of implementing this. I a l s o believe t h a t highly e f f e c t i v e

t r a i n i n g tapes could b e developed h i g h l i g h t i n g t h e t y p e s of: deleterious

r e s o u r c e management i s o l a t e d i n such research.

A s a f i n a l n o t e , I would stress t h a t from a social psychologist's

viewpoint, a program i n r e s o u r c e management w i l l o n l y be s u c c e s s f u l i f

it is apparent to line personnel that it has the complete and

unequivocal support of management. The implementation o f s u c h a s h i f t

in training must also be done with some d e l i c a c y regarding the

self-images .of crew members. I think an example from t h e merchant

marine is h i g h l y i n s t r u c t i v e . One o f the major oil companies which

o p e r a t e s a large t a n k e r f l e e t d i d a c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s o f C a p t a i n ' s d u t i e s

and concluded that the Captain's job definition really consists

primarily of the management of complex resources; both human and

material. It was t h e r e f o r e d e c i d e d that the job description should

reflect this. Accordingly, all of t h e f l e e t c a p t a i n s were informed

t h a t , e f f e c t i v e immediately, t h e y were no longer Captains o f their

vessels but i n s t e a d were Shipboard Managers. Somewhat t o management's

s u r p r i s e , t h e r e a c t i o n s o f these managers was d i s t i n c t l y h o s t i l e . Their

t i t l e somehow f a i l e d t o c a p t u r e t h e image o f s a l t - s p r a y and r o l l i n g seas

which t h e y had s p e n t y e a r s a c q u i r i n g .

I doubt i f t h e t i t l e Aircraft Manager would f i n d much acceptance

29
among your Captains even though it may r e f l e c t t h e r e a l i t y of t o d a y ' s

operations. On t h e o t h e r hand, I f e e l t h a t c o n c r e t e demonstrations of

the need f o r crew c o o r d i n a t i o n and c a r e f u l management of r e s o u r c e s w i l l

lead t o r a p i d acceptance of the concept. The Ruffell Smith study

provides a good starting point. The very f a v o r a b l e r e a c t i o n s of t h e

crews involved s u g g e s t t h a t awareness o f a problem area can come r a p i d l y

under t h e proper c o n d i t i o n s .

Our case is n o t proven, but I hope t h a t time will bear out the

importance of dealing w i t h s o c i a l psychological f a c t o r s on t h e f l i g h t

deck. I feel that we can demonstrate quite conclusively that a

s i g n i f i c a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n can be made t o your o p e r a t i o n s . If we convince

you o f t h i s , s o c i a l psychology can assume a place as a significant

r e s o u r c e i n commeroial a v i a t i o n .

30
 AVIATION A C C I U M S AND

THE ‘THEORY OF THE SI’I’UTION’’

Lee Bolman
Harvard Graduate School of Education

Lee Bolman
Graduate School of Mucation
Harvard University
6 ~ p p Wiay ~
Cambridge, HA 02138

31
 ABSTMCT

F l i g h t crews can never be e n t i r e l y cer

the s i t u a t i o n o f t h o i r f l i g

s e t of

c o h e r e n t picture of what is happ

many r o u t i n e situations, those theories a c c o r d so c l o s e l y w i t h r e a l i t y ,

t h a t t h e r e is l i t t l e s t i o u t the . v a l i d i t y and

a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e difficult situations,

t h e chances of error i n t h e t h e o r y become much h i g h e r . The s k i l l s and

w i l l i n g n e s s o f a f l i g h t crew to b e alert t o possible errors i n t h e t h e o r y

become c r i t i c a l to t h e i r e f f e c t i v e n e s s and t h e i r a b i l i t y t o e n s u r e a safe

flight.

The paper i d e n t i f i e s s e v e r a l major factors t h a t determine t h e l i k e l i h o o d

t h a t a f a u l t y t h e o r y w i l l be detected and r e v i s e d :

1. The 'theories of practice' t h a t p i l o t s have developed through

t r a i n i n g and experience-and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e d e g r e e t o which
t h o s e t h e o r i e s b u i l d i n i n q u i r y and t e s t i n g i n s i t u a t i o n s of
c o n f u s i o n , anomaly, and crisis.

2. The abilities of crew members t o combine s k i l l s i n advocacy

and i n q u i r y .

3.. The management s k i l l s and s t y l e of t h e c a p t a i n .

4. The d e g r e e t o which t h e role system i n t h e c o c k p i t is w e l l

understood, and p r o c e d u r e s for role-modificati
shared.

l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e t r a i n i n g of p

t t h e y r e c e i v e training i n a l l o

lane. But it is e q u a l l y c r i t i c a l t h a t t h e y

i z e t h e i r own h i s t o r i c p a t t e r n s for l e a r n i n g , for r e l a t i n g

They need t o understand how to combine

32
authority with learning, f a s t response t

and c l a r i t y with w i l l i n g n a s s

dynamics o f role systems, how to create an e f f e c t i v e and mutually under-

stood set of role r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and how to modify those r e l a t i o n s h i p s

quickly without creating confusion, overlaps and gaps.

33
 ---The crew of a 1011 d i s c o v e r s d u r i n g an approach t h a t t h e l i g h t
on their nose gear is n o t on, and b e g i n t o circle w h i l e
a t t e m p t i n g t o correct t h e problem. The crew a p p a r e n t l y assume
that a l t i t u d e i s b e i n g monitored, b u t f a i l t o d e t e c t an unintended
d e s c e n t . "lie p l a n e crashes on a clear n i g h t , 99 p e o p l e are
k i l l e d , and 77 ottiers are i n j u r e d .

In each case, the c a p t a i n (or the e n t i r e crew) was, o p e r a c i n g on the

b

basis of a ' t h e o r y of t h e s i t u a t i o n ' -0 a s e t of b e l i e f s about what w a s

happening and what; a c t i o n s it w a s appropriate to take. I n e a c h case, t h e r e

was data a v a i l a b l e to i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e t h e o r y of t h e s i t u a t i o n was i n

error. In t h e f i r s t case, t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y data was assumed away. In the

second case, t h e crew d i d n o t s e e k d a t a t h a t might have alerted them to

their error. I n t h e third, t h e c r e w focused so h e a v i l y o n one element

of the s i t u a t i o n ( t h e nose gear l i g h t ) , that t h e y i n a t t e n d e d to e a s i l y

available data that would have a l e r t e d them to a serious problem. f n each

 2. taint n r o the factor:; i n fnckqrouncl and exjx?riencc. which i n f l u e n c e
t h e TOS t h a t a p i l o t is l i k e l y t o use?

3. How c a n e d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i i i q a c t i v i t i e s reduce t h o p r o b a b i l i t y

of errors i n a TOS?

4. What are t h e s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s t h a t i n c r e a s e t h e l i k e l i h o o d
that pilots w i l l recoqnize errors i n t h e i r TOS?

A. What d e t e r m i n e s t h e t h e o r y of t h e s i t u a t i o n ?

The TOS is a short-term t h e o r y used by a n i n d i v i d u a l to a n a l y z e and

make d e c i s i o n s a b o u t t h e immediate environment. As i n d i v i d u a l s move through

d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , t h e i r TOS's change c o n t i n u a l l y . Thc TOS " I am is?

t h e sllpermarket buying food' i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t from t h e TOS 'b a m l a n d i n g

a 727 under v e r y d i f f i c u l t weather c o n d i t i o n s ' . Iiuman e f f e c t i v e n e s s

ddpends h e a v i l y on the d e g r e e of correspondence between a TOS and t h e

environment. Error occurs when a TQS and t h e environmont are mismatshcd.

'h

An example is t h e case i n which t h e crew assumed t h a t t h e a l t i t u d e must be

s a f e because t h e y had a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d approach c l e a r a n c e from ground

control.

The TOS t h a t a n i n d i v i d u a l u s e s i n any g i v e n s i t u a t i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d

by long-term c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e person, s h o r t - t e r m c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of

t h e s i t u a t i o n , and by t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e two.

W e can divide t h e long-term c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p e r s o n i n t o two

major.categoriesr (1) fundamental c o g n i t i v e and b e h a v i o r a l p a r a m e t e r s i n

humanst (2) t h e ' t h e o r y of practice' t h a t i n f o r m s t h e b e h a v i o r of a

particular individual. The l a t t e r may be viewed as a long-term t h e o r y

(i.e., a t h e o r y which is r e l a t i v e l y stable, and e v o l v e s o n l y t h r o u g h

r e l a t i v e l y s l o w , developmental p r o c e s s e s ) . The ' t h e o r y o f practice' is

used by the individual to d e s i g n , test and implement ' t h e o r i e s of t h e

35
situation'. Without a t h e o r y o f practice, t h e i n d i v i d u a l could not

have any c o h e r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a s i t u a t i o n .

1.
' There are v e r y i m p o r t a n t l i m i t s

a t t e n d t o o n l y a very l i m i t e d number of discrete phenomena a t any one

t i m e , and have v e r y s e v e r e limits o n short-term memory. Wfaa

a ' d i s c r e t e phenomenon' is h e a v i l y dependent o n prior Pcarning. f

n o t a p i l o t , and when I look a t t h e c o n t r o l s o n a n a i r p l a n e (even a v e r y

s m a l l , p r o p e l l o r p l a n e ) , I f i n d t h e e n t i r e t h i n g confusing. I have never

learned a s e t of ' p a t t e r n s ' t h a t would e n a b l e m e t o o r g a n i z e a large

of discrete b i t s o f i n f o r m a t i o n i n t o a s i n g l e , organized concept.

:-LA.nber

A t r a i n e d p i l o t c o u l d look a t t h e i n s t r u m e n t s f o r a few seconds, and would

i
know a g r e a t deal about t h e s i t u a t i o n of t h e p l a n e . Y could look a t the

same i n s t r u m e n t s f o r s e v e r a l hours, and s t i l l know almost n o t h i n g .

P a t t e r n s or c o n c e p t s are stored i n l o n g - t e m memory, add require time

and e f f o r t to l e a r n . Once l e a r n e d , however, t h e y c a n be used w i t h

enormous speed and accuracy. The p i l o t who 'seems to hawe a s i x t h s e n s e

f o r knowing j u s t what's happening at any g i v e n mment' is a p i l o t who

has a c q u i r e d o v e r t i m e a n u n u s u a l l y powerful set of c o g n i t i v e p a t t e r n s .

While a p a t t e r n is b e i n g l e a r n e d , t h e p i l o t needs t o spend a c o n s i d e r a b l e

amount of time c o n s c i o u s l y and e x p l i c i t l y a t t e n d i n g t o t h e information

subsumed by t h e pattern. I t is a slow, s e l f - c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s of

t t e r n , and s t o r i n g the p a t t e r n

i n long-ter Once t h e p a t t e r n is w e l l - l e a r n e d , howevero it c a n

be used quickly and with no c o n s u s a t t e n t i o n a t all. The i

36
c-m use t h o p a t t e r n w i t h o u t t h i n k i n g a b o u t it, and may n o t be a b l e t o

i d e n t i f y what p a t t e r n lie is u s i n q .

The behavioral equivalr?nt: to a patt.arn is a ' ! 3 k l l l s . Ju:%tas a

p a t t e r n is b u i l t up t h r o u q h thc o r g a n i z a t i o n of a number of discrete b i t s

of i n f o r m a t i o n , a s k i l l i s b u i l t up t h r o u g h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of a number

of discfcete, molecular b e h a v i o r s i n t o a molar p a t t e r n . Learning a s k i l l

r e q u i r e s time, effort, practice, and thought. But o n c e t h e s k i l l is l e a r n e d ,

it c a n be used i n t h e same way as a w e l l - l e a r n e d p a t t e r n - quickly,

e f f o r t l e s s l y , and t a c i t l y . I t is i n f a c t e s s e n t i a l t o s k i l l e d performance

t h a t it become t a c i t -- t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s no l o n g e r c o n s c i o u s of t h e

i n d i v i d u a l components of t h e s k i l l . Consciousness of t h o s e components

would r e t a r d or even d i s r u p t t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e s k i l l . A simple example

is typing s k i l l . I c a n t y p e much more r a p i d l y t h a n I c h w r i t e %Onghand,

b u t my t y p i n g rate s l o w s down by a b o u t 90% i f I t r y t o t h i n k a b o u t which

f i n g e r I w i l l u s e t o t y p e each letter. My speed w i l l also d e c l i n e (and

I w i l l make more errors) i f I t r y to t y p e a t e x t c o n s i s t i n g of nonsense

s y l l a b l e s or w r i t t e n i n a n u n f a m i l i a r f o r e i g n language. E i t h e r of t h o s e

c o n d i t i o n s i s o u t s i d e of my s k i l l range. With practice, I c o u l d l e a r n

t o t y p e nonsense s y l l a b l e s o r Swedish t e x t s w i t h h i g h e f f i c i e n c y , but as

y e t I have f e l t no need t o d e v e l o p e i t h e r s k i l l .

The major i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e s e parameters for p i l o t i n g a n a i r p l a n e

are :

1. The c a p a c i t y of a p i l o t t o cope w i t h i n c r e a s i n g complex

a i t u a t i o n s w i l l depend on t h e patterns and s k i l l s that the
p i l o t has developed.

2. When s i t u a t i o n s o c c u r which go outside of l e a r n e d p a t t e r n s

and s k i l l s , t h e p i l o t ' s performance w i l l s l o w markodiy, and
the r i s k of c o g n i t i v e or b e h a v i o r a l overload w i l l i n c r e a s e

37
 markedly. ( T h i s is s u p p o r t e d by t h e work of Ruffell Smith, 1979.)
z ,

:
2, T h e o r i e s of P r a c t i c e

Earlier, I i n t r o d u c e d t h o n o t i o n o f a TOS, which is s h o r t - t e r m and

s i t u a t i o n a l , and a t h e o r y o f p r a c t i c e (TOP), which is more g e n e r a l and

longer-term. A p i l o t ' s TOS changes c o n t i n u a l l y d u r i n g a single flight;

t h e p i l o t ' s TOP ( i - e . , c o n c e p t s and s k i l l s f o r f l y i n q a n a i r p l a n e )

changes very l i t t l e d u r i n g a t y p i c a l f l i q h t .

The TOS and TOP are fmth examples of ' t h e o r i e s f o r a c t i o n ' (Argyris

and Schon, 1974; Bolman, 1974). Humans always operate i n environments

that are so complex t h a t it is d i f f i c u l t or i m p o s s i b l e t o a t t e n d t o

everything. The q u e s t i o n arises: h o w do t h e y select? The a c t i o n -

t h e o r e t i c p r o p o s a l i s t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s develop theories f o r action;

i
c o g n i t i v e and b e h a v i o r a l frameworks t h a t g u i d e them i n dccitlinq what

variables t o a t t e n d to, w h a t i n f o r m a t i o n t o seek, w h a t c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s

t o e x p e c t , and what a c t i o n s t o t a k e . The p i t t e r n and r e g u l a r i t y i n any

i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e h a v i o r is s e e n as s t o m i n g from a learned program that

i n f o r m s t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s c h o i c e s and, i f a c c u r a t e l y described, c a n be

used to predict the i n d i v i d u a l ' s behavior.

T h a t program, or t h e o r y for action, can be viewed as c o n t a i n i n g f o u r

major components:

1. C o r e values: basic c r i t e r i a for making choices.

2. Beliefs: b e l i e f s or hypotheses a b o u t the e x p e r i e n c e d world,

i n c l u d i n g beliefs a b u t o n e s e l f , about o n e ' s p r o f e s s i o n a l role,
a b o u t people, a b o u t s i t u a t i o n a l c o n t i n g e n c i e s , etc.

3 . Skillsi learned behavior p a t t e r n s .

4. Outcomes: consequences of b e h a v i o r , which feed back t o i n f l u e n c e

8 mdify, d i s c o n f i r m ) e x i s t i n g core v a l u e s , assumptions,
and s k i l l s .

38
 A r g y r i s and Schon (1374) d i s t i n g u i s h t w o v e r s i o n s of t h e t h e o r y t h a t

informs an i n d i v i d u a l ' s behavior. The espoused t h e o r y r e p r e s e n t s a n

i n d i v i d u a l ' s own e x p l a n a t i o n o r account of h i s or h e r behavior; it is t h e

c o n s c i o u s , c o g n i t i v e map t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l u s e s to e x p l a i n and to p r e d i c t

h i s o r h e r own behavior. The theory-in-use i s the t h c o r y that v a l i d l y

predicts w h a t a n i n d i v i d u a l w i l l do; i t i s t h e i m p l i c i t program t h a t

g u i d e s an i n d i v i d u a l ' s clioicos.

The d i s t i n c t i o n between espoused t h e o r y and theory-in-use is v i t a l

because t h e t w o are o f t e n d i f f e r e n t or d i s c r e p a n t . The espaused t h e o r y

is n e c e s s a r i l y incomplete for one r e a s o n a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d : it is e s s e n t i a l

to s k i l l e d b e h a v i o r t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of d e t a i l s become t a c i t and subsumed

under a c o g n i t i v e p a t t e r n o r b e h a v i o r a l s k i l l . tlore troublesome t h a n

incompleteness of t h e espoused t h e o r y is i r r e l e v a n c e o r h i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n

between espoused t h e o r y and theory-in-use. Under t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,

i n d i v i d u a l s are unaware of i m p o r t a n t elements of t h e i r b e h a v i o r , and a r e

u n r e l i a b l e i n d e s c r i b i n g and p r e d i c t i n g t h e i r behavior.

A b a s i c reason t h e t w o t h e o r i e s are o f t e n d i s c r e p a n t i s t h a t t h e y

were l e a r n e d i n r e s p o n s e t o somewhat d i f f e r e n t environmental c o n t i n q e n c i e s .

Espoused t h e o r y is o f t e n shaped as much or more by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of

p o s i t i v e s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n as by accuracy of s e l f - p r e s e n t a t i o n . Theory-

in-use is shaped by environmental r e s p o n s e s to s p e c i f i c behavior. 1 learned

as a child t o espouse honesty as a g e n e r a l value, and was n o t t a u g h t to

s a y a b o u t myself, " S o m e t i m e s I lie." But I was also t a u g h t t h a t t h e r e

were. c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s i n which I was expected to l i e . I was f u r t h e r

t a u g h t not: t o t a l k about the possible d i s c r e p a n c y between t h c g e n e r a l

v a l u e of h o n e s t y and t h e s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s in which I w a s expected t o

39
bi: d i s h o n e s t . Under t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s , it i s r e l a t i v e l y e a s y for m e t o

d e v e l o p an espoused view of myself as h o n e s t , and a theory-in-use t h a t is

o n l y p a r t l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e espoused theory.

The d i s t i n c t i o n between espoused t h e o r y and theory-in-use implies

'
a n epistemological d i s t i n c t i o n among three d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of knowing.

Knowledge i s ' i n t e l l e c t u a l ' when it e x i s t s i n t h e espoused t h e o r y b u t n o t

i n t h e theory-in-use: t h e i n d i v i d u a l c a n t h i n k a b o u t i t and t a l k a b o u t i t ,

b u t c a n n o t do it. Knowledge is ' t a c i t ' when it e x i s t s i n the theory-in-

u s e b u t n o t t h e espoused t h e o r y : the p e r s o n c a n do i t , b u t c a n n o t e x p l a i n

how i t i s done. Knowledge is ' i n t e g r a t e d ' when t h e r e i s synchrony between

espoused t h e o r y and theory-in-use: t h e p e r s o n c a n both t h i n k it and do it.

D i f f e r e n t forms o f e d u c a t i o n are l i k e l y t o produce d i f f e r e n t forms of

knowledge. 'Academic e d u c a t i o n ' -- i n which l e a r n e r s t h i n k a b o u t and

d i s c u s s t h e practice environment, b u t d o n o t perform w i t h i n it 0- is l i k e l y

to produce changes i n espoused t h e o r y , b u t no c o r r e s p o n d i n g changes i n

theory-in-use. The r e s u l t is i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge, b u t t h e knowledge

may bo useless or even harmful if t h e knowledge is abstracted a t a l e v e l

too f a r removed from practice, i f a p p l i c a t i o n r e q u i r e s s k i l l s t h a t t h e

, l e a r n e r s have n o t developed, or if s u c c e s s f u l a p p l i c a t i o n is blocked

by t h e l e a r n e r ' s l a c k o f self-awareness. I n t h e extreme, t h e e d u c a t i o n

may h e l p t h e l e a r n e r to become more i n c o n s i s t e n t and s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,

r a t h e r t h a n more e f f e c t i v e .

' F i e l d e d u c a t i o n ' places t h e l e a r n e r d i r e c t l y i n t h e practice

environment, and requires t h e l e a r n e r t o perform w i t h i n it, But the

f i e l d may n o t r e q u i r e , and may p r e v e n t , t h e l e a r n e r ' s r e f l e c t i o n o n t h e i r

performance. Thus, t h e f i e l d is an ideal s e t t i n g f o r t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of

'tacit' knowledge. T h e l e a r n e r s develop s k i l l s which e n a b l e them t o cope

i n t h e p r a c t i c e environment, b u t may n o t be f u l l y aware of t h e s k i l l s t h e y

have developcd, a i d o f p o s s i b l e d e f i c i e n c i e s i n t h e i r s k i l l repertoire.

It i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s l i k e t h e s e t h a t have led many t r a i n i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n s

to attempt t o i n t e g r a t e academic, f i e l d , and ' s i m u l a t o r ' t r a i n i n g so as to

d e v e l o p ' p r a c t i t i o n e r s who are s e l f - c o n s c i o u s and s e l f - r e f l e c t i v e a b o u t

t h e i r practice, and who also have t h e s k i l l s needed f o r e f f e c t i v e performance.

But s u c h programs do n o t always pay a d e q u a t e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e

d i s t i n c t i o n between espoused t h e o r y and theory-in-use, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of

i n c o n s i s t e n c y between t h e t w o , and t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s problems which may

res\zlt. When i n d i v i d u a l s are u n a b l e to d e s c r i b e a c c u r a t e l y s i g n i f i c a n t

aspects o f their theory-in-use, any o f s e v e r a l processes are o f t e n a t work:

1. The i n d i v i d u a l i s unable t o acknowledge t h e d i h c r e p a n c y '

(because of t h e a n x i e t y t h a t t h e d i s c r e p a n c y creates),
and w i l l defend a g a i n s t any i n f o r m a t i o n s u g g e s t i n g t h a t
a discrepancy exists,

2. The gaps between espoused t h e o r y and theory-in-use m y

g e n e r a t e l e a r n i n g errors, p a r t i c u l a r l y s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g
and s e l f - s e a l i n g processes. ( I f , f o r example, I believe
I a m b e i n g p l e a s a n t and f r i e n d l y when o t h e r s p e r c e i v e m e
as cool and a g g r e s s i v e , t h e r e is a good p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t
I w i l l m i s i n t e r p r e t t h e i r r e s p o n s e s to m e as e v i d e n c e
of t h e i r personal d e f i c i e n c i e s , r a t h e r t h a n as a p p r o p r i a t e
r e s p o n s e s t o my behavior.)

3. There may be c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n t h e theory-in-use t h a t t h e

i n d i v i d u a l does' n o t recognize, b u t which create c o n f u s i o n
f o r others. (Suppose t h a t I a m c o n t i n u a l l y s e n d i n q to t h e
same p e r s o n t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o messages: (1) you s h o u l d get
o u t and t a k e more i n i t i a t i v e s i n l i f e ; (2) you are too weak
and incompetent t o g e t anywhere. I f I f a i l to recognize t h e
c o n t r a d i c t i o n (because I feel t h e r e is a c o n s i s t e n t message
t h a t says 'get o u t and do more t o overcome your weaknesses'),
I may create double-binds f o r t h e o t h e r person, y e t blame
the other p e r s o n for n o t responding i n a more positive way
to my e f f o r t s t o help.)

The i m p l i c a t i o n is t h a t any e d u c a t i o n a l program which aspires t o

41
 c e s s f u l practice must help l e a r n e r s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r

espoused t h e o r i e s and t h e i r t h e o r i e s - i n - u s e , and

between t h e two.

An i n d i v i d u a l ' s t h e o in-use is t h e o v e r a l l program f o r t h e des'

o f b e h a v i o r , from which a l l o t h e r t h e o r i e s ( i n c l u d i n g t h e espoused t h e o r y )

are d e r i v e d . The theory-in-use is a long-term program, which b e g i n s t o

d e v e l o p a t b i r t h , and g r a d u a l l y e v o l v e s through t h e i n d i v i d u a l e s l i f e . A

program l e a r n e d over so long a p e r i o d of t i m e i s h e a v i l y o v e r l e a r n e d , and

can be altered only through l e a r n i n g e x p e r i e n c e s which e x t e n d over c o n s i d e r a b l e

periods of time. I n any s h o r t - t e r m l e a r n i n g e x p e r i e n c e (e.g., an e x p e r i e n c e

of a f e w hours), t h e theory-in-use i s j u s t short of u n a l t e r a b l e .

I have d i s c u s s e d t h e o r i e s f o r a c t i o n a t t h r e e d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s :
the theory-in-use, t h e t h e o r y of practice, and t h e theoky of t h e

situation. The relationship among t h e t h r e e i s h i e r a r c h i c a l , and c a n be

i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e f i g u r e below:
TH EO RY-IN-USE

TOPA TOPS

ToSAl
A T0SA2 ToSBl
A T0SB2
sists o f t h e core v a l u e s , beliefs, and strategies

which provide d uniqueness t o eve i n g t h a t I do.

The theory-in-use a r of
TOPS for d i f f e e arenas. For examp f o r driving

an automobil es. My TOP for automobile

driving incorporates a number o f d i f f e r e n t TOS's (e.g,, ' I am p a r k i n g my

42
car', 'I a m d r i v i n g 5 m i l e s above t h e speed l i m i t ' ) .

S i n c e a TOP is u s u a l l y l e a r n e d a f t e r a n i n d i v i d u d ' s theory-in-use

is wall-established, t h e t h e o r y o f practice w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d

by t h e p r e v i o u s theory-in-use. The n a t u r e o f t h a t influence i s bikehy

t o be d i f f e r e n t for d i f f e r e n t e l e m e n t s o f t h e practice environment. ,Some

areas of t h e practice e n v i r o n m e n t - - p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e h i g h l y t e c h n i c a l areas--

are l i k e l y t o be r e l a t i v e l y u n f a m i l i a r t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l , They r e p r e s e n t

problems f o r which t h e theory-in-use h a s n o t dcvelopcd. established r o u t i n e s .

Learning i n such areas is nore a q u e s t i o n of a d d i n g new ct2ements t o t h e

e x i s t i n g t h e o r y t h a n o f a l t c r i n q e l e m e n t s which are aE.rcady p r e s e n t ,

Other areas of the practice environment -- p a r t i c u l a r l y t h o s e d,oaling w i t h

communications, i n t e r p e r s o n a l i n f l u e n c e , and managcnent of'' l:.man r e s o u r c e s --
r e p r e s e n t areas i n which o v e r l e a r n i n g has a l r e a d y oecurkad, and the e x i s t i n g

theory-in-use is r e l a t i v e l y d i f f i c u l t to alter. This can lead to m i s l e a d i n g

assumptions l i k e , "You c a n t e a c h a man t o f l y , b u t you $can never t e a c h him

t o lead. H e ' s e i t h e r got it, or he d o e s n ' t . " The problem As not t h a t t h e

i n d i v i d u a l c a n n o t l e a r n a b o u t l e a d e r s h i p ; it is j u s t that new l e a d e r s h i p

skills are d i f f i c u l t t o a c q u i r e because t h e y r e q u i r e extexaaiwe r e v i s i o n s

i n a t h e o r y which is a l r e a d y o v e r l e a r n e d .

The q u e s t i o n t h e n becomes under what c o n d i t i o n s w i l l an i n d i v i d u a l

r e v i s e a theory. To u n d e r s t a n d t h i s i s s u e , it i s i m p o r t a n t ta r e c o g n i z e

a dilemma t h a t is always p r e s e n t . Revision of a t h e o r y that i o a l r e a d y

developed is always c o s t l y - i t r e q u i r e s t i m , energy, effort and, o f t e n ,

emotional stress.

Marris (1975) c a l l s t h e tendency to h o l d o n t o our e x i s t i n g t h e o r i e s

the ' c o n s e r v a t i v e impulse', and a r g u e s t h a t it is i n t r i n s i c to t h e human

c a p a c i t y to s u r v i v e and l e a r n from e x p e r i e n c e :

43
 (The c o n s e r v a t i v e iinlnilse) i s a c o n d i t i o n of siirlij ~ ~ a il n. any
s i t u a t i o n , w t m for t l w i w o t l r d c l i w l iirnovalor. \$t? t ~ r ~ i ~ i ~a~c>t t -
without some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what is going on about u s , and t o
i n t e r p r e t i t , we f i r s t match i t w i t h somethi
di!;covcry is lie I W X ~ , i l l a HC
.
p r c t a t i o n s which g r a d u a l l y c o n s o l i d a t e . . i n t o a n u n d e r ~ t a n d h q
o f l i f e . Hence, thcrc is a deap-seated impulse i n aXR uf us t o
defend t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t w e have l e a r n e d , for wit!iL_”v:i:i ~ w. e
would be h e l p l e s s . (Marris, p. 10)

’ ( T ) h e e x p e r i e n c e of p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t r e a t m e n t sucrgcjests that it
i s s l o w , p a i n f u l and d i f f i c u l t for a n a d u l t t o r c c o n s t x w t a
r a d i c a l l y d i f f c r e n t way of s e c i n g l i f e , however needle
h i s p r e c o n c e p t i o n s makc h i m . In t h i s s e n s e , w e are a l l r pxoSoundPy
c o n s e r v a t i v e , and f e e l immediately t h r e a t e n e d i f oux bn-;;.c assumptions
aiid emotional a t t a c h m e n t s are t h r e a t e n e d . (Marris, p. 1 % )

So w e f i n d innumerable examples o f s i t u a t i o n s i n which an Lndividual,

a group, o r a n a t i o n c l i n g s d e s p e r a t e l y t o a t h e o r y which 6% sm Longer

working, r a t h e r t h a n to r i s k t h e u n c e r t a i n t y , ambiguity asad h s s of meaning

t h a t would come from abandoning a f a m i l i a r way of i n t e r p x a t d , n g the world.

.b

A teacher who h a s been t e a c h i n g t h e same g r a d e i n t h e same way for many

y e a r s is asked by h i s s u p e r i o r s t o adopt a new pedagogy. If his sense

of h i m s e l f and h i s e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a t e a c h s r i s attached to h i s old ways,

t h e change i s profoundly threat.ening. It would take great effort and time

for him t o l e a r n a new approach, and he is n o t a t a l l s u r e %laat.h e w i l l

feel c o m f o r t a b l e a n d e f f e c t i v e even i f he c a n l e a r n it.

The example i l l u s t r a t e s a p e r v a s i v e dilemma - it is often difficult

to know i n advance whether it is u s e f u l i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n t o c o n t i n u e

t o use t h e t h e o r y I have (and save t h e costs associated w i t h re-design),

or to r e - d e s i g n (and save costs associated w i t h error i n my p r e s e n t

theory). Taking a c c o u n t o h i s dilemma, we c a n assert several propositions

about a n i n d i v i d u a l ’ s w i l l i n g n e s s t o engage i n theory-

44
rdvisionr

I, The more c e n t r a l a t h e o r y is t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s s e l f - c o n c e p t

and self-esteem, t h e less l i k c l y t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l w i l l r e v i s e .
(Returning t o an earlier example, viewing myself as ' h o n e s t ' h a s
become so c e n t r a l t o my v a l u i n g o f myself, t h a t I find it d i f f i c u l t
even to c o n s i d e r modifying t h a t p a r t o f my t h e o r y a h o u t myself.)

2. The mre a t h e o r y i s ' o v e r l e a r n e d ' (i.e., t h e more t h a t I have

l e a r n e d t h e same t h i n g through i t e r a t i o n s o f the same or similar
' e x p e r i e n c e s ) , t h e less l i k e l y is t h e t h e o r y t o be xevised.

3. Thc mre t h a t i n q u i r y and l e a r n i n g are b u i l t i n t o khe t t x i s t i n g

t h e o r y , t h e more l i k e l y i s r e v i s i o n . (For example, many of t h e
t h e o r i e s of p r a c t i c e used by s c i e n t i s t s i n c o r p o r a t e i n q u i r y as a
c e n t r a l v a l u e , and i n c r e a s e the l i k e l i h o o d of t h e o r y r e v i s i o n . 1

4. The mre t h e s i t u a t i o n makes d i s c o n f i r m i n g evidence a v a i l . a b l e ,

t h e more l i k e l y i s r e v i s i o n of t h e theory. (In other w ~ r d s P
i f my t h e o r y i s i n a c c u r a t e , b u t I g e t no feedback Prom the
environment t o a l e r t m e t o t h e problem, I may int-erp-oxat the
e x p e r i e n c e as f u r t h e r c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e t h e o r y ' s validity.)

5. The greater t h e arnount of ambiguity, c o n f u s i o n , infamat:ion

o v e r l o a d and stress t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l i s experlewcinq, the
less l i k e l y i s r e v i s i o n of t h e o p e r a t i n q t h e o r y . Omything t h a t
o v e r l o a d a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o g n i t i v e a i d performance capabilities
i n c r e a s e s t h o i n c e n t i v e t o s o l v e problems i n t h e simplest possible
way-usually by r e l y i n g o n a t h e o r y t h a t is welJ:-learned, rather
t h a n s e a r c h i n g f o r new ones. 1

To aumnarizer

1. Individuals develop over t h e course o f t h e i r l i v e s t h e o r i e s

f o r a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a theory-in-use which informs a l l o f
t h e i r b e h a v i o r , and an espoused t h e o r y , which g u i d e s t h e
individual's perception of s e l f .

2. An i n d i v i d u a l ' st h e o r i e s f o r a c t i o n may c o n t a i n errors and

gaps, b u t be d e s i g n e d i n such a way as t o p r e v e n t t h e person
from r e c o g n i z i n g t h e problems.

3. m e n i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l does r e c o g n i z e problems i n the theory-

in-use, s/he c a n a l t e r t h e t h e o r y o n l y w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f o r t
and t i m e .

4. In order t o perform i n s p e c i f i e d practice domains, i n d i v i d u a l s

davelop ' t h e o r i e s o f practice'. I n some a r e a s - - u s u a l l y areas
t h a t are h i g h l y t e c h n i c a l or unique to t h e practice domain-
those t h e o r i e s r e p r e s e n t additions t o r a t h e r t h a n r e v i s i o n s in
the pre-existing theory-in-use. In o t h e r a r e a s - p a r t i c u l a r l y
i s s u e s of how an i n d i v i d u a l relates t o and works w i t h o t h e r s -
l e a r n i n g i s l i k e l y t o be much more d i f f i c u l t because it r e q u i r e s

45
 revisions to pre-existing patterns. I n t h e former areas, t h e
t h e o r y of p r a c t i c e is more l i k e l y t o bc dominated by t h e

theory of pra
produce a ' t h e o r y of t h e s i t u a t i o n ' - - a s h o r t - t e r m set: af goals,
assumptions, s k i l l s and outcomes for use i n a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n .

6.. There i s always a dilemma a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n to r e v i s e

a t h e o r y {at any o f t h e t h r e e l e v e l s ) : is i t more P . , C Q W ~ ~ and C
e f f i c i e n t to c o n t i n u e t o implement t h e p r e s e n t t h e o r y , BP is it
more e f f i c i e n t t o r e v i s e t h e t h e o r y i n order to carreb=t i t s
errors and d e f i c i e n c i e s .

7. R e v i s i o n is mre l i k e l y under c o n d i t i o n s of (a) Xow stress and

o v e r l o a d , (b) a c c e s s i b i l i t y o f r e l e v a n t feedback, f c $ i n q u i r y
s k i l l s built i n t o t h e e x i s t i n g theory.

8. Theory-revision is less l i k e l y when a t h e o r y i s csxaQra.7.kcj a n

i n d i v i d u a l ' s s e l f - e s t e e m , when it is o v e r l e a r n e d , and i~ crisis
s i t u a t i o n s which overwhelm t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o g m i t l v e and
performance c a p a c i t i e s .

E. The Problems o f On-Line Theory R e v i s i o n

The a i r a c c i d e n t cases cited above--like many o t h e r cases in which

crew errors o c c u r - a l l o c c u r r e d i n s i t u a t i o n s where t h e c a p t a i n (or t h e

e n t i r e crew) was o p e r a t i n g o n a f a u l t y t h e o r y of the s i t u a t i o n , and was

o v e r l o o k i n g data t h a t raised q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e v a l i d i t y o f that t h e o r y .

I have a l r e a d y s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e TOS arises from t h e i n t e r p l a y between

t h e pilot's theory of practice (TOP) and s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s , When the

TOS is i n error, w e can a r g u e t h a t t h e a n s s t o t w o basic q u e s t i o n s

TOS error a v a i l a b l e bn t h e environment?

ror@i s t h e s e o t h e r
sinformation?
t i o n t h a t t h e y do n o t have, i s it

le i n f o r m a t i o n

46
 The a v a i l a b i l i t y of information t o d o t o c t error is n e c e s s a r y , but

not sufficient. Many questions about availability of information go t o

design issues - t h e d e s i g n o f a i r c r a f t and a i r c r a f t i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n , t h e

d e s i g n o f a i r c o n t r o l l e r systems, t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a c c u r a t e and u s e a b l e

manuals and c h e c k - l i s t s , etc. But some q u e s t i o n s go t o i s s u e s ~b manage-

ment a n d . i n t e r p e r s o n a 1 r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Take t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n v e r s a t i o n ,

which o c c u r r e d i n a DC-8 s h o r t l y b e f o r e it c r a s h e d i n t o a mountains

F i r s t officer: We should be a l i t t l e h i g h e r h e r e , s h o u l d n ' t we?

Captain: No, 40 DME, y o u ' r e a l l r i g h t .

The f i r s t o f f i c e r w a s correct; t h e c a p t a i n w a s wrong. Both were k i l l e d

because t h e c a p t a i n c o n t i n u e d t o r e l y on h i s f a u l t y TOS. The c a p t a i n ' s

TOP d i d n o t lead him t o test the possible v a l i d i t y of the f i r s t o f f i c e r ' s

suggestion. The c a p t a i n was f o l l o w i n g a time-honored precedent2 leaders

i n a l l sorts o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s reject s u b o r d i n a t e q u e s t i o n i n g o f t h e i r

b e l i e f s day i n and day o u t . I t enables them t o g e t on w i t h implementing

t h e i r c u r r e n t TOS, r a t h e r t h a n h a v i n g to d e l a y and t e s t its v a l i d i t y .

A c o n s i d e r a b l e body o f r e s e a r c h o n t h e t h e o r i e s - i n - u s e h e l d b y managers

and p r o f e s s i o n a l s s u g g e s t s t h a t it is normative f o r them t o respond t o

q u e s t i o n i n g or c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f t h e i r TOS by d e f e n d i n g it r a t h e r t h a n

i n q u i r i n g i n t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f error. Even i n s i t u a t i o n s where t h e

s t a k e s are not so h i g h nor so irrevocable as i n air t r a f f i c safety, the

costs can be s e r i o u s . I n t h e c o c k p i t of a n air carrier, t h e costs are

unacceptable. That s u g g e s t s t w o i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e TOPS that

t r a i n i n g programs s h o u l d seek t o produce i n f l i g h t crews:

1. Whenever a member of a f l i g h t crew senses t h e p o s s i b i l i t y

t h a t t h e crew's o p e r a t i n g TOS may lead t o s i g n i f i c a n t error,
t h a t member h a s a p o s i t i v e o b l i g a t i o n t o raise t h e i s s u e and
request t h a t t h e TOS be tested.

47
 2. Whenever a member of a f l i g h t crew is challenged by another
about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t h i s h e r operating
t o s i g n i f i c a n t error, t h a t member has a p o s i t i v e
t o seek infornation to the vali

Those pro may seem reasonable enough, b u t they are

t o implement, for t w o reasons:

1. The propositions are much easier to adopt a t t h e l e v e l of

espoused theory than theory-in-use, because they r e q u i r e
willingness and s k i l l i n confrontation, inquiry, and
conflict-management t h a t crew members may not have.

2. There i s a problem of how t o design a management system

which i n s i s t s t h a t t h e c a p t a i n has a p o s i t i v e o b l i g a t i o n
to i n q u i r e when challenged, b u t also has t h e a u t h o r i t y
to make binding decisions.

The problems are r e l a t e d , because both r e q u i r e t h a t f l i g h t crew

menbers have a s e t of management and i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s which are

r a r e l y observed i n any organizational s e t t i n g . Basically, they r e q u i r e

i
t h e a b i l i t y t o combine advocacy (behavior which advocates one's b e l i e f s ,

values and opinions) with inquiry (behavior which seeks t o test t h e

v a l i d i t y of one's beliefs, behavior, and values) . Advocacy and inquiry

are o f t e n perceived as polar opposites--with t h e implication t h a t it

is impossible to do both a t t h e same time. Empirical observation of

managers is c o n s i s t e n t with t h e p o l a r opposite theory-it i s rare t o f i n d

managers who a good a t both. But t h e r e are some. And both s k i l l s are

essential i n a cockpit. I t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t a l l members of a f l i g h t

efs and advocate t h e i r view of t h e

i n very weak advmcacy

captain' s response

48
make himself appear foolish by questioning the judgment of an experienced

pilot who was familiar with the area). Supose that each had an operating

TOP which led them to combine advocacy and inquiry. An alternative

conversation might have been:

First officer: I'm really concerned about whether our altitude

is safe. What leads you to think we're o.k.?
Captain: I think we're 0.k. at 40 DME, but what's your concern?

Theories of practice, pilot skills and cockpit norms that favor high

levels of advocacy and inquiry can help to ensure that crewmembers

communicate effectively whenever someone in the crew senses error. An

additional step is to train crewmembers to develop TOP'S which call for

testing and inquiry whenever there is ambiguity or anomaly in their current

TOS. That is, whenever the crew recognizes that something is happening

that does not completely fit their theory of the situation, they need to begin
asking questions like, 'Could we be mistaken?' 'Is there some other

explanation for what's happening?' 'Is there any information we have (or
can obtain) to help us understand the situation?'

For example, consider the case of a 727 which crashed because the

flight crew did not recognize the nature of their problem. They had

inadvertantly failed to turn on the pitot heaters. When the pitot heads

became blocked by atmospheric icing, they gave erroneously high airspeed

readings. The crew was very surprised by the high airspeeds, but

attributed them to unusual weather conditions and the fact that the plane
was flying light. They did not consider the possibility that the airspeed

indicators were erroneous, although the plane's altitude should have

alerted them that such high airspeeds were improbable or impossible.

49
The sounds of a stall warning were mistaken for a Mach buffet (partly
because the crew had just heard an erron

situation, a disaster might have

question the puzzling result by askin

be wrong?"

C. Theory-revision and Management of Human Resources

Anomalous or confusing situations tend to overload flight crews. Over-

load increases the likelihood of error. The optimal use of available human

resources becomes a critical factor in aviation safety. It is precisely

in crisis situations that the demands on both information-processing and

performance skills are highest. In those situations, a flight crew needs

to ensure that each member of the crew is performing effectively and

working on the right set of tasks for the situation. The way in which

tasks are defined and allocated constitutes a set of role definitions for

a given moment (and those role definitions are one aspect--often implicit--

of the crew's theory of the situation).

The flight situation makes very high demands on the role system--
simultaneously demanding high levels of role clarity (so that everyone

is clear about their tasks) and role flexibility (so that tasks may be

shifted or re-allocated as changes in the situation warrant).

A role is a set of activities or performances that are defined by

the expectations of 'role-senders'--persons who have expectations about

how a role-occupant will pe rm in the role. Role-senders for an airline

captain include the captain himself, other members of the flight crew, the

passengers, airline management, air controllers, other airline pilots, etc.

der has expectations for how a captain is to behave (although

those expectations vary greatly in breadth, specificity and clarity among

50
different role-senders) and has the potential to exert influence on the

captain (the amount varying greatly among different role-senders: the

captain usually pays much closer attention to air controllers than to ~

passengers). Role clarity exists when the expectations are well-defined

and there is agreement among those role-senders who are significant for

a particular situation. If the expectations are vague, then role ambiguity

exists. If the expectations conflict with one another, there is role

conflict. To avoid role ambiguity and conflict in the cockpit, the members

of the flight crew need to have mutual role expectations that are clear

and mutually understood. When this does not occur, a variety of role

problems can lead to serious errors. Those problems include excessive

role restriction, inappropriate role differentiation, errors in managing

interdependence, and problems in managing role boundaries.

1. Role restriction

Excessive role-restriction is the common result of over-controlling

management styles. Many individuals have great difficulty'making the

transition from 'doing it themselves' to 'getting it done through managing

others'. In many cases, they doubt that anyone else can do it as well

as they. In others, they are fearful that subordinates will make errors

unless closely controlled. The result is a controlling style of management

which creates a very restrictive role for subordinates. Managers who try

to succeed through over-control often fail, because thehr subordinates

are unable to accomplish very much. Warwick (1975) describes in vivid, if

depressing detail how such a management style pervades the U . S . State

Department and helps to produce enormously slow and cumbersome performance.

The subordinates are 'disempowered' and prevented from making optimal use

51
of their skills and capacities. The manager's primary task is not to do

it himself/herself, but to make the best possible use of available human

resources.

Ruffell Smith's (1979) simulator study of crew response to overload found

that one source of errors in many crews was the captain's tendency to do

too much by himself, and to overcontrol his crewmembers. For example,

some captains attempted to fly the plane and command during a difficult,

emergency condition. They became overloaded, while other members of the

crew were underloaded. In other cases, the captain gave so many discrete

orders that other crewmembers never finished important tasks because of

constant interruptions.

2. Role differentiation and management of interdependence

Role differentiation refers to the degree to which different roles

are clearly distinct from one another. It is possible to under-differentiate

or over-differentiate. Under-differentiation leads to excessive overlap

(too many people doing the same thing), which often coincides with sig-
I)

nificant gaps (some activities that no one is doing). A clear example i s

the crew which permitted their 1011 to crash because everyone was worrying

about the nose gear light, but no one was monitoring the plane's flight

performance. The under-differentiation (too many people focusing on one

problem) led easily to gaps (significant problems that no one focused on).

Under-differentiation often leads to conflict--as people trip over each

other, or resent one another's intrusions into their turf. In the DC-8
which crashed into the mountain, the captain had apparently taken over the

navigational role by developing his o m personal approach plan, which he

with anyone else. rtly before the accident, the first

52
officer asked the captain if he was planning to make a procedure turn.

The captain replied, "No, I ... I wasn't going to." But the captain did not

say what he was planning to do. The,first officer asked about the terrain,

and the captain said, "Mountains everywhere." The first officer then asked,

"We should be a little higher, shouldn't we?", but he did not have enough

information about the captains plan to be sure.

Overlap can have one advantage--redundancy can reduce the likelihood

of error. A number of such redundancies are planned into aircraft and

into the roles of air pilots. What is important is that crews be clear

about the areas in which redundancy is expected and needed, and the areas

in which overlap is wasteful and hazardous.

Over-differentiation occurs when different roles are so completely

distinct, that different individuals have great difficulty knowing what

one another is doing. The risk is that they make erroneous assumptions
about one another, and fail to communicate enough to test those assumptions.

In the airline setting, that risk is particularly high between pilots

and flight controllers, whose roles are highly differentiated. Many of

the interdependencies between the roles have been worked out over time and

have achieved high levels of precision and reliability. But some areas

are not completely resolved (e.g., the responsibilities of pilots and

controllers with respect to detecting and communicating possible conflicts

among aircraft). An example of pilot-controller misunderstanding occurred

in the case (discussed earlier) of the 727 which crashed on an approach.

The captain believed that the controller had cleared him to an elevation

of 1800 feet. Even though his approach chart suggested a possible problem,

the captain relied on the assumption that it was the controller's responsibility

53
t o be s u r e t h a t a n approach is nok g i v e n u n l e s s i t i s aaf'e. The c r e w had

p l e n t y of t i m e t o re-check t h e charts or t o check a y a h w i t h ground c o n t r o l ,

b u t d i d n o t do SO. The p l a n e c r a s h e d , k i l l i n g everyom aboard.

3. Boundary Management

A r o l e is a set o f t a s k s d e f i n e d by t h e e x p e c t a t i o n s of r o l e - s e n d e r s .

Those e x p e c t a t i o n s can be s e e n as d e f i n i n g a 'Ix3undaryG maund t h e role.

Tasks i n s i d e t h e boundary are p a r t of t h e role: tasks c x t s i d e of t h e boundary

are n o t part of t h e role. Role b o u n d a r i e s axe never completely precise,

and r o l e - f l e x i b i l i t y r e q u i r e s t h a t a n d i v i d c a l s be able t o r e - d e f i n e

boundaries. Many of the role problems discussed above occur because t h e

bor:n:Xaries are i l l - d e f i n e d , o r because there is l i t t l e agreement on t h e

p..;'ocess for r e - d e f i n i n g boundaries. U n d a x - d i P f e r e n t i e ~ i o n , for example,

.is v e r y l i k e l y t o occur when roles are ambiguous an6 h x i h d a r i e s are ill-

defined.

For a f l i g h t crew t o be e f f e c t i v e uncficr anomalous or crisis c o n d i t i o n s ,

t h e y need t o be c o n s c i o u s of t h e need for hoiindary c l a r i k y , and clear about

t h e legitimate ways i n which role b o u n d a r i e s may b e redefined. The latter

is critical, because emergencies w i l l o f t e n r e q u i r e v e r y rapid role s h i f t s ;

t h e crew needs a way t o accomplish t h i s w i t h o u t producing c o n f u s i o n , role

r e s t r i c t i o n , or i n n a p p r o p r i a t e gaps and o v e r l a p s . One obvious approach

t o t h e problem--'role boundaries are whatever t h e c a p t a i n s a y s t h e y are'---

i s e f f e c t i v e in producing r a p i d s h i f t s , b u t does n o t always g u a r a n t e e

correct s h i f t s . On the o t h e r hand, a system i n which anyone h a s t h e r i g h t

ae any time to resist or appeal the c a p t a i n ' s d e c i s i o n s would make rapid

s h i f t very d i f f i c u l t to achieve. It might lead t o good d e c i s i o n s i n t h e

long-run, b u t that is no i f t h e p l a n e c r a s h e s i n t h e s h o r t run.

What is needed is a system t h a t preserves t h e c a p t a i n ' s a u t h o r i t y t o

54
make b i n d i n g d e c i s i o n s , b u t places a p o s i t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n o t h e r crew

members t o raise q u e s t i o n s o r s u g g e s t a l t e r n a t i v e s when they p e r c e i v e

3

t h a t t h e c a p t a i n ' e s t r a t e n m i g h t lead t o sfqnificant error. Captains,

i n t u r n , need t o v a l u e such i n p u t as part o f t h e help t h e y e x p e c t from

t h e i r f l i g h t crew, r a t h e r t h a n r e j e c t i n g i t o u t of hand or s e e i n g it as a

threat to t h e command s t r u c t u r e .

D. T r a i n i n g i n KLU-IE-.~~ Resource Mdnagement

e.

The arguments i n this paper imply a need t o d e v o t e more a t t e n t i o n to

topics t h a t have been largely n e g l e c t e d i n p i l o t t r a i n i n g . P i l o t s need

to u8:derstand t h e i n t e r a c t i o n hcta een slituationv and t h e i r own t h e o r i e s

To.; p r a c t i c e , the^ need to approc iate t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between espoused

t h e o r y and theory-in-use, and Le able t o explore t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s of

d i s c r e p a n c y i n t h e i r own theories. They need t o u ~ - I ~ w s & A J ~t h e importance

of s k i l l i n i n q u i r y and o n - l i n e l c a r n i n g , and t h e y need t o l e a r n t h e o r i e s

of p i l o t i n g t h a t emphasize those :jkil.lS. They need a c o n c e p t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g

of t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l processes and role i s s u e s t h a t aze c r i t i c a l to the

flight deck s i t u a t i o n , and they need practice and skill i n implementing

t h o s e concepts.

W e have begun to d e v e l o p e d u c a t i o n a l approaches t o accomplish similar

goals i n working w i t h o t h e r p r o f e s s i o n a l s , i n c l u d i n g managers ( A r g y r i s ,

1976, B o h a n , 19761, lawyers (Bolman, 19781, educational. a d m i n i s t r a t o r s

(Bolman, 1976), and m i n i s t e r s (Bolman and Gallos, 19791, All of the

methods emphasize the importance of i n t e g r a t i n g theory, s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n ,

and practice. The d e s i g n of s u c h t r a i n i n g v a r i e s w i t h t h e l e a r n i n g

context , b u t always i n c l u d e s some v e r s i o n of the f o l l o w i n g elementas

1. P r e s e n t a t i o n of r e l e v a n t t h e o r y ( e . g . , t h e o r y about i n q u i r y

55
 and learning, interpersonal skills, role dynamics,
communication in small groups, etc.)

2. Discussion of case examples from the learner's experience

(e.g., discussion by pilots of particularly challenging '
situations that they have faced), as a way to apply the
theory and to encourage learners to reflect on their
own practice.

3. Simulation of practice problems, with the chance for

discussion, feedback, and repeated practice. (As an
example, a crew could work through a crisis situation in
a full-mission simulation. They would then discuss the
experience with assistance from faculty. Next they would
practice the same situation again.)

The design of such training is a challenging but exciting task.

Part of the challenge is creating effective training experiences. Another

part of the challenge is integrating new experiences with existing training.

A significant part of the challenge is that the training must begin to

question traditional assumptions about management and superior-subordinate

communications. Those questions go beyond the flight deck--the same

questions can be raised about the entire training activity, and about the

management of the airline. If the management patterns that lead to pilot

error are the same patterns used at every level of management in an air-

line (where they presumably also lead to error), then the question of

training pilots in effective management of human resources is closely

tied to the larger questions of organizational climate and human resource

management for the entire system.

Those are large and difficult questions, and many of the answers

remain to be discovered. But I believe that the air transport industry

has little choice--sooner or later those questions will have to be con-

fronted. Personally, I would prefer to fly with the-airlinesthat do it

sooner.

56
 NOTES

1. T h i s i s a working paper red the

Management on t h e F l i g h t It
9 Fr an

57
 REFERENCES

Argyris, C .
Intersc

:Effectivenese .
~ r g y r i s , C. a d D. A. ~ c b n .
San Franc

Bolman, L. "The c h i e n t as t h e o r i s t . " I n Adams, J. D. (ed.) 'ikory and

Method in Qrgirnization Development. Washington8 PJJTL T m t i t u t e .

Bolman, Lo "Organizational learning, " I n Argyrfs, C. hproving Leadership

Effectiveness, New Yorkt Wiley-Interscience, 1376,
Bolman, Lo "Theory, practice, and educational administ.ratisnn bridging
troublesome dichotomies. " Fxfucation and Urban S o c i s , L976, 2, 67-80,

Bolmarr, L. "Learning and lawyering, An approach tu educacion for: legal

p r a c t i c e . * In-Cooper, C. a.nd Alderfkr, C. (eds. 1 il Mvancee&&per-
i e n t i a l Sociai Processes, 1977.

%dman, t. and J. Gallss. "Learning f o r ministry, " Unpubiished lmanuscript,

Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1979.
b
Marris, P. Us8 and Chanye. Garden City, N. Y.: Ancbx', 1975.

Ruffell Smith, H.P. "A simulator study of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of pP%sk work-

load with errors, vigilance, and decisions," NASA, S c i e n t i f i c and
Technical Office, 1979.

Warwick, D. A Theory of Public Bure- Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard

University Press, 1975.

58
 SESSION 2

CURRENT INDUSTRY APPROACHES TO RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING

John K. Lauber, Chairman

F l i g h t C r e w S e l e c t i o n a t United A i r l i n e s
Capt. W i l l i a m Traub, F l i g h t T r a i n i n g Manager

B r i t i s h Airways' Pre-Command T r a i n i n g Program

C a p t . L. F. 3. Holdstock,
Chief T r a i n i n g P i l o t

Upgrade and I n t e r p e r s o n a l S k i l l s T r a i n i n g a t American A i r l i n e s

Capt. W. W. E s t r i d g e , D i r e c t o r , F l i g h t T r a i n i n g
J . L. Mansfield, Manager, T r a i n i n g Techniques

Captains' Training a t S w i s s a i r
Capt. N. Grob,
D i v i s i o n Manager , Cockpit C r e w s

Line-Oriented F l i g h t T r a i n i n g
Capt. Berton E. Beach, Manager,
Intermediate Jet Training
Eastern A i r Lines, Inc.

Flight-Manager and Check-Airman T r a i n i n g

Capt. J. E. C a r r o l l , Vice P r e s i d e n t ,
F l i g h t S t a n d a r d s and T r a i n i n g
United A i r l i n e s

L e f t S e a t Command and/or Leadership? F l i g h t Leadership

T r a i n i n g and Research a t North C e n t r a l A i r l i n e s
Capt. Gramer C. F o s t e r , D i r e c t o r , F l i g h t S t a n d a r d s
Michael C. Garvey,
P r e s i d e n t (M. C . Garvey and A s s o c i a t e s , I n c . )

59
 FLIGHT CREW SELECTION AT UNITED AIRLINES

Capt. W i l l i a m Traub*

Poor d e c i s i o n s i n p i l o t s e l e c t i o n c a n be v e r y expensive and i n t o d a y ' s

environment of s o p h i s t i c a t e d equipment and i n c r e a s e d c o m p e t i t i o n , d e c i s i o n s
do have a s i g n i f i c a n t b e a r i n g on an a i r l i n e ' s s u c c e s s o r f a i l u r e .

Looking o n l y a t t r a i n i n g expense, w e a t United Airlines estimate a

m i s t a k e i n p i l o t s e l e c t i o n could c o s t upwards of $250,000 over a 30-year
p i l o t career.

On t h e o t h e r hand, good d e c i s i o n s i n p i l o t s e l e c t i o n pay o f f

handsomely i n t e r m s of t r a i n i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s , whether w e a r e d i s c u s s i n g
r e s o u r c e management s k i l l s , f l y i n g s k i l l s , o r a composite of a l l of t h o s e
t a l e n t s t h a t go i n t o t h e makeup of a n o u t s t a n d i n g employee and u l t i m a t e l y i n
an outstanding captain.

I n t h e p a s t 25 y e a r s , United A i r l i n e s h a s h i r e d more t h a n 6,000 p i l o t s .

To d o t h i s i t has been n e c e s s a r y t o p r o c e s s over 90,000 a p p l i c a n t s . A s a
r e s u l t , i n t h o s e 25 y e a r s w e b e l i e v e w e have developed some s k i l l s i n p i l o t
s e l e c t ion.

A s shown i n f i g u r e 1, our q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r p i l o t employment have

v a r i e d over t h e y e a r s from 1954, when w e r e q u i r e d a h i g h s c h o o l diploma and
165 hours of f l i g h t - t i m e e x p e r i e n c e , t o 1970, when w e r e q u i r e d a c o l l e g e
d e g r e e and 500 hours of f l i g h t t i m e .

There w a s a l s o a p e r i o d i n t h e l a t e 1960's d u r i n g which w e processed

a p p l i c a n t s w i t h a p r i v a t e p i l o t l i c e n s e ; i f t h e a p p l i c a n t passed a l l of our
tests w e guaranteed him a j o b i f h e w a s a b l e t o o b t a i n a commercial license
within 1 yr.

The c u r r e n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s shown i n f i g u r e 1 came about as a r e s u l t of

a c o u r t d e c r e e . For t h o s e of you who d o n ' t know, United A i r l i n e s w a s
c h a l l e n g e d by t h e Equal Employment Opportunity Commission f o r d i s c r i m i n a t o r y
hiring practices i n pilot selection.

T h i s r e s u l t e d i n a c o u r t case and t h e s i g n i n g of a c o u r t d e c r e e .
Included i n t h a t d e c r e e were t h e s e minimum employment q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .

With t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e c u r r e n t h i r i n g program, t h e changes w e made

i n minimum employment q u a l i f i c a t i o n s were motivated p r i m a r i l y by a p p l i c a n t
supply r a t h e r t h a n any d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e q u a l i t y of t h e p i l o t s
previously hired.

T h i s i s n o t t o s a y w e d i d n ' t make some m i s t a k e s . However, t h e e f f e c t s

of t h e m i s t a k e s were minimized l a r g e l y due t o t h e q u a l i t y of a p p l i c a n t s
r a t h e r t h a n any r e a l l y s c i e n t i f i c s e l e c t i o n procedure.
" F l i g h t T r a i n i n g Manager , United A i r l i n e s .
61
 I n 1975, United A i r l i n e s d i d something i t had n o t attempted t o do b e f o r e ,
a t l e a s t i n any important d e t a i l . Looking ahead t o t h e later 1970's and e a r l y
1980s, w e could f o r e s e e a p e r i o d of s i g n i f i c a n t h i r i n g . W e would r e c a l l
approximately 500 furloughed p i l o t s and h i r e more t h a n 1,000 new p i l o t s .

To b e s u r e w e would pursue t h e proper h i r i n g philosophy, United

management formed w h a t w e c a l l a p i l o t new-hire committee. The f i r s t
c h a l l e n g e of t h e committee ( f i g . 2 ) w a s t o e v a l u a t e p a s t s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s e s
used a t United A i r l i n e s . F u r t h e r , w e would expand our e x p e r t i s e i n t h e
methods of p i l o t s e l e c t i o n by s t u d y i n g t h e s t a t e of t h e a r t and t h e h i r i n g
p r o c e s s e s used by o t h e r a i r l i n e s throughout t h e world. And f i n a l l y , w e would
develop recommendations f o r f u t u r e new-hire p i l o t s e l e c t i o n , new-hire
t r a i n i n g , and t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y y e a r e v a l u a t i o n .

The committee pursued t h e s e matters f o r some 18 months and developed a

philosophy of p i l o t s e l e c t i o n . T h i s philosophy forms t h e b a s i s of U n i t e d ' s
p r e s e n t h i r i n g and t r a i n i n g program which i s t o d a t e proving t o be t h e most
s u c c e s s f u l i n our h i s t o r y .

Before reviewing o u r c u r r e n t philosophy, a l l o w m e t o s h a r e w i t h you

s e v e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t shaped t h e committee's development of philosophy
and i t s recommendations ( f i g . 3 ) .

F i r s t w a s t h e s i g n i n g of t h e Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

v e r s u s United A i r l i n e s Consent Decree, which reduced some of our p r e v i o u s
h i r i n g s t a n d a r d s and set g o a l s f o r employment of m i n o r i t i e s and females as
airline pilots.

A s a r e s u l t of t h e c o u r t d e c r e e , formal e d u c a t i o n and f l i g h t time could

no l o n g e r b e used as primary S e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a i n our h i r i n g program.

Second, t h e committee w a s i n f l u e n c e d by t h e heavy a t t a c k our p r e v i o u s

s t a n d a r d s were s u b j e c t e d t o d u r i n g t h e Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission-United A i r l i n e s case, and o u r l a c k of proof t h a t t h e s e s t a n d a r d s
r e l a t e d t o any c r i t e r i o n of j o b performance. I n t h e f u t u r e w e would b e
r e q u i r e d t o v a l i d a t e each s t e p of t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s w e intended t o u s e .

T h i r d , and v e r y i m p o r t a n t l y , a thorough s t u d y w a s undertaken of t h e

p s y c h o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of o u r most s u c c e s s f u l and least s u c c e s s f u l
p i l o t s . T h i s l e d t o t h e development of what w e c a l l a c r i t e r i a p r o f i l e
i d e n t i f y i n g t h o s e a t t i t u d e s and p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s possessed by o u r most
successful p i l o t s .

T h i s p r o f i l e w a s compared w i t h a h i g h d e g r e e of c o r r e l a t i o n t o
p e r s o n a l i t y i n v e n t o r i e s developed by o t h e r a i r l i n e s throughout t h e world.

Our s t u d y showed t h a t a l t h o u g h , a t t h e t i m e of h i r e , t h e r e were s i g -

n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n p e r s o n a l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s between o u r most
s u c c e s s f u l and least s u c c e s s f u l p i l o t s , t h e r e were e s s e n t i a l l y no d i f f e r e n c e s
i n education o r f l i g h t t i m e .

62
 A l a r g e b a t t e r y of p s y c h o l o g i c a l tests w a s a d m i n i s t e r e d t o a sample
group of p i l o t s . The r e s u l t of t h e s e t e s t s w a s compared t o f l i g h t management
r a t i n g s of p i l o t ' s performance and t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e p o r t of j o b satis-
f a c t i o n . Again t h e r e w a s a h i g h c o r r e l a t i o n between c e r t a i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l
t r a i t s and j o b performance of our most s u c c e s s f u l employees.

The committee a l s o i d e n t i f i e d p i l o t s who w i t h o u t s i g n i f i c a n t a d d i t i o n a l

p e r i o d s of t r a i n i n g a p p a r e n t l y d i d n o t p o s s e s s t h e n e c e s s a r y psychomotor
s k i l l s t o perform c o n s i s t e n t l y a t t h e h i g h s t a n d a r d s expected of a United
A i r l i n e s p i l o t . I n most cases t h e y w e r e n o t r e q u i r e d t o complete a
thorough p i l o t t r a i n i n g and e v a l u a t i o n program as p a r t of- new-hire t r a i n i n g .

And f i n a l l y , t h e committee i d e n t i f i e d p i l o t s who were h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d

a t t h e t i m e of h i r e , b u t who appeared t o b e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y u n s u i t e d f o r a
c a r e e r as an a i r l i n e p i l o t . These men do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have p r o f i c i e n c y
problems, b u t do have p e r s o n a l i t y and a t t i t u d i n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t a r e
c o s t l y i n terms of s u p e r v i s o r y t i m e , employee morale, passenger r e l a t i o n s ,
and c o c k p i t harmony.

A s a r e s u l t of t h i s r e s e a r c h and s t u d y , t h e new-hire committee developed

t h i s philosophy of p i l o t s e l e c t i o n ( f i g . 4 ) : S e l e c t p i l o t s who have b a s i c
f l y i n g s k i l l s p l u s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a t t i t u d e and p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s t h a t make
an o u t s t a n d i n g employee and u l t i m a t e l y a n o u t s t a n d i n g c a p t a i n .

To implement and conform t o t h i s philosophy w e developed t h e f o l l o w i n g

m u l t i - s t e p s e l e c t i o n and t r a i n i n g p r o c e s s ( f i g . 5 ) :

F i r s t w e developed a computerized p i l o t a p p l i c a n t t r a c k i n g system t h a t

p e r m i t s a completely c e n t r a l i z e d s e l e c t i o n procedure whereby w e a r e a b l e t o
select f o r p r o c e s s i n g t h e b e s t c a n d i d a t e s r e g a r d l e s s of where
( g e o g r a p h i c a l l y ) t h e y make a p p l i c a t i o n .

Second, a series of p s y c h o l o g i c a l tests w a s s e l e c t e d and v a l i d a t e d by

t e s t i n g p a r t of o u r incumbent p i l o t group. T h i s allowed u s t o develop a
p r o f i l e t o b e s u r e a p p l i c a n t s possessed t h e r e q u i r e d a t t i t u d e and
personality traits.

The a t t i t u d e and p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s w e a t United c o n s i d e r important a r e

l i s t e d i n f i g u r e 6 . I t h i n k w e g e n e r a l l y a g r e e w i t h M r . Webster, b u t l e t m e
i n any case t e l l you what w e mean by each of t h e s e t e r m s :

The i n d i v i d u a l must be motivated by a career i n a v i a t i o n i t s e l f , n o t by

t h e h i g h pay o r o t h e r advantages.

The p i l o t must have a congruent i n t e r e s t p a t t e r n . Divergent i n t e r e s t s

a r e a n e g a t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . I n t e r e s t s should b e predominantly i n
t e c h n i c a l areas b u t w i t h some i n t e r e s t s i n i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h people.

P i l o t s should b e confident of t h e i r a b i l i t y and c a p a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l

t h e i r environment, b u t n o t t o t h e p o i n t of overconfidence.

63
 A reaZistic o u t l o o k on l i f e , f r e e from abnormal a n x i e t y r e a c t i o n s , i s
important. A p i l o t must make d e c i s i o n s based on f a c t s and n o t b e o v e r l y
impatient .
By conscientious w e mean someone who e x h i b i t s good g o a l - d i r e c t e d
behavior.

Cooperative - accepts a u t h o r i t y and procedures , and q u e s t i o n s when

appropriate - n o t a maverick.
Consistency -
n o t always l o o k i n g f o r ways t o do t h i n g s d i f f e r e n t l y ;
willing t o follow a consistent habit pattern.

And f i n a l l y , startZe threshotd. An i n d i v i d u a l ' s a b i l i t y t o t h i n k

l o g i c a l l y and q u i c k l y under stress. I n d i v i d u a l s who f r e e z e o r respond t o
i n a p p r o p r i a t e s t i m u l i under stress have a low s t a r t l e t h r e s h o l d .

Third ( f i g . 5 ) , w e designed a s i m u l a t o r e v a l u a t i o n t o a p p r a i s e a n
a p p l i c a n t ' s p i l o t s k i l l s and p r o v i d e some a d d i t i o n a l i n s i g h t i n t o s e v e r a l
a t t i t u d e and p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s . S t a r t l e t h r e s h o l d and s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e a r e
a s s e s s e d i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e b a s i c psychomotor and i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g
s k i l l s . T h i s e v a l u a t i o n i s computer-administered and computer-graded under
t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of a f l i g h t t r a i n i n g manager. The a p p l i c a n t f l i e s a DC-10
s i m u l a t o r approximately 1 hour, performing seven c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d and
h i g h l y s t r u c t u r e d maneuvers.

F o u r t h , a n in-depth i n t e r v i e w designed t o assess t h e a p p l i c a n t ' s

t e c h n i c a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , and probe h i s a t t i t u d e toward f l y i n g and h i s
m o t i v a t i o n f o r a p p l y i n g f o r t h e p o s i t i o n of a i r l i n e p i l o t .

We b e l i e v e t h a t i n t e r e s t i n f l y i n g and a t t i t u d e may b e more important

t h a n e d u c a t i o n and f l y i n g e x p e r i e n c e i f t h e y are combined w i t h t h e pre-
r e q u i s i t e i n t e l l i g e n c e , psychomotor s k i l l s , and p e r s o n a l i t y t r a i t s . The
i n t e r v i e w i s s t r u c t u r e d t o v e r b a l l y e x p l o r e t h e a t t i t u d e and p e r s o n a l i t y
t r a i t s j u s t mentioned. To conduct t h e i n t e r v i e w s w e have c a r e f u l l y
s e l e c t e d and thoroughly t r a i n e d a group of f l i g h t managers from around our
system.

The a i r crew s e l e c t i o n t e s t , o r STANINE as i t is more commonly known, i s

a d m i n i s t e r e d t o o b t a i n a n i n d i c a t i o n of p i l o t a p t i t u d e and i s a p r e d i c t o r of
s u c c e s s i n t r a i n i n g . A d d i t i o n a l l y w e f e e l t h i s p r o v i d e s a u s e f u l measure of
a n a p p l i c a n t ' s c o g n i t i v e s k i l l s , t h o s e s k i l l s w e c o n s i d e r s o important i n t h e
t r a n s i t i o n t o a new a i r c r a f t .

F i n a l l y , an e x t e n s i v e medical assessment is accomplished. T h i s s t e p is

designed t o measure c u r r e n t h e a l t h and a l s o t o p r e d i c t long-term p h y s i c a l
s u i t a b i l i t y f o r an a i r l i n e career.

This m u l t i - s t e p s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s a l l o w s u s t o create a p r o f i l e on each

a p p l i c a n t ( f i g . 7 ) . The p r o f i l e is t h e n p r e s e n t e d t o a board of review
composed of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from F l i g h t O p e r a t i o n s , P e r s o n n e l , and Medical
departments. The board makes a f i n a l d e c i s i o n on p i l o t s e l e c t i o n based on
a c a r e f u l review of each p r o f i l e .

A f t e r s e l e c t i o n by t h e board, t h e p i l o t e n t e r s a 6-8 week new-hire

t r a i n i n g program followed by a 1-year l i n e p r o b a t i o n a r y p e r i o d . The s e l e c t i o n
procedure i s n o t f i n i s h e d u n t i l t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y y e a r i s s u c c e s s f u l l y
completed.

New-hire t r a i n i n g i n c l u d e s t h e f o l l o w i n g t h r e e p a r t s ( f i g . 8 ) . F i r s t ,
t h e u s e of i n d i v i d u a l i z e d computer-managed and computer-assisted i n s t r u c t i o n .
T h i s t r a i n i n g i s c r i t e r i o n - b a s e d and i s designed t o e n s u r e a d e q u a t e
a e r o n a u t i c a l knowledge and knowledge i n o t h e r areas a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e j o b of
being a f l i g h t crewmember.

Second, a p i l o t - s k i l l s t r a i n i n g and e v a l u a t i o n program i s provided,

based on t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e new-hire w i l l n o t f u n c t i o n as a c a p t a i n o r
c o p i l o t f o r some time. I t is t h e r e f o r e i m p e r a t i v e t h a t an e a r l y f l i g h t -
s k i l l s assessment be provided.

T h i r d , a f l i g h t e n g i n e e r t r a n s i t i o n t r a i n i n g program i s i n c l u d e d i n
new-hire t r a i n i n g , s i n c e i n i t i a l l i n e assignment w i l l b e as second o f f i c e r .

F i n a i l y , a n e x t e n s i v e p r o b a t i o n a r y year l i n e - e v a l u a t i o n program h a s been

implemented t o p r o v i d e a c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e t o t a l e v a l u a t i o n philosophy and
t o e n s u r e t h e new p i l o t meets t h e c r i t e r i a p r o f i l e e s t a b l i s h e d f o r a United
Airlines pilot.

This program ( f i g . 9) c o n s i s t s of a l i n e check each q u a r t e r of t h e f i r s t

year g i v e n by a f l i g h t manager; a home s t u d y c o u r s e on f o u r f l i g h t -
o p e r a t i o n s r e l a t e d s u b j e c t s ; and a n o r a l examination on t h e equipment t o
which t h e p i l o t i s a s s i g n e d .

And f i n a l l y , t h e r e i s a n a d d i t i o n a l p i l o t e v a l u a t i o n a t t h e t r a i n i n g
c e n t e r , i f p i l o t s k i l l s d u r i n g new-hire t r a i n i n g are i n any way marginal.

Although i t i s s t i l l e a r l y t o r e a c h t o t a l l y d e f i n i t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s , a l l
t h e i n d i c a t i o n s a r e t h a t 1978 w a s one of our most s u c c e s s f u l y e a r s of p i l o t
employment. I n t h a t y e a r o v e r 6,000 a p p l i c a n t s progressed through some phase
of t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s d e s c r i b e d earlier.

From t h o s e 6,000 a p p l i c a n t s , 494 p i l o t s were h i r e d i n 1978. They

p o s s e s s a n a v e r a g e of 16.2 y e a r s of e d u c a t i o n , 3,300 hours of f l i g h t t i m e
e x p e r i e n c e , and t h i s i n s p i t e of t h e f a c t t h a t e d u c a t i o n and f l i g h t t i m e
w e r e n o t primary c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n s e l e c t i o n . The group i n c l u d e s 21 women
and 47 members of m i n o r i t i e s , some w i t h e d u c a t i o n and f l i g h t t i m e w e l l below
t h e average.

The a t t r i t i o n rate i n new-hire t r a i n i n g w a s less t h a n 2%, and r e p o r t s

from l i n e f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s management i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e s e people are o u t -
s t a n d i n g i n t e r m s of j o b performance, m o t i v a t i o n , and a t t i t u d e .

65
 Our work of examining, v a l i d a t i n g , and r e f i n i n g a p p l i c a n t c r i t e r i a may
never b e f i n i s h e d , b u t o v e r a l l w e f e e l o p t i m i s t i c a b o u t t h e r e s u l t s of o u r
p r o c e s s so f a r and e x p e c t t o b e n e f i t even more i n t h e f u t u r e .

We a l s o f e e l i t h a s s i g n i f i c a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s i n t h e c o n t e x t of f l i g h t -
deck r e s o u r c e management, s i n c e t h i s p r e c i s i o n approach t o p i l o t s e l e c t i o n
p r o v i d e s u s w i t h a well-defined, p r e d i c t a b l e s t a r t i n g p o i n t . But i t ' s o n l y
a beginning.

We may know through i n i t i a l s e l e c t i o n t h a t w e have a diamond i n t h e

rough. The s h a p i n g , p o l i s h i n g , and s e t t i n g of t h i s gem t o m e e t o u r needs
comes n e x t . T h i s e x p l a i n s my i n t e r e s t and t h e i n t e r e s t of United A i r l i n e s
i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r conference.

Thank you. Do you have any q u e s t i o n s of comments?

DISCUSSION

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN, Scandinavian A i r l i n e s : You mentioned you had a

p s y c h o l o g i c a l test of your most s u c c e s s f u l and most u n s u c c e s s f u l p i l o t s i n
your c o u r s e . Could I have t h e c r i t e r i a f o r how you deem a p i l o t t o b e
successful and/or unsuccessful, please?

CAPT. TRAUB: I can p r o v i d e you w i t h t h e names of t h e tests t h a t w e

used. I ' m n o t completely f a m i l i a r w i t h how t h e tests were s c o r e d . I f t h a t
a d d r e s s e s your q u e s t i o n .

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: How do you s a y t h a t t h e p i l o t i s s u c c e s s f u l ?

CAPT. TRAUB: It w a s based on f l i g h t management assessment of t h e

p i l o t ' s performance and a l s o t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s f e e l i n g of j o b s a t i s f a c t i o n .

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: Was t h a t s u b j e c t i v e e v a l u a t i o n of t h e man by

himself and by management?

CAPT. TRAUB: Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED: Did you h i r e any of t h e 350-hour t y p e s ?

C U T . TRAUB: Y e s , w e d i d h i r e some w i t h v e r y low e x p e r i e n c e , r i g h t

about 350 hours.

CAPT. SIMONS, Pan Am: How do you m a i n t a i n t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r ' s

p i l o t i n g s k i l l s d u r i n g h i s t e n u r e as f l i g h t e n g i n e e r ?

CAPT. TRAUB: Over t h e years, WE: have made s i m u l a t o r t i m e a v a i l a b l e

t o t h e s e people t h a t t h e y c a n u s e v o l u n t a r i l y when t h e y go through a p i l o t
o r f l i g h t e n g i n e e r t r a i n i n g program. We a l s o p r o v i d e some p i l o t t r a i n i n g

66
d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d of t i m e . It i s v e r y l i m i t e d b u t w e do p r o v i d e s i m u l a t o r
e x p e r i e n c e and u n t i l r e c e n t l y a i r p l a n e e x p e r i e n c e as w e l l .

CAPT. SIMONS: T h i s v o l u n t e e r s i m u l a t o r , do you have a f l i g h t

i n s t r u c t o r w i t h them o r j u s t l e t them f l y t h e s i m u l a t o r ?

CAPT. TRAUB: Most of t h e t i m e n o t . It i s set up w i t h a t a p e

program and t h e y ' r e f r e e t o u s e t h e t a p e i n t h e s i m u l a t o r w i t h o u t a n
instructor.

CAPT. SIMONS: What's your recovery r a t e on f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s ?

We've g o t f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s f l y i n g f o r 8 o r 1 0 y e a r s and t h e y are now j u s t
becoming f i r s t o f f i c e r s and w e ' r e v e r y concerned a b o u t t h e s u c c e s s of g e t t i n g
t h e i r p i l o t s k i l l s back a f t e r being o f f t h a t long a t i m e . O f a l l your f l i g h t
e n g i n e e r s t h a t have flown as f l i g h t e n g i n e e r f o r q u i t e a w h i l e , were a l l
s u c c e s s f u l i n coming back as a p i l o t ?

CAPT. TRAUB: I c a n ' t s a y t h a t a l l have been s u c c e s s f u l . The v a s t

m a j o r i t y of them have been s u c c e s s f u l w i t h v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of t r a i n i n g .

CAPT. SIMONS: We've a l r e a d y found t h a t w e have t o g i v e them a l o t

of e x c e s s t r a i n i n g when t h e y come back a f t e r being f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s f o r q u i t e
a long t i m e , and I d o n ' t know what kind of s u p p o r t you g e t from a p i l o t
group. When you say v o l u n t e e r , i t ' s l i k e s a y i n g , you know, come up on your
b i r t h d a y . P l u s , y o u ' r e i n Denver and you've g o t your p i l o t s a l l over t h e
system.

CAPT. TRAUB: We have r e c e n t l y introduced a new program. When a

f l i g h t engineer upgrades t o f i r s t o f f i c e r , h e must come t o Denver s e v e r a l
weeks t o a month b e f o r e t r a n s i t i o n t r a i n i n g t o go through what w e c a l l
I n i t i a l F i r s t O f f i c e r T r a i n i n g , which i s r e a l l y ground t r a i n i n g .

But d u r i n g t h a t p e r i o d w e a l s o o f f e r them - w e l l , v o l u n t e e r , i f you

w i l l - p i l o t e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e s i m u l a t o r . T h i s i s w i t h an i n s t r u c t o r and
has been used by almost everyone r e c e n t l y .

CAPT. SIMONS: One o t h e r t h i n g t h a t you could u s e i s a b a s k e t b a l l

c o u r t . You can t e l l a p i l o t by h i s p h y s i c a l c o o r d i n a t i o n p l a y i n g b a s k e t b a l l .
You g e t r i d of t h e dumb ones r i g h t t h e r e .

CAPT. TRATJB: Maybe w e should i n c o r p o r a t e t h a t i n t o o u r p i l o t

s e l e c t i o n procedure.

UNIDENTIFIED: Do you do any e x p l i c i t i n t e l l i g e n c e t e s t i n g o r do

you i n f e r t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e l e v e l from how they behave on a l l t h e s e o t h e r
tests?

CAPT. TRAUB: Mostly t h e l a t t e r . The STANINE i s , t o some e x t e n t ,

a n i n t e l l i g e n c e t e s t , o r t h e s t a n d a r d i n t e l l i g e n c e t e s t i s included i n t h e
STANINE.

67
 MR. GERSZEUSKI, FAA: How do you d e f i n e a n u n s u c c e s s f u l p i l o t ?

CAPT. TRAUB: W e d o n ' t s a y u n s u c c e s s f u l ; w e s a y n o t as s u c c e s s f u l

as o t h e r s . Again, through f l i g h t management e v a l u a t i o n of t h a t p i l o t and
h i s r e c o r d i n t r a i n i n g . Some p i l o t s t r a d i t i o n a l l y t a k e more t i m e i n
t r a n s i t i o n i n g t o new a i r p l a n e s . Cockpit harmony and r e l a t i o n s w i t h crew
members become known o v e r a p e r i o d of t i m e .

CAPT. SIMONS: One o t h e r i t e m . A f t e r your y e a r of p r o b a t i o n , i t ' s

my u n d e r s t a n d i n g you have f a l l - b a c k p r i v i l e g e s f o r anybody t r y i n g t o upgrade
i n any manner. How d o you l i k e t h a t system?

CAPT. TRAUB: What do you mean by f a l l - b a c k p r i v i l e g e s ?

CAPT. SIMONS: Say, a f l i g h t e n g i n e e r i s going up t o f i r s t o f f i c e r .

If he d o e s n ' t do i t s u c c e s s f u l l y , h e ' s allowed t o go back and f l y as f l i g h t
e n g i n e e r . O r f i r s t o f f i c e r t r y i n g t o upgrade t o c a p t a i n , h e ' s u n s u c c e s s f u l ,
he f a l l s back t o being a f i r s t o f f i c e r . I n o t h e r words, you d o n ' t have
up-or-out, you have up-or-back. H a s t h a t been s u c c e s s f u l ? A r e you happy
w i t h t h a t kind of t r a i n i n g requirement - t o f a l l back t o a p r e v i o u s
posit ion?

CAPT. TRAUB: Y e s , I t h i n k w e are happy w i t h t h a t procedure.

CAPT. SIMONS: How do you g e t r i d of t h e person you r e a l l y want t o

get r i d of?

CAPT. TRAUB: I ' m s u r e t h e same way you i n Pan American do. I t ' s
a c a s e of d e c i s i o n , a c o r p o r a t e d e c i s i o n by t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s manager, and
supported by h i s d i r e c t o r .

CAPT. SIMONS: I understand you h a v e n ' t f i r e d a p i l o t i n many y e a r s .

CAPT. TRAUB: T h a t ' s n o t c o r r e c t ; w e have.

CAPT. SIMONS: The u n s u c c e s s f u l p i l o t you were t a l k i n g about a

w h i l e ago w a s t h e one you'd l i k e t o g e t r i d o f , b u t you c a n ' t ?

CAPT. TRAUB: I t h i n k w e a l l have t h a t problem.

CAPT. CRUMP, United A i r l i n e s : I f you e s t a b l i s h any kind of a norm

f o r a p i l o t , o b v i o u s l y y o u ' r e going t o have p i l o t s t h a t a r e s u p e r i o r t o t h e
norm and p i l o t s t h a t are i n f e r i o r t o t h a t norm. I t h i n k a v e r y c a r e f u l ,
thorough s t u d y of t h e background of a number of p i l o t s c a r r i e d o u t by some
of our p e r s o n n e l i n Denver has g i v e n u s a real good i d e a of a group of p i l o t s
w e d o n ' t want t o g e t r i d of a t a l l , b u t who a r e n o t performing i n t r a i n i n g t o
t h e same l e v e l of p r o f i c i e n c y t h a t o t h e r p i l o t s do, and t h o s e are t h e p i l o t s
w e u s e as a measure of t h i s $250,000 i n a career. And i t ' s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
t h e case of poor performance on t h e l i n e . I n many cases i t ' s i n a b i l i t y t o
t a k e a i r l i n e - t y p e t r a i n i n g i n t h e same manner t h a t o t h e r p i l o t s are a b l e t o
do.

63
 CAPT. SIMONS: Well, you know t r a i n i n g t h a t poor performer can
r e a l l y g e t expensive. You w e l l know t h a t , I ' m s u r e .

CAPT. TRAUB: Measured i n about 1975 d o l l a r s w e i n d i c a t e d about

$250,000 over a 30-year career. L i k e you s a i d , v e r y expensive, and t h a t ' s
j u s t i n e x t r a t r a i n i n g a t t e n t i o n d u r i n g t h e career.

CAPT. WASTMAN, F l y i n g T i g e r s : Have you had any d i f f i c u l t y i n

terminating a p i l o t during h i s probationary period?

CAPT. TRAUB: No.

CAPT. BORN, North C e n t r a l : Did I understand you c o r r e c t l y t o s a y

t h a t t h o s e new h i r e s t h a t might b e q u e s t i o n a b l e a t t h e end of t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y
year were r e t u r n e d t o Denver f o r f u r t h e r e v a l u a t i o n ? O r a l l second o f f i c e r s ?

CAPT. TRAUB: T h a t ' s p r i o r t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y

p e r i o d . W e p r o v i d e a p i l o t s k i l l s assessment d u r i n g new-hire t r a i n i n g , and
a l s o t h e r e i s a pre-simulator e v a l u a t i o n t h a t t h e a p p l i c a n t goes through.
I f e i t h e r one of t h o s e i s i n any way marginal, t h e n d u r i n g t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y
period w e b r i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l back and p r o v i d e e q u i v a l e n t of f i r s t o f f i c e r
t r a i n i n g o r c o p i l o t t r a i n i n g i n one of our s i m u l a t o r s . That i n c l u d e s a
management check similar t o what would have t o b e passed when t h e i n d i v i d u a l
upgrades t o f i r s t o f f i c e r . W e are t r y i n g t o a v o i d t h e problems t h a t t h e
gentleman from Pan American w a s a l l u d i n g t o l a t e r on i n t h e career, a f t e r
5 o r 1 0 y e a r s a s a f l i g h t e n g i n e e r and now upgrading t o c o p i l o t . W e are
t r y i n g t o determine a s b e s t w e c a n t h a t t h e y do have t h e s k i l l s and
c a p a b i l i t y t o make t h a t t r a n s i t i o n .

CAPT. TURLINGTON, Pan American: I h a v e n ' t been i n t h i s b u s i n e s s

as long as some, b u t I ' m c u r i o u s - i n your 25 y e a r s i t seems l i k e
m o t i v a t i o n and d e s i r e were something w e presumed a l o n g t i m e ago. Do you
see a r e a l d i f f e r e n c e now i n how d e e p l y you g e t i n t o t h o s e a s p e c t s i n your
s e l e c t i o n process?

CAPT. TRAUB: We're t r y i n g t o t e s t t h a t now. I t h i n k y o u ' r e r i g h t ,

w e presumed t h a t b e f o r e . I f somebody w a s a p p l y i n g f o r t h e j o b , and they had
a good background, w e presumed they had t h e m o t i v a t i o n and d e s i r e . We're n o t
assuming t h a t any more -
w e ' r e trying t o test f o r it.

CAPT. ESTRIDGE, American: Would you d e s c r i b e t o u s t h e startle-

t h r e s h o l d t e c h n i q u e you u s e i n t h e s i m u l a t o r ? Is i t a d i s t r a c t a b i l i t y element
o r a d i v i s i o n of a t t e n t i o n ?

CAPT. TRAUB: Both, I guess. Without t e l l i n g you t o o much about

t h e s i m u l a t o r e v a l u a t i o n - b e f o r e t h e l a s t maneuver t h a t they a r e r e q u i r e d
t o perform i n t h e s i m u l a t o r , w e t e l l t h e a p p l i c a n t t h a t t h i s i s t h e most
important p a r t of t h e e v a l u a t i o n . It r e a l l y i s n ' t , b u t w e t e l l them t h a t .
W e t e l l them t h a t t h e y w i l l e x p e r i e n c e a c r i t i c a l emergency d u r i n g t h i s
maneuver, and t h e n w e i n t r o d u c e t h a t emergency a t some p e r i o d d u r i n g t h e

69
maneuver. So w e t r y t o , I guess, o v e r l o a d them t o some e x t e n t by t e l l i n g
them t h a t it is a v e r y important e v a l u a t i o n , and t h a t i t ' s a l s o t h e most
d i f f i c u l t maneuver t h a t t h e y are r e q u i r e d t o perform d u r i n g t h e s i m u l a t o r
evaluation.

CAPT. SCLIFO, Texas I n t e r n a t i o n a l : How do you g e t a guy w i t h 350

hours and p u t him i n a DC-10 s i m u l a t o r ? It seems l i k e t h a t would be a l i t t l e
unfair.

CAPT. TRAUB: W e d o n ' t f l y i t n e c e s s a r i l y as a DC-10 s i m u l a t o r ; w e

f l y i t j u s t as an instrument-based t r a i n e r . And a l l a p p l i c a n t s are w e l l
b r i e f e d on what t h e y ' r e r e q u i r e d t o perform i n t h a t s i m u l a t o r . W e do t o
some e x t e n t , expect a l i t t l e b i t less of t h e 350-hour i n d i v i d u a l as opposed
t o t h e 3,000-hour a p p l i c a n t . Does t h a t answer your q u e s t i o n ?

CAPT. SCLIFO: I j u s t c a n ' t imagine how you g e t a guy w i t h 350

hours and p u t him i n a DC-10 s i m u l a t o r and, s a y , w i t h t h e s t a r t l e t h r e s h o l d -
i t seems l i k e i t would b e almost impossible.

CAPT. TRAUB: I t h i n k w e are amazed a t how w e l l some of t h e low-time

a p p l i c a n t s do. I f t h e y have a b a s i c a l l y good i n s t r u m e n t background and some
information-processing s k i l l s , t h e y handle i t q u i t e w e l l . They a r e graded
a g a i n s t each o t h e r s o w e develop a p r e t t y good d a t a b a s e t o make a judgment
on t h a t i n d i v i d u a l .

CAPT. SIMONS: One o t h e r area, B i l l . Log book e n t r i e s are hard t o

v e r i f y and you know y o u ' r e g e t t i n g p e o p l e t h a t s a y t h e y have 350 hours and
i t ' s q u i t e w e l l known, you know, t h e y d o n ' t . Is t h e r e any way you people
v e r i f y t h e i r l o g books?

CAPT. TRAUB: I mentioned t h a t w e provided a p r e t t y thorough

t r a i n i n g program f o r t h e f l i g h t managers t h a t are p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e i n t e r -
views, and w e p o i n t o u t t o t h e managers t h a t i t ' s t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e
b e s t of t h e i r a b i l i t y t o make t h a t v e r i f i c a t i o n . Now, I ' m s u r e t h a t some
people do s l i p by, b u t I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t many do, i n t h a t they do have t o
f l y a DC-10 s i m u l a t o r and t h e y answer some v e r y t e c h n i c a l q u e s t i o n s based on
t h e i r l e v e l of e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e i n t e r v i e w s i t u a t i o n .

CAPT. SIMONS: The r e a s o n I s a y t h a t i s t h a t p i l o t s who have been

w i t h u s f o r 1 5 y e a r s w i l l s a y "Gee, I r e a l l y o n l y had 40 hours when I h i r e d
on." I h e a r t h a t a l l t h e time.

CAF'T. TRAUB: W e found t h a t t o be more t r u e e a r l y i n t h e h i r i n g

program. About a y e a r ago w e found people who had made e r r o r s i n t h e i r
logbooks. I t ' s n o t t u r n i n g up n e a r l y as f r e q u e n t l y now.

CAPT. SIMONS: I b e t t h e y had more m o t i v a t i o n though.

CAPT. TRAUB: Right.

70
 MR. SMITH, ALPA: To g e t back t o t h e q u e s t i o n having t o do w i t h
t h e s u b j e c t i v e assessment of t h e f l i g h t managers as t o s u c c e s s f u l o r n o t s o
s u c c e s s f u l compared t o t h e norm. Was t h e f l i g h t manager r e q u i r e d t o r a t e
t h e i n d i v i d u a l on a s i n g l e s c a l e o f , l e t ' s s a y , 1 t o 9, which w a s c o r r e l a t e d
w i t h some p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s t ? O r w a s i t broken down i n t o c e r t a i n c a t e g o r i e s ,
f o r example, t r a i n a b i l i t y , 1 t o 9; i n t e r p e r s o n n e l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 1 t o 9; and
t h e n c r o s s - c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e s e d i f f e r e n t p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s t s ? And if i n
f a c t i t w a s , do you have any i d e a what some of t h e s e c o r r e l a t i o n v a l u e s i n
f a c t are o r w e r e ?

CAPT. TRAUB: Our group i n Chicago t h a t had t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

f e l t v e r y comfortable w i t h t h e h i g h d e g r e e of c o r r e l a t i o n , and t h e y d i d u s e
both t h e 1-9 e v a l u a t i o n , numerical e v a l u a t i o n , p l u s t h e w r i t t e n e v a l u a t i o n s .
And o u r p s y c h o l o g i s t s on t h e s t a f f had t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o them.

MR. SMITH: You mean t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t s determined t h e scale o r t h e

f l i g h t manager determined t h e s c a l e ?

CAPT. TRAUB: No, t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t s set up t h e e v a l u a t i o n

q u e s t i o n n a i r e . So, i n e f f e c t , t h e y determined t h e scale, and t h e n i t w a s
a d e q u a t e l y explained t o t h e f l i g h t managers. Not s o s u b j e c t i v e i s t h e
t r a i n i n g r e c o r d of t h e same people. By t r a i n i n g , I d o n ' t mean j u s t i n o u r
t r a i n i n g c e n t e r i n Denver, b u t t h e i r l i n e checks and so f o r t h , which w e r e
a l s o included i n t h e e v a l u a t i o n . Hopefully, w e were a b l e t o minimize t h e
e r r o r s by t e s t i n g a l a r g e enough group of people.

MR. SMITH: But t h e d i r e c t i o n s t o t h e management people who t h e n

e v a l u a t e d t h e i n d i v i d u a l s w e r e f a i r l y s p e c i f i c as t o t h e n a t u r e of t h e t h i n g s
t h a t they were a c t u a l l y s c o r i n g ?

CAPT. TRAUB: That's correct.

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: How do you s c o r e a man's m o t i v a t i o n ? What

I
c r i t e r i a do you u s e ?

CAPT. TRAUB: Well, w e p r o v i d e a word d e s c r i p t i o n of what a h i g h l y

motivated p i l o t i s v e r s u s a low m o t i v a t i o n . And I would suppose such t h i n g s
as a b u s e of s i c k leave. An i n d i v i d u a l who r e a l l y p u t s o u t n o t h i n g e x t r a ,
and maybe h a s problems w i t h p r o f i c i e n c y checks, might have low m o t i v a t i o n .

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: But i n t h e a p p l i c a n t s ?

CAPT. TRAUB: Oh, a p p l i c a n t s . W e t r y t o l o o k a t t h e i r background

t o judge t h e m o t i v a t i o n , t o see how t h e y p r e p a r e themselves f o r t h i s j o b
t h a t t h e y ' r e t r y i n g t o o b t a i n . Some of t h e same q u a l i t i e s t h a t we looked f o r
i n our own p i l o t s w e t r y t o see i n t h e a p p l i c a n t s . How t h e y have a p p l i e d
themselves i n t h e i r academic t r a i n i n g and t h e i r a v i a t i o n t r a i n i n g .

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: Wouldn't i t b e v e r y e a s y t o f a k e m o t i v a t i o n ?

71
 CAPT. TRAUB: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . It i s e a s y t o f a k e . W e j u s t f e l t
t h a t w i t h a m u l t i - s t e p p r o c e s s l i k e o u r s , n o t t o o many would s l i p through.

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: More s p e c i f i c a l l y , f o r i n s t a n c e a man who h a s

been, o r a boy who h a s been a model a i r c r a f t p i l o t i n h i s youth, i s t h a t a
good m o t i v a t i o n o r ---.
CAPT. TRAUB: I t h i n k t h a t , coupled w i t h a d e q u a t e t r a i n i n g and
performance as h e w a s educated, would mean t h a t h e w a s h i g h l y motivated.

UNIDENTIFIED: To what e x t e n t , what v a l u e does p r i o r m i l i t a r y

f l y i n g e x p e r i e n c e c a r r y i n your t o t a l s e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a ?

CAPT. TRAUB: W e d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t i t ' s p a r t i c u l a r l y important. The

m i l i t a r y does p r o v i d e v e r y good t r a i n i n g and w e r e c o g n i z e t h a t , b u t beyond
t h a t t r a i n i n g and how t h e y perform i n t h a t t r a i n i n g w e g i v e no p a r t i c u l a r
c r e d i t f o r m i l i t a r y v e r s u s n o n m i l i t a r y . I n f a c t , about 35 p e r c e n t of t h e
p i l o t s w e h i r e d t h e f i r s t year w e r e n o n m i l i t a r y .

MR. McEMBER, E a s t e r n : A s a p i l o t - s e l e c t e e flows through t h i s

program, does h e g e t some i n d i c a t i o n a t c e r t a i n s t a g e s t h a t h e ' s doing w e l l
o r doing p o o r l y , o r does it a l l w a i t ' t i l t h e end?

CAPT. TRAUB: U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i t r e a l l y goes t o t h e end. The

a p p l i c a n t knows t h a t through being i n v i t e d back t o t h e n e x t s t a g e , h e ' s
s t i l l i n t h e p r o c e s s . Of c o u r s e , i f h e ' s n o t s u c c e s s f u l a t any s t e p , w e
d o n ' t p r o v i d e any feedback as t o why, and w e d o n ' t g i v e any i n d i c a t i o n , as
f a r as I know, e v e r i n t h e i r c a r e e r as t o how t h e y d i d d u r i n g new-hire
selection.

DR. LAUBER: Thank you, B i l l . The t a s k of s e l e c t i o n i s v e r y

i n t e r e s t i n g . Given c u r r e n t p a t t e r n s of career p r o g r e s s i o n , i t poses a n
i n t e r e s t i n g problem, because t h e i d e a l s e l e c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f o r a
s u b o r d i n a t e crewmember may, i n f a c t , b e d i f f e r e n t from t h e i d e a l s e l e c t i o n
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l who i s i n command, o r who p l a y s t h e
primary management r o l e i n t h e c o c k p i t .

And y e t , because of t h e way t h e system o p e r a t e s , you are, i n t h e s h o r t

r u n , s e l e c t i n g f o r s u b o r d i n a t e crewmembers who w i l l n o t upgrade t o c a p t a i n
f o r many y e a r s . How do you select f o r b o t h r o l e s ?

72
 1954 -HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
COMMERCIAL PILOT LICENSE
MINIMUM 165 FLIGHT HOURS

1966 - 2 YEARS CCLLEGE

PRIVATE PILOT LICENSE

1970 - 4 YEAR COLLEGE DEGREE

COMMERCIAL PILOT LICENSE
MINIMUM 500 FLIGHT HOURS

1978 - HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE

COMMERCIAL PILOT LICENSE
MINIMUM 350 FLIGHT HOURS

F i g u r e 1.- P i l o t a p p l i c a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .

1. EVALUATE PAST UNITED AIRLINES SELECTION

PROCESSES

2. GAIN EXPERTISE IN PILOT SELECTION METHODS:

0 STATE OF THE ART
0 PROCESSES USED BY OTHER AiRLlNES

3. DEVELOP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR:

0 PILOT SELECTION
0 NEW-HIRE TRAINING
0 PROBATIONARY YEAR EVALUATION

F i g u r e 2.- P i l o t new-hire committee.

1. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC)

vs UNITED AIRLINES -CONSENT DECREE

2. VALIDATION OF SELECTION CRITERIA

3. PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR MOST

SUCCESSFUL PlLOTS

4. LACK OF NECESSARY PSYCHOMOTOR SKILLS

5. PSYCHOLOGICALLY NOT SUITED

F i g u r e 3 . - New-hire committee c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .

73
 Fi

1. COMPUTERIZED PILOT APPLICANT TRACKING

SYSTEM

2. PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS

3. SIMULATOR EVALUATION

4. INTERVIEW

5. AIRCREW SELECTION TEST - PILOT APTITUDE

6. MEDICAL ASSESSMENT

F i g u r e 5.- P i l o t s e l e c t i o n .

e MOTIVATION
e INTERESTS

traits

74
 Figure 7 .- P i l o t selection profile.

1. INDlVlDUALlZED COMPUTER MANAGED

INSTRUCTION

2. PILOT SKILLS TRAINING AND EVALUATION

3. FLIGHT ENGINEER TRAINING

F i g u r e 8. - New-hire p i l o t t r a i n i n g .

1. LINE CHECK EACH QUARTER

2. HOME STUDY COURSE

3. ORAL EXAMINATION

4. PI LOTlNG SKILLS EVALUATION

F i g u r e 9.- P r o b a t i o n a r y y e a r program.

75
 BRITISH AIRWAYS' PRE-COMMAND TRAINING PROGRAM

Capt. L. P. J. Holdstock"

Some t i m e ago t h e r e w a s a r a d i o program a t home known as The Brain

T r u s t . There w a s a c h a r a c t e r who used t o appear q u i t e r e g u l a r l y by t h e name
of P r o f e s s o r Jode. An i n t e r e s t i n g man -
i t d i d n ' t matter what q u e s t i o n he
w a s a s k e d , h e always s t a r t e d o f f by saying "Well, i t depends upon what you
mean by . , . I ' and t h e n h e would answer about 1 4 d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n s b e f o r e he
g o t back t o t h e one h e w a s asked.

I f e e l t h a t way r a t h e r about pre-command t r a i n i n g because i t r e a l l y

depends on what you mean by pre-command. I ' m r a t h e r old-fashioned i n my out-
l o o k , and i t ' s my o p i n i o n t h a t pre-command t r a i n i n g starts on t h e day you
f i r s t g e t i n t o an a i r p l a n e f o r i n s t r u c t i o n . From t h a t day on e v e r y t h i n g i s
l e a r n i n g , e v e r y t h i n g i s p r e p a r i n g f o r command i n some form. Maybe i t ' s j u s t
command of your f i r s t s o l o , b u t e v e n t u a l l y f o r t h e commercial p i l o t i t ' s
command of t h e multi-crew a i r c r a f t .

For t h e purposes of t h i s paper I j u s t want t o e x p l a i n what w e do f o r o u r

p i l o t s t o h e l p them t o meet t h e b i g day.

Perhaps I ought t o b r e a k o f f a t t h i s p o i n t j u s t t o e x p l a i n our p i l o t

s o u r c e . I n 1958 w e suddenly r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e supply of RAF p i l o t s w a s
dwindling. That t h e i n p u t numbers t h a t w e could g e t compared w i t h what w e
thought w a s going t o be o u r growth would n o t meet demand, and w e took s t e p s
t o m e e t t h a t d e f i c i e n c y by opening up a c o l l e g e of a i r t r a i n i n g . I n t o t h a t
c o l l e g e we put young men who had never flown a n a i r p l a n e . They w e r e 18 y e a r
o l d s . We had a s e l e c t i o n problem, w e are s t i l l l e a r n i n g , b u t w e p u t i n t o t h e
c o l l e g e young men and we t a u g h t them t o f l y and, i n f a c t , from t h a t day on,
from 1960, w e have r e l i e d upon t h e c o l l e g e f o r o u r p i l o t s t r e n g t h .

I n t h e l a t e 1960's w e f e l l a l i t t l e s h o r t because, of c o u r s e , w e always

asked p l a n n i n g people t o l o o k a b o u t 3 y e a r s ahead, c o n s i d e r i n g b o t h t h e
s e l e c t i o n and t h e t r a i n i n g . They seldom g e t t h e i r numbers r i g h t , and t h e r e
w a s t h i s p e r i o d when w e had t o f a l l back on m i l i t a r y p i l o t s .

So, as f a r as command i s concerned, w e had a group of p i l o t s , some of

whom w e r e e x - s e r v i c e people. They had u s u a l l y experienced command i n some
d e g r e e r e g a r d l e s s of what a i r c r a f t t h e y had come o f f . We a l s o had young men
w i t h a t o t a l of 225 h o u r s i n whom w e had t o i n s t i l l some i d e a of what w e
meant by command.

It w a s something new t o n e a r l y a l l of them. Now, I should s a y t h a t t h e

i n s t r u c t o r s a t our c o l l e g e are p r e t t y good. The s o u r c e i s changing now, b u t
i n t h e p a s t t h e y have been mainly ex-RAF i n s t r u c t o r s , and t h e y have had t h e

J(
Chief T r a i n i n g P i l o t , B r i t i s h Airways.

76
f a c i l i t y of r e c o g n i z i n g command p o t e n t i a l . I know i f w e s t a r t t r y i n g t o
d e s c r i b e t h a t w e ' r e going t o g e t i n t o deep water, b u t I ' m s u r e t h a t ex-
perienced t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n s w i l l know what I mean when I s a y you can s e n s e
i t , and t h e s e people d i d . So t h a t i f we had a young man t h a t w e had p u t i n t o
H a m l j l e who t h e s e l e c t i o n people had thought w a s r i g h t , b u t who a l o n g t h e way
showed a t o t a l l a c k of command p o t e n t i a l , t h e n i t ' s most u n l i k e l y t h a t young
man would r e a c h t h e a i r l i n e .

I ' d l i k e t o make one o t h e r p o i n t h e r e , and t h a t i s t h a t i t w a s our ex-

p e r i e n c e , r i g h t a t t h e beginning, t h a t about a y e a r a f t e r t h e s e young men
a r r i v e d w i t h u s t h e y r e l a x e d . They had been through t h e i r s c h o o l l i f e , they
had been picked up from s c h o o l , t h e y had been p u t i n t o our c o l l e g e , and
suddenly you could s e n s e t h a t t h e y had a f e e l i n g t h a t they had i t a l l made.
A f t e r a y e a r w e had t o p i c k them up, t a k e them back i n t o t h e s c h o o l , p u t them
w i t h a t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n and j u s t p o l i s h them up, remind them t h a t t h e y had a
j o b t o do and make s u r e t h a t t h e y d i d i t p r o p e r l y .

Having g o t t h a t o u t of t h e way I t h i n k w e c a n now l o o k a t what w e do t o

t r y and h e l p t h i s man toward t h e command.

W e have f o u r i n p u t s . W e have a n i n i t i a l command p o t e n t i a l assessment,

and I'll come back t o t h a t i n a moment. We have a pre-command management
s t u d i e s c o u r s e , w e have a pre-command c o u r s e , and w e have a command c o u r s e
itself.

About 5 y e a r s a f t e r t h e young man e n t e r s Hamble, t h a t i s about 3 y e a r s

a f t e r h e j o i n s t h e f l e e t and becomes a l i n e c o p i l o t , w e make t h i s i n i t i a l
command-potential assessment. I t ' s a long-winded name, b u t t h a t ' s what w e
do, s o t h a t ' s what w e c a l l i t .

W h a t w e do i s a r r a n g e f o r a p e r i o d of group f l y i n g c o n s i s t i n g of a
minimum of 1 2 s e c t o r s w i t h a t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n . During t h i s p e r i o d n o t o n l y
is t h e c o p i l o t checked i n h i s normal d u t i e s b u t h e i s a l s o checked and
a s s e s s e d i n h i s a b i l i t y i n command. H e ' s being s u p e r v i s e d , of c o u r s e .

L i t t l e t r a i n i n g i s given. What w e r e a l l y want t h e t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n t o

do a t t h i s s t a g e i s t o j u s t l o o k a t t h e young man as h e is. Not as you can
make him, b u t as he i s performing on t h i s day. And a t t h e end of t h e s e
p e r i o d s , t h i s p e r i o d of l i n e s e c t o r s , t h e t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n makes a pre-
l i m i n a r y assessment as t o whether t h a t young man w i l l g e t a command o r n o t .

I n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e assessment i s u n f a v o r a b l e , t h e n w e a r r a n g e a
c o u r s e of t r a i n i n g . Obviously, t h e t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n w i l l s a y where t h e
d e f i c i e n c i e s are i n h i s mind, and w e a r r a n g e a c o u r s e of t r a i n i n g i n a n
e f f o r t t o e r a d i c a t e them. I f , of c o u r s e , t h e r e are no problems, w e l l , a l l
r i g h t , t h a t ' s straightforward.

Our c o p i l o t s are upgraded t o s e n i o r f i r s t o f f i c e r a f t e r approximately

8 y e a r s . And a t t h a t p o i n t w e make a f i n a l assessment as t o whether t h e
c o p i l o t i s command material o r n o t .

77
 It c u r r e n t l y t a k e s about 1 2 y e a r s t o command i n B r i t i s h Airways. The
lowest w e have e v e r s e e n w a s 8 y e a r s , t h a t being 5 o r 6 y e a r s ago. A t t h e
moment i t ' s n e a r e r 15 y e a r s . So over t h e y e a r s you can s a y w e have had a n
average of a b o u t 1 2 y e a r s t o command.

T h i s command assessment is made i n t h e l i g h t of a l l t h e material t h a t ' s

a v a i l a b l e t o a board, n o t j u s t one i n d i v i d u a l . The f l y i n g manager w i l l s e t
up a board. There w i l l b e a t r a i n i n g manager included i n a board of about
f o u r o r f i v e people t o l o o k a t t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l s . I n t h e assessment one c a n
f e e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l r e p o r t s from t h e a b i n i t i o c o u r s e a t Hamble, you can
feed i n t h e t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n ' s assessment which h a s been made earlier on,
t h e c u r r e n t l i n e r e c o r d , t h e t r a i n i n g r e c o r d , and t h e i n d i v i d u a l s ' q u a l i t i e s ,

I f s a t i s f a c t o r y a t t h i s p o i n t , t h e n w e merely p u t a n o t e i n t h e t r a i n i n g '
f i l e s and t h e p e r s o n n e l f i l e s , and t h e young man t h e n f o l l o w s a normal p a t h
toward t h e command c o u r s e .

I f a t t h i s s t a g e a n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y assessment i s made -
e i t h e r because
t h e o r i g i n a l assessment w a s never changed, w a s a poor one t h e n and never
upgraded, f o r p e r s o n a l r e a s o n s , o r f o r c u r r e n t o p e r a t i o n a l r e a s o n s which
have come t o l i g h t - t h e n w e merely t e l l t h e young man.

T h e r e ' s no l o s s of s e n i o r i t y involved. We p o i n t o u t h i s d e f i c i e n t
areas. W e d o n ' t p l a n any t r a i n i n g f o r him, b u t w e w i l l g i v e him a l l t h e
t r a i n i n g h e needs i f he comes t o u s . W e w i l l p r o v i d e f o r s i m u l a t o r t r a i n i n g ,
w e w i l l p r o v i d e l i n e t r a i n i n g , b u t i t ' s up t o him r e a l l y t o approach u s and
s a y , " W e l l , what can I do, and how c a n you h e l p m e t o a c h i e v e command?'' And
i f h e manages t o do something a b o u t i t , t h e n , of c o u r s e , he c a n be
r e c a t e g o r i z e d and p u t i n t o t h e command stream.

The n e x t s t e p i s about 2 y e a r s b e f o r e t h e a n t i c i p a t e d command c o u r s e .

A s I s a i d earlier, p l a n n e r s are seldom r i g h t , so sometimes w e m i s s . But w e
a i m a t about 2 y e a r s t o g i v e a man a management c o u r s e . I d o n ' t want you t o
misunderstand t h a t t e r m . W e are n o t t e a c h i n g him a t t h a t s t a g e t o be a
manager, b u t w e do have a l o t of i n p u t from managers i n v a r i o u s s e c t i o n s , and
t h e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e c o u r s e are l a i d down. They are t o communicate informa-
t i o n on a wide r a n g e of activities and systems i n our own a i r l i n e , i n t h e
B r i t i s h A i r p o r t s A u t h o r i t y , C i v i l A v i a t i o n A u t h o r i t y , and any o t h e r a g e n c i e s ,
s a f e t y groups, anyone w i t h whom t h e y a r e l i k e l y t o come i n c o n t a c t l a t e r on.
By c l o s e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a number of p r o j e c t e x e r c i s e s , t h e y are
t o g i v e him some e x p e r i e n c e i n managerial f u n c t i o n s . And t h i r d , they are t o
create a climate of knowledge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g f o r a l l concerned.

What w e are r e a l l y t r y i n g t o do is t o relieve t h i s young man of some of

t h e p e r i p h e r a l f l i g h t - d e c k problems. I f he h a s a n i n s i g h t of t h e work of
h i s a i r l i n e and w h a t ' s going on around him, h e ' s less l i k e l y t o be t a k e n by
s u r p r i s e when problems do occur. The c o u r s e i t s e l f l a s t s f o r 2 weeks. I t ' s
r e s i d e n t i a l a p a r t from t h e middle weekend. And l i k e most workshops t h e r e ' s
q u i t e a l o t of evening work. W e d i v i d e t h e c o u r s e i n t o s y n d i c a t e s of f o u r
o r f i v e people depending on t h e number.

78
 We u s u a l l y have 1 6 t o 18 i n t h e c o u r s e . During t h e 2 weeks, w e have
l e c t u r e s and t a l k s by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s , f i r e s e r v i c e ,
c a b i n crew, medical s e r v i c e , ramp s e r v i c e s , c o r p o r a t e p l a n n i n g , p u b l i c
r e l a t i o n s , o p e r a t i o n s p l a n n i n g , customer r e l a t i o n s , s e c u r i t y , p e r s o n n e l , and
our computer services. T h i s g i v e s a p r e t t y broad p i c t u r e of t h e a i r l i n e .
F l i g h t managers make evening t r i p s t o t h e h o t e l , and w e t h e n have p e r i o d s of
informal d i s c u s s i o n w i t h them.

The c o u r s e a l s o i n c l u d e s v i s i t s t o our main London passenger t e r m i n a l ,

t h e e n g i n e e r i n g base and t h e a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l l e r c e n t e r f o r t h e London
area. Our own g e n e r a l t r a i n i n g s t a f f g i v e s l e c t u r e s on l a w as i t a f f e c t s
t h e p i l o t , and on manpower e f f e c t i v e n e s s .

There a r e some t a l k s on management s t y l e s and some h e l p w i t h p r o j e c t

p r e p a r a t i o n . We always a s k t h e p i l o t s t o f i l l i n a q u e s t i o n n a i r e a f t e r w a r d s ,
s o w e are c o n s t a n t l y changing t h e c o n t e n t of t h e c o u r s e i n t h e l i g h t of t h e
feedback. W e a l s o a s k f o r f r e e and honest o p i n i o n s , and g e n e r a l l y i t ' s v e r y
w e l l received.

When w e f i r s t t r i e d t h e c o u r s e w e d i d i t immediately b e f o r e t h e command

c o u r s e , and i t w a s n ' t w e l l r e c e i v e d . The young man knew t h a t j u s t around t h e
c o r n e r w a s a command c o u r s e , and what h e wanted t o do w a s g e t i n t h e l e f t -
hand s e a t , g e t f o u r r i n g s on h i s a r m and g e t f l y i n g t h e a i r p l a n e . H e d i d n ' t
want t o know about a n y t h i n g else. But by g i v i n g i t t o him about 2 y e a r s
ahead w e f i n d t h e i n t e r e s t i s t h e r e . H e ' s n o t r e a l l y t h i n k i n g a b o u t
command, and you can i n s t i l l i n him some of t h e s e l i t t l e b i t s and p i e c e s
j u s t t o help.

The t h i r d i n p u t w e make i s j u s t b e f o r e t h e command c o u r s e , t h e r e f o r e

named pre-command. The l e n g t h of t h e c o u r s e i s t a i l o r e d t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l .
I f you've g o t a good o p e r a t o r , h i s checks have been good, h i s s t a n d a r d i s
known t o b e good, l i n e f l y i n g when h e ' s been a c t i n g i n command under
s u p e r v i s i o n i s good, t h e n you d o n ' t need t o g i v e t h e young man v e r y much.

On t h e o t h e r hand, i f h e i s t r a i l i n g a l i t t l e t h e n w e b r i e f t h e t r a i n i n g
c a p t a i n , w e b r i e f t h e p l a n n e r s , and w e g i v e him a s l i g h t l y extended c o u r s e .
One has t o be c a r e f u l about t h i s , of c o u r s e , because i f you g i v e one chap
2 days and a n o t h e r one 3 weeks, t h e n immediately t h e y s t a r t a s s e s s i n g them-
selves.

A t any rate, w e know a f a i r amount about t h e chap. The c o u r s e i t s e l f

i s n o t mandatory and h a s no b e a r i n g on t h e command c o u r s e . W e never f a i l a
man a t t h i s s t a g e . The t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n i s b r i e f e d t h a t h e i s t h e r e t o h e l p ,
h e ' s t h e r e t o guide.

All t h e t r a i n i n g i s c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e young man i n t h e right-hand

seat. I t ' s c a r r i e d o u t d u r i n g revenue f l i g h t s , and b o t h t h e t r a i n i n g
c a p t a i n and t h e t r a i n e e are encouraged t o t a l k . Now, d o n ' t g e t m e wrong, I
d o n ' t want them t o t a l k a b o u t t h e n i g h t o u t they had t h e p r e v i o u s n i g h t and
t h e f o o t b a l l r e s u l t s . I want them t o t a l k about t h e o p e r a t i o n .

79
 We want them t o p r o g r e s s w i t h t h e f l i g h t , t o t h i n k about t h e f l i g h t .
Where t h e y are, w h a t ' s beneath them, what t h e weather i s l i k e , what t h e
d e s t i n a t i o n weather i s l i k e , what t h e y ' r e going t o do i f i t does t u r n n a s t y .
W e l i k e t o i n v o l v e them i n passenger problems, t o remind t h a t t h e y do have
people behind them paying t h e i r wages, and t h e y ought t o be l o o k i n g a f t e r
them. They need t o l o o k a f t e r t h e c a b i n crew. So w e need him t o c o n s i d e r
t h e s e commercial a s p e c t s .

On t h e o t h e r hand, obviously t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a s p e c t s of t h e f l i g h t are

t h e most i m p o r t a n t , and w e j u s t f o s t e r t h i s awareness a l l t h e way through
t h e o p e r a t i o n . Even t h e handling of t h e a i r c r a f t i s of secondary
importance, because t h e command c o u r s e i t s e l f i s going t o check h i s f l y i n g
a b i l i t y . A l s o , i t could w e l l be t h a t t h e pre-command c o u r s e i s being given
i n a n a i r c r a f t t h a t h e won't o p e r a t e , because w e a r e c u r s e d w i t h a number
of a i r c r a f t t y p e s , and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e ' s a f a i r amount of s w i t c h i n g goes
on. But i t d o e s n ' t matter - you c a n g i v e a pre-command c o u r s e on any a i r -
c r a f t , and g i v e t h e command c o u r s e on t h e a i r c r a f t h e ' s going t o o p e r a t e .

Now, I w i l l move on t o t h e command c o u r s e . I ' m n o t going t o go i n t o i t

i n d e p t h because I n o t e someone i s f o l l o w i n g m e t a l k i n g about command
c o u r s e s , and I know from t h e r e t u r n s t h a t t h e r e are no r e a l l y major
d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e upgrading t r a i n i n g i n t h e major a i r l i n e s . But i t i s
p o s s i b l e t h a t perhaps one o r two of our p o l i c i e s and p h i l o s o p h i e s are
d i f f e r e n t and, t h e r e f o r e , I would l i k e t o j u s t mention them.

One t h i n g about which I a m a b s o l u t e l y i n s i s t e n t , and t h a t i s t h a t any

c o u r s e must b e as r e a l i s t i c as p o s s i b l e . I a m opposed t o people p l a y i n g
musical c h a i r s , s i t t i n g i n on d e t a i l s , p r e t e n d i n g t h e y are something o t h e r
t h a n t h a t which t h e y are. And when a t r a i n e e i s t r y i n g t o l e a r n , I t h i n k
t h e least w e can do i s g i v e him t h e b e n e f i t of q u a l i f i e d crew members i n t h e
o t h e r seats.

Apart from one o r two p e r i o d s on t h e s i m u l a t o r when w e a r e r e a l l y

f a m i l i a r i z i n g t h e young man w i t h t h e a i r d r a f t d r i l l s and emergency procedures,
t h e whole of t h e s i m u l a t o r s e r v i c e i s planned on a real-time b a s i s . The
t r a i n e e i s c o n s t a n t l y aware t h a t t h e a i r c r a f t is being o p e r a t e d between two
p o i n t s , and t h e f l i g h t has t o p r o g r e s s r e g a r d l e s s of t h e problems.
Obviously, t h e r e ' s a f r e e z e s w i t c h , and i t i s used, b u t t h e u s e of i t i s n o t
encouraged. When d i s c u s s i o n is n e c e s s a r y , w e i n s i s t t h a t someone h a s t o b e
l o o k i n g a f t e r t h e shop. I t h i n k t h e e x p r e s s i o n used earlier w a s " t h e s t o r e . "

W e are w e l l placed i n r e s p e c t t o p l a n n i n g of d e t a i l s because w e have a

number of s e c t o r s -
London-Paris, London-Brussels -
a l l of which t a k e
about a n hour i n normal t i m e . So t h a t one can p l a n one of t h e s e d e t a i l s i n t o
a 1-hour s e s s i o n .

Normally w e do 2-hour s e s s i o n s i n t h e s i m u l a t o r , s o i t ' s t h e easiest

t h i n g i n t h e world t o start b u i l d i n g i n d i v e r s i o n s and u t i l i z i n g t h e 2-hour
p e r i o d . I d o n ' t t h i n k any f l i g h t i s normal, I ' m t a l k i n g now about t r a i n i n g
f l i g h t s i n t h e s i m u l a t o r . Weather and t e c h n i c a l problems a r e c o n s t a n t l y

80
being f a c e d , b u t a t no t i m e i s i t suggested t h a t w e are t r y i n g t o overload
t h e p i l o t . I t h i n k one can l o a d him up t o a p o i n t , b u t t h e r e i s a l i m i t .

W e o c c a s i o n a l l y b u i l d i n e x e r c i s e s from o u r knowledge of i n c i d e n t s i n
o t h e r a i r l i n e s and o u r own a i r l i n e , b u t w e o n l y b u i l d t h e s e i n c i d e n t s i n i f
w e are a b l e t o show t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t could have been avoided. The l a s t
t h i n g w e want t o do is t o demonstrate a n i n c i d e n t t h a t f i n i s h e s up w i t h a n
a c c i d e n t , and t h e n p a t him on t h e back and s a y , "But you c o u l d n ' t have done
a n y t h i n g anyway.'' T h a t ' s o n l y going t o r u i n h i s c o n f i d e n c e , and a t t h i s
s t a g e , of c o u r s e , t h a t ' s t h e one t h i n g you d o n ' t want t o d e s t r o y .

We encourage our t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n s t o t h i n k a b o u t t h i s young man as

someone who has had f a i r l y good t r a i n i n g , p e r i o d i c a l l y a s s e s s e d , and by t h e
t i m e he g e t s t o a command c o u r s e h e should b e a b l e t o become a c a p t a i n . I f
h e ' s n o t l o o k i n g good, t h e n t h e f i r s t t h i n g t h e t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n does is
l o o k a t himself and make s u r e t h a t h e ' s a l l r i g h t , t h a t h e i s n o t t h e
problem. Then i f a l l i s w e l l , o b v i o u s l y , t h e young man w i l l succeed.

From what I ' v e s a i d i t l o o k s as though w e are going o u t of our way t o

i n s u r e t h a t everyone p a s s e s . T h a t ' s n o t t r u e ; w e do have a f a i l u r e r a t e ,
a l b e i t a v e r y s m a l l one. Amongst t h e Hamble c a d e t s we have, i n f a c t , a
f a i l u r e r a t e on t h e command c o u r s e i t s e l f of 1 p e r c e n t . That f i g u r e might b e
m i s l e a d i n g because I ' m t a l k i n g about t h e command c o u r s e i t s e l f . W e may have
l o s t q u i t e a l o t a l o n g t h e way because of t h e v a r i o u s assessments w e have
made and t h e c o u r s e s w e have g i v e n , b u t on t h e command c o u r s e i t s e l f
1 percent.

With t h e m i l i t a r y p i l o t s t h a t w e had t o t a k e i n t h e 1960s, t h e i r

f a i l u r e r a t e , having been g i v e n t h e same f a c i l i t i e s , w a s much h i g h e r . I n
f a c t , w e l o s t about 7 p e r c e n t t h e r e . The Hamble c a d e t s are n o t j u s t pushed
on t o t h e l i g h t e r a i r c r a f t . It may b e of i n t e r e s t t o know t h a t t h e s e young
men who went i n t o t h e s c h o o l i n 1958 o r 1960, t h e y now have ...
w e l l , w e have
an ex-Hamble t r a i n e d p i l o t i n command of a l l a i r c r a f t i n our f l e e t s
i n c l u d i n g Concorde. Admittedly o n l y one, b u t one young man h a s made Concorde.

I n concluding, can I j u s t s a y a few words about t h e f a i l u r e s . Because

w e do, as I ' v e t r i e d t o e x p l a i n , a tremendous amount t o make s u r e w e d o n ' t
g e t f a i l u r e s . The p o i n t h a s a l r e a d y been made t h a t i t ' s worth a b o u t
$250,000 i n c o s t s . It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t w e came o u t w i t h e x a c t l y t h e s a m e
f i g u r e when w e were l o o k i n g a t i t a w h i l e ago. The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e i s w e
w e r e t a l k i n g i n pounds.

But when I t a l k a b o u t t h e s e f a i l u r e s I t h i n k i t comes i n t o t h e area i n

which w e are going t o b e spending a l o t of t i m e i n t h e n e x t few days. I t ' s
a t o p i c i n which I have a l o t of i n t e r e s t b u t v e r y l i t t l e knowledge, because
t h e prime f a c t o r i n t h e f a i l u r e s w e have had i s t h e i n a b i l i t y of p e r f e c t l y
good p i l o t s t o manage as w e l l as f l y . They become overloaded. And t o u s e a n
e x p r e s s i o n t h a t as I s a y , we're going t o h e a r a l o t a b o u t , t h e y seem t o have
no a b i l i t y t o l e a d . They have no l e a d e r s h i p a t a l l .

81
 I know t h a t t h e r e are widely d i v e r g e n t views on t h i s matter from t h o s e
who c o n s i d e r t h a t l e a d e r s h i p i s born i n people, and t h e r e are t h o s e who t h i n k
t h a t i t c a n b e t r a i n e d i n t o people. I would a g r e e t h a t some people do appear
t o b e n a t u r a l l e a d e r s , and some q u i c k l y a c q u i r e t h e a b i l i t y when g i v e n t h e
o p p o r t u n i t y . But when w e have a f a i l u r e i n t h i s area, I ' m s u r e t h a t i t ' s t o o
l a t e f o r t r a i n i n g t o help.

I d o n ' t t h i n k you c a n t e a c h l e a d e r s h i p i n a week. I t h i n k you've g o t t o

p i c k up t h i s l a c k of l e a d e r s h i p as e a r l y a s you p o s s i b l y can i n a young man's
career. Given t i m e , y e s , I t h i n k you c a n encourage i t . I ' m n o t convinced
t h a t i f t h e man i s completely l a c k i n g i n t h a t a b i l i t y t h a t you can p u t i t i n .
I d o n ' t know, time w i l l t e l l . And I ' m n o t t o o s u r e what I r e a l l y mean by
l e a d e r s h i p . I t h i n k w e a l l know what w e mean by t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s ,
h i s t o r y i s f u l l of them. W e know t o o a b o u t l e a d e r s i n management, and I
t h i n k some of t h i s c a n be t a u g h t - c e r t a i n l y t h e r e are v e r y s u c c e s s f u l
management c o u r s e s . But I t h i n k o u r l e a d e r f a l l s somewhere between t h e s e two.
W e a r e l o o k i n g f o r a young man who c a n e x t r a c t t h e maximum s k i l l from t h e
o t h e r members of h i s crew, who h a s t h e a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e them, and who
q u i t e n a t u r a l l y e a r n s t h e i r r e s p e c t through h i s a b i l i t y . I ' m s u r e t h i s
c a n ' t b e t a u g h t q u i c k l y . It must b e f o s t e r e d , encouraged, and e v e n t u a l l y , I
t h i n k , you w i l l f i n d i t i n most of t h e people who are p i l o t s . A f t e r a l l ,
w e are a big-headed group. Most of u s a r e c o n f i d e n t and g i v e n t h e h e l p I
t h i n k t h a t c o n f i d e n c e can be used.

J u s t t o end, I t h i n k w e are probably doing a l l w e can t o assist our

p i l o t s t o become c a p t a i n s , commanders, a i r c r a f t managers, c a l l them what you
w i l l . I f w e ' r e f a l l i n g down, I t h i n k i t ' s because w e have y e t t o f i n d o u t
how t o t e a c h l e a d e r s h i p .

W e have t r i e d ; I ' m n o t s u r e t h a t w e ' r e s u c c e s s f u l . Thank you.

DISCUSSION

MR. FELL, FAA: I n t h e p o r t i o n you showed on i n i t i a l command

t r a i n i n g , t h e v e r y f i r s t p o r t i o n on t r a i n i n g , you d i v i d e d i t i n t o 8 o r 1 2
what you c a l l e d s e c t o r s . Is t h a t what I ' m t h i n k i n g of as a f l i g h t l e g ?

C U T . HOLDSTOCK: T h a t ' s r i g h t , a l e g from A t o B.

MR. FELL: Is a l l t h a t t r a i n i n g conducted under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of

one p i l o t - t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n , o r are t h e r e v a r i o u s . . . . *

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: W e t r y t o c o n f i n e i t t o a maximum of two. I t ' s

almost a minimum and a maximum because i f you o n l y i n v o l v e one person, you
c a n always have a p e r s o n a l i t y c l a s h . You can have a young man whose career
w a s t o t a l l y r u i n e d becauBe h e had more s u c c e s s on t h e n i g h t s t o p w i t h
somebody o r o t h e r . These t h i n g s happen i n l i f e , s o i t would b e wrong t o a s k
one t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n t o r e a l l y assess a young man f o r t h e rest of h i s l i f e .

82
But on t h e o t h e r hand, you d o n ' t need t o i n v o l v e t o o many. I f you g e t t o o
many people involved t h e r e c i p i e n t g e t s f e d up, h e ' s n o t s u r e w h a t ' s going on,
and, a l s o , you could w e l l g e t c o n f l i c t i n g assessments. But if w e c a n
i n v o l v e two people, w e f i n d t h e y u s u a l l y g e t t o g e t h e r and they t a l k , and
what goes i n t o t h e f i l e i s a n i n i t i a l assessment, a n agreed assessment of
two people.

MR. FELL: A r e t h e s e s e c t o r s g i v e n over a s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d of t i m e ?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: No, b u t once you s t a r t t h e y are continuous. You'll

work f o r 2 o r 3 weeks j u s t t o complete them.

DR. BILLINGS, NASA: Is t h e young man always aware on t h e f i r s t go

a t t h i s t h a t t h i s i s a pre-command assessment, I b e l i e v e you c a l l e d i t ?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Yes, he knows. When t h e y f i r s t come t o t h e

a i r l i n e w e t e l l them what we're going t o do, what t h e i r career s t r u c t u r e i s .
They a r e aware t h a t t h e s e t h i n g s w i l l happen and a s each one comes up, of
c o u r s e , h e ' s thoroughly b r i e f e d s o he knows what i t ' s a l l about.
1

MR. DANAHER, NTSB: Would you a d d r e s s s e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a f o r e n t r y

i n t o Hamble?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Y e s . W e have two s e l e c t i o n teams. W e have some

t r a i n e d s e l e c t o r s based a t Hamble. They are ex-RAF people, p e o p l e who have
s p e n t y e a r s doing RAF s e l e c t i o n , f i n i s h e d t h e i r . p e r i o d i n t h e service, and
t h e n w e t a k e some of them on.

Very b r i e f l y , w e g e t about 12,000 a p p l i c a t i o n s a y e a r . We're l o o k i n g

f o r about 120 on average. Those p e o p l e a t Hamble are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
w h i t t l i n g down t h e 12,000 t o something l i k e 600 t o 700 who a r e looked a t ,
and t h e s e l e c t o r s a t Hamble l o o k a t them and r e d u c e t h e number by about a
h a l f . So you are t h e n down t o , s a y 350, perhaps 400 l i k e l y i n d i v i d u a l s . The
s e l e c t o r s a t Hamble are t h e n j o i n e d by two a i r l i n e people who have been
t r a i n e d i n s e l e c t i o n , and t h e r e i s a board t h e n of t h r e e people, one from
Hamble, two from t h e a i r l i n e . They spend t h e day w i t h t h e s e young men and
a t t h e end of t h e day you come o u t w i t h a n assessment, make o r b r e a k ,
l o o k i n g f o r a b o u t 120 o u t of t h e o r i g i n a l 12,000. To go through t h e a c t u a l
c r i t e r i a of how's and when's would t a k e a long t i m e , I ' m a f r a i d , b u t I'll
g i v e you some t i m e a f t e r w a r d s .

MR. DANAHER, NTSB: What i s t h e d i s p o s i t i o n s f t h e v e r y few, t h e

1 p e r c e n t o r s o , t h a t f a i l s t h e command c o u r s e ?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: They go down one of two r o a d s . W e f i n d

o c c a s i o n a l l y - w e ' l l write and a young man w i l l s h r u g h i s s h o u l d e r s and
s a y "Well, I knew I should never have made i t anyway," and h e ' l l go back t o
running t h e bank o r t h e garden o r what have you. I n f a c t , t h e r e are t h r e e
t y p e s . Others w i l l s a y "There's room f o r m e i n t h e o u t s i d e world. I f you
won't have m e as a c a p t a i n , I know I'll convince someone else," and they

a3
d i s a p p e a r . O r , they become permanent c o p i l o t s , and one o r two of t h o s e
people who have become permanent c o p i l o t s have f i n i s h e d up by b e i n g e x c e l l e n t
t r a i n i n g people. Don't a s k m e why, b u t they have.

UNIDENTIFIED: W e have a n e x p r e s s i o n , t h o s e t h a t can do and t h o s e

t h a t can't i n s t r u c t .

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Well, I ' l l go one f u r t h e r , t h o s e t h a t c a n ' t

instruct, instruct instructors.

UNIDENTIFIED: Regarding t h e i n d i v i d u a l who becomes a career f i r s t

officer - I ' v e heard comment t h a t t h e r e ' s a concern about t h e l e g a l
i m p l i c a t i o n s i n our f a i l - s a f e c r e w concept. That is, i f t h a t i n d i v i d u a l
who has been r e j e c t e d i n t h e command c o u r s e now becomes a permanent o r
career f i r s t o f f i c e r , and now you have a n i n c a p a c i t a t e d c a p t a i n and t h e
a i r p l a n e comes under t h e command of t h i s r e j e c t e d commander, as t o what t h e
l e g a l i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e f o r t h e company?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Y e s , I see t h e problem. I t ' s one t h a t h a s n ' t

been suggested t o u s .

UNIDENTIFIED: This i s t h e up-and-out o r f a l l - b a c k q u e s t i o n and

the implications t o i t .

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: You wouldn't l i k e t o keep t h a t problem on your

s i d e of t h e w a t e r , would you?

UNIDENTIFIED: How do you handle your f l i g h t engineer s i t u a t i o n ?

Do you have p r o f e s s i o n a l f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s , career f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s , o r p i l o t
engineers?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: I ' m a s h o r t - h a u l man and have been. My back-

ground w a s BEA, and i n BEA w e d i d n o t have f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s . The three-crew
a i r c r a f t w e had, l i k e t h e T r i d e n t and t h e 1011, w e f l e w w i t h t h r e e p i l o t s
b u t n o t w i t h one of them confined t o t h e systems p a n e l . W e trained the
c o p i l o t s as c o p i l o t s i n t h e right-hand seat; w e a l s o t r a i n e d them as systems
p a n e l o p e r a t o r s , and t h e y changed around t h e whole of t h e t i m e . Now, on
long h a u l , t h e o l d BOAC, t h e y had p r o f e s s i o n a l f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s . And I s a y ,
t h e y r e a l l y are p r o f e s s i o n a l e n g i n e e r s and t h e r e ' s no upgrading; t h e y ' r e
not pilots.

MR. SMITH, ALPA: Could you expand on your pre-command management

s t u d y c o u r s e o r program on what you c a l l p r o j e c t exercises?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Yes. What w e do a t t h e beginning of t h e 2-week

c o u r s e , i s d i v i d e them up i n t o s y n d i c a t e s , and w e f a c e them w i t h t h e p r o j e c t
t h a t t h e y ' r e going t o have. I t could be, i f you l i k e , command t r a i n i n g . I t
could b e something t h a t is on t h e commercial s i d e . But w e g i v e them a
problem, and g i v e them 2 weeks t o s o r t i t o u t and p r e p a r e a p r e s e n t a t i o n f o r

84
t h e end of t h e 2 weeks. The l a s t day i s devoted p u r e l y t o p r o j e c t p r e s e n t a -
t i o n s , and as a group they come up w i t h t h e i r answers, t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n s ,
t h e i r recommendations, and they c a n do w h a t t h e y l i k e t o make t h i s p r e s e n t a -
t i o n . I f t h e y want t o u s e v i s u a l a i d s o r f i l m s o r a n y t h i n g w e encourage
them.

MR. SMITH: I f I could j u s t c o n t i n u e , i t would appear t h a t t h e

system t h a t you have placed t h i s "command" t h i n g b e f o r e t h e p i l o t group,
throughout t h e i r e n t i r e career. I n o t h e r words, they t h i n k i n terms of
command on a v e r y r e - o c c u r r i n g b a s i s . Can you i n d i c a t e what t h e p i l o t
r e a c t i o n t o t h i s system is? L i k e , f o r example, t h e c a p t a i n v e r s u s t h e
c o p i l o t . Can you g i v e u s any f e e l f o r how t h e p i l o t s i n g e n e r a l react t o t h e
system where your c o p i l o t s are being t r a i n e d as managers o r c a p t a i n s and so
on a l l t h e way through, and t h e y ' r e i n t e r a c t i n g on t h e l i n e w i t h c a p t a i n s who
have a l r e a d y gone through t h e command c o u r s e ?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: T h i s w e f i n d i s no problem a t a l l . The a v e r a g e

c a p t a i n i s o n l y t o o g l a d t o t e l l o t h e r people how good he i s and t o impart
h i s knowledge and t o h e l p . I would t h i n k r e a l l y a b o u t 50 p e r c e n t of o u r
c a p t a i n s t a k e p r i d e i n s h a r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n and t a l k i n g a b o u t i t and s a y i n g
what they would do under c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , h e l p i n g t h e young man make
d e c i s i o n s . There a r e some, of c o u r s e , who j u s t come i n , t a k e t h e money and
go home. W e a l l know about t h o s e . But t h e c o p i l o t s are n o t f l y i n g i n a crew
way; t h e y ' r e c o n s t a n t l y f l y i n g w i t h d i f f e r e n t people so they g e t amongst t h e
good ones which i s t h e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g .

MR. SMITH: Do you stress a c e r t a i n c a p t a i n requirement t o b e a

training captain?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: No, b u t what w e do s a y i s t h a t t h i s young man

f l y i n g i n t h e o t h e r seat could w e l l save your l i f e . The more he knows about
the operation the b e t t e r .

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN, Scandinavian A i r l i n e s : Do you r e c r u i t new

f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s f o r your long-haul o p e r a t i o n s ?

C U T . HOLDSTOCK: W e h a v e n ' t had any i n t h e l a s t y e a r , b u t w e were

s t i l l r e c r u i t i n g l a s t y e a r , e a r l y 1978.

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: So you are n o t s p e c i f i c t o t h r e e - p i l o t

operation?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Sorry, I d i d n ' t hear t h a t question.

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN: How many t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n s do you have and are

they simulator captains?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: W e have t h r e e t y p e s of t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n s . When a

man does become a t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n t h e o n l y p l a c e w e u s e him i s on t h e l i n e ,
f i r s t of a l l i n doing t h e j o b t h a t h e knows. Then if h e i s s u c c e s s f u l w e
s t a r t u s i n g him i n t h e s i m u l a t o r as w e l l as on t h e l i n e , and i f that i s
s u c c e s s f u l , t h e n he g r a d u a t e s t o a l l a s p e c t s of t r a i n i n g . That i s , any air-
c r a f t conversion t r a i n i n g t h a t ' s necessary p l u s t h e simulator plus t h e line
work. A t t h e moment w e have something l i k e 150 t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n s .

MR. COHEN, FAA: Do I g e t t h e i d e a t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of

t h e t h r e e s t e p s of your t r a i n i n g i s on o n e ' s own i n i t i a t i v e . T h i s is n o t a
d u t y s t a t u s , pay s t a t u s t h i n g ? Is a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of t h i s t r a i n i n g
voluntary?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Some of i t ' s v o l u n t a r y . R e a l l y , t h e o n l y

v o l u n t a r y t r a i n i n g i s where a man is d e f i c i e n t . The a c t u a l p l a n n i n g of t h e
t h r e e s t a g e s i s done by u s , and i n t h a t s e n s e i t i s mandatory. But you a l s o
have t o remember t h a t w e are n o t , a t t h e moment on a f u l l b i d - l i n e system.
W e d o n ' t have any w o r r i e s about who does what, where, o r when. What's going
t o happen when w e do go on a b i d - l i n e system I ' m n o t q u i t e s u r e .

MR. TURLINGTON, Pan Am: I ' m c u r i o u s about t h a t l o o k a t t h e

p e r s o n a l q u a l i t i e s by t h a t board of f o u r o r f i v e t h a t comes a f t e r about 8
y e a r s , could you e l a b o r a t e on t h a t ?

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Well, a l l t h e t i m e o u r l i n e c a p t a i n s are pro-

v i d i n g r e p o r t s on c o p i l o t s . Nothing secret a b o u t t h i s , t h e y ' r e a l l
c o u n t e r s i g n e d by t h e c o p i l o t , b u t i f a c o u p l e f l y t o g e t h e r f o r 4 o r 5 days
t h e c a p t a i n u s u a l l y p u t s i n a r e p o r t . But somehow t h e f l i g h t managers, t h e y
g e t t o know t h e i r s t a f f , t h e y g e t t o know t h e problems, they g e t t o know t h e
ones who a r e t a k i n g t h e v a r i o u s b a r s a p a r t i n v a r i o u s p a r t s of Europe.
Maybe t h e y do over h e r e , I d o n ' t know. But you know t h e ones who are having
problems a t home. I ' m n o t t a l k i n g now about odd i n s t a n c e s where one has a
w i f e who's ill o r f a m i l y problems. I ' m t a l k i n g about long-term problems,
people who are c o n s t a n t l y i n t r o u b l e . And r e a l l y , h i s t o r y t e l l s u s t h a t
t h o s e people d o n ' t make good commanders. Because on t h e day t h a t t h e y ' r e
having most t r o u b l e , t h a t ' s t h e day they make a s i l l y d e c i s i o n .

86
 UPGRADE AND INTERPERSONAL SKILLS TRAINING AT AMERICAN AIRLINES
By: W. W. Estridge
Director - Flight Training
and
J. L. Mansfield
Manager - Training Techniques
(W. W. Estridge)
Three years ago, the American Airlines Captain
Upgrade program constituted a detailed study of
rules, policies and procedures. Special emphasis was
placed on such subjects as Weather, Communication,
Administration, etc., as published in a document
entitled, Flight Manual Part I. This program was
labeled, “Duties and Responsibilities” or “D & R.”
Naturally, in addition to the “D & R ’ training, each
new Captain also completed a flight training program
and the required rating rides in the left seat of the
equipment he would be assigned to fly.
Originally, the “D & R” program was conducted by
an instructor in a classroom/workshop format. However,
many complaints about the program seemed to highlight
the lack of standardization in the presentations. As a
result, the program was produced on color video tape,
using a panel format with the members being three of
American’s key Check Airman supervisors. The total
video program required eleven hours of running time
which was presented in forty minute sessions, each
followed with a question and answer period.
This reduced the complaints concerning the “Duties
and Responsibilities” program, but not to the point
the training staff was satisfied. Therefore, it was
decided that a survey was needed to determine the
critical needs, or objectives, of the Captain’s Upgrade
program. Acting on that decision, a training
development specialist visited several of the domicile
bases and interviewed base management pilots and
Captains, who had upgraded within the past year.
The conclusions resulting from those interviews were:
1. Upgrading Captains averaged from ten to fifteen
years with the company as cockpit crewmembers
and had been exposed to the entire contents of
Flight Manual Part I many times during their career.
They believed a detailed review of the operational
rules and policies could be accomplished by the
individual through self-study.
2. Captains are advised they are an important
representative of management, therefore it is
absolutely necessary they become aware of the
various company functions and programs that are
in support of their day-to-day operation as pilot-
in-command.
3. To assist new Captains in effectively directing the
activities of other crewmembers, training was
needed in Interpersonal Skills.
4. Proper importance should be afforded to the
significant milestone in a pilot’s career of being
promoted to Captain.
87
To meet those identified objectives, a completely new
Captain’s Upgrade program was developed. The
requirement t o provide information on “various
company functions and programs” was met by
conducting the following presentations, all followed
by question and answer periods.
Captain Ehmann and his immediate staff, during their
presentations, mainly emphasize the importance of
each Captain’s new responsibility. They also outline
major principles that Captains should consider in the
decision making process as the Pilot-In-Command.
The other speakers describe their major responsibilities
and problem areas, and describe how they might be
contacted and provide assistance to the Captains
during future years.
1. Captain D. E. Ehmann, Vice President - Flight,
and Staff
2. Air Traffic Control Director
3. Flying Operations Technical Director
4. Dispatch - Director
5. Crew Schedule - Director
6. Director - Flying Training
7. Director --Operational Engineering
8. Manager F/E Standards
9. Manager - Flight Service Training
10. AA General Manager DFW Airport
11. Manager - Aircraft Maintenance DFW Airport
In addition to those company functions, providing
information on two supporting activities outside of
the company seemed essential:
1. A visit to the Fort Worth Air Route Traffic Control
Center where individual briefings are provided.
2.A presentation made by the FAA Principal
Operations Inspector. This presentation covers
compliance with FAR’S, FAA’s role in American
Airlines’ operations, etc.
In two one-half day sessions scheduled on the‘third
and fourth days of the overall three and one-half day
program, the recommended Interpersonal Skills
training is conducted. During presentations on the
first two days, several of the speakers, starting with
Captain D. E. “Bud” Ehmann, Vice President- Flight,
the importance of open two-way communications in
the cockpit is emphasized. Also, the need for effective
two-way communications with other supporting
personnel is stressed: Cabin crewmembers, gate
agents, maintenance, dispatch, etc.
 The core of the Interpersonal Skills training is a five
part 35mm color slide and audio program. This program
was developed by American Airlines to train customer
contact personnel - ticket agents, reservation agents,
etc., and is titled TACT (Transactional Analysis in
Customer Treatment). However, during the Captain
Upgrade program the intzoduction and the discussions
that follow the presentation of each part of the TACT
program is directed to the cockpit work world. In terms
of Transactional Analysis concepts the program
discusses the make up of the personality, identified
as three ego states. These ego states are identified
colloquially as the PARENT, the ADULT, and the
CHILD (P-AX).
-.- ..” . . .-
From that basis individual transactions between two
people are analyzed. Following the discussions
students are then given an opportunity to analyze
several transactions presented in slide tape format.
During the remainder of the program students learn
additional concepts which help them to understand
many of the common transactions occurring daily on
the job.
To provide additional importance to the promotion to
Captain, besides congratulations stated during the
Flight Academy presentations, an attractive brochure
is presented to each new Captain. On the cover,
Captain’s wings and the individual’s name is embossed
in silver. The first page is a letter of congratulations
from Captain Ehmann and the remaining pages
constitute a notebook outline of the entire program
with adequate space for note taking during each
presentation. This brochure is presented to the new
Captain before leaving for the Flight Academy Training
program.
A highlight of the program at the Flight Academy is a
dinner for the class hosted by Captain Ehmann. This
provides an added opportunity for emphasizing the
availability and interest of Flight Management in the
new Captain’s point of view.
88
The fifthday is spent at American Airlines Maintenance
and Engineering facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma. There,
they receive a briefing by Mr. R. J. (Rocky) Masiello,
Vice President M & E, and his staff, folllowed by a
detailed tour of all M & E shops.
These briefings and tours provide the new Captains
with an understanding of the complexities and
thoroughness of the Company’s maintenance and
engineering responsibilities.
At this time the basic program is complete and each
new Captain commences his Operating Experience
phase. Upon completion he continues a normal
schedule as Pilot-In-Command. Soon thereafter
an important part of this new Captain Upgrade
program is conducted - a two to three month line
check, This provides an opportunity for an experienced
Check Airman to answer any questions the new Captain
may have and to put a final polish on his techniques
and methods of being a Captain for American Airlines.
The concluding step of the Captain Upgrade program
is a one day visit to the General Office in New York
City, Approximately six months after the Flight
Academy program, each new Captain is scheduled
with seven to ten other new graduates to spend a day
with Mr. Don Lloyd-Jones, Senior Vice President-
Operations, and his staff. In view of recent line
operating requirements, all new Captains have not
had the opportunity to visit the General Office on
schedule. However, it is believed this is an appropriate
conclusion to our effective program and hopefully
future upgrading Captains will have this day of
important training.
Since the beginning of this Upgrade program, student
critiques have consistently and with unusual enthusiasm
praised the merits of this new approach. Therefore,
plans are being considered for including segments of
thisprogramintheFirstOfficerandNewHireprograms.
 (Mansf i e l d )

When w e were f a c e d w i t h t h e r e q u e s t on t h e p a r t of t h e crewmembers and

b a s e managers t h a t i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s t r a i n i n g be included i n t h e c a p t a i n
upgrade program, I f e l t w e had t o concern o u r s e l v e s w i t h two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
i n s e l e c t i n g what t h e t r a i n i n g would be.

The f i r s t one w a s b a s i c a l l y a n assumption. That assumption is t h a t most

of t h e c a n d i d a t e s i n t h e c a p t a i n upgrade program had n o t had any s p e c i f i c
t r a i n i n g i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s , a t l e a s t w i t h i n t h e l a s t 10 t o 15 y e a r s .

The second one w a s a f a c t , and t h a t ' s t h e elements of t i m e c o n s t r a i n t s

and r e s o u r c e s . I t h i n k w e a r e a l l f a c e d w i t h t h a t i n a profit-making
o r g a n i z a t i o n . A f t e r p a r t i c i p a t i n g t h i s f a r i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r symposium, I
would c e r t a i n l y s u g g e s t t h a t w e have a l l our c a p t a i n s s i t i n on t h i s kind of
a d i s c u s s i o n . That would be q u i t e i d e a l , a l t h o u g h n o t q u i t e r e a l i s t i c .

Faced w i t h t h a t assumption and t h a t p a r t i c u l a r f a c t , I f i n a l l y chose a

program t h a t had been developed w i t h i n my company, one t h a t I had been u s i n g
f o r some t i m e i n t h e check-airman t r a i n i n g program. T h i s program i s a two-
p a r t program, t a k i n g 2-112 d a y s , and i t i s b u i l t around a s l i d e - t a p e program
of which I'll show you p a r t . A c t u a l l y , i t w a s p u t t o g e t h e r t o t r a i n customer
c o n t a c t people; i t ' s one t h a t ' s been i n e x i s t e n c e i n American A i r l i n e s f o r
some t i m e . T h i s program w a s developed t o t r a i n t h e t i c k e t a g e n t s , t h e
r e s e r v a t i o n s a g e n t s , t h o s e k i n d s of people t h a t have a v e r y s h o r t b u t v e r y
important c o n t a c t w i t h o u r customers, and t h a t would i n c l u d e our f l i g h t
a t t e n d a n t s - t h e people t h a t probably have t h e most e f f e c t on whether our
customers come back t h e second t i m e .

I t h i n k a l l of u s , r e g a r d l e s s of o u r company, c e r t a i n l y wish t o s t r i v e
f o r t h a t kind of f e e l i n g i n our p e o p l e and i n t h e i r t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h
customers.

A s I s t a t e d , I ' v e been u s i n g t h i s program i n t h e check-airman t r a i n i n g ,

and i n view of t h e need t o f i n d something t h a t would a d d r e s s t h e s u b j e c t of
i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s i n a r a t h e r s h o r t , c o n c i s e way, t h i s seemed a p p r o p r i a t e .

The program i s b u i l t around a method developed r a t h e r r e c e n t l y , c a l l e d

transactional analysis.

Now, how t o t e l l you a b o u t t h i s ? I pondered on i t a l i t t l e . I could

go through a long v e r b a l d e s c r i p t i o n , b u t I thought probably t h e b e s t way
i s t o show you a c o u p l e of segments.

89
 I ' m a c t u a l l y going t o show you t h e f i r s t segment e x a c t l y as i t ' s
p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c a p t a i n s . I precede t h e showing of t h a t s e c t i o n w i t h a n
i n t r o d u c t i o n . I won't go through a l l of i t , b u t one of t h e t h i n g s I b r i n g
t o t h e i r a t t e n t i o n i s t h a t t h e y ' v e had 10 t o 15 y e a r s of e x p e r i e n c e s i t t i n g
i n t h e o t h e r two seats, r e a l i z i n g f u l l w e l l t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e c a p t a i n h a s
on t h e t o n e , on t h e atmosphere, and on t h e working c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t a k e p l a c e
within the cockpit.

Secondly, I h i g h l i g h t t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h a t uniform w i t h t h o s e f o u r
s t r i p e s h e a l s o has c o n s i d e r a b l e e f f e c t on t h e young p e o p l e t h a t come
through t h e c a b i n door t r y i n g t o conduct b u s i n e s s i n t h e c a b i n who are co-
o r d i n a t i n g w i t h t h e f r o n t end, w i t h t h e maintenance man on t h e end of t h e
pushback l i n e , t h e d i s p a t c h c l e r k , t h e s c h e d u l e r , and many o t h e r people
w i t h i n t h e company t h a t are t h e r e t o s u p p o r t t h e o p e r a t i o n of g e t t i n g our
p a s s e n g e r s s a f e l y from A t o B.

With t h a t , I t h e n s a y l e t ' s u s e a v e h i c l e c a l l e d " t r a n s a c t i o n a l

a n a l y s i s " t o t a l k about your work world, and t h a t i s e x a c t l y what w e do.

So what I ' d l i k e t o do i s a c t u a l l y demonstrate a s l i d e - t a p e p o r t i o n of

t h e program. I ' m going t o revert t o a master s l i d e changer and l e t t h e
program now speak f o r i t s e l f .

Synopses of f o u r of t h e t a p e programs used by American A i r l i n e s are

given here :

Synopsis No. 1
The TACT Program opens w i t h a Prologue which, through images and music,
p r e s e n t s a day i n t h e l i f e of Everyman. A f t e r t h e s t u d e n t h a s i n f e r r e d t h e
dehumanizing a s p e c t s of l i f e i n a t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o c i e t y , t h e n a r r a t i o n
commences w i t h a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e b e s t s e l l i n g book, I ' M OK -YOU.'RE OK, by
D r . Thomas A. Harris, which p r o v i d e s t h e b e h a v i o r a l t h e o r y ( T r a n s a c t i o n a l
A n a l y s i s ) around which t h e TACT Program r e v o l v e s ( T r a n s a c t i o n a l A n a l y s i s i n
Customer Treatment).

The f i r s t t e a c h i n g p o i n t i s t h a t t h e human b r a i n f u n c t i o n s l i k e a high-

f i d e l i t y t a p e r e c o r d e r which s t o r e s our e a r l i e s t e x p e r i e n c e s and f e e l i n g s .
These r e c o r d i n g s are permanent; t h e n cannot be e r a s e d . These p a s t e v e n t s and
our o r i g i n a l f e e l i n g s a b o u t them r e p l a y today i n r e s p o n s e t o today's
s t i m u l i , and t h e e f f e c t s of t h e s e v i s i t s t o our p a s t are g e n e r a l l y f a r
g r e a t e r t h a n t h e i r d u r a t i o n which may b e o n l y a f r a c t i o n of a second.

The n e x t t e a c h i n g p o i n t i s t h a t c o n t i n u a l o b s e r v a t i o n has supported t h e

assumption t h a t t h r e e ego states e x i s t i n a l l people. These ego states are
i d e n t i f i e d c o l l o q u i a l l y as t h e parent, t h e a d u l t , and t h e c h i l d (PAC).
These t h r e e ego states comprise t h e p e r s o n a l i t y , and each h a s a v i t a l v a l u e
f o r t h e human being. The parent and t h e c k Z d a r e r e c o r d i n g s i n t h e b r a i n of
actual e x p e r i e n c e s of e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l e v e n t s . The adult i s a r e c o r d i n g
of d a t a a c q u i r e d and computed through e x p l o r a t i o n and t e s t i n g .

90
 Synopsis No. 2
I n t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e c o u r s e , t h e s t u d e n t o b s e r v e s t h e formation of t h e
parent, adult, and child ego s t a t e s i n one l i t t l e boy. The s t u d e n t a l s o
l e a r n s how t h e p a i n f u l , c i v i l i z i n g p r o c e s s which t h i s e n t a i l s l e a d s t o t h e
almost u n i v e r s a l l i f e p o s i t i o n I ' M NOT OK - YOU'RE OK.

The f i r s t t e a c h i n g p o i n t i s t h a t t h e parent c o n t a i n s t h e t a u g h t concept

of l i f e ; t h e mother and f a t h e r become r e c o r d i n g s i n s i d e t h e l i t t l e person who
obs erved them.

The n e x t t e a c h i n g p o i n t is t h a t t h e chiZd c o n t a i n s t h e f e l t concept of

l i f e , t h e responses of t h e s m a l l person t o what h e sees and h e a r s . These
e v e n t s and f e e l i n g s ( p r i m a r i l y NOT OK f e e l i n g s ) a l s o a r e recorded.

A t h i r d t e a c h i n g p o i n t i s t h a t t h e adult c o n t a i n s t h e thought concept of

l i f e , t h e r e c o r d i n g of d a t a a c q u i r e d from about 1 0 months on through
e x p l o r a t i o n and t e s t i n g . The adult i s a d a t a - p r o c e s s i n g computer t h a t g r i n d s
o u t d e c i s i o n s a f t e r computing t h e i n f o r m a t i o n from t h r e e s o u r c e s : t h e parent,
t h e child, and t h e d a t a which t h e adult h a s g a t h e r e d and i s g a t h e r i n g .

The d e c i s i o n I ' M NOT OK - YOU'RE OK i s , perhaps, one of t h e f i r s t

f u n c t i o n s of' t h e i n f a n t ' s a t t e m p t t o make s e n s e o u t of l i f e . Once h i s l i f e
p o s i t i o n i s d e c i d e d , he h a s something t o work w i t h , some b a s i s f o r p r e -
.
d i c t a b il i t y

Synopsis No. 3
Having developed a language, w e come t o t h e c e n t r a l technique: u s i n g
t h a t language t o a n a l y z e a t r a n s a c t i o n . The t r a n s a c t i o n c o n s i s t s of a
s t i m u l u s by one person and a r e s p o n s e by a n o t h e r , which r e s p o n s e i n t u r n
becomes a new s t i m u l u s to which t h e f i r s t person responds. The purpose of
t h e a n a l y s i s t o d i s c o v e r which p a r t of each person -
parent, adult, and
child - i s o r i g i n a t i n g e a c h s t i m u l u s and response.

The s t u d e n t i s f i r s t provided w i t h p h y s i c a l and v e r b a l c l u e s f o r each

ego s t a t e . T h i s b r i n g s u s t o t h e f i r s t r u l e of communication i n Trans-
a c t i o n a l Analysis: When s t i m u l u s and r e s p o n s e on t h e P-A-C t r a n s a c t i o n a l
diagram make p a r a l l e l l i n e s ...
t h e t r a n s a c t i o n c a n go on i n d e f i n i t e l y .
The second r u l e of communication i s t h a t : When s t i m u l u s and r e s p o n s e c r o s s
on t h e P-A-C t r a n s a c t i o n a l diagram, communication s t o p s . Examples of
" p a r a l l e l " and "crossed" t r a n s a c t i o n s are provided.

The s t u d e n t i s t h e n g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o a n a l y z e s e v e r a l t r a n s -
actions. ( I n s t r u c t i o n s f o r t h i s d r i l l are provided b o t h i n t h e taped
n a r r a t i o n and i n a n o t e t o t h e s c r i p t f o l l o w i n g S l i d e 6.60.)

Following t h e taped e x e r c i s e s , a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n i s scheduled d u r i n g

which t h e d i s c u s s i o n l e a d e r makes several c o m e n t s concerning P-A-C

91
terminology, and r e q u e s t s t h e s t u d e n t t o p r o v i d e w r i t t e n examples of p a r a l l e l
and c r o s s e d t r a n s a c t i o n s (one each) f o r d i s c u s s i o n a t t h e n e x t s e s s i o n of t h e
TACT program.

Synopsis No. 4
I n t h i s p o r t i o n of t h e TACT program, t h e s t u d e n t l e a r n s a d d i t i o n a l
P-A-C c o n c e p t s which h e l p him t o understand many of t h e common t r a n s a c t i o n s
o c c u r r i n g d a i l y on t h e j o b and elsewhere. These c o n c e p t s are stroking,
trading s tarrips , and games.
Stroking i s l i t e r a l l y e s s e n t i a l f o r our e a r l y s u r v i v a l as i n f a n t s .
Today, stroking, i n t h e form of r e c o g n i t i o n , i s j u s t a s e s s e n t i a l f o r our
p s y c h o l o g i c a l well-being. Hence a stroke may be used as t h e fundamental u n i t
of s o c i a l a c t i o n . An exchange of strokes c o n s t i t u t e s a transaction, which i s
t h e u n i t of s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e .

Trading starrips symbolize t h e n e g a t i v e ( d i r t y stamp) f e e l i n g s and t h e

p o s i t i v e (gold stamp) f e e l i n g s t h a t people save up t o c a s h i n f o r g u i l t - f r e e
p r i z e s . Stamp redemption i s one t e c h n i q u e used by p e o p l e t o d e a l w i t h t h e i r
uncomfortable, NOT OK f e e l i n g s .

Another t e c h n i q u e used t o d e a l w i t h NOT OK f e e l i n g s i s games. Games are

s p e c i a l , u l t e r i o r t r a n s a c t i o n s programmed by t h e child. Such t r a n s a c t i o n s
d i f f e r from simple p a r a l l e l o r c r o s s e d t r a n s a c t i o n s i n t h a t t h e y o p e r a t e on
two l e v e l s , a n o s t e n s i b l e o r s o c i a l l e v e l , and a n u l t e r i o r o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l
l e v e l . G a m e s are always r e s o l v e d on t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l e v e l .

The s t u d e n t i s t h e n g i v e n examples of how stroking, s t q coZZecting,

and games a f f e c t him on t h e j o b , and i s shown how p u t t i n g t h e aduZt i n charge
of a t r a n s a c t i o n can o f t e n s t o p a game from p r o g r e s s i n g t o i t s p a y o f f .

T h a t ' s e x a c t l y how t h e program i s designed i n t h e f i r s t s e c t i o n , repre-

s e n t i n g a b o u t o n e - f i f t h of t h e t o t a l s l i d e p r e s e n t a t i o n , A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n
of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e c t i o n t h a t w e j u s t l i s t e n e d t o , w e t h e n have a d i s c u s s i o n
t r y i n g t o r e l a t e t o t h e i r work world some of t h e c o n c e p t s introduced.

For i n s t a n c e , my f i r s t q u e s t i o n u s u a l l y r e f e r s t o t h e prologue o r t h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n , and I a s k them what w a s t h e i n t e n t of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r i n t r o -
d u c t i o n . It t a k e s a l i t t l e w h i l e t o g e t some answers s t a r t e d , b u t i t ' s a
p r e t t y a l e r t group, and i t d o e s n ' t t a k e them long t o d e f i n e t h a t t h o s e w e r e
t h e r e t o p o r t r a y t h e e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t t a k e p l a c e i n p e o p l e ' s everyday l i f e
and some of t h e f e e l i n g s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h o s e k i n d s of e x p e r i e n c e s , b o t h
good and bad.

They do a good j o b d e s c r i b i n g t h e f r u s t r a t i o n s , t h e a l o n e n e s s , t h e
v a r i o u s o t h e r happenings t h a t t a k e p l a c e t h a t g e n e r a t e , maybe unhappy, b u t
some of them happy f e e l i n g s t h a t go a l o n g w i t h t h e work day.

Following t h a t I u s u a l l y a s k them what t a k e s p l a c e i n t h e i r workday t h a t

b r i n g s about t h o s e same k i n d s of f e e l i n g s of f r u s t r a t i o n , etc. By t h i s t i m e

92
t h e y c a n w a r m up r a p i d l y , and I won't r e p e a t a l l t h e r e s p o n s e s I g e t , b u t
some examples a r e "The c a p t a i n I f l e w w i t h l a s t month,'' o r "The day a t t h e
g a t e over which I had no c o n t r o l , ' ' and so on.

We t h e n go i n t o t h e a c t u a l concept of t r a n s a c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s and d i s c u s s
some p a r t s of t h e program, t h e a d u t t , parent, and chitd that's a l r e a d y been
p r e s e n t e d , and go i n t o a l i t t l e f u r t h e r development b e f o r e t h e second p a r t i s
presented.

I n t h e second p a r t t h e s l i d e p r e s e n t a t i o n a d d r e s s e s more of t h e how's

and why's i n t h e development of t h e t h r e e ego states, and what some of t h e
c l u e s are t h a t you and I can observe. I r e a l i z e I ' m a d d r e s s i n g t h i s t o
people who may n o t know about t r a n s a c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , b u t w e do go i n t o
d e t a i l because most of t h e c a p t a i n c a n d i d a t e s have n o t heard of t h i s method,
nor have t h e y had any d i r e c t i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s t r a i n i n g . A f t e r t h e second
s e c t i o n i s shown w e a g a i n have a d i s c u s s i o n p e r i o d and i t g e t s l i v e l i e r as
you go d e e p e r .

The t h i r d p a r t i s t h e m e a t of t h e whole t h i n g , so I ' d l i k e t o show you

about 2 o r 3 minutes of that t h i r d p a r t t o g i v e you a n i d e a of how t h i s
program flows. [ S l i d e s w e r e shown.]

A s I s t a t e d , t h a t ' s j u s t a l i t t l e segment of t h e t h i r d p a r t of t h i s
p a r t i c u l a r program. And, a g a i n , f o l l o w i n g t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h i s w e g e t i n t o
d i s c u s s i o n i n which t h e r e are some p r a c t i c e t r a n s a c t i o n s .

The t r a n s a c t i o n s , p r e s e n t l y , are i n t h e t i c k e t a g e n t ' s work l i f e . W e

a r e d e s i g n i n g some t o b e i n t h e c o c k p i t work l i f e , b u t even as p r e s e n t l y
shown, t h e crewmen can r e l a t e v e r y w e l l t o a t i c k e t a g e n t and t r a n s f e r t h e
event t o t h e happenings t h a t t a k e p l a c e around them.

The f o u r t h p a r t of t h e program a d d r e s s e s o t h e r c o n c e p t s of t r a n s -
a c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s i n v o l v i n g r e i n f o r c e m e n t , b o t h p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e , and
a l s o some of t h e more complex t r a n s a c t i o n s t h a t D r . Berne, t h e - o r i g i n a t o r ,
h a s t i t l e d Trading Stamps, G a m e s , e t c .

I conclude t h e program w i t h some p r a c t i c e t r a n s a c t i o n s and a 30-minute

f i l m t h a t summarizes t h e i d e a of t r a n s a c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , and does a n
e x c e l l e n t j o b of showing t h e r o l e - p l a y i n g of games t h a t people g e t involved
i n on t h e j o b .

A s t o t h e s u c c e s s of t h e program, as Capt. E s t r i d g e s a i d , w e have pre-

s e n t e d t h i s as p a r t of t h e captain-upgrade program t o about 700 c a n d i d a t e s .
C e r t a i n l y t h e w r i t t e n and spoken c r i t i q u e s have been i n l a r g e p a r t f a v o r a b l e .
I t h i n k t h e most important b e n e f i t is t h a t i t p o s s i b l y makes each c a p t a i n ,
o r most of them anyway, a l i t t l e more aware of how t h e y might o p e r a t e i n
t r a n s a c t i n g o r d e a l i n g w i t h o t h e r p e o p l e , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e p e o p l e who are s o
c r u c i a l t o t h e s a f e o p e r a t i o n of a n a i r p l a n e , t h e c o c k p i t crew f i r s t and
c e r t a i n l y a l l t h e o t h e r s u p p o r t i n g people.

Based on what I have observed as a r e s u l t of i n c l u d i n g t h i s i n t h e up-

g r a d e program, I would l i k e t o see some e x t e n s i o n of t h e approach. P o s s i b l y

93
t h i s b a s i c e x p l a n a t i o n and t h e n some r o l e p l a y i n g , such as w e do f o r our
check-airmen. Then w e hope t h a t w e can soon g e t i n t o LOFT t r a i n i n g where t h e
e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t r a n s a c t i o n i s d i s c u s s e d d u r i n g t h e c r i t i q u e .

DISCUSSION

DR. LAUBER: I ' m s u r e t h a t t h e s e gentlemen w i l l be hapiy t o answer

questions.

DR, TANNER, NASA: Do you have any thought of doing t h i s on a

recurrent basis?

MR. MANSFIELD: No, i t h a s n ' t been d i s c u s s e d . The o n l y t h i n g t h a t

might a d d r e s s what you are a s k i n g , i s t h a t we have thought of backing i t up
i n t i m e , a s i t were, because one of t h e f i r s t comments a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of
t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s t r a i n i n g w a s , "Why d i d I have t o w a i t t o become a
c a p t a i n t o g e t t h i s kind of t r a i n i n g ? " So t h e thought w a s t o i n s e r t t h a t
kind of t r a i n i n g b o t h i n t h e f i r s t - o f f i c e r upgrade and t h e new-hire program,
a t l e a s t f o r a p e r i o d of 4-5 y e a r s , u n t i l we've covered everybody on t h e low
end. Regarding t h e e n t i r e program i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s ,
we have been c h a l l e n g e d on how w e can p r e s e n t t h i s t o c a p t a i n s who have
a l r e a d y been upgraded. That c h a l l e n g e h a s n ' t been m e t as y e t .

CAF'T. ESTRIDGE: A q u e s t i o n t h a t ' s o f t e n asked i n t h e class by

c a n d i d a t e s is "Why d i d n ' t you g i v e t h a t t o o l d J o e , h e s u r e could have used
i t . " And t h e r e ' s a good p o i n t t o t h a t . I ' m f i r m l y convinced- I'm
a b s o l u t e l y convinced - t h a t a h o s t i l e c o c k p i t atmosphere, o r even one t h a t ' s
uneasy, i n which a f r e e exchange of i d e a s and t h o u g h t s and r e s p o n s e s are
i n h i b i t e d , is a dangerous c o c k p i t . I t ' s a n a c c i d e n t l o o k i n g f o r a p l a c e t o
happen. And t h e r e i s a method t o t h i s madness, because t h i s pays o f f , i t
works, and I hope w e c a n develop i t even a l o t b e t t e r t h a n w e have.

CAPT. FRINK, Pan Am: Have you any evidence t o i n d i c a t e t h a t o l d

J o e s d o n ' t e x i s t any more since t h i s 7 y e a r s of a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s i n t e r -
p e r s o n a l s k i l l s program on t h e 700 new men t h a t have gone through i t ?

C U T . ESTRIDGE: I wish I c o u l d answer you i n t h e a f f i r m a t i v e and

s a y o l d J o e s d o n ' t e x i s t , b u t t h e y do. Of c o u r s e , t h i s h a s been j u s t 3
y e a r s and we've done 700; t h a t ' s o n l y a t h i r d of t h e c a p t a i n p o p u l a t i o n .

C U T . FRINK: But among t h i s new group, do you s t i l l have some of

t h e o l d J o e t y p e s even though t h e y ' v e s e e n t h i s ?

CAPT. ESTRIDGE: I guess w e d o n ' t have p o s i t i v e feedback t h a t a l l

of them a r e performing 100 p e r c e n t .

MR. MANSFIELD: A s u b j e c t i v e r e s p o n s e t o t h a t , which I ' v e heard ex-

p r e s s e d by some of our b a s e managers, e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e a t t h e smaller b a s e s
and t h o s e b a s e s where t h e new c a p t a i n s are going, i s that t h e y f e e l t h a t i t ' s
e f f e c t i v e , t h a t it i s h e l p i n g . But t h a t ' s a s u b j e c t i v e judgment, and t h a t ' s
t h e b e s t feedback I c a n provide.
94
 CAPT. CARROLL, United A i r l i n e s : Thinking l o g i s t i c a l l y of t h e
numbers you s a y you have plowed through t h i s program i n 3 y e a r s , w h a t ' s t h e
frequency of t h e t i m e you hold a command c o u r s e , what are t h e numbers that
a r e i n t h e c o u r s e ? The r e a s o n I a s k i s t h a t g e t t i n g them a l l a c t i v a t e d a t
t h e same t i m e and i n p o s i t i o n t o t a k e t h i s c o u r s e a t t h e same t i m e , t o go t o
Tulsa a t t h e same t i m e , and make t h e v i s i t t o New York a t t h e s a m e t i m e
becomes q u i t e a problem. I ' m concerned a b o u t i t from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of some
of t h e programs t h a t w e run, t h a t i s , of t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of t h e p r i n c i p a l s ,
as an example, t o be on scene t o do t h i s kind of t h i n g . I t ' s kind of a
complicated q u e s t i o n , b u t how o f t e n , and how many, and what do you do f o r t h e
p r i n c i p a l s being t h e r e ?

CAPT. ESTRIDGE: W e l l , i t ' s t r i g g e r e d by t h e number of c a p t a i n

upgrades t h a t w e need f o r t h e a i r l i n e . They are programmed i n t o t h e f l i g h t
academy on t h e b a s i s of b i d s opening up, and i t ' s j u s t a matter of numbers.
L o g i s t i c a l l y , t h e y g e t t h e r e because w e need them t o f l y i n t h e l e f t seat.
I t ' s averaged about 20 a month f o r t h e p a s t 3 y e a r s i n upgrade. A s f a r as
t a k i n g t h e program t o t h e rest of t h e a i r l i n e o r t a k i n g t h e s e people t o a l l
of t h e s e f u n c t i o n s t h a t w e d e s c r i b e d , such as t h e maintenance and e n g i n e e r i n g
v i s i t , w e have been a b l e t o s u c c e s s f u l l y do t h a t except f o r t h e l a s t c l a s s
l a s t week, which w e w e r e n ' t a b l e t o g e t i n t o t h e e n g i n e e r i n g c e n t e r . But
t h e one p a r t of t h e program w e do have d i f f i c u l t y i n s c h e d u l i n g i s t h e
g e n e r a l o f f i c e v i s i t downstream a month o r two. T h a t ' s s o r t of d i f f i c u l t t o
work because of t h e s c h e d u l e s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l s involved. It i s a r e a l
problem, i t t a k e s a l o t of e f f o r t , and i t could b e q u i t e expensive.

MR. MANSFIELD: The g e n e r a l o f f i c e v i s i t h a s n o t been f u l l y

s u c c e s s f u l . We're hoping t h a t w i t h t h e g e n e r a l o f f i c e move, w e could
s c h e d u l e t h a t kind of a v i s i t a s t h e y come i n , maybe each 6 months on t h e i r
semi-annual r e c u r r e n t s e s s i o n .

CAPT. TRAUB, United A i r l i n e s : Did you s a y t h a t you had a 2-3 month

l i n e f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n program?

CAPT. ESTRIDGE: No, t h e l i n e f a m i l i a r i z a t i o n s are t h e 25 hours done

immediately a f t e r t h e upgrade checkout c o u r s e , But t h e n w e have a follow-up
of 2 t o 3 months i n t h a t area l i n e check of t h e new c a p t a i n s , i n which a
check-airman goes w i t h him on several segments t o t a k e a l o o k and d i s c u s s a
l o t of t h e good t h i n g s t h a t you'd want t o r e i n f o r c e a t t h a t t i m e .

DR. TANNER, NASA: You mentioned t h a t i n t h e c o u r c e of t h e TA

t r a i n i n g t h e r e are t i m e s when t h e r e ' s r o l e p l a y i n g by t h e c a n d i d a t e ?

MR. MANSFIELD: No, i t ' s j u s t a d i s c u s s i o n . What I s a i d w a s , t h e

f i r s t a d d i t i o n I ' d l i k e t o make is r o l e p l a y i n g . For i n s t a n c e , i n our check-
airman t r a i n i n g program w e r e q u i r e c e r t a i n l y t h e s a m e t r a i n i n g as i n t h e
c a p t a i n upgrade.

Secondly, w i t h i n t h e check-airman's f i r s t y e a r w e t r y t o s c h e d u l e him

f o r a 3 o r 4-day workshop, conducted by t h e management t r a i n i n g s e c t i o n .

95
I n t h i s workshop c e r t a i n r o l e s have been t a i l o r e d f o r t h e f l i g h t department.
I t ' s done w i t h t h e u s e of v i d e o playback and c r i t i q u e . That I would l i k e t o
see a l s o i n t h e c a p t a i n upgrade program.

MR. RANDALL, NASA: I can see a l o t of advantages t o what y o u ' r e

doing; I t h i n k i t ' s v e r y commendable. I t h i n k one of t h e main t h i n g o you g e t
o u t of it i s happy employees who have probably a l i t t l e b e t t e r company
o r i e n t a t i o n t h a n t h e y had p r e v i o u s l y , b u t do you see any evidence t h a t
t h e y ' r e b e t t e r a b l e t o manage r e s o u r c e s i n t h e c o c k p i t ?

C U T . ESTRIDGE: Y e s , I t h i n k t h a t ' s a d i r e c t f a l l o u t t h a t w e are

a b l e t o observe. And t h e b a s e f l i g h t managers, t h e check p i l o t s , and t h e
people who have observed them s u b j e c t i v e l y have r e p o r t e d t h a t c o c k p i t
communications and i n t e r a c t i o n s between crewmen are b e t t e r t h a n t h e y were.
I t ' s r a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t t h e r e were a few s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s about
whom t h e y made o b s e r v a t i o n s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e y have d e f i n i t e l y made a n
improvement; t h e r e are a c o u p l e I would l i k e t o see improve even more.

MR. MANSFIELD: The o t h e r recommendation t h a t I would l i k e t o see

implemented i s t h a t w e adopt t h e LOFT concept soon. There t h e d e c i s i o n -
making p r o c e s s o r crew c o o r d i n a t i o n can n o t o n l y b e observed, b u t i t a l s o
can be used t o p r a c t i c e what w e have t a u g h t p r i o r t o t h e LOFT t r a i n i n g .
I n t h a t way w e c a n r e i n f o r c e t h e t r a i n i n g by p r o v i d i n g e x p e r i e n c e s i n
something of a real-time s e t t i n g . I t h i n k t h a t a d d i t i o n is much needed.
 CAPTAINS' TRAINING AT SWISSAIR

Capt. N. Grob
*

I n t h e f o l l o w i n g s h o r t l e c t u r e I should l i k e f i r s t l y , t o comment on some

of t h e l i m i t a t i o n s as r e g a r d s p i l o t s , w i t h i n which our A i r l i n e h a s t o
o p e r a t e , and secondly, t o examine t h e o b j e c t i v e s , c r u c i a l p o i n t s and
problems of t h e i n d i v i d u a l phases of t h e c a p t a i n ' s b a s i c t r a i n i n g . What I
have t o s a y completes and emphasizes t h e e s s e n t i a l p o i n t s mentioned i n t h e
Working Paper submitted by Capt. Griinewald, o u r F l i g h t T r a i n i n g Manager ( s e e
appendix B) .
W e a l l have t h e same t a r g e t : w e want t o t r a i n c o p i l o t s t o become
c a p t a i n s , c a p t a i n s t o whom w e c a n e n t r u s t , w i t h a clear conscience,
p a s s e n g e r s and material of immense v a l u e . Each a i r l i n e , however, h a s t o a
g r e a t e r o r lesser e x t e n t , d i f f e r e n t prerequisites. Already i n t h e s e l e c t i o n ,
f o r example, t h e requirements v a r y c o n s i d e r a b l y . Not o n l y t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l
b u t a l s o t h e f l y i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e v e r y d i f f e r e n t . One company may only
r e c r u i t A i r Force p i l o t s ; o t h e r s p r e f e r a b i n i t i o a p p l i c a n t s . On t h e one
hand a m a t r i c u l a t i o n may b e demanded; on t h e o t h e r a r e l a t i v e l y lower
s t a n d a r d of e d u c a t i o n i s s u f f i c i e n t . Also v a r y i n g c o n s i d e r a b l y are t h e
systems of promotion, t h e demands and p r e s s u r e s from t h e unions. And
c e r t a i n l y t h e v a r i o u s f l i g h t t r a i n i n g departments are a l s o s u b j e c t t o v a r y i n g
economic p r e s s u r e s e x e r t e d on them by t h e i r managements.

With t h i s , I must s a y t h a t I d o n ' t expect t o r e c e i v e a gold medal f o r

S w i s s a i r ' s methods, b u t r a t h e r t o o f f e r a s o l u t i o n , based on e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t
f u n c t i o n s w e l l e s s e n t i a l l y as f a r a s our marginal requirements are concerned.

These c a n be d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s . W e r e c r u i t y e a r l y about 4 0 p i l o t s ,
of whom one t h i r d a r e from t h e A i r Force and two t h i r d s a b i n i t i o a p p l i c a n t s .
The a v e r a g e a g e i s about 25 y e a r s . A t p r e s e n t , a f t e r b a s i c t r a i n i n g , t h e y
f l y about 1 2 y e a r s a s c o p i l o t . A s r e g a r d s assignment t o a i r c r a f t t y p e , t h e
management h a s a f r e e hand where c o p i l o t s are conceFned. Usually f o r t h e
f i r s t 5 t o 6 y e a r s , c o p i l o t s f l y t h e short-range DC-9, a f t e r which f o r about
6 y e a r s t h e y change t o one of t h e long-range a i r c r a f t t y p e s -DC-8, DC-10,
o r -747 ( f i g . 1). Then f o l l o w s a r e t r a i n i n g p e r i o d on t h e DC-9, a 2-month
assignment a s DC-9 c o p i l o t , and f i n a l l y comes t h e l o n g awaited i n i t i a l
upgrading t o c a p t a i n . The c a p t a i n ' s career i s i n 3 s t e p s : c a p t a i n of a
DC-9, c a p t a i n of a DC-8, and c a p t a i n of a DC-10 o r -747.

Wherein l i e s t h e e x a c t problem i n the captain's training? In my

o p i n i o n , t h e main a i m i s t o f u r t h e r t h e a b i l i t y of t h e p i l o t t o r e c o g n i z e
c l e a r l y s i t u a t i o n s t h a t r e q u i r e him t o make d e c i s i o n s and t o make t h o s e
d e c i s i o n s i n good t i m e , w i t h t h e b e s t means a v a i l a b l e . T h i s w e c a n d e f i n e as
management. P r e r e q u i s i t e s are knowledge and f l y i n g a b i l i t y .

*D i v i s i o n Manager, Cockpit C r e w s , S w i s s a i r .

97
 For a long t i m e w e o n l y c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e s e two l i n e s . I n a c t u a l
f a c t , it s t a r t e d o r i g i n a l l y only with f l y i n g a b i l i t y-localized i n the
e x t e n s i o n of t h e spine! Nowadays, S w i s s a i r bases i t s c a p t a i n ' s t r a i n i n g on
three points :

1. TheoreticaZ know2edge h a s t a k e n on immense p r o p o r t i o n s i n t h e f i e l d s

of aerodynamics, performance, a i r c r a f t systems, r e g u l a t i o n s , and so on.

2 . Flying ski22 or abi2ity i s s t i l l demanded t o a high d e g r e e ; i t i s

n o t y e t r e p l a c e d by p r o g r e s s i v e automation. For t h e n e x t few y e a r s , w e s h a l l
s t i l l b e l i v i n g i n t h i s demanding i n t e r i m phase. A p i l o t must b e c a p a b l e ,
on t h e one hand, of being a back-up system f o r normal o p e r a t i o n s and primary
system f o r abnormal o p e r a t i o n s ; on t h e o t h e r hand, h e must a c t a s programmer
and s u p e r v i s o r of t h e a u t o m a t i c systems. Both areas, manual f l y i n g as w e l l as
a u t o m a t i c f l y i n g , must s t i l l be demanded i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y .

3 . Management, t h a t is t h e a b i l i t y (1) t o r e c o g n i z e s i t u a t i o n s and

problems i n good t i m e , (2) t o a n a l y z e , and ( 3 ) t o f i n d t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e
solution.

A high f a i l u r e r a t e i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 ' s f o r c e d u s t o i n t r o d u c e tu0

innovations ( f i g . 2 ) :
1. For one morning, approximately 1 y e a r b e f o r e t h e c a p t a i n ' s c o u r s e
b e g i n s , a l l a s p i r a n t s from t h e same a g e group are b r i e f e d a s t o t h e
o b j e c t i v e s , c o u r s e s t r u c t u r e and o r g a n i z a t i o n , and t h e problems and possi-
b i l i t i e s of p r e p a r a t i o n by t h e f l i g h t t r a i n i n g manager, t h e DC-9 c h i e f p i l o t ,
and myself. .

The mental p r e p a r a t i o n and m o t i v a t i o n toward a h i g h e r p e r s o n a l

commitment are e s s e n t i a l . A c o l d e n g i n e d o e s n ' t t a k e k i n d l y t o a q u i c k
change from i d l e i n t o t o p gear!

2 . Whereas earlier t h e t r a n s i t i o n from long-range t o short-range air-

c r a f t w a s combined w i t h t h e c a p t a i n ' s c o u r s e , w e have now made a d e f i n i t e
s e p a r a t i o n . The p i l o t i s consequently n o t s o o v e r t a x e d . H e completes t h e
t r a n s i t i o n c o u r s e as c o p i l o t , under less stress, and f o r 2 months h a s t h e
o p p o r t u n i t y t o f a m i l i a r i z e himself w i t h t h e new equipment, t h e new r o u t e
s t r u c t u r e , and t h e new rhythm of s h o r t - r a n g e o p e r a t i o n s . The w e l l known
so-called "slow starters" now have a b e t t e r chance.

I n a d d i t i o n , w e have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y , i n such cases where weaknesses

are observed i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n c o u r s e , t o extend t h e p e r i o d as c o p i l o t by a
few weeks, o r even months, t h e r e b y a l s o reducing t h e r i s k of f a i l u r e s . W e
s t i l l come a c r o s s t h e o c c a s i o n a l case each y e a r , however.

And now comes t h e b i g h u r d l e .

The Captain's Course ( C C ) .

On t h e average, w e t r a i n 24 new c a p t a i n s
each y e a r , of whom 3 t o 4 , o r a b o u t 15 p e r c e n t , f a i l t o p a s s t h i s p a r t of t h e

98
t r a i n i n g . For humanitarian and economical r e a s o n s , t h i s f i g u r e i s s t i l l t o o
h i g h and w e are n o t s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e r e s u l t . S t u d i e s of each i n d i v i d u a l
c a s e make it e s s e n t i a l t h a t o u r s e l e c t i o n , t e a c h i n g methods, and a i d s are
c o n t i n u a l l y examined and improved. These u n s u c c e s s f u l p i l o t s c o n t i n u e f o r a t
least one year as DC-9 c o p i l o t s b e f o r e g e t t i n g a second chance. Half p a s s a t
t h e second a t t e m p t ; f o r t h e o t h e r s , t h e a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o remain as long-
range c o p i l o t .

A f t e r s e v e r a l n e g a t i v e r e s u l t s , w e have abandoned t h e procedure of

g i v i n g a t h i r d chance, because o n l y more damage i s done. L i t t l e hope and a
minimum of s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e a r e d e s t r o y e d completely - t h e p r o c e s s b o r d e r s on
torture!

The reasons for failure are mostly a n accumulation of poor f l y i n g

a p t i t u d e s , mental i n f l e x i b i l i t y , and meager l e a d e r s h i p q u a l i t i e s . I n some
cases, performance w a s d e f i n i t e l y shadowed by p r i v a t e problems. W e have t o
a c c e p t t h e f a c t t h a t a p i l o t ' s p r o g r e s s cannot b e f o r e c a s t e x a c t l y d u r i n g t h e
s e l e c t i o n , and t h a t i n t h e c o u r s e of t i m e as c o p i l o t , o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s are
a t work over which w e have no c o n t r o l . The l o n g c o p i l o t p e r i o d i s i n i t s e l f
a problem and could q u i t e w e l l p r o v i d e a t o p i c f o r such a workshop.

The objective of t h e c a p t a i n ' s c o u r s e is c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z a b l e . The

a s p i r a n t must understand t h e normal and abnormal f l i g h t procedures and be
a b l e t o apply them i n t h e s i m u l a t o r and i n t h e a i r c r a f t . Compared t o t h e
demands made of t h e c o p i l o t , w e add (1) e n g i n e f a i l u r e i n a l l phases, and
( 2 ) approaches and l a n d i n g s w i t h abnormal c o n f i g u r a t i o n s (0-flaps, s l a t s ,
etc.).

The c a p t a i n ' s c o u r s e comprises t h e f o l l o w i n g ( t a b l e 1 ) :

1. One day ( 6 h o u r s ) t h e o r y f l i g h t procedures, which comes under t h e

heading of knowledge

2. F i v e s e s s i o n s (9 hours a t t h e c o n t r o l s ) s i m u l a t o r and f l y i n g s k i l l s

3. Three s e s s i o n s ( 4 t o 5 h o u r s ) f l i g h t t r a i n i n g and f l y i n g s k i l l s

4. Three s e s s i o n s (10 h o u r s ) s i m u l a t o r and management

I n t h e f l i g h t training, w e c o n c e n t r a t e f o r t h e most p a r t on VMC c i r c u i t

work, which i s s t i l l r e q u i r e d f o r a few p o o r l y equipped a i r p o r t s . A s t h e
o v e r a l l m a j o r i t y of our d e s t i n a t i o n s o f f e r n a v i g a t i o n a l l u x u r y , t h e t r a i n i n g
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r low c i r c u i t s are s m a l l . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , A i r Force p i l o t s
have more e x p e r i e n c e compared w i t h a b i n i t i o p i l o t s .

Now t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l b r i c k s are provided, it i s up t o t h e would-be

c a p t a i n , as a l a s t s t e p , t o assemble them and make a b u i l d i n g . H e must d e a l
w i t h v a r i o u s r e a l i s t i c t r o u b l e s i t u a t i o n s independently, r i g h t up t o t h e
landing .

99
 The f o c a l p o i n t i s management. Here t h e p r o s p e c t i v e c a p t a i n must n o t be
t h e s o l o i s t b u t r a t h e r t h e conductor, making t h e o p t i m a l u s e of h i s
o r c h e s t r a t o b u i l d up a harmony, u s i n g h i s knowledge and s k i l l , h i s c o p i l o t
(we have a two-man concept) and t h e a s s i s t a n c e of ATC, d i s p a t c h e r , e t c .

Thereupon t h e c h i e f p i l o t t a k e s o v e r . I n a 5-day t h e o r y c o u r s e , t h e
s o - c a l l e d Captain's Theory Course I ( f i g . 2), w e want t o i n t r o d u c e our f u t u r e
manager i n t o t h e domain of t h e l a r g e - s c a l e e n t e r p r i s e of S w i s s a i r , a t t h e
same t i m e going i n t o t h e d e t a i l s of t h e c a p t a i n ' s r i g h t f u l position.

Captains a r e i n a s e n s e i s o l a t e d , a s a r e s u l t of t h e n a t u r e of t h e i r
work. Ground p e r s o n n e l , being s t a t i o n e d i n one p l a c e , g e n e r a l l y f e e l
themselves more i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e company as a whole. Together w i t h 400
c a p t a i n s , t h e r e a r e about 15,000 employees p u l l i n g on t h e same s t r i n g , A l l
want t o c a r r y a l a r g e number of s a t i s f i e d passengers s a f e l y over our r o u t e
network. There i s a n enormous p r o f i t t o be gained from a good c o o p e r a t i o n
between a l l departments, b u t t h i s depends e n t i r e l y on understanding t h e
problems and o p p o r t u n i t i e s of t h e o t h e r s -above a l l , mutual r e s p e c t . The
c a p t a i n , i n h i s work, comes i n t o e i t h e r d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h
p r a c t i c a l l y a l l departments connected w i t h t h e a i r l i n e b u s i n e s s .

W e s t r i v e f o r a c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n and c o o p e r a t i o n by g e t t i n g t o know,
above a l l , t h e d i r e c t c o n t a c t o f f i c e r s , such as d i s p a t c h , crew c o o r d i n a t o r ,
ATC, s t a t i o n manager, and so on - b u t n o t f o r g e t t i n g t h o s e who remain
r a t h e r more i n t h e background. The managers of t h e v a r i o u s departments
appear p e r s o n a l l y as s p e a k e r s . Although under p r e s s u r e of work, t h e y
accept t h i s duty willingly.

These e f f o r t s b r i n g real rewards and t h e r e s u l t s of a harmonious

i n t e g r a t i o n of f l i g h t p e r s o n n e l can b e e a s i l y recognized as a sound
m o t i v a t i o n and h e a l t h y working atmosphere a s a whole.

And now w e throw t h e a s p i r a n t s i n t o t h e p o o l , w i t h t h e swimming t e a c h e r

s t a n d i n g watch. For a b o u t 150 h o u r s , w e t r a i n t h e would-be c a p t a i n s i n
practice. T h i s phase w e c a l l upgrading ( f i g . 2 ) . During t h e f i r s t 70 h o u r s ,
t h e a s p i r a n t s i t s i n t h e l e f t seat w i t h t h e r o u t e i n s t r u c t o r t a k i n g t h e
p l a c e of t h e c o p i l o t i n t h e right-hand seat, t h e r e g u l a r c o p i l o t occupying
t h e o b s e r v e r seat. A t t h e end of t h e 70 h o u r s , t h e r o u t e i n s t r u c t o r changes
places w i t h t h e c o p i l o t , a l l o w i n g t h e c a p t a i n and c o p i l o t t o work t o g e t h e r as
a normal c o c k p i t team. During t h e f i r s t phase, some a s p i r a n t s o c c a s i o n a l l y
have d i f f i c u l t i e s p l a y i n g t h e r o l e of b o s s , i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e
experienced r o u t e i n s t r u c t o r .

The upgrading i s made up of t h r e e phases ( f i g . 3 ) :

1. I n t h e Introduction Phase, m i s t a k e s are by a l l means a c c e p t e d , as

long a s s a f e t y i s n o t a f f e c t e d .

2. I n t h e Second Phase, t h e q u a l i t i e s of l e a d e r s h i p , crew s u p e r v i s i o n ,

i n i t i a t i v e , powers of d e c i s i o n , and c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h o t h e r departments come
more t o t h e f r o n t .

100
 3 . I n t h e Final Phase, w e want t o make s u r e t h a t t h e p r o s p e c t i v e
c a p t a i n i s now i n t h e p o s i t i o n , as p i l o t as w e l l as manager, t o master h i s
j o b and prove h i s c a p a b i l i t i e s r e g u l a r l y .

I n t h e upgrading, w e seldom have f a i l u r e s . Each a s p i r a n t f l i e s w i t h

approximately e i g h t route instructors. Each day t h e m i s t a k e s are d i s c u s s e d
w i t h t h e a s p i r a n t , p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s imparted and, by means of a s y l l a b u s ,
knowledge of t h e f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s manual, a i r c r a f t systems, performance and
f l i g h t procedures are explained and checked. Each r o u t e i n s t r u c t o r i s s u e s a
qua 1i f ica t ion.

A s a r e s u l t , t h e c h i e f p i l o t c a n assess t h e p r o g r e s s of h i s p u p i l s and
can t a k e immediate a c t i o n and t h e n e c e s s a r y measures, f o r each case
i n d i v i d u a l l y , should any d i f f i c u l t i e s arise.

Our system demands much a d a p t a b i l i t y on t h e p a r t of our would-be

c a e t a i n s : a d a p t a t i o n t o d i f f e r e n t v i e w p o i n t s , p e r s o n a l i t i e s , and
temperaments. D i f f e r e n c e s , however, have t h e b i g advantage i n t h a t t h e y
provoke d i s c u s s i o n and t h e a n a l y s i s of a problem. Not o n l y t h a t , but t h e
r o u t e i n s t r u c t o r s , and f i n a l l y t h e management of f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s , a r e
f o r c e d t o c o n t i n u a l l y r e f l e c t on t h e b a s i c p o i n t s .

Out of a t o t a l complement of 200 DC-9 c a p t a i n s , w e have 50 r o u t e

i n s t r u c t o r s who are i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e c h i e f p i l o t . Every 2 months
each r o u t e i n s t r u c t o r c a l l s a 1-day meeting, a t which g e n e r a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s
exchanged and problem cases and q u e s t i o n s d i s c u s s e d . W e t r y c o n t i n u a l l y ,
u s i n g examples, t o come t o a unanimous assessment of t h e a s p i r a n t concerned.

These r o u t e i n s t r u c t o r meetings g i v e u s , i n every r e s p e c t , a clear

i n s i g h t i n t o t h e working atmosphere, t h e w o r r i e s and needs of our crews;
w e can o b t a i n v a l u a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n from them.

The c a p t a i n ' s appointment i s c e l e b r a t e d w i t h a d i n n e r , a t which a

r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e t o p management, u s u a l l y t h e P r e s i d e n t h i m s e l f , i s
p r e s e n t . The wives are a l s o i n v i t e d t o t h i s c e l e b r a t i o n . Shortly a f t e r the
appointment, a l l t h e new c a p t a i n s are i n v i t e d once more t o a secluded
c e n t e r i n t h e Swiss Alps. Using examples of some of t h e problems i n l i n e
o p e r a t i o n s - w i t h c a b i n p e r s o n n e l , p a s s e n g e r s , s t a t i o n and h o t e l p e r s o n n e l ,
e t c . - w e work o u t management p r i n c i p l e s f o r t h e c a p t a i n , i n group
discussions.

W e p l a c e t h i s c o u r s e a t t h e end of t h e t r a i n i n g ( f i g . 2 ) , and a f t e r t h e
appointment as c a p t a i n , because w i t h t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of p e o p l e who are no
l o n g e r under d u r e s s , and who c a n i n t r o d u c e problem s i t u a t i o n s which t h e y
themselves have experienced, w e c a n a c h i e v e an e s s e n t i a l l y g r e a t e r s u c c e s s .
T h i s f i n a l 3-day c o u r s e i s conducted by t h e DC-9 c h i e f p i l o t .

To conclude, a l l o w m e t o make a few s t a t e m e n t s , which I hope w i l l a c t

as s t i m u l a t i o n f o r t h e working group a c t i v i t i e s t h a t start tomorrow.

101
 It i s no probZem t o t r a i n our c o p i l o t s t o become e n t h u s i a s t i c , w e l l -
m o t i v a t e d , and q u a l i t a t i v e l y e x c e l l e n t c a p t a i n s . Subsequently, however,
f o r c e s are a t work over which w e have no power of c o n t r o l . I n s u f f i c i e n t
c h a l l e n g e i n d a i l y r o u t i n e ; t h e changing r o l e of t h e p i l o t ; t h e s i n k i n g image
of t h e p r o f e s s i o n i n t h e e y e s of s o c i e t y ; t h e e f f e c t s of t o p salaries f o r a
minimum of c r e a t i v i t y and having a s a y i n matters; t h e changing s o c i a l and
f a m i l y s t r u c t u r e s and t h e r e s u l t a n t i n c r e a s i n g p e r s o n a l problems are j u s t a
few of t h e animating keywords.

The main problem l i e s i n maintaining the standard of our young f i r s t -

rate captains u n t i l t h e i r retirement.

DISCUSSION

DR. LAUBER: A r e t h e r e q u e s t i o n s of Capt. Grob?'

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN, Scandinavian A i r l i n e s : Did you s a y every

month, a few days w i t h t h e r o u t e i n s t r u c t o r ?

CAPT. GROB: No, every two months a 1-day meeting.

CAPT. FRINK, Pan Am: Did I understand t h a t t h e p r e s i d e n t of your

company p e r s o n a l l y g r e e t s each new c a p t a i n ?

CAPT. GROB: Right.

CAPT. FRINK: T h a t ' s wonderful.

CAPT. GROB: W e t a k e them a l l t o g e t h e r , a b o u t 1 2 . W e have t h e

c e l e b r a t i o n t w i c e a y e a r , and t h e n t h e p r e s i d e n t w i l l b e p r e s e n t f o r t h a t
ce le b r at i o n

JOAN BARRIAGE, FAA: Would you comment on what t y p e of t r a i n i n g

you have f o r t h e t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e s o u r c e management?
Your c a p t a i n s a r e imparting t o your new c a p t a i n s a concept of how t h e y
manage i n t h e c o c k p i t - I w a s wondering what p r i n c i p l e s o r what background
might b e common t o a l l of your t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n s i n r e g a r d t o t h i s
p a r t i c u l a r a s p e c t of t r a i n i n g ?

C U T . GROB: Our t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n s are t r a i n e d i n a course. T h a t

c o u r s e t a k e s a b o u t 5 t o 6 days and t h e r e a l l t h e p r i n c i p l e s are d i s c u s s e d .
And a l s o t h e s e r o u t e i n s t r u c t o r meetings are f o r t h a t purpose - to
s t a n d a r d i z e procedures and t o f i n d t h e " u n i t 6 d e d o c t r i n e . " Does t h a t
answer your q u e s t i o n ?

JOAN BARRIAGE: 1 understand t h e n t h a t i t is through t h i s j o i n t

meeting of t e i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t , shall w e say, a common approach evolves i n
d e a l i n g t h e n w i t h t h e whole r a n g e of a n t i c i p a t e d problems i n t h e c o c k p i t ?

102
 CAPT. GROB: Yes.

CAPT. FRISTOE, United A i r l i n e s : I n connection w i t h t h e f l y i n g

s k i l l s , you s t a t e d you had f i v e s e s s i o n s i n t h e s i m u l a t o r and t h r e e s e s s i o n s
of i n - f l i g h t t r a i n i n g . Would you b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e what each one of t h e s e
days i n v o l v e s ? What i s t h e l e n g t h of t r a i n i n g involved, and s o on?

CAPT. GROB: Yes. You mean t h i s h e r e ?

CAPT. FRISTOE: Yes. It s a y s you have f i v e s e s s i o n s over a period

of f i v e days; t h a t would b e one s e s s i o n a day, i s t h a t c o r r e c t ?

CAPT. GROB: T h a t ' s r i g h t , every day a s e s s i o n .

CAPT. FRISTOE: What i s t h e l e n g t h of t h a t day and what does t h e

s e s s i o n b a s i c a l l y involve?

CAPT. GROB: A s e s s i o n t a k e s about 3 hours i n t h e s i m u l a t o r and

then comes t h e b r i e f i n g t i m e . And w e go through a l l t h e f l i g h t procedures,
a l l normal and abnormal procedures. So w e b u i l d t h e b r i c k h e r e , w e form t h e
b r i c k s . T h a t ' s t h e r e a s o n f o r these s e s s i o n s . I n t h e f l i g h t t r a i n i n g w e
c a n ' t go through a l l t h e f l i g h t procedures, w e j u s t select a few of them.
I ' d s a y mainly t h e VMC p a r t , which c a n ' t be simulated completely i n t h e
s i m u l a t o r , and a l s o t h e l a n d i n g s w i t h abnormal c o n f i g u r a t i o n s , are done
d u r i n g t h e f l i g h t t r a i n i n g . And t h e s e 3 days and t h r e e s e s s i o n s h e r e , (post
f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r ) w e have d i f f e r e n t problems, s i t u a t i o n s which t h e new
c a p t a i n h a s t o d e a l w i t h . T h a t ' s where w e t e a c h him t o assess t h e s i t u a t i o n ,
a n a l y s e t h e s i t u a t i o n , and t o manage h i s r e s o u r c e s . W e had j u s t two cases
i n t h e l a s t 2 months where w e could see t h a t t h e r e w a s q u i t e a problem and
q u i t e a b i t of p r o g r e s s t o be made, and w e t h i n k t h a t w e w i l l extend t h e s e
3 s e s s i o n s here. Here t h e c a p t a i n can l e a r n something r e a l l y new -
something t h a t they have t o know f o r t h e i r f u t u r e j o b .

MR. COEN, FAA: Capt. Grob, is t h a t what we're c a l l i n g LOFT, t h a t

last three sessions?

C U T . GROB: Yes, r i g h t , t h a t ' s t h e same.

MR. MANSFIELD, American A i r l i n e s : That being t h e case, w i t h t h e

new c a p t a i n , t h e r e w i l l be q u a l i f i e d l i n e crewmembers i n t h e o t h e r two
seats, i n t h e c a s e of t h e three-member a i r p l a n e ?

CAPT. GROB: Yes.

MR. MANSFIELD: A r e they undergoing some kind of t r a i n i n g o r j u s t

t h e r e t o support?

CAPT. GROB: J u s t t h e r e t o support.

103
 CAPT. GILSTRAP, United A i r l i n e s : You mentioned t h e r e a s o n s f o r
f a i l u r e . Lack of p i l o t a p t i t u d e , I t h i n k w a s one, and t h e t h i r d one w a s a
l a c k of l e a d e r s h i p q u a l i t i e s . What w a s t h e s nd one i n between t h o s e two?

C U T . GROB: Y e s , i t is t h e l a c k of f l e x i b i l i t y .

CAPT. GILSTW: Could you expand on any of t h e s e three,, i n any

way, as t o what you see t h e r e i n t h e way of f a i l u r e s ?

CAPT. GROB: W e l l , w e thought a l o t a b o u t how w e could reduce t h i s

number of f a i l u r e s , of c o u r s e . I ' m n o t s u r e i f w e should i n v e s t more t i m e .
W e have q u i t e a b i g program, I t h i n k , compared w i t h t h e programs you have h e r e
i n t h e United S t a t e s . We w i l l g i v e t r a i n i n g as l o n g a s w e c a n see a n im-
provement. However, v e r y o f t e n t h e improvement s t o p s , and t h e n i t d o e s n ' t
make any s e n s e t o go on f u r t h e r . So our way is t o s a y , " t h e n w e s t o p h e r e ,
and w e s t a r t a g a i n i n 1 y e a r . "

DR. LAUBER: Capt. Grob, thank you v e r y much.

104
 TABLE 1.- CAPTAINS COURSE

THEORY - FLIGHT PROCEDURES - 1 DAY -

KNOWLEDGE

SIMULATOR - 5 SESSIONS - 5 DAYS -

FLYING ABILITY

0 FLIGHT TRAINING - 3 SESSIONS - 3 DAYS -

FLYING ABILITY

SIMULATOR - 3 SESSIONS - 3 DAYS -

MANAGEMENT

-6 yr

-6 yr
-12 yr (SHORTHAUL)

5558

Figure 1.- P i l o t career progression.

105
 INFORMATION

1- TRANSITION DC-9
V
COP1LOT DC-9
V
piZFl CAPTAIN'S COURSE
V
VI CAPTAIN'S THEORY COURSE I

F
V
l -
I
I.
E UPGRADING
-
V zCAPTAIN'S THEORY COURSE I1

F i g u r e 2.- Course program.

A i

CAPTAIN'S LEVEL

W
0
2
a
E
a
9a
1-
W
a

-50 h

!
Oh 50 h 100 h 150 h
TIME

F i g u r e 3 . - I n i t i a l upgrading.

106
 LINE-ORIENTED FLIGHT TRAINING

Captain Berton E. Beach

Manager-In t e r m e d i a t e Jet Training
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.
Miami, Florida

I'd like t o talk about some ideas on Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT):

0 Why we at Eastern chose t h a t program as a training tool;

0 How we've developed our program;

0 What it has done f o r us so f a r at Eastern Air Lines, and;

0 What uses we plan f o r it in t h e future.

T h e environment in which w e o p e r a t e continues to become m o r e demanding of
management skills on t h e p a r t of t h e pilot conducting t h e flight. This is directly
related to t h e complexity of a n operation intended to a t t a i n absolute safety
while conducting all weather flight. W e recognize t h e need to shift from training
in manipulative skills to something closer to management skills.

Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) is n o t a new idea. W e used a similar

f o r m a t at Eastern in t h e late 1950's on our DC-8 a n d Boeing 720 series aircraft.
A t t h a t time, t h e simulators available had no motion, nor visual capabilities. As
a result, we w e r e unable, until recently, to develop a training environment t h a t
would simulate t h e real world with acceptable fidelity. W e needed to illustrate
t h e value of standard operating procedures as they a f f e c t t h e line pilot in
everyday operation. T h e a d v e n t of simulators with motion, plus t h e visual
system ability t o reproduce a realistic airport scene, provided us with t h e tools
w e needed to construct a worthwhile line-oriented flight training program.
Our f i r s t e f f o r t to implement LOFT was a scenario w e developed in 1975,
wherein t h e c r e w took a three-leg, four-hour flight t h a t satisfied all require-
m e n t s of Appendix F, except for s t e e p turns and approaches to stall. By t h e end
of t h e four-hour period, t h e c r e w had seen a major fault in every system o n t h e
aircraft. They conducted at least two ILS approaches a n d t w o non-precision
instrument approaches p e r pilot. Most, if n o t all, of t h e emergency procedures
had been reviewed.

To accommodate all this activity, t h e legs between t h e city pairs used in t h e

scenario w e r e shortened electronically. Shortly a f t e r this time, Eastern applied
for, but was n o t granted, permission t o o p e r a t e under a n exemption from
Appendix F. Appendix F lists t h e requirements f o r t h e demonstration of
competency as outlined by t h e Federal Aviation Administrator. In fairness to t h e
Administrator, I m u s t point out t h a t this regulation is intended to accommodate
all operators under Part 121, including those c a r r i e r s who may n o t have t h e most
modern training devices.

107
Since ours was a special case, we f e l t t h a t s t r i c t compliance with t h e regulation
would n o t provide t h e flexibility needed to shift emphasis from training in "man-
ipulative skillsI1 t o training in management skills. W e w e r e unable to obtain t h e
exemption a n d LOFT was put aside for a time.
Our c u r r e n t f o r m a t was developed a f t e r guidelines f o r exemption w e r e published,
-
a n d we found t h a t we w e r e not required to conform to Appendix F at a l l e x c e p t
t h a t we must maintain our landing certification to Category I1 o r Category IIIa
minimums. This was no real d e t e r r e n t since our visual systems a r e capable of
visibility reductions, to whatever degree is required. If individual performance
indicated a need f o r remedial training in normal VFR approach and landings, this
could be completed as a n add-on to t h e LOFT session.. Right now we have t w o
programs in operation, both approved by t h e Federal Aviation Agency (FAA).
O n e is f o r t h e Boeing 727 aircraft, t h e o t h e r f o r t h e Douglas DC-9. LOFT
programs f o r t h e Lockheed L-1011 and t h e A300 a r e being developed now. W e
expect to have these programs approved by t h e end of 1979.

Our present program consists of six scenarios p e r a i r c r a f t type. Each scenario

contains t h r e e legs. T h e scenarios a r e designed to f i t within t h e four-hour t i m e
f r a m e ordinarily used for a training period.

When we develop our programs, we emphasize s t r i c t realism. All t h e legs are

flown in real time. The problems presented f o r t h e c r e w s t o solve a r e those
which can, and in some cases, have happened in real aircraft. T h e visual systems
c a n construct t h e airport environment with considerable fidelity. T h e picture
t h e pilot sees on approach to a runway in our simulator is amazingly close t o
what h e would see in t h e real world. These visual breakthroughs add
immeasurably t o t h e flight crew's a c c e p t a n c e of LOFT, a n d therefore, enhance
our program's value materially.

When we began to c r e a t e scenarios, we needed to consider some key items:

1. What route segments a n d airports should we use which would give t h e best
indication of t h e Captain's management skill? The approach briefing,
individual task assignments, c r e w coordination a n d t h e command presence
w e r e some of t h e i t e m s w e considered. F o r example, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, gives us a c h a n c e to work o n Category 11. I t also affords us
t h e opportunity t o use a n inner marker f o r decision height r a t h e r t h a n a
radio altimeter.

T h e VOR approach to Runways 5 o r 36 in Charlotte, North Carolina,

compels t h e flight c r e w t o make a n approach to what is commonly known
as a "black hole" type a i r p o r t - which is to say, t h e r e a r e n o perimeter
lights to rely on f o r a t t i t u d e judgment. T h e only things you see when you
break out a r e t h e runway lights a n d those lights adjacent to t h e terminal.
So, we chose C h a r l o t t e to illustrate t h a t particular problem at night.

Operations in a n d out of Atlanta, Georgia, g a v e us a c h a n c e to o p e r a t e in a

complex air t r a f f i c control environment, a n d another try at Category I1
approaches as well.

108
 W e chose Miami, Florida, because .of the v of approaches available in
generally VFR weather. Previous experi in upgrade training from
Second Officer (Flight Engineer) t o First Officer (Co-Pilot) has indicated a
need for training in approach and landing based on visual perception rather
than electronic guidance.
2. What aircraft systems and procedures should we examine and where should
we put them in the scenario t o ensure the highest degree of realism? For
instance, current emphasis is being placed on the use of maximum braking
in t h e event of a rejected takeoff. This is the result of industry experience
which indicates that:

A. The rejected takeoff is more likely to be the result of some

malfunction, such as a blown tire, or a fire warning indication, rather
than a failure of t h e most critical power plant; and,
B. Admonitions to the flight crews to go "easy on the brakes" - konsider
-
costs" lldonlt try t o make that first turn-off," have resulted in the use
of less-than-maximum braking when needed.

In the scenario, we can consider including the rejected take off, to

physically demonstrate maximum brake pedal deflection, and the
effectiveness of ground spoilers and reverse thrust in reducing roll-out
distance, and by using a n airport layout in the visual scene, such as
Washington National, the results of non-standard operating procedures
on a rejected takeoff can be dramatically displayed.
3. Finally, how should we tailor these scenarios t o f i t the four-hour time
frame?

First, we decided what approaches we would "shoot" into what airports. Then we
took city pairs and linked them together to form the legs of t h e scenarios. W e
decided, on each leg of each "flight,'* what problems we would present for the
crews to solve and also, how many problems, and where they should occur. After
we roughed out our plans, we went to our dispatch department, and drew from
the computer actual flight plans that a r e stored there, selecting those city pairs
we had chosen. Once we had those plans in hand, we began to f i t t h e segments
together to form the four-hour training period needed to satisfy our require-
ments.

As soon as all six scenarios were composed and all of the legs were laid out, we
test-flew them in the simulator to be certain that they f i t within the four-hour
time frame. W e allowed adequate time between legs for short breaks for the
crew. When all of the scenarios were put together, we invited three different
groups to fly t h e scenarios, and we solicited comments from each group.

First, our simulator flight instructors wete scheduled to fly the scenarios. In
each case, they were asked to consider:
0 Whether the flight plan was realistic and could related to a typical
EAL flight segment.

109
 0 Was the routine excessively demanding? and,
a Could t h e expected response by t h e crew be indicative of a lack of
management skills?
Next, the Training Committee from ALPA reviewed the scenarios and flew one.
Since all members of t h e committee a r e regular line pilots, we felt that their
input as potential users would be significant.
W e then invited a group of Air Carrier Inspectors from the FAA to try a scenario
or two and give their opinions. W e felt that FAA participation at the early stage
of program development was important. Since they would be t h e approving
authority, we could use their input to help identify any possible problems which
might delay program approval. Once we had collected all of the ideas,
comments, and suggestions, we put a final polish on the total package and passed
it to the FAA for its official approval.

The training period begins with t h e full crew attending for the examination of
t h e flight departure papers. At Eastern Air Lines, all of those flight departure
papers are stored; t h a t is, dispatch releases, flight plans, fuel requirements,
weather sequences, and forecasts a r e all in t h e computer and are recalled as
each crew requires them prior to departure. Since we strive for considerable
realism in the LOFT program, we also have the flight departure papers for the
program stored in t h e computer, accessible t o us in training. They are recalled
by t h e instructor prior to briefing his crew, before the training sequence.

As in normal operations, the crew examines the papers for minimum equipment
items, fuel requirements, notices t o airmen, and so forth. They also check t h e
appropriate weather sequences and forecasts, determine fuel requirements, and
perform any other preparations that a Captain may require.

When the Captain decides that sufficient time has been spent on briefing, the
crew proceeds t o t h e simulator. While in t h e simulator, the Instructor/Check
Airman links normal communications among s t a r t crew, ground control, tower,
departure control, and so forth. He does not, under any circumstance, interfere
with normal operation or functioning of t h e crew.
Once under way, the crew must solve all problems according to their own best
judgment. W e took great care t o avoid overloading the scenario. Had we
cluttered it with unrealistic situations, we might have induced mismanagement.
But, any of t h e crew's mistakes or errors in judgment, or ignorance of
procedures, will remain until corrected, or until t h e "aircraft" is on the ground.
The training requirement is for four hours, and all the legs need not be
completed.

A word about scripting is appropriate at this time. All sequences are tightly
scripted, and deviations and additions a r e not permitted, except that items may
be deleted i f there is not enough time in t h e four-hour period left to perform
them. As a timing aid t o the instructor who is conducting t h e scenario, we
designed t h e last leg with an adjustable time frame. The script is so written that
t h e instructor has t h e option of selecting t h a t point at which t h e problem will be
presented which best utilizes the training time remaining.

110
When t h e simulator period ends, t h e InstructorlCheck Airman leads t h e crew's
debriefing session.

In t h e year and a half since Eastern Air Lines began t h e LOFT program, we have
come to see it as t h e training vehicle of t h e future. W e believe t h a t LOFT c a n
provide more realistic initial training because, from t h e first day of training, we
c a n emphasize t h e kinds of skills needed t o operate a particular aircraft in
today's complex environment. W e believe t h a t LOFT develops considerable
judgment skills and provides excellent experience in structuring priorities. It
also illustrates t h e consequences of poor resource management, ignorance of
proper procedures, and lack of command presence.

Training conducted in simulation, very closely matching t h e environment in

which t h e crew normally operates, gives a crew t h e best opportunity to see
normal and abnormal situations and their solutions. For example: in t h e
simulator, a Category I1 approach to a runway closely approximates what t h e
pilot will see in t h e real world. But in a trainer aircraft, as soon as you "pop t h e
hood,'' t h e pilot finds himself in a n entirely visual environment. For this reason,
we feel t h a t LOFT provides considerably more realism.

In addition to its value as a training vehicle, a line oriented training program is

a n excellent evaluation exercise. The simulator's ability t o accurately reproduce
t h e line pilot's normal working environment, plus t h e instructor's briefing prior to
t h e s t a r t of t h e period, emphasizes to t h e crew t h a t they a r e expected to
perform in t h e simulator exactly as they would perform in t h e real world. This
permits us t o see a more a c c u r a t e picture of how t h e crew functions in such
areas as decision-makin cockpit discipline, t h e Captain's command presence,
d
crew coor nation, a n other resource management skills. Th e crew IS also
briefed that t h e LOFT program is n o t constructed as a pass or fail check ride; i t
is, rather, a n evaluation of their skills to uncover in what areas, if any, they may
need additional training. W e feel t h a t it is important to remove any t h r e a t of
embarrassment or punitive action. By so doing, we diminish t h e tendency of t h e
crew to respond in t h e way t h a t they think t h a t t h e instructor wishes them to
respond, and apply instead their own best solution. W e believe t h a t this
environment produces a very clear picture of t h e capabilities of t h e crew being
evaluated.

W e have found LOFT t o be excellent for remedial training. W e have taken crews
off t h e line who have had a problem of o n e kind or another, put them in a LOFT
training format to duplicate t h e problem o r circumstances they experienced, and
l e t them pinpoint t h e moment when things go wrong. W e c a n show them what
they did, find out why they did it, and demonstrate t h e b e t t e r way t o do it next
time.

As a result of our success with this approach in remedial training, we a r e now

experimenting with t h e construction of modules t o b e stored in t h e computer.
Each o n e will b e fabricated to illustrate a particular problem or abnormality
that, if mishandled, could have serious consequences.

111
When we g e t a c r e w requiring remedial work, f o r whatever reason, we hope to
retrieve these modules from t h e computer, examine them, a n d e x t r a c t those
which, when linked, will result in a LOFT scenario f o r t h a t particular c r e w t o
exercise in. Eventually, we hope t o have enough modules t o cover t h e majority
of difficulties w e see o n t h e line. In this fashion, w e will tailor a training
program, almost exactly, to f i t t h e kind of training required.
W e also intend to use LOFT to evaluate our c u r r e n t operational procedures f o r
both normal a n d abnormal situations, a n d to help us determine needs for, a n d t h e
effectiveness of, new procedures. For instance, at Eastern Air Lines, we have no
written procedure t o cover c r e w incapacitation, both subtle a n d dramatic. By
observing t h e c r e w s as they handle these situations, we will 'decide whether o r
n o t we should have in writing some procedures f o r c r e w incapacitation, and if so,
what they shoud be.

W e intend to f u r t h e r use LOFT t o spot any trends indicating weak spots in our
training program.
When a l l of our simulators a r e approved f o r t h e landing maneuver, LOFT will
make it possible t o complete all phases of training in t h e simulator. W e w a n t
training programs t h a t will a s s u r e competency in t h e a r e a of manipulative a n d
management skills prior t o assignment to scheduled operations. T h e line
operating experience will s e r v e to validate t h e effectiveness of t h e training
program.

To sum up: Line-Oriented Flight Training, as it has b e e n developed at Eastern

Air Lines, represents t h e b e s t training vehicle w e have seen thus far. W e believe
it matches all our training needs more than anything y e t devised.

W e shall, of course, use LOFT programs in training, a n d f o r t h e annual a n d semi-

annual proficiency checks. Soon w e will build i t i n t o initial training. W e see it
as a marvelous device f o r remedial training as well, a n d f o r reviewing t h e
effectiveness of operational procedures. As a tool f o r developing new
procedures, we have found it to be unequalled. W e a r e confident t h a t LOFT will
l e a d us to z e r o a i r c r a f t time.

112
 DISCUSSION

MR. RANDALL, NASA: I a g r e e w i t h you, t h e C G I systems are r e a l l y

c l a s s y , b u t I ' v e never s e e n a g e n e r a t i o n of t e r m i n a l weather w i t h t h o s e
t h i n g s . Is i t done e l e c t r o n i c a l l y o r o p t i c a l l y ?

CAPT. BEACH: No, i t ' s e l e c t r o n i c .

MR. RANDALL: Could you d e s c r i b e how i t l o o k s ?

CAPT. BEACH: The b e s t d e s c r i p t i o n I c a n g i v e you as t o how i t

looks is - I ' l l go back t o t h e example I used t o b e g i n w i t h . I n Category
11, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e o n l y t h i n g t h a t you do n o t see i n t h e v i s u a l system,
i f y o u ' r e l o o k i n g a t f o g a t t h e a i r p o r t , i s t h e h a l o around t h e l i g h t s -
w e have done e v e r y t h i n g b u t t h a t . The d i s c r i m i n a t i o n of t h e runway t e x t u r e ,
t h e numbers, t h e s l i g h t b l u r r i n g of the. c e n t e r l i n e , a l l of t h a t , touchdown
zone l i g h t s , t h e i r i n t e n s i t y . I f y o u ' r e n o t c a r e f u l you t h i n k y o u ' r e i n a
r e a l a i r p l a n e , t h a t ' s how good i t is. The o n l y t h i n g w e d o n ' t have i n t h e
v i s u a l system now i s t h e o c c u l t i n g of b u i l d i n g s . A s you t a x i up t o t h e
t e r m i n a l , f o r i n s t a n c e , a t Washington N a t i o n a l A i r p o r t i n Washington, D.C.,
you can see through t h e b u i l d i n g s . It i s o n l y a s l i g h t i n f i d e l i t y , b u t i t
i s n o t t o o dandy and w e ' r e working on i t .

MR. RANDALL: Do you have t h e phenomenon of broken c l o u d s - now

you see i t , now you d o n ' t ?

CAPT. BEACH: Y e s , t h a t mode i s c a l l e d scud. I ' m n o t s u r e w h a t

t h e random o c c u l t i n g i s , b u t t h e r e i s a random, p a t c h y f o g t h a t w e can u s e .
A s a matter of f a c t , w e u s e i t f o r a missed-approach maneuver, now you see
i t , now you d o n ' t , you've g o t t o go.

UNIDENTIFIED: How do you h a n d l e a n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y o r l e s s - t h a n -

c a p a b l e crewmember?

CAPT. BEACH: What i s done depends e n t i r e l y on w h a t t h e check

c a p t a i n f e e l s i s r e q u i r e d . S i n c e t h e r e i s no p a s s o r f a i l , w e t a k e t h e
i n s t r u c t o r ' s recommendation as t o what kind of t r a i n i n g i s r e q u i r e d t o b r i n g
t h e man up t o o u r s t a n d a r d s , how much and i n what d i r e c t i o n . W e r e l y
completely upon t h e i n s t r u c t o r t o g i v e u s t h a t i n p u t . I f Capt. Jones needs
a 4-hour t r a i n i n g p e r i o d w i t h emphasis on n o n p r e c i s i o n approaches, that's
what h e g e t s . Then a n o t h e r e v a l u a t i o n .

MR. MANSFIELD, American A i r l i n e s : I understand what y o u ' r e going

t o do i n t h e n e x t s t e p , b u t up t o t h i s p o i n t i n t i m e do you u s e LOFT a t a l l
i n t h e s t a n d a r d t r a n s i t i o n program, and i f so, how?

CAPT. BEACH: On J u l y 1 w e are beginning t o u s e LOFT c o n c e p t s t o

reduce a i r c r a f t t i m e . We're doing what r e a l l y amounts t o a d r e s s r e h e a r s a l
f o r t h e t y p e r a t i n g r i d e . I t w i l l b e done i n o u r AST s i m u l a t o r , and I have

113
c o n s t r u c t e d a s m a l l mini-scenario t o b e used by t h e t r a i n i n g c a p t a i n as a
d r e s s r e h e a r s a l . T h a t ' s t h e beginning. I d e a l l y what I want t o do, and I
t h i n k w e w i l l when w e have t h e development-type s i m u l a t o r , i s u s e l i n e -
o r i e n t e d f l i g h t t r a i n i n g i n i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g . The f i r s t s i m u l a t o r p e r i o d o r
two w i l l b e devoted t o systems and procedures, a f t e r which i t b e g i n s t o b e a
l i n e t r i p . That's next.

CAPT. SESSA, Allegheny A i r l i n e s : A f t e r , s a y , a p i l o t r e c e i v e s

4 hours of emphasis on n o n p r e c i s i o n approaches, how is t h e r e e v a l u a t i o n
conducted? Is i t under a LOFT b a s i s , o r on a normal p r o f i c i e n c y check?

CAPT. BEACH: On t h e normal p r o f i c i e n c y check, because w e r e q u i r e

f o r a LOFT program a l i n e crew. Which i s t o s a y , i f t h e l i n e crew i s n o t
p r e s e n t , w e c a n ' t do LOFT. For one t h i n g , t h e exemption, I t h i n k , p r o h i b i t s
u s from p u t t i n g check p e o p l e i n t o b e used as a d d i t i o n a l crew members. So
because t h e crew he went through t h e LOFT program w i t h i s gone, p l u s t h e
f a c t t h a t w e want t o f o c u s on h i s i n d i v i d u a l problem, w e t a k e him a s i d e and
plug him i n t o t h e o r d i n a r y program.

MR. COEN, FAA: L e s t w e scare some of t h e s e o t h e r people o f f , t h e

r u l e w a s changed about 9 months ago t o a l l o w f o r LOFT t r a i n i n g , under
Subpart N and 1 2 1 . So now you have t h e t h r e e o p t i o n s of 409 t r a i n i n g ,
Appendix E and o t h e r p r o f i c i e n c y checks f o r t h e LOFT t r a i n i n g , and i t s p e l l s
out t h e regulations.

CAPT. BEACH: I ' m n o t e n t i r e l y s u r e t h a t I have s e e n t h a t

p a r t i c u l a r m o d i f i c a t i o n a c r o s s my d e s k , b u t I ' m g l a d t o hear i t .

MR. COEN: Anybody who wants t o can go i n t o LOFT; we d o n ' t want

t o s c a r e you o f f .

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK, B r i t i s h Airways: We have gone down t h i s road,

and, l i k e you, I do a p p r e c i a t e t h e v a l u e . However, f o r t h e p e r i o d t h e f l i g h t
i s a c t u a l l y going on t h e r e is no t r a i n i n g . We c a l l i t t r a i n i n g , b u t we're
n o t , we're checking, we're e v a l u a t i n g . The t r a i n i n g comes a t t h e end w i t h
t h e d e b r i e f i n g . However, t h e r e a r e t i m e s when a m i s t a k e has t a k e n p l a c e
d u r i n g t h e f l i g h t , and t h e one t h i n g you need t o do f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s t o
r i g h t i t , t h e n and t h e r e . You d o n ' t want t o send him home w i t h t h e thought
t h a t h e d i d something s t u p i d o r w a s i n c a p a b l e of f l y i n g t h e procedure -
you want t o p u t i t r i g h t . Do you have any f a c i l i t y i n t h i s t r a i n i n g ?

CAPT. BEACH: We have done perhaps t h e o t h e r s i d e of t h e same

coin you're t a l k i n g about. W e s p e c i f i c a l l y do n o t i n t e r r u p t t h e flow of t h e
f l i g h t as i t proceeds. For example, t h e DC-9 a i r c r a f t e l e c t r i c a l f i r e and
smoke i s one of t h e more f r i g h t e n i n g t h i n g s about t h a t a i r p l a n e . I f you
f i n d a crew t h a t simply cannot h a n d l e i t , w e s i t back and l e t t h e t h i n g
c r a s h . The i d e a being w e want t h e man t o d i g as deep a h o l e a s h e can d i g .
But once h e h a s c r a s h e d , i f t h a t ' s what t u r n s o u t t o b e t h e case, once t h e
a i r c r a f t i s back on t h e ground a g a i n , t h e n by d e b r i e f i n g immediately
t h e r e a f t e r w e can begin t o show him what h e d i d wrong. But w e d o n ' t

114
i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h i n g s as t h e y are happening. W e used t o do t h a t on what w e
c a l l e d t h e 4-hour t r a i n i n g p e r i o d i n l i e u of a p r o f i c i e n c y check. Launch t h e
a i r c r a f t , p r e s e n t a problem, p u t t h e s i m u l a t i o n on f r e e z e , and l e t ' s t a l k
about what you've s e e n - why d i d t h i s happen o r why d i d t h a t happen. W e
crammed a w e a l t h of i n f o r m a t i o n i n t o t h a t 4-hour t r a i n i n g p e r i o d , and you
could see i t l e a k o u t of t h e man as h e walked away from t h e s i m u l a t o r .

W e f e l t t h a t you never l e a r n b e t t e r t h a n when you embarrass y o u r s e l f ,

i f i t comes t o t h a t . Those k i n d s of t h i n g s t h a t make a d r a m a t i c impression
on you o r t h o s e k i n d s of e v e n t s where you could have k i l l e d y o u r s e l f . So w e
f e l t r a t h e r t h a n , and w e s p e c i f i c a l l y t a l k e d a b o u t t h a t s u b j e c t , r a t h e r
than put it r i g h t a t t h a t t i m e , w e ' l l u s e t h e d e b r i e f i n g f o r t h a t . I f w e
f e e l t h a t w e have made t h e man o v e r l y humble, t h e n w e ' l l p u t him back i n t h e
machine a g a i n , and l e t him do i t r i g h t , j u s t t o prove t o himself t h a t h e can.

CAPT. FRINK, Pan Am: Can you t e l l m e t o what e x t e n t you are

r e q u i r e d t o do a d d i t i o n a l s p e c i f i c remedial o r brush-up-type t r a i n i n g
f o l l o w i n g t h e LOFT e x e r c i s e ? Also, how do you f a c e t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h e
normal c o u r s e of a man's l i n e f l y i n g , h e does n o t come upon a n e n g i n e c u t
on t a k e o f f , h e does n o t come upon a two-engine approach o r three-engine missed
approach. Y e t throughout t h e y e a r s w e have been u s i n g o u r p e r i o d i c checks
and our t r a i n i n g i n l i e u of checks t o g i v e him p r a c t i c e i n maneuvers t h a t
w e f e e l t h e y need. To g i v e him a s m a t t e r i n g of t h e s e , b u t n o t a l l of them,
i n a LOFT program h a s caused u s t o l o o k v e r y , v e r y c a r e f u l l y a t t h e concept
of t h e LOFT because of t h e economic e f f e c t i t would have. On t h e one hand,
i t would f o r c e u s t o d o u b l e our t r a i n i n g i n o r d e r t o acccomplish t h e
p r a c t i c e p i e c e of t h i s t h i n g , y e t on t h e o t h e r hand it would obviously
t a k e advantage of t h e c r e w concept a s p e c t and t h e management a s p e c t of LOFT
i t s e l f . It would b e v e r y h e l p f u l t o u s i f you could t e l l u s e x a c t l y how much
a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g i t w i l l r e q u i r e i f w e were t o go t o t h e LOFT concept f o r
our t r a i n i n g i n l i e u of check.

CAPT. BEACH: W e h a v e n ' t found a s p e c i f i c amount of t i m e r e q u i r e d .

Maybe I can a d d r e s s your q u e s t i o n by answering t h e l a s t h a l f of i t f i r s t .
P a r t of what y o u ' r e t a l k i n g about i s t h o s e k i n d s of t h i n g s , as I mentioned
' e a r l i e r , when w e had t h e 4-hour t r a i n i n g p e r i o d , where h e s a w one each of
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t could p o s s i b l y go wrong. Engine f a i l u r e a t V-1 i n t h e case
of t h e 727, a n e n g i n e - f a i l e d approach, an e n g i n e - f a i l e d missed approach,
double-engine f a i l u r e , s i n g l e - e n g i n e l a n d i n g s , electrical f i r e and smoke,
abnormalities - a l l of t h a t i n 4 hours. A s you j u s t s a i d , it d o e s n ' t
happen a l l t h e time. But maybe he ought t o see i t once a y e a r , a t least,
t o r e f r e s h h i s memory on why t h i n g s happen l i k e that. T h a t ' s what w e used
t o do. But w e f e l t , a l l of u s who t a l k e d about i t i n c o n c e r t , t h a t t h a t
kind of t h i n g l a s t s j u s t about t h e l e n g t h of t i m e i t t a k e s him t o walk o u t
t h e door i f you p u t t h a t much i n t o a program. W e f e l t t h a t w e were t e a c h i n g
b e t t e r management of t h e f l i g h t by s e l e c t i n g t h o s e k i n d s of t h i n g s which, i f
improperly managed, could be c a t a s t r o p h i c . For i n s t a n c e , one of t h e
s c e n a r i o s i s a n engine e x p l o s i o n t h a t throws p i e c e s through t h e c e n t e r
engine; as a r e s u l t , you are on one engine about a 100 m i l e s from P i t t s b u r g h .

115
There i t i s , 100 m i l e s away, you can see i t , what do you do? O r y o u ' r e
looking a t s i n g l e engine d r i f t down. W e f e l t t h a t t h e l e n g t h of t i m e t h a t
w e exposed t h e people t o t h a t problem w a s f a r more b e n e f i c i a l t h a n running
them through t h r e e a n t i - i c i n g e x e r c i s e s perhaps. But t h a t a n t i - i c i n g
e x e r c i s e i s p a r t of t h e s c e n a r i o . So w e covered t h e k i n d s of t h i n g s t h a t
could g e t you i n t h e d e e p e s t t r o u b l e , e n g i n e f a i l u r e a t VR, t h a t kind of
t h i n g . W e f e l t t h a t w e should cover r e a l l y t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t would be
b e n e f i c i a l t o t h e crew r a t h e r t h a n gyro f a i l u r e o r compass f a i l u r e , which
d o n ' t r e a l l y p r o v i d e a g r e a t b a s e t o b u i l d a t r a i n i n g problem on. With o u r
approach, a l t h o u g h t h e r e ' s no p a s s o r f a i l , w e have had t o t a k e some p e o p l e
o u t of t h e program and r e t r a i n them o r upgrade t h e i r t r a i n i n g . There h a s
been no s p e c i f i c amount of r e t r a i n i n g t h a t w e have had t o do -
i t depends
on t h e i n d i v i d u a l . W e have had p e o p l e come through who can almost walk on
water, and w e have some who d o n ' t wash. Between t h o s e two i s t h e o r d i n a r y
p i c k and s h o v e l a v i a t o r l i k e myself who manages t o stumble through i t every
time. So w e f e l t t h a t t h e program r e a l l y h a d n ' t caused u s any e x t r a
t r a i n i n g a t a l l except f o r t h o s e few who r e a l l y need i t , and they would b e
t h e ones who would probably f a i l t h e PIC check o r t h e semiannual check
anyway. So t h e r e has been no t r a i n i n g g e n e r a t e d i n excess of what w e
o r d i n a r i l y do. I hope t h a t answers your q u e s t i o n .

MR. SMITH, ALPA: Has t h i s had any e f f e c t on your i n s t r u c t o r s i n

terms of what t h e y ' r e r e q u i r e d t o know and t o b e a b l e t o t r a n s m i t i n terms
of i n f o r m a t i o n ? How do you f e e l t h i s h a s a f f e c t e d s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of
procedures under emergency s i t u a t i o n s ?

CAPT. BEACH: The e f f e c t on i n s t r u c t o r s has been c o n s i d e r a b l e

because when w e f i r s t p u t t h e program t o g e t h e r , i t w a s incumbent upon u s t o
be s u r e t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t o r conducting t h e program, which i s r e a l l y a n
e v a l u a t i o n , knows what h e ' s doing.

It i s , as probably you have g a t h e r e d , q u i t e s u b j e c t i v e i n scope.

Whether t h e man i s good, bad, o r i n d i f f e r e n t depends e n t i r e l y on how t h e
i n s t r u c t o r f e e l s . So w e h a v e , I won't s a y r i g i d , b u t r a t h e r comprehensive
b r i e f i n g s among t h e i n s t r u c t o r s who a r e LOFT q u a l i f i e d and m y s e l f , about
what t h e program i s a b o u t . I n o u r handout, t h e s c r i p t w e g i v e t o t h e
i n s t r u c t o r s t o u s e i s a foreword t h a t g i v e s my i d e a s of what l i n e - o r i e n t e d
f l i g h t t r a i n i n g i s and what t h e i n s t r u c t o r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are, and w e
d i s c u s s t h o s e when he comes i n t o t a l k t o m e b e f o r e h e ' s LOFT-qualified.
It h i n g e s v e r y much on t h e i n s t r u c t o r , and h e ' s v e r y much aware of t h e f a c t
t h a t t h a t ' s h i s p o s i t i o n , and w e t r a i n him f o r t h a t .

MR. SMITH: But i n t h e s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of t h e emergency pro-

c e d u r e s , h a s t h e r e been any problem i n t e r m s of t h e i n s t r u c t o r s '
t e c h n i q u e s t o s o l v e a problem?

CAPT. BEACH: No, t h e r e i s no i n d i v i d u a l o p i n i o n i n t h e l i n e -

o r i e n t e d f l i g h t t r a i n i n g as w e c o n s t r u c t e d i t . The emergencies are handled
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a n d a r d p r o c e d u r e s as s p e l l e d o u t i n t h e a i r p l a n e f l i g h t
manual. That d o e s n ' t mean t o s a y t h e c a p t a i n c a n ' t u s e whatever s o l u t i o n

116
h e f e e l s b e s t , b u t i n d e b r i e f i n g he should be prepared t o defend i t . I f you
d e v i a t e from s t a n d a r d procedure, w e expect you t o s a y why. One b e n e f i t of
t h e LOFT program w e f e e l may be t h a t i f w e f i n d your procedure i s b e t t e r
than t h e one w e have w r i t t e n , w e may change t h e one w e have w r i t t e n . W e
h a v e n ' t y e t , though.

CAPT. FRINK: The t r a i n i n g committee r e q u e s t e d of t h e FAA, when

t h e y w e r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s r e g u l a t o r y change, t h a t t h e y change t h e t i m e
d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r LOFT t o 3 hours f o r t h e s c e n a r i o s and a l l o w u s 1 hour
remaining t o do s p e c i f i c maneuver p r a c t i c e t h a t may b e a s e a s o n a l t h i n g . W e
might want w e t runways, i c y runways, w e might want crosswinds, w e might n o t
want wind s h e a r , something of t h i s n a t u r e . But w e f e l t a v e r y g r e a t need
t o b e a b l e t o have some t i m e t o c o n c e n t r a t e once a y e a r on s p e c i f i c needs
t h a t t h e o p e r a t i o n s has i n d i c a t e d a r e t h e r e . I n your o p i n i o n , having used
t h e LOFT t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t you have, would a 3-hour p e r i o d be a d e q u a t e t o
do t h e j o b t h a t y o u ' r e t r y i n g t o do?

CAPT. BEACH: A 3-hour p e r i o d a g a i n would depend on what k i n d s of

t h i n g s you want t o see. Our o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e
a i r p l a n e s I ' m involved w i t h , are u n l i k e y o u r s . The s i t u a t i o n t h a t you are
probably l o o k i n g a t , where maybe you g e t one l a n d i n g a day, d o e s n ' t a p p l y
t o u s . So you would perhaps need t h a t e x t r a p e r i o d t o f o c u s on t h e k i n d s of
t h i n g s you f e e l t h e crew may n o t o r d i n a r i l y g e t t o see. Because of t h e way
w e ' r e o p e r a t i n g and t h e k i n d s of a i r p l a n e s and r o u t e s t r u c t u r e w e have, w e
e l e c t e d t o go t h e f u l l 4 hours f o r l i n e - o r i e n t e d f l i g h t t r a i n i n g and have
t h r e e l e g s t o develop t h e k i n d s of t h i n g s w e wanted t o see. Can you do i t
i n two? Y e s , I t h i n k you can. You would have t o s i t down w i t h t h e people
who are going t o c o n s t r u c t t h e program and d e c i d e your p r i o r i t i e s and t h e n
c o n s t r u c t 3 hours based on what you f e e l i s r e a l l y i m p o r t a n t , which i s what
w e r e a l l y d i d f o r 4 hours.

MR. COEN: 1 would l i k e t o s u g g e s t t h a t maybe w e ought t o have a

t r a i n i n g committee meeting. The 409 t r a i n i n g p r e s e n t l y i n t h e book t h a t a l o t
of t h e carriers have i s n o t h i n g b u t a race through a l l of t h e maneuvers of
Appendix E. Now, when you g e t i n t o LOFT, i t ' s Appendix E t r a i n i n g i n a
l o g i c a l sequence, i n a r e a l i s t i c s e n s e . And t h e g r a d i n g o r t h e p a s s - f a i l
s i t u a t i o n i s no d i f f e r e n t f o r LOFT t r a i n i n g t h a n i t i s f o r 409 t r a i n i n g ,
u s i n g a l l of Appendix E i n s t e a d of l i n e check. So t h e r e i s r e a l l y no g r e a t
change i n t h e a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g t h a t would be r e q u i r e d t o b r i n g a man up t o
a s t a n d a r d i f he i n f a c t w a s n o t . I d o n ' t know how many carriers are u s i n g
i t , b u t t h e r e are many. So t h e r e i s no real g r e a t change h e r e .

The o t h e r t h i n g i s t h a t t h e LOFT t r a i n i n g program, a t t h e recommendation

of t h e t r a i n i n g committee, r e q u i r e s a minimum of 3 h o u r s and 20 minutes and
t h e o t h e r 40 minutes a r e t h e r e f o r such t h i n g s as wind s h e a r and w h a t have
you.

CAPT. BEACH: Every a i r l i n e h a s i t s own f l a v o r , I b e l i e v e , based

on t h e k i n d s of t h i n g s t h a t you f e e l you need f o r o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s .
Ours may t a s t e d i f f e r e n t l y from y o u r s . But I t h i n k i f you a d o p t a

117
l i n e - o r i e n t e d f l i g h t t r a i n i n g program t h a t s u i t s your needs i t probably
won't b e d i f f e r e n t completely from my own, b u t w i l l b e every b i t as good f o r
t h e kind of t r a i n i n g you need t o do from your p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t of view.

DR. LAUBER: Thank you, B e r t . I ' d l i k e t o u n d e r s c o r e a c o u p l e of

t h i n g s t h a t B e r t brought o u t and Capt. Holdstock brought up. One of t h e
t h i n g s t h a t Tom Nunn d i d up a t Northwest w a s t o a d m i n i s t e r a q u e s t i o n n a i r e
t o people who had gone through h i s program t o g e t some i d e a of what t h e i r
i d e a s and impressions were about t h e program. Tom provided t h o s e d a t a t o
u s , and w e analyzed them i n a n a t t e m p t t o f i n d o u t what people who had been
through t h e program thought they l e a r n e d a b o u t i t . There are a c o u p l e of
s e l e c t e d comments t h a t w e g o t back t h a t I t h i n k r e a l l y speak f o r themselves.
These are d i r e c t q u o t a t i o n s .

"Judgment i n f l y i n g can be d e s c r i b e d as t h e a b i l i t y t o p l a c e r e l a t i v e
importance on many v a r i a b l e s w h i l e i n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s . LOFT a l l o w s t h e
i n d i v i d u a l t o e x e r c i s e t h i s judgment . I '

Another comment, "LOFT o f f e r s t h e chance t o t a k e a s i t u a t i o n t o i t s

c o n c l u s i o n r e g a r d l e s s of whether t h e procedure s e l e c t e d w a s good o r bad. It
f o r c e s them t o c a r r y through w i t h a series of a c t i o n s and f o r c e s them t o
t h i n k about i t . I '

Another one, "It w a s a r e a l eye-opener t o see a crew l o s e i t s co-

o r d i n a t i o n . It brought o u t two t h i n g s t o m e . One, t h e r e ' s a heavy load on
t h e second o f f i c e r d u r i n g emergencies and two, t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n
b e f o r e t a k i n g a c t i o n . You must t h i n k about t h e consequences of every a c t i o n . "

I t h i n k t h e s e are some i n d i c a t i o n of t h e i n s i g h t t h a t p e o p l e g e t i n t o
t h e i r own behavior when t h e y go through t h i s . Two f i n a l ones.

One, "This program should make a few maverick l o n e r s r e a l i z e how much

w e need c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e c o c k p i t . "

And t h e f i n a l one: t h i s i n d i v i d u a l l e a r n e d "How e a s y i t w a s t o compound

i g n o r a n c e w i t h damned f o o l i s h n e s s . "

118
 FLIGHT MANAGER AND CHECK-AIRMAN TRAINING

Capt. J. E. C a r r o l l *

The i n d u s t r y , and s p e c i f i c a l l y United A i r l i n e s , went through a p e r i o d

when t h i n g s were going j u s t about t h e way w e wanted. It w a s a s t a b l e p e r i o d
from approximately 1970 t o 1977. Things w e r e going w e l l o p e r a t i o n a l l y , b u t
our p i l o t s c a l l e d i t t h e p e r i o d of s t a g n a t i o n . W e had v e r y l i t t l e movement,
v e r y f e w promotions, v e r y l i t t l e a t t r i t i o n through normal r e t i r e m e n t o r
people having t o r e t i r e because of i l l n e s s . We d i d r e a l i z e one b e n e f i t ,
however, because w i t h t h i s s t a g n a t i o n w e w e r e b u i l d i n g up a v e r y h i g h level
of e x p e r i e n c e i n our c o c k p i t s . A s a r e s u l t of t h i s l a c k of movement
people w e r e i n t h e same a i r p l a n e , t h e same seat f o r a l o n g p e r i o d of time.
And o b v i o u s l y , when you do t h e same t h i n g over and over a g a i n you should
become more p r o f i c i e n t and t h e r e should b e fewer i n c i d e n t s and a c c i d e n t s .

However, i n s p i t e of t h i n g s going so w e l l w e found w e were beginning t o

g e t a l i t t l e uneasy. Things were r e a l l y going v e r y w e l l , b u t w e began t o
worry j u s t a l i t t l e b i t because t h e y were going so w e l l . W e reasoned t h a t i f
i t ' s going t h i s w e l l , t h e o n l y way it c a n go i s down. Every a i r l i n e , as
J . D. Smith, our r e s i d e n t e x p e r t s a y s , has a s a f e t y f o o t p r i n t , and what i t
t e l l s u s i s t h a t i n a c e r t a i n p e r i o d of t i m e you can a n t i c i p a t e t h a t y o u ' r e
going t o have a n a c c i d e n t . It v a r i e s between a i r l i n e s , b u t you c a n l o o k a t
t h e r e c o r d and say i n "x" number of months o r y e a r s y o u ' r e going t o have a
major a c c i d e n t .

On United A i r l i n e s w e had a s a f e t y f o o t p r i n t of 4 y e a r s between major

a c c i d e n t s . A t t h i s time w e had gone 4 y e a r s and h a d n ' t had a major a c c i d e n t ,
s o w i t h each succeeding month w e wondered j u s t what w e were doing s o w e l l , o r
what w a s about t o happen.

Other t h i n g s were g i v i n g concern. We w e r e becoming, as f a r as t h e

crews w e r e concerned, r a t h e r complacent -
perhaps because s o many t h i n g s
were b e i n g done f o r u s . The automated f l i g h t p l a n n i n g , t h e e x t e n s i v e r a d a r
v e c t o r i n g , INS systems; a l l of t h e conveniences and t h e advances of
technology w e r e r e a l l y l e a d i n g u s i n t o t h e p o s i t i o n of t a k i n g f o r g r a n t e d
t h a t t h i n g s w e r e going t o b e "okay." A s a n example, I t h i n k mention w a s
made i n one o r more of t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n t h e last day o r so of t h e D u l l e s
i n c i d e n t when a crew took a v e c t o r and an a l t i t u d e f o r g r a n t e d .

A l l t h e s e t h i n g s s t a r t e d t o c a u s e a vague concern, and t h e n w e found

t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n w a s about t o b e compounded. We passed t h e p e r i o d of
s t a g n a t i o n , and w e s t a r t e d t o expand. The a t t r i t i o n rate w a s beginning t o
i n c r e a s e and w e s t a r t e d w h a t B i l l Traub r e f e r r e d t o as t h e new-hire program.
W e a n t i c i p a t e d , as w e approached t h e new-hire program, a n a d d i t i o n of 1,800
persons over a 5-year p e r i o d , o r roughly 360 p e r s o n s a y e a r . With t h i s
movement w e found w e were l o s i n g t h e advantage t h a t w e had of s t a b i l i t y

*Vice P r e s i d e n t , F l i g h t S t a n d a r d s and T r a i n i n g , United A i r l i n e s .

I

119
and e x p e r i e n c e , because w i t h t h e p o t being s t i r r e d w e had new p e o p l e i n a l l
of o u r seats i n a l l of our a i r p l a n e s .

We could c o n c e i v a b l y , and I ' m q u i t e s u r e i t w i l l c o n t i n u e t h a t way f o r

some t i m e , f i n d w i t h i n a c o c k p i t a c a p t a i n brand new t o t h e a i r p l a n e , a f i r s t
o f f i c e r f l y i n g h i s f i r s t t r i p a f t e r having moved up from second o f f i c e r , and
a new-hire second o f f i c e r i n t h e t h i r d seat. And t h e new second o f f i c e r
could i n t h i s case be a female. Depending on t h e a t t i t u d e of t h e crew, t h a t
could e x a c e r b a t e t h e s i t u a t i o n a l i t t l e more.

So w e a l l of a sudden went from a p o s i t i o n of s t a b i l i t y and e x p e r i e n c e

t o one of m o b i l i t y and low e x p e r i e n c e .

Toward t h e end of t h i s p e r i o d of growth, w e a l s o found a l o t of

i n c i d e n t s beginning t o occur. The w i n t e r of 1976-77 on United A i r l i n e s w a s
t h e worst w i n t e r w e had had f o r a l o n g , long t i m e . There w a s ground damage
t o equipment, off-the-side-of-the-runway e x c u r s i o n s , w i t h no b i g damage t o
t h e a i r p l a n e , b u t a t nuch t o o g r e a t a frequency, blowing o u t windows i n t h e
t e r m i n a l , going o f f t h e end of runways -
w e would go 3 o r 4 f e e t o f f t h e
end of t h e runway w i t h no damage t o t h e a i r p l a n e , b u t more t h a n a l i t t l e
embarrassment t o t h e crew.

We were a p p r i s e d by our Western D i v i s i o n v i c e p r e s i d e n t who a t t e n d e d a

meeting i n Hong Kong t h a t Japan A i r L i n e s s a i d t h e y had had e x a c t l y t h e
same e x p e r i e n c e a b o u t t h a t t i m e , w i t h a n i n c r e a s i n g number of i n c i d e n t s . We
were n o t unique, and t h e r e w a s a n o v e r a l l concern i n t h e i n d u s t r y .

W e t h e n conducted what w e c a l l a road show, t a k i n g a l l of t h i s t o t h e

f i e l d t o t e l l people a b o u t i t and what w e thought t h e y could do about i t .
And we'd l i k e t o b e l i e v e , s i n c e w e s p e n t t h r e e q u a r t e r s of a m i l l i o n d o l l a r s
doing t h a t , t h a t t h e road show w a s v e r y b e n e f i c i a l because o u r performance
t h e n e x t w i n t e r w a s a b i g improvement.

We had one a c c i d e n t a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , t h e one a t S a l t Lake C i t y ,

and i t w a s i n t h e v e i n of what we've been t a l k i n g about h e r e -
poor r e s o u r c e
management and t a k i n g f o r g r a n t e d what you were t o l d .

But w e a t least thought t h a t t h e road show had helped u s i n t h e area of

minimizing, i f n o t e l i m i n a t i n g , o u r i n c i d e n t s .

And t h e n t h e w i n t e r of 1978-79 turned r i g h t around, and w e had a

problem a l l over a g a i n , w i t h one more a c c i d e n t t h a t involved r e s o u r c e
management, w e b e l i e v e . I r e a l i z e t h e f i n a l r e p o r t i s n ' t o u t , b u t t h e pre-
l i m i n a r y r e p o r t , which Bob Helmreich quoted a l t h o u g h h e d i d n ' t i d e n t i f y t h e
a c c i d e n t , i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h a t w a s perhaps a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r t o t h e
accident.

Throughout t h i s p e r i o d u n e a s i n e s s w a s growing i n t h e i n d u s t r y , and t h e

ATA T r a i n i n g Committee came up w i t h t h e expressed need f o r what t h e y c a l l e d
a more meaningful l i n e check. Due t o a f e e l i n g a t t h a t t i m e t h a t perhaps w e

120
w e r e n o t being as a t t e n t i v e t o o u r line-check s u p e r v i s i o n as w e should, t h a t
because of t h e s t a g n a t i o n - t h e same crews, t h e same people working w i t h
t h e same check-airman - w e were becoming c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h each o t h e r , and
weren't a d d r e s s i n g as a t t e n t i v e l y as w e might, t h e need f o r c o r r e c t i o n .

W e p u t a l l of t h e s e t h i n g s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t w i t h t h e
sudden turnaround and t h e expansion w e were having, w e were a l s o a s s i g n i n g a
l o t of new s u p e r v i s o r y people, new f l i g h t managers as w e c a l l them. They
were having t o work w i t h a l o t of new crewmembers i n a new environment f o r
t h o s e crewmembers, w h i l e t h e y themselves w e r e new t o t h e j o b .

Now, what w e recognized a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e a l s o w a s t h a t our

approach t o career p l a n n i n g had been based p r i m a r i l y on what B i l l Traub
covered by saying t h a t when w e h i r e d someone w e h i r e d a c a p t a i n . W e looked
a t them i n t h e p a s t and s a i d , "When w e h i r e you i t ' s i n a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t
you're going t o be a c a p t a i n , s o w e ' r e t r y i n g t o h i r e good people." Our
career planning and s u c c e s s i o n p l a n n i n g , a s f a r as management w a s concerned,
only c a r r i e d i t one s t e p f u r t h e r . I f you h i r e a good c a p t a i n , n a t u r a l l y
y o u ' r e going t o have a good manager. T h a t ' s a r a t h e r f a l s e philosophy, b u t
n e v e r t h e l e s s I t h i n k t h a t ' s what w e premised i t on. And w e r e a l l y d i d n ' t
c a r r y i t much f u r t h e r than t h a t .

I t h i n k w e a l s o recognized t h a t what w e had done i n t h e p a s t a s a way of

s e l e c t i n g our managers w a s more p o l i t i c a l t h a n i t w a s o b j e c t i v e . I t w a s a
buddy system t o a d e g r e e . It w a s a c a s e of who knew whom i n what p a r t i c u l a r
area, and t h e y t h e n became t h e manager, a g a i n premised on t h e f a c t t h a t if
they were good c a p t a i n s they would b e good managers.

With t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of a l l of t h e s e problems w e decided t h a t w i t h t h e

numbers of people t h a t we had on our a i r l i n e (we have 9 b a s e s , 6,000 p i l o t s ,
a few more than 2,000 c a p t a i n s ) -
t h a t t o t r y t o address d i r e c t l y t o the
crewmembers t h e c u r i n g of a l o t of t h e s e t h i n g s w a s probably j u s t t o o much t o
b i t e o f f a t one t i m e .

But w e could t a k e i t down t o a smaller group of p e o p l e - our f l i g h t

management. And i f w e d i d w h a t w e should 'have done a l o n g t i m e ago f o r
them, t r a i n e d them b e t t e r , t h e n they would b e i n a p o s i t i o n t o p a s s on what
they could t o t h e f l i g h t crews.

So t h e s u b j e c t of what I'll b e c o v e r i n g today i s twofold. One program

w a s t h e s p e c i a l i z e d e d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i n g of o u r f l i g h t management people.
And t h e t h r u s t w a s t o a i d our managers i n h e l p i n g o u r p r o f e s s i o n a l p i l o t s
b e more p r o f e s s i o n a l . W e weren't going on a w i t c h h u n t , w e weren't o u t t o
g e t people, w e w e r e n ' t o u t t o t r y and c r a c k t h e whip, w e were j u s t t r y i n g t o
smooth o u t our o p e r a t i o n s by h e l p i n g p r o f e s s i o n a l s b e more p r o f e s s i o n a l .
That w a s t h e t h r u s t behind our management t r a i n i n g program.

The second t h i n g t h a t w e recognized, f o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s I ' l l

cover l a t e r , w a s t h e r a t h e r u r g e n t need of o u r c r e w members f o r some t r a i n i n g
i n command o r r e s o u r c e management. W e i n i t i a l l y termed i t , and w e are
a d j u s t i n g o u r t h i n k i n g now, a s command t r a i n i n g f o r p i l o t s .

121
 Management recognized t h i s need, t h e f l i g h t crewmembers themselves
recognized i t . It w a s being asked f o r t o a d e g r e e t h a t w a s d i s t u r b i n g ,
because o b v i o u s l y i t p o i n t o u t t o management that w e h a d n ' t f u l f i l l e d a
need. F i r s t , however, I ' l l review t h e program w e evolved f o r t h e t r a i n i n g
of our managers.

To understand where t h i s f i t s , l e t m e g i v e you a v e r y b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n

of how United A i r l i n e s o p e r a t e s . W e have, as I s a i d , 9 b a s e s . W e d i v i d e
them i n t o 3 d i v i s i o n s , w i t h a d i v i s i o n vice p r e s i d e n t . Each one of t h o s e
d i v i s i o n v i c e p r e s i d e n t s then has t h r e e b a s e s r e p o r t i n g t o him, headed up by
a d i r e c t o r of f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s who has f l i g h t managers working f o r him. I n
a c o u p l e of o u r b i g g e r b a s e s w e have a n i n t e r m e d i a t e level c a l l e d f l i g h t
o p e r a t i o n s manager who have some of t h e f l i g h t managers r e p o r t i n g t o them.

A s e a r l y as 1973 w e recognized that from t h e second level of management

on up w e had 25 p e r s o n s , a l l b u t one of whom were going t o r e t i r e i n 9 y e a r s .
T h a t ' s a p r e t t y good t u r n o v e r .

W e a l s o recognized t h a t as w e s t a r t e d t o expand w e would have even more

people pumping i n a t t h e bottom w i t h a need t o b e t r a i n e d . So, h o p e f u l l y ,
whatever t r a i n i n g w e could g i v e would h e l p them, as t h e y progressed i n
management, t o h e l p o t h e r s who would e v e n t u a l l y work f o r them.

I n i t i a l l y , and going back t o t h e p e r i o d of t i m e when I w a s s e l e c t e d as

a manager w e used t o have e s s e n t i a l l y a s i m p l e way of p i c k i n g managers. He
had t o b e and t h i s , of c o u r s e , i s s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g , a b e t t e r t h a n a v e r a g e
p i l o t . H e had t o have some s k i l l s i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s which
would have been evidenced through ALPA a c t i v i t y and i n some cases, a l s o
a p p l i c a b l e t o myself, i n c o n t i n u i n g m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y , and have a r e p u t a t i o n
of being a good commander and one t h a t p e o p l e could work w i t h .

With that a s a l i s t of c r i t e r i a t o u s e , I r e p o r t e d t o t h e f l i g h t o f f i c e
and my manager s a i d , "Good morning, i t ' s n i c e t o have you w i t h us." I said,
"Fine, w h a t would you l i k e m e t o do?" H e s a i d , "Your d e s k i s back t h e r e , go
t o work."

And t h e r e w a s my i n d o c t r i n a t i o n , t h e r e w a s my t r a i n i n g , t h e r e w a s my
s e l e c t i o n , and I w a s t o l d I now had 70 crewmembers a s s i g n e d t o m e and I
should s u p e r v i s e them.

I s a i d , What s p e c i f i c a l l y would you l i k e m e t o do?" H e s a i d , " W e l l ,

most of your work is going t o b e going o u t and g i v i n g l i n e checks. You
have t a k e n them -
go o u t and g i v e them."

T h a t w a s o u r program. They p a i d p e o p l e a l o t of money t o do t h a t s o r t

of t h i n g . I f t h e y d i d t h a t i n any o t h e r i n d u s t r y , I t h i n k they'd f a l l a l l
over themselves w i t h l a u g h t e r t h a t you p a i d t h a t kind of money and gave t h a t
kind of t r a i n i n g t o somebody i n that p o s i t i o n .

122
 But w e now recognized, v e r y f o r c e f u l l y , t h a t w e needed a f l i g h t
management t r a i n i n g program. W e p u t i t t o g e t h e r i n f i v e phases. Phase one,
as w e c a l l i t , w a s devoted t o t h e b a s i c o p e r a t i o n a l concerns of a f l i g h t
manager i n d e a l i n g w i t h h i s people, p l u s some i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s work and
some philosophy and psychology t h a t would a d d r e s s i t s e l f t o t h e s u p e r v i s i o n
of people.

W e decided w e would b a s i c a l l y want t o p u t t o g e t h e r a c o u r s e f o r

management c a n d i d a t e s b u t w e had t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e r e would be problems
if w e threw t h e s e neophytes i n t o t h e f i e l d w i t h a l l t h i s h i g h f a l u t i n
t r a i n i n g , philosophy and t h e o r y w e had g i v e n them, and t h e y t h e n g o t i n t o a
d o m i c i l e w i t h some of t h e o l d hands, t h e managers who had been around a w h i l e
who would s a y t o them, "What are you doing?" "Why are you pursuing t h i s
p a r t i c u l a r area i n t h i s way?" And t h e y ' d s a y , " T h a t ' s what t h e y t a u g h t me."
They'd b e t o l d , "Oh, i g n o r e t h a t , w e d o n ' t do i t t h a t way."

So what w e d i d w a s c y c l e our incumbent managers through f i r s t . But

u l t i m a t e l y i t w i l l b e a c o u r s e f o r management c a n d i d a t e s .

With known a t t r i t i o n , i n a g i v e n year w e w i l l t r a i n t h e number of

c a n d i d a t e s t h a t w e a n t i c i p a t e w e w i l l have t o p u t i n t o t h e system i n t h e
f o l l o w i n g year o r 6 months. W e have p u t some c a n d i d a t e s and some incumbent
managers through t h e s e classes and t h e mix h a s been good because t h e exchange
i s good. The group s h a r e s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e incumbent managers, and t h e y
g e t t h e enthusiasm of t h e c a n d i d a t e s .

B r i e f l y , what w e cover i n t h e c o u r s e i s f i r s t , an i n t r o d u c t i o n by t h e
s e n i o r v i c e p r e s i d e n t of o p e r a t i o n s t o a t t e s t t o t h e importance of t h e
program. W e do some t r a i n i n g i n t h e j o b of managing given by some pro-
f e s s i o n a l t e a c h e r s and i n s t r u c t o r s t h a t w e have i n o u r h e a d q u a r t e r s t r a i n i n g
group. W e a l s o cover what w e b a s i c a l l y c a l l our "den concept."

W e c a l l o u r f l i g h t managers "den mothers." W e a s s i g n 70-some people,

up as h i g h as 90 o r 100 depending on t h e d o m i c i l e , t o one manager and h e ' s
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . We t r e a t what w e c a l l t h e "whole man
concept," n o t o n l y o p e r a t i o n a l l y , b u t p e r s o n a l l y . The f l i g h t managers are
concerned w i t h t h e i r p e r s o n a l problems as w e l l as t h e i r e d u c a t i o n i n o t h e r
areas.

During t h e t r a i n i n g w e have a "hangar f l y i n g " s e s s i o n on one of t h e

evenings i n which people g e t a l i t t l e more r e l a x e d , ( t h e a t t i t u d e adjustment
h o u r ) , and exchange o p i n i o n s . We a l s o go i n t o some p e r s o n n e l p o l i c y so t h a t
t h e y can l e a r n t o h a n d l e t h e p e r s o n n e l s i t u a t i o n s .

W e review t h e p r o c e s s of e v a l u a t i o n which a t f i r s t i s a theory-type

approach. W e cover t h r e e o p e r a t i o n a l areas t h a t w e c a l l t h e o p e r a t i o n a l
approach t o checking, which i s g i v e n by our d i r e c t o r of f l i g h t s t a n d a r d s and
procedures, o r one of h i s f l i g h t managers. There w e emphasize t h e need f o r
o b j e c t i v i t y i n checking on p r o f i c i e n c y checks and r a t i n g r i d e s , which our
managers w i l l handle a t some time. We p o i n t o u t t h a t when you do t a k e a n

123
o p e r a t i o n a l approach t o a check, you a s k q u e s t i o n s on o r a l s and approach
t h e s u b j e c t from t h e c o c k p i t o u t r a t h e r t h a n t h e system i n ; t h a t i s , "What
c a n you do a b o u t i t ? " "What's your a b i l i t y t o h a n d l e a p a r t i c u l a r
s i t u a t i o n ? " We encourage them t o a s k t h e q u e s t i o n s i n t h a t way r a t h e r t h a n
e s o t e r i c a l l y , and t o avoid g e t t i n g d e e p l y i n t o a system over which they have
no c o n t r o l .

W e cover - and I have handled t h i s myself -

w e cover e n r o u t e checks,
and t h e n move on t o t h a t more meaningful l i n e check. The r e a s o n I handled
t h i s one i n i t i a l l y w i t h t h e incumbent managers, q u i t e c a n d i d l y , i s t o
emphasize how s e r i o u s l y t h e company f e l t about what w e were a f t e r , t h a t w e
r e a l l y meant what w e were s a y i n g . The s e n i o r vice p r e s i d e n t f e l t t h a t t h i s
w a s b e s t done by having a n o f f i c e r of t h e company convey t h e i n f o r m a t i o n .

We wanted a l i t t l e more p r o f e s s i o n a l approach t o e n r o u t e checking.

" C a l l them as you see them." "Record what you see." "Bring t o p e o p l e ' s
a t t e n t i o n t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r change." Not j u s t t o w r i t e t h i n g s up, j u s t t o
p u t something i n t h e r e c o r d . A s most of u s who are i n t h i s b u s i n e s s
r e c o g n i z e , t h e worst t h i n g i n t h e world w e c a n have i s something i n our
r e c o r d t h a t somebody c a n go back and l o o k a t .

So w e b r i n g t o t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t h a t t h i s approach i s what w e want t o

a v o i d . But given t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e s e s o r t s of t h i n g s w i l l t a k e p l a c e ,
w e p o i n t o u t t h a t u n l e s s w e r e c o r d them when w e do see them w e sometimes
don't get people's attention.

We a l l i n d u l g e i n a n ego t r i p t o o many t i m e s I t h i n k . I c a n o n l y speak

f o r United A i r l i n e s people, b u t i t ' s probably t r u e of everyone. When you
s u p e r v i s e p i l o t s , everyone t h i n k s h e ' s t h e w o r l d ' s g r e a t e s t p i l o t . You
know, "You c a n ' t be, I am."

But when you t a k e t h a t approach as f a r as s u p e r v i s i o n of p e o p l e i s

concerned, t h e ego s p r e a d s t o t h e p o i n t where you s a y , "I n o t i c e t h i s , I
r e c o g n i z e t h i s . But I ' m so good t h a t I ' m going t o b e a b l e t o b r i n g t o t h i s
i n d i v i d u a l t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of what he h a s t o do t o change, and h e w i l l
change because I ' m g i v i n g i t t o him, and h e ' l l be b e t t e r f o r i t . "

I f you i n d u l g e i n t h i s ego t r i p , almost every t i m e you do, t h e f i r s t

r i d e i s f o r f r e e , because you always s a y t o y o u r s e l f , "The poor guy never
had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e g i v e n what I can b r i n g t o him, nobody else e v e r
t o l d him t h i s I know, and now t h a t I have t o l d him, i t w i l l never happen
a g a i n . 'I

I ' m going t o d i g r e s s f o r a moment on t h i s ego f a c t o r . L e e Bolman might

know t h i s s t o r y , I d o n ' t know. I l i k e t o t e l l i t because I t h i n k i t s v e r y
apropos of t h e ego t h a t w e a l l i n d u l g e i n .

T h i s h a s t o do w i t h John Kenneth G a l b r a i t h . When I went t o t h e

Advanced Management Program a t Harvard, I heard t h i s from one of t h e Harvard
p r o f e s s o r s . John Kenneth G a l b r a i t h is supposed t o b e t h e b i g g e s t egomaniac

124
i n t h e world, and I guess h i s s t u d e n t s were aware of t h i s t o a v e r y h i g h
d e g r e e , and they g o t a l i t t l e s i c k of i t a f t e r a w h i l e . One of them, t r y i n g
t o b r i n g t o h i s a t t e n t i o n t h a t he w a s v e r y e g o t i s t i c a l , chose Christmas t o
send him a b i r t h d a y c a r d . But he w a s n o t a t a l l t a k e n aback. Coming back t o
c l a s s a f t e r t h e h o l i d a y s he a p p r i s e d t h e group of s t u d e n t s t h a t he had
r e c e i v e d a b i r t h d a y c a r d , b u t obviously somebody made a m i s t a k e - they
should have s e n t i t t o h i s son.

Now, s a d l y enough a l o t of management people i n d u l g e i n t h e same t y p e of

ego t r i p . "I can h a n d l e a n y t h i n g as l o n g a s I have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y , and
they w i l l be b e t t e r f o r it." Then he f o r g e t s t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l may change
t o a n o t h e r a i r p l a n e , t o a n o t h e r s u p e r v i s o r , and s t a r t t h e p r o c e s s a l l over
a g a i n . O r , a s one of our e n t e r p r i s i n g f l i g h t o f f i c e r s found, a l l he had t o
do w a s t r a n s f e r from d o m i c i l e t o d o m i c i l e t o g e t o u t from under t h e problem.

A t any r a t e , w e do cover a l l of t h i s ; w e a l s o cover o v e r a l l e v a l u a t i o n s .

A t t h e end of t h e year w e write what w e c a l l a "green s h e e t " - i t ' s a
personnel evaluation.

And a t t h a t p o i n t w e emphasize a g a i n t h e need, i n handling t h e s e 70 o r

more people a s s i g n e d t o u s , f o r c a l l i n g them a s w e see them, f o r having a n
o b j e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , because t h e o n l y t h i n g t h a t
remains w i t h t h e man through h i s career i s t h a t annual a p p r a i s a l .

We a l s o t r a i n i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s , which Rod G i l s t r a p h a s handled

many t i m e s , and so has Bob Crump. And t h a t ' s a v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g day and a
h a l f s e s s i o n . We cover c o n t r a c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , d i s c i p l i n e and g r i e v a n c e ,
and a new one, t h e employee a s s i s t a n c e program, which i s t h e approach t o
problems of people who are involved i n a l c o h o l dependency.

We g e t i n t o management c o u n s e l i n g s k i l l s , w i t h r o l e p l a y i n g , s o they
can see how they h a n d l e themselves i n s i t u a t i o n s o r how t h e y should h a n d l e
themselves.

W e review a c c i d e n t and i n c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , s o t h a t i t ' s done

c o r r e c t l y and w e l e a r n from i t , n o t j u s t go through t h e paper work. John
Perkinson i s involved i n o u r s a f e t y department and can a t t e s t t o t h e f a c t
t h a t too many t i m e s w e have p u t t o g e t h e r a n a c c i d e n t o r i n c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a -
t i o n , and i t ' s j u s t been a case of g e t t i n g t h e paper work o u t of t h e way.
We h a v e n ' t r e a l l y l e a r n e d from i t , o r disseminated what w e d i d l e a r n t o t h e
rest of t h e crews.

To wrap i t up, a n o t h e r s e s s i o n i s l e d by t h e s e n i o r vice p r e s i d e n t t o

g e t t h e r e a c t i o n s of t h e people; t h e r e a c t i o n s s o f a r have been v e r y , v e r y
f i n e . What t h e y say i s , "We have needed t h i s f o r a long t i m e ; no one ever
t o l d us t h i s before."

We i n c l u d e a l i t t l e p r e c o u r s e s t u d y and a l i t t l e homework w h i l e t h e y ' r e

t h e r e d u r i n g t h e week. I t ' s i n our T r a i n i n g Center i n Chicago, s o i t ' s away
from home, and they c a n a d d r e s s themselves more i n t e n s e l y t o t h e s u b j e c t .

125
 The second phase of o u r management t r a i n i n g i s check-airman t r a i n i n g .
W e u s u a l l y g i v e t h a t j u s t p r i o r t o t h e assignment of t h e man as a manager.
H e spends 5 t o 7 days i n Denver l e a r n i n g how t o b e a check-airman g i v i n g
p r o f i c i e n c y checks and r a t i n g r i d e s .

I f you have never thought a b o u t i t , i t ' s a v e r y tough t h i n g t h e f i r s t

t i m e you a p p r a i s e a f l i g h t crew. The o n l y t h i n g most of u s could e v e r b r i n g
t o a n a p p r a i s a l of a f l i g h t crew i s our own s t a n d a r d s , t h e way We f l y .

Consider t h a t most of our people who are a s s i g n e d as managers a r e w e l l

above a v e r a g e p i l o t s so t h a t t h e y can have c r e d i b i l i t y i n the operational
s u p e r v i s i o n of o t h e r people. When you do approach t h e t a s k you have a v e r y
high set of s t a n d a r d s , b u t you r e a l l y a r e o n l y l o o k i n g f o r a p a s s i n g per-
formance of an a v e r a g e p i l o t .

No p i l o t wants t o b e c a l l e d average. I t ' s t h e w o r s t t h i n g i n t h e world

you could p u t down, "He d i d a good, average job.'' That goes crossways i n
your t h r o a t . But you have t o g e t i n t o t h e atmosphere and r e c o g n i z e what i t
is t h a t i s a good s o l i d performance, and i t i s a l e a r n i n g e x p e r i e n c e . You
a l s o have t o l e a r n how t o communicate w i t h t h e people i n a p o s i t i v e s e n s e ,
so t h a t i t ' s c o n s t r u c t i v e and y o u ' l l b e a b l e t h e n t o t r a n s m i t reinforcement
t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l so he c a n b e n e f i t by i t .

The r e a c t i o n s t o t h a t phase of t r a i n i n g a r e always v e r y p o s i t i v e .

T h e y ' r e always a l i t t l e shaky, because i t ' s a l i t t l e tough t h e f i r s t t i m e
people go through i t . But i t ' s a v e r y b e n e f i c i a l t h i n g .

W e a l s o g i v e them r i g h t seat t i m e - o f f s e t approaches so t h a t when

t h e y ' r e o u t shot-gunning p e o p l e , t h e y ' r e i n a p o s i t i o n t o r e c o g n i z e what t h e y
should b e looking f o r and how t o c o r r e c t f o r i t .

The t h i r d phase of our t r a i n i n g i s what w e c a l l our Executive O f f i c e s

Seminar. T h i s i s similar t o what a l o t of you have d i s c u s s e d i n t h e p a s t day
o r s o , i n which w e cover a l l of t h e o t h e r departments i n t h e company.

Who i s behind t h a t v o i c e on t h e phone, who c a n you c a l l about a

situation. Also the t o t a l recognition t h a t - a g a i n , going back t o t h e ego
position - most of t h e f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s people have. "You a r e n o t t h e
o n l y ones i n t h e world who r u n t h i s a i r l i n e , i t t a k e s a l o t of people t o
b r i n g t h a t product t o you. And when t h e y do b r i n g i t t o you, you have t o do
a good j o b s o you c a n b r i n g t h e p a s s e n g e r s back again."

A l l of t h o s e t h i n g s and a11 of t h e departments i n t h e company a r e

brought t o t h e i r a t t e n t i o n i n t h e week of t r a i n i n g a t o u r h e a d q u a r t e r s i n
Chicago. It i s done e i t h e r j u s t b e f o r e t h e i r assignment as a manager o r
w i t h i n t h e f i r s t 6 months of t h e i r assignment.

Phase f o u r of t h e t r a i n i n g f o r managers, which w e are working on r i g h t

now, h a s t o do w i t h enhancement modules. T h i s c o v e r s material i n t h e c o u r s e
t h a t perhaps t h e y would n o t have been i n t h e p o s i t i o n t o absorb i n i t i a l l y ,

126
and t h a t t h e y wouldn't have been a s s i g n e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i n t h e i r i n i t i a l
assignment as a manager. Such t h i n g s as h i j a c k i n g s i t u a t i o n s , t h e i d e n t i f i -
c a t i o n and s e l e c t i o n of f u t u r e management c a n d i d a t e s , m o t i v a t i o n and pro-
ductivity - a l o t of t h i n g s p r e p a r i n g some of our p e o p l e f o r second-level
p o s i t i o n s . W e cover i n d u s t r y and agency media involvement , and b u s i n e s s
p r i n c i p l e s , s i n c e they s t a r t g e t t i n g involved i n budgets, e t c . A l s o , some
hazardous materials t r a i n i n g .

The f i n a l phase of our t r a i n i n g , and one t h a t w e have gone i n t o v e r y

l i t t l e s o f a r , i s going t o b e devoted p r i m a r i l y t o t h e people who show real
p o t e n t i a l f o r advancement t o o t h e r p o s i t i o n s and who are going t o be given
o u t s i d e t r a i n i n g . Such t h i n g s as t h e advanced management program a t Harvard
o r S t a n f o r d - a c o u r s e r u n by Chicago U n i v e r s i t y t o which some people have
been s e n t and, of c o u r s e , Michigan. W e w e r e n ' t t o o e n t h r a l l e d w i t h t h e one
a t Michigan b u t i n case anybody's h e r e from Michigan, i t ' s o n l y because i t
d i d n ' t s e r v e our purpose. But w e a r e t a k i n g advantage of o u t s i d e t r a i n i n g .
So much f o r t h e f l i g h t management a s p e c t of t r a i n i n g .

Now t o t h e need f o r command t r a i n i n g . A s you have probably recognized

i f you have worked a t i t , and i f you have a program a t t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , a
l o t of t h e t h i n g s t h a t you p e o p l e had i n your command c o u r s e s w e are g i v i n g
i n a d i f f e r e n t way. Our EX0 seminar c o v e r s t h e rest of t h e company. Some of
you people have t h a t included i n your command t r a i n i n g , b u t w e are r e f e r r i n g
t o t h e s p e c i f i c s u b j e c t of command, human r e s o u r c e management.

W e a t United have been t a l k i n g a b o u t i t f o r a y e a r and a h a l f .

Corporate approaches t o t h i n g s being what t h e y a r e , p r i o r i t i e s being what
t h e y are, i t t a k e s t i m e t o g e t p e o p l e ' s a t t e n t i o n . We t a l k e d about i t i n
February of 1978 b u t i t wasn't u n t i l February of 1979 t h a t w e had our f i r s t
meeting of t h e t a s k f o r c e p u t t o g e t h e r by t h e s e n i o r v i c e p r e s i d e n t of
f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s t o a d d r e s s t h i s p a r t i c u l a r problem.

W e found, f i n a l l y , t h a t n o t o n l y w a s management aware of t h e need f o r

t h i s command t r a i n i n g , b u t a l s o t h a t t h e l a s t two a c c i d e n t s w e had had high-
l i g h t e d t h e need. Some i n g r e d i e n t s i n b o t h of them suggested t h a t t h e
management of r e s o u r c e s w i t h i n t h e c o c k p i t perhaps could have precluded t h e
a c c i d e n t . The second a c c i d e n t r e a l l y g o t our a t t t e n t i o n , s o w e s t a r t e d t o
work on i t .

Then t h e s t r i k e i n t e r v e n e d , and w e r e a l l y w e r e n ' t a b l e t o do v e r y much

u n t i l t h e s t r i k e w a s over. We f l l n a l l y had t h e t h i r d meeting of o u r t a s k
f o r c e h e r e , Monday, of t h i s week, and w e i n t e n d t o m e e t a g a i n tomorrow
morning f o r a n hour o r more and t h e n a g a i n tomorrow a f t e r n o o n a t t h e con-
c l u s i o n of t h e c o n f e r e n c e t o condense what w e have been a b l e t o p i c k up from
you and what w e perhaps might want t o u s e i n our approach t o command
training.

We have asked a l o t of q u e s t i o n s . We took a sampling of o u r p e o p l e and

w e had p e r s o n a l l e t t e r s from some p e o p l e i n d i c a t i n g t h e need f o r t h i s
t r a i n i n g . W e p u t a l l t h i s t o g e t h e r and went o u t w i t h a q u e s t i o n n a i r e , and
t h e answers w e g o t back were ra,ther e a s y t o f o l l o w .

127
 Some of t h e g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n s were t h a t people b e l i e v e t h e a b i l i t y t o
command o r t o l e a d can b e enhanced. They b e l i e v e t h a t a command o r l e a d e r -
s h i p l e a r n i n g e x p e r i e n c e should i n c l u d e philosophy, psychology, and i n t e r -
p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s s k i l l s . Also some of t h e b a s i c management and human
r e s o u r c e s management s k i l l s , and d e c i s i o n making and problem a n a l y s i s s k i l l s .

S p e c i f i c a l l y and i n descending o r d e r of p r i o r i t y t h e r e s p o n s e s s t a t e

1. That i t w a s n e c e s s a r y t o have a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of people.

2. There had t o b e a w i l l i n g n e s s on t h e p a r t of t h e commander t o u s e

t h e rest of h i s crew, and of t h e c r e w t o p a r t i c i p a t e , c o o p e r a t e , and
communicate.

3. I n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s s k i l l s a r e obviously v e r y n e c e s s a r y .

4 . There had t o b e a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e n e c e s s i t y t o a c c e p t
responsibility. The knowledge of j o b procedures, t h e o p e r a t i o n a l aspects
were v e r y low on t h e l i s t .

L e t ' s c o n s i d e r where w e a r e r i g h t now and what w e ' r e going t o b e doing.

It is a b i g problem t o make 6,000 people aware of t h e environment and
atmosphere n e c e s s a r y f o r good command. I r e c e n t l y picked up a n e x p r e s s i o n ,
"When y o u ' r e going t o have t o eat a n e l e p h a n t , t h e b e s t way i s one l i t t l e b i t e
a t a time." W e have a n e l e p h a n t h e r e , w i t h 6,000 people p l u s t h e c a b i n crew
people t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r awareness of t h e problems.

W e a n t i c i p a t e t h a t probably t h e f i r s t p e o p l e w e are going t o t r a i n a r e ,

a g a i n , o u r managers. When t h e y a r e aware of what i t i s t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y ,
t h e y can l o o k f o r i t , b e t t e r assess i t , and t h e n more c o n s t r u c t i v e l y com-
municate t h e need f o r adjustment on t h e p a r t of o t h e r s , W e w i l l t a k e i t i n
s t e p s . Perhaps w e w i l l do i t n e x t w i t h our new c a p t a i n s , and then t a k e i t on
from t h e r e .

We t h i n k one of t h e t h i n g s t h a t ' s going t o enhance our a b i l i t y t o do

t h i s s o r t of t h i n g i s t h e f a c t t h a t w e have t h e CDC PLATO system, which
American A i r l i n e s i s a l s o involved i n u s i n g . W e have g o t t e n a p p r o v a l from
o u r Board of D i r e c t o r s t o buy our own computer and p u t i n our own in-house
program. I f y o u ' r e n o t f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e PLATO system, i t ' s a computer-
managed and computer-assisted program w i t h which w e c a n do i n d i v i d u a l i z e d
t r a i n i n g . W e are going t o extend i t s u s e t o o u r d o m i c i l e s where w e ' l l
i n s t a l l t e r m i n a l s . W e a n t i c i p a t e s t a r t i n g t h a t t h e f i r s t of n e x t y e a r .
Once w e have t h e t e r m i n a l s on t h e s c e n e i n t h e d o m i c i l e s , t h e n w e w i l l have
t h e a b i l i t y t o b r i n g i n groups of people w i t h o u t having t o b r i n g them t o one
c e n t r a l l o c a t i o n , and w e ' l l be a b l e t o do i t much q u i c k e r and g e t b e t t e r
exposure.

Obviously, what w e t e a c h i s going t o have t o b e d i f f e r e n t f o r each group

of people. But, n e v e r t h e l e s s , w e a n t i c i p a t e t h a t w i l l enhance o u r a b i l i t y t o
do i t .

128
 Right now w e are f i r s t reviewing t h e q u e s t i o n of what w e ' l l i n c l u d e i n
t h i s c o u r s e . A s I s a i d , i t w i l l be t h e o r y , psychology, t h e p r a c t i c e of
command on United A i r l i n e s . Then t h e methods t h a t we perhaps c a n u s e t o g i v e
t h i s kind of t r a i n i n g , i n c l u d i n g r o l e p l a y i n g s i n c e t h a t s t r i k e s u s as being
one of t h e b e s t ways t o proceed. W e might even have f i l m s t o show a t t h e
domiciles.

But w e do b e l i e v e w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n t h a t i t h a s t o b e done w i t h a l l of
t h e people who are involved i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e a i r p l a n e , t h e c o c k p i t and
t h e c a b i n crew, s o t h a t t h e y w i l l a l l r e c o g n i z e t h a t command i s a v e r y l o n e l y
p o s i t i o n , and t h a t when i t comes t i m e s t o make a d e c i s i o n , i t may n o t always
be popular w i t h everyone. But i f w e can e d u c a t e a l l of t h e crew members t o
t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of what i t means t o be a commander, and what i t t a k e s on t h e
p a r t of t h e rest of t h e c r e w t o h e l p t h a t commander, t h e p o s i t i o n w i l l n o t be
q u i t e so l o n e l y . When i t comes t i m e s t o make a d e c i s i o n , s u p p o r t w i l l be more
r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e - more c o o p e r a t i o n w i l l b e e v i d e n t .

I n c l o s i n g , one of t h e t h i n g s t h a t I have recognized i n l i s t e n i n g t o

what a l o t of you have g i v e n u s a s t h e b e n e f i t of your knowledge and ex-
p e r i e n c e , i s t h a t t h e r e a r e d i s t i n c t i o n s t o b e made between a i r l i n e s . What
can and c a n ' t b e done depends on t h e economic c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t a l o t of u s
a r e confronted w i t h , and a l s o t h e s i z e of o u r a i r l i n e s .

I ' v e always been one who h a s g r e a t a d m i r a t i o n f o r t h e Swiss. Anything

they do t h e y approach w i t h g r e a t f i n e s s e , g r e a t s k i l l , g r e a t a t t e n t i o n t o
d e t a i l . Anything t h e y manufacture t h e y do on a l i m i t e d b a s i s s o they can
c o n t r o l t h e q u a l i t y of t h e product. I n t h e i r case, Nick Grob i n d i c a t e s t h a t
he h a n d l e s 24 c a p t a i n s a y e a r , and h e u s e s , I b e l i e v e , 50 r o u t e - q u a l i f y i n g
c a p t a i n s . I f I e q u a t e t h a t w i t h my o p e r a t i o n I ' d be p u t t i n g through 15 t i m e s
as many c a p t a i n s a y e a r , and I would need 15 t i m e s a s many r o u t e - q u a l i f y i n g
c a p t a i n s . Also, I do i t i n 6 weeks, and h e t a k e s 9 months. I ' m a f r a i d my
q u a l i t y c o n t r o l i s n o t q u i t e as good as h i s . I a l s o have d i f f e r e n t economic
c o n s t r a i n t s i n being a p r i v a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n . But w e are a l l a f t e r t h e same
end r e s u l t - w e ' r e l o o k i n g f o r t h e b e s t product w e c a n p o s s i b l y t u r n o u t .

W e hope t h a t t h e two programs t h a t I have o u t l i n e d h e r e today w i l l be

as good a s t h e b e s t , and i n n o t t o o long a p e r i o d of t i m e .

DISCUSSION

CAPT. BEACH, E a s t e r n A i r l i n e s : Talking a b o u t r e c r u i t i n g managers,

and t h e i d e a of someone who knows someone who would b e a good one, w e have
probably a l l done t h a t s i n c e y e a r 1. S i n c e you f i n d t h a t less t h a n
a c c e p t a b l e , how do you r e c r u i t ? Where do your managers come from?

CAPT. CARROLL: W e have i n o u r group h e r e today a t least one man

who h a s n o t been a t t h e j o b t o o l o n g , and h e may c o r r e c t m e when I s a y t h i s .
What w e do now, i n r e c o g n i t i o n of how bad o u r system h a s been i n t h e p a s t , i s

129
s c r e e n t h e p e o p l e i n each den. Each group of p i l o t s a s s i g n e d t o a manager i s
screened by t h a t manager f o r t h e p o t e n t i a l t h a t h e sees i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l f o r
being a manager. The n e x t s t e p i s t o d i s c u s s them w i t h h i s d i r e c t o r . I f
t h e r e i s no o b j e c t i o n by t h e d i r e c t o r t o t h e u s e of t h a t i n d i v i d u a l as a
p o t e n t i a l manager, t h e n an i n t e r v i e w i s conducted t o f i n d o u t what h i s
i n t e r e s t is. I f h e is i n t e r e s t e d , t h e n w e w i l l p r o c e s s him through a
management e v a l u a t i o n by our people i n Chicago, p s y c h o l o g i c a l t e s t i n g , e t c .
Not too d i s s i m i l a r t o what w e ' r e t a l k i n g about w i t h t h e new h i r e approach,
e x c e p t t h i s i s new management. I f t h i s a l l pans o u t - w e g e t good feedback
from t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t and t h e c a n d i d a t e i s s t i l l i n t e r e s t e d - w e then p u t
him through t h i s management t r a i n i n g program. It could be t h a t c u r r e n t l y
t h e b e s t c a n d i d a t e f o r a vacancy i s from M i a m i and t h e vacancy i s i n S e a t t l e .
T h i s would mean t e a r i n g up t h e i n d i v i d u a l and h i s f a m i l y , paying f o r t h e
move on t h e p a r t of t h e company t o g e t him o u t t o S e a t t l e and then perhaps
when h e g e t s i n t o t h e j o b d i s c o v e r t h a t it wasn't h i s cup of t e a . H e d i d n ' t
l i k e being a manager.

So, t o avoid t h i s , w e are s t i l l i n t h e p o s i t i o n of u s i n g p r i m a r i l y

people from w i t h i n a d o m i c i l e as much as w e always have, b u t now w e do i t on
t h e b a s i s of a much more s e l e c t i v e , much more d e t a i l e d approach. Not t h a t ,
" I ' v e known J o e a l l my l i f e and w e p l a y golf t o g e t h e r and w e go t o c o c k t a i l
p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r and we're good f r i e n d s and, t h e r e f o r e , I ' d l i k e him t o work
f o r me.'' T h a t ' s how most of i t w a s done i n t h e p a s t , i n c l u d i n g second,
t h i r d , and f o u r t h l e v e l promotions, b u t n o t anymore.

S i n c e 1976 w e have had a s e n i o r v i c e p r e s i d e n t who t a k e s a n e n t i r e l y

d i f f e r e n t approach t o s u c c e s s i o n planning. The ears of p e o p l e who are on
t h a t s u c c e s s i o n p l a n should burn because w e go through a d i s c u s s i o n several
t i m e s a y e a r on t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s . W e d i s c u s s whether they s t a y where t h e y
are i n t h e p l a n , o r whether t h e y are moved o f f .

I ' m v e r y proud of t h e f a c t t h a t w e have a v e r y f i n e system r i g h t now.

I t ' s been i n o p e r a t i o n f o r 3 y e a r s . About 5 y e a r s from now i t w i l l b e what
i t should be. We've g o t i t p r o j e c t e d , on a t e n t a t i v e b a s i s , 5 y e a r s i n t o
t h e f u t u r e t o account f o r a l l of t h e recognized a t t r i t i o n t h a t ' s going t o
take place.

T h a t ' s a l s o how w e program t h e t r a i n i n g through v a r i o u s phases f o r a

manager, based on t h e p o t e n t i a l t h e y ' v e shown.

CAPT. BEACH: May I ask you one more q u e s t i o n on t h a t . When you

come i n t o t h e program as a bottom-level manager, have you a g o a l t h a t
y o u ' r e l o o k i n g a t , o r do t h e y j u s t f l o a t as t h e i r a b i l i t y d i c t a t e s ?

C U T . CARROLL: P e r s o n a l l y t h e y may have a g o a l . The company h a s

no g o a l f o r them a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e , n o t u n t i l t h e y prove themselves.
U n t i l t h e y f i n d o u t i f t h e y r e a l l y want i t , and w e d e c i d e w e want them t o
c o n t i n u e . It i s no bad t h i n g f o r an i n d i v i d u a l t o go back on t h e l i n e .
I know your system i s a r o t a t i o n system. Economically t h e r e ' s n o t t h a t much
of a n advantage i n being a manager and t h e r e ' s no q u e s t i o n t h e working

130
c o n d i t i o n s a r e a l o t worse from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of t i m e o f f . But t h e company
h a s a g o a l f o r them when t h e y s t a r t t o show p o t e n t i a l . T h e y ' l l probably
r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e y ' r e showing t h a t p o t e n t i a l by t h e assignments t h e y ' r e
g i v e n , by t h e t r a i n i n g t h a t t h e y ' r e g i v e n , by t h e c h a l l e n g e s t h a t are
addressed t o them. But t h a t t a k e s t i m e . A t l e a s t i t ' s a formalized manage-
ment program and t h e r e a r e p r o d u c t s of t h a t program i n t h i s room r i g h t now.
Four of them t h a t I c a n see, who have been p a r t of t h a t system s i n c e i t
s t a r t e d , and I t h i n k t h e y ' r e p r e t t y f i n e people. We're doing a l o t b e t t e r
t h a n w e were when w e f i r s t s t a r t e d o u t .

JOAN GALLOS, ASSISTANT TO LEE BOLMAN: You mentioned a problem t h a t

w a s r e f e r r e d t o y e s t e r d a y , namely, t h e growing p o t e n t i a l problem of c o c k p i t
cohesiveness w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of women and also some of t h e m i n o r i t i e s i n
t h e c o c k p i t . I wonder what y o u ' r e doing i n t h e r e d e s i g n i n g of your t r a i n i n g
program t o s u r f a c e and d e a l w i t h some of t h o s e i s s u e s ?

C U T . CARROLL: I d o n ' t know t h a t I can s a y w e a r e a d d r e s s i n g i t

s p e c i f i c a l l y i n t h e area of females and m i n o r i t i e s , because I d o n ' t t h i n k w e
e v e r want t o a d d r e s s i t t h a t way. I t h i n k what w e want t o do i s a d d r e s s i t
as t h e c o c k p i t . Of c o u r s e , w e have t o have t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e
i n g r e d i e n t s t h a t go i n t o i t , b u t w e d o n ' t want a program t h a t s a y s , "For
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r manager, who may have women a s s i g n e d t o him, a d i f f e r e n t
approach t o t h i n g s i s needed."

So f a r , w e have 2 1 women i n our system and 48 o r 49 m i n o r i t i e s . I'll

a d d r e s s myself s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e women. They have done a n o u t s t a n d i n g
j o b . One of t h e women i n our f i r s t class w a s t h e d a u g h t e r of one of our
DC-8 c a p t a i n s . A t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e a b o u t 3,500 o r 3,600 people had been
processed through t h e system and had been t e s t e d , and s h e had scored t h e
second h i g h e s t of t h e 3,500 people.

I h o n e s t l y b e l i e v e t h e y ' r e doing a f i n e j o b . I d o n ' t know how many of

you read t h e book " S h e ' l l Never G e t Off The Ground" w r i t t e n by Rod S e r l i n g ,
but t h a t a d d r e s s e s i t s e l f t o t h e f i r s t woman a i r l i n e p i l o t and a l l of t h e
emotional involvements. The problem i s t h e r e , b u t I d o n ' t t h i n k t o t h e
d e g r e e t h a t i t ' s been magnified. What w e are doing t o a d d r e s s t h e problem,
w i t h o u t being s p e c i f i c about females and m i n o r i t i e s , i s t o a d d r e s s t h e
cohesiveness q u e s t i o n i n t h e c o c k p i t i n g e n e r a l . We t h i n k t h a t as a r e s u l t
of o u r command t r a i n i n g approach and t h e exposure of a l l t h e o t h e r people i n
t h e c o c k p i t t o t h e same i n f o r m a t i o n , a l l have a n awareness of t h e a r e n a i n
which w e o p e r a t e and t h e need f o r c o h e s i v e n e s s . W e have examples of what can
t a k e p l a c e i f w e d o n ' t have t h e c o h e s i v e n e s s i n t h e c o c k p i t . So w e d o n ' t
s p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s t h a t p a r t i c u l a r area, because w e d o n ' t t h i n k w e should.
W e t h i n k w e should t a k e i t as one problem and n o t two.

MR. MURPHY, NASA: You mentioned t h a t you e i t h e r are o r i n t e n d t o

t r a i n i n decisionmaking and problem a n a l y s i s . Is some of t h a t being t a u g h t
now i n classes? Would you s a y a l i t t l e more a b o u t t h a t , what kind of
s u c c e s s do you have?

1.31
 CAPT. CARROLL: W e w i l l a d d r e s s it i n t h e command c o u r s e . I've
been through a c o u r s e on problem a n a l y s i s and d e c i s i o n making. W e w i l l n o t
a d d r e s s i t as i t p e r t a i n s t o t h e g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n of problem a n a l y s i s and
d e c i s i o n making, b u t more s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e t y p e of q u e s t i o n s and problems
t h a t would a r i s e w i t h i n a c o c k p i t .

W e w i l l preserrt some t h e o r y on t h e s u b j e c t , and t h e n w e ' l l go i n t o r o l e

p l a y i n g . To f o r e c a s t t h e s u c c e s s of i t , I t h i n k is something w e are n o t
going t o b e a b l e t o do r i g h t now. I t h i n k w e ' l l b e good a t i t . Not because
i t ' s u s , b u t because of t h e people w e ' r e working w i t h . A l l f l i g h t crew-
members, t h o s e i n t h e c o c k p i t s p e c i f i c a l l y , are a c u t above t h e a v e r a g e , i n
many r e s p e c t s . They a l s o have had a p r e t t y h i g h s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g , s o they
move i n p r e t t y f i n e c i r c l e s and p i c k up a l o t from t h e i r travels and people
w i t h whom they a s s o c i a t e . I t h i n k t h e y ' r e a n e a s i l y t r a i n e d group and
t h e y ' r e hungry f o r t h i s kind of i n f o r m a t i o n . I t h i n k w e should be s u c c e s s f u l .

132
 LEFT SEAT COMMAND OR LEADERSHIP? FLIGHT

LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND RESEARCH AT

NORTH CENTRAL AIRLINES

Capt. G r a m e r C. F o s t e r * and Michael C . Garvey+

I t ' s r e f r e s h i n g t o be w i t h a working group t h a t i s t a l k i n g about t h e how

and what form r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g should t a k e r a t h e r t h a n d e b a t i n g
t h e i s s u e of whether o r n o t i t should t a k e p l a c e . Although w e a t North
C e n t r a l have recognized t h e need f o r f l i g h t l e a d e r s h i p t r a i n i n g f o r some
t i m e , w e found i t a r e a l l y d i f f i c u l t s u b j e c t around which t o write a
d e f i n i t i v e program. I n i t i a l l y w e thought w e could do i t o u r s e l v e s , b u t i t
soon became a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e j o b w a s more d i f f i c u l t than w e had o r i g i n a l l y
thought.

F i r s t w e were hampered by t h e absence of e i t h e r good r e s o u r c e material

o r a good r e l i a b l e d a t a b a s e . Soon w e were s e e k i n g someone from t h e o u t s i d e
who could p r o v i d e t h e i n s i g h t s and p e r s p e c t i v e w e lacked. A t about t h e same
t i m e , and t h i s i s going back about 2 y e a r s , our company had engaged M r . Michael
Garvey, management c o n s u l t a n t , t o p r o v i d e t r a i n i n g f o r a l l management people
a t North C e n t r a l .

The program conducted f o r o u r management p e r s o n n e l had as i t s

f o u n d a t i o n t h e Blake and Muton managerial g r i d a l o n g w i t h i t s r a t h e r sub-
s t a n t i a l d a t a b a s e . For t h o s e of you n o t f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e g r i d i t a l l o w s
you t o measure your own s t y l e , and i t p r o v i d e s you w i t h a q u a n t i t a t i v e
management language a g a i n s t which you can measure any number of management
b e h a v i o r s . Although t h e Blake and Muton management g r i d had n o t been
p r e v i o u s l y u t i l i z e d f o r f l i g h t crews, w e f e l t t h a t t h e similarities between
good c o r p o r a t e and good c o c k p i t management made t h i s instrument a r e a s o n a b l e
c h o i c e . And an a d d i t i o n a l p l u s t o t h i s concept i s t h a t i t p r o v i d e s our
p i l o t s w i t h a management language t h a t i s common w i t h i n o u r company. Mike
Garvey agreed t o h e l p u s p u t t o g e t h e r a program t o h e l p c a p t a i n s improve
t h e i r f l i g h t management s k i l l s .

S i n c e w e intended t o spend q u i t e a sum of money on t h e p r o j e c t , i t w a s

n e c e s s a r y t o s e c u r e a p p r o v a l from o u r p r e s i d e n t , Bud Sweet. I n w r i t i n g t h e
r a t i o n a l e f o r o u r p r o j e c t w e n o t o n l y spoke t o t h e i s s u e of a i r s a f e t y , b u t
w e a l s o argued t h a t a c a p t a i n e x e r c i s e s a t least some c o n t r o l o v e r an
enormous amount of o p e r a t i o n a l money, and, t h e r e f o r e , should b e a f f o r d e d
some management t r a i n i n g i n o r d e r t o b e t t e r manage t h e s e r e s o u r c e s . T h i s
w a s probably t h e c l i n c h e r a l o n g w i t h t h e a i r s a f e t y argument, and o u r p r o j e c t
w a s approved.

With f i n a n c i n g ensured w e s t a r t e d p r e p a r i n g o u r f i r s t seminar. S i n c e

Mike would b e doing t h e b u l k of t h e program, and s i n c e w e d i d need t o d e f i n e
some of t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between b u s i n e s s and c o c k p i t management, w e set up a
" D i r e c t o r , F l i g h t S t a n d a r d s , North C e n t r a l A i r l i n e s .
+ P r e s i d e n t , M. C. Garvey and A s s o c i a t e s , I n c .

133
program designed t o f a m i l i a r i z e Mike w i t h as many a s p e c t s of a p i l o t ' s l i f e
as p o s s i b l e . I n t h e p r o c e s s Mike r o d e e n d l e s s h o u r s of jump seat t i m e and
h e interviewed many, many p i l o t s , b o t h c a p t a i n s and c o p i l o t s . H e a l s o i n t e r -
viewed f l i g h t a t t e n d a n t s , mechanics, s t a t i o n a g e n t s , d i s p a t c h e r s , tower and
ACT p e o p l e , and, I ' m n o t sure, b u t I t h i n k even some FAA people.

When Mike f e l t c o n f i d e n t t h a t h e had a good f e e l f o r t h e c a p t a i n ' s

r o l e , w e p u t t h e f i n i s h i n g touches on our f i r s t p r o d u c t , and i n v i t e d a m i x of
20 check p i l o t s and ALPA r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o a t t e n d . W e chose t h e s e people
f o r our f i r s t program because w e wanted t h e v e r y b e s t and most c o n s t r u c t i v e
c r i t i c i s m w e could g e t . I t ' s worthy t o n o t e h e r e t h a t through t h i s e n t i r e
e f f o r t t h e ALPA group i n our a i r l i n e h a s been most h e l p f u l , even t o t h e p o i n t
of s u p p l y i n g some of t h e manpower n e c e s s a r y f o r our s u c c e s s .

Our f i r s t program w a s a 2-day a f f a i r , and, a s w e have a t t h e end of

each seminar, w e asked t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t o f i l l o u t a n anonymous c r i t i q u e
form. F u r t h e r , w e asked t h a t w i t h i n 30 days they w r i t e a n unsigned l e t t e r
t e l l i n g u s what w a s r i g h t and what w a s wrong a b o u t t h e program.

Now, w e a l l know how d i f f i c u l t i t i s t o g e t a p i l o t t o t a k e pen i n hand,

b u t t h e r e s p o n s e t o t h e r e q u e s t w a s tremendous. Out of 20 p a r t i c i p a n t s w e
r e c e i v e d 1 5 follow-up l e t t e r s , many of them t y p e w r i t t e n pages running t h r e e
o r f o u r pages i n l e n g t h . They c o n t a i n e d b o t h p r a i s e and c o n s t r u c t i v e
c r i t i c i s m . A l l b u t one thought t h e c o u r s e should b e continued and even
expanded. There w a s one c r i t i c i s m t h a t d i d have kind of a common t h r e a d i n
many of t h e l e t t e r s , and t h a t w a s t h a t w e h a d n ' t been p r e s c r i p t i v e enough
for specific situations.

I n o u r subsequent seminars w e expanded t o a v e r y f u l l 3-day program,

w i t h t h e t h i r d day s p e n t a t t h e a i r r o u t e t r a f f i c c o n t r o l c e n t e r , and t h e n
w e went back i n t o t h e classroom f o r a s e s s i o n t h a t w e have dubbed s i t u a t i o n
analysis.

To d a t e w e have conducted f o u r seminars f o r a t o t a l of about 80 p i l o t s .

The r e s p o n s e h a s been good t o a l l f o u r programs, b u t w e s t i l l have r e q u e s t s
f o r more p r e s c r i p t i v e s o l u t i o n s . W e hope i n t h e f u t u r e t o s a t i s f y t h e s e
r e q u e s t s i n a c o u p l e of ways. F i r s t , w e are planning a home s t u d y c o u r s e
f o r upgrading c a p t a i n s . That w i l l cover r e g u l a t i o n s , d i s p a t c h r e q u i r e m e n t s ,
a l t e r n a t e weather requirements and t h e l i k e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , w e are d e s i g n i n g
a n i n i t i a l l i n e assignment s y l l a b u s , which is designed t o r e i n f o r c e t h e home
s t u d y program, and, a l s o t o expose t h e new c a p t a i n t o a more organized l i n e
check.

W e want t o f o l l o w t h i s w i t h o u r r e s t r u c t u r e d command seminar. N o t i c e

t h a t I have changed from f l i g h t l e a d e r s h i p seminars t o command seminar.

A p o e t of some-renown once asked w h a t ' s i n a name, and I w a s amused and

i n t e r e s t e d i n Bob Helmreich's s t o r y a b o u t t h e Merchant Marine c a p t a i n s who
r e s e n t e d being c a l l e d shipboard managers. T h i s s t r u c k a f a m i l i a r chord
because o u r e a r l y e f f o r t s b o r e t h e t i t l e F l i g h t Leadership Seminar. There

134
w a s a vague f e e l i n g among t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t h a t t h i s somehow undercut t h e i r
command, so our more r e c e n t program w a s c a l l e d Command Seminar. The p i l o t s
seemed t o l i k e t h i s b e t t e r . We d o n ' t p r e t e n d t o have a l l t h e answers,
indeed w e d o n ' t have a l l t h e quest,ions. But w e are t r y i n g , and w e are im-
proving, and I t h i n k t h a t ' s what c o u n t s .

I have given you a q u i c k overview of o u r e f f o r t s . Now I ' d l i k e t o t u r n

i t over t o Mike Garvey f o r h i s u s u a l f i n e j o b of e x p l a i n i n g t h e d e t a i l s of
both t h i s program and some of t h e r e s e a r c h programs which w e have on t h e
horizon .
(Mike Garvey)

You're going t o g e t p e r i l o u s l y few d e t a i l s i n t h e approximately 1 0 o r

1 5 minutes remaining t o g i v e them t o you. I thought what I ' d do i s p r o v i d e
as much i n f o r m a t i o n as I could t o you about what w e cover w i t h t h e c a p t a i n s ,
how w e go about i t , and g i v e you my o b s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t t h e r e s u l t s .

G e n e r a l l y , you have g o t t e n feedback from G r a m e r t h a t w e do g e t v e r y

good e v a l u a t i o n s , b u t I ' d l i k e t o g i v e you my o b s e r v a t i o n s about what seems
t o go smoothly and where t h e s t i c k i n g p o i n t s remain.

F i r s t , I ' m going t o g i v e you a n overview of t h e management g r i d

concept. Those of you who have been exposed t o i t b e f o r e can bear w i t h m e ,
and t h o s e of you who h a v e n ' t may want t o t a k e some n o t e s . Then I ' d l i k e t o
d i s c u s s how w e a p p l y t h a t concept i n o u r work w i t h c a p t a i n s . And t h a t w i l l
a l s o t i e back i n t o some of t h e d a t a - g a t h e r i n g r e s u l t s of i n t e r v i e w i n g t h e
work groups who work w i t h t h e c a p t a i n s : f i r s t o f f i c e r s , f l i g h t a t t e n d a n t s ,
and s o on.

And t h e n I ' d l i k e t o go back through t h e rest of t h e o u t l i n e w e have

l a i d o u t h e r e ( t a b l e 1) and touch on how we approached t h e areas of com-
municat i o n s .

Later on i n t h e second day w e s w i t c h over t o some d e p a r t m e n t a l r e p r e -

s e n t a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and d i s c u s s i o n s .

I ' d l i k e t o now s t a r t w i t h t h e g r i d ( f i g . 1). Blake and Muton were

s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t s w i t h t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Texas who s t u d i e d t h e management
l i t e r a t u r e about t h e b e s t ways t o manage v e r s u s t h e n o t s o good ways t o
manage. They t r i e d t o o r g a n i z e t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n i n t o some kind of a system
t h a t would make i t more s e n s i b l e and more e a s i l y u s a b l e by t h e management
audience. They reduced t h e s t u d y of management t o two o v e r a l l dimensions.

One dimension w a s t h e concern f o r p r o d u c t i o n o r o u t p u t , t h a t a manager

might have. They decided t h i s concern w a s n o t something t h a t would be
e i t h e r a l l p r e s e n t o r a l l a b s e n t . It can be r e p r e s e n t e d on some kind of a
scale, and t h e y a p p l i e d t h e numbers of 1 through 9 t o r e p r e s e n t t h a t scale.
Nine, i n t h i s case, would r e p r e s e n t a manager's maximum concern, a v e r y h i g h
concern, f o r o u t p u t . One, would r e p r e s e n t t h e a b s o l u t e minimum concern t h a t

13 5
a manager could have f o r g e t t i n g t h e j o b done. By t h e way, l e t ' s c o n s i d e r
o u t p u t and p r o d u c t i o n concerns i n a v e r y broad way. It could be amount of
i n f o r m a t i o n , q u a l i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n , q u a l i t y of d e c i s i o n s , s o l u t i o n s t o
problems, o r i t could b e manufacturing care.

The o t h e r dimension t h e y focused on w a s t h e dimension of concern f o r

people. T h i s w a s n o t p e o p l e i n t h e s e n s e of p a s s e n g e r s , f o r example; t h i s
w a s people i n t h e s e n s e of employees; o r t h o s e r e s o u r c e s that are a v a i l a b l e
t o u s t o accomplish whatever o u t p u t i t i s t h a t w e need t o o b t a i n .

Once a g a i n t h e y p u t t h i s on a scale from low t o h i g h , 1 t o 9 , such t h a t ,

when they completed t h i s g r i d , they wound up w i t h 9 x 9 o r 81 d i f f e r e n t ways
i n which a manager can combine h i s o r h e r concern f o r o u t p u t and f o r people.
Each one of t h e s e d i f f e r e n t ways r e p r e s e n t s a d i f f e r e n t s t y l e o r d i f f e r e n t
approach t o d e a l i n g w i t h people t o accomplish r e s u l t s .

Rather t h a n f o c u s i n g on 81 s t y l e s , t h e y focused on t h e f i v e major

s t y l e s . The f i r s t one w a s c a l l e d 9-1, which r e p r e s e n t s a v e r y o u t p u t -
o r i e n t e d s t y l e , w i t h minimum concern f o r people. An o p p o s i t e s o r t of s t y l e
i s 1-9, minimum concern f o r o u t p u t , a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a maximum concern f o r
people. The s t y l e somewhere i n t h e middle is c a l l e d 5-5 which r e p r e s e n t s a
moderate concern f o r o u t p u t counterbalanced by a n e q u a l l y moderate concern
f o r people. So he m a i n t a i n s some kind of a b a l a n c e w i t h people who a r e h i s
r e s o u r c e s f o r g e t t i n g t h i n g s accomplished.

There i s a l s o a s t y l e c a l l e d 1-1 which i s kind of a do-nothing s t y l e of

management. Blake and Muton d e s c r i b e t h i s a s a n impoverished s t y l e of
management w i t h o n l y minimum concern f o r o u t p u t and p e o p l e . T h e r e ' s more of
t h a t t h a n you might imagine.

W e u s u a l l y s t a r t o u t i n a class s i t u a t i o n w i t h t h e c a p t a i n s laughing
and j o k i n g about how r i d i c u l o u s t h a t is. A f t e r l o o k i n g a t some of t h e
b e h a v i o r s of 1-1 t h e y s a y , "Oh y e s . There are some people who g i v e you a
c o l d v a c a n t stare," which may mean, "My God, i t ' s me."

The l a s t s t y l e t h a t t h e y f o c u s on i s a s t y l e c a l l e d 9-9, maximum concern

f o r o u t p u t and a t t h e s a m e t i m e maximum concern f o r people involved i n
h e l p i n g t o g e t t h a t o u t p u t . These d i f f e r e n t s t y l e s r e p r e s e n t d i f f e r e n t
c a t e g o r i e s of b e h a v i o r s .

You could l a b e l t h i s s t y l e of behavior (9-1) as a u t o c r a t i c . You could

l a b e l t h i s s t y l e (1-9) a real n i c e guy, c o u n t r y c l u b approach. Treat people
n i c e and p r o d u c t i o n w i l l take care of i t s e l f .

T h i s s t y l e (5-5) on t h e o t h e r hand, i s r e p r e s e n t e d by a n awful l o t of

compromise. There i s n o t h i n g wrong w i t h compromise p e r s e , b u t i n t h i s
s t y l e w e ' r e t a l k i n g a b o u t a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e amount of compromise.
Acceptable, perhaps, o n l y mediocre r e s u l t s ; j u s t something t o w a f f l e through
the situation.

136
 And, of c o u r s e , h e r e (1-l),as I ' v e a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d , a n a p p r o p r i a t e
l a b e l might be "Impoverished Management "

Of c o u r s e , h e r e (9-9) t h e l a b e l t h a t we'd a p p l y probably i s team

manager. Not always i n t e a m meetings, b u t t r y i n g t o manage t h e
t h e most o u t p u t and t h e b e s t q u a l i t y o u t p u t p o s s i b l e , y e t keep t h e r e s o u r c e s
motivated and p a r t of t h e t o t a l t e a m e f f o r t .

Now, i n u s i n g t h i s concept w i t h t h e c a p t a i n s w e go through a b i t more

d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n t h a n I j u s t gave you. They a l s o have a number of pre-
r e a d i n g a r t i c l e s and o t h e r p i e c e s , as much as w e could f i n d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e .
Then w e q u i c k l y s h i f t from t h e management g r i d concept p e r se and i n t o i t s
application t o captains.

W e begin w i t h t h e s t y l e 9-1 and I a s k t h e c a p t a i n s t o h e l p m e b u i l d a

p r o f i l e of t h e k i n d s of b e h a v i o r s t h e y would e x p e c t from a 9-1 c a p t a i n . They
have no t r o u b l e a t a l l i n doing t h i s .

And a f t e r w e b u i l d a behavior p r o f i l e of 9-1, w e s w i t c h t o 1-9, and once

a g a i n I a s k t h e c a p t a i n s t o d e s c r i b e t h e k i n d s of b e h a v i o r s t h e y would e x p e c t .
Once a g a i n , no real d i f f i c u l t y i n b u i l d i n g up dozens and dozens of d e s c r i p -
t i o n s of t h e k i n d s of b e h a v i o r s t h a t t h e s e s t y l e s of c a p t a i n s would u s e i n
i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h members of t h e c r e w .

W e t h e n do a v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g t h i n g , I t h i n k . W e s w i t c h from t h e
b e h a v i o r s themselves t o t r y i n g t o e x p l o r e what might be t h e consequences,
t h e r e a c t i o n s on t h e p a r t of d i f f e r e n t work groups, f i r s t o f f i c e r s , f l i g h t
a t t e n d a n t s , c o n t r o l l e r s , and s o on. Once w e can r e a s o n a b l y a g r e e on what
t h e normal r e a c t i o n s might be, w e f o c u s on what might b e some of t h e
p o t e n t i a l consequences of t h e s e r e a c t i o n s a l o n g f o u r d i f f e r e n t dimensions.

One of t h e s e i s t h e m o t i v a t i o n of o t h e r p e r s o n s a f f e c t e d by t h i s s t y p e
of management. The n e x t i s economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h a t i s , t o t a l Republic
A i r l i n e s s u c c e s s . The t h i r d i s passenger service, t h e q u a l i t y of passenger
s e r v i c e . And, of c o u r s e , t h e f o u r t h i s f l i g h t s a f e t y .

I ' d l i k e t o show you t h e format t h a t w e u s e w i t h t h e c a p t a i n s ( f i g . 2 ) .

Based on o u r p r i o r d i s c u s s i o n of t h e g r i d , w e a s k them t o i d e n t i f y t h e
t y p i c a l b e h a v i o r s of each s t y l e of c a p t a i n . Then, f o c u s i n g on d i f f e r e n t
work groups a t d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s i n t i m e , f o r example, t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r , w e
f o c u s on what might b e t h e t y p i c a l f i r s t o f f i c e r ' s r e a c t i o n t o t h e s e k i n d s
of c a p t a i n s ' b e h a v i o r s . Once t h e t y p i c a l r e a c t i o n s are developed, w e
e x p l o r e some of t h e p o t e n t i a l consequences a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e s e r e a c t i o n s .
The c a p t a i n s d i d a v e r y good j o b as a t o t a l group. A s you might b e l i e v e ,
t h e r e w e r e d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e group members, b u t t h e y d i d a v e r y good
j o b i n l a y i n g o u t t h e b e h a v i o r s , r e a c t i o n s , and p o t e n t i a l consequences.

Here are some examples of t y p i c a l b e h a v i o r s of a 9-1 c a p t a i n toward a

f i r s t officer: Authoritarian, d i c t a t o r i a l -
commands w i t h o u t f i r s t o f f i c e r

137
i n p u t , perhaps even a t a l l - no d e l e g a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y -
may do a l l
t a k e o f f s and l a n d i n g s himself o r h e r s e l f - minimal communication, and t h e
communication t h a t i s used i s v e r y one-way - over-reacts i n a very punitive
way t o m i s t a k e s t h a t might b e made - v e r y picky about t h e k i n d s of d e c i s i o n s
and c h o i c e s t h a t t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r would make when h e ' s f l y i n g t h e l e g .

The t y p i c a l r e a c t i o n s t h a t you might e x p e c t from f i r s t o f f i c e r s , a l s o ,

as t h e s e c a p t a i n s r e l a t e d i t : f i r s t o f f i c e r would normally become d e f e n s i v e ,
clam up - become i n t i m i d a t e d- avoid c o n f r o n t i n g t h e c a p t a i n o r c l a r i f y i n g
i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e c a p t a i n - would have f e a r of f a i l u r e , h i g h t e n s i o n ,
and s o on.

Some of t h e p o t e n t i a l consequences are obvious: more m i s t a k e s - more

v i o l a t i o n s - s a f e t y would be compromised -
passenger s e r v i c e would tend t o
go down - may b e a l i t t l e s t r o n g e r ego commitment t o a wrong d e c i s i o n t h a n
a c a p t a i n should have. For example: f l y i n g through rough weather without
t u r n i n g around because h e had made t h a t d e c i s i o n i n i t i a l l y .

One of t h e t h i n g s t h a t i s kind of i n t e r e s t i n g i s t h a t many f i r s t

o f f i c e r s spend a l o t of t i m e t r y i n g t o g e t o u t of c e r t a i n c a p t a i n ' s block
of t i m e . There i s a l o t of f a t i g u e f o r a f i r s t o f f i c e r working w i t h t h i s
kind of a c a p t a i n , and a much h i g h e r e x p e r i e n c e of stress.

Now, l e t ' s c o n t r a s t t h o s e k i n d s of b e h a v i o r s and p o t e n t i a l conse-

quences t o t h e k i n d s of r e s p o n s e s w e g o t when w e looked a t o t h e r s t y l e s of
management. The c a p t a i n s , a f t e r t h e f i r s t one o r two workshops, took t h e
f i v e major s t y l e s of t h e g r i d and s h o r t e n e d up t h e p r o c e s s f o r u s . They
s a i d , "We're v e r y concerned about t h e 9-1 s t y l e , v e r y concerned about t h e 9-9
s t y l e , b u t w e a l r e a d y have a p h r a s e i n o u r i n d u s t r y t h a t f i t s some combina-
t i o n of 1-9, 1-1, and 5-5, and f o r u s i t ' s complacency, t h e complacent
captain."

So from t h a t p o i n t forward w e began t o lump t h o s e t h r e e s t y l e s t o g e t h e r

and i t saved u s some t i m e i n t h e workshops.

The k i n d s of b e h a v i o r s t h e y would expect from a complacent c a p t a i n :

i n s u b t l e ways t o a l l o w t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r t o begin t o run t h e f l i g h t -
a l l o w him t o i n i t i a t e t h e r o u t i n e p r o c e d u r e s - e x h i b i t a l o t of b e h a v i o r s
t o gain approval - a c c e p t s " s p i t - o u t s " from t h e system; p r e t t y much "What-
e v e r t h e system s a y s , t h a t ' s it" - a l l o w s t h e system i t s e l f t o support and
c a r r y t h e m r a t h e r t h a n manage t h e system - very hesitant t o get i n t o a
disagreement w i t h anyone - kind of a l l o w s t h e f l i g h t t o r u n i t s e l f w i t h
minimum c a p t a i n involvement.

'Typical r e a c t i o n s of a f i r s t o f f i c e r : probably a tendency f o r t h e f i r s t

o f f i c e r t o t r y t o t a k e over t h e f l i g h t - c e r t a i n l y would hold t h e c a p t a i n
i n less esteem - might a l s o be sloppy themselves, have no real r e a s o n t o
m a i n t a i n competency and p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m - probably less pre-planning -
t h e r e might b e a l o t of c o n f u s i o n around t h e area of communications and
a u t h o r i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p s , q u e s t i o n s of who's r e a l l y i n c h a r g e and s o on.
 L e t m e j u s t q u i c k l y r u n through some of t h e b e h a v i o r s t h e c a p t a i n s
would expect of a 9-9 c a p t a i n : t h e 9-9 c a p t a i n i n behaving toward a f i r s t
o f f i c e r would more o f t e n s e e k i n p u t on o p e r a t i o n a l problems and feedback on
h i s own problem s o l v i n g and d e c i s i o n s - would l i s t e n more t o t h e f i r s t
o f f i c e r - would t e a c h and coach t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r - would l e a r n from
m i s t a k e s - would h e l p t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r l e a r n from m i s t a k e s - would be
constructively critical - would a b s o l u t e l y demand q u a l i t y performance -
would be v e r y assertive, etc.

Reactions of t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r t o t h e s e k i n d s of b e h a v i o r s , as you might

guess: v e r y motivated - f o r t h e most p a r t , v e r y s u p p o r t i v e of t h e
c a p t a i n ' s d e c i s i o n s - probably p r o v i d e b e t t e r q u a l i t y work - b e t t e r f l i g h t
planning - more a t t e n t i o n t o d e t a i l - more a l e r t - f e e l more c h a l l e n g e d -
q u i c k e r t o i n t e r v e n e w i t h t h e c a p t a i n t o c l a r i f y misunderstood d a t a , e t c .

Very p o s i t i v e p o t e n t i a l consequences i n terms of f l i g h t s a f e t y , motiva-

t i o n , passenger s e r v i c e , and s o on.

So w e u s e t h e s e k i n d s of d e s c r i p t i o n s of b e h a v i o r s , r e a c t i o n s , and
p o t e n t i a l consequences t o g e t a c r o s s t o t h e c a p t a i n s t h e e f f e c t s of d i f f e r e n t
approaches t o managing t h e l e a d e r s h i p s i t u a t i o n and t o d e a l i n g w i t h
problems i n t h e c o c k p i t and between t h e c o c k p i t and t h e c a b i n crew. I t
u s u a l l y goes v e r y w e l l .

W e t h e n make a r a t h e r a b r u p t s h i f t from a p p l i c a t i o n s of management

s t y l e t o communications. W e t e a c h communications t o t h e c a p t a i n s by u s i n g a
l e a r n i n g s i m u l a t i o n . T h i s i s n o t t o b e confused w i t h w h a t you u s u a l l y c a l l a
s i m u l a t i o n w i t h i n your i n d u s t r y . It is a communications e x e r c i s e which
t a k e s about a n hour f o r t h e c a p t a i n s t o go through. Then w e spend about a n
hour a n a l y z i n g what took p l a c e d u r i n g t h a t e x e r c i s e i n t e r m s of good and poor
communications p r a c t i c e s .

W e t r y t o make t h i s a p e r s o n a l l e a r n i n g e x p e r i e n c e f o r t h e c a p t a i n s .
We cover a l o t of l e a r n i n g areas, one-way and two-way communications, t h e
e f f e c t of t a k i n g a p u b l i c s t a n c e on a d e c i s i o n , and t h e d i f f i c u l t y of
changing your mind and moving on t o a n o t h e r p o s i t i o n .

W e c o n t i n u e w i t h communications t h e n e x t morning from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of

t h e i n t e r g r o u p a s p e c t of communications, c o o p e r a t i o n , and r e l a t i o n s h i p s . We
have a n a d d i t i o n a l s i m u l a t i o n w e p u t t h e c a p t a i n s through, which f o c u s e s on
t h e k i n d s of r e l a t i o n s h i p d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t arise when members of d i f f e r e n t
employee and o c c u p a t i o n a l groups must i n t e r a c t f o r some j o i n t purpose. A s a
r e s u l t of t h e l e a r n i n g from t h i s s i m u l a t i o n , w e a n a l y z e ways t o improve
e f f e c t i v e n e s s between c a p t a i n s and f i r s t o f f i c e r s , c a p t a i n s and f l i g h t
a t t e n d a n t s , c a p t a i n s and maintenance, and even c a p t a i n s and a i r - t r a f f i c
controllers.

That a f t e r n o o n w e spend 2-3 h o u r s touching b r i e f l y on m o t i v a t i o n . One

concept w e p r e s e n t i s c a l l e d t h e s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy, o r t h e Pygmalion
effect .

139
 W e d i s c u s s w i t h t h e c a p t a i n s how t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s of t h e o t h e r people
w i t h whom they i n t e r a c t can, over a period of t i m e , begin t o b u i l d c e r t a i n
b e h a v i o r a l responses from t h e o t h e r person. These behaviors t a k e on t h e form
of f u l f i l l i n g t h e c a p t a i n ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s - t h e r e f o r e , a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g
prophecy.

I n o t h e r words, i f I as a c a p t a i n r e g a r d my f i r s t o f f i c e r as a v e r y
competent, probably s u c c e s s f u l , v e r y a l e r t person, I t r e a t him t h a t way, I
show t h o s e e x p e c t a t i o n s . Some of t h e ways i n which I behave i n doing t h i s
I ' m n o t even aware o f ; i t ' s nonverbal communication. But I communicate t h o s e
high e x p e c t a t i o n s t o t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r , and I consequently, over t i m e , begin
t o g e t t h a t kind of behavior back i n r e t u r n .

C o n t r a s t t h a t w i t h r e g a r d i n g my f i r s t o f f i c e r as v e r y , v e r y j u n i o r i n
a l l r e s p e c t s , probably n o t too competent, probably prone t o f a i l u r e and
making m i s t a k e s . I communicate t h a t , and, as you might e x p e c t , t h a t ' s t h e
kind of performance I r e c e i v e from t h a t f i r s t o f f i c e r . Before t h i s p o r t i o n
of t h e workshop ends w e spend a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of t i m e t r y i n g t o p u t a l l
t h a t w e have done up t o t h a t p o i n t i n some kind of p e r s p e c t i v e . W e go back
t o t h e g r i d concept and r e i n f o r c e t h e 9-9 s t y l e . However, w e t r y t o g e t
away from t h e mystique of saying t h a t you have t o change your whole s t y l e ,
t h a t i f y o u ' r e a 9-1 c a p t a i n you have t o move completely t o 9-9. That's
q u i t e a l e a p , and probably i n v o l v e s more change t h a t most of u s are capable
of accomplishing.

So w e t r y t o g e t away from t h a t . We t r y t o g e t t h e c a p t a i n t o t h i n k of
t h i s g r i d framework and t h e r e l a t e d d a t a as a p e r s p e c t i v e t o u s e t o improve
h i s judgments and p r e d i c t i o n s about what kind of behavior i s a p p r o p r i a t e i n
a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n w i t h f i r s t o f f i c e r s , f l i g h t a t t e n d a n t s , and o t h e r s . W e
t r y t o g e t t h e c a p t a i n t o t h i n k i n t e r m s of a d j u s t i n g b e h a v i o r s , r a t h e r than
g e t t i n g t o o focused i n on changing o v e r a l l s t y l e .

Probably t h e r e a r e v e r y few 9-9 managers i n t h e world, and s i m i l a r l y

v e r y few 9-9 c a p t a i n s , although I t h i n k w e have been b l e s s e d i n having some
i n our classes.

Now I ' d l i k e t o t u r n t h i s back t o G r a m e r t o q u i c k l y d i s c u s s t h e

remainder of t h e program. Then, b e f o r e w e break i n t o q u e s t i o n s and
answers, w e ' l l q u i c k l y d e s c r i b e t h e r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t coming up.

(Capt. F o s t e r )

There i s one t h i n g I ' d l i k e t o j u s t touch on b r i e f l y . An i n t e r e s t i n g

o u t p u t of t h e Blake and Muton r e s e a r c h w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e managerial g r i d i s
t h a t something l i k e 65% o r 70% of a l l of t h e managers i n t h e major corpora-
t i o n s i n America f i t t h e 5-5 s t y l e . I t ' s i n t e r e s t i n g f o r u s t o t r y t o see
where t h e f l i g h t crews f i t . Wherever t h e y f i t , w e show them t h a t t h e y d o n ' t

140
have t o s t a y i n t h a t s t y l e , t h a t a l t h o u g h t h a t may be t h e i r b a s i c management
s t y l e , t h e y can s l i p o u t of i t i f t h e y r e c o g n i z e t h e s i t u a t i o n , and manage i n
a b e t t e r way.

A f t e r Mike does s t y l e s i n p e r s p e c t i v e , a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from F l i g h t

C o n t r o l , perhaps t h e D i r e c t o r of F l i g h t C o n t r o l , comes i n and speaks w i t h t h e
c a p t a i n s about v a r i o u s d i s p a t c h problems and d i s p a t c h requirements. That
g e t s t o b e a kind of two-way program i n which t h e r e ' s a good d e a l of g i v e and
take.

W e a l s o i n c l u d e Maintenance Control and t h e F l i g h t Attendant group.

What we've t r i e d t o do i s i n c l u d e t h e p e o p l e w i t h whom t h e c a p t a i n

i n t e r a c t s t h e most, d i s c o u n t i n g t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r , of c o u r s e . So t h a t t h e
c a p t a i n g e t s a b e t t e r f e e l f o r some of t h e problems t h a t t h e y have, and
where t h e y ' r e coming from, and t h e r e is a good f l o w of i d e a s and i n t e r c h a n g e
of i d e a s .

The t h i r d day is s p e n t a t t h e Minneapolis A i r Route T r a f f i c C o n t r o l

C e n t e r , t h a t i s , 4 hours of i t are.

The t r a f f i c c o n t r o l people have worked o u t a real s l i c k program f o r u s ;

w e are v e r y happy w i t h i t . It a c t u a l l y starts a t 7:30 A.M. and f i n i s h e s a t
12:OO P.M., and d u r i n g t h i s t i m e w e i n t r o d u c e them t o b a s i c a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l
procedures.

You know how a p i l o t t y p i c a l l y f e e l s h e could c o n t r o l t r a f f i c b e t t e r

t h a n anyone else. Well, w e manage t o g e t the p i l o t i n t o t h e ATC s i m u l a t o r ,
which h a s become q u o t e popular, and w e s h o o t a l o t of problems t o him. It
g i v e s t h e p i l o t a l i t t l e p e r s p e c t i v e on t h e a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l l e r ' s
problems. They w i l l t y p i c a l l y p u t North C e n t r a l and a n o t h e r carrier neck
and neck and, of c o u r s e , t h e p i l o t i n t h e c o n t r o l l e r p o s i t i o n h a s no
d i f f i c u l t y s a y i n g United do a 360 and North C e n t r a l c o n t i n u e on.

But t h e y f i n d o u t t h a t d o e s n ' t always work. Then t h e p i l o t s move on t o

c o n t r o l p o s i t i o n s on a one-to-one b a s i s w i t h t r a f f i c c o n t r o l l e r s . They p l u g
i n t o a s e c t o r and a c t u a l l y s i t t h e r e and o b s e r v e t h e c o n t r o l l e r work
t r a f f i c , and d i s c u s s t h e p r o b l e m a t t e n d a n t w i t h working t h e t r a f f i c . I t ' s
been a v e r y popular p a r t of o u r seminar.

W e r e t u r n i n t h e a f t e r n o o n t o t h e classroom once a g a i n and h e r e a g a i n

w e t r y t o a d d r e s s some of t h e p r e v i o u s c r i t i c i s m t h a t w e h a v e n ' t spoken t o ,
p r e s c r i p t i v e means of s o l v i n g problems. For t h i s w e have a s e s s i o n t h a t is
called situation analysis.

T h i s i s a program t h a t Sherm Cornel1 and I have been doing, i n which w e

o u t l i n e a g i v e n problem, and t h e n , t a k i n g t h e s e 20 c a p t a i n s who have had
t h i s exposure t o some new i d e a s and c o n c e p t s , w e l e t them p r e s e n t t h e i r
i d e a s on how t h e y would s o l v e t h e problem. W e g e t some q u i t e i n t e r e s t i n g
interact ions there.

141
 Then a t t h e end w e have t h e w r i t t e n e v a l u a t i o n , which i s done i n t h e
anonymous form, followed by t h e l e t t e r . I t h i n k t h a t p r e t t y w e l l c o v e r s i t .

A t t h i s t i m e w e might throw i t open f o r q u e s t i o n s .

DISCUSSION

CAPT. PERKINSON, United A i r l i n e s : How l o n g have you been u s i n g

t h i s t e c h n i q u e a t North C e n t r a l ?

CAPT. FOSTER: W e s t a r t e d about 2 y e a r s ago. We've done a t o t a l

of 4 seminars. W e , l i k e most people i n t h e i n d u s t r y , are impeded by p i l o t
s h o r t a g e s and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of people f o r t h e programs. So w e have o n l y
been a b l e t o do 4 t o d a t e , o r a t o t a l of 80 people. W e do have a u t h o r i z a t i o n
t o c o n t i n u e . We p l a n t o p i c k up w i t h a n improved f o r m a t , and p l a n t o make i t
an ongo i n g t h i n g .
CAPT. TRAUB, United A i r l i n e s : You mentioned i n t h e s i t u a t i o n
a n a l y s i s e s s i o n you p r e s e n t a problem.
s Could you g i v e u s an example o f ' t h e
t y p e of problem?

CAPT. FOSTER: W e might p r e s e n t a c a p t a i n w i t h a r e c a l c i t r a n t

f i r s t o f f i c e r , a f i r s t o f f i c e r who i s n ' t performing up t o s t a n d a r d s , some-
t h i n g l i k e t h a t . Then w e go around t h e room and l e t each one i n d i c a t e how he
t h i n k s he might handle t h e s i t u a t i o n . W e might do t h a t , w e might have a n ill
p a s s e n g e r , any number of t h i n g s .

DR. HELMREICH: I w a s j u s t c u r i o u s t o h e a r a l i t t l e b i t about where

y o u ' r e going w i t h t h e r e s e a r c h and e v a l u a t i o n s ?

MR. GARVEY: I ' l l t r y t o g i v e you a c o u p l e of q u i c k thoughts on

t h a t . L e t m e t e l l you about our m o t i v a t i o n f i r s t . One of our c o n s t a n t
concerns about o u r workshop i s w i t h t h e i s s u e of d a t a . W e d o n ' t f e e l r i g h t
now l i k e w e have a n a d e q u a t e d a t a b a s e of i n f o r m a t i o n t o p r o v i d e t o t h e s e
c a p t a i n s a b o u t t h e i r s p e c i f i c b e h a v i o r s and, t h e r e f o r e , i t makes i t d i f f i c u l t
t o t a l k about u n d e r s t a n d i n g and changing t h o s e b e h a v i o r s . W e do i t as b e s t
w e c a n g i v e n a model l i k e t h i s , and i t goes v e r y w e l l f o r w h a t i t i s .

W e would l o v e t o b e a b l e t o p r o v i d e t h e c a p t a i n s coming i n t o o u r work-

shop w i t h a p r o f i l e of how h e o r s h e t h i n k s , approaches s i t u a t i o n s , and
behaves. Then w e could g i v e them b e t t e r h e l p i n a d j u s t i n g t h e i r b e h a v i o r s .

The o t h e r concern w e have about our workshop is t h a t w e are u n a b l e t o

do any kind of v a l i d pre-post t e s t i n g on j u s t how much e f f e c t o u r workshop
has. Does i t h e l p ? Does i t h u r t ? Does i t do a n y t h i n g a t a l l ?

142
 I f w e had a n i n s t r u m e n t t h a t would f u l f i l l t h e i n i t i a l d a t a need, and
t h e n could b e r e a d m i n i s t e r e d 3 , 6 , o r 8 months l a t e r t o g i v e both t h e c a p t a i n
and us some feedback as t o how t h a t program a f f e c t e d t h a t p e r s o n , i t would b e
v e r y h e l p f u l t o a l l concerned.

That l e d us t o t h e r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t . W e have begun t o f o r m u l a t e a

r e s e a r c h e f f o r t w i t h a c o n s u l t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n i n Plymouth, Michigan by t h e
name of Human S y n e r g i s t i c s . They have over 10 y r s of h i s t o r y i n u s i n g t h e i r
i n s t r u m e n t w i t h t h e g e n e r a l management p o p u l a t i o n . They have developed
norms on over 100,000 managers throughout t h e c o u n t r y . These p r o f i l e s and
norms a r e n o t based on p s y c h o l o g i c a l i l l n e s s ; i n s t e a d they a r e based on
p s y c h o l o g i c a l h e a l t h . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e s e i n s t r u m e n t s measure t h e t h i n k i n g
p a t t e r n s of t h e s e managers and how t h e s e p a t t e r n s c a u s e d i f f e r e n t b e h a v i o r s .
We'd l i k e t o u s e t h e s e i n s t r u m e n t s on a group of p i l o t s and see if w e
c o u l d n ' t develop norms t h a t would be p r e d i c t i v e of more e f f e c t i v e and less
e f f e c t i v e c a p t a i n s . Of c o u r s e , w e a l s o have t o develop c r i t e r i a f o r
defining captain effectiveness.

We d o n ' t y e t know i f t h e i n s t r u m e n t s w i l l work on t h e p i l o t group, as

they have w i t h t h e g e n e r a l management p o p u l a t i o n . But we're hoping t o
answer t h a t q u e s t i o n w i t h t h e r e s e a r c h r e s u l t s . The c u r r e n t p r o p o s a l i s t o
work w i t h a sample of 25 c a p t a i n s and 25 f i r s t o f f i c e r s from North C e n t r a l ,
and an a d d i t i o n a l 25 c a p t a i n s and 25 f i r s t o f f i c e r s from Southern Airways.

I f w e wind up w i t h a good s e t of p r o f i l e s , t h e i n i t i a l u s e of t h e s e
d a t a would b e f o r t h e development of c a p t a i n s i n o u r workshops. The
i n d i v i d u a l d a t a would go s t r a i g h t t o t h e p i l o t and n o t t o t h e company,
thereby p r o t e c t i n g t h e p i l o t ' s anonymity. Later i t could be used as a
s e l e c t i o n t o o l as w e l l .

C U T . CRUMP, United A i r l i n e s : Were you going t o make any a t t e m p t

t o select t h o s e c a p t a i n s and f i r s t o f f i c e r s f o r any q u a l i t y o r w e r e you j u s t
going t o t a k e an o v e r a l l , . , .
MR. GARVEY: The i n i t i a l a t t e m p t w a s planned t o b e random. The
d i f f i c u l t y w i l l b e i n coming t o an agreement on t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a n
e f f e c t i v e c a p t a i n , t h e same i s s u e w e d i s c u s s e d a c o u p l e of t i m e s y e s t e r d a y .

CAF'T. CRUMP: I j u s t wanted t o comment t h a t somewhere downstream

y o u ' r e going t o have t o e v a l u a t e what t y p e of a performer he i s on t h e
a i r l i n e i n o r d e r t o v a l i d a t e your t e s t i n g .

MR. GARVEY: Oh, s u r e , t h a t w i l l have t o happen a s a companion

issue.

MR. MANSFIELD: You s a y t h e c o n t i n u i n g e f f o r t w i l l s t i l l be a

random c h o i c e ?

MR. GARVEY: No, t h e continued e f f o r t would n o t . T h i s i s j u s t

i n i t i a l r e s e a r c h t o see whether t h e s e i n s t r u m e n t s w i l l b e p r e d i c t i v e of a

143
p i l o t ' s behavior o r n o t , as t h e y have been w i t h managers. We may need a
completely d i f f e r e n t i n s t r u m e n t . W e may j u s t need t o develop e v a l u a t i o n
c r i t e r i a . W e d o n ' t know.

MR. MANSFIELD, American A i r l i n e s : Maybe I d i d n ' t s t a t e t h e

q u e s t i o n c l e a r l y . How w i l l you choose t h e c a n d i d a t e s t h a t are going t o
p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e f u t u r e i n t h i s program?

MR. GARVEY: T h a t ' s v o l u n t a r y . A t t h i s p o i n t , w e are encouraging

c a p t a i n s t o come i n t o t h e workshop. Pseudo v o l u n t e e r i n g ? G r a m e r , I t h i n k
you'd b e t t e r f i e l d t h a t .

CAPT. FOSTER: The workshop h a s been f u l l pay and c r e d i t ; w e

h a v e n ' t asked anybody t o do i t on a f r e e b i e b a s i s . We are paying them f l i g h t
pay l o s s , f u l l expenses, h o t e l b i l l s , t h e whole b i t . W e t r y t o make i t a
p r e s t i g i o u s t h i n g , and w e do p r e t t y w e l l a s s i g n t h e people t o i t . We've
had a l i t t l e grumbling by some of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , wondering why they w e r e
s e l e c t e d , and t h i n k i n g t h a t perhaps we had them i n mind f o r some r e a s o n o r
o t h e r . And sometimes w e d i d . But u s u a l l y they went away s a y i n g , "Although
I had some r e s e r v a t i o n s and wondered why you s e l e c t e d m e , I ' m v e r y happy
t h a t I came, and I g o t a l o t o u t of it.'' We have had some r e a l l y good
feedback.

MR. FELL, FAA: A r e t h e r e any p l a n s f o r Republic t o expand t h i s

i n t o a r e c u r r e n t t y p e c o u r s e o r update t y p e ?

CAPT. FOSTER: No, n o t c u r r e n t l y . Although i t ' s obvious t h a t a

program of t h i s kind i s a n i d e a l f o u n d a t i o n , and t h a t t h e r e should be some-
t h i n g b u i l t upon i t i n an ongoing way, I t h i n k t h a t something i n t h e way of
a f u l l - m i s s i o n s i m u l a t i o n might be a n i d e a l method of doing i t i n a n ongoing
way.

CAPT. TURLINGTON, Pan American: A r e you a t p r e s e n t j u s t i n v i t i n g

c a p t a i n s t o t h i s program?

CAPT. FOSTER: For t h e most p a r t , yes. W e have t a k e n some v e r y

s e n i o r f i r s t o f f i c e r s who have n o t y e t flown a s c a p t a i n , b u t who are a b o u t t o
f l y c a p t a i n , and had them i n t h e program. I f t h e r e are no o t h e r q u e s t i o n s ,
I ' d l i k e t o e x p r e s s our a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r your a t t e n t i o n ; t h a n k s a g a i n .

144
 TABLE 1.- CONMON LEADERSHIP WORKSHOP OUTLINE

0 INTRODUCTION 0 COMMUNICATIONS 0 MINNEAPOLIS

0 MANAGEMENT AIR ROUTE
STYLES 0 MANAGEMENT STYLES
MORN1NG TRAFFIC
I N PERSPECTIVE CONTROL
CENTER VISIT
LUNCH LUNCH LUNCH

0 CAPTAIN'S 0 MOTIVATION 0 SITUATION

BEHAVIOR 0 DEPARTMENTAL ANALYSIS
0 CREW REACTIONS PR ESENTATIONS
AFT ER NOON 0 EVALUATION
0 POTENTIAL - MAINTENANCE
CONSEQUENCES CONTROL
0 ADJOURN
- FLIGHT A'ITENDANTS
- FLIGHT CONTROL
DINNER

0 COMMUNICATIONS 0 COCKTAILS AND

DINNER
EVENI NG

145
 HIGH

CONCERN
FOR
PEOPLE

LOW
LOW HIGH
CONCERN FOR OUTPUT

Figure 1.- Management g r i d .

CAPTAIN

CAPTAlN'S POTENTIAL
GROUP BEHAVIORS R EACTlONS CONSEQUENCES

Figure 2 . - Reactions and consequences of d i f f e r e n t management s t y l e s .

146
 SESSION 3

THE WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

TRAINING - NASA/INDUSTRY WORKING GROUP MEETINGS

CAPT. A. A. FRINK, CHAIRMAN
Pan American World Airways

INTRODUCTION

GROUP REPORTS ( i n o r d e r of p r e s e n t a t i o n )

Recurrent T r a i n i n g and Line Operation

Group 5, Capt. Ron Sessa, Allegheny A i r l i n e s , Chairman

S e l e c t i o n and I n i t i a l T r a i n i n g
Group 1, Capt. R. E. Crump, United A i r l i n e s , Chairman

Recurrent T r a i n i n g and Line Operation

Group 2 , R. C. Houston, United A i r l i n e s , Chairman

T r a n s i t i o n and Upgrade T r a i n i n g
Group 3 , Capt. L. F. J . Holdstock, B r i t i s h Airways, Chairman

S e l e c t i o n and I n i t i a l T r a i n i n g
Group 4 , Capt. Berton Beach, E a s t e r n A i r l i n e s , Chairman

T r a n s i t i o n and Upgrade Trainirig

Group 6 , Lawson White, IATA, Chairman

PANEL DISCUSSION

147
 THE WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

TRAINING - NASA/INDUSTRY WORKING GROUP MEETINGS

INTRODUCTION

DR. LAUBER: A t t h i s t i m e I would l i k e t o t u r n t h e proceedings of

t h i s workshop over t o C a p t . A 1 F r i n k , Vice P r e s i d e n t of F l i g h t Standards f o r
Pan Am, t o g i v e you some words of a d v i c e .

CAPT. FRINK:
*
I d o n ' t presume t o g i v e you words of a d v i c e r e a l l y ,
I t h i n k everybody h e r e knows what t h e y ' r e doing, and we've seen a m p l e
evidence of t h a t f o r t h e l a s t day and a h a l f .

John i n d i c a t e d t h a t he had done something r i g h t w i t h some of t h e

s p e a k e r s t h a t w e have heard h e r e , and I ' d l i k e t o s a y t h i s i s one of t h e most
o u t s t a n d i n g groups of s p e a k e r s a t a meeting such as t h i s t h a t i t has ever
been my p l e a s u r e t o l i s t e n t o . They've been t o t h e p o i n t and i n t e r e s t i n g i n
t h e i r p r e s e n t a t i o n s , and I f u l l y a g r e e w i t h John t h a t w e owe them a d e b t of
gratitude.

I want t o quote from t h e recommendations made by t h e N a t i o n a l Transporta-

t i o n S a f e t y Board about t h e a c c i d e n t t h a t occurred i n P o r t l a n d some t i m e ago.

The complexity of c u r r e n t a i r carrier f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s

imposes c o n s i d e r a b l e demands on f l i g h t crewmembers, par-
t i c u l a r l y under h i g h workload c o n d i t i o n s . Moreover, a c c i d e n t
i n v e s t i g a t i o n e x p e r i e n c e , a s mentioned above, i n d i c a t e s t h a t
c a p t a i n s have f a i l e d , sometimes a t c r i t i c a l p o i n t s i n t h e f l i g h t ,
t o t a k e advantage of important r e s o u r c e s t h a t are a v a i l a b l e t o
them.

These r e s o u r c e s have included n o t o n l y a v a i l a b l e equipment

and s u p p o r t i n g services, b u t a l s o t h e a s s i s t a n c e of t h e co-
o r d i n a t e d crew. F i r s t and second o f f i c e r s have n o t i n some
c a s e s a d e q u a t e l y monitored f l i g h t p r o g r e s s , p o s i t i v e l y communica-
ted t h e i r observations, or a c t i v e l y a s s i s t e d the captain i n the
management of t h e f l i g h t . T h e r e f o r e , t h e S a f e t y Board b e l i e v e s
t h a t p r e s e n t e f f o r t s t o f o s t e r improved f l i g h t deck management
should b e expanded t o i n c l u d e a l l a i r carrier o p e r a t o r s .

Accordingly, t h e N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board
recommends t h a t t h e F e d e r a l A v i a t i o n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s s u e a n
o p e r a t i o n s b u l l e t i n t o a l l a i r carrier o p e r a t i o n s i n s p e c t o r s

*Pan American World Airways.

14 9
 d i r e c t i n g them t o u r g e t h e i r a s s i g n e d o p e r a t o r s t o i n s u r e t h a t
t h e i r f l i g h t crews are i n d o c t r i n a t e d i n t h e p r i n c i p l e s of f l i g h t
deck r e s o u r c e management, w i t h p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on t h e m e r i t s
of p a r t i c i p a t i v e management f o r c a p t a i n s and a s s e r t i v e n e s s
t r a i n i n g f o r o t h e r c o c k p i t crewmembers.

Gentlemen, f l i g h t deck r e s o u r c e management i s a recognized need. I

t h i n k w e a l l know t h a t need. Everything t h a t we've heard f o r t h e p a s t day
and a h a l f h a s i n d i c a t e d t h i s . A s Gramer mentioned j u s t a few seconds ago,
i t ' s v e r y rewarding t o see t h a t we're n o t d i s c u s s i n g t h i s as a p o s s i b i l i t y
b u t as a f a c t , and how t o a c h i e v e i t . Accidents t h a t w e have s t u d i e d , t h e
e f f i c i e n c y t h a t w e need, t h e complacency t h a t w e have observed over t h e
years, a l l have v e r y d e f i n i t e l y i n d i c a t e d a need f o r t h i s kind of t r a i n i n g
and f o r a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s s u b j e c t .

One of t h e t h i n g s t h a t I t h i n k w e have t o guard a g a i n s t i s that: w e a l l

t h i n k we're doing p r e t t y w e l l . Some of u s , as we've seen h e r e i n t h e l a s t
day and a h a l f , have i n d i v i d u a l programs t h a t w e t h i n k are f a c i n g some of t h e
i s s u e s t h a t we're t a l k i n g a b o u t .

Some of u s have been f o r t u n a t e enough t o go f o r y e a r s without an

a c c i d e n t , s o w e t h i n k w e ' r e doing p r e t t y w e l l . Some of u s have been chosen
a s managers without t h e b e n e f i t of some of t h o s e g r e a t programs t h a t Ed
C a r r o l l r e f e r r e d t o a w h i l e ago. But I t h i n k , Ed, i n t h i s room t h e r e a r e a
l o t of people who, d e s p i t e t h a t r a t h e r random s e l e c t i o n , are s t i l l w i t h i t ,
and I t h i n k doing a p r e t t y good j o b . But w e do r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e r e i s a
r e a l need f o r some of t h e p r o c e d u r e s t h a t Ed o u t l i n e d .

I t h i n k t h a t w e a l l have t o p u t a s i d e f o r t h e moment our p r i d e , our ego

a s t o what w e have a l l done, and t o a c c e p t as a primary premise t h a t w e c a n
improve. Each and every a i r l i n e h e r e and each person h e r e can improve, and
w e should go i n t o our seminars w i t h t h a t thought uppermost i n our minds.

W e have heard some s p e c i f i c i d e a s , w e have heard some g e n e r a l i t i e s , w e

have heard t h e o r i e s v e r y w e l l e x p r e s s e d . Bob Helmreich t a l k e d a b o u t group
and g o a l o r i e n t a t i o n , and L e e Bolman v e r y c l e a r l y o u t l i n e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s
t h a t w e a r e involved w i t h h e r e today. W e have heard some wonderful pre-
s e n t a t i o n s about s p e c i f i c methods t h a t are being used, and i t ' s now our j o b ,
your j o b , t o determine how and when - w e a l r e a d y know why - t o apply t h e s e
ideas.

So w e should, i n t h e s e groups t h a t w e are about t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n , be

v e r y f r e e i n coming up w i t h any new i d e a s , v e r y f r e e w i t h t h o u g h t s of when
t o u s e them.

W e should n o t b e r e s t r i c t e d t o p a r t i c u l a r methods of t r a i n i n g t h a t
happen t o be f a m i l i a r p a t t e r n s t h a t w e are u s i n g now. L e t ' s open up our
minds. Maybe t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n s of t r a i n i n g , d i f f e r e n t t i m e s t h e y
should be done. Maybe i t ' s a c o n t i n u i n g p r o c e s s . L e t ' s open up o u r minds
t o new t h o u g h t s .

150
 How much of i t i s t r a i n i n g r e a l l y ? How much of i t i s t h e development
of t h e h a b i t p a t t e r n s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l , and how do w e go about d e a l i n g w i t h
t h a t ? How much of i t i s procedural? D o w e accomplish some of t h i s i n our
manuals? Do w e accomplish some of t h i s through our communications w i t h i n our
a i r l i n e s , as separate from t r a i n i n g ? And how much of i t do w e accomplish i n
t h e s e l e c t i o n process and t h e weeding-out p r o c e s s i t s e l f ?

So t h e s e a r e t h e q u e s t i o n s t h a t w e should f r e e l y f a c e . I ' m going t o

suggest t h a t when w e a l l break up and go i n t o our s m a l l working groups, t h e
f i r s t t h i n g w e should a l l do i s t o have a n open mind, t o l i s t e n t o t h e o t h e r
f e l l o w ' s thoughts, and t o p o s s i b l y expand and comment on t h a t .

I know t h a t each person h e r e h a s done a l o t of t h i n k i n g about t h i s .

Each person r e p r e s e n t s a n a i r l i n e o r a group t h a t has done some t h i n g s t h a t
y o u ' r e probably proud o f . Good. Express t h a t , e x p l a i n i t , but d o n ' t home i n
on t h a t so much t h a t t h e p r o g r e s s of your group i s held'back. This i s a
c h a l l e n g e t o t h e chairmen. The chairmen are going t o have t o see t o i t t h a t
no one person w i t h a n axe t o g r i n d - and I guess t h a t ' s everyone i n t h i s
room - no one of u s dominates t h e groups t o t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o r t h e d i l u t i o n
of t h e e f f e c t of t h e o t h e r s i n t h e group.

Try t o t h i n k of a l l t h e means of a t t a i n i n g t h e g o a l s t h a t w e ' r e s h o o t i n g

f o r . And above a l l , w e a r e challenged w i t h coming up w i t h recommendations.
The recommendation s e c t i o n of t h i s working group should be s p e c i f i c . The
group should a t t e m p t o r i g i n a l l y t o o r g a n i z e t h e i r method of approach t o t h e s e
problems w i t h t h e s p e c i f i c g o a l i n mind of coming up w i t h recommendations.

B e g e n e r a l a t f i r s t , d i s c u s s concepts a t f i r s t , and then come down t o

recommendations. W e a r e going t o have t o come up w i t h a r e p o r t from each of
t h e working groups tomorrow morning, and i n t h o s e r e p o r t s w e should have
s p e c i f i c recommendations. (A handout, " I n s t r u c t i o n s f o r Working Groups," is
shown i n appendix C . )

I t h i n k w e have a v e r y b i g j o b c u t o u t f o r o u r s e l v e s i n t h e s e working
groups. The s p e a k e r s have s e t a v e r y , v e r y f i n e example f o r t h i s seminar,
and I hope t h a t t h e working groups w i l l c a r r y on t h a t w e l l . The chairmen
have a b i g c h a l l e n g e ahead, s o l e t ' s go t o i t .

151
 RECURRENT TRAINING AND LINE OPERATION

Capt. Ron Sessa

*
Chairman, Group 5

CAPT. FRINK ( I n t r o d u c t o r y comments): Today i s r e p o r t c a r d day f o r

a l l of u s . We're going t o f i n d o u t j u s t e x a c t l y how w e l l w e d i d y e s t e r d a y i n
our d i s c u s s i o n s . It w a s v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g t o m e t o move among t h e groups from
t h r e e t o f o u r o ' c l o c k y e s t e r d a y a f t e r n o o n and see t h e h o r r i b l y worried f a c e s
on a l l of t h e chairmen i n t h o s e rooms, and t h e n t o v i s i t w i t h them t h i s
morning and see them a l l s m i l i n g and happy. So something happened between
f o u r o ' c l o c k y e s t e r d a y a f t e r n o o n and e a r l y t h i s morning t o make them f e e l
comfortable. It had t o b e t h a t you a l l c o n t r i b u t e d enough t o g i v e them a
r e p o r t t o be proud o f .

N o r m l l y I would l i k e t o have gone through our working groups i n t h e

o r d e r of t h e p r o g r e s s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o h i s career, b u t because Ron Sessa
has t o leave, we're going t o b r e a k t h e r o u t i n e and s t a r t o f f w i t h Ron's
r e p o r t . W e a r e f u r t h e r going t o b r e a k t h e r o u t i n e t o have some d i s c u s s i o n
on h i s committee's r e p o r t b e f o r e h e leaves, s o t h a t h e ' l l b e a b l e t o answer
any q u e s t i o n s t h a t any of you have. Ron w a s t h e chairman of Working Group 5,
Recurrent T r a i n i n g and Line Operations.

CAPT. SESSA: Thanks, A l . The approach of o u r committee w a s t o

e s t a b l i s h s p e c i f i c recommendations toward implementation of r e s o u r c e
management t r a i n i n g t o t h e f l i g h t - d e c k crewmembers i n r e c u r r e n t ground
s c h o o l , s i m u l a t o r , and l i n e o p e r a t i o n s . Our o b j e c t i v e w a s t o e s t a b l i s h
i n t r o d u c t o r y methods t h a t would e d u c a t e crew members t o t h e importance of
r e s o u r c e management and t h a t would m o t i v a t e them t o develop and t o u t i l i z e
t h o s e s k i l l s i n t h e i r day-to-day o p e r a t i o n s . We f e l t t h a t ground s c h o o l
i n t r o d u c t i o n t o r e s o u r c e management, p r i o r t o p r a c t i c e i n t h e s i m u l a t o r and
on t h e l i n e , w a s t h e b e s t method f o r i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h i s t y p e of t r a i n i n g
a t t h e r e c u r r e n t ground s c h o o l l e v e l .

Our s p e c i f i c recommendations f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of r e s o u r c e management

t r a i n i n g i n r e c u r r e n t ground s c h o o l , s i m u l a t o r , and l i n e o p e r a t i o n s w a s ,
f i r s t , t o e s t a b l i s h a program f o r proper t r a i n i n g of i n s t r u c t o r s . T h i s
t r a i n i n g could b e accomplished e i t h e r inhouse, o u t s i d e , o r i n s i d e w i t h
o u t s i d e a s s i s t a n c e , depending on t h e i n d i v i d u a l a i r l i n e ' s a v a i l a b l e
resources.

I n a d d i t i o n t o comprehensive r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g p e r se f o r
t h e i n s t r u c t o r s , w e f e l t t h a t t h e t r a i n i n g should a l s o stress s i t u a t i o n
a n a l y s i s , t h e importance of t e c h n i c a l competence i n a p p l y i n g r e s o u r c e manage-
ment t e c h n i q u e s , and t h a t comprehensive t r a i n i n g i n o b s e r v a t i o n s k i l l s should
be i n c l u d e d .

*Allegheny Airlines.

152
 Secondly, w e f e l t t h a t a n a u d i o v i s u a l program should be developed f o r
p r e s e n t a t i o n a t r e c u r r e n t ground s c h o o l , w i t h c o u r s e c o n t e n t f o c u s i n g on t h e
f o l l o w i n g areas: (1) l e a d e r s h i p and a u t h o r i t y ; (2) c r e w c o o r d i n a t i o n and
communications; (3) awareness, and t h e e f f e c t of f a t i g u e , stress, boredom
and work l o a d on t h e l e v e l of awareness; and ( 4 ) planning, w i t h emphasis on
f l e x i b i l i t y and t h e a b i l i t y t o change p l a n s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s i t u a t i o n .

W e would t h e n recommend development of LOFT s c e n a r i o s o r o t h e r s i m u l a t o r

s i t u a t i o n s t h a t would s t i m u l a t e crew i n t e r a c t i o n and r e q u i r e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
of l e a r n e d r e s o u r c e management t e c h n i q u e s . The r e s u l t of t h i s e x e r c i s e
would b e s u b j e c t t o e v a l u a t i o n , c r i t i q u e and a d d i t i o n a l t r a i n i n g when
n e c e s s a r y . Some p o s s i b l e enhancements t h a t w e r e suggested t o t h i s phase of
t h e t r a i n i n g included v i d e o t a p i n g of p e r t i n e n t p o r t i o n s of t h e s e s s i o n o r a t
l e a s t a u d i o t a p i n g i n o r d e r t o improve r e c a l l of r e s u l t s f o r d e b r i e f i n g and
critiques.

The t h i r d s t e p a t t h i s l e v e l f o r t h e p i l o t would occur on t h e f i r s t l i n e

check f o l l o w i n g t h e completion of h i s ground s c h o o l and s i m u l a t o r s e s s i o n .
T h i s would a l l o w s u f f i c i e n t t i m e f o r exposure t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s b e f o r e a c t u a l
o n l i n e e v a l u a t i o n w a s performed. W e f e l t - I t h i n k most of u s d i d -
that
t h i s would i n c r e a s e t h e p i l o t ' s i n t e r e s t i n t h e program i f s t a r t e d o u t
g r a d u a l l y w i t h o u t a c o n n o t a t i o n of t e s t i n g immediately.

An a d d i t i o n a l recommendation i s f o r t h e development of a LOFT p l a n n i n g

committee t o o f f e r recommendations t o i n d u s t r y r e g a r d i n g LOFT s c e n a r i o s . The
i n t e n t would be t o u t i l i z e t h e e x p e r i e n c e of carriers a l r e a d y u s i n g LOFT,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o management t r a i n i n g o r r e s o u r c e management
training.

W e had some r e s e a r c h recommendations. I n any new system, t h e r e w i l l be

q u e s t i o n s about t h e b e s t way t o proceed t o i n s u r e a good product w i t h a h i g h
d o l l a r r e t u r n . W e i n i n d u s t r y c a n pose q u e s t i o n s a b o u t methods and
t e c h n i q u e s , b u t are n o t r e a l l y i n a good p o s i t i o n t o do e x t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h
s t u d i e s t o answer t h e s e q u e s t i o n s . W e would s e e k a s s i s t a n c e from a p p r o p r i a t e
a g e n c i e s o u t s i d e o u r companies t o a d d r e s s t h e s e i s s u e s .

Areas i n which i t a p p e a r s w e should s e e k s u p p o r t i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g :

d e t e r m i n i n g t h e c o n t e n t of LOFT-type t r a i n i n g programs t h a t w i l l develop t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e b e h a v i o r s f o r e v a l u a t i o n and t r a i n i n g ; developing t e c h n i q u e s f o r
t r a i n i n g and e x p e r t i n s t r u c t o r s who can p e r c e i v e and e v a l u a t e r e s o u r c e
management behavior; p r e p a r i n g g u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e p l a n n i n g and development of
LOFT-type t r a i n i n g s c e n a r i o s ; d e a l i n g w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n s of f i d e l i t y of
t h e s c e n a r i o and c o n t e n t of t h e t r a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n ; and e s t a b l i s h i n g s c e n a r i o
s t r u c t u r e , l e n g t h of t r a i n i n g s e s s i o n , e x t e n t of t i m e impression, how a
s i m u l a t i o n c a n b e promoted, and t h e e f f e c t s of r e a l i t y i n t r a i n i n g as
p e r t a i n s t o real f l i g h t .

Some o t h e r q u e s t i o n s were a l s o r a i s e d . How does one t e a c h r e s o u r c e

management t r a i n i n g once r e s o u r c e management i s recognized as d e f i c i e n t ?
And t h e whole q u e s t i o n of c r i t e r i a , e v a l u a t i o n , feedback of r e s u l t s f o r
program e v a l u a t i o n and m o d i f i c a t i o n -
how c a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e behavior b e

153
modified u s i n g behavior m o d i f i c a t i o n t e c h n i q u e s t h a t are a c c e p t a b l e and
e f f i c i e n t ? W e f e l t t h a t a l o t of t h e s e q u e s t i o n s and s t u d i e s should be
conducted by a n o u t s i d e agency.

I n summary, o u r o b j e c t i v e w a s t o i n t r o d u c e r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g
u t i l i z i n g t h e b a s i c s , w i t h t h e i n t e n t t o enhance t h e program t o a h i g h e r
l e v e l i n subsequent y e a r s . A t t h e r e c u r r e n t l e v e l , every p i l o t would a t
l e a s t have been exposed t o t h e b a s i c s i n one y e a r . W e d i d n ' t f e e l , a s a
committee, t h a t w e had s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o i d e n t i f y what t h a t a d d i t i o n a l
t r a i n i n g o r ongoing t r a i n i n g beyond 1 y e a r should i n c l u d e , o r make any
recommendations a l o n g t h o s e l i n e s . But i t should b e married t o t h e o t h e r
t r a i n i n g programs t h a t would b e i n s t i t u t e d by an a i r l i n e i n t h e r e s o u r c e
management t r a i n i n g . T h a t ' s t h e end of my r e p o r t . A r e t h e r e any q u e s t i o n s ?

CAPT. CARROLL, United A i r l i n e s : Speaking of t h e review d u r i n g

r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g of t h e p r i n c i p l e s involved i n r e s o u r c e management, I have
two q u e s t i o n s . How deep d i d you f e e l t h a t you wanted t o go a t t h a t
p a r t i c u l a r t i m e ? And as a r e s u l t of t h a t d e p t h , how long would you b e
keeping t h e i n d i v i d u a l t h e r e j u s t f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p o r t i o n of r e c u r r e n t
training?

CAPT. SESSA: W e f e l t t h a t a t t h e ground s c h o o l l e v e l t h e r e would

b e no e v a l u a t i o n , t h a t i t would b e a p r e s e n t a t i o n , an a u d i o v i s u a l package,
l a s t i n g 1 o r 2 hours. And t h a t t h a t would i n c l u d e t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t I
mentioned - a u t h o r i t y , l e a d e r s h i p , crew c o o r d i n a t i o n and communications,
awareness, and planning. It should n o t be made any more comprehensive t h a n
t h a t . But i n i t i a l exposure t o t h i s t y p e t r a i n i n g should be r e s t r i c t e d t o
b a s i c s . W e would have i t p r e s e n t e d by a t r a i n e d i n s t r u c t o r . H e would be
t h e r e t o t u r n a machine on and o f f , answer q u e s t i o n s , and b e kind of a
salesman, i f you w i l l , t o g e t t h e b a l l r o l l i n g , g e t a p o s i t i v e r e s p o n s e t o
t h i s t y p e t r a i n i n g , and have i t a c c e p t e d by t h e p i l o t s .

C U T . CARROLL: You u s e t h e word i n i t i a l l y . I ' m t h i n k i n g of t h i s

i n t h e c o n t e x t of r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g , meaning t h a t every year w e would be
doing t h i s f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l . Do 1: h e a r you s a y i n g t h a t w e would b e doing
e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same t y p e review, perhaps r e v i s e d s l i g h t l y , each y e a r ?

CAPT. SESSA: Revised each y e a r . I n o t h e r words, what w e would

e n v i s i o n i s t h a t t h e n e x t y e a r t h e program would b e enhanced, brought t o a
h i g h e r l e v e l because everyone would a l r e a d y have been exposed t o i t . A t
t h e level w e w e r e asked t o make o u r recommendations, w e f e l t t h a t i t w a s
i m p o r t a n t , i f t h i s w e r e p u t i n t o p r a c t i c e a n d w e s t a r t e d tomorrow, t h a t i n
a y e a r we'd have every p i l o t exposed a t a c e r t a i n l e v e l , everybody would
have t h e b a s i c s . And t h a t t h e n you could expand upon t h a t i n year-to-year
r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g , and a l s o i n s p e c i a l i z e d programs f o r upgrade and
t r a n s i ti o n .

CAPT. TRAUB, United A i r l i n e s : Would t h e LOFT s c e n a r i o t h e n f o l l o w

t h i s aud i o v i s u a l ?

154
 CAPT. SESSA: Y e s . We e n v i s i o n t h e LOFT s c e n a r i o following t h e
a u d i o v i s u a l , where now t h e p i l o t could u t i l i z e some of t h e s k i l l s he had
l e a r n e d i n t h e a u d i o v i s u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n a l o n g w i t h some b r i e f i n g and so on,
and then a c r i t i q u e a f t e r w a r d s . The s u g g e s t i o n , I t h i n k where carriers were
a b l e t o do i t , i s t o v i d e o t a p e . Video t a p i n g i s good because you see t h e
whole s i t u a t i o n . I t h i n k w e a l l a g r e e t h a t i t would be a n i d e a l s i t u a t i o n t o
video t a p e i t , and t o s o r t of a l l o w t h e p i l o t t o observe himself.

And w e f e l t , t o go on w i t h your q u e s t i o n , t h a t he should n o t be evaluated

i n h i s own world, t h a t i s , t h e c o c k p i t o n - l i n e o p e r a t i o n , u n t i l he had
adequate exposure t o t h e p r i n c i p l e s , some t r a i n i n g i n i t , and p r i o r evalua-
t i o n on a simulated b a s i s f o r t h e most p a r t .

CAPT. CARROLL: This v i d e o t a p i n g t h a t you r e f e r t o , Ron, would i t

be of each i n d i v i d u a l s e s s i o n ? O r would i t be of a s e s s i o n t o be used as a
t r a i n i n g v e h i c l e f o r o t h e r s ? I n e i t h e r case, i n t h e v i d e o t a p i n g , how d i d
you e n v i s i o n w e would avoid t h e d i s t r a c t i o n of t h e video t a p i n g , o r t h e
p e r s o n a l embarrassment i n u s i n g t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s e s s i o n f o r o t h e r s , t o see i f
t h e r e were obvious i n d i c a t i o n s of l a c k of r e s o u r c e management?

CAPT. SESSA: Well, w e hadn't envisioned u s i n g i t beyond t h a t

s e s s i o n f o r only t h e p a r t i c i p a n t t o observe. We r e a l l y d i d n ' t g e t i n t o some
of t h o s e o t h e r i s s u e s . We d i d n ' t r e a l l y a d d r e s s t h o s e o t h e r i s s u e s except
f o r t h e f a c t t h a t i t would n o t be seen by anyone except t h e p a r t i c i p a n t .

CAPT. CARROLL: So t h a t ' s j u s t done a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s e s s i o n ?

CAPT. SESSA: Right.

CAPT. FRINK: Did you c o n s i d e r a t a l l t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a mock

s e s s i o n , t h a t i s , video t a p e a mock s e s s i o n where m i s t a k e s may be made, b u t
obviously made, because of a l a c k of o r g a n i z a t i o n as a t o o l ?

CAPT. SESSA: Not s p e c i f i c a l l y . W e t a l k e d about some s t a g i n g

during LOFT s c e n a r i o s by one o r more of t h e crewmembers, but w e d i d n ' t
t a l k about c r e a t i n g a mock s i t u a t i o n p e r se.

155
 SELECTION AND I N I T I A L TRAINING

Capt. R. E. Crump
*
Chairman, Group 1

CAPT. FRINK ( I n t r o d u c t o r y comments): A t t h i s p o i n t w e ' l l s t a r t

w i t h Working Group 1 and go r i g h t on through t h e rest of t h e groups. Working
Group 1 w a s headed by Bob Crump, of United A i r l i n e s , w i t h John Lauber as h i s
assistant.

CAPT. CRUMF': Thank you v e r y much. T h i s has been t h e most thought-

provoking, s t i m u l a t i n g , i n f o r m a t i v e , hard working workshop t h a t I have e v e r
a t t e n d e d . Resource management s k i l l s , behavior and p r o f i c i e n c i e s are c r i t i c a l
t o t h e s a f e , e f f i c i e n t o p e r a t i o n of a c a r r i e r ' s a i r c r a f t . We have a l l r e a d
t h e a c c i d e n t r e p o r t s t h a t g r a p h i c a l l y i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t . Working Group 1,
which I r e p r e s e n t , w a s asked t o l o o k a t r e s o u r c e management i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e
earliest events i n an a i r l i n e p i l o t ' s c a r e e r , h i s o r her s e l e c t i o n f o r t h e
p o s i t i o n of aircrewmember, and t h e i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g t h a t f o l l o w s t h a t
selection. L e t m e discuss the selection process f i r s t .

Development of r e s o u r c e management s k i l l s , behavior and p r o f i c i e n c y

b e g i n s t h e f i r s t t i m e a s t u d e n t p i l o t e n t e r s t h e c o c k p i t , whether t h e person
i s aware of i t o r n o t . The p r o c e s s c o n t i n u e s as t r a i n i n g becomes more i n t e n s e
and t e c h n i c a l , and by t h e t i m e t h e i n d i v i d u a l a p p l i e s f o r a p o s i t i o n a s an
a i r l i n e p i l o t , he o r s h e has gained a c e r t a i n l e v e l of p r o f i c i e n c y t h a t i s t h e
r e s u l t of a number of f a c t o r s , among them b a s i c p e r s o n a l i t y , n o n f l y i n g
e d u c a t i o n background, and p i l o t t r a i n i n g . D i f f e r e n t a p p l i c a n t s obviously have
d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of p r o f i c i e n c y i n r e s o u r c e management a t t h i s p o i n t . I n
a d d i t i o n , t h e a p p l i c a n t s have d i f f e r e n t p o t e n t i a l a s f a r a s f u r t h e r develop-
ment of t h e s e c r i t i c a l s k i l l s i s concerned.

A t t h i s p o i n t , w i t h t h e b e n e f i t of what w e have l e a r n e d a t t h i s work-

shop, i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t i t i s important t h a t b o t h t h e l e v e l of r e s o u r c e
management s k i l l a t t h e t i m e of a p p l i c a t i o n and t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r improving
t h e s e s k i l l s t o a l e v e l t h a t w i l l a l l o w a person t o become a s a f e , e f f i c i e n t
aircrewmember, b e measured and e v a l u a t e d i n making c a n d i d a t e s e l e c t i o n .

How are w e doing i n t h i s a r e a ? I c a n ' t speak f o r everyone, b u t from my

e x p e r i e n c e i n h e l p i n g t o develop t h e United A i r l i n e s P i l o t S e l e c t i o n Program
and from what I ' v e heard h e r e , I b e l i e v e we are n o t doing w e l l a t a l l . T h i s
matter i s n o t being a d e q u a t e l y addressed and I t h i n k t h i s h a s s e r i o u s s a f e t y
i m p l i c a t i o n s . There i s a measure of e v a l u a t i o n of p r e s e n t s k i l l s t h a t i s
lumped i n t o our o t h e r c r i t e r i a f o r s e l e c t i o n , b u t i t i s n ' t s p e c i f i c . I n t h e
area of measuring p o t e n t i a l , even less i s b e i n g done.

I n o r d e r t o be a b l e t o e v a l u a t e s k i l l level and p o t e n t i a l , i t i s
n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h a s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t which t o measure t h e a p p l i c a n t s .
Our committee f e e l s s t r o n g l y t h a t no such s t a n d a r d e x i s t s today. Although
w e i n i t i a l l y t r i e d t o d e a l w i t h t h i s i n our d e l i b e r a t i o n , i t q u i c k l y became
*United Airlines.
156
obvious t h a t t h e t a s k w a s beyond u s , i n f a c t , overwhelming. A g r e a t d e a l of
r e s e a r c h needs t o b e done. Who can do t h i s ? The i n d i v i d u a l a i r l i n e s
p o s s i b l y . Perhaps i n d i v i d u a l a i r l i n e s i n t i m e could develop t h e r e s o u r c e s ,
b u t i t would b e t i m e consuming and v e r y expensive.

We b e l i e v e what i s needed i s a n i n d u s t r y approach t o t h e s e twin

problems. It i s our recommendation t h a t t h e i n d u s t r y and NASA j o i n t l y
develop a r e s e a r c h program t o p r o v i d e t h e t o o l s t o measure both r e s o u r c e
management s k i l l s and p o t e n t i a l . W e are s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h i s s t u d y concern
i t s e l f w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g a l i s t of a t t r i b u t e s and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which b e s t
equip a n a i r l i n e p i l o t t o perform a t a h i g h l e v e l of s k i l l i n r e s o u r c e
management; a p r o f i l e of t h e s u c c e s s f u l p i l o t , t h e h i g h a c h i e v e r i n t h i s
area. W e f u r t h e r b e l i e v e t h a t w e should begin by l o o k i n g a t t h e s e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n a broad spectrum of o u r p r e s e n t a i r l i n e p i l o t p o p u l a t i o n ,
from t h e long-haul Boeing 747 p i l o t t o t h e s h o r t - h a u l DC-9 p i l o t . We’believe
t h e p r o f i l e should a l l o w u s t o s c r e e n i n good c a n d i d a t e s , n o t s c r e e n o u t
poor ones.

L e t m e l i s t some of t h e o t h e r concerns w e f e e l should be a d d r e s s e d ; t h e

l i s t i s n o t intended t o be e x h a u s t i v e . F i r s t , t h e r o l e of t h e p i l o t h a s
changed s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n t h e l a s t 10 y e a r s and w i l l c o n t i n u e t o change i n
t h e f u t u r e as w e i n t r o d u c e such a i r c r a f t as t h e Boeing 767. What implica-
t i o n s does t h i s have when i t comes t o e f f e c t i v e p i l o t r e s o u r c e management?
Do w e have t o l o o k f o r d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e s i n p i l o t s i n t h e f u t u r e ? It
seems t h i s may b e p o s s i b l e . It needs t o be s t u d i e d .

Second, as more females a r e e n t e r i n g t h e a i r l i n e p i l o t r a n k s , w e f e e l

t h a t t h i s may i n some way a f f e c t c o c k p i t r e s o u r c e management. W e f e e l t h a t
t h i s should b e a s u b j e c t of a phase of t h e recommended s t u d y .

T h i r d , e d u c a t i o n i s a n important r e s o u r c e t h a t t h e p i l o t a p p l i c a n t
b r i n g s t o h i s j o b . W e recommend t h a t t h e s t u d y l o o k a t what t y p e of
e d u c a t i o n a l background b e s t s u i t s a person f o r a p i l o t career, and more
s p e c i f i c a l l y , what t y p e e d u c a t i o n enhances t h e n a t i v e a b i l i t y p i l o t
t r a i n e e s have i n t h e area of r e s o u r c e management. Our group f e l t t h a t a
4-year c o l l e g e e d u c a t i o n w i t h perhaps e q u a l emphasis on b u s i n e s s , s c i e n c e ,
and t h e humanities might be b e s t , b u t w e would l i k e more guidance i n t h i s
area. From t h i s s t u d y , i t i s hoped, would come a p r o f i l e of t h e p i l o t who
would b e s k i l l e d i n r e s o u r c e management. It would b e up t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l
a i r l i n e t o r e f i n e t h i s p r o f i l e t o s u i t t h e i r own needs. The s t u d y , t o b e
s u c c e s s f u l , would have t o be l o n g i t u d i n a l , would have t o c o n t i n u e over a
long p e r i o d i n o r d e r t o v a l i d a t e t h e s t u d y ; t h i s i s a n important p a r t of our
recommendation. The ALPA would have t o p l a y a v i t a l r o l e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g
t h e s t u d y . Without t h e wholehearted p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e
s t u d y could n o t be s u c c e s s f u l .

Another a s p e c t of p i l o t s e l e c t i o n and r e s o u r c e management concerns t h e

supply of q u a l i f i e d p i l o t s . The pool of experienced a p p l i c a n t s w i l l d r y up.
The s t u d y w e are recommending could g i v e c o l l e g e s w i t h a v i a t i o n programs
guidance i n t h e s e l e c t i o n of h i g h q u a l i t y s t u d e n t s f o r t h e i r programs.

157
Resource management t r a i n i n g and e v a l u a t i o n could become a p a r t of t h e
program. T h i s would p r o v i d e t h e a i r l i n e s w i t h h i g h e r q u a l i t y a p p l i c a n t s .

L e t m e now a d d r e s s t h e second p o r t i o n of our r e p o r t , new-hire t r a i n i n g .

It f o l l o w s t h a t i f w e b e l i e v e i t v i t a l t o t e s t f o r r e s o u r c e management s k i l l s
and p o t e n t i a l i n o u r a p p l i c a n t p o p u l a t i o n and s e l e c t w i t h t h i s i n mind, w e
s t r o n g l y a d v o c a t e management s k i l l s t r a i n i n g d u r i n g new-hire s c h o o l . For t h e
purpose of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , Working Group 1 d e f i n e d i n i t i a l new-hire t r a i n i n g
as c o n s i s t i n g of t h e f o l l o w i n g phases:

F i r s t , b a s i c ground s c h o o l , which c o v e r s FAR, company p o l i c y and

o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s , and o t h e r i t e m s of g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t .

Two, t e c h n i c a l t r a i n i n g equipment s p e c i f i c s and checkout a s e i t h e r

f l i g h t e n g i n e e r o r c o p i l o t , depending on a i r c r a f t t y p e .

Three, s u p e r v i s e d l i n e e x p e r i e n c e o r t h e shotgun phase.

Four, t h e remainder of t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y y e a r . I t h i n k i t ' s important t o

n o t e t h a t w e f e e l t h a t new-hire t r a i n i n g extends i n t o t h e p r o b a t i o n a r y y e a r .

The group t h u s examined t h e requirements f o r t r a i n i n g and, e q u a l l y

i m p o r t a n t , t h e e v a l u a t i o n of r e s o u r c e management s k i l l s i n each of t h e s e
f o u r phases.

Here are our recommendations: Working Group 1 b e l i e v e s t h e c u r r e n t

new-hire t r a i n i n g programs do n o t a d d r e s s r e s o u r c e management i n s u f f i c i e n t
d e p t h . F u r t h e r , w e b e l i e v e t h a t c u r r e n t approaches t o e v a l u a t i n g new-hire
performance do n o t a d e q u a t e l y a d d r e s s r e s o u r c e management s k i l l s .
Accordingly, w e recommend t h a t t h e new-hire i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g program i n -
c o r p o r a t e r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g i n t h e b a s i c ground s c h o o l phase. W e
f u r t h e r recommend t h a t more e f f e c t i v e u s e of t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r e v a l u a t i n g
and t r a i n i n g r e s o u r c e management be made by check-airmen d u r i n g t h e pro-
b a t i o n a r y phase.

We have t h r e e s p e c i f i c t r a i n i n g o b j e c t i v e s : f i r s t , d e f i n i t i o n of crew
members' r o l e s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . W e recommend t h a t new-hire t r a i n e e s
should be thoroughly i n d o c t r i n a t e d i n t h e b a s i c m u l t i - p i l o t o p e r a t i o n . T h i s
must i n c l u d e c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n of each c r e w member's r o l e and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .
The importance of m o n i t o r i n g , cross-checking, and e f f e c t i v e communication
should be s t r e s s e d . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n of c r e w r o l e s should extend beyond t h e
c o c k p i t t o i n c l u d e a d e f i n i t i o n of how c r e w member r o l e s are i n t e g r a t e d w i t h
t h o s e of t h e a i r l i n e management. We recommend t h a t t h e s e r o l e s b e d e f i n e d
i n such a way t h a t t h e new h i r e c l e a r l y sees t h a t he o r s h e must c o n t i n u a l l y
work on improving r e s o u r c e management s k i l l s i n o r d e r t o s u c c e s s f u l l y move
i n t o p o s i t i o n s of i n c r e a s i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .

Two, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e . The new-hire i n i t i a l

t r a i n i n g program should c l e a r l y make t h e p o i n t t h a t f l i g h t - d e c k r e s o u r c e
management i s n o t j u s t t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e c a p t a i n , b u t t h a t a l l crew

158
members have r e s o u r c e s t o manage. To s u c c e s s f u l l y accomplish t h i s , t h e
r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e new-hire f l i g h t e n g i n e e r o r c o p i l o t must be
c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d . These r e s o u r c e s i n c l u d e t h e f o l l o w i n g :

1. Manuals - t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r u s u a l l y h a s access t o manuals t h a t

are n o t a v a i l a b l e t o o t h e r crewmembers.

2 . C h a r t s - a n obvious r e s o u r c e f o r p i l o t s , b u t a l s o important f o r
f l i g h t e n g i n e e r s because they make cross-checking and monitoring more
.
ef f e c t i v e

3 . Log book - t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r may o f t e n b e i n t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n

t o i d e n t i f y o r diagnose t h e problem because of h i s o r h e r knowledge of t h e
mechanical h i s t o r y of t h e a i r c r a f t .

4 . Systeps panels - a resource t h a t is not o f t e n considered, but i t

i s of some importance. Some systems, p r e s s u r i z a t i o n , f o r example, c a n be
operated i n a manual o r automatic mode, t h u s modifying workloads.

5. Other crew members a r e a r e s o u r c e - t h e new h i r e should be t r a i n e d

t o r e c o g n i z e s i t u a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g high workload o r s i t u a t i o n s i n which
c l o s e monitoring o r s u p e r v i s i o n is r e q u i r e d . I n t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s , t h e new
h i r e should be t r a i n e d t o a s k f o r a s s i s t a n c e . For example, a s k i n g t h e
c a p t a i n o r f i r s t o f f i c e r t o v e r i f y t h a t t h e proper f u e l c u t o f f l e v e r has
been s e l e c t e d p r i o r t o s h u t t i n g down a n engine.

6. Other human r e s o u r c e s - t h e s e i n c l u d e t h e c a b i n crew and, v i a

company r a d i o , maintenance, d i s p a t c h , and o t h e r s o u r c e s of a s s i s t a n c e . H i s
o r h e r e x p e r i e n c e as a n airman i s a r e s o u r c e even i f r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l . T h i s
i s p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u a b l e f o r h e l p i n g t h e monitoring and cross-checking
process.

7 . Related t o t h i s i s t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r o r f i r s t
o f f i c e r . P r o f e s s i o n a l airmen should s t r i v e t o e s t a b l i s h c r e d i b i l i t y w i t h
t h e i r f e l l o w crewmembers because t h i s makes f o r more e f f e c t i v e crew co-
o r d i n a t i o n . "I can r e l y on J o e t o do a good j o b , " t r a n s l a t e s i n t o , "I d o n ' t
have t o spend t o o much t i m e monitoring J o e ' s work.''

8. Another v a l u a b l e r e s o u r c e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r i s h i s
unique v a n t a g e p o i n t i n t h e c o c k p i t . The f l i g h t e n g i n e e r i s f r e q u e n t l y i n
t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n t o observe, monitor, and cross-check t h e o t h e r crew-
members.

Now, I want t o t a l k about i n t e r p e r s o n a l and communications s k i l l s . W e

recommend t h a t new h i r e s be given s p e c i f i c t r a i n i n g i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s
and e f f e c t i v e communications. Monitoring and cross-checking can be
e f f e c t i v e o n l y i f t h e r e s u l t s of t h e p r o c e s s a r e e f f e c t i v e l y communicated t o
t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r e c i p i e n t . Furthermore, t h i s t r a i n i n g should i n c l u d e methods
and ways of a d j u s t i n g t o t h e domineering c a p t a i n t h a t t h e new h i r e w i l l
i n e v i t a b l y f l y w i t h sometime i n h i s o r h e r career.

159
 Now, f o r s p e c i f i c t r a i n i n g approaches. Many of t h e o b j e c t i v e s
i d e n t i f i e d above can b e e f f e c t i v e l y and economically m e t t h r o u
c a t i o n of a u d i o v i s u a l programs. It would b e d e s i r a b l e i f a l i b r a r y of s u c h
programs c o u l d be produced and made a v a i l a b l e on a n industry-wide b a s i s .
Other p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n c l u d e r o l e p l a y i n g and o t h e r group t e c h n i q u e s .
Furthermore, t h e check-airman and t h e f l i g h t manager should p l a y a n important
t r a i n i n g and e v a l u a t i o n r o l e d u r i n g t h e s u p e r v i s e d l i n e e x p e r i e n c e and
p r o b a t i o n a r y phases by c l o s e l y o b s e r v i n g t h e r e s o u r c e management performance
of t h e new-hire t r a i n e e and p r o v i d i n g feedback, a d v i c e , and guidance t o h e l p
refine h i s skills.

G e n e r a l l y , r e a d i n g material- f o r example, f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s news-

l e t t e r s and v a r i o u s awareness-generating programs - should a l s o b e made
a v a i l a b l e . S i m u l a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y LOFT, w i l l a l s o p l a y a n important r o l e
i n t h e t r a i n i n g . That b r i n g s my r e p o r t t o a c l o s e .

160
 RECURRENT TRAINING AND LINE OPERATION

R. C. Houston*

Chairman, Group 2

CAPT. FRINK ( I n t r o d u c t o r y comments): Working group 2 w a s headed

by Bob Houston, who i s a l s o involved w i t h r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g and l i n e
o p e r a t i o n s ; Duncan D i e t e r l y , of NASA, w a s h i s c o h o r t .

DR. HOUSTON: W e have some recommendations and c o n c l u s i o n s v e r y

similar t o t h o s e of Ron S e s s a ' s group. W e had a l i v e l y and s p i r i t e d d i s -
c u s s i o n , and covered a l o t of t o p i c s t h a t I ' m n o t going t o b e a b l e t o review
here.

The group f e l t t h a t t h e p a p e r s t h a t we p r e s e n t e d were v e r y h e l p f u l ,

provided a good b a s i s f o r group d i s c u s s i o n , and t h a t t h e concepts p r e s e n t e d
by L e e Bolman, Bob Helmreich, and Mike Garvey had a d e f i n i t e a p p l i c a t i o n t o
a i r l i n e o p e r a t i o n s . I n o u r group, w e had r e a l l y no s e r i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s of
opinion. We d i d r e c o g n i z e t h e n e c e s s a r y d i f f e r e n c e s i n a i r l i n e approaches
because of d i f f e r e n t requirements of r o u t e s t r u c t u r e and volume of t r a i n i n g ,
and f o r t h a t r e a s o n w e d i d n ' t t r y t o g e t s p e c i f i c a s t o e x a c t l y how some
t r a i n i n g should be conducted.

W e d i d have f u l l agreement on t h e need f o r r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g

and t h e urgency f o r i t . A s t h e f i r s t s t e p w e t r i e d t o d e f i n e r e s o u r c e
management. The g e n e r a l d e f i n i t i o n t h a t w e came up w i t h w a s "The optimum
and e f f i c i e n t a l l o c a t i o n of r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e crew, i n c l u d i n g
p e r s o n n e l , f a c i l i t i e s , equipment, and manuals.''

W e decided t h a t t h e need f o r r e s o u r c e management s k i l l c e r t a i n l y i s n o t

l i m i t e d t o t h e c a p t a i n , b u t i t ' s most e v i d e n t as t h e c a p t a i n ' s r e s p o n s i -
b i l i t y , and p a r t i c u l a r l y when a c r e w member upgrades t o c a p t a i n . W e d i d
a g r e e t h a t company management h a s a c e r t a i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o make s u r e t h a t
t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e c r e w a r e a p p r o p r i a t e and proper and n o t un-
n e c e s s a r i l y redundant; t h i s would i n c l u d e manuals and paperwork and approach
c h a r t s . C e r t a i n l y w e want t h e crew members t o u s e t h e i r p r i n t e d r e s o u r c e s ,
b u t i t ' s e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e r e s o u r c e s be p r o p e r l y designed so t h a t they c a n
be e f f e c t i v e l y used.

W e t a l k e d about t h e c r i t i c a l components of r e s o u r c e management, and w e

w i l l t r y t o cover a few of them. Some o v e r l a p w i t h t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t John
Lauber p r e s e n t e d earlier i n t h i s symposium. One of t h e broad headings of
r e s o u r c e management w a s t h e c a p t a i n ' s a u t h o r i t y and c o n t r o l . Under t h a t w e
s u b s c r i b e t o L e e Bolman's t h e o r y of advocacy and i n q u i r y i n which t h e c a p t a i n
should test and s e e k and d i a g n o s e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e . H e
should check c o n f l i c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e advocacy o r group o r i e n t a t i o n
p o i n t of view. H e should b e c o n s i d e r a t e of t h e needs and p o i n t s of view of
t h e f i r s t o f f i c e r and t h e f l i g h t e n g i n e e r . I n t e r m s of t h e management g r i d ,
c e r t a i n l y h e should be p e o p l e o r i e n t e d as w e l l as g o a l o r i e n t e d .
*American Airlines.
161
 The c a p t a i n a g a i n , i n e x e r c i s i n g h i s a u t h o r i t y , should e n s u r e clear
d e l e g a t i o n of r o l e s d u r i n g normal and emergency procedures. I n some of t h e
accidents t h a t w e discussed, a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r w a s t h a t t h e r e w a s not a
c l e a r d e l e g a t i o n of what each crew member w a s supposed t o b e doing,
p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o f l y i n g t h e a i r p l a n e . That d e l e g a t i o n should
n o t o n l y be c l e a r , b u t p o s i t i v e , and t h e c a p t a i n should be a b l e t o depend on
t h e o t h e r crew members t o be a b l e t o accomplish t h e d u t i e s t h a t he has
a s s i g n e d them.

A second area t h a t w e considered as one of t h e c r i t i c a l components w a s

t h e c a p t a i n ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o set p r i o r i t i e s . I n some s i t u a t i o n s , t h e
p r i o r i t i e s a r e obvious; however, t h e y a r e n o t so clear i n o t h e r s , f o r
example, i n s i t u a t i o n s where t h e r e are c o n f l i c t i n g requirements, as i n t h e
c a s e of m u l t i p l e - f a c t o r emergency. The c a p t a i n t h e n must e s t a b l i s h t h e
sequence of e v e n t s ; he must minimize d i s t r a c t i o n s ; e v a l u a t e o t h e r p o s s i b l e
i n f o r m a t i o n ; e l i m i n a t e t h e n o i s e o r t h e i n t e r f e r e n c e of l i g h t s t h a t come on
i n t h e c o c k p i t t h a t are n o t u r g e n t ; and t h e n t i e t o g e t h e r t h e v a r i e t y of
procedures.

Another major heading i s t h a t of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , which Ron

Sessa has a l r e a d y covered. One of t h e t h i n g s t h a t w a s p o i n t e d o u t w a s t h a t
communication between c r e w members cannot w a i t u n t i l t h e crew i s i n t h e
c o c k p i t , b u t i t has t o s t a r t i n O p e r a t i o n s , w i t h t h e v e r y b a s i c s t e p of
having t h e crew members i n t r o d u c e themselves t o each o t h e r . It c a n ' t j u s t
s t a r t when t h e f l i g h t starts, b u t r a t h e r as soon a s p o s s i b l e i n t h e whole
f l i g h t sequence.

Another major heading i s d e c i s i o n making. W e d i s c u s s e d t h e r o l e of

procedures v e r s u s t h e c a p t a i n ' s i n n o v a t i v e c a p a b i l i t y , h i s a b i l i t y t o u s e
other a d d i t i o n a l resources. W e d i d n ' t r e a l l y a r r i v e a t a conclusion.
We agreed t h a t t h e r e had t o be s p e c i f i c , w e l l - o u t l i n e d procedures, b u t t h e r e
a l s o had t o b e room f o r t h e c a p t a i n t o e x e r c i s e h i s proper judgment when
circumstances r e q u i r e d . I t h i n k w e agreed t h a t j u s t e s t a b l i s h i n g new
procedures o r a d d i t i o n a l procedures wasn't n e c e s s a r i l y t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e
decisionmaking p r o c e s s .

Another f a c t o r ( a n o t h e r component) i s s i t u a t i o n a n a l y s i s . I n t h i s
c o n n e c t i o n , w e t a l k e d about some of L e e ' s [Bolman] c o n c e p t s of t h e t h e o r y of
t h e s i t u a t i o n , and whether i t ' s a c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s of t h e s i t u a t i o n .

A s p e r t a i n s t o t r a i n i n g t o m e e t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of r e s o u r c e manage-
ment, w e much a g r e e w i t h t h e p r e v i o u s committee r e p o r t . W e t h i n k t h a t t h e
t r a i n i n g should s t a r t e a r l y i n a p e r s o n ' s career and, w e hope, i f we're
s u c c e s s f u l i n t r a i n i n g o u r c a p t a i n s t o b e t h e i d e a l model of r e s o u r c e
management, t h a t t h e j u n i o r crew members w i l l l e a r n from t h a t model. Now,
t h a t ' s a n i d e a l s i t u a t i o n , b u t i t would b e n i c e i f t h a t could b e brought
a b o u t . I f we're going t o t r a i n f o r r e s o u r c e management, f i r s t w e have t o
d e f i n e a l i t t l e more s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e management s k i l l s t o be t r a i n e d , and
t h a t w a s one of our o b j e c t i v e s . W e need t o g i v e examples and come o u t w i t h
s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n s , i f w e ' r e going t o develop good t r a i n i n g programs.

162
 W e do need t o spend some t i m e i n t h e r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g p r o c e s s i n a
classroom o r w i t h a u d i o v i s u a l t a p e o r computer-based i n s t r u c t i o n program t o
g e t a c r o s s t h e c o n c e p t s t h a t w e t h i n k are important f o r r e s o u r c e management.
W e would a g r e e w i t h t h e need t o s e l l t h e concept. There w a s one s u g g e s t i o n
of p l a y i n g back some of t h e a u d i o t a p e s of crew c o n v e r s a t i o n s p r i o r t o some
r e c e n t a c c i d e n t s , as a means of convincing t h e crewmembers t h a t t h e r e s o u r c e
management p r i o r t o t h o s e a c c i d e n t s w a s n o t what i t could have been. P l a y i n g
back t h o s e c o n v e r s a t i o n s , w i t h some g r a p h i c i l l u s t r a t i o n s of where t h e a i r -
plane was and what w a s happening, could be a n e f f e c t i v e method (even w i t h o u t
f u r t h e r comments) of convincing t h e crewmembers t h a t t h e y r e a l l y d i d need t o
pay a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s area.

And t h e n , of c o u r s e , w e f e l t t h a t w e need t o t r a i n t h e managers f i r s t ,

t h a t i s , s t a r t from t h e t o p down s o t h a t they would have a f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g
of what w a s meant by r e s o u r c e management and what t h e o t h e r crew members a r e
being t r a i n e d f o r . We suggested t h a t r o l e - p l a y i n g could p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t
p a r t h e r e i n t e a c h i n g t h e concepts t h a t w e want t o g e t a c r o s s . It w a s a l s o
suggested t h a t t h e crewmembers themselves could create some s c e n a r i o s . A t
American t h e y have found t h a t t o b e v e r y e f f e c t i v e .

Having done a l l t h i s t e a c h i n g w e might f i n d t h a t t h e crew member h a s , t o

u s e Lee's t e r m , an espoused t h e o r y of o p e r a t i o n . But w e need t o f i n d o u t
whether he can a c t u a l l y p u t t h a t t h e o r y i n t o o p e r a t i o n ; whether i t c a n be a
t h e o r y of p r a c t i c e . We concluded t h a t a well-designed LOFT s i t u a t i o n w a s t h e
p l a c e where w e could determine whether t h e crewmember w a s a b l e t o p u t t h e
concept i n t o p r a c t i c e .

T h i s a g a i n would r e q u i r e that t h e check-airmen and i n s t r u c t o r s be

thoroughly t r a i n e d s o t h a t t h e y would be a b l e t o o b s e r v e t h e crew's
performance. W e d i d t a l k about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of r e c o r d i n g o r v i d e o t a p i n g
e i t h e r some r o l e - p l a y s e s s i o n s o r a c t u a l s e s s i o n s , b u t w e d i d n ' t g e t i n t o t h e
d e t a i l s of e x a c t l y how t h i s would be done.

LOFT t r a i n i n g i s c e r t a i n l y a f e a s i b l e concept t h a t ' s supported by a l l

of t h e p a p e r s t h a t w e r e handed o u t t o u s p r i o r t o o u r meeting. It would
e n a b l e u s t o p u t t h e crewmembers i n r e a l i s t i c emergency s i t u a t i o n s and l e t
them see f o r themselves how t h e y can respond and h a n d l e t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s .
The t h i n g t h a t needs t o b e a d d r e s s e d , of c o u r s e , i s t h e o b s e r v a t i o n of t h e i r
a b i l i t y t o manage t h e i r r e s o u r c e s , t o work w i t h t h e o t h e r crew members, t o
u s e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t ' s a v a i l a b l e t o them b o t h i n t h e a i r c r a f t i t s e l f , t h e
i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n , t h e o p e r a t i n g manuals, procedures, and so on. T h i s r e q u i r e s
t h e development of t r a i n e d o b s e r v e r s , who can d e b r i e f t h e crews a f t e r w a r d and
make s u g g e s t i o n s as t o how t h e i r management of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s could be
improved.
.
S i m i l a r o p p o r t u n i t i e s occur i n l i n e checks f o r which w e need p r o p e r l y
t r a i n e d check-airmen whp are aware of t h e need f o r good r e s o u r c e management.
Well-trained o b s e r v e r s could c o u n s e l and g u i d e t h e crewmembers i n improving
t h e i r a b i l i t y i n r e s o u r c e management.

163
 One s u g g e s t i o n f o r a r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t would be t h e development of a
s e l f - t e s t t o e v a l u a t e a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e s o u r c e management c a p a b i l i t y .

Now, t h i s would be h i s espoused t h e o r y , i n L e e Bolman's terms. And

t h e n , r e l a t e d t o t h a t , of c o u r s e , would be t o e s t a b l i s h LOFT-type-scenario
measurements w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o r e s o u r c e management. I n o t h e r words, we'd
have a measure of t h e man's espoused t h e o r y , p u t him i n a LOFT s i t u a t i o n ,
and do some r e s e a r c h t o develop ways of measuring more e f f e c t i v e l y h i s
r e s o u r c e management i n t h e LOFT s i t u a t i o n . I thought t h a t w a s a good
combination.

T h e r e ' s one o t h e r q u e s t i o n t h a t may be a l i t t l e c o n t r o v e r s i a l . The

s u g g e s t i o n w a s made by one member t h a t a f t e r t h e crewmembers have gone
through LOFT t r a i n i n g t h e y r a t e each o t h e r i n t h e management of t h e i r
r e s o u r c e s . A s I s a y , t h a t g o t mixed r e c e p t i o n from t h e committee, b u t
t h a t ' s always a p o s s i b i l i t y depending on t h e a i r l i n e s i t u a t i o n .

I t w a s a l s o suggested t h a t t h e r e b e some r e s e a r c h on t h e e f f e c t of
automation and s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e on t h e l e v e l of r e s o u r c e management and on
t h e p i l o t ' s self-image and j o b s a t i s f a c t i o n . W i l l t h e automation,
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n f u t u r e a i r c r a f t , reduce t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s c a p a b i l i t y i n
r e s o u r c e management and reduce h i s a b i l i t y t o i n n o v a t e and u s e a d d i t i o n a l
resources?

Another recommendation w a s t o encourage v a l i d a t i o n of a managerial

concept i n t h e c o c k p i t s e t t i n g , t h e program t h a t ' s under way a t North C e n t r a l
now. The concept proposed by Bob Helmreich and L e e Bolman can be f u r t h e r
validated i n a cockpit s e t t i n g .

Another i s , do some f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h on t h i s gap between t h e espoused

t h e o r y and t h e t h e o r y i n u s e i n a c o c k p i t s e t t i n g . That, I t h i n k ,
. a t t r a c t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n and i n t e r e s t of a l l of u s .

We need t o do a b e t t e r j o b of d e f i n i n g and perhaps rank-ordering f o r

t r a i n i n g emphasis t h e c r i t i c a l components of r e s o u r c e management, and t o
g i v e examples and i d e n t i f y b e h a v i o r s . And then w e need t o develop measures
of c a p a b i l i t y i n r e s o u r c e management.

One f i n a l recommendation - r e s e a r c h i n t o t h e e f f e c t of f a t i g u e on
r e s o u r c e management f a c i l i t y . Is i t c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t r e s o u r c e management
s k i l l i s more s u s c e p t i b l e t o f a t i g u e , e i t h e r as a r e s u l t of a l o n g f l i g h t
o r what went on p r l o r t o a f l i g h t o r t h e number of segments? Do w e tend t o
become less e f f e c t i v e i n our i n t e r c r e w communications and i n t e r p e r s o n a l
s k i l l s a f t e r many segments of a l o n g f l e g h t o r under f a t i g u e c o n d i t i o n s ,
more s o t h a n w e drop o f f i n a c t u a l s k i l l i n f l y i n g t h e a i r p l a n e t e c h n i c a l l y ,
f o r example, i n making t h e approach?

I n summary, I l e a r n e d a l o t i n o u r workshop. Now I ' m anxious t o g e t

back and see what w e c a n do t o a p p l y some of t h e s e concepts a t American
A i r l i n e s . W e have a l i t t l e work t o do t o develop some of t h e d e t a i l s and
some of t h e economic i m p l i c a t i o n s .

164
 TRANSITION AND UPGRADE TRAINING

C a p t . L. F. 3. Holdstock*

Chairman, Group 3

CAPT. FRINK ( I n t r o d u c t o r y comments): I t ' s obvious t h a t a l o t of

good i n f o r m a t i o n i s coming o u t . W e have a l o t l e f t t o do though, and i t ' s
a sad t h i n g that many a i r l i n e s are n o t r e p r e s e n t e d h e r e . So w e a r e going t o
a s k NASA t o g e t something r e a d y as a r e s u l t of t h i s s o t h a t t h e o t h e r a i r -
l i n e s w i l l b e n e f i t from t h i s work t h a t you people have done. I t ' s v e r y
v a l u a b l e work and t h e whole i n d u s t r y i s going t o b e n e f i t .

Working Group 3 w a s a l s o concerned w i t h t r a n s i t i o n and upgrade t r a i n i n g .

The chairman w a s Len Holdstock; h i s a s s i s t a n t , from NASA, w a s Ren Curry.

CAPT. HOLDSTOCK: Our group t r i e d , f i r s t of a l l , t o a g r e e i n t h e i r

own minds on what w a s meant by t r a n s i t i o n and upgrade t r a i n i n g . And a f t e r
4 hours of d i s c u s s i o n and some v e r y e r u d i t e e x p l a n a t i o n s , you w i l l be p l e a s e d
t o know w e a r e s t i l l i n t h e d a r k .

W e t h e n decided t o c o n f i n e o u r t h o u g h t s t o t h o s e a t t r i b u t e s i n which
r e s o u r c e management c o u l d p l a y a p a r t . That seemed t o b e the o b j e c t of t h e
e x e r c i s e , and w e immediately found t h a t w i t h t r a n s i t i o n and upgrade t r a i n i n g
w e w e r e l o o k i n g both backward and forward. W e were dependent on material
coming from behind u s as w e were p r e p a r i n g p e o p l e f o r a f u t u r e . W e t h e n
decided t h a t w e had t o make some assumptions.

The f i r s t of t h e s e assumptions w a s t h a t f l i g h t crews have t o be t r a i n e d

t o a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d s . We want h e r e t o stress t h e importance of f l y i n g
s t a n d a r d s and t e c h n i c a l s t a n d a r d s , and t h a t t h e t r a i n i n g has t o meet both
company and r e g u l a t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s .

The second assumption w e made i s t h a t t h e r o l e s a l l o c a t e d t o each crew-

member a r e understood and r e s p e c t e d by t h e o t h e r crewmembers, s o t h a t t h e
i n f l u e n c e of r e s o u r c e management is known t o a l l .

T h i r d l y , w e r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e r e could be a number of f a c t o r s changing

i n t h e world of a v i a t i o n . I n t h e l a s t few d a y s , w e have heard of energy
problems. There may w e l l be n o t problems b u t changes i n equipment and
o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e s , a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l , a l l of which may change t h e r o l e s of
t h e c r e w . For t h e purposes of t h i s e x e r c i s e , w e assumed t h a t i n t h e f o r e -
s e e a b l e f u t u r e , t h e r e would be no changes.

And l a s t l y , w e assumed t h a t any recommendations w e made o r any thoughts

w e had would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y b e a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l groups and a l l a i r l i n e s .

*B r i t i s h Airways.

165
 W e t h e n went on t o t r y and answer t h e q u e s t i o n ’ p o s e d i n t h e paper by
NASA, ’What are t h e s p e c i f i c management r e s o u r c e s k i l l s , behavior and pro-
f i c i e n c i e s t o b e developed?’’ One p o i n t made s t r a i g h t away, l a r g e l y i n
r e f e r e n c e t o t r a n s i t i o n t r a i n i n g , i s t h a t t h e r e w i l l b e d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of
r e s o u r c e management a v a i l a b l e a t any p a r t i c u l a r t i m e . To e n l a r g e on t h a t ,
immediately a f t e r t r a i n i n g t h e r e i s a b a s i c l e v e l of competency. Following
t h a t t h e r e w i l l be change, t h e r e w i l l b e i n c r e a s e d competency, and as t h a t
competency changes, s o w i l l t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e change.

Now, t h e u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e , of c o u r s e , i s t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e crew,
under t h e c o n t r o l of t h e c a p t a i n , w i l l e v e n t u a l l y o p e r a t e as a t o t a l l y co-
o r d i n a t e d u n i t w i t h t h e maximum l e v e l of e f f i c i e n c y . W e t h e n went on t o
l i s t t h o s e s k i l l s t h a t w e t h i n k a r e n e c e s s a r y , b u t I must emphasize t h a t w e
are n o t l i s t i n g them i n any o r d e r of importance o r p r i o r i t y . We merely l i s t
them as t h e group d i s c u s s e d them.

W e have put them under t h r e e recommended headings, f i r s t of a l l d e a l i n g

w i t h s o c i a l and communication s k i l l s . Although w e haven’t l i s t e d them i n
any p r i o r i t y , w e d i d c l a s s i f y them e i t h e r above o r below a l i n e . The ones
above t h e l i n e , w e thought, should be s p e c i a l l y emphasized i n upgrade and
t r a n s i t i o n t r a i n i n g ; t h o s e below t h e l i n e should b e t a u g h t a s g e n e r a l l y
desirable attributes.

Thus, a s shown i n t a b l e 1, t h e i n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l r e l a t i o n s are l i s t e d

above t h e l i n e . I n t e r d e p a r t m e n t a l
TABLE 1.- SOCIAL AND COMMUNICATION relations refers t o the relations
SKILLS between t h e crew and t h e c a b i n crew
INTERDEPARTMENTAL RELATIONS o r f l i g h t a t t e n d a n t s , t h e ground
crews, maintenance - anyone who i s
----------_.
contributing t o t h e s a f e operation.
CONS1DER AT 10N And below t h e l i n e w e t h e n p u t con-
s i d e r a t i o n of everyone e l s e . Con-
FAIRNESS s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e r e s t of your crew,
b o t h i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e a i r c r a f t .
INSIDE COCKPIT When c o n s i d e r i n g them, w e thought
t h a t t h e r e must b e a d e g r e e of f a i r -
OUTSIDE COCKPIT
n e s s , f a i r n e s s i n judgment. One h a s
t o b e a r i n mind t h a t a f a s t judgment o r a judgment based on incomplete in-
formation could w e l l impair t h e f u t u r e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a n i n d i v i d u a l . And
t h i s , of c o u r s e , i s b o t h i n s i d e and o u t s i d e t h e a i r c r a f t . I know w e t e n d ,
when we’re f l y i n g , t o wrap o u r s e l v e s up i n t h i s cocoon of metal, but t h e r e
a r e a l o t of people involved, and t h e y a l l have a p a r t t o p l a y .

166
 TABLE 2.- PLANNING, PROBLEM-SOLVING, Under t h e heading of Planning,
D E C I SIONMAKING Problem-Solving, Decisionmaking
( t a b l e 2 ) w e l i s t e d 4 p o i n t s . The
CONSIDERATION OF ALL ALTERNATIVES f i r s t one above t h e l i n e i s t h e
necessity t o consider a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s .
SETTING TASK PRIORITIES We need t r a i n i n g i n t h e a b i l i t y t o
c o n s i d e r a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s , t o know t h e
_.-----------
s i t u a t i o n , t o respond t o t h e s i t u a -
COMMUNICATION OF PLANS t i o n . Secondly, w e have t o be a b l e t o
set t h e t a s k p r i o r i t i e s . It's a
ANTICIPATION OF SITUATION f u n c t i o n of t i m e , and of a b i l i t y
w i t h i n t h e crew.

Below t h e l i n e , good communications of f u t u r e a c t i o n s and a n t i c i p a t e d

a c t i o n s a r e needed. I t ' s n o t good enough i f you, a s one crewmember, a r e
aware of a n impending problem. You may know t h a t you a r e q u i t e happy t o m e e t
i t and do t h e r i g h t t h i n g a t t h e r i g h t t i m e , b u t i t ' s a l s o n e c e s s a r y f o r
everyone e l s e t o know t h a t y o u ' r e going t o do i t .

And l a s t l y , below t h e l i n e , i s t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n of o t h e r i n f l u e n c e s on
t h e s i t u a t i o n . These i n c l u d e environmental i n f l u e n c e s , p o s s i b l y company
i n f l u e n c e s , i n f l u e n c e s of p a s s e n g e r s , i n f l u e n c e s of c a b i n crew on t h e f l i g h t
deck, and i n f l u e n c e s of c o n t r o l . A l l i n a l l , a g e n e r a l awareness and
anticipation.

A t h i r d heading i s t h a t of Leadership and Management ( t a b l e 3 ) . Above

t h e l i n e , we t h i n k i t ' s n e c e s s a r y t o develop a n a p p r e c i a t i o n of new
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , changed r e s p o n s i -
TABLE 3.- LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT b i l i t i e s . I t ' s necessary f o r t h e
l e a d e r t o b e t o t a l l y aware of everyone
APPRECIATION 0F NEW R ESPONSIBI LIT IES else's t a s k s , t o have a complete
AWARENESS OF CREW'S TASKS
p i c t u r e . Equally, i t ' s necessary f o r
o t h e r crewmembers t o know what he o r
ABILITY TO DELEGATE s h e can e x p e c t of everyone else.
WILLINGNESS TO TEACH/SHARE
ABILITY TO INSTILL CONFIDENCE We t h i n k i t ' s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e
---------_I---
l e a d e r t o be a b l e t o d e l e g a t e -
n o t t o o f f l o a d t h o s e s m a l l , unnecessary
PROF ESSlONA LISM tasks - but t o delegate with the
SELF-CONFIDENCE thought t h a t t h e r e i s some t e a c h i n g t o
COMMAND PRESENCE - STYLE - INTEGRITY b e done. The crew w i l l l e a r n by u s e
of t h e r e s o u r c e s ; and i f t h e y ' r e
COMMUNICATION OF INTENT
d e l e g a t e d e a r l y i n t h e man's career
and i n c r e a s i n g l y d e l e g a t e d , t h e
p i c t u r e w i l l b e c o n s t a n t l y improved.

Below t h e l i n e , and i t should be acknowledged t h a t t h e r e w a s some

d i f f i c u l t y i n d e f i n i n g t h e word, w e p u t p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m . W e went on t o s a y
t h a t self-confidence w a s necessary. W e thought i t n e c e s s a r y t h a t a l e a d e r
should have command p r e s e n c e . Again, a d i f f i c u l t word t o d e f i n e , b u t I t h i n k
w e a l l know what i s meant. The man should have s t y l e , he should have

167
 .
i n t e g r i t y . L a s t l y , t h e r e should be a d i s t r i b u t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s t o u s e a l l
a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s i n t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e way.

Now, a l l of t h e p o i n t s mentioned do a p p l y t o b o t h t r a n s i t i o n and upgrade

t r a i n i n g . A t t h e same t i m e w e a p p r e c i a t e t h a t a l l t h e s e p o i n t s a r e l e a r n e d
throughout t h e a i r m a n ' s career and any p e r i o d i c reinforcement must be t o t h e
i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e n e f i t , whether i t be by way of c o u r s e s , i n f o r m a t i o n , o r word
of mouth. I t d o e s n ' t matter how i t comes, a s l o n g a s i t ' s c o n s t a n t l y s p r e a d .

We d i d n ' t spend too much t i m e d e c i d i n g how one w a s t o do t h i s . There

a r e a number of t o o l s a v a i l a b l e . There a r e classroom t o o l s , t h e c a s e s t u d y
approach, t h e r o l e p l a y i n g t h a t h a s a l r e a d y been mentioned, exchange of
s i t u a t i o n s and d u t i e s i n s i m u l a t o r s o r n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n s i m u l a t o r s , b u t
j u s t s i m u l a t e d c o n d i t i o n s . Obviously, u s e of t h e s i m u l a t o r , LOFT t r a i n i n g ,
a i r c r a f t t r a i n i n g , and t h e r e a r e a number of o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s .

We thought t h a t t h e r e should be more p r e b r i e f i n g and d e b r i e f i n g by t h e

o r d i n a r y l i n e crews. We a l l know t h a t i t ' s e a s y t o walk aboard a n a i r c r a f t ,
and a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e f l i g h t s a y , "Thank you v e r y much, goodbye.''
But v e r y o f t e n something happens d u r i n g a f l i g h t t h a t i s worth d i s c u s s i n g
and t h a t should be d i s c u s s e d r i g h t t h e n and t h e r e .

Management c o u r s e s a r e - o f v a l u e and i n t h i s r e s p e c t I t h i n k t h a t one

should n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o n f i n e such c o u r s e s t o t h e commanders, t o t h e
c a p t a i n s , b u t t h a t the sooner one i n v o l v e s c o p i l o t s t h e b e t t e r .

I n summary, t h e f e e l i n g of o u r group w a s t h a t t h e e x p e r t i s e of p i l o t s
and crews i s n e c e s s a r i l y a n ongoing m a t t e r , and t h e y should be encouraged t o
accept t h e f a c t t h a t they are i n a profession c a l l i n g f o r cqnstant learning
and c o n s t a n t improvement.

168
 SELECTION AND I N I T I A L TRAINING

Capt. Berton Beach

*
Chairman, Group 4

CAPT. FRINK ( I n t r o d u c t o r y comments): The t o p i c of Group 4 w a s

s e l e c t i o n and i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g . The chairman of Group 4 w a s Bert Beach, of
E a s t e r n , and h e w a s a s s i s t e d by Maurie White.

CAPT. BEACH: By way of i n t r o d u c t i o n , w e f e l t t h a t t o e n a b l e t h e

c l e a r s e p a r a t i o n of t h e i s s u e s of r e s o u r c e management from t h o s e of o t h e r w i s e
w e l l - q u a l i f i e d airmen, w e should treat t h e s k i l l s and t r a i n i n g r e q u i r e d f o r
r e s o u r c e management as i n c r e m e n t a l ; t h a t i s , as n o t n e c e s s a r i l y being e v i d e n t
i n t h e p h y s i c a l o p e r a t i o n of t h e a i r p l a n e . T h i s s t a t e m e n t of t h e approach i s
perhaps n o t t h e c l e a r e s t w e could develop, b u t a t l e a s t i t had t h e v i r t u e of
h e l p i n g t o f o c u s t h e t a s k t h a t w e considered i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n .

One of t h e fundamental c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t w e reached unanimously w a s t h a t

r e s o u r c e management should be sought and f o s t e r e d a t every s t a g e of
e v o l u t i o n i n t h e c a p t a i n ' s c a r e e r , i n c l u d i n g s e l e c t i o n of t h e c a n d i d a t e a i r -
man, from t h e f i r s t day h e ' s on t h e p r o p e r t y . The i n f e r e n c e of t h i s
d e c i s i o n i s t h a t given t h e p r e s e n t p a t t e r n of f l i g h t - d e c k promotions, t h e
c a n d i d a t e should have s k i l l s and q u a l i t i e s t h a t w i l l e n a b l e him t o f u n c t i o n
e f f e c t i v e l y as a s u b o r d i n a t e d u r i n g t h e l o n g w a i t f o r c a p t a i n c y , and t h a t ,
upon o b t a i n i n g command rank, he should e x h i b i t a new balance of t h e s e s k i l l s
a s r e q u i r e d by t h a t j o b .

These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s l e a d t o a d e f i n i t i o n of t h e s k i l l s r e q u i r e d f o r
r e s o u r c e management t h a t might n o t have o t h e r w i s e been introduced i n t h e
s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s . They a l s o impose a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a i r l i n e
management t o h e l p m a i n t a i n e a r l y m o t i v a t i o n s through t h e long p e r i o d of
subordinate s t a t u s .

It should be noted f u r t h e r t h a t t h e d e l i n e a t i o n of s k i l l s and

q u a l i t i e s t h a t should be looked f o r i n t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s d o e s n ' t
n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t w e a l r e a d y have t h e c r i t e r i a and t h e t e s t procedures
needed t o i d e n t i f y them. P o s s i b l y knowledge e x i s t s r e g a r d i n g a v a i l a b i l i t y of
such i n f o r m a t i o n , c r i t e r i a , o r t e s t procedures, b u t t h e y w e r e n ' t immediately
a t hand i n our working group, and t h e consensus w a s t h a t e i t h e r t h o s e
procedures e x i s t c u r r e n t l y o r could be developed.

The p r o v i s i o n of r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g
p e r i o d w a s d i s c u s s e d , and i t w a s agreed t h a t such t r a i n i n g must b e provided
i n o r d e r t o e n a b l e t h e j u n i o r airman t o f u n c t i o n e f f e c t i v e l y i n s u p p o r t of
t h e c a p t a i n . I t would have t h e added b e n e f i t of e n s u r i n g t h a t h i s i n d o c t r i -
n a t i o n t o c a p t a i n c y w a s c a r r i e d o u t as a n ongoing, p r o g r e s s i v e , e v o l u t i o n a r y
p r o c e s s , one t h a t i s more e a s i l y d i g e s t e d t h a n t h e kind of c r a s h c o u r s e s w e
s e e m t o be p r o v i d i n g today.

*Eastern A i r l i n e s .

169
 To e n s u r e t h a t t h e c a n d i d a t e e i t h e r a l r e a d y h a s r e s o u r c e management
s k i l l s o r can b e t r a i n e d i n t h e s e s k i l l s , c e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s o v e r and above
t h e obvious ones needed f o r good airmanship should b e looked f o r and
e v a l u a t e d i n t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s . And w e f e l t some of t h e s e t h i n g s should
be as f o l l o w s .

1. H e should have e f f e c t i v e i n t e r p e r s o n a l communication s k i l l .

2. H e should b e a t e a m p l a y e r . That i s t o s a y , h e needs t o b e t o l e r a n t

of d e f e r r e d g r a t i f i c a t i o n .

3. H e should be a good f o l l o w e r as w e l l as a good l e a d e r .

4 . H e should o p e r a t e c o o p e r a t i v e l y w i t h i n t h e system, t h a t i s t o s a y ,
t h e a v i a t i o n system, and he should have a s t r o n g p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t i n t h a t
system.

5. H e should have a s t a b l e p e r s o n a l i t y .

6 . H e should be f l e x i b l e , t h a t i s t o s a y , he needs t o be a d a p t a b l e t o
changing c o n d i t i o n s .

7. H e needs t o have t h e proper m o t i v a t i o n t o become an a i r l i n e c a p t a i n .

We g o t a l i t t l e hung up on what m o t i v a t i o n means, b u t w e ' l l a d d r e s s t h a t

later.

The c r i t e r i a and test procedures f o r e v a l u a t i n g t h e above s k i l l s may

a l r e a d y b e a v a i l a b l e i n a n a d a p t a b l e form from t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e
now e x t a n t . I f n o t , programs ought t o be conducted t o develop them. The
f i n a l s e l e c t i o n f o r t h e c a n d i d a t e should b e done by F l y i n g Operations as t h e
u l t i m a t e a r b i t e r of t h e man's s u i t a b i l i t y as a p o t e n t i a l a i r c r a f t commander.

T r a i n i n g f o r r e s o u r c e management should be s t a r t e d as e a r l y i n t h e
a i r m a n ' s career as p o s s i b l e , i n i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g , obviously. It should be
c a r r i e d on c o n t i n u o u s l y through h i s p r o g r e s s toward being an a i r l i n e c a p t a i n ,
T r a i n i n g f o r r e s o u r c e management, even a t t h e s u b o r d i n a t e l e v e l , should
i n c l u d e improved methods of p r o v i d i n g expanded o r i e n t a t i o n t r a i n i n g . T h i s
would e n a b l e t h e new h i r e t o be aware of t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o him, and
t o begin t o t h i n k e a r l y i n h i s career as he would i f he w e r e a c a p t a i n , and
could t h e r e b y p r o v i d e t h e c a p t a i n w i t h informed s u p p o r t .

Because of t h e cosmopolitan makeup of o u r group w e tended, i n d i s -

c u s s i n g methods w e thought would be a p p l i c a b l e t o t r a i n i n g , t o b e v e r y
g e n e r a l , r e a l i z i n g t h a t each carrier may have s p e c i f i c r e q u i r e m e n t s . We
f e l t t h a t formal t r a i n i n g on i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s and management s k i l l s w a s
a n a b s o l u t e requirement, formal t r a i n i n g being classroom t r a i n i n g , s l i d e
t a p e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , a u d i o v i s u a l , TV, f i l m - whatever f i t s t h e carrier's
needs.

170
 T r a i n i n g i n t h e complete crew concept should b e g i v e n e a r l y . Complete
crew concept being n o t n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d t o , b u t i n c l u d i n g "What is your
r o l e i n t h e c r e w ? " "What i s your r o l e i n s u p p o r t of t h e o t h e r p e r s o n ' s
r o l e ? " "What do t h e y do?" The complete crew c o n c e p t , w e f e l t , meant j u s t
that - what do you do, what i s a v a i l a b l e t o you, and how do you u s e i t .

W e f e l t t h a t e a r l y i n t h e t r a i n i n g program, perhaps i n i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g ,
f u l l - m i s s i o n s i m u l a t i o n o r LOFT t r a i n i n g , i f you p r e f e r , should b e i n i t i a t e d ,
beginning w i t h normal s i t u a t i o n s , and proceeding on t o t h e more d i f f i c u l t
abnormal s i t u a t i o n s . W e a l s o f e l t t h a t t h e p u b l i c a t i o n s t h a t f l i g h t crews
u s e as g u i d e l i n e s f o r o p e r a t i o n s should r e f l e c t r e s o u r c e management con-
s i d e r a t i o n s . Perhaps t h a t might be a p r o j e c t t h a t NASA could u n d e r t a k e s i n c e
w e w e r e n ' t c e r t a i n how w e could rewrite t r a i n i n g manuals and a i r c r a f t
o p e r a t i n g manuals t o r e f l e c t t h e k i n d s of t h i n g s w e f e e l were important i n
t h a t area.

Procedures should b e developed t o e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h i s

kind of t r a i n i n g . They could i n c l u d e such t h i n g s as feedback from t h e l i n e
c a p t a i n as t o how e f f e c t i v e l y we're t r a i n i n g t h e i n i t i a l crewman, and w r i t t e n
r e p o r t s , t h a t i s , l i n e p i l o t ' s r e p o r t s , on how w e l l t h e man i s performing i n
h i s j o b . There w a s a need f o r e f f e c t i v e s u p e r v i s i o n by check-airmen from t h e
carrier t o watch t h e i n i t i a l t r a i n e e and t o r e p o r t back any d e f i c i e n c i e s t h e y
s a w i n t h e t h i n g s w e supposedly t r a i n e d him t o do. W e a l s o f e l t t h a t LOFT,
used as an e v a l u a t o r d u r i n g r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g , would g i v e u s a h a n d l e on how
w e l l w e had done o u r j o b i n i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g .

W e a l s o would a s k t h e s t u d e n t f o r feedback immediately upon completion

of t h e t r a i n i n g - what h e thought of i t , what h e f e l t he had missed, a n
o v e r a l l judgment of our a b i l i t y t o t r a i n him w e l l . A d d i t i o n a l feedback
should be o b t a i n e d a f t e r he h a s completed t h e p r o b a t i o n . It w a s thought t h a t
w e might f i n d a l i t t l e more candor a f t e r he w a s a l r e a d y a s s u r e d of t h e j o b
t h a n when h e w a s a t o u r mercy d u r i n g our t r a i n i n g program.

W e a l s o f e l t , as I see t h e o t h e r groups d i d , t h a t w e need open

communications between t h e t r a i n e r s and t h e managers on t h e one hand, and
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e p i l o t s , i n our case, t h e Air L i n e P i l o t s
A s s o c i a t i o n , on t h e o t h e r hand, t o provide u s w i t h a d d i t i o n a l feedback.

I n summary, w e f e l t t h a t r e s o u r c e management s k i l l s and p o t e n t i a l should

be i d e n t i f i e d and c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s . C e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s of
t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t i n g t o r e s o u r c e management s k i l l have been
d e l i n e a t e d , b u t t h e c r i t e r i a and procedures f o r e v a l u a t i o n may need t o be
developed. T r a i n i n g and r e s o u r c e management should b e provided c o n t i n u o u s l y
throughout t h e a i r m a n ' s career s t a r t i n g i n i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g .

A v a r i e t y of p o s s i b l e methods f o r e v a l u a t i n g t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of
r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g can b e u t i l i z e d , i n c l u d i n g p o s s i b l e a c t i v i t y by
company management, feedback from t h e p i l o t s ' s e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , e t c .

171
 Some developments might r e q u i
p r o j e c t s perhaps f o r NASA. W e s p
t r y i n g t o d e c i d e what an a i r l i n e c a p t a i n is, s i n c e t h a t ' s t h e
t r a i n i n g u l t i m a t e l y t a k e s . W e had some d i f f e ce of o p i n i o n
a l e a d e r ? Is he t h e commander? Is t h e r e a d
c a p t a i n i s might b e a problem, and s i n c e w e c o u l d n ' t s o l v e i t t o o u r
unanimous s a t i s f a c t i o n , we f e l t i t might be a good p r o j e c t f o r NASA t o under-
t a k e t o develop a d e f i n i t i o n . Once w e know t h a t d e f i n i t i o n f o r s u r e , t h e n w e
might be b e t t e r a b l e t o a d d r e s s t h e t r a i n i n g methods t o make him one.

W e a l s o thought t h a t t o i n i t i a t e some t r a i n i n g i n r e s o u r c e management,

i t might b e p o s s i b l e t o t a k e an a i r carrier's i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g program and
r u n two groups through i t . One would b e p u t through t h e c a r r i e r ' s e x i s t i n g
i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g program, and t h e o t h e r through a program developed perhaps
e n t i r e l y by NASA o r t h e c a r r i e r ' s program modified by NASA t o i n c l u d e t h e
i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s emphasis, t h e r e s o u r c e management emphasis. A t t h e end
of i t w e would t r y t o e v a l u a t e which produced t h e b e t t e r a v i a t o r .

That, i n summary, i s what w e s p e n t t h e l a s t day and a h a l f doing.

172
 TRANSITION AND UPGRADE TRAINING

Lawson mite*
Chairman, Group 6

CAPT. FRINK ( I n t r o d u c t o r y comments): Our l a s t r e p o r t i s from

Working Group 6 , which w a s c h a i r e d by Lawson White, of IATA; he w a s a s s i s t e d
by George Cooper. T h e i r t o p i c w a s t r a n s i t i o n and upgrade t r a i n i n g .

MR. WHITE: We t o o found i t a problem t o d e f i n e what w e meant by

t r a n s i t i o n and upgrade t r a i n i n g . To our group, t r a n s i t i o n t r a i n i n g i s t h a t
t r a i n i n g given t o a f l i g h t crewmember i n o r d e r f o r him o r h e r t o be
q u a l i f i e d t o o p e r a t e i n t h e same c a p a c i t y i n a new a i r c r a f t t y p e . And
upgrade t r a i n i n g w e considered as t h e t r a i n i n g g i v e n t o a f l i g h t crewmember
i n o r d e r f o r her o r him t o o p e r a t e i n a h i g h e r c a p a c i t y i n t h e same a i r c r a f t
t y p e , t h a t i s , from f i r s t o f f i c e r t o c a p t a i n o r even from second o f f i c e r t o
f i r s t officer.

I propose t o r e a d you a summary of our d i s c u s s i o n s . For t r a n s i t i o n

t r a i n i n g , t h e working group concluded t h a t t h e r e s o u r c e s t o be managed would
vary a c c o r d i n g t o t h e a i r c r a f t t y p e , t h e crewing philosophy, t h e t y p e of
o p e r a t i o n s , e t c . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e p r i n c i p l e s of r e s o u r c e management would
remain t h e same, t h a t i s , u s i n g a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s t o t h e b e s t
advantage.

I t w a s agreed t h a t r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g , i f i t i s included i n a

t r a n s i t i o n c o u r s e , should c o n s i s t s o l e l y of i n s t r u c t i o n on what r e s o u r c e s
were a v a i l a b l e t o t h e crewmembers. The r e a s o n w e reached t h i s d e c i s i o n w a s
because w e d i d n ' t know what had gone on i n i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g , and w e d i d n ' t
know what had gone on i n r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g , and so w e had t o make some
assumptions t h a t t h e o t h e r groups would t a k e c a r e of t h a t . W e thought i t
important t h a t t h e crewmembers a l r e a d y had some t r a i n i n g , and w e j u s t had t o
i d e n t i f y f o r them i n t h i s t r a n s i t i o n what w a s d i f f e r e n t on t h e new a i r c r a f t
type

We a l s o agreed t h a t t h e knowledge and s k i l l i n r e s o u r c e management would

b e d i f f e r e n t f o r t h e c a p t a i n and t h e o t h e r crewmembers. The r e a s o n f o r t h i s
i s because t h e c a p t a i n must have t h e l e g a l a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e s a f e t y of h i s
a i r c r a f t , and h e i s , t h e r e f o r e , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e t o t a l o p e r a t i o n , i n -
c l u d i n g p r o p e r r e s o u r c e management. The r o l e f o r t h e o t h e r crewmembers, and
t h i s i n c l u d e s c a b i n crewmembers, would be t h a t t h e y are p a r t of t h e
c a p t a i n ' s r e s o u r c e s and hence have r o l e s t h a t a r e d i f f e r e n t and s u p p o r t i v e .
Resource management t r a i n i n g s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , r e f l e c t t h e s e d i f f e r e n t
r o l e s f o r t h e d i f f e r e n t crewmembers.

*IATA.

173
 It w a s agreed a l s o t h a t r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e ,
s t a r t w i t h t h e i n i t i a l h i r i n g , and c o n t i n u e through each crewmember's c a r e e r
t o r e f l e c t t h e requirements of t h e r o l e s t h a t I have j u s t o u t l i n e d , namely,
s u p p o r t i v e and managerial. There w a s a l s o no doubt t h a t each and every
c a p t a i n should be c a p a b l e of proper r e s o u r c e management. To do t h i s he w a s
r e q u i r e d , f i r s t of a l l , t o show proper c r e d i b i l i t y t o t h e o t h e r crewmembers.
T h i s i n f e r s competence, imparting s k i l l and knowledge as a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r
a good r e s o u r c e manager and, of c o u r s e , continued maintenance of t h i s
proficiency .
W e n e x t turned our a t t e n t i o n t o i d e n t i f y i n g t h e s k i l l s r e q u i r e d of a
good r e s o u r c e manager and w e f i r s t of a l l o u t l i n e d t h e s e ( f i g . 1) a s s o c i a l
and communication s k i l l s , l e a d e r s h i p and management s k i l l s , p l a n n i n g ,
problem-solving and decisionmaking s k i l l s . W e expanded t h e requirements t o
some e x t e n t , a l t h o u g h incompletely, as f o l l o w s :

Under s o c i a l and communication s k i l l s ( f i g . 2 ) w e f e l t t h a t t h e manager,

i f you w i l l , should have t r a i n i n g i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i n t h e
mechanics of communication and communication e r r o r s . I n f i g u r e 3 , manage-
ment s k i l l s , you n o t e , I dropped l e a d e r s h i p from t h e t i t l e and I'll r e t u r n
t o t h a t . H e should have t r a i n i n g i n d e l e g a t i o n of a u t h o r i t y ; e s t a b l i s h i n g
p r i o r i t i e s ; a c h i e v i n g proper crew c o o r d i n a t i o n and crew c o o p e r a t i o n ;
a l l o c a t i n g d u t i e s ; d i s t r i b u t i n g workload; r e c o g n i z i n g stress; s u p e r v i s i n g
a s s i g n e d t a s k s ; monitoring t a s k s ; and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , i n a c c e p t i n g h i s
responsibilities.

With r e g a r d t o planning s k i l l s ( f i g . 4 ) he needed t r a i n i n g f o r t h e

s i t u a t i o n awareness and s t a y i n g ahead of t h e a i r c r a f t . What w e mean by t h a t
seems s e l f - e v i d e n t .

I n problem-solving s k i l l s ( f i g . 5) t r a i n i n g should be provided i n

problem r e c o g n i t i o n and s o l u t i o n s t r a t e g i e s .

With r e s p e c t t o decisionmaking s k i l l s , w e f e l t t h e t r a i n i n g should be i n

t h e knowledge n e c e s s a r y t o make t h e d e c i s i o n , t r a i n i n g f o r t h e s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e
t o make a d e c i s i o n , and t h e courage t o s t a n d by o r change t h a t d e c i s i o n as
necessary.

Now, w i t h respect t o l e a d e r s h i p , t h i s s k i l l gave t h e working group t h e

most d i f f i c u l t y . A f t e r a l o n g exchange of views i n which each member of t h e
working group gave h i s i d e a of what w e meant by l e a d e r s h i p , w e came t o t h e
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e n e c e s s a r y s k i l l i n t h i s f i e l d would b e provided i f he had
t h e s k i l l s i n t h e o t h e r f i e l d s I ' v e j u s t mentioned. I n o t h e r words, i f w e
covered p r o p e r l y decisionmaking, problem-solving, and t h e o t h e r s k i l l s , h e
would have t h e n e c e s s a r y l e a d e r s h i p s k i l l .

W e t h e n turned our a t t e n t i o n t o e x a c t l y what upgrade t r a i n i n g meant.

F i r s t , when should t h i s upgrade t r a i n i n g be given? W e concluded t h a t by t h e
t i m e t h e new c a p t a i n t a k e s h i s f i r s t t r i p as c a p t a i n , he should have had
t h a t t r a i n i n g . That may seem a s o r t of motherhood and s i n s s t a t e m e n t , b u t

174
t h e s i t u a t i o n i s s o complicated t h a t w e f e l t t h a t w e had t o Teave i t t o each
i n d i v i d u a l a i r l i n e as t o when t h e y gave t h a t t r a i n i n g .

With r e s p e c t t o t h e method of conducting t h i s t r a i n i n g , i n c l u d i n g who

d i d i t , a g a i n w e f e l t t h a t t h i s needed t o be determined by t h e a i r l i n e con-
cerned, because each a i r l i n e h a s d i f f e r e n t r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e . The v a r i o u s
t r a i n i n g t e c h n i q u e s are w e l l . known, b u t t h e y may be s u i t a b l e t o one group and
not a n o t h e r . And w e f e l t i t was n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e a i r l i n e i t s e l f t o d e c i d e
i t s method and who should do i t .

We h a v e n ' t r e a l l y i d e n t i f i e d any s p e c i f i c r e s e a r c h t a s k needed. I t w a s

our g r o u p ' s f e e l i n g t h a t w i t h t h e a i r l i n e s ' a c t i v i t y i n t h i s r e g a r d and w i t h
NASA monitoring i t , t h e r e may be some areas f o r r e s e a r c h t h a t are s e l f -
r e v e a l i n g . But one p o i n t w a s made - t h a t perhaps w e should c o n s i d e r t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y of a t i m e and motion s t u d y of c o c k p i t t a s k s , and t h a t t h i s may
h e l p u s i n proper r e s o u r c e management.

With r e g a r d t o t h e second o f f i c e r t o f i r s t o f f i c e r upgrade c o u r s e , w e

d i d n o t t h i n k t h e r e w a s any d i f f e r e n c e i n s p e c i f i c t r a i n i n g . W e f e l t t h a t
with t h e t r a i n i n g he r e c e i v e d from i n i t i a l h i r e u n t i l he became second
o f f i c e r , p l u s h i s r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g , he would n o t r e q u i r e any a d d i t i o n a l
t r a i n i n g when he became a f i r s t o f f i c e r o t h e r t h a n i n t h e r e s o u r c e s a v a i l -
a b l e t o him. .

A f i n a l comment - a n o t h e r p r e r e q u i s i t e of a l l of t h i s i s t h a t t h e
check-airmen, t h e people who are doing t h e checking, obviously have t o be
t r a i n e d a s w e l l i n t h e r o l e s t h a t t h e second o f f i c e r , f i r s t o f f i c e r , and
c a p t a i n are going t o p l a y . It n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w s , of c o u r s e , t h a t a l l of
t h i s h a s g o t t o be a u t h o r i z e d from t h e t o p .

CAPT. FRINK: Thank you v e r y much. That i s t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e

formal r e p o r t s .

175
 1. SOCIAL A N D COMMUNICATIONS

2. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

3. PLANNING

4. PROBLEM-SOLVING

5. DECISIONMAKING

Figure 1.- S k i l l s r e q u i r e d f o r r e s o u r c e management.

e INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS
0 MECHANlCS OF COMMUNICATION

Figure 2.- S o c i a l and communications s k i l l s .

0 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
e ESTABLISHMENT OF PRIORITIES
e ACHIEVING CREW COORDINATION A N D CREW COOPERATION
e ALLOCATION OF DUTIES
a DISTRIBUTION OF WORKLOAD
e RECOGNITION OF COMPETENCY A N D STRESS
SUPERVISION OF ASSIGNED TASKS
e MONITORING
0 ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSJBILITY

Figure 3 . - Management skills.

176
SITUATION AWARENESS
0 STAYING AHEAD OF THE AIRCRAFT

Figure 4.- Planning s k i l l s .

0 PROBLEM RECOGNITION
0 SOLUTION STRATEGIES

Figure 5.- Problem-solving s k i l l s .

177
 PANEL DISCUSSION

CAPT. CARROLL, United A i r l i n e s : One of t h e comments t h a t you made,

Bob [Houston, Group 21 w a s t h a t w e should be q u e s t i o n i n g t h e adequacy of t h e
r e s o u r c e s made a v a i l a b l e by t h e company. Do you have any recommendations o r
any c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t evolved from your group d i s c u s s i o n s a s t o how you might
determine t h e adequacy of t h e r e s o u r c e s t h a t a r e c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e ?

DR. HOUSTON, American A i r l i n e s : I d o n ' t t h i n k w e have any

recommendations, Ed. I t j u s t came o u t i n our d i s c u s s i o n t h a t w e do p r o v i d e
our crewmembers w i t h a n awful l o t of paperwork. Some of i t might b e
redundant, and some of i t might n o t be designed a s c l e a r l y a s i t might be.
I f w e expect them t o u s e t h i s a s r e s o u r c e m a t e r i a l , t h e n i t ' s incumbent upon
management t o i n s u r e t h a t they have t h e e s s e n t i a l m a t e r i a l , t h a t t h e informa-
t i o n is r e a d i l y r e t r i e v a b l e , i s n o t o v e r l y redundant, and s o on - j u s t kind
of a c a u t i o n f o r management.

There w a s a comment from one of t h e s p e a k e r s about t h e f l i g h t papers

t h a t he t a k e s w i t h him from Dispatch, and proceeds t o throw away. That w a s
i n j e s t , b u t i f w e expect t h e crewmembers t o u s e t h a t p r i n t e d m a t e r i a l , t h e n
i t behooves u s t o make s u r e t h a t i t ' s r e a l l y e f f e c t i v e l y p r e s e n t e d .

CAPT. CARROLL: I ' d l i k e t o s u g g e s t t h a t perhaps i t i s something

t h a t would f a l l i n a n area f o r John Lauber's people t o pursue. That i f t h e r e
a r e d i f f e r e n c e s , and I ' m aware of a few d i f f e r e n c e s , a t any r a t e , i n t h e
paperwork a c t i v i t y - n o t o n l y i n t h e volume of t h e paperwork t h a t ' s in-
volved, but t h e a c t i v i t y i n t h e c o c k p i t r e l a t i v e t o paperwork. The
procedures d i f f e r between a i r l i n e s , and i t may w e l l b e t h a t t h a t ' s something
t h a t John and your people could pursue t o improve t h e e f f i c a c y of some of t h e
procedures t h a t have t o b e followed; w e might a l l b e n e f i t from a d d i t i o n o r
d e l e t i o n . A s l o n g a s your group d i d n o t have a n y t h i n g s p e c i f i c i n mind, I ' d
l i k e some feedback, i f w e could g e t t h a t s o r t of t h i n g , as t o whether w e ' r e
encumbering our people more than w e s h o u l d , o r whether we're supplying them
w i t h t h e r i g h t material.

DR. HOUSTON: The R u f f e l l Smith s t u d y made some comments about t h e

d i f f i c u l t y i n r e a d i n g t h e approach p l a t e s and t h e u n s a t i s f a c t o r y l e v e l s of
i l l u m i n a t i o n , as w e l l a s t h e l e g i b i l i t y of approach p l a t e s and a l l t h e o t h e r
paperwork t h a t w e g i v e t h e crewmembers. I t ' s a m u l t i f a c e t e d problem.

CAPT. FRINK, Pan Am: Paperwork i s a n i n t e r e s t i n g p i e c e of t h e

workload. O f c o u r s e , i n t e r e s t i n g l y enough, t h e r e i s a n o t h e r s i d e t o t h a t ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t h e long-range o p e r a t o r s . W e f i n d t h e r e ' s a n overload
s i t u a t i o n and a l s o a n underload s i t u a t i o n . W e h a v e n ' t t a l k e d about t h a t h e r e
because i t r e a l l y i s n ' t p e r t i n e n t t o t h e g e n e r a l o p e r a t i o n , b u t t h e r e does
come a t i m e i n a long, 8-12 hour o p e r a t i o n a t 35,000 t o 39,000 f e e t , where a n
underload does occur. For t h i s r e a s o n w e a c t u a l l y f i n d a n o p e r a t i o n t h a t i s
l e s s t h a n t h e b e s t , and i t creates a l e v e l - f l i g h t complacency, i f you w i l l .
I t ' s a s u b j e c t t h a t t h o s e of you who are involved i n long-range o p e r a t i o n
might want t o d i s c u s s some day.

178
 I t ' s a n i n t e r e s t i n g phenomenon t h a t , i f w e d i d n ' t p r o v i d e something
r e l a t i v e l y important f o r t h a t man t o do p r o c e d u r a l l y d u r i n g t h a t 8-10 hours
w i t h t h i s l e v e l - f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n , m i s t a k e s would be made more o f t e n t h a n i f
w e do p r o v i d e some paperwork.

I n o t i c e d t h a t two p r e s e n t a t i o n s made on t h e s u b j e c t of s e l e c t i o n and

i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g had a number of s i m i l a r i t i e s as w e l l as some d i f f e r e n c e s ,
and perhaps some of you would l i k e t o comment on t h o s e . I n o t i c e d t h a t i n
r e g a r d t o t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s , t h e y b o t h i n d i c a t e d t h a t w e a r e n o t doing i t
w e l l now, even t h o s e a i r l i n e s which have done a l o t of r e s e a r c h on t h i s . I
t h i n k i t w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t even a t United, a company t h a t has
done a g r e a t d e a l of work on s e l e c t i o n and h a s done a l o t of i n v e s t i g a t i o n of
t h e b e s t methods and procedures t o u s e - f o r g i v e m e i f I quote you wrong,
Ed - b u t I b e l i e v e t h a t i t w a s s t a t e d t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s of r e s o u r c e manage-
ment r e a l l y w a s n o t looked i n t o w e l l a s p a r t of your s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s .
Would you l i k e t o comment on t h a t , Ed?

CAPT. CARROLL: I b e l i e v e Bob made t h a t comment i n h i s summary, s o

I'll d e f e r t o Bob.

CAPT. CRUMP, United: I t h i n k i t ' s t r u e ; w e looked r i g h t p a s t t h a t .

W e looked a t some of t h e t h i n g s t h a t a r e p a r t of r e s o u r c e management; b u t
a f t e r s e v e r a l y e a r s of i n v e s t i g a t i o n and l o o k i n g a t a l l of t h e d i f f e r e n t
aspects of s e l e c t i o n , w e never zeroed i n on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t p e r se.

I t h i n k we've g o t good people b u t I t h i n k w e have them because of o t h e r

r e a s o n s . We've g o t people who are going t o be a b l e t o accommodate q u i t e
w e l l t o r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g because t h e y are experienced and
i n t e l l i g e n t . We're going t o come o u t p r e t t y w e l l w i t h our p r e s e n t group,
b u t i f w e g e t i n t o a p e r i o d when o u r c a n d i d a t e s have lower q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , I
t h i n k w e would f i n d o u t t h a t w e had a d e f i c i e n c y i n our s e l e c t i o n system.
W e w i l l go back now w i t h what we've l e a r n e d h e r e and begin t o modify t h e
program t o i n c l u d e an e v a l u a t i o n of r e s o u r c e management c a p a b i l i t i e s and
potential.

CAPT. FRINK: I t h i n k i t ' s v e r y i n t e r e s t i n g t o mention t h a t r i g h t

o f f t h e b a t we're f o c u s i n g on i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g whereas I ' m s u r e w e a l l came
i n h e r e w i t h o u t t h e i d e a of command t r a i n i n g as p a r t of t h i s . I f w e go o u t
of h e r e w i t h n o t h i n g more, w e know t h a t what w e have l e a r n e d i s t h a t
r e s o u r c e management e x t e n d s a l l t h e way from t h e t o p t o t h e bottom of o u r
a v i a t i o n c a r e e r s , and w e have a v e r y d e f i n i t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o c a r r y on
t r a i n i n g r i g h t from t h e beginning.

I t ' s i n t e r e s t i n g a l s o t o n o t e t h a t w i t h t h e l i m i t e d amount of t i m e t h a t
w e have had, t h e q u a l i t y of t h e d i s c u s s i o n s t h a t have been s t i m u l a t e d h a s
been o u t s t a n d i n g . The r a p i d r a t e a t which w e have reached consensus on t h e
need f o r t h i s workshop i s a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g . There have been some
d i f f e r e n c e s expressed t h i s morning, and I hope t h a t by your q u e s t i o n s and
comments on t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s w e c a n e x p l o r e f u r t h e r t h e how of t r a i n i n g f o r
r e s o u r c e management.

179
 Is t h e r e anyone who would l i k e t o comment f u r t h e r on t h a t ? A r e t h e r e
any q u e s t i o n s about some of t h e d i f f e r e n c e s ? There w a s a s u g g e s t i o n , f o r
i n s t a n c e , t h a t w e might p l a y back a u d i o t a p e s of a c c i d e n t s i n o r d e r t o
demonstrate t h e problem of l a c k of proper communication i n t h e c o c k p i t and
i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a c c i d e n t s . It o c c u r r e d t o m e t h a t t h i s i s a v e r y
s e n s i t i v e t h i n g . Bob, d i d your group have any d i s c u s s i o n on t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y
of such tapes; t h a t i s , whether t h e y might be made g e n e r a l l y a v a i l a b l e ?

DR. HOUSTON: T h i s i s a technique t h a t i s being used, and w e r a i s e d

t h a t q u e s t i o n . B i l l Traub, would you l i k e t o comment on t h a t by any chance?

CAPT. TRAUB, United A i r l i n e s : I merely p o i n t e d o u t t h a t d u r i n g

our r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g now, w e r e p l a y t h e S a l t Lake C i t y a c c i d e n t i n c l u d i n g
t h e tapes t h a t are a v a i l a b l e , communications w i t h ATC, and w i t h t h e company.
I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e t a p e s and a u d i o program, w e show t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e
a i r p l a n e d u r i n g approximately t h e l a s t 20 min of t h e f l i g h t . I t h i n k i t ' s
gone over v e r y w e l l .

CAPT. FRINK: I can a t t e s t t o t h a t . I t h i n k t h a t w e owe United

A i r l i n e s a r e a l d e b t of g r a t i t u d e f o r making up t h a t a u d i o v i s u a l program, and
making i t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e i n d u s t r y . Every airman i n our company has s e e n
t h a t , w i t h a n a p p r o p r i a t e commentary t h a t t h i s could be you; i t ' s been v e r y
e f f e c t i v e and very w e l l r e c e i v e d .

T h e r e ' s no q u e s t i o n i n my mind whatever, and I ' m s u r e t h e o t h e r s h e r e

w i l l a g r e e , t h a t such programs a r e v e r y h e l p f u l . The problem i s how do w e
g e t them? Everyone i s n ' t going t o b e q u i t e as generous o r q u i t e a s a b l e t o
p r e p a r e t h a t kind of program. Perhaps t h i s is something NASA o r someone else
could do f o r u s .

DR. HOUSTON: I d o n ' t t h i n k you mentioned t h e f a c t t h a t you j u s t

p l a y t h e t a p e back. You d o n ' t make any c r i t i c a l comments, you d o n ' t p o i n t
f i n g e r s , you j u s t l e t t h e crewmen l i s t e n t o t h i s and make t h e i r own
judgment, and t h a t ' s t h e message.

CAPT. TRAUB: T h e r e ' s no e d i t o r i a l comment whatsoever; i t ' s ex-

tremely e f f e c t i v e .

CAPT. FRINK: T h a t ' s r i g h t , i t ' s v e r y e f f e c t i v e . This is p u r e l y

and simply t h e c o c k p i t v o i c e r e c o r d e r being played back, w i t h some o v e r r i d e
of t h e tower t a p e s and some v i s u a l s t o go a l o n g w i t h i t t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e
case. Very, v e r y e f f e c t i v e program.

MAJOR BURGH, USAF: W e d o n ' t have t h e v o i c e t a p e c a p a b i l i t y , b u t w e

do do t h i s . W e have about f o u r d i f f e r e n t anatomies of a c c i d e n t s t h a t w e go
through p r i m a r i l y f o r crew c o o r d i n a t i o n , checking a l t i t u d e s , checking
d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , from a c c i d e n t s t h a t have happened. And w e b a s i c a l l y go
through t h e screwup w i t h t h e s l i d e s , t h e n s t o p and d i s c u s s . T h i s h'as gone
over v e r y w e l l , and i t b r i n g s t h e problems o u t . W e d o n ' t know i f i t h e l p s
much a f t e r t h a t , b u t i t does b r i n g everybody's a t t e n t i o n t o i t .

180
 CAPT. FRINK: T h a t ' s v e r y t r u e , I know most of t h e a i r l i n e s have a n
a c c i d e n t r e p o r t c a p a b i l i t y , and airmen eat t h a t up. And i t is a form of
management t r a i n i n g - t h e r e ' s no q u e s t i o n about i t -
r e s o u r c e management.
And you see t h e l a c k of u s e of t h a t d r a m a t i c a l l y i n i t s e f f e c t .

CAPT. GILSTRAP, United A i r l i n e s : I t h i n k t h e r e are some pre-

c a u t i o n s t h a t you have t o t a k e which I t h i n k w e d i d . W e waited u n t i l a l l
t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n w a s p u b l i c knowledge anyway, s o t h e r e ' s no d i v u l g i n g of any
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t wouldn't overwise b e a v a i l a b l e . I n f a c t , t h e t a p e s and t h e
p r e s e n t a t i o n o n l y make p u b l i c knowledge more a c c u r a t e by i t s p r e s e n t a t i o n .
T h e r e f o r e , any crewmembers who see i t are o n l y l o o k i n g a t t h e most a c c u r a t e
p r e s e n t a t i o n of what r e a l l y took p l a c e . I t ' s much more a c c u r a t e t h a n
p r e v i o u s i n f o r m a t i o n t h e y might have h e a r d , o b v i o u s l y much more a c c u r a t e
t h a n newspaper accounts o r a n y t h i n g . Consequently, i t ' s an u p d a t i n g on a
permanent b a s i s of t h e most a c c u r a t e t y p e of p r e s e n t a t i o n you can g e t of w h a t
took place a t a d i s a s t e r . A s a r e s u l t , i t becomes more a c c e p t a b l e f o r crew
consumption t h a n i t would i f i t were i n any way inflammatory, even though t h e
n a t u r e of i t might b e s l i g h t l y s o because of what took p l a c e . But, a t l e a s t ,
w e ' r e doing i t w i t h g r e a t , g r e a t care f o r accuracy, and I t h i n k t h a t ' s v e r y
important f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of p i l o t s as a group i n t h e p r o f e s s i o n .

CAPT. FRINK: I a g r e e w i t h you. A s I mentioned b e f o r e , t h a t w a s

v e r y , very w e l l done. I s t h e r e anyone else who would l i k e t o comment on
a n y t h i n g else t o any of t h e o t h e r members of o u r p a n e l t h i s a f t e r n o o n ?

CAPT. CRUMP: Our group w a s i n t e r e s t e d i n f i n d i n g o u t how our

recommendation on t h i s r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t t h a t w e o u t l i n e d w a s r e c e i v e d by
o t h e r groups. I f you remember, w e w e r e i n t e r e s t e d i n having a n e u t r a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n , s p e c i f i c a l l y , NASA, do t h i s r e s e a r c h i n e s t a b l i s h i n g s t a n d a r d s
f o r r e s o u r c e management, b o t h i n measuring t h e l e v e l of a p p l i c a n t s and a l s o
t h e p o t e n t i a l . I wondered i f t h e r e i s any comment from anyone i n any of t h e
o t h e r groups about how you r e c e i v e d t h a t i d e a ? W e a r e wondering whether t h i s
e n t i r e group would s u b s c r i b e t o t h a t , would endorse i t . I f i t d i d , I t h i n k
t h e recommendation would have more weight, and t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e s e a r c h
program t a k i n g p l a c e might b e s i g n i f i c a n t l y improved.

CAPT. FRINK: Does anybody have any comment on t h a t ? How do you

f e e l about NASA l o o k i n g i n t o t h i s ?

CAPT. TRAUB: I t h i n k you proposed, Bob, a j o i n t Industry/NASA

committee, r i g h t ?

CAPT. CRUME': That's r i g h t .

CAPT. TRAUB: I l i k e t h a t idea.

CAPT. FRINK: How would s u c h a committee be s e l e c t e d ? T h i s i s

something t h a t , b a s i c a l l y , two groups almost d i s a g r e e d on. One group w a s
s p e c i f i c on a group of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t they f e l t ought t o b e looked f o r
i n t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s as r e l a t e d t o r e s o u r c e management, whereas t h e o t h e r
group s a y s w e are i n t h e d a r k about t h a t , e f f e c t i v e l y , and s a i d i t ought t o
be researched.

181
 Do you t h i n k t h a t t h e r e i s a need f o r r e s e a r c h i n g t h i s , o r do you f e e l
c o n f i d e n t from what w e have come up w i t h , t h a t you can go back t o your air-
l i n e and, based on t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t w e have gleaned from t h e s e few days,
develop a b e t t e r code f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s ? O r do you f e e l t h a t i t i s
n e c e s s a r y f o r NASA and o t h e r s t o g e t i n t o some r e s e a r c h on t h i s ?

MR. WHITE: Y o u ' l l remember, I s a i d i n t h e r e p o r t on o u r working

group d i s c u s s i o n , t h a t i t goes r i g h t back t o s e l e c t i o n . When w e were d i s -
c u s s i n g s e l e c t i o n , w e happened t o have Bob Helmreich r i g h t i n w i t h u s . W e
had a l r e a d y l i s t e d a l l t h e s e t r a i n i n g requirements i n communications and
problem s o l v i n g and s o on and so f o r t h t h a t I mentioned, and w e asked him i f
i t w a s p o s s i b l e t o have any measurement f o r s e l e c t i o n under t h o s e areas and
he s a i d yes. So o b v i o u s l y some r e s e a r c h has been done.

MR. COEN, FAA: I ' m a l l f o r f o l l o w i n g up. That w a s o u r g r o u p ' s

recommendation, t h a t w e do p u t NASA t o work. And w e came up w i t h many good
programs h e r e . W e see t h a t some people are a l r e a d y working on some programs,
and some are n o t working on i t . Some have good programs, some have mediocre
programs, b u t t h e r e i s no s t a n d a r d i n t h e i n d u s t r y .

I b e l i e v e t h a t w i t h some recommendations from somebody l i k e NASA o r an

IndustryINASA committee t o develop an i n d u s t r y s t a n d a r d , i t would g i v e you
people i n t r a i n i n g a b i g g e r s t i c k t o go back t o your company and s a y , "This
i s what t h e i n d u s t r y as a whole i s doing." W e o f t e n hear t h a t w e c a n ' t g e t
t h e money from top management, t h a t w e need some s t i m u l u s t o a p p l y t o them.
Following t h i s workshop I t h i n k most of t h e people h e r e w i l l go back and do
something. We'll s t i l l wind up w i t h a good, b e t t e r , and b e s t , b u t I t h i n k
t h a t by coming up w i t h a n i n d u s t r y s t a n d a r d , w e can a l l a t l e a s t d e r i v e a
mark p r e t t y h i g h above t h e middle.

CAPT. FRINK: George, w h i l e y o u ' r e t h e r e , I wanted t o mention t h a t

i t h a s been mentioned t o m e by a few people t h a t t h e r e i s a danger, a r i s k
i n coming up w i t h , what should I s a y , a n i n d u s t r y recommendation f o r some-
t h i n g l i k e t h i s ; t h a t t h i s w i l l b e l a t c h e d o n t o by t h e r e g u l a t o r y a g e n c i e s ,
and become a requirement i n some form. A new r e g u l a t i o n w i l l come o u t and
i n s t e a d of Appendix E and F, w e ' l l have E , F, and 6. Would you l i k e t o
comment on t h a t ? I s a i d , "No, i t wouldn't happen," b u t maybe I ' m n a i v e .

MR. COEN: T h a t ' s always a risk, A l . I n c i d e n t a l l y , I t h i n k one of

t h e t h i n g s t h a t came o u t h e r e , t h a t a l o t of p e o p l e were n o t aware o f , i s t h e
f a c t t h a t w e d i d go ahead and make a s p o t change i n t h a t r e g u l a t i o n j u s t t o
a l l o w LOFT t r a i n i n g , and w e d i d t h i s q u i t e some t i m e ago. I know t h e r e ' s a
l o t of p e o p l e i n t h i s room who a r e n o t aware of t h a t . Some of t h e papers
r e f e r r e d t o exemptions, t h e Northwest exemption, and Captain Beach, of c o u r s e ,
hoped t o g e t a n exemption. So t h a t w a s a good r e g u l a t i o n . It loosened
t h i n g s up, gave you t h r e e c h o i c e s of ways t o perform your p r o f i c i e n c y
training.

But I d o n ' t i n t e n d t o go back and recoxmend t h a t somebody come up w i t h a

new r e g u l a t i o n t o make a s t a n d a r d , a l t h o u g h w e are o u t a l r e a d y w i t h a
b u l l e t i n t h a t w e s e n t t o our p r i n c i p a l i n s p e c t o r s , t e l l i n g them t o recommend

182
t o t h e company t h a t they do come up w i t h some kind of r e s o u r c e management
t r a i n i n g f o r t h e c a p t a i n , o r command t r a i n i n g , c a l l i t what you w i l l . We are
a l r e a d y on r e c o r d as recommending t h a t , b u t w e d i d n ' t go any f u r t h e r .

Of c o u r s e , what NTSB does sometimes h a s some of our people jump through

a hoop. W e t r y t o jump o u t a g a i n sometimes, b u t I d o n ' t r e a l l y see any
regulatory process r e s u l t i n g .

CAPT. FRINK: A c t u a l l y , I t h i n k t h a t t h e FAA does have a n o b l i g a -

t i o n t o pay some a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s s u b j e c t ; I d o n ' t t h i n k i t ' s a n y t h i n g t h e y
can i g n o r e . On t h e o t h e r hand, i f w e l e t o u r s e l v e s b e d e t e r r e d i n f e a r of
s p e c i f i c r e g u l a t i o n s , I t h i n k t h a t w e , o u r s e l v e s , are i g n o r i n g our
responsibility. I f w e have two b a t t l e s on our hands, t h e n w e have two b a t t l e s
on o u r hands. W e have t o f a c e t h e i s s u e of a recognized need, and I t h i n k
t h a t ' s what w e a r e doing i n t h i s forum. I hope t h a t w e a l l i n t e n d t o go back
and a p p l y i t .

I d o n ' t want t o n e e d l e s s l y extend t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . I f t h o s e of you who

are h e r e f e e l t h a t t h e r e p o r t s t h i s morning can s t a n d on t h e i r own f e e t , and
t h a t t h e y should be g i v e n t o NASA f o r a n a l y s i s and f o r review and f o r
recommendations, w e can c a r r y on w i t h t h a t . I know t h a t John has some o t h e r
matters he would l i k e t o g e t t o , and I w i l l t u r n i t back t o him i f t h e r e a r e
no o t h e r comments.

CAPT. JOHANNESSEN, Scandinavian A i r l i n e s : W i l l w e g e t t h e s e

r e p o r t s d i s t r i b u t e d ? W i l l you m u l t i p l y them and send them t o u s a f t e r w a r d s ?

CAPT. FRINK: Y e s , t h i s w i l l be done. It w i l l t a k e some t i m e

because t h e r e ' s a long e d i t i n g p r o c e s s t h a t w i l l have t o b e done and I would
guess i t would be a matter of t h r e e o r f o u r months b e f o r e . . . .

DR. LAUBER: Not t h a t l o n g , b u t i t ' s going t o t a k e a w h i l e .

CAF'T. FRINK: But t h e r e w i l l b e a r e p o r t o u t from t h i s meeting,

yes.

CAPT. TURLINGTON, Pan Am: One of my p o i n t s i s I j u s t hope t h a t

NASA s t a y s involved i n t h i s t h i n g . I can imagine a l l i n d i v i d u a l a i r l i n e s
r e t u r n i n g t o t h e i r own b a s e s and embarking on t h e s e programs on t h e i r own,
b u t I c a n ' t imagine t h a t t h a t ' s t h e most e f f e c t i v e way t o g e t t h e most o u t of
t h e r e s o u r c e s t h a t w e have c o l l e c t i v e l y . That's the big difference I ' v e
seen today. I hope t h e y s t a y i n t h e program.

DR. LAUBER: That raises a q u e s t i o n t h a t you brought up t h i s

morning, A l , t h a t I ' d l i k e t o h e a r some c l a r i f i c a t i o n on. A t one p o i n t , you
i n d i c a t e d something a b o u t o t h e r a i r l i n e s who w e r e n ' t p r e s e n t . Would you care
t o expound on what you had i n mind by t h a t ?

DR. BILLINGS, Ames Research Center: You s a i d v e r y s p e c i f i c a l l y

t h a t you would - I w r o t e i t down -
w i l l b e a s k i n g NASA f o r something f o r
o t h e r carriers.

183
 C U T . FRINK: I t h i n k i t ' s obvious t h a t my meaning t h e r e w a s I
t h i n k t h e r e ' s a g r e a t d e a l of v a l u e i n t h i s , and i t ' s a v a l u e t h a t extends t o
a l l t h e i n d u s t r y . They a l l could n o t b e h e r e f o r v a r i o u s r e a s o n s . Some of
them d o n ' t have t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o send members of t h e i r s t a f f h e r e , and some
of them are n o t r e a l l y aware enough of t h e importance of t h i s t o a t t e n d .
Which d o e s n ' t mean t h a t i f w e do a n e f f e c t i v e j o b of r e p o r t i n g , t h a t they
won't develop a n i n t e r e s t . And i f w e come o u t w i t h some recommendations, i t
w i l l a s s i s t them i n improving t h e i r programs i n r e s p o n s e t o NASA's guidance.
So, y e s , t h e r e a r e many a i r l i n e s t h a t a r e n o t r e p r e s e n t e d h e r e t h a t w i l l and
should b e n e f i t by t h e proceedings.

MR. DANAHER, NTSB: F u r t h e r t o t h a t , I would assume t h a t c o p i e s of

t h e proceedings w i l l be a v a i l a b l e and might s u g g e s t , a t t h e r i s k of t h e
obvious, t h a t w e t r y t o i n s u r e t h a t a copy g e t s t o a l l scheduled a i r c a r r i e r s
i n t h e U.S. and perhaps do something through IATA toward making them a v a i l -
able for international airlines. Is t h e r e a p l a n ?

DR. LAUBER: Y e s . The d e t a i l s of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n remain t o be

worked o u t , b u t w e c e r t a i n l y would l i k e t o make i t as widely a v a i l a b l e a s
p o s s i b l e . We'll have t o work w i t h you and IATA and o t h e r s t o determine how
t o go about doing t h a t .

CAPT. FRINK: It a p p e a r s t o m e t h a t w e have a tendency a t t h i s

s t a g e of t h e game t o s a y , "This is g r e a t , NASA h a s t o l d u s what w e ought t o
do." I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t ' s a s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n c l u s i o n .

I know from c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h a t l e a s t t h r e e of t h e a i r l i n e s t h a t a r e
r e p r e s e n t e d h e r e , t h a t t h e r e i s every i n t e n t i o n of going back home and
p u t t i n g some s t a f f work i n t o t h i s t o see what w e can come up w i t h o u r s e l v e s .
I do t h i n k that i t would be h e l p f u l t o conduct o u r i n d i v i d u a l a i r l i n e s t a f f
work, and c o o r d i n a t e t h a t work w i t h NASA, so t h a t t h e b e n e f i t s of t h e work
and t h e f i n d i n g s t h a t w e g e t i n d i v i d u a l l y can be made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e rest
of t h e i n d u s t r y . I t h i n k t h a t i t might b e a p p r o p r i a t e i f someone would come
up w i t h a s u g g e s t i o n as t o e x a c t l y how t o do t h a t , i f t h a t i s a worthy
method of doing t h i n g s . What do you t h i n k , John, do you t h i n k t h e r e ' s a way
w e can g e t t o g e t h e r and come up w i t h recommendations on t h i s ?

DR. LAUBER: Y e s , I s u s p e c t t h a t ' s p o s s i b l e . We'll have t o work

o u t t h e mechanism by which w e do so.

CAPT. FRINK: Can you t e l l m e what you a n t i c i p a t e t h e r o l e of NASA

would be? George Coen mentioned t h a t i f w e do e v e r y t h i n g t h a t everyone h a s
s u g g e s t e d , w e would have g i v e n NASA enough work t o do f o r t h e n e x t c e n t u r y ,
and A 1 Chambers i s worried. What d i d you see as your r o l e on a c o n t i n u i n g
b a s i s on t h e s u b j e c t of r e s o u r c e management? Al, would you l i k e t o answer
that?

DR. CHAMBERS, NASA: I t h i n k t h a t t o some d e g r e e C h a r l i e i s going

t o a d d r e s s t h a t s u b j e c t , a t least i n t e r m s of t h e i t e m s t h a t have been r a i s e d
h e r e i n t h e l a s t few days. But t h e r e may b e a c o u p l e of areas i n which I

184
t h i n k w e can provide some h e l p immediately. One i s t o c o n t i n u e t o be a
f a c i l i t a t o r f o r a c t i v i t i e s l i k e t h i s one, which w i l l h e l p keep some momentum
going toward r e a l l y g e t t i n g good programs i n s t i t u t e d .

I t h i n k t h e o t h e r may be one where w e t r y and sharpen t h e t o o l s t h a t w e

u s e t o measure how e f f e c t i v e a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y would be, be i t a LOFT-
t y p e s i m u l a t i o n o r be i t some a u d i o v i s u a l a i d s o r some o t h e r t y p e of class-
room a c t i v i t y ; a l l of u s would l i k e t o have a b e t t e r f e e l i n g t h a t t h o s e
t h i n g s t h a t w e are doing a r e t r u l y e f f e c t i v e . And i t may be t h a t w e can
provide some i n s i g h t i n t o t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h o s e d i f f e r e n t techniques
which then you could u s e w i t h more confidence i n planning your own programs.

I t h i n k each a i r l i n e w i l l , i n t h e end, probably i n s t i t u t e a program t h a t

i s s p e c i f i c t o i t s own needs, i t s own t y p e of o p e r a t i o n . I n t h a t c a s e , NASA
can perhaps b e s t p l a y a r o l e i n g i v i n g you some t o o l s t o work w i t h .

CAPT. FRINK: I tend t o a g r e e w i t h t h a t . W e a r e going t o g e t some

h e l p i n t h e form of t h e s e proceedings t h a t w i l l make a v a i l a b l e t o a l l t h e
a i r l i n e s t h e thoughts t h a t have been expressed here. We have been made aware
of t h e o u t s i d e a g e n c i e s t h a t are ready t o a s s i s t i n t h e development of
programs and i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of
programs, and w e w i l l be a b l e t o u t i l i z e t h a t h e l p .

B u t I t h i n k t h e message t h a t w e must g r a s p a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l a i r l i n e s i s
t h a t , b z s i c a l l y , i t i s our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o u s e t h e information t h a t w e have
received i n t h e l a s t few d a y s , and t h a t w e w i l l receive from NASA a s a
r e s u l t of t h i s meeting, and develop o u r programs. And w e w i l l c o n t i n u e t o
communicate through ATA and IATA and t h e i r committees a s t o t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s
of our v a r i o u s programs.

CAPT. BEACH: Could I a d d r e s s t h i s t o John. From t h i s meeting

t h e r e w i l l be prepared a d i g e s t of a l l t h a t w e have s a i d and done. I would
l i k e t o see s p e c i f i c i t e m s l i s t e d t h e r e , f o r i n s t a n c e , American A i r l i n e s
t r a n s a c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s program, s o t h a t w e might communicate among o u r s e l v e s
without going up through NASA and back down on t h e k i n d s of t h i n g s
s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t a r e of i n t e r e s t perhaps t o my c a r r i e r . I t h i n k they can
perform a s e r v i c e a s a c l e a r i n g house of i n f o r m a t i o n t o be made a v a i l a b l e t o
u s , conveying o t h e r p o i n t s of view w e may n o t have considered. I ’ d l i k e t o
see t h a t s p e c i f i c a l l y when t h e f i n a l product comes o u t of t h i s meeting.

DR. LAUBER: Your u s e of t h e word c l e a r i n g h o u s e i s most appro-

p r i a t e ; t h a t ’ s one of t h e r o l e s w e see o u r s e l v e s p l a y i n g and t h a t i s e x a c t l y
t h e i n t e n t , t o make t h e s e proceedings a s o u r c e book s o t h a t o t h e r s can, f o r
example, l e a r n t h a t J a c k Mansfield, of American, h a s a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l s k i l l s
t r a i n i n g program and go d i r e c t l y t o him. W e d o n ’ t i n t e n d t o be i n t h a t p a t h
at all.

C U T . BEACH: F u r t h e r , I t h i n k i t might b e of v a l u e , once w e

examine our c u r r e n t programs, t o g e t back tc; you on how w e have changed i t .
I n t h a t way w e could see t h e t r e n d s t h a t t h e i n d u s t r y may be t a k i n g , what w e
f e l t we g o t from t h i s meeting t h a t i n f l u e n c e d u s t o do i t d i f f e r e n t l y from
now on.
185
 CAPT. CARROLL: That s p e c i f i c a l l y , I t h i n k , came o u t i n o u r working
group d e l i b e r a t i o n s . The p o i n t i s t h a t a l t h o u g h you are going t o be a
c l e a r i n g house, John, f o r c o l l a t i n g a l l t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n and d i s p e n s i n g i t t o
u s , i t s h o u l d n ' t end t h e r e . There should b e some t i m e l y o r p e r i o d i c c o n t a c t
t h a t you now make w i t h a l l a i r l i n e s and you would s a y , "We gave you t h i s
i n f o r m a t i o n , w e understood you had c e r t a i n p l a n s f o r implementation. Please
a d v i s e u s of t h e p r o g r e s s you have made o r t h e problems you have r u n i n t o , "
and you would a g a i n d i s s e m i n a t e t h a t information. T h a t ' s how w e d i s c u s s e d
it.

Otherwise, w e would g e t t o t h e p o i n t where w e s a t and jawboned f o r e v e r

about t h i s and n o t h i n g f u r t h e r would be done because of t h e p r e s s u r e s w e a r e
under, t h e economic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w e are c o n f r o n t e d w i t h , o r t h e work l o a d .
I ' d l i k e t o see a c o n t i n u i n g r e f l e c t i o n of clearing-house o p e r a t i o n .

CAPT. FRINK: T h a t ' s e x a c t l y r i g h t . T h i s i s what I meant when I

asked you, John, about your ongoing i n t e n t i o n . This i s t h e s o r t of t h i n g w e
have t o have.

DR. LAUBER: One of t h e q u e s t i o n s (on t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e ) has t o do

w i t h whether a d d i t i o n a l workshops of t h i s kind might b e a n a p p r o p r i a t e t h i n g .
Of c o u r s e , t h a t is one way of doing i t r a t h e r t h a n u s going o u t t o t h e
c a r r i e r s , t h a t i s , t o b r i n g t h e c a r r i e r s i n as a group on some r e c u r r e n t
b a s i s t o p e r i o d i c a l l y review p r o g r e s s and new problems, new developments, and
what e v e r .

One of t h e t h i n g s we'd l i k e some feedback on i s how t o accomplish t h a t .

The workshop approach i s o n l y one p o s s i b l e way; t h e r e are many o t h e r t h i n g s
t h a t might be p o s s i b l e , and your s u g g e s t i o n s on how w e might b e s t do t h a t
would b e a p p r e c i a t e d .

CAPT. CARROLL: T h a t ' s a l w a y s good and I t h i n k I ' m i n f a v o r of

c o n t i n u i n g a v e h i c l e of t h i s type. But n o t everyone c a n a v a i l themselves of
t h i s , and w e d o n ' t want t o keep i t i n one small group. We want t o extend i t
t o o t h e r s , b o t h f o r t h e i r advantage and f o r feedback.

CAPT. FRINK: I t h i n k t h a t workshops l i k e t h i s are o u t s t a n d i n g t o

s t i m u l a t e t h e kind of i n t e r e s t w e have had i n t h e l a s t few days. Now i t
behooves u s t o go back and s t a r t g e t t i n g programs i n t o being. Then w e w i l l
p e r i o d i c a l l y b e i n c o n t a c t w i t h you and work w i t h you, and d e t e r m i n e what of
U n i t e d ' s work, Pan Am's work, American's work, h a s been e f f e c t i v e , and what
they have done. We'll b e i n touch w i t h you i n a y e a r . And i f w e d o n ' t g e t
i n touch w i t h you d i r e c t l y as i n d i v i d u a l a i r l i n e s , t h e n a q u e s t i o n n a i r e
should be s e n t by you a s k i n g what w e have done and how e f f e c t i v e i t h a s been.
The r e s p o n s e t o t h a t q u e s t i o n n a i r e from a l l t h e a i r l i n e s would b e h e l p f u l .

I f u l l y a g r e e t h a t t h e r e is a t e n d e m y f o r a l l of u s , r e g a r d l e s s of our
good i n t e n t i o n s , t o go back and g e t locked up i n o u r problems. I t ' s
d i f f i c u l t t o p u t some of t h e s e t h i n g s i n t o p r a c t i c e i n t h e manner i n which w e
i n t e n d t o do s o , and some s p u r s t o t h a t would b e h e l p f u l . Also, I ' m s u r e

186
everyone h e r e a g r e e s t h a t w e c a n ' t a f f o r d t o waste e f f o r t s , w e c a n ' t a f f o r d
t o go t h e wrong way, w e c a n ' t a f f o r d t o go i n t o m e t h o d s - t h a t are n o t
effective.

I i n t e n d t o s t u d y a l l of t h i s material, and t h e r e ' s going t o be some

t h a t t h e e x p e r t i s e i n t h i s room h a s agreed would be a good way t o go. T h a t ' s
probably t h e way w e ' l l s t a r t , w i t h t h e s o l i d , s a f e , agreed-upon b e s t methods,
b u t then I want t o f i n d o u t what o t h e r people a r e doing and what i s e f f e c t i v e .
Sometimes t h a t ' s hard t o measure. A s American A i r l i n e s i n d i c a t e d , t h e r e i s
no way t h a t they can d i r e c t l y measure t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r i n t e r -
p e r s o n a l s k i l l s programs. $ut w e are agreed t h a t such programs a r e good, and
t h a t w e should l e t each a i r l i n e develop i t i n i t s own way.

C U T . CRUMP: I j u s t want t o p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e r e a r e n o t v e r y many

a v i a t i o n p s y c h o l o g i s t s i n t h i s c o u n t r y ; t h a t ' s a n area of e x p e r t i s e i n my
e x p e r i e n c e t h a t i s r e a l l y l a c k i n g . The gentlemen t h a t were h e r e , both Bob
Helmreich and L e e Bolman, were n o t a v i a t i o n p s y c h o l o g i s t s ; they w e r e people
who work i n a s s o c i a t e d f i e l d s . But t h e r e i s probably as much e x p e r t i s e
w i t h i n NASA i n t h i s area as t h e r e i s i n t h e rest of t h e c o u n t r y combined,
and I t h i n k w e should f o c u s on t h a t . We're t a l k i n g about each of u s
developing our programs. I know how hard i t i s t o f i n d people i n t h a t f i e l d
who a r e t r u l y e x p e r t , t o g i v e you t h e kind of i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t you need t o
measure t h e program t h a t y o u ' r e developing.

We can measure i t a g a i n s t our e x p e r t i s e and a g a i n s t what o t h e r people

a r e d o i n g , b u t i n some c a s e s , i t ' s t h e b l i n d l e a d i n g t h e b l i n d . I would
c e r t a i n l y hope t h a t NASA would c o n s i d e r doing some b a s i c r e s e a r c h i n t h i s
whole area of r e s o u r c e management. Maybe I ' m h a r p i n g on t h a t same o l d t h i n g
a g a i n , b u t w e d o n ' t have a l o t of c h o i c e when i t comes t o looking f o r people
who c a n g i v e u s t h e kind of e x p e r t h e l p w e need. I t h i n k w e should do what
w e c a n t o u r g e t h e NASA o r g a n i z a t i o n t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h i s way, as w e l l a s
be a c l e a r i n g house and t h e o t h e r t h i n g s w e have asked them t o do.

MR. COEN: I guess t h e q u e s t i o n is how much t i m e and manpower c a n

NASA p u t i n t o something l i k e t h i s w i t h i n t h e i r budgetary and manpower
r e s t r a i n t s w i t h o u t some s o r t of a c h a r t e r from i n d u s t r y . Somebody i s going
t o have t o mandate t h i s . I d o n ' t t h i n k they c a n j u s t go a l o n g .

CAPT. FRINK: I a g r e e , i t ' s something w e are going t o have t o t a l k

a b o u t . There may b e a way of doing t h a t ; I d o n ' t know e x a c t l y what i t is.
A l , do you have a n y t h i n g t o s a y about t h a t ?

DR. CHAMBERS: I ' d r a t h e r l e a v e t h a t t o you and George. I t ' s a v e r y

s e r i o u s problem. I guess i t ' s t h e r e a s o n why w e are h e r e t r y i n g t o l i s t e n ,
t o understand what i t i s t h a t you t h i n k i s most i m p o r t a n t , because t h e r e a r e
l o t s of t h i n g s t o work on. They need t o b e p r i o r i t i z e d i n some way, some
s o r t of message b e passed on t o NASA as t o t h e ones t h a t are most u r g e n t .
I ' m t a l k i n g a b o u t NASA i n i t s formal s e n s e . Headquarters should be t o l d t h a t
t h e s e are i s s u e s t h a t t h e i n d u s t r y and t h a t o u r sister a g e n c i e s f e e l are

187
important i s s u e s , and t h a t they would l i k e t o have NASA t a k e a l o o k a t them.
But c e r t a i n l y you should h e l p u s g e t t h e support t h a t w e need t o , i n t u r n ,
support you people.

CAPT. FRINK: I w a s going t o c a l l on George Cooper i n j u s t a moment

anyway because I wanted, b e f o r e w e terminated our d i s c u s s i o n t h i s a f t e r n o o n ,
t o a s k George how he f e e l s about t h e way t h i n g s have gone. George r e a l l y i s
t h e mentor of t h i s meeting. We have him t o thank f o r t h e f a c t t h a t w e a r e
h e r e a t a l l , and I want t o know whether you a r e s a t i s f i e d w i t h your e f f o r t s ,
George?

MR. COOPER, 6. E . Cooper Associates: W e l l , " s a t i s f a c t i o n " d o e s n ' t

e x p r e s s my f e e l i n g s a d e q u a t e l y because from what I have observed t h i s h a s
gone way beyond my g r e a t e s t e x p e c t a t i o n s . A s a matter of f a c t , w e are
d e a l i n g i n an area t h a t ' s d i f f i c u l t t o g e t a hold on, and i f i t h a d n ' t been
f o r t h e d i r e c t i n p u t t h a t w e r e c e i v e d from a number of you people i n t h e
i n d u s t r y , encouraging u s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , why I doubt t h a t I would have had
t h e a u d a c i t y t o propose t h a t we do i t . I t ' s a s i t u a t i o n of h e l p i n g you t o
s o l v e your own problems and, of course, doing whatever w e can g i v e s u s
s a t i s f a c t i o n as w e l l .

CAPT. FRINK: Did you have a q u e s t i o n ?

MR. COOPER: I d i d n ' t have a q u e s t i o n ; I had a statement w i t h

r e s p e c t t o how t o g e t t h e support f o r what you want NASA t o do. It j u s t s o
happens t h a t r i g h t now t h e r e ' s a meeting going on a t Goddard of t h e
Aeronautical Research Council of NASA. T h i s y e a r they have r e i n s t i t u t e d many
of t h e r e s e a r c h technology a d v i s o r y committees and subcommittees on a n ad hoc
b a s i s , t o t r e a t t h i s v e r y s u b j e c t of what should NASA be doing. There's been
a l o t of e f f o r t p u t i n t o i t .

One way t o g e t your i n p u t i n t o t h e system, i f you have s p e c i f i c recom-

mendations, i s through people l i k e J . D. Smith, of United, who i s Chairman
of t h e Committee on Operating Systems and S a f e t y . T h a t ' s one way. Of
c o u r s e , t h e r e a r e o t h e r ways, I wouldn't l e a v e i t j u s t t o t h a t .

CAPT. FRINK: I ' m going t o j u s t sum t h i s up i n a couple of words,

and s a y t h a t i n t h e l a s t t h r e e o r f o u r days w e have l e a r n e d a l o t . W e have
a l s o l e a r n e d what w e d o n ' t know, and what w e h a v e n ' t done, and I t h i n k t h a t
t h a t ' s almost a s important as t h e s p e c i f i c s t h a t w e have l e a r n e d . We've
g o t t e n a s t a r t , and w e know where we have t o go.

The t a s k t h a t is l e f t t o u s r i g h t now i s an extremely important one.

W e i d e n t i f y a n area i n need of t r a i n i n g , as we have s o c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e d
t h i s one, and w e have i d e n t i f i e d how important i t i s t o t h e s a f e t y of our
o p e r a t i o n s . W e have i d e n t i f i e d t h a t t h e need f o r t r a i n i n g goes r i g h t from
s e l e c t i o n , through t h e upgrade t r a i n i n g and r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g , and
throughout t h e a i r m a n ' s career. I t ' s a new f a c t o r i n f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s , and
i t ' s one t h a t , now t h a t w e know i t , imposes upon u s a v e r y s e r i o u s
responsibility

188
 The d e t a i l s t h a t w e have r e c e i v e d h e r e are important. I ' m s u r e w e are
a l l going t o s t u d y them c a r e f u l l y , and t h a t w e are going t o do something
about i t . Now, what w e have t o do i s t o r e s o l v e t o f o l l o w up and see t h a t
something i s done, s o t h a t t h i s l a c k i s r e s o l v e d . With t h a t , I ' m going t o
a s k John t o come up and t e r m i n a t e t h e proceedings.

189
 SESSION 4

CONCLUDING REMARKS

John K. Lauber, Chairman

SUMMARY OF THE WORKSHOP

C h a r l e s E. B i l l i n g s , M.D.

CLOSING REMARKS

Capt. A . A . F r i n k

191
 CONCLUDING REMARKS

John K. Lauber
*

Thank you, A . And l i k e t o thank you and a l l of t h e working group

chairmen f o r aoing an o u t s t a n d i n g j o b . We gave you a v e r y d i f f i c u l t t a s k ,
knowingly, but I i n d i c a t e d , too, t h a t w e picked our working group chairmen
w i t h a g r e a t d e a l of care, and i t q u i t e obviously p a i d o f f . I t h i n k a l l of
you d i d a n o u t s t a n d i n g j o b w i t h what w a s r e a l l y a v e r y d i f f i c u l t assignment.
A s A 1 and many o t h e r s around m e know, a l o t of u s had some r e s e r v a t i o n s about
how w e l l t h a t p r o c e s s would work. My impression of i t a t t h i s p o i n t i s t h a t
you people found i t u s e f u l , and C h a r l i e B i l l i n g s i s about t o t e l l you w e
found i t e q u a l l y u s e f u l . I ' d l i k e t o have C h a r l i e b r i e f l y summarize our view
of some of t h e r e s e a r c h i s s u e s and p r i o r i t i e s t h a t have come up i n t h i s
workshop, and then w e ' l l c l o s e t h e proceedings.

"Ames Research Center, NASA, M o f f e t t F i e l d , C a l i f o r n i a .

193
 SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP

C h a r l e s E. B i l l i n g s , M.D.
*

Thank you, John. There have been a g r e a t many comments made h e r e i n

what I f e e l i s probably t h e s t r o n g e s t s i n g l e s e t of p r e s e n t a t i o n s w i t h t h e
fewest weak s p o t s t h a t I have e v e r encountered i n t h e 25 y e a r s i n which I ' v e
been going t o v a r i o u s c o n f e r e n c e s . The q u a l i t y of t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n s h a s been
superb and, o b v i o u s l y , t h e amount of work t h a t many of you p u t i n t o them i s
extraordinary.

John h a s given m e a t a s k t h a t seems as i m p o s s i b l e as summarizing t h e

world i n 30 minutes. I ' m n o t going t o subsume t h e world. But a number of
t h i n g s have s t r u c k m e over t h e l a s t 3 days t h a t I ' d l i k e t o c h a t about. Some
of them have been a l l u d e d t o t h i s a f t e r n o o n i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n j u s t completed.

,The f i r s t i s t h a t t h e t h r e e keynote s p e a k e r s , Bob Helmreich, L e e Bolman,

and Mike Garvey worked v i r t u a l l y independently of each o t h e r . Y e t a l l of
them, i n t r y i n g t o g e t t h e i r hands around t h i s t h i n g as t h e y understood i t ,
given t h a t t h e y d i d have c e r t a i n background and b r i e f i n g materials i n
common, found i t n e c e s s a r y t o s e t up a kind of two-way m a t r i x t o t r y t o
c o n c e p t u a l i z e t h e problem. Bob, who t a l k e d f i r s t , t a l k e d about " i n s t r u -
m e n t a l i t y " o r "goal o r i e n t a t i o n " and s o r t of s u g g e s t e d , w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y
drawing u s an x-y g r i d , t h a t t h a t w a s kind of o r t h o g o n a l w i t h ''expresSivity.l'
"Group o r i e n t a t i o n , " I b e l i e v e , was h i s p h r a s e f o r t h a t .

L e e Bolman a c t u a l l y drew u s a l i t t l e two-by-two diagram i n which, on h i s

x-axis, i f you w i l l , h e p u t "advocacy," and t h e n almost equated i t t o "goal
o r i e n t a t i o n . " H i s y-axis w a s "inquiry."

And t h e n Mike y e s t e r d a y t a l k e d about "production" which he p u t on h i s

x-axis. That w a s clear enough. Then h e s o r t of c a t e g o r i z e d t h e rest of t h e
world as "people," and p u t "people" on h i s y-axis. I d o n ' t know whether
t h e r e ' s any s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h e f a c t t h a t a l l t h r e e of t h e s e gentlemen,
having had t r a i n i n g i n psychology and i n e x p e r i m e n t a l methodology, chose as
t h e i r independent a x i s t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y o r p r o d u c t i o n element and put people
on t h e dependent a x i s . I w a s a l i t t l e b i t amused by t h e f a c t t h a t t h a t w a s
t h e way i t w a s drawn. I w a s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e f a c t t h a t none of t h e
s p e a k e r s i n t h e s e t h r e e days have t a l k e d a l o t a b o u t t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y
element. I ' m going t o come back t o t h a t i n a second.

One of t h e t h i n g s t h a t I t h i n k w e ought t o c o n s i d e r i s t h a t I d o n ' t want

t o , and I hope t h a t you won't, g e t hung up on t h e methodology, t h e 9-1, 1-9
business. I t may be t h e g r e a t e s t c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g d e v i c e s i n c e s l i c e d bread,
b u t i t ' s n o t h i n g more t h a n t h a t . I wondered.whether t h e e x p r e s s i v i t y o r
i n q u i r y o r p e o p l e element of t h e s e t h r e e v e r y e f f e c t i v e people who have g i v e n
t h i s a l o t of thought w a s t h e same element. A r e t h e s e t h e same f a c t o r ?

*Ames Research C e n t e r , NASA, M o f f e t t F i e l d , C a l i f o r n i a .

194
 The x-axis a p p e a r s t o be i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y , and I t h i n k w e can s a f e l y
e q u a t e advocacy w i t h p r o d u c t i v i t y . But I ' m n o t q u i t e s u r e about t h e
o r d i n a t e , whether t h o s e o t h e r t h r e e are t h e same t h i n g . If t h e y a r e
d i f f e r e n t , I ' m n o t s u r e whether t h e d i f f e r e n c e s are semantic o r r e a l , and
I ' m n o t s u r e i f i t makes any d i f f e r e n c e e i t h e r , because each of t h e s e i s only
a techrrique f o r t r y i n g t o g e t your hands around a concept t h a t i s a n y t h i n g
but e a s y , a s John and h i s co-workers have found i n t h e l a s t s e v e r a l months.

A s I s a i d , we've heard a l o t of t a l k i n t h e group meetings and elsewhere

about t h e s o c i a l s k i l l s , communications s k i l l s , e t c . , and much less about
production. And I wonder whether t h i s i s simply because w e do g e t t h e j o b
done p r e t t y w e l l . W e g e t t h e j o b done extremely w e l l under most circum-
s t a n c e s , b u t t h e r e a r e s t i l l enough b i t s and p i e c e s of crumpled aluminum
f l o a t i n g around t o i n d i c a t e t h a t w e d o n ' t g e t i t done q u i t e w e l l enough. And
w e s t i l l g e t enough ASRS r e p o r t s of a c c i d e n t s t h a t d i d n ' t happen because of
chance a l o n e t o make u s f e e l a l i t t l e b i t queasy a b o u t being comfortable
w i t h how well we're doing.

One member of t h i s group, n o t p r e s e n t h e r e a t t h e moment, argued t h a t

procedures r e p r e s e n t our only e f f e c t i v e approach t o t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y s i d e of
t h i s box. H e argued t h a t w e c a n ' t expect t o change p e r s o n a l i t i e s , w e c a n ' t
r e a l l y modify a g r e a t d e a l t h e way i n which people t h i n k , and t h a t , there-
f o r e , we have g o t t o do i t w i t h procedures. I t occurred t o m e , i n t h i n k i n g
about i t , t h a t I d o n ' t know what p r o p o r t i o n of t h e t o t a l anomalies t h a t occur
i n a i r c a r r i e r o p e r a t i o n s are t h o s e f o r which we a l r e a d y have procedures,
e i t h e r i m p l i c i t o r e x p l i c i t , and what p r o p o r t i o n of t h i n g s t h a t occur i n l i n e
o p e r a t i o n s a r e t r u l y unforeseen anomalies. I s a y unforeseen a d v i s e d l y
because i f i t had been f o r e s e e n somebody would have w r i t t e n a procedure € o r
t h e t h i n g . I t probably i s n ' t indexed i n t h e f l i g h t manual, b u t somebody h a s
w r i t t e n a procedure j u s t t h e same, because w e have a tendency t o o p e r a t e t h e
system t h i s way. The FAA w r i t e s r u l e s , w e write r u l e s , everybody writes
rules.

I n Bolman's c o n s t r u c t , i t ' s of primary importance t o p r o v i d e people w i t h

t o o l s t h a t h e l p them r e c o g n i z e when t h e r e ' s a d i f f e r e n c e between espoused
t h e o r y and t h e o r y i n u s e : t o h e l p them r e c o g n i z e and a c t on what I ' d l i k e t o
c a l l d i s c o r d , and t o r e s o l v e t h e d i s c o r d w i t h more i n f o r m a t i o n . This busi-
n e s s of being a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e d i s c o r d c e r t a i n l y r e q u i r e s s o c i a l s k i l l s
because w e have g o t t o create a n environment i n which any crew member o r any
r e s o u r c e , whether i t ' s on t h e ground o r i n t h e a i r , i s used e f f e c t i v e l y .
C e r t a i n l y , ASRS h a s t a u g h t u s t h a t a i r t r a f f i c c o n t r o l l e r s under c e r t a i n
circumstances a r e t h e most e f f e c t i v e r e c o g n i z e r s of d i s c o r d t h a t w e have.
J u s t a s you people, i f you r e t a i n a p r o p e r l y s u s p i c i o u s mind, can be
e x c e l l e n t r e c o g n i z e r s of d i s c o r d i n t h e ATC system.

Yes, you've g o t t o have s o c i a l s k i l l s t o create t h e environment i n which

anybody who n o t i c e s d i s c o r d can and i s expected t o announce i t s presence.
But t h e r e may b e many ways t o create t h a t kind of a n environment. No one
approach t o t h i s b u s i n e s s i s going t o work i n a l l c a r r i e r s , because w e have
s e e n t h e v e r y pronounced d i f f e r e n c e s i n management s t y l e and a l l o c a b l e

195
r e s o u r c e s . We've heard about some r a t h e r d i s t i n c t d i f f e r e n c e s i n a l l o c a b l e
r e s o u r c e s f o r t h i s kind of j o b between some of t h e European and some of our
U.S. carriers.

But of e q u a l importance, no one approach w i l l work f o r a l l cap

a l l crewmembers because t h e y are i n d i v i d u a l l y d i f f e r e n t . Probably t h e r e a r e
many more d i f f e r e n c e s among t h e s e p e o p l e whom you have h i r e d and who are
working o u t t h e r e t h a n t h e r e are among a i r carriers. The g o a l h e r e , and I
t h i n k t h e r e i s c e r t a i n l y a consensus on t h i s , i s t o assist aircrewmembers
t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t d i s c o r d a n t s i t u a t i o n s can e x i s t , t o assist them t o create
a n environment t h a t maximizes t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e y w i l l be recognized,
and t o assist them t o create a n approach t h a t w i l l permit them t o diagnose
such d i s c o r d , t o f i n d t h e r e a s o n s why e v e r y t h i n g d o e s n ' t q u i t e add up.

That b r i n g s up a number of i n t e r e s t i n g problems, b o t h i n t r a i n i n g and on

t h e l i n e . One of them, which h a s been a l l u d e d t o t h i s a f t e r n o o n , i s t h a t i t
i s d i f f i c u l t f o r a n i n d i v i d u a l ( p a i n f u l , even) t o r e c o g n i z e t h e d i f f e r e n c e
between what h e t h i n k s h e i s and what he a c t u a l l y i s . Between, if you w i l l ,
espoused t h e o r y and t h e o r y i n use.

One of t h e b e a u t i e s of LOFT is t h a t t h e c a p t a i n and t h e crew g e t t o d i g

t h e i r own h o l e . But I s u s p e c t t h a t when we have g o t t e n i n t o t h i s f a r
enough, one of t h e most s e r i o u s problems w i t h LOFT, f o r t h o s e people whose
r e s o u r c e s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h t h o s e k i n d s of h o l e s a r e m a r g i n a l , i s going t o b e
h e l p i n g them o u t of t h e h o l e , h e l p i n g them t o r e c o g n i z e why t h e y f e l l i n t h e
h o l e i n t h e f i r s t place, and h e l p i n g them t o f i l l i n t h e h o l e . And a l l t h r e e
of t h o s e have g o t t o b e done. T h i s , t o m e , p l a c e s a v e r y c o n s i d e r a b l e burden
on t h e LOFT i n s t r u c t o r s and on t h e i r t r a i n i n g . I d o n ' t know whether w e
should c a l l them i n s t r u c t o r s , o b s e r v e r s , o r maybe c o u n s e l o r s , b u t I t h i n k
t h e r e are going t o b e some people, when we've e v a l u a t e d enough people, t h a t
w e are going t o end up c o u n s e l i n g , r a t h e r t h a n t r a i n i n g o r o b s e r v i n g .

I t h i n k t h e LOFT o b s e r v e r o r i n s t r u c t o r o r c o u n s e l o r o r whatever you

want t o c a l l him h a s g o t t o b e a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e t h e d i f f e r e n c e between a
crewmember who f a l l s i n a h o l e because of a p r o f i c i e n c y problem, and one who
f a l l s i n a h o l e because of a p s y c h o l o g i c a l problem. Remember, we're n o t
aiming a t t h e t o p 5 p e r c e n t of o u r a i r l i n e . W e d o n ' t know any way t o h e l p
them, you d o n ' t know any way t o h e l p them, and t h e y d o n ' t need t h e h e l p .
"If i t a i n ' t broke, d o n ' t f i x it.'' We're t a l k i n g about t h e bottom 15 o r 20
p e r c e n t . It i s important t o r e c o g n i z e t h e d i f f e r e n c e between a p s y c h o l o g i c a l
problem and a p r o f i c i e n c y problem because t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e two may b e
v e r y d i f f e r e n t . T r e a t i n g t h e ozle w i t h t h i n g s t h a t work b e s t f o r t h e o t h e r
may do more harm t h a n good. T h a t , I t h i n k , i s a p o t e n t i a l problem i n t h i s
area.

Another one. I suggested t h a t I d o n ' t t h i n one approach i s going

t o work f o r everyone. The North C e n t r a l p i l o t s i t very p l a i n that they
wanted p r e s c r i p t i o n s . They were u p s e t a b o u t t h e f a c t t h a t more p r e s c r i p t i v e
material wasn't p r e s e n t e d i n t h a t v e r y e x c e l l e n t approach t o t h i s problem.
Well, p r e s c r i p t i o n s may h e l p , b u t one of t h e t h i n g s you l e a r n i n medicine i s

196
t h a t a l l drugs have s i d e e f f e c t s , t h a t you never g e t something f o r n o t h i n g ,
and t h a t n o t h i n g i s going t o work f o r everybody. And t h e r e i n l i e s a v e r y
d i s t i n c t danger i n t h e area of p r e s c r i p t i v e remedies.

I t h i n k i t b r i n g s up a g a i n t h e importance of i n s t r u c t o r s w i t h f l e x i -
b i l i t y , i n s t r u c t o r s who have n o t been t a k e n through a cookbook kind of
c o u r s e i n how t o t e a c h r e s o u r c e management, b u t i n s t r u c t o r s who understand
what they are t a l k i n g a b o u t , and t h a t t h e r e i s more t h a n one way of d e a l i n g
with i t .

I d o n ' t t h i n k i t ' s going t o b e enormously d i f f i c u l t t o e l l u c i d a t e t h e

g o a l s of r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g . I t h i n k t h a t can be done. A g r e a t
d e a l of i t has been done a t t h i s c o n f e r e n c e , and i t w i l l be f a r easier as a
r e s u l t of t h i s c o n f e r e n c e . W e may even be a b l e t o s t a n d a r d i z e t h e g o a l s
somewhere down t h e l i n e .

The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g i s , I t h i n k ,
abundantly c l e a r . The r e a s o n I t h i n k s o , as does John and t h e rest of u s ,
i s because you people have t o l d u s . You s t a r t e d t e l l i n g u s i n 1 9 7 4 i n our
i n i t i a l p i l o t i n t e r v i e w s , t o which John r e f e r r e d . W e d i d n ' t understand by
any means a l l of what you were t e l l i n g u s , and I ' m n o t s u r e w e understand a l l
of what you w e r e t e l l i n g u s now. But t h e s e i d e a s , what you have s e e n
embodied i n t h i s conference, what John, George, Maurie, and P a t R u f f e l l
Smith p u t t o g e t h e r f o r t h i s , came s t r a i g h t from you people. I f i t ' s r i g h t ,
i t ' s r i g h t because you t o l d u s i n a n e f f e c t i v e way, and i f i t ' s wrong, i t ' s
your f a u l t t o o .

So I t h i n k w e can handle t h e g o a l s and t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e s o u r c e

management t r a i n i n g , b u t t h e n w e g e t t o t h e methodology and t h a t ' s going t o
be v e r y much more d i f f i c u l t . And i t ' s going t o be d i f f i c u l t because we've
g o t t o r'ind approaches t h a t c a n be s o l d t o managements t h a t have g o t t o buy
t h e concept and t h e n buy t h e package. And managements are funny when i t
comes t o buying s t u f f . You know f a r b e t t e r t h a n w e do what's going t o s e l l
t o your managers.

A s I i n d i c a t e d , t h e r e ' s a n enormous d i f f e r e n c e i n management and crew

s t y l e s a c r o s s c a r r i e r s and even w i t h i n carriers. There are t h o s e carriers
t h a t have been involved i n mergers i n v o l v i n g q u i t e d i s s i m i l a r crew s t y l e s .
There a r e v e r y pronounced d i f f e r e n c e s i n s t y l e s w i t h i n a i r crew groups, and
I t h i n k i t ' s t r u e w i t h i n d o m i c i l e s as w e l l w i t h i n c a r r i e r s .

Maybe what works f o r one kind of group i s n o t going t o work f o r

a n o t h e r kind of group, and maybe t h e person who t r i e s t o f i g u r e i t o u t
b e t t e r have enough f l e x i b i l i t y t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t i n advance. I t h i n k t h a t ' s
going t o pose some i n t e r e s t i n g problems f o r c a r r i e r s i n t h e p r o c e s s of
merging over t h e n e x t c o u p l e of y e a r s .

Carriers a r e going t o have d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e s o u r c e s t h a t c a n b e

devoted t o t h e programs, and I t h i n k t h a t w h i l e some c a n ' t buy a l l of i t ,
t h e y may b e a b l e t o buy 80 p e r c e n t of i t f o r a c o s t of 50 p e r c e n t of i t .

197
T h a t ' s one of t h e areas where I do t h i n k more r e s e a r c h i s needed, b u t I ' m n o t
s u r e i t ' s t h e kind of r e s e a r c h t h a t NASA c a n do. It may w e l l b e i n t h i s in-
s t a n c e t h a t h a l f a l o a f i s a p r e t t y b i g p i e c e of bread. There are going t o
be d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n of t h e t r a i n i n g department by f l i g h t
p e r s o n n e l , d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t are going t o i n f l u e n c e what t h e t r a i n i n g d e p a r t -
ment can o f f e r i n t h i s area and g e t away with.

T h e r e ' s a n o t h e r problem, I t h i n k . I t ' s e a s y t o become c a p t i v a t e d by

s o c i a l and i n t e r p e r s o n a l i s s u e s . T h e r e ' s a l i t t l e b i t of t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t
i n a l l of u s . We've heard q u e s t i o n s h e r e , g e n e r a l l y answered i n t h e
n e g a t i v e , about whether you can change p e r s o n a l i t y . Trieve suggested t o m e
t h i s morning t h a t t h a t probably i s a moot p o i n t , t h a t i t probably d o e s n ' t
make a l o t of d i f f e r e n c e whether you can change p e r s o n a l i t y . But one t h i n g
w e do know, and you people know i t v e r y w e l l indeed because i t ' s one of t h e
t h i n g s you do f o r a l i v i n g , you can change b e h a v i o r . You can change behavior
by making i t v e r y p l e a s a n t t o behave one way and v e r y u n p l e a s a n t t o behave i n
a n o t h e r way. I n c e n t i v e s , p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e i n c e n t i v e s .

Now, i f you c a n change b e h a v i o r , and i f t h e d e s i r a b l e o r t h e d e s i r e d

modes of behavior c a n be t a u g h t , and I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e r e ' s any q u e s t i o n t h a t
they can b e t a u g h t , t h e n t h a t becomes t h e g o a l of t h i s kind of t r a i n i n g f o r
t h o s e p e r s o n s whose behavior i s s u b s t a n d a r d .

T r a i n i n g must t a k e i n t o account t h e worst c a s e , and r e s o u r c e management

t r a i n i n g i s r e a l l y no e x c e p t i o n . And y e t t r a i n i n g h a s g o t t o t a k e t h e worst
case i n t o account w i t h o u t becoming completely d e a d l y f o r b e t t e r people. It
seems t o m e t h a t i f r e s o u r c e management i s going t o be of h e l p t o a crew
somewhere i n a bad s i t u a t i o n , t h a t t h e kind of crew t h a t i s most going t o
need t h a t h e l p i s going t o b e t h e kind t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e s a r e l a t i v e l y in-
experienced c a p t a i n who may n o t be t o o s u r e of himself as a manger and a new
f i r s t o f f i c e r and a second o f f i c e r who are e i t h e r weak o r new o r o l d and
i n f i r m o r something of t h a t s o r t , because t h a t ' s j u s t t h e way i t seems t o
happen. And i t ' s t h o s e p e o p l e who a r e most going t o need t h e s k i l l s and,
t h e r e f o r e , t h o s e people whom you must r e a c h most e f f e c t i v e l y . And you've g o t
t o f i g u r e o u t a way t o do t h a t w i t h o u t b o r i n g everybody else t o d e a t h .

I t h i n k t h e s e s c e n a r i o s need t o b e designed w i t h t h i s i n mind. T h i s i s

one of t h e t h i n g s t h a t w o r r i e s m e a b o u t s t a n d a r d i z e d s c e n a r i o s . I t h i n k i t ' s
e n t i r e l y p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e s i m u l a t o r i n s t r u c t o r should have some o p t i o n s w i t h
r e s p e c t t o c o n s t r u c t i n g s c e n a r i o s such t h a t people c a n go through t r i b u -
l a t i o n s and succeed r a t h e r t h a n simply f a i l . Captain Beach t a l k e d a b o u t t h i s
w i t h r e g a r d t o graded s c e n a r i o s . Perhaps w e should b e a b l e t o do a c e r t a i n
amount of ad hoc g r a d i n g on t h e s p o t - I ' m n o t s u r e . I know t h e c u r r e n t
o p e r a t i n g p e r m i t s do n o t permit u s t o do t h a t kind of t h i n g . I ' v e g o t some
problems w i t h t h a t . We're paying f l i g h t i n s t r u c t o r s t o i n s t r u c t and t a k e
i n t o account i n d i v i d u a l l i m i t a t i o n s and c a p a b i l i t i e s . I t h i n k t h a t t o t i e
t h e i r hands may be a n unwise t h i n g , a l t h o u g h I can q u i t e understand t h e
r e a s o n why t h o s e r e g u l a t i o n s were w r i t t e n . But I t h i n k w e may need t o do
some p l a y i n g around w i t h t h a t .
 And t h e n I t h i n k we've g o t one o t h e r problem t o t h i n k a b o u t . I t h i n k
somewhere o u t t h e r e i n t h a t world t h a t you people i n h a b i t , t h e r e a r e going
t o be a few p i l o t s who c a n make i t as l o n g as w e keep making them do t h e
jumping-through-the-hoop r o u t i n e e v e r y s i x months, b u t who a r e n ' t going t o
make i t i f w e i n t r o d u c e t h i s t r a i n i n g . I t h i n k you've g o t some guys who can
f l y t h e a i r p l a n e , who can f l y emergency procedures, who can p a s s t h e
s t a n d a r d PC, b u t who may n o t have t h e f l e x i b i l i t y t o t a k e on t h i s kind of a
c a p e r . What are you going t o do w i t h them? You b e t t e r know b e f o r e you g e t
t o them. I d o n ' t know t h e answer t o t h a t one. I d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t ' s a
r e s e a r c h a b l e i s s u e . But somebody b e t t e r do a l i t t l e pragmatic t h i n k i n g about
i t , and I t h i n k i t would be h i g h l y d e s i r a b l e t o t h i n k about i t b e f o r e t h e guy
shows up on your d o o r s t e p , and s a y s , "I j u s t busted t h i s t h i n g , what a r e you
going t o do now?"

There are a number of r e s e a r c h a b l e i s s u e s i n t h i s area. Whether t h e y

a l l need t o be r e s e a r c h e d o r n o t i s a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n . You people brought
most of them up. V a l i d a t i o n . W e k e p t h e a r i n g about v a l i d a t i o n , and t h i s
morning i n two v e r y e f f e c t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n s d e a l i n g w i t h what I had thought
w a s a t o t a l l y unmanageable can of worms, you managed t o d i s p o s e , i n r e a l l y
q u i t e e l e g a n t p r o s e , of t h e s e l e c t i o n aspect of a l l of t h i s . W e need
c r i t e r i a . I t w a s p o i n t e d o u t v e r y c l e a r l y today, b u t t h e b e s t way of coming
up w i t h them i s a n o t h e r i s s u e .

T r a i n i n g , a n o t h e r r e s e a r c h a b l e i s s u e . How do w e e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t s of
what we're doing? I a m s t i l l l o a t h t o w a i t 1 5 y e a r s t o accumulate
s u f f i c i e n t major a c c i d e n t e x p e r i e n c e w i t h i n an a i r carrier s o t h a t I c a n
d e c i d e whether I ' v e been doing b e t t e r f o r t h a t 15 y e a r s than t h e p r e v i o u s 15
y e a r s . And then you g e t a n a i r l i n e l i k e Qantas where you c a n ' t do i t t h a t
way e i t h e r , because t h e y d o n ' t have any a c c i d e n t s . But t h e r e ' s g o t t o be
some way. W e c o l l e c t a n i n o r d i n a t e amount of d a t a , and I j u s t have t h e
f e e l i n g , as w a s t h e case w i t h t h e Apollo program when people s t a r t e d l o o k i n g
a t a l l t h e b i t s and p i e c e s of t e l e m e t r y t h e y had g a t h e r e d , t h a t t h e r e may be
some b i t s and p i e c e s of d a t a t h a t t e l l u s t h i n g s about how people perform on
our a i r l i n e s . And so I posed t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t v a l i d a t i o n might be
p o s s i b l e u s i n g d a t a c u r r e n t l y a v a i l a b l e , i f we w e r e j u s t a l i t t l e more
ingenious about how w e used i t .

We've g o t t o e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t s of t h i s t r a i n i n g w h i l e i t ' s being

given. We've g o t t o e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t s of t h i s t r a i n i n g on t h o s e who have
j u s t had i t , and we've g o t t o e v a l u a t e t h e e f f e c t s of t h i s t r a i n i n g long
a f t e r i t has been given.

I t h i n k w e ought t o pay some a t t e n t i o n t o whether LOFT i s a method of

t r a i n i n g o r a method of e v a l u a t i o n , o r both. I t h i n k we've heard about LOFT
as a n e v a l u a t i o n method, we've heard about LOFT a s a t r a i n i n g method,
e v e r y t h i n g b u t LOFT as a s e l e c t i o n method -
nobody h a s mentioned t h a t . I ' m
r e a l l y somewhat s u r p r i s e d nobody d i d , because t h e r e are c e r t a i n t h i n g s t h a t
are common t o f l i g h t a c r o s s a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of a i r p l a n e s . A s a
matter of f a c t , Bob, a m I n o t c o r r e c t t h a t you p e o p l e have been u s i n g simu-
l a t i o n d u r i n g your s e l e c t i o n p r o c e s s ?

199
 CAPT. CRUMP: W e a l s o have, i n s t e a d of a PC, used t h e LOFT program
during t h e probationary year.

DR. BILLINGS: That would scare me. Methodology, a g a i n . A number

of areas t h a t may o r may n o t need formal r e s e a r c h b u t which c e r t a i n l y need
c o o r d i n a t i o n , I f we've heard n o t h i n g else w e have heard you people loud and
clear w i t h respect t o t h a t . What works b e s t f o r whom and why.

Regarding t h e r e l a t i o n of t h e s e l e c t i o n c r i t e r i a t o t h e t r a i n i n g
methods: i s i t j u s t p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e a r e some k i n d s of people who a r e
s e l e c t e d by t h e a i r carriers f o r whom LOFT i s n o t perhaps t h e most e f f e c t i v e ?
And t h e o t h e r i s s u e : LOFT w i t h a f u l l crew i s enormously expensive. Does
i t have t o b e a f u l l crew? Again, I c a n understand why t h e FAA r e s t r i c t i o n s ,
b u t somebody's g o t t o g r a b t h a t by t h e h o r n s , too. LOFT would be a l o t l e s s
expensive i f w e d i d n ' t have t o have a f u l l crew. Is i t c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t w e
d o n ' t ? I d o n ' t t h i n k anyone knows a t t h e p r e s e n t moment.

The i s s u e of s i m u l a t i o n realism and s i m u l a t o r a c c e p t a n c e w a s brought up

h e r e . I d o n ' t doubt t h a t t h e r e ' s any q u e s t i o n t h a t f o r c e r t a i n crews, t h o s e
same crews who always know t h a t t h e y a r e d r i v i n g a s i m u l a t o r a s opposed t o
g e t t i n g wrapped up i n t h e t h i n g , t h i s kind of t r a i n i n g technique may have
some s e r i o u s shortcomings because i t j u s t i s n ' t a n a i r p l a n e f o r t h o s e guys.
How do w e g e t around t h a t ?

W e p r e s e n t l y s t i l l check p i l o t s , n o t crews r e a l l y . Is t h e r e perhaps a

way of r e i n f o r c i n g t h e v a l u e of r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g and t h e r e s o u r c e
management approach by making crew i n t e g r a t i o n a s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i o n i n
checks? Now, I r e a l i z e t h a t crew c o o r d i n a t i o n i s one of t h e i t e m s t h a t i s
e v a l u a t e d , b u t I ' m t a l k i n g about a s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e c a p t a i n ' s p e r -
formance i s s p e c i f i c a l l y e v a l u a t e d i n terms of how e f f e c t i v e l y t h e crew
helped him. I wonder i f perhaps t h a t might do something t o r e i n f o r c e t h e
v a l u e of t h i s t r a i n i n g ?

A r e w e t r a i n i n g command s k i l l s o r are w e t r a i n i n g s o c i a l s k i l l s ? T h a t ' s

an i s s u e about which t h e r e ' s been c o n s i d e r a b l e l o o s e n e s s i n o u r t h i n k i n g and
i n some of t h e s t a t e m e n t s h e r e . I t h i n k i t ' s i m p o r t a n t t h a t we f i g u r e o u t
which i t i s because i f we're t r a i n i n g command s k i l l s , t h a t , I t h i n k ,
c e r t a i n l y militates t h a t we place the t r a i n i n g somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y i n t h e
career p r o g r e s s i o n , and probably t h a t i t have a c o n t e n t somewhat d i f f e r e n t
from t h e placement and t h e c o n t e n t i f we're t r a i n i n g e s s e n t i a l l y s o c i a l and
communications s k i l l s .

And f i n a l l y w e g e t back t o what I t h i n k i s t h e most expensive and

perhaps t h e most c r i t i c a l i s s u e , which i s why I w a s most i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e s e
p r e s e n t a t i o n s t h a t i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t w a s being t a k e n i n hand f i r s t , t h e
t r a i n i n g of i n s t r u c t o r s . What do w e t r a i n them i n ? How do w e t r a i n them?
How much t r a i n i n g do w e g i v e them? How o f t e n do w e r e i n f o r c e i t ? And i f
y o u ' l l f o r g i v e m e f o r b e i n g a f l i g h t surgeon f o r a minute, how c l i n i c a l i s
t h a t t r a i n i n g going t o be? T h e r e ' s a c o s t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h making t h e s e guys
c o u n s e l o r s as w e l l as i n s t r u c t o r s , b u t I would a s k you whether t h e r e may be

200
a l a r g e r c o s t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h n o t g i v i n g them a thorough understanding of
t h e dynamics of t h e t r a i n i n g p r o c e s s a s i t w i l l b e when we g e t h e a v i l y i n t o
r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g .

There have been a number of q u e s t i o n s asked h e r e about a u d i o v i s u a l

methodology, feedback, computer a s s i s t e d i n s t r u c t i o n , f i l m s and v i d e p f o r
o r i e n t a t i o n and t h a t s o r t of t h i n g . I t h i n k t h a t ' s g o t t o be looked i n t o
and I t h i n k one of t h e o t h e r t h i n g s t h a t somebody i s going t o have t o l o o k
i n t o i s s e l l i n g methods, because I t h i n k sooner o r l a t e r we're going t o come
up a g a i n s t some tough customers when w e t r y t o s e l l t h i s concept.

I h a v e n ' t answered any of t h e r e s e a r c h i s s u e s h e r e and I d i d n ' t i n t e n d

t o . We're n o t being v e r y p r e s c r i p t i v e e i t h e r , because t h e r e ' s no magic i n
any of what w e p r e s e n t e d h e r e . I ' m s u r e L e e , Bob, and Mike would be t h e
f i r s t t o s a y s o . Whatever g e t s t h e j o b done, whatever g i v e s you a c o n s t r u c t
t h a t you can wrap y o u r s e l f around and a s s i m i l a t e , i s probably an e f f e c t i v e
concept f o r g e t t i n g i n t o t h i s area.

Now, w i t h r e g a r d t o NASA's r o l e s , I have s a i d t o my c o l l e a g u e s i t t i n g

over h e r e on my r i g h t l o o k i n g v e r y s e r i o u s a t t h i s p o i n t , t h a t w e have
g o t t e n more mileage o u t of r e s o u r c e management w i t h less r e s e a r c h than any
o t h e r p r o j e c t NASA h a s e v e r done. T h a t ' s n o t perhaps t o t a l l y f a i r because
George and Maurie and P a t R u f f e l l Smith have, i n f a c t , done some r e s e a r c h .
Miles Murphy has been working w i t h John l o o k i n g a t t h e NASA ASRS d a t a . W e
have done r e s e a r c h of a t y p e , b u t i t c e r t a i n l y i s a f a r p i e c e from t h e kind
of r e s e a r c h t h a t NASA i s o r d i n a r i l y accused of doing. Nor, w i t h l i m i t e d
r e s o u r c e s , are w e c a p a b l e of d e v o t i n g a l l of o u r r e s o u r c e s t o r e s e a r c h , and
a l a r g e p a r t of o u r r e s o u r c e s t o f a c i l i t a t i o n , and a c t i n g a s a c a t a l y s t , as
w e hope w e have done i n t h i s c o n f e r e n c e .

W e have t o be v e r y c a r e f u l about t h i s because people have a way of

a s k i n g u s i n some of t h e s e areas f o r recommendations, and when w e g i v e
recommendations based on consensus i n s t e a d of d a t a , we're on v e r y , v e r y s o f t
t u r f . I t ' s a problem t h a t is going t o l e a d t o some f r u s t r a t i o n f o r you
people as you come and c h a t w i t h u s and a s k u s about t h i n g s , t h i n g s about
which w e do n o t have d a t a . Recommendations w i t h o u t r e s e a r c h can b e p r e t t y
hollow recommendations.

It i s n o t i m p o s s i b l e , however, f o r c o o r d i n a t e d programs i n which you do

t h e r e s e a r c h , and w e t r y t o h e l p d e s i g n i t , and e v a l u a t e i t and i n t e r p r e t i t .
It i s n o t a t a l l i m p o s s i b l e t h a t some of t h e programs t h a t you a r e a l r e a d y
doing o r p l a n n i n g , i f planned o r done j u s t a l i t t l e b i t d i f f e r e n t l y , would
r e s u l t i n a b e t t e r y i e l d of d a t a which could b e u s e f u l n o t o n l y t o you b u t
t o o t h e r p e o p l e . And w e have some people who know q u i t e a l o t a b o u t e x p e r i -
mental d e s i g n and are r e a l l y q u i t e c a p a b l e of l i v i n g w i t h i n t h e c o n s t r a i n t s
of t h e real world.

So I t h i n k one of t h e r e a s o n s f o r c o c r d i n a t i o n i s t o t r y t o g e t maximum
u s e o u t of t h e d a t a t h a t you and you and you may be c o l l e c t i n g i f you d e c i d e
t o s t i c k your f o o t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r swimming p o o l . That i s probably a

201
b e t t e r r e a s o n f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n t h a n any o t h e r . I t h i n k t h a t may w e l l
r e p r e s e n t i n t h i s area t h e major r v i c e t h a t NASA ea erform i n t h e long
r u n , t h a t of h e l p i n g t o a c t as a n t r a l point f o r i
h e l p i n g you t o maximize t h e e f f e c e n e s s of t h e exp
W e are doing t h i s i n a d i f f e r e n t area of t r a i n i n g a t t h e p r e s e n t moment,
thanks t o A 1 and h i s c o l l e a g u e s on t h e ATA t r a i n i n g committee. W e are t r y i n g
t o h e l p a carrier do a p i e c e of r e s e a r c h t h a t i t wants, t h a t w e want, and
t h a t a l l of u s f e e l should b e done, t o e v a l u a t e t h e d a t a , t o i n t e r p r e t them.
I t h i n k t h a t perhaps has.some real promise i n t h i s area of r e s o u r c e manage-
ment, where a number of d i f f e r e n t approaches may be found t o be a b o u t
e q u a l l y e f f e c t i v e . I t h i n k t h a t r e a l l y i s a b o u t what I t h i n k I ' v e been
h e a r i n g h e r e t h e l a s t t h r e e days.

Once a g a i n , w e are enormously g r a t e f u l t o a l l of you f o r t h e t i m e ,

because you a l l had o t h e r t h i n g s t o do, f o r your a t t e n t i o n and f o r your
i n p u t which h a s been enormously h e l p f u l t o u s . I have l e a r n e d a v e r y g r e a t
d e a l h e r e and I ' m g r a t e f u l f o r t h a t .

2 02
 CLOSING REMARKS

Capt. A. A. Frink"

Before John c l o s e s t h e proceedings, which is n e x t on h i s l i s t , I

b e l i e v e , I want on behalf of a l l of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of i n d u s t r y h e r e , t o
thank you - A l , John, C h a r l i e , George, Maurie, T r i e v e - and a l l t h e rest
of t h e NASA group t h a t h a s t a c k l e d a v e r y , v e r y d i f f i c u l t problem i n a way
t h a t i s n o t t h e u s u a l way, as C h a r l i e i n d i c a t e d , t h a t they l i k e t o do t h i n g s .
But t h e y % a v e done u s a tremendous s e r v i c e and I t h i n k t h a t on behalf of t h e
i n d u s t r y w e should g i v e them a v e r y r o u s i n g v o t e of thanks.

I a l s o want t o s a y t h a t one of them could n o t be h e r e , P a t R u f f e l l

Smith, who c o n t r i b u t e d h e a v i l y t o t h e development of t h i s program. P a t i s
s e r i o u s l y ill and w e c e r t a i n l y want t o i n c l u d e P a t i n our thoughts.

DR. LAUBER: Thank you, A l . There are a g r e a t number of people

who made i n p u t s , a l o t of v a l u a b l e i n p u t s , i n t o t h i s program, about which I
t h i n k w e heard some reasonably good and p o s i t i v e feedback on. A l l of t h e
speakers w e r e s u p e r . The working group chairmen d i d s u p e r b l y , and A 1 F r i n k ,
a s t h e i n d u s t r y chairman, as you have j u s t seen, gave a n e x c e l l e n t p e r -
formance i n t h a t c a p a c i t y . Louise Cooper and M i r i a m White d i d a superb j o b
t o o w i t h t h e wives' program and w e should a p p r e c i a t e t h e i r e f f o r t s i n t h a t
regard.

A l o t of NASA people have put a l o t of e f f o r t i n t o t h i s , as A 1 j u s t

s a i d . A l l of t h e NASA a s s i s t a n t s w e r e n o t j u s t a s s i s t a n t s d u r i n g t h e 3
days of t h i s workshop; r a t h e r , they have been involved v e r y c l o s e l y w i t h t h e
program f o r a long p e r i o d of t i m e , and have made s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s .
For example, I n o t i c e t h a t i n the working group r e p o r t s t h i s morning, Miles
Murphy's breakdown of t h e c a t e g o r i e s of s k i l l s and b e h a v i o r s involved w a s
used q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y . And t h a t ' s a n i n d i c a t i o n of j u s t one of t h e t h i n g s
t h a t a l o t of people have done.

T r i e v e Tanner w a s r e s p o n s i b l e i n l a r g e p a r t f o r g e t t i n g L e e Bolman and

Bob Helmreich on t h e program and c o o r d i n a t i n g w i t h them. I ' v e heard some
v e r y p o s i t i v e comments about t h o s e papers and I t h i n k t h a t i n l a r g e p a r t t h e
s u c c e s s of t h o s e w a s because of Trieve's working w i t h them. And, of c o u r s e ,
Maurie and George - A 1 w a s n o t e x a g g e r a t i n g when he s a i d George i s t r u l y
t h e mentor of t h i s workshop, t r u l y i n a l l senses of t h e word. And, of
c o u r s e , P a t R u f f e l l Smith, who, as Al j u s t i n d i c a t e d , w a s unable t o be w i t h
u s because of s e r i o u s i l l n e s s .

George had a c a b l e t h i s morning from England s a y i n g , "Best wishes f o r a

happy and p r o d u c t i v e workshop.'' I t h i n k a l l of u s are going t o be a b l e t o
r e l a y t o P a t t h a t w e have, i n f a c t , had a happy and p r o d u c t i v e workshop.
I ' m s u r e i f any of you want t o convey t h a t message t o P a t , i t would b e
greatly appreciated.

*Pan American World Airways.

2 03
 One f i n a l c h a l l e n g e b e f o r e w e c l o s e . My d i s s e r t a t i o n a d v i s o r r a r e l y
s a i d a n y t h i n g t h a t I agreed w i t h , b u t one of t h e t h i n g s t h a t h e d i d s a y w a s
t h a t an i d e a , i f good, is probably n o t v e r y new, and i f i t ' s new, i t ' s
probably n o t very good. I s a i d i t t h e o t h e r way around, b u t t h e concept i s
t h e same. Len Holdstock handed m e a paper earlier today which he s a i d you
might f i n d i n t e r e s t i n g . I t ' s t i t l e d "Crew Management, a C a p t a i n ' s
Viewpoint." It goes on t o say t h a t a n accepted t r u i s m i s t h a t management
and l e a d e r s h i p go hand i n hand. I t ' s been s o i n some of our o u t s t a n d i n g
crews, good crews, and o n l y some f a i r ones. Although i t may never have been
so s t a t e d , t h i s v a r i a t i o n i n crews i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e q u a l i t i e s of
l e a d e r s h i p d i s p l a y e d by t h e c a p t a i n . Leadership t h a t produces s u c c e s s i s
r e f l e c t e d by t h e crew t o t h e p a s s e n g e r s and n o t o n l y enhances t h e image of
t h e crew b u t a l s o more s t r o n g l y t h a t of t h e a i r l i n e t h e p a s s e n g e r s have
s e l e c t e d t o use.

And i t goes on t o t a l k about some of t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s expected from

a good c a p t a i n , i n c l u d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o each i n d i v i d u a l crewmember as a
mature p r o f e s s i o n a l , h o n e s t , j u s t and f a i r t r e a t m e n t , l o y a l t y , t o be k e p t
o r i e n t e d and i n t h e loop when d e c i s i o n s may i n v o l v e a n emergency, a n s o on
and s o f o r t h . Sound l i k e f a m i l i a r words. The paper t h a t Len gave t o m e w a s
a l i t t l e b i t yellowed and f r a y e d . He s a i d he found i t i n t h e bottom of a
drawer, and probably i t w a s on t h e o r d e r of 1 0 y e a r s o l d . And I w a s j u s t
wondering i f , when w e m e e t i n 1989, we're going t o be t a l k i n g about t h e same
concepts o r i f w e w i l l have made some p r o g r e s s . T h a t , of c o u r s e , i s t h e
c h a l l e n g e t h a t A1 made t o a l l of u s .

Thank you a l l v e r y much. The proceedings are c l o s e d .

204

Joan B a r r i a g e
Capt. Berton E. Beach
C h a r l e s E. B i l l i n g s , M.D.
R. L . Bisbee
L e e Bolman
C a p t . Gordon Born
Capt. M. G. Bridge
L e s Brown
Major J o e Burch
C a p t . J . E. C a r r o l l
Carl H. C a s t o r e
Alan B. Chambers
George T. Coen
George E. Cooper
Capt. Sherman Cornel1
John M. C o s t l e y
.
Capt Robert Crump
Renwick E. Curry, Jr
James W. Danaher
Duncan D i e t e r l y
Peter B. Dupret
F/O Jon E r t z g a a r d
Capt. W. W . E s t r i d g e
Edgar C. F e l l
Capt. Stanley Fickes
Capt. G r a m e r Foster
Clay Foushee
E. V. F r e t w e l l
Capt. A. A. F r i n k
Capt. Charles F r i s t o e
Michael C . Garvey
Richard G e r s z e u s k i
W i l l i a m C. G i l b e r t
C a p t . Rod G i l s t r a p
James G r e w e
Capt. Nik Grob
Robert Helmreich
C a p t . M. R. Hoagland
Capt. L. F. J . Holdstock
R. C. Houston
J a m e s L. Jacobson
Capt. Tor Johannessen
Capt. Noel J o n e s
P e t e r Kearvell
APPENDIX A
WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS
FAA
Eastern A i r l i n e s
Ames Research Center
American A i r l i n e s
Harvard U n i v e r s i t y
Republic A i r l i n e s
Cathay P a c i f i c Airways
S inger-Link
USAF
United A i r l i n e s
USAF
Ames Research Center
FAA
6. E. Cooper A s s o c i a t e s
Republic A i r l i n e s
KLM Royal Dutch A i r l i n e s
United Airlines
. Ames Research Center
N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board
USAF
A i r Transport Association
Scandinavian A i r L i n e s System
American Airlines
FAA
Allegheny A i r 1i n e s
Republic A i r l i n e s
U. of Texas
ALPA I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Pan American World Airways
United A i r 1i n e s
Michael C. Garvey and Assoc.
FAA
Texas I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r l i n e s
United A i r l i n e s
United Airlines
Swissair
U. of Texas
United A i r l i n e s
B r i t i s h Airways
American A i r l i n e s
The Boeing Company
Scandinavian A i r l i n e s System
Cathay P a c i f i c Airways
IATA
205
John K. Lauber Ames Research Center
Robert R. McEmber Eastern A i r l i n e s
J . L. Mansfield American A i r l i n e s
C a p t . Katsuyuki Maruyama A i r l i n e s Co., L t d .
Miles Plurphy Ames Research Center
C a p t . H. Nagano Japan A i r l i n e s Co.
Carl A. Peden McDonnel Douglas A i r c r a f t Co.
.
C a p t John Perkinson United A i r l i n e s
Robert J . Randle, J r . Ames Research Center
Thomas H. Rockwell Ohio S t a t e Univ.
Major J e f f r e y E. S c h o f i e l d Ohio S t a t e Univ.
Capt. J . V . S c l i f o Texas I n t e r n a t i o n a l A i r l i n e s
Capt. S . R. K. Seaver Quantas Airways
C a p t . Ronald If. Sessa Allegheny A i r l i n e s
Capt. Wally Simons Pan American World Airways
Robzrt Smith United A i r l i n :s
Amos A. Spady, J r . Langley Research Center
T r i e v e Tanner Ames Research Center
Capt, Id. H. Traub United A i r l i n e s
C a p t . Dwain T u r l i n g t o n Pari American World Airways
C a p t . Vern Wastman F l y i n g T i g e r Line
John D. Wells Lockheed-California Co.
Lawson White IATA
Maurice D. White G. E. Cooper Associates
G . E . Wilson United A i r l i n e s - ALPA
Col. A 1 Worden A 1 Worden, Inc .

206
 APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTARY WORKING PAPERS

I n i t i a l Upgrading from C o p i l o t t o Captain

C a p t . G. Griinewald, S w i s s a i r

Training - Economic and S a f e t y C o n s i d e r a t i o n s

Capt. R. E. Norman, J r . , A i r l i n e P i l o t s A s s o c i a t i o n

C a l c u l a t e d Risk o r Blind Assumption?

Gerard M. Bruggink, N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board

Managing Emergencies i n J e t T r a n s p o r t Operations

Gerard M. Bruggink, N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board

2 07
INITIAL UPGRADING FROM COPILOT TO CAPTAIN
(Prepared by Capt. 6 . Griinewald, SWISSAIR)

Zurich, June i979

209
I N I T I A L UPGRADING, PART I

INTRODUCTION

The step from Copilot to Captai? can certainly be

described as one of the most significant achievements
in the professional life of a civil aviation pilot.
Not only the greater demands but also the emotional
state associated with the Initial Upgrading give the
training course for future Captains a meaning, which
in the individual phases can have even a detrimental
effect on the performance of the course participant.

The aim of this paper is on the one hand to describe

the course structure and on the other hand to go into
the various related problems, such as method, failure
rate, complaints, efficient preparation for the up-
grading, etc.: In the third part, some envisaged
future programme changes will be briefly described.

TRAINING OBJECTIVES
The training objectives are established in accordance
with the Standards of Performance, which clearly
define the flying capabilities, knowledge and
personality of a Captain.

COURSE STRUCTURE
The Initial Up,grading is divided into two main parts,
namely the so-called Captain's Course (CC) and
Upgrading (UP). The CC falls within the responsibilities
of the'Training Department, whereas the UP, lies in the
hands of Line Operations.

210
operation and only then, after this introduction phase,
the actual training as Pic take place.

The basic features of the individual phases from CC

and UP are described as follows:

---------------
CAPTAINS COURSE

Theory "Flight Procedures" Explanation of flight

(1 day / 6 hours) procedures, mainly with
regard to T/O, APP with
abnormal configuration,
CAT 11,

Simulator (pre-flight) Familiarisation the

(5 days / approx. 9 hours left seat and the ulting
s t i c k time) new duties. Discussion

with abnormal configurations.

Simulator (post-flight)
( 3 days / approx. 10 hours
crew tirne)
The objective of these 3
days is to give the future
Captain the opportunity to
fly the DC-9 in conditions
which cannot, or at least
not realistLCally, be achieved
in the a/c (e.g. hydraulic
failure, electrical failure,
etc.).

Here the emphasis is on the

systematic work organisation,
clear and precise actions and.
consistent supervision of the
assisting pilot; in short, in
the sphere of flight manage-
ment in. its broadest sense.

Performance throughout the last eight days (whenever

possible under the same flight instructor) determines
the CC qualification. In this qualification, in
addition to performance, the progress must also be
assessed. Apart from the .final result, which is of
course of vital significance, it must be seen -
how this
was achieved.

Should the final qualification be "Not Qualified", the

UP cannot-be started.

After the pure flying part, the so-called Captain's

Theory Course now begins. The first phase of this
course lasts 5 days (approx. 34 hours) and the following
subjects are dealt with:

212
- Organisation SWISSAIR;
Orientation Finance & Partnerships;
Orientation Product Planning & Marketing;
Orientation Branch Offi’ces Abroad, Customer Service
and the Pic, Problems of the Station Manager abroad;
Noise Abatement Zurich Airport.

- Organisation and work.distribution within Flight

Operations;
Operations Planning;
Flight Area Manager Europe;
Technical & Maintenance Department, Orientation .
and Inspection Maintenance Control;
Station Zurich, Orientation and Inspection.

- Movement Control, Inspection, Cooperation with

the Pic;
Dispatch Zurich; Crew Planning and Control,
Organisation, Problems, Cooperation;
Medical Department:
Catering Service, Orientation and Inspection.

- The Work of the Cabin Crews;

Position and Responsibility of the Pic, Cooperation
with the Pic;
ATC, Orientation and Inspection, Discussion;
Security, Orientation and Discussion.

- The Fears of the Passenger;

The good Public Address;
Speech Training.

Following this first part of the Theory Course, the

actual training in line operation begins. Under the
213
guidance of the Route Instructor, that which has been
learned in flight and theoretical training is put into
practice. At the same time, the new elements of
operational problems must be assimilated.

Route Training is divided into three phases: Instruction,

Consolidation and Proficiency, with a total duration of
120 - 150 hours. The objective of the three phases is
selfexplanatory. After 70 hour;s, the Route Instructor
no longer sits in the RH seat, the Captain-to-be works
with the Copilot in a normal working capacity.

In the last part'of the UP comes the second phase of

the Theory Course. This lasts three days and usually
takes place in the seclusion of the Training Centre for
Swissair Management. The course deals mainly with the
subjects "The Pic as boss" and "The conduct of the Pic
in specific situations". The emphasis in this course
is therefore laid on the managerial duties of the Pic.

Upon successful completion of the Route Training comes

the appointment as Captain.

214
 INITIAL UPGRADING, PART I 1

This part is limited to the various problem areas

related to the structure and implementation of the
Captain's Courses.

ARE THE DEMANDS TOO HIGH ?

Again and again the whole course, or certain phases of

the programme, are thought to be unrealistic or generally
too difficult, whereby the frequently cited "problem free
line operation" is used as criterion. Taken point by
point this may be the case. However, bearing in mind
* the training objective, which should not consist purely
of assimilating knowledge and skills but should consider
, the training of correct.behaviour,we must so devise our
programmes that this behaviour or conduct can be taught,
practised and examined. 'Apart from the purely specialist
training, the course must be planned so as to make
possible the development of those personal qualities
which enable the Captain to'carry out his duties calmly
and decisively.

The Initial Upgrading programme valid at present can be

considered integrated and well balanced as regards both
degree of difficulty and duration. Not without satis-
faction, perhaps even with a certain feeling of relief,
we discover that our opinion is confirmed by the majority
of course participants.

TOO MUCH STRESS ?

Many Captains-to-be.enter into a conflict of rales,

especially at the start of their training, resulting in

215
psychic difficulties. The aspirant gets into a
situation in the course where mental powers of resist-
ance are required of him. With the mobilisation of
these powers, so much energy is burned up that, where
flying is concerned, a frequent drop in performance
is noted.

Stress situations in CC are basically unavoidable,

although varying in extent from person to person. The
mastering of the various situations of rou.tine flying
demands also later a certain resistance, which simply
belongs to the pilot's profession.

We do not attempt to artificially produce any stress

anywhere. We know that the task faced by a Pic aspir-
ant holds sufficient stress situations in itself. We
can do without vexations, tricks or special effects,

TOO MANY TESTS, TOO LITTLE TRAINING ?

This accusation, which always crops up, is probably as

old as flight training itself. In the CC it applies
to the fact that certain knowledge and skills are
expected of the aspirant, e.g. aer0dynamic.basi.c
knowledge or the ability to fly a normal VMC circuit.
These requirements, however, are usually too little
defined and are therefore for the participants not
clearly recognisable, In this area there are still
possibilities for improvement, which we want to realise
as soon as possible.

All that which is "new ground" for the future Captains

is taught during the course and can also be practised.
A CC without mistakes is Utopia, apart from the fact

216
that in a learning process mistakes are necessary, even
desirable.

The limits set for the required performance, instruction

and exmination will always remain somewhat indistinct,
particularly in the CC, for it cannot be ignored that
the CC also has a last say in the selection. Copilots
who have had more than sufficient opportunity to prepare
themselves for this duty, yet who are unable to cope
with the demands made upon them, have obviously not
developed sufficiently enough the qualities necessary.

Seen purely statistically, there will always be such

isolated cases and it would therefore be wrong to
completely eliminate the filter effect of such an
"initiation". If the CC were to contain absolutely
no examination means anymore, one would have to reckon
with unsuitable captains being appointed occasionally,
despite the high quality of the selection methods and
the basic training.

FAILURE RATES
The failure rate in the past was relatively high,
between 17 % and 35 % yearly, whereas from 1976 onwards
the failure rate has remained at approximately 15 %.

The degree of difficulty of a course - and thereby

one's own chance of success - is often measured by the
failure rate. To point out that every aspect should be
taken into consideration does not have much effect. As
high failure rates can have .really undesirable
psychological consequences on performance abilities
and because they are unpleasant, not just for those

217
directly concerned but also for Swissair (for human
and economical reasons), it was important to probe
into the deeper lying reasons for these failures.
Were the stress and performance demands too high?

An investigation into the mat.ter xevealed that most

failure cases involved two special areas: the partic-
ipant either could not cope with the stress resulting
from his duties or he lacked the mental fLexibility
necessary to carry out the various tasks.

HOW CAN ONE PREPARE ONESELF ?

To prepare himself, a person has to know exactly what
is expected of him, i.e. the learning objectives must
be 'determined as clearly as possible. Furthermore,
those areas which always present difficulties should
be known, so that preparation can be optimi-sed by
means of objective measures.

For the past three years, all Captains-to-be have been

informed some time prior to beginning the course as to
course structure, learning Objectives and suggestions
as to effective preparation. The content of this
informative day programme will presently be examined
with regard to its suitability and the experiences of
the last three years will be evaluated. Finally, from
time to time we shall indicate to our line Captains
how-essential it is for the best possible intensive
and initiative cooperation in the cockpit to motivate
Copilots, by means of continual educational work,
towards self education. Copilots should already think
as Captains before they do a Captain's Course and the
Captains should make this possible for them. A Copilot
should prepare himself with each flight for his career
218
as Captain. Should he have too little support in this
respect he could, during a longer period of time as
Copilot, be in danger of deterioration as far as his
level of performance is concerned. .

219
INITIAL UPGRADING, PART I 1 1

The training towards becoming a Captain, who bears the

responsibility for the passengers entrusted to him, for
the crew, for the aircraft and, last but not least,
also for the reputation of his company, cannot consist,
even in the future, only of supplying knowledge and
skills but rather the education towards and appropriation
of behaviour and attitudes. The training of the Captain
as manager will be intensified, the personality training
must be brought somewhat more into the foreground.
A l s o cognitions in the wider field of so-called "human
factors" must be increased and must enter into our
programmes more systematically. Finally, the constantly
changing environment, with its varying kinds of reper-
cussions on the r41e and demands of a Captain will be
observed carefully s o that any important changes can be
recognised and brought into the train'ing programme in
time.

220
 TRAINING -. ECONOP?IC AND SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS

by
C a p t a i n R. E. Norman, Jr.
Chairman, P i l o t T r a i n i n g Committee
A i r Line F i l o t s A s s o c i a t i o n

Continued development of f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r s and v i s u a l s y s t e m s i s a key

f a c t o r i n t h e s o l u t i o n t o many s a f e t y problems and t o t h e economic h e a l t h
of t h e a i r c a r r i e r i n d u s t r y . The u s e of f l i g h t simula'tors h a s made i t
p o s s i b l e t o a t t a i n a near-zero t r a i n i n g a c c i d e n t rate i n t h e p a s t s e v e r a l
years compared t o t h e h i g h l o s s of l i v e s and a i r c r a f t d u r i n g e a r l i e r y e a r s
of t h e j e t a g e when most t r a i n i n g was accomplished i n a i r c r a f t . However,
r e c e n t a i r c r a f t a c c i d e n t s have o c c u r r e d d u r i n g i n c r e a s e d p i l o t t r a i n i n g i n
t h e a i r c r a f t due t o t h e e x p a n s i o n of t h e n m b e r of p i l o t s and t h e l a c k o f
a q a i l a b l e s i m u l a t o r time, which h i g h l i g h t s t h e c u r r e n t v a l u e of s i m u l a t o r
training. F l i g h t s i m u l a t o r s c a n p r o v i d e v a l u a b l e and r e a l i s t i c t r a i n i n g
f o r p i l o t s t o cope w i t h -- o r avoid t h e circumstances t h a t continue t o cause
accidents i n a i r l i n e operations. The consequences of any f a t a l a c c i d e n t ,
i n t h e s e t i m e s , c a n r e s u l t i n a n economic d i s a s t e r f o r a n y a i r c a r r i e r . The
f a c t t h a t many a i r c a r r i e r s , a s w e l l a s s i n u l a t o r and a i r c r a f t
m a n u f a c t u r e r s , a r e expending c o n s i d e r a b l e f u n d s on new v i s u a l s i m u l a t o r s
and t r a i n i n g s t u d i e s v e r i f i e s o u r o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t : S a f e t y and economic
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c a n complement one a n o t h e r and s a t i s f y t h e a i r c a r r i e r
o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s and e n s u r e t h e i r economic s u r v i v a l .

F u e l s a v i n g s r e s u l t i n g from t h e u s e of s i m u l a t o r s a r e a l s o s i z n i f i c a n t .
F i r exaz:ple, i t i s e s t,,mated ; t h a t preser,: z i r c r a f t p r o f i c i e c c y c h e c k s f g r ? z r t
121 c a r r i e r s w i l l s a v e more t h a n 100 m i l l i o n g a l l o n s of f u e l a n w a l l y
through t h e u s e of f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r s . For a l l t y p e s of t r a i n i n g , i t h a s
been e s t i m a t e d l / t h a t more t h a n 3-90 m i l l i o n g a l l o n s of f u e l a r e saved
each year. Along w i t h t h e b e n e f i t s of f u e l s a v i n g s , o t h e r e x p e n s e s
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a i r c r a f t o p e r a t i o n a r e reduced. T h e s e i n c l u d e a i r c r a f t
maintenance and d e p r e c i a t i o n , a i r p o r t c h a r g e s , and a i r c r a f t and p e r s o n n e l
s c h e d u l i n g expenses. A i r c r a f t s h o u l d be k e p t on t h e l i n e p r o d u c i n g
revenue, n o t f l y i n g a r o u n d w i t h a n empty c a b i n .

We estimate t h a t more t h a n 100 v i s u a l a t t a c h m e n t s have been p u r c h a s e d by

the industry i n the past three years. Advancements i n d i g i t a l computers
make i t t e c h n i c a l l y p o s s i b l e t o perform a l l f l i g h t t r a i n i n g i n v i s u a l
f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r s . Development of t h e Computer-Generated-Image (CGI)
v i s u a l s y s t e m s h a s made i t p o s s i b l e t o p r o v i d e a n a c c e p t a b l e and h i g h l y
r e l i a b l e v i s u a l s c e n e € o r t a k e o f f and l a n d i n g maneuvers. I n our
e s t i m a t i o n , t h e g o a l of t o t a l s i m u l a t i o n i s well w i t h i n t h e t e c h n i c a l
c a p a b i l i t y which e x i s t s today. With a l l oE t h i s computer t e c h n o l o g y and
hardware a v a i l a b l e , why t h e n a r e w e w a i t i n g f o r s i m u l a t o r s t o become a
t o t a l s u b s t i t u t e €or aircraft t r a i n i n g ?

-American
1/ " F l i g h t S i m u l a t o r s Impact on U.S. A i r l i n e s " , by D e C. K i l l i a n ,
A i r l L n e s , A v i a t i o n Magazine, January 1979, page 3 1 33- -

221
The answer i s s€mple. C r i t e r i a for s i m u l a t o r a p p r o v a l have n o t k e p t up
w i t h t h e r a p i d t e c h n i c a l advancements which have o c c u r r e d i n s i m u l a t o r
technology o v e r t h e p a s t s e v e r a l y e a r s , and o n l y r e c e n t l y have t h e human
f a c t o r a s p e c t s of d e s i g n and u s e i n approved t r a i n i n g programs been
considered i n simulator design.

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The ALPA P i l o t T r a i n i n g Committee's i n t e r e s t i n f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r s and

a p p r o v a l procedures e x t e n d s back many y e a r s . During t h i s t i m e , t h e
Committee has recommended on many o c c a s i o n s t h a t :

(1) I n d u s t r y and government proceed w i t h a comprehensive e v a l u a t i o n

of e x i s t i n g t r a i n i n g methods and c r i t e r i a used f o r t h e d e s i g n ,
a p p r o v a l and u s e of f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r s .

(2) T e c h n i c a l c r i t e r i a s h o u l d be developed f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n of a
f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r . The g o a l of t h i s c e r t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s would
be a s i m u l a t o r w i t h performance r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e a i r p l a n e ' s
aerodynamic r e s p o n s e s and h a n d l i n g q u a l i t i e s under s t a t e d
atmospheric c o n d i t i o n s . With t h e a c h i e v e n e n t of t h i s g o a l , f l i g h t
s i m u l a t o r s could be u t i l i z e d i n l i e u of t h e a i r p l a n e f o r f o r m a l
t r a i n i n g and checking maneuvers.

Research and development funds a v a i l a b l e i n 1970 f o r f l i g h t s i m u l a t i o n

s t u d i e s were not used because of o p p o s i t i o n by a - few ? e o p l e i n government
and i n d u s t r y . The problems a € d e v e l o p i n g human f a c t o r s and t e c h n i c a l d a t a
f o r a p p r o v a l of t o t a l s i n u l a t i o n must now be s o l v e d p r i a a r i l y by a i r
c a r r i g r s , p i l o t s and sirnulator manufacturers. Government a p p r o v a l of t o t a l
s i m u l a t i o n must be based on "hard d a t a " r a t h e r t n a n t h e s u b j e c t i v e judgment
methods t h a t have proved t o be i n a d e q u a t e i n t h e p a s t . The r e c e n t F M
a p p r o v a l of s i m u l a t o r s f o r t h e l a n d i n g manuever by two a i r c a r r i e r s h a s
shown t h e v a l u e of good d a t a and is a n o t h e r s t e p toward t o t a l s i m u l a t i o n .

Development of. a i r p l a n e per€ormance d a t a f o r programming s i m u l a t o r s ,

e s p e c i a l l y f o r o l d e r a i r p l a n e s , will r e q u i r e some f l i g h t t e s t i n g w i t h
instrumented airplanes. Areas where more a i r c r a f t d a t a i s needed i n c l u d e
t h e i n f l u e n c e s of ground e f f e c t on performance and h a n d l i n g , f l a r e
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , s t o p p i n g and d i r e c t i o n a l c o n t r o l f o r c e s and rates on
contaminated runways, and e f f e c t s of wind and p r e c i p i t a t i o n on a i r c r a f t
performance. Reduction of € l i g h t test d a t a t o computer programs depends o n
more q u a l i t y i n f a r m a t i o n t o e l i m i n a t e unknown f a c t o r s t h a t i n f l u e n c e t h e
complex i n t e r r e l a t e d aerodynamic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of j e t a i r c r a f t .

HUMAN FACTORS

Human f a c t o r s a n a l y s i s i n t h e computer programming of € L i g h t s i m u l a t o r s may

prove t o be t h e most d i € f i c u l t p a r t of t o t a l s i m u l a t i o n . Developments i n
human F a c t o r s a n a l y s i s a l s o have a p o t e n t i a l t o produce the greatest Long-

222
term b e n e f i t s i n t h e d e s i g n of t r a i n i n g programs, o p e r a t i n g p h i l o s o p h i e s
and economic e f f i c i e n c y i n t r a i n i n g programs.

Some of t h e i m p o r t a n t human f a c t o r s areas t h a t must b e c o n s i d e r

development of- t o t a l s i m u l a t i o n i n c l u d e :

A n a l y s i s of t h e v i s u a l cues n e c e s s a r y f
l a n d an a i r p l a n e under normal and a d v e r
methods of t r a i n i n g may be needed t o overcome some of t h e
l i m i t a t i o n s of v i s u a l systems.

The e f f e c t s and n e c e s s i t y f o r s i m u l a t o r motion d u r i n g v a r i o u s

f l i g h t maneuvers and i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r l a n d i n g s .

Methods of programming and development of t r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e s f o r

t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t a r e l i k e l y t o c a u s e a c c i d e n t s such as
t u r b u l e n c e , wind s h e a r , low v i s i b i l i t y a p p r o a c h e s , v i s u a l
i l l u s i o r s , etc.

(4) The c o o r d i n a t e d crew c o n c e p t s of o p e r a t i n g a i r c r a f t w i t h more

emphasis on t h e r e a l world problems of a i r l i n e o p e r a t i o n . A
c a r e f u l and thorough a n a l y s i s of a i r c a r r i e r a c c i d e n t s o v e r t h e
p a s t s e v e r a l years w i l l r e v e a l t h o s e areas where improvement i s
r e q u i r e d i n p r o v i d i n g a i r c r e w s w i t h a .sound b a s i s € o r
c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e i r f l i g h t deck a c t i v i t i e s .

R e e v a l u a t i o n of check-orientsd c c n t r o l l i n g r e g u l a t i o n s t o p e r m i t
more t r a i n i n g emphasis on methods of h a n d l i n g o r a v o i d i n g t h e
circumstances t h a t cause accidents.

E a r l y and easy s o l u t i o n s t o t h e above problems would appear t o be

d i f f i c u l t ; however, w e b e l i e v e r e s e a r c h a l r e a d y completed and p r o j e c t s i n
p r o g r e s s can p r o v i d e much of t h e n e c e s s a r y i n f o r m a t i o n . W e detect a
renewed s p i r i t of c o o p e r a t i o n and a s e n s e of urgency w i t h i n t h e i n d u s t r y i n
the development o € s a f e t y and t r a i n i n g programs. W e have a c t i v e l y
p a r t i c i p a t e d i n and reviewed a number of i n d u s t r y p r o j e c t s t h a t have o r
w i l l e v e n t u a l l y i n f l u e n c e t h e s t r u c t u r e of p i l o t t r a i n i r . g programs and
f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r a p p r o v a l p r o c e s s e s . Some of t h e p r o j e c t s most important
t o t raLning are :

S a f e t y awareness programs.
Low v i s i b i l i t y approach s t u d i e s .
Human f a c t o r s s t u d i e s .
Renewed i n t e r e s t i n v i s u a l i l l u s i o n s .
S i m u l a t i o n s t u d i e s of wind s h e a r .
O p e r a t i o n a l l y o r i e n t e d p r o f i c i e n c y t r a i n i n g programs.
FAA exemption t o r e q u a l i f y p i l o t s i n f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r s .
FAA a p p r o v a l o f s i m u l a t o r s f o r t a k e o f f s and Landings i n v i s u a l
simu La t o r s .
s t e n t e f f o r t s by p i l o t s and a i r carriers t o r e v i s e and
e controlling regulations.

223
D i s s e m i n a t i o n of t i m e l y and u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e above and other
s t u d i e s i s a r e c o g n i z e d problem. P u b l i c a t i o n of t h e r e s u l t s o f low
v i s i b i l i t y s i m u l a t o r s t u d i e s h a s l o n g been d e l a y e d because of o p p o s i t i o n t o
t h e probable conclusions. I n f o r m a t i o n from wind s h e a r a c c i d e n t s i s f i n a l l y
b e i n g developed f o r i n c l u s i o n i n t r a l n i n g programs. Other problems o f
i n s t r u m e n t f a i l u r e s , t u r b u l e n c e e n c o u n t e r s and u n u s u a l w e a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s
d u r i n g approaches a r e b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d by some carriers f o r i n c l u s i o n i n
t r a i n i n g programs. S i n c e many oE t h e s e t r a i n i n g exercises a r e n o t
a d a p t a b l e t o c h e c k i n g , t h e r e is c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r t h e v a l u e a s w e l l a s t h e
methods of p r o v i d i n g r e a l i s t i c s i m u l a t o r t r a i n i n g i n t h e s e areas.
Programming a t r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e t h a t may r e s u l t i n l o s s of c o n t r o l i s o n e
method where 3 p i l o t c a n l e a r n t o r e c o g n i z e and p o s s i b l y a v o i d a n impending
disaster. "Negative t r a i n i n g " is t h e u s u a l comment from t h o s e who oppose
i n v e s t i g a t i o n of human f a c t o r s i n t r a i n i n g and t h e y seldom have
constructive a l t e r n a t i v e proposals.

We a r e convinced t h a t new methods of t r a i n i n g w i l l e v o l v e from human

f a c t o r s s t u d i e s completed and a l r e a d y i n p r o g r e s s . One a i r c a r r i e r h a s been
g r a n t e d a waiver t o conduct a n " o p e r a t i o n a l l y o r i e n t e d " p r o f i c i e n c y
t r a i n i n g p r o g r a a r a t h e r t h a n u s i n g t h e Appendix F r e q u i r e m e n t s . Short
segment r e a l world s i t u a t i o n s are programmed w i t h r e a l i s t i c abnormal and
emergency s i t u a t i o n s i n s e r t e d f o r t h e crew t o s o l v e i n r e a l time. P i l o t s
a r e e n t h u s i a s t i c a b o u t t h i s l i n e - o r i e n t e d crew c o n c e p t of t r a i n i n g . The
t r e n d of r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g and c h e c k i n g w i l l d e f i n i t e l y f o l l o w a s i m i l a r
concept. We b e l i e v e l i n e - o r i e n t e d crew c o o r d i n a t e d c o n c e p t s w i l l
e v e n t u a l l y be adopted by most of t h e i n d u s t r y . Attachment 1 p r o v i d e s a
b r i e f o u t l i n e of w h a t we t h i n k would be a l a r g e s t e p f o r w a r d i n r e c u r r e n t
crew t r a i n i n g programs.

FUTURE TREND

The f u t u r e of p i l o t t r a i n i n g programs depends on the a d o p t i o n of new

p h i l o s o p h i e s and t h e t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e of a n a i r c a r r i e r ' s t r a i n i n g and
t e c h n i c a l s t a f f . With t h e newer developments i n s i m u l a t o r s and v i s u a l
s y s t e m s , w e a r e not r e f e r r i n g t o t h e u s u a l " b i g a i r l i n e " s t a f f of many
e n g i n e e r s and t e c h n i c i a n s . Simulator manufacturers can provide r e l a t i v e l y
w e l l developed and r e l i a b l e machines t h a t c a n be m a i n t a i n e d by a minimum
technical s t a f f . The i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s t h e long-range economic
advantage p l u s t h e f a c t t h a t v i s u a l s i m u l a t o r s p r o v i d e t h e o n l y l o g i c a l
method O E a c c o m p l i s h i n g t r a i n i n g e x e r c i s e s i n t h e areas t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y
have caused a c c i d e n t s .
S i n c e c e r t a i n a i r c a r r i e r s ( o t h e r s a r e e x p e c t e d ' t o follow) have r e c e i v e d
a p p r o v a l of t h e t r s i m u l a t o r s f o r t h e l a n d i n g maneuver and a d d i t i o n a l u s e oE
approved s l m u l a t o r s w i L L be made a s w e approach t o t a l s i m u l a t i o n , s i m u l a t o r
time i s becoming v e r y v a l u a b l e . Better p l a n n i n g f o r t h e u s e O E s i m u l a t o r
time will be r e q u i r e d s i n c e t h e r e i s a s h o r t a g e of approved s i m u l a t o r s .

Various p i l o t g r o u p s have i n d i c a t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t i n f l i g h t
s l m u l a t l o n , v i s u a l s y s t e m s and human € a c t o r s s t u d i e s . We recommend t h a t
a l l p i l o t g r o u p s p a r t l c i p a t e w i t h t h e i r companies i n t h e development of
more p r o d u c t t v e t r a t n i n g programs. W h e t h e r - i t be r e v i s e d r e c u r r e n t

224
t r a i n i n g , new simulators or a t o t a l simulation program, w e i b e l i e v e p i l o t
i n t e r e s t and support will be welcomed by most a i r c a r r i e r s . In these times,
training funds must be used i n a productive manner so t h a t t h e ultimate
goal of s a f e t y and e f f i c i e n c y in everyday l i n e operations can be achieved.

225
 ATTACHMENT 1
In 1 9 7 4 , a s u r v e y of o u r most e x p e r i e n c e d s a f e t y and t r a i n i n g
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n d i c a t e d overwhelming agreement on t h e n e c e s s i t y t o r e v i s e
r e q u i r e d r e c u r r e n t proEiciency t r a i n i n g and checking. Recurrent t r a i n i n g
was proposed on a n a n n u a l b a s i s f o r a l l p i l o t s a s a f u e l s a v i n g measure and
as a s o l u t i o n t o s e v e r a l s a f e t y problems. During t h e i n t e r v e n i n g two
y e a r s , a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n h a s developed t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e need t o
c o n s i d e r improved r e c u r r e n t a i r crew t r a i n i n g . A i r c a r r i e r s , p i l o t s and
o t h e r s have recommended t h a t r e c u r r e n t and o t h e r programs be r e v i s e d t o
r e f l e c t a l i n e - o r i e n t e d and crew c o o r d i n a t e d concept of t r a i n i n g .

We propose t h e f o l l o w i n g b r i e f l y s t a t e d o u t l i n e as a n improved method of

conducting r e c u r r e n t t r a i n i n g f o r f l i g h t deck a i r crews:

Recurrent p i l o t t r a i n i n g should be conducted on a n a n n u a l b a s i s

in an approved f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r .

F l i g h t s i m u l a t o r t r a i n i n g s h o u l d i n c l u d e a review of i n s t r u m e n t
approaches and s e l e c t e d abnormal and emergency procedures.

The t r a i n i n g w i l l be designed t o r e a l i s t i c line o p e r a t i o n a l

c o n c e p t s w i t h emphasis on crew c o o r d i n a t i o n .

T r a i n l n g may i n c l u d e s e l e c t e d weather, wind shear, t u r b u l e n c e and

unusual approach c o n d i t i o n s o r o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t are
l i k e l y t o cause accidents.

Annual, t r a i n i n g f o r f l i g h t deck crew members s h o u l d i n c l u d e '

a p p r o p r i a t e review of a i r c r a f t systems, a i r c r a f t performance and
emergency p r o c e d u r e s , i n c l u d i n g d i t c h i n g i E over water.

Annual t r a i n i n g f o r f l i g h t deck crew s h o u l d i n c l u d e a review of

r e c e n t o r r e c u r r i n g problems f o r t h e a i r c r a f t t y p e and a d d i t i o n s o r
r e v i s i o n s t o t h e n a v i g a t i o n and i n s t r u m e n t equipment o r a i r
t r a f f i c c o n t r o l procedures.

W
e estimate t h a t t h e above procedure would r e q u i r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y s i x hours
of ground t r a i n i n g and f o u r h o u r s of f l i g h t s i m u l a t o r t r a i n i n g .

S e v e r a l s i m u l a t o r sequences a r e recommended and would be r e v i s e d and

approved on a n a n n u a l b a s i s .

The p r e c e d i n g b r i e f l y s t a t e d o u t l i n e p r o v i d e s more t r a i n i n g f o r a i r crews

than is now r e q u i r e d by t h e r e g u l a t i o n s . The t r a i n i n g would be more u s e f u l
than t h e p r e s e n t s t e r e o t y p e d check requirements. T r a i n i n g equipment would
be b e t t e r u t i l i z e d and s c h e d u l i n g of f l i g h t crews for t r a i n i n g would be
simpLL€ied and more e € E i c i e n t .

226
 CALCUIATTD 2 I S K Ori B L I N D ASSUMPTION? *
bY
Gerard M . Bruggink
Bureau of Accident I n v e s t i g a t i o n
N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board
;lashington, D .C . 20594

I n May, 1 9 5 2 , t h e U . S . P r e s i d e n t ' s A i r p o r t Commission,

c h a i r e d by James I i . D o o l i t t l e , d e f i n e d c a l c u l a t e d risk a s "A
w i l l i n g n e s s t o embark d e l i b e r a t e l y on a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n w h i c h
o f f e r s p r o s p e c t i v e rewards outweighing i t s e s t i m a t e d dangers".
T h e r e c a n be no doubt t h a t t h i s d e f i n i t i o n reflected t h e a t t i -
t u d e o f p i l o t s l i k e D o o l i t t l e who c o n t r i b u t e d so much t o t h e
development of a v i a t i o n i n t o a p u b l i c t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system.
Iiowever, when we 1001~a t some of t h e a c c i d e n t s i n r e c e n t y e a r s
i t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e a r t of r i s k - t a k i n g is slowly becoming a l o s t
a r t . That is t h e o n l y c o n c l u s i o n one c a n draw f r o m mishaps t h a t
could have been prevented by using o n l y a modest degree of skep-
t i c i s m i n e s t i m a t i n g t h e danger of a p a r t i c u l a r c o u r s e of a c t i o n
or inaction.
Our a f f l i c t i o n could be t h e i r o n i c consequence o f o p e r a t i n g
i n a system t h a t achieved a h i q h degree of r e l i a b i l i t y by re-
ducing dependence on i n d i v i d u a l decision-making - i n c l u d i n g r i s k
assessment - t h r o u g h a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of managerial c o n t r o l s , reg-
u l a t i o n s , and computer i n p u t s . A c t u a l l y , i n the p r o c e s s of e l i m i -
n a t i n g some of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l human f a c t o r s problems w e may have
c r e a t e d a new one: t h e i n a b i l i t y t o s e n s e when " t h e s y s t e m s ' "
p r o t e c t i v e mantle no l o n g e r covers u s . T h e s a f e t y p u b l i c a t i o n of
a major U . S . c a r r i e r i d e n t i f i e d a s i m i l a r problem when it re-
ferred t o ('a h i g h l y s t r u c t u r e d o p e r a t i o n a l environment which i n -
v i t e s f o l l o w - t h e - l e a d e r complacency and d i s c o u r a g e s d e p a r t u r e
from r o u t i n e . " Ye c a n go one s t e p f u r t h e r and make t h e b l u n t ob-
s e r v a t i o n t h a t w e o p e r a t e i n a c l i m a t e t h a t i s more conducive t o
t h e development of b l i n d f a i t h t h a n r i s k awareness.

THE ACCIDENT HECORD

Elements of i n a d e q u a t e r i s k p e r c e p t i o n c a n be found i n
almost e v e r y a c c i d e n t and a t a l l levels of t h e a v i a t i o n i n d u s t r y .
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h a t s t a g e - s e t t i n g a s p e c t of an a c c i d e n t sequence
is seldom d i s c u s s e d i n unambiguous t e r m s i n a c c i 3 e n t reports
because t h e u n d e r l y i n g r e a s o n s may be too e l u s i v e o r too emhar-
rassing f o r analytical treatment. This frustrating limitation

* Presented a tt h e OrientAirlines Association Flight Safety

Seminar, Manila, 9-11 May, 1 9 7 9 .

227
 o f o u r a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i s e l o q u e n t l y summarized i n t h e
i n t r o d u c t i o n t o a NASA s t u d y * d e a l i n g w i t h human f a c t o r s i n a i r -
c r a f t operations. A f t e r r e f e r r i n g t o our l a c k of understanding
of t h e error mechansim i n v o l v i n g w e l l - t r a i n e d p r o f e s s i o n a l s a t
c r i t i c a l p o i n t s i n f l i g h t t h e a u t h o r s s t a t e : "Neither do w e under-
s t a n d , e x c e p t i n i s o l a t e d c a s e s , t h e f a c t o r s which may be respon-
s i b l e f o r ( t h e c r e w ' s ) f a i l u r e t o r e c o g n i z e and r e a c t t o presumably
c l e a r warnings, o r t o i n t e r v e n e under c i r c u m s t a n c e s which seem t o
c l e a r l y r e q u i r e such i n t e r v e n t i o n " .
The u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h i s problem c a n best be i l l u s t r a t e d
by b r i e f l y reviewing t h e risk-management a s p e c t s of some r e c e n t
a c c i d e n t s . The headings of t h e s e summaries refer t o t h e segment
of a v i a t i o n commonly a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e i d e n t i f i e d risks. T h i s
t r e a t m e n t of these a c c i d e n t s i s used f o r a c c i d e n t p r e v e n t i o n p u r -
poses o n l y ; t h e r e i s no i n t e n t t o imply c u l p a b i l i t y o r t o q u e s t i o n
the o f f i c i a l c a u s e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of these a c c i d e n t s .

Operator
About f o u r y e a r s ago, a j e t t r a n s p o r t c o l l i d e d w i t h r i s i n q
t e r r a i n a s t h e a i r c r a f t descended below s a f e a l t i t u d e due t o the
crew's incorrect i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r p o s i t i o n r \ r i t h r e q a r d t o t h e
a i r p o r t . There w e r e no s u r v i v o r s . The i n v e s t i g a t i v e a u t h o r i t y
a t t r i b u t e d t h e premature d e s c e n t t o "dependence on Doppler and
weather r a d a r systems on board t h e a i r c r a f t which l e f t room f o r
misinterpretationo1.
T h i s was t h e o n l y a i r c r a f t i n t h e o p e r a t o r ' s f l e e t w i t h
o f f - s t a n d a r d cockpit i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n . The Doppler computer i n -
d i c a t o r and t h e computer system w e r e n o t of t h e same make. A s
a r e s u l t , o n l y t h e 100-miles i n d i c a t i o n on t h e d i s t a n c e - t o - g o
p r e s e n t a t i o n was correct; t h e p o s i t i o n s of t h e t e n and one m i l e s
i n d i c a t o r d i s k s w e r e "more o r less a r b i t r a r y " . The o p e r a t i o n s
manual had t h e f o l l o w i n g remark under t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h e com-
p u t e r i n d i c a t o r : "Distance-to-go n o t Active". The i n v e s t i g a t i v e
a u t h o r i t y was o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t it would have been more appro-
p r i a t e t o mask t h i s i n d i c a t o r " s o t h a t t h e chances o f c r e w m i s -
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would have been completely eliminated'l. That t h e
c r e w relied on t h e d i s t a n c e - t o - g o c o u n t e r was s t r o n g l y suggested
by t h e i r reports of being "one three z e r o m i l e s o u t " and *'one
f o u r m i l e s o u t " . T h e a i r c r a f t s t r u c k a mountain 40 m i l e s f r o m t h e
a i r p o r t , a t 4300 f t m s l .
The weather r a d a r system v a s a l s o o f f - s t a n d a r d i n t h a t t h e
range markings d i f f e r e d f r o m t h o s e used i n t h e o p e r a t o r ' s o t h e r
a i r c r a f t . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e was n o t e x p l a i n e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n s
manual. The i n v e s t i g a t i v e a u t h o r i t y concluded t h a t the c r e w could
have received m i s l e a d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n i f t h e y were u s i n g t h e t e r r a i n
mapping f e a t u r e s of t h e weather radar t o cross check t h e i r p o s i t i o n

* NASA TMX-62,472.

228
 w i t h regard t o t h e a i r p o r t (located near a c o a s t l i n e ) .

What does these case have t o do w i t h r i s k awareness? T h e

answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i s governed by o u r understand
of t h e fundamental c o n c e p t s i n a c c i d e n t p r e v e n t i o n : always t r y
t o make i t e a s i e r f o r t h e o t h e r person - and o u r s e l v e s - n o t t o
make a n e r r o r . T h i s r e q u i r e s i m a g i n a t i o n and awareness of what
goes on on t h e d a r k s i d e o f human b e h a v i o r . W e a r e c r e a t u r e s of
h a b i t w i t h a b u i l t - i n tendency t o r e l y on what seems t o conform
with p a s t e x p e r i e n c e . Therefore, t h e assumption t h a t a c a u t i o n a r y
n o t e about a non-standard p i e c e o f equipment w i l l p r o t e c t a c r e w
from r e v e r t i n g t o i n g r a i n e d h a b i t s i n a h i g h workload s i t u a t i o n
m u s t be viewed w i t h s u s p i c i o n .
A i r T r a f f i c Control

I n November, 1975, t w o wide-bodied j e t s were on t h e same

j e t r o u t e and approaching each o t h e r head-on, a t n i g h t , a t a
c l o s i n g speed o f 863 k n o t s ; one was m a i n t a i n i n g f l i g h t l e v e l 350,
t h e o t h e r was c l i m b i n g t h r o u g h FL 350 t o FL 370. The r a d a r con-
t r o l l e r , who had full d a t a b l o c k s a v a i l a b l e , r e a l i z e d t h a t L? poten-
t i a l c o n f l i c t existed b u t expected t h a t t h e climbing a i r c r a f t
would r e a c h FL 370 b e f o r e p a s s i n g t h e o t h e r f l i g h t . According t o
t h e o f f i c i a l a c c i d e n t r e p o r t he "assumed t h a t , by keeping a n eye
on t h e s i t u a t i o n , he would be a b l e t o t a k e t i m e l y s t e p s i f t h e
anticipated separation a i d not materialize".
When t h i s c o n t r o l l e r relied on automation technology r a t h e r
t h a n on p o s i t i v e s t e p s t o i n s u r e s e p a r a t i o n , t h e s a f e t y of t h e 306
persons aboard t h e two f l i g h t s was governed s o l e l y by h i s con-
t i n u i n g awareness of t h e developments on h i s r a d a r scope. T h i s
presumed s a f e g u a r d f a i l e d when he allowed secondary d u t i e s t o i n -
terfere with h i s observation of the c l e a r l y displayed c o n f l i c t .
13 l a s t - s e c o n d warning from a n o t h e r c o n t r o l l e r , t h e a l e r t n e s s
of t h e c a p t a i n of t h e climbing a i r c r a f t , and h i s v i q o r o u s e v a s i v e
maneuver k e p t t h e a i r c r a f t s e p a r a t e d by no more t h d n 100 f e e t .
-__--
T h i s c a s e i s a c l a s s i c i l l u s t r a t i o g nf one of t h e c a r d i n a l
s i n s i n a v i a t i o n : U N C R I T I C A L A C C E P T A X E O F U N J U S T I F I A B L E AS-
S U I W T I O N S . T h i s i s the t y p e of assumption t h a t c a n e a s i l y be
avoided by a s l i g h t exercise of t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i n t h e form of a
q u e s t i o n : "iiJhat a r e t h e consequences if my assumption i s f a l s e ? "

Manufacturer and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
I n l a t e 1974, t h e c r e w of a j e t t r a n s p o r t i n i t i a t e d a t a k e -
o f f w i t h t h e l e a d i n g edge ( L E ) f l a p s r e t r a c t e d because the pneu-
m a t i c system which o p e r a t e s them had n o t been t u r n e d on. T h e
a i r c r a f t became a i r b o r n e i n a p a r t i a l l y s t a l l e d c o n d i t i o n and
s e t t l e d back t o t h e ground, beyond t h e runway. There was a p o s t -

229
c r a s h f i r e ; 6 7 6 o f t h e occupants s u r v i v e d .

Two y e a r s e a r l i e r , a n o t h e r o p e r a t o r of t h e same t y p e a i r -
c r a f t experienced a n i n c i d e n t i n v o l v i n g a t a k e - o f f w i t h t h e LE
f l a p s p a r t i a l l y r e t r a c t e d . R e a l i z i n g t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s
i n c i d e n t as a p o t e n t i a l accident cause, the operator a l e r t e d t h e
manufacturer and t h e c e r t i f i c a t i n g a u t h o r i t y . In c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h
t h e manufacturer t h e o p e r a t o r modified h i s own a i r c r a f t by i n -
c l u d i n g t h e LE f l a p p o s t i o n i n t h e t a k e - o f f c o n f i g u r a t i o n a u r a l
warning system. N o f u r t h e r a c t i o n was t a k e n because t h e c e r t i f i -
c a t i n g a u t h o r i t y and manufacturer c o n s i d e r e d t h e o c c u r r e n c e a n
i s o l a t e d i n c i d e n t t h a t could have been prevented by adherence t o
e x i s t i n g c o c k p i t procedures.

I t should be noted t h a t , a t t h e t i m e , t h e i n c o r r e c t p o s i -
t i o n i n g of t h e LE f l a p s was i n d i c a t e d by t h e absence of a g r e e n
l i q h t . T h e adquacy of a warning system t h a t r e l i e s o n the ab-
s e n c e of a s t i m u l u s needs no comment w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h i s
seminar. Nhat should be stressed i s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e
of t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n , proposed and adopted by t h e o p e r a t o r who ex-
perienced t h e f i r s t r e p o r t e d i n c i d e n t , was n o t o f f i c i a l l y mentioned
t o o t h e r o p e r a t o r s o f t h e same t y p e a i r c r a f t . Furthermore, follow-
i n g t h a t i n c i d e n t t h e r e o c c u r r e d e i g h t known, s i m i l a r i n c i d e n t s
w h i c h , for one r e a s o n o r a n o t h e r , never reached t h e c e r t i f i c a t i n g
a u t h o r i t y o r t h e manufacturer u n t i l a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , two y e a r s
later.
To sum it up, t h i s a c c i d e n t i s a d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f :
1. Unimaginative r i s k assessment compounded by
2 . The inadequacy o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n c i d e n t
r e p o r t i n g system,

Crew

About f i v e y e a r s ago, a j e t t r a n s p o r t s t r u c k mountainous

t e r r a i n while t h e c r e w was e x e c u t i n g a letdown procedure a s p a r t
o f t h e NDB approach t o a s e a l e v e l a i r p o r t , l o c a t e d on a n i s l a n d .
The a c c i d e n t occurred a t n i g h t ; all occupants d i e d .

T h e i n v e s t i g a t i v e a u t h o r i t y determined t h a t t h e c r e w s t a r t e d
t h e letdown when one o f t h e ADF n e e d l e s i n t h e c o c k p i t swung
w h i l e t h e o t h e r remained s t e a d y ; based on a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the
f l i g h t t r a c k , t h i s n e e d l e swing o c c u r r e d while t h e f l i g h t was s t i l l
about 30 m i l e s from t h e NDB ( l o c a t e d on t h e a i r p o r t ) . The c r e w
r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e y w e r e over t h e s t a t i o n and c l e a r a n c e f o r letdown
was g i v e n . Due t o t h e displacement of t h e d e s c e n t p a t t e r n , t h e
letdown was made over the mountainous i s l a n d i n s t e a d of over open
w a t e r . The a i r c r a f t f l e w i n t o r i s i n g t e r r a i n a t 3000 f t m s l .

Although t h e a c c i d e n t r e p o r t does n o t p r o v i d e enough i n -

formation t o e v a l u a t e t h e c r e w ' s r e s p o n s e t o t h e s i n g l e A D F n e e d l e
swing, it a p p e a r s t h a t t h i s a c c i d e n t was caused by t h e acceptance

230
o f d o u b t f u l p o s i t i o n i n f o r m a t i o n . S i n c e t h e topoqraphy of t h e
s i t u a t i o n s h o u l d have made i t obvious t h a t a letdown s t a r t e d
before r e a c h i n g the s t a t i o n c a r r i e d an u n a c c e p t a b l e r i s k , t h e
crew s h o u l d a t l e a s t have waited f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n from t h e second
ADF. Furthcrmorc, a n o p e r a t i n y VOR w a s l o c a t e d 6 m i l e s from t h e
s t a t i o n . T h e r e a r e no i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h e crew made a n a t t e m p t
t o u s e t h i s a d d i t i o n a l navaid.

T h i s controlled-flight-into-terrain a c c i d e n t was one of

three, i n t h c same y e a r , t h a t d e s t r o y e d t h r e e j e t t r a n s p o r t s Find
k i l l e d 390 p e r s o n s on mountain s l o p e s i n t h e v i c i n i t y of
d e s t i n a t i o n airporl:s. Gne w o u l d expect t h a t d e s c e n t s and i n i t i a l
approachcs t h a t 1eave no marqin whatsocvcr f o r n a v i g a t i o n a l o r
p r o c e d u r a l e r r o r s would be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e crew's r e a d i n e s s
t o r e a c t p r o t e c t i v e l y t o t h e f i r s t doubt about t h e i r p o s i t i o n
i n t i m e and s p a c e .

DISCUSS I O N

The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e examples i n each of thc f o u r c d t e g o r i c s

s h o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e premise t h d t our r i s k - t a k i n g
behavior, o c c a s i o n a l l y , shows s e r i o u s f l a w s . Those who a r e not
y e t convinced of t h i s should t a k e a hard and o b j e c t i v e look a t
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c c i d e n t e x p e r i e n c e , i n c l u d i n g some of a v i a t i o n ' s
worst d i s a s t e r s s o f a r .

T h i s a p p a r e n t weakness i n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n and handling o f

r i s k s probably f i n d s i t s o r i g i n i n a misunderstanding about t h e
role of t r u s t i n a n y t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system. N o s o c i e t y can have
m o b i l i t y without a c e r t a i n level of t r u s t , t h a t i s , t h e con-
v i c t i o n t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r person o r t h i n g will perform ils promised.
T h i s t r u s t m u s t have a sound foundation; it cdnnot be equated w i t h
hope o r b l i n d f a i t h . There is no such t h i n g as t r u s t i n g t h a t a
badly-worn t i r e w i l l s u s t a i n a n o t h e r 1000 m i l e s of high-speed
d r i v i n g ; t h i s i s not a c a l c u l a t e d r i s k b u t one of t h e lowest forms
o f gambling.

Although there a r e some n o t o r i o u s e x c e p t i o n s , proven high-

r i s k s i t u a t i o n s a r e g e n e r a l l y t r e a t e d w i t h t h e respcct t h e y de-
serve a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l a s w e l l a s t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and c o r -
porate level. For i n s t a n c e , no p i l o t i n h i s r i q h t mind would a t -
t e m p t a n approach i n t o F,ai Tak, w i t h weather a t minimums, u n l e s s
he has complete t r u s t i n h i s a i r c r a f t , h i s i n s t r u m e n t s , t h e
navaids, h i s own competence, and h i s crew. A s long a s t h i s t r u s t
i s n o t contaminated by s e l f - s e r v i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s we are d e a l i n g
with a n a c c e p t a b l e c a l c u l a t e d r i s k .

I3etween the d e s i r a b l e and u n d e s i r a b l e extremes of d e c i s i o n -

making - c a l c u l a t e d r i s k and b l i n d assumption- I.ic?s a t r a n s i t i o n
zone i n which o u r proximity t o e i t h e r extreme is governed by t h e
q u a l i t y of o u r t r u s t . Nith r e g a r d t o t h i s i n t m g i b l e index of
t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f s u c c e s s of o u r endeavors it should be noted
t h a t there is nothing a b s o l u t e about i t ; t r u s t can o n l y be measured
i n t e r m s of i t s j u s t i f i a b i l i t y . To p u t it d i f f e r e n t l y , nobody

231
c a n g i v e one hundred p e r c e n t a s s u r a n c e t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r f l i g h t
w i l l be a c c i d e n t - f r e e . W e c a n only bend t h e od's i n f a v o r of
s a f e t y . Such a c o n s c i o u s a t t e m p t t o j u s t i f y o u r t r u s t d i f f e r e n -
t i a t e s the c a l c u l a t e d r i s k from t h e mindless assumption.

Some of t h e f a c t o r s t h a t p r e d i s p o s e towards t h e t a k i n g of
r i s k s t h a t have no b a s i s i n t r u s t hdVe f a m i l i a r names:

- Economicdl o r r e p u t a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
- T h e p r e s s u r e of s c h e d u l e s o r d u t y time l i m i t a t i o n s
- Faticjue, h e it s e l f - i n d u c e d , system-induced, o r
t h e r e s u l t o f uncont r o l l ab1e c i rcums t ances
- Xcluctance t o d i v e r t , o r t o qo-around, for a v a r i c t :
of r e a s q n s
- A c o c k p i t atmosphere t h a t d i s c o u r a g e s un-
s o l i c i t e d e x p r e s s i o n o f d o u b t o r concern

These f a c t o r s have been i d e n t i f i e d r e p e a t e d l y i n a c c i d e n t

r e p o r t s . However, t h e p e r t i n e n t f i n d i n g s never seem t o have reached
t h o s e f o r whom t h e h e l l t o l l s n e x t , Apparently, there i s a small
number of p e r s o n s , i n a l l segments of a v i a t i o n , who remain b l i s s -
f u l l y i g n o r a n t o f t h e risk t h e y t a k e , o r impose on o t h e r s , because
t h e y believe t h a t y e a r s of u n e v e n t f u l routi.ne operati-ons do away
with t h e need t o l i s t e n t o woeful t a l e s . T h i s f a l s e sense of
s e c u r i t y i s t h e b i g g e s t o b s t a c l e i n o u r a t t e m p t s t o e x p l o i t what
i s bad i n a v i a t i o n t o make what is good about it b e t t e r .

CONCLUSION

O c c a s i o n a l l y , one h e a r s tallc about a v i a t i o n ' s " i n c r e d i b l e

s a f e t y r e c o r d . " The r e a l l y i n c r e d i b l e p a r t about i t is t h a t we
g e t away w i t h s o much u n c a l l e d - f o r r i s k t a k i n g . The few a c c i d e n t s
t h a t s t i l l occur s u g g e s t t h a t most of t h e m i n v o l v e an under&-
veloped, or t e m p o r a r i l y i n a c t i v e , t r i g g e r i n g mechanism for t h e
t i m e l y p e r c e p t i o n o f risk a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l , managerial, o r regu-
latory level.

One h a s t o conclude t h a t t h e haze o f i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y through

which t o o many approach a c a r e e r i n a v i a t i o n c a n best be d i s -
persed by d i s c u s s i n g the f a c t s of l i f e - and d e a t h - i n a v i a t i o n
i n unadulterated t e r m s . That means we need a merciless com-
munications system t h a t deprives every p r i n c i p a l i n o u r de-
c e p t i v e l y s a f e environment of t h e excuse t o proceed on b l i n d a s -
sumptions,
About 300 hundred y e a r s ago, when h i s t r o o p s were about t o
cross a river, Cromwell t o l d them: " T r u s t t h e Lord b u t keep y o u r
powder dry.'* I n a v i a t i o n we need a s i m i l a r message a f t e r each
t a k e - o f f c l e a r a n c e : "Trust t h e system b u t keep your o p t i o n s open."

232
 MANAGING EMERGENCIES
w.*
I1v
JET TRANSPORT OPERATIONS *
Gerard M . Bruggink
Bureau o f Accident I n v e s t i g a t i o n
N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board
Washington, D.C. 20594

T h e r a r e o c c u r r e n c e o f s e r i o u s emergencies i n j e t t r a n s p o r t
o p e r a t i o n s - combined w i t h t h e p r e v a i l i n g t r e n d t o g l o s s o v e r , o r
i g n o r e , t h e u n p l e a s a n t - makes it d i f f i c u l t t o broach t h i s s u b j e c t
without b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d an a l a r m i s t . T h e sheer volume of techno-
l o g i c a l i r r e g u l a r i t i e s covered i n t h e emergency s e c t i o n of o u r
handbooks d i s c o u r a g e s any doubt about o u r p r e p a r e d n e s s . W e may
even derive a s e n s e o f s e c u r i t y from t h e s e c a t a l o g u e d r e s p o n s e s i n
o u r f l i g h t b a g , w i t h o u t r e a l i z i n g t h a t some emergencies d o n ' t f o l l o w
t h e p r i n t e d s c e n a r i o and may n o t l e a v e t i m e t o c o n s u l t t h e book o r
a c h e c k l i s t . Worst of a l l , there i s no way t o p r e d i c t how t h e sud-
den demands of a l i f e - s i z e emergency may c r i p p l e the c e r t i f i c a t e d
and renowned a b i l i t y o f o u r c o c k p i t team t o master a d v e r s i t y .
Over t h e y e a r s w e have s e e n some s p e c t a c u l a r 1tsaves18 of air-
c r a f t by f l i g h t c r e w s who managed t o b r i n g a d i s a b l e d a i r c r a f t i n
f o r a s u c c e s s f u l emergency l a n d i n g a t a n a i r p o r t . S i n c e one cannot
a r g u e w i t h s u c c e s s , it i s n o t customary t o q u e s t i o n t h e d e c i s i o n s
of a c r e w who made it d e s p i t e a v o i d a b l e d e l a y s i n l a n d i n g a n a i r -
c r a f t whose a i r w o r t h i n e s s could n o t be guaranteed 73y anybody. A s
a r e s u l t , t h e t h i n n e s s o f t h e s t r i n g t h a t may have held t h i n g s t o -
g e t h e r u n t i l a s a f e l a n d i n g could be made i s seldom the s u b j e c t o f
open d i s c u s s i o n .
To t h e e x t e n t t h a t a n excuse i s needed t o r a t t l e o u r s e l f -
c o n f i d e n c e , a review of some o f t h e uncomfortable knowledge s t o r e d
i n a v i a t i o n ' s c l o s e t should s u f f i c e . A c t u a l l y , t h i s paper p r e t e n d s
t o be no more t h a n a n i n v i t a t i o n f o r i n t r o s p e c t i o n intended t o
s t i m u l a t e t h e development of p r o t e c t i v e i n s t i n c t s i n t h o s e who rec-
o g n i z e the b r i t t l e e l e m g n t s i n o u r a v i a t i o n s y s t e m ,
To p r o v i d e some semblance of o r d e r i n a n o t h e r w i s e un-
wieldy s u b j e c t , t h e decisionmaking p r o c e s s and t h e manner i n which
it may be a f f e c t e d by t h e urgency o f a n emergency s i t u a t i o n w i l l
be d i s c u s s e d f i r s t . T h i s w i l l be followed by some s u g g e s t i o n s
d e a l i n g w i t h t h e p r e v e n t i o n o f emergency s i t u a t i o n s . F i n a l l y , a

T h e v i e w s expressed by t h e w r i t e r do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
reflect t h o s e o f t h e N a t i o n a l T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S a f e t y Board
*Presented at the Flight Safety Foundation's Corporate Aviation
Safety Seminar, April 1978.

233
 c o n t r o v e r s i a l s u b j e c t w i l l be t r e a t e d : t h e o p t i o n t o s a c r i f i c e
t h e a i r c r a f t i n a survivable, o f f - a i r p o r t crash-landing.

DECISIONMAKING
Although w e may n o t always be c o n s c i o u s l y aware o f i t ,
decision-making i m p l i e s having a c h o i c e . The manner i n which w e
p e r c e i v e a c h o i c e , o r a n o p t i o n , i s governed by t h e q u a l i t y o f
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a t o u r d i s p o s a l and t h e q u a l i t y o f o u r i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n thereof. Most textbooks on human behavior give t h e i m -
p r e s s i o n t h a t t h i s i s a r a t h e r o r d e r l y p r o c e s s o f weighing the
pros and cons of a v a i l a b l e o p t i o n s and t h e n d e c i d i n g on t h e a c t i o n
t h a t best s u i t s o u r purposes.
T h e problem w i t h some emergencies i s t h a t t h e y do n o t a l -
low t h e l u x u r y of a by-the-book decisionmaking p r o c e s s . The
a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n may be incomplete o r m i s l e a d i n g . The phase
of o p e r a t i o n where t h e unusual o c c u r s may l e a v e enough t i m e o n l y
f o r an immediate r e a c t i o n , a response t h a t i s governed more by
what m i g h t be c a l l e d a s i x t h s e n s e developed through t r a i n i n g and
e x p e r i e n c e , t h a n by t h e p r o c e s s of r e a s o n i n g .
Take-Off Emerqencies
T h e i n t e r e s t i n g p a r t of emergencies r e q u i r i n g an immediate
and i r r e v e r s i b l e d e c i s i o n is t h a t t h e y a r e o f t e n handled better
t h a n t h o s e t h a t l e a v e t i m e f o r apprehension and changes i n p l a n s .
T h e go-no-go d e c i s i o n d u r i n g t h e t a k e o f f r o l l i s a c a s e i n p o i n t .
Most o f t h e r e a s o n i n g i n p u t s a r e cranked i n t o t h e go-no-go formu-
l a well b e f o r e t a k e o f f . T h i s t a k e s i n t o account s u c h i t e m s a s
runway l e n g t h , c o n d i t i o n of runway and o v e r r u n , n a t u r e of t e r r a i n
o r o b s t a c l e s beyond a i r p o r t boundary, t h e a i r c r a f t ' s s t o p p i n g ca-
p a b i l i t y , and v i s i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s . T h e p r i n c i p a l v a r i a b l e s a r e
t h e n a t u r e of t h e emergency and t h e crew's i n s t a n t a n e o u s e v a l u a t i o n
of i t s s e r i o u s n e s s . Consid$ring t h e c r i t i c a l i t y of t h e t i m e element
and t h e problems i n a s s e s s i n g some emergencies, t h e immediate no-go
d e c i s i o n of a c r e w w h o s e n s e s r e a s o n a b l e doubt about t h e a i r c r a f t ' s
a b i l i t y t o become - and remain - a i r b o r n e has t o be accepted and
respected, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e outcome.
A c o n s e r v a t i v e approach i n making t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e de-
c i s i o n t o keep an a i r c r a f t on t h e ground i n q u e s t i o n a b l e circum-
s t a n c e s seems sound p o l i c y . I n March 1968, a B-727 was t o t a l l y
d e s t r o y e d when t h e c r e w continued a n i g h t t a k e o f f r o l l d e s p i t e a
t a k e o f f warning horn t h a t s t a r t e d t o sound a f e w seconds a f t e r t h e
t h r u s t levers w e r e advanced. T h e c r e w assumed t h e y would be a b l e
t o i d e n t i f y and c o r r e c t t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t caused t h e warning s i g -
n a l . The a i r c r a f t was r o t a t e d a t V r and l i f t e d o f f . Immediately
t h e r e a f t e r t h e s t i c k s h a k e r was a c t i v a t e d . Concern about t h i s a b i l -
i t y t o keep the a i r p l a n e i n t h e a i r , and t o c l e a r a nearby freeway,
prompted the c a p t a i n t o p u t t h e a i r c r a f t back on t h e ground. The
undiscovered, unsafe c o n d i t i o n t h a t t r i g g e r e d the warning horn was
a 20 f l a p s e t t i n g .
I n October 1977 t h e c r e w of a s t r e t c h e d DC-8 s u c c e s s f u l l y
d i s c o n t i n u e d t h e t a k e o f f j u s t before l i f t - o f f when t h e y heard a

234
loud n o i s e and t h e a i r c r a f t s t a r t e d t o l i s t . A c t u a l l y , a d i s i n -
t e g r a t i n g w h e e l r i m had c u t a l a r g e h o l e i n an i n t e g r a l f u e l t a n k
and t h e s p i l l i n g , f u e l was i g n i t e d immediately. An a l e r t f i r e de-
partment managed t o c o n t r o l the f i r e b u t n o t u n t i l it had caused
s u b s t a n t i a l damage.
Assuming t h a t a s l i g h t change i n t h e t i m i n g o f t h e c r i t i c a l
e v e n t s had allowed t h e a i r c r a f t t o become a i r b o r n e w i t h a f i r e i n
a w h e e l w e l l and t h e wing r o o t , some i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n s c a n be
raised:
- What immediate i n d i c a t i o n s would the c r e w have had
about the t r u e n a t u r e o f t h e problem?
- How could t h e y have a s s e s s e d t h e urgency o f t h e
s i t u a t i o n based on i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e i n t h e
cockpit?
- Could t h e d i s a b l i n g o f alarm systems by f i r e o r o t h e r
e v e n t s have g i v e n them a f a l s e s e n s e o f s e c u r i t y ?
- To what e x t e n t i s t h e c a b i n c r e w t r a i f i e d and p o s i t i o n -
ed t o observe and r e p o r t unusual o c c u r r e n c e s i n -
v o l v i n g a i r c r a f t s t r u c t u r e s o r systems t h a t a r e
beyond t h e purview o f t h e f l i g h t deck crew?
- How l o n g would it have t a k e n the wing t o f o l d
a f t e r b e i n g weakened by t h e f i r e , o r , how long
b e f o r e an e x p l o s i o n i n t h e wing would have ended
the f l i g h t ?
These q u e s t i o n s d e a l o n l y w i t h t h e t e c h n i c a l a s p e c t s o f t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n a c r e w needs t o make i n t e l l i g e n t d e c i s i o n s . O t h e r
a s p e c t s of o u r i n f o r m a t i o n - p r o c e s s i n g c a p a b i l i t y i n an emergency
s i t u a t i o n a r e o f t e n so complex t h a t t h e i r i n f l u e n c e c a n o n l y be
surmised. For example:
- The manner i n which w e s o r t o u t and f i t p r i o r i t i z e "
m u l t i p l e s t i m u l i i n a stress environment.
- The manner i n which t r a i n i n g and e x p e r i e n c e c o n d i t i o n
o u r p e r c e p t i o n and reflexes.
- T h e absence of a f a m i l i a r feedback l o o p s o t h a t w e c a n
no l o n g e r judge the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f o u r a c t i o n s . The
feedback may a l s o be m i s l e a d i n g .
- T h e manner i n w h i c h s u b s u r f a c e p s y c h o l o g i c a l and -
p h y s i o l o g i c a l stresses - i n c l u d i n g f a t i g u e - may
degrade c o c k p i t d i s c i p l i n e and t h e performance
c a p a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l c r e w m e m b e r s .
A B-707 a c c i d e n t t h a t o c c u r r e d several y e a r s ago i l l u s -
t r a t e s how e a s i l y t h e r o u t i n e response t o a Ifistandard" emergency
c a n be d i s r u p t e d by well-meaning b u t uncoordinated c r e w m e m b e r s .
L e s s t h a n a minute a f t e r t a k e o f f , a d i s i n t e g r a t i n g compressor disc
i n t h e N o . 2 e n g i n e severed t h e main f u e l l i n e t o t h a t engine. T h e
c r e w f e l t and h e a d a combined shock and bang and saw t h e N o . 2
engine i n s t r u m e n t s running down. The f l i g h t e n g i n e e r moved t h e
t h r u s t lever back and p u l l e d t h e l a n d i n g g e a r horn c a n c e l s w i t c h ,
w h i l e t h e first o f f i c e r pressed t h e f i r e bell cancel button.
A check c a p t a i n occupying t h e forward jumpseat r e p o r t e d
a t t h i s t i m e t h a t there w a s a s e r i o u s f i r e i n t h e N o . 2 engine
and suggested a n immediate l a n d i n g . Although the N o . 2 engine
f i r e s h u t - o f f h a n d l e w a s i l l u m i n a t e d , and t h e c a p t a i n had o r d e r e d

235
"Engine F i r e D r i l l " , t h e No. 2 s h u t - o f f han
because of c o n f u s i o n about what t
s t i l l needed t o be done. A s
feeding t h e f i r e a t a
a f t e r t h e l a n d i n g . Du
t o t h e n e a r e s t runway t h e bur
a i r c r a f t , b u t the f i r e i n the
t h e wing persisted. Shortly a f t e r a successful
a n e x p l o s i o n i n t h e l e f t wing. Five occupants w e r e unable t o es-
c a p e i n t i m e from t h e burning a i r c r a f t .
H e r e is a n o t h e r c l i f f h a n g e r . An i n g e s t e d s e a g u l l d i s a b l e d
t h e No. 4 engine of a B-747 immediately a f t e r l i f t - o f f f o r a long
f e r r y f l i g h t . T h e c a p t a i n c a l l e d gear-up b u t h i s command was n o t
heard by the f i r s t o f f i c e r who s t a r t e d a s s i s t i n g t h e f l l g h t e n g l n e e r
i n s e c u r i n g t h e engine. The c a p t a i n c o n c e n t r a t e d on m a i n t a i n i n g
v e r t i c a l s e p a r a t i o n from b u i l d i n g s i n t h e t a k e o f f p a t h , w h i l e
climbing a t V2 + 2 0 . A t a h e i g h t o f 800 feet " f l a p s 5" was select-
ed. A t about 1100 f e e t the 5-minute l i m i t a t i o n on t a k e o f f t h r u s t
was reached and t h r u s t was reduced. A t t h i s t i m e it became i m -
p o s s i b l e t o c l i m b o r a c c e l e r a t e beyond V2+ 2 0 and t h e c a p t a i n o r d e r -
ed t h e immediate dumping o f f u e l . Performance g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d
and t h e f l a p s w e r e r e t r a c t e d i n s t a g e s . I t was n o t u n t i l a f t e r t h e
s i t u a t i o n l o s t i t s c r i t i c a l i t y t h a t the first o f f i c e r discovered
t h a t t h e g e a r was s t i l l down.
These l a s t two i n c i d e n t s h i g h l i g h t a u n i v e r s a l shortcoming
i n emergency t r a i n i n g : our i n a b i l i t y t o d u p l i c a t e t h e unmitigated
stress of a r e a l o r imagined t h r e a t t o s u r v i v a l and i t s p o t e n t i a l
effect on i n d i v i d u a l and team b e h a v i o r . One o f t h e best s a f e g u a r d s
under these c o n d i t i o n s i s t h e c a p t a i n ' s f i r m and immediate exercise
o f command a u t h o r i t y and t h e e n t i r e c r e w ' s s t r i c t , methodical com-
p l i a n c e w i t h p e r t i n e n t procedures. The enforced o r d e r l i n e s s of the
i n i t i a l r e a c t i o n t o an emergency may be t h e most important f a c t o r
i n c h a n n e l i n g t h e a d r e n a l i n flow i n t h e c o c k p i t i n t o the desired
direction.
I n f l i q h t Emerqencies
By t h e i r v e r y n a t u r e , i n f l i g h t emergencies tend t o a l l o w
more t i m e f o r a n a l y s i s and c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n . I n November 1.977,
t h e c r e w o f a B-707 experienced a nosedown runaway s t a b i l i z e r t r i m ,
and o t h e r unusual i n d i c a t i o n s , w h i l e a t FL 390. A t t h e same t i m e ,
one o f the c a b i n c r e w r e p o r t e d f l o o d i n g o f t h e forward t o i l e t .
( T h e washbasin had overflowed due t o a d e f e c t i v e f a u c e t . ) Water
had e n t e r e d t h e e l e c t r i c a l bay and affected e l e c t r i c a l equipment.
a y s t a b i l i z e r d r i l l w a s completed and t h e f l i g h t continued
I n t h i s c a s e , a r e a d i l y d i s c e r n a b l e c a u s e / e f f e c t rela-
combined w i t h t h e moder e r a t e o f t h e t r i m d e v i a t i o n
and t h e high a l t i t u d e , created no e r i o u s problems
I n c i d e n t s i n v o l v i n g smoke o r f i r e should be treated w i t h
t h e h i g h e s t resp from t h e i r very beginning. I n J u l y 1973, the
c r e w of a 4-engi j e t t r a n s p o r t asked the approach c o n t r o l l e r f o r
a n emergency des t s i n c e they **aproblem of f i r e on board."
The f l i g h t had c l a n t i c c r o s s i n g and had
U t e s a f t e r t h e emergency

236
was d e c l a r e d , smoke i n t h e c o c k p i t made t h e s i t u a t i o n so i n t o l e r -
a b l e t h a t t h e c a p t a i n decided t o make a f o r c l a n d i n g . H e had t o
open t h e s l i d i n g c o c k p i t window t o m a i n t a i n ound r e f e r e n c e , The
a i r c r a f t was s k i l l f u l l y landed i n open farm l a n d , about 3 m i l e s
from t h e d e s t i n a t i o n runway. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , by t h a t t i m e most of
t h e c a b i n occupants had a l r e a d y been i n c a p a c i t a t e d by t h e i n f l i g h t
smoke and w e r e unable t o l e a v e t h e i n t a c t f u s e l a g e which was subse-
q u e n t l y d e s t r o y e d i n t h e ground f i r e .
T h e probable c a u s e of t h i s a c c i d e n t was a f i r e i n one o f t h e
a f t t o i l e t s . The i g n i t i o n mechanism could n o t be p i n p o i n t e d ; it
may have been an e l e c t r i c a l problem o r c a r e l e s s n e s s i n the form of
a d i s c a r d e d c i g a r e t t e . Whatever went wrong, it t o o k o n l y about 10
m i n u t e s t o c r e a t e t o x i c c o n d i t i o n s throughout t h e f u s e l a g e and t o
convince t h e c a p t a i n t h a t t h e o n l y r e a s o n a b l e d e c i s i o n under t h e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s was a n immediate c r a s h l a n d i n g .
I n November 1 9 7 3 , t h e c r e w of a c a r g o j e t c a r r y i n g hazard-
ous m a t e r i a l s l o s t c o n t r o l of t h e a i r c r a f t w h i l e a t t e m p t i n g t o
make an emergency l a n d i n g a t a major a i r p o r t . About 35 minutes
e a r l i e - r t h e f l i g h t had r e p o r t e d a n accumulation of smoke i n t h e
e l e c t r i c a l bay and had s t a r t e d emergency d r i l l s f o r a n e l e c t r i c a l
problem. A c t u a l l y , improperly packaged chemicals i n t h e c a r g o
probably s t a r t e d l e a k i n g and r e a c t e d spontaneously w i t h the pack-
a g i n g m a t e r i a l . T h i s c r e a t e d a c o n t i n u o u s and u n c o n t r o l l a b l e s o u r c e
o f smoke which permeated t h e c o c k p i t . There w e r e no i n d i c a t i o n s
t h a t t h e c r e w was aware of t h e amount and t y p e of hazardous m a t e r i -
a l s on board.
About 20 minutes b e f o r e t h e f l i g h t ' s a b r u p t end, a t r a f f i c
c o n t r o l l e r volunteered t o t h e c r e w information t h a t they w e r e
p a s s i n g a m i l i t a r y a i r b a s e . A t t h a t t i m e t h e f l i g h t was about
45 m i l e s from t h e a i r p o r t where t h e c r e w planned t o t a k e t h e a i r -
c r a f t and where company maintenance f a c i l i t i e s w e r e a v a i l a b l e .
According t o t h e a c c i d e n t r e p o r t , had an e l e c t r i c a l problem i n t h e
e l e c t r i c a l bay indeed been t h e s o u r c e o f t h e smoke, a s s u s p e c t e d
by t h e c r e w , t h e l o g i c a l d e c i s i o n from a l o g i s t i c s viewpoint w a s
t o l a n d t h e a i r c r a f t a t t h e n e a r e s t a i r p o r t w i t h company f a c i l i -
t i e s . However, w h i l e sympathizing w i t h t h i s c r e w ' s b a f f l i n g
predicament, w e should n o t h e s i t a t e t o p u t s e l f p r e s e r v a t i o n i n
i t s proper p e r s p e c t i v e by drawing t h i s c o n c l u s i o n : when t h e o r i g i n
o f smoke o r f i r e i s unknown, and when c h e c k l i s t a c t i o n s f a i l t o
i d e n t i f y and c o r r e c t t h e problem, l a n d a s soon a s p o s s i b l e o r b r i n g
t h e a i r c r a f t down t o a l e v e l from which an immediate emergency
l a n d i n g o r d i t c h i n g c a n be made. I f t h i s sounds l i k e grim a d v i c e ,
c o n s i d e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s reflected i n t h e s e two i s o l a t e d mishaps.
M i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of unusual i n s t r u m e n t i n d i c a t i o n s c a n
l e a d q u i c k l y t o a c r i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . I n D e c e m b e r 1974, t h e c r e w
o f a j e t t r a n s p o r t was unable t o r e g a i n c o n t r o l of t h e a i r c r a f t
a f t e r s t a l l i n g it a t about 24,000 f e e t as a r e s u l t of a t t e m p t s t o
r e d u c e a n abnormally h i g h a i r s p e e d and r a t e o f c l i m b . The c r e w
a t t r i b u t e d t h e h i g h r e a d i n g s t o t h e a i r c r a f t ' s l i g h t weight and
weather c o n d i t i o n s , A c t u a l l y , t h e f l i g h t w a s climbing through
f o r e c a s t i c i n g c o n d i t i o n s and t h e p i t o t heads became blocked by
i c i n g , because t h e c r e w had n e g l e c t e d t o t u r n on the p i t o t h e a t e r
switches.

237
 There w e r e no i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t any of t h e c r e w m e m b e r s
s u s p e c t e d t h e t r u e n a t u r e of t h e problem and t h e r e was no a p p a r e n t
a t t e m p t t o revert t o a t t i t u d e f l y i n g . This i s a d i s t u r b i n g d i s -
covery s i n c e one e x p e c t s t h a t e v e r y p i 1 t t o rec-
o g n i z e , and cope w i t h , problems i n t h e
i s one o f t h e many p i e c e s of
t h e subconscious, ready
c i a t i o n . There is a n o t h
p i l o t ' s bag of tricks." There is no s t a n
should go i n t o t h i s bag. The s i z e and
probably governed a s much by what w e "soak up" from o u r own ex-
p e r i e n c e s , and t h o s e o f o t h e r s , a s by formal
I t does n o t r e q u i r e a n emergency of mo proportions
t o reduce t h e margin between s u c c e s s and f a i l u r e t o z e r o , I n
January 1969, a DC-8 w a s flown i n t o t h e water d u r i n g a n i n s t r u m e n t
approach w h i l e the c a p t a i n and the f l i g h t e n g i n e e r w e r e a s c e r t a i n -
i n g t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e l a n d i n g g e a r f o l l o w i n g t h e f a i l u r e o f the
gear i n d i c a t o r l i g h t s . I n D e c e m b e r 1972, a s i m i l a r , " f i f t y - c e n t "
d i s t r a c t i o n i n t h e c o c k p i t l e d t o t h e f i r s t f a t a l wide-bodied j e t
accident.
I t a p p e a r s t h a t i n t h e p r o c e s s of c l u t t e r i n g c o c k p i t s and
t r a f f i c c o n t r o l rooms w i t h warning devices w e r u n t h e r i s k o f
d u l l i n g the s e n s i t i v i t y of o u r i n t e r n a l warning systems t o the
p o i n t where w e a r e becoming victims of o u r own c l e v e r n e s s .
I n some modes of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s e r i o u s t h o u g h t s i s g i v e n
t o using technology i n s u c h a manner t h a t even t h e most i r r e s p o n s i -
b l e cannot h u r t themselves. A s i d e from t h e q u e s t i o n whether any
s o c i e t y c a n a f f o r d t h e price of a foolproof t r a n s p o r t a t i o n system,
t h e n a t u r e of a v i a t i o n i s such t h a t it w i l l probably be t h e l a s t
t o f a l l v i c t i m t o t h e u t o p i a n i d e a t h a t you c a n d e s i g n i n d i v i d u a l
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y completely o u t of o u r freedom o f m o b i l i t y . There-
f o r e , t r u e s a f e t y i n a v i a t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o r e q u i r e an o p e r a t i n g
i n t e l l i g e n c e and c o n s c i e n c e .
PREVENTING EMERGENCIES

I t i s n o t unusual f o r an emergency t o s t a r t w i t h o u r f a i l -
u r e t o l i s t e n t o a n a i r c r a f t which i s t r y i n g t o t e l l u s i t - h a s
a problem. These s e l f - i n f l i c t e d emergencies o f t e n s t a r t w i t h t h e
placebo: "Groundcheck OK" o r "Carried over." I n August 1977, the
N o . 1 engine o f a four-engine t r a n s p o r t went i n t o f u l l reverse a t
FL 300. Ten days b e f o r e t h i s j o l t i n g i n c i d e n t , the N o . 1 engine
reverse o p e r a t i n g l i g h t s t a r t e d a c t i n g up. Maintenance personnel
could n o t f i n d a n y t h i n g wrong w i t h it. During t h e ta'keoff on the
day o f the i n c i d e n t the reverse l i g h t i l l u m i n a t e d a g a i n , t h e n went
out 0

The l e s s o n i s obvious: i f you want t o p r o t e c t y o u r s e l f

a g a i n s t u n p l e a s a n t s u r p r i s e s from a system problem t h a t stymies
maintenance, have it i s o l a t e d ; i f t h e system i s e s s e n t i a l t o f l i g h t ,
don't accept
s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i n t e n t of t h e minimum equip-
ment l i s t ( M e same c a t e g o r y . Consider t h e p r e d i c -
ament of t h e w i t h o u t e l e c t r i c a l power s h o r t l y
a f t e r a night takeoff i n t o i e n t c o n d i t i o n s . The a i r c r a f t
had been o p e r a t e d f o r 4 2 hours w i t h the N o . 3 g e n e r a t o r i n o p e r a t i v e

238
 ( p e r m i s s i b l e by MEL). S h o r t l y a f t e r l i f t - o f f , a f i r e warning i n
t h e N o . 1 engine f o r c e d t h e c r e w t o s h u t down t h a t engine. (No
evidence of a n i n f l i g h t f i r e was found i n t h e wreckage.) S h o r t l y
a f t e r shutdown of t h e N o . 1 engine, a l l power from t h e remaining
( N o . 2 ) g e n e r a t o r was l o s t . T h e standby e l e c t r i c a l system was n o t
a c t i v a t e d or f a i l e d t o f u n c t i o n . The c r e w l o s t a l l a t t i t u d e ref-
e r e n c e and an a c c i d e n t was unavoidable.
A s a r e s u l t of t h i s a c c i d e n t t h e MEL was revised and a n i n -
dependent, standby a t t i t u d e i n d i c a t o r became mandatory f o r a l l t u r -
b o j e t a i r c r a f t . Some innocuous q u e s t i o n s : D o you have t o do any-
t h i n g t o keep t h i s l a s t - r e s o r t i n s t r u m e n t o p e r a t i n g and i l l u m i n a t -
ed i n c a s e of t o t a l loss of e l e c t r i c a l power i n your a i r c r a f t ?
How long w i l l i t o p e r a t e on i t s own power?
While on t h e s u b j e c t of warning l i g h t s and s i g n a l ? , it
might be w e l l t o p o i n t o u t t h a t f o r a f l i g h t c r e w t h e r e i s no such
t h i n g a s a f a l s e warning; every warning h a s t o be t a k e n s e r i o u s l y .
I n March, 1977 t h e c r e w o f a 4-engine t r a n s p o r t experienced simul-
taneous f i r e warnings on t h e N o . 2 and 3 e n g i n e s a t FL 330. The
f i r e d r i l l s f o r b o t h engines w e r e completed and t h e f l i g h t was
continued s u c c e s s f u l l y on two e n g i n e s . I t was l a t e r determined
t h a t b o t h warnings w e r e f a l s e . A s e a l i n g washer w a s missing from
a connector i n t h e N o . 2 system. Crossed w i r e s on a r e l a y u n i t
caused a sympathetic warning i n t h e N o . 3 system. What i s a c r e w
t o do who h a s a s i m i l a r e x p e r i e n c e a f t e r t a k e o f f a t max g r o s s , o r
i n t h e m i d d l e o f a P a c i f i c c r o s s i n g ? How many persons and a i r c r a f t
have been l o s t - i n a l l forms o f f l y i n g - because of f a l s e warnings?
The s o l u t i o n of t h i s problem is i n t h e hands of d e s i g n e r s and main-
tenance personnel.
T h e p r e v e n t i o n of emergencies - and a c c i d e n t s - h a s a l o t
t o do w i t h what w e l e a r n f r o m the t r i b u l a t i o n s of our c o l l e a g u e s .
Some examples:
- The N o . 3 engine of a B-747 s t a l l e d and flamed o u t
when t h e a i r c r a f t encountered the j e t wake of a n o t h e r
B-747 a t FL 300.
- The f a n assembly of t h e N o . 3 e n g i n e o f a DC-10 d i s -
i n t e g r a t e d 36 seconds a f t e r t h e c r e w s t a r t e d ex-
perimenting w i t h t h e a u t o t h r o t t l e / s p e e d c o n t r o l
system f o r no o t h e r r e a s o n t h a n t h e i r own c u r i o s i t y .
The a i r c r a f t w a s a t FL 390. Fragments of t h e N o . 3
engine p e n e t r a t e d the f u s e l a g e , t h e N o . 2 engine
n a c e l l e , and t h e r i g h t wing. During t h e t o t a l c a b i n
decompression, a passenger was f o r c e d o u t of a c a b i n
window t h a t had been broken by an engine fragment.
- A wide-bodied j e t s t r u c k approach l i g h t s u p p o r t i n g
s t r u c t u r e a f t e r l i f t - o f f a t the v e r y end of t h e
runway. The a i r c r a f t w a s damaged s u b s t a n t i a l l y ; 3 of t h e
4 h y d r a u l i c systems became i n o p e r a t i v e . The l a t e
l i f t - o f f w a s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the u s e of i n c o r r e c t
t a k e o f f r e f e r e n c e speeds. There had been a change
i n d e p a r t u r e runway, which r e q u i r e d a f l a p s e t t i n g
of 20° i n s t e a d o f 100; however, the speed bugs w e r e
left a t their original settings,

239
 - S h o r t l y a f t e r a n i g h t t a k e o f f , and w h i l e e n t e r i n g
an o v e r c a s t , the c r e w o f a n L-1011 experienced a
severe nose-up tendency t h a t could n o t be relieved
by u s i n g a l l a v a i l a b l e e l e c t r i c a l t r i m . Although
t h e yoke was held a g a i n s t the forward s t o p , the
p i t c h passed through about 2 2 degrees and t h e a i r -
speed went down t o 140 k n o t s . By s k i l l f u l manip-
u l a t i o n o f power and f l a p s t h e c r e w was a b l e t o
c o n t r o l t h e f l i g h t p a t h and make a n ILS approach,
followed by a s u c c e s s f u l l a n d i n g .
I t was l a t e r determined t h a t f a i l u r e o f a b e a r i n g assembly
i n one o f t h e e l e v a t o r drive systems resulted i n jamming
of t h e l e f t e l e v a t o r i n t h e U P p o s i t i o n .

THE F I N A L O P T I O N

One of t h e most ignored t r u i s m s i n a v i a t i o n i s t h a t t h e

a b i l i t y t o f l y an a i r c r a f t has t o be complemented by t h e a b i l i t y
t o c r a s h it competently, should t h e need a r i s e . Equally ignored
i s t h e l o g i c t h a t a l l p i l o t s must p o s s e s s a working knowledge of
c r a s h dynamics a l t h o u g h o n l y a f r a c t i o n of one p e r c e n t of each gen-
e r a t i o n of t r a n s p o r t p i l o t s f a c e s a s i t u a t i o n where t h e a i r c r a f t
c e a s e s t o be a f l y i n g machine. That does n o t mean t h a t o u r o u t l o o k
should be one o f morbid preoccupation w i t h what m i g h t happen. A s -
s t a t e d e a r l i e r , preparedness i n t h i s r e g a r d i n v o l v e s o n l y an h o n e s t
a t t e m p t t o g r a s p t h e underlying c o n c e p t s and s t o r i n g them - o u t o f
s i g h t b u t w i t h i n r e a c h - i n o u r bag of t r i c k s .
D e s p i t e a l l i t s n e g a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s , world-wide a c c i d e n t
e x p e r i e n c e has provided one comforting i n s i g h t : t h e modern j e t
a i r c r a f t ' s impressive a b i l i t y t o p r o t e c t i t s occupants even d u r i n g
severe c r a s h d e c e l e r a t i o n s . I t i s n o t unusual t o see an a i r c r a f t
s l i d e t o s t o p i n r e l a t i v e l y rough t e r r a i n , d u r i n g a l a n d i n g o r
t a k e o f f mishap, w i t h o u t e x t e n s i v e t r a u m a t i c effects on t h e occu-
pants. The obvious c o n c l u s i o n i s t h a t a p i l o t who has some under-
s t a n d i n g of the minimum requirements f o r an o f f - a i r p o r t emergency
l a n d i n g s i t e i s i n a much b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o i n s u r e t h e s u c c e s s o f
a c r a s h landing,
Terrain Selection
The l e n g t h o f a f i e l d t h a t w i l l accommodate a j e t t r a n s p o r t
depends on t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e s o i l . The smoke-filled B-707 t h a t
was s u c c e s s f u l l y crash-landed by a p i l o t who had t o look o u t of a
s i d e window s l i d 1800 f e e t on d r y , hard farmland. S o f t e r t e r r a i n ,
such a s a c o r n f i e l d , would probably reduce t h i s d i s t a n c e . About
2000 t o 2500 f e e t of open t e r r a i n should be adequate f o r most
t r a n s p o r t s a t t y p i c a l l a n d i n g speeds. However, it must b e remember-
ed t h a t t h i s i s ground d i s t a n c e . I f t h e approach h a s t o be made
over an o b s t r u c t e d a r e a , a c o n s i d e r a b l e larger f i e l d i s d e s i r a b l e
t o compensate f o r judgment errors, e s p e c i a l l y when no power i s
a v a i l a b l e . Every e f f o r t should be made t o p r e v e n t t h e a i r c r a f t
from s t r i k i n g s o l i d o b s t a c l e s b e f o r e t h e touchdown p o i n t i s reached.
If c o n t a c t w i t h s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e s i s unavoidable, due t o t h e l i m i t s
of a v a i l a b l e space, i t i s best t o have such c o n t a c t s occur a t t h e
low speed a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the end of a ground s l i d e .

240
 T h e f i e l d does n o t have t o have t h e q u a l i t i e s o f a WW IX
g r a s s s t r i p . I t c a n be g e n t l y r o l l i n g , c r o s s e d by f e n c e s and s m a l l
d i t c h e s , and covered w i t h c r o p s and s m a l l trees. But it should
n o t have d e s t r u c t i v e o b s t a c l e s l i k e l a r g e trees, s o l i d s t r u c t u r e s ,
b o u l d e r s , r a v i n e s , and powerlines i n t h e i n t e n d e d path. S i n c e t h e
a i r c r a f t may s w e r v e a s it slows down, l a t e r a l space i n t h e second
h a l f of t h e f i e l d i s more i m p o r t a n t t h a n i n t h e f i r s t h a l f .
Jet a i r c r a f t d i t c h w e l l when f l i g h t manual i n s t r u c t i o n s are
followed. T h e r e f o r e , a w a t e r l a n d i n g c a n be a good a l t e r n a t i v e
when t h e o n l y o t h e r c h o i c e i s o b v i o u s l y u n s u i t a b l e t e r r a i n . T h e
p r i n c i p a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r a d i t c h i n g are: w a t e r t e m p e r a t u r e and
s u r f a c e c o n d i t i o n s , proximity t o l a n d , a c c e s s t o w a t e r - s u r v i v a l
equipment, and the t i m e a v a i l a b l e t o p r e p a r e the occupants.
During ground-level emergencies t e r r a i n s e l e c t i o n may con-
s i s t of nothing more t h a n a brief o p p o r t u n i t y t o nudge t h e a i r c r a f t
i n t o the l e a s t u n d e s i r a b l e d i r e c t i o n . For i n s t a n c e , when a t a k e o f f
o r go-around h a s t o be rejected, t h e p i l o t should a t t e m p t t o u s e
t h e remaining c o n t r o l o v e r t h e a i r c r a f t t o a c h i e v e the most f a v o r -
a b l e c r a s h heading. Knowledge of c o n d i t i o n s and o b s t a c l e s beyond
t h e runway i s v i t a l i n t h i s r e g a r d . A f e w degrees o f change i n
heading may make a l l t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n the outcome of such an
emergency.
&proach and Landinq
T h e d e s t r u c t i v e energy t h a t i s brought t o b e a r on the
s t r u c t u r a l i n t e g r i t y of a n a i r c r a f t i s governed by t h e a b r u p t n e s s
of the s t o p p i n g p r o c e s s which, i n t u r n , i s p r o p o r t i o n a l to s t o p p i n g
d i s t a n c e and v e l o c i t y squared. S i n c e w e a r e concerned w i t h ground-
speed o n l y , wind d i r e c t i o n and v e l o c i t y c a n become c r i t i c a l f a c t o r s .
An a i r c r a f t landed w i t h a t a i l w i n d of 20 k n o t s a t a n i n d i c a t e d a i r -
speed of 130 k n o t s has almost t w i c e a s much d e s t r u c t i v e energy a s
a n a i r c r a f t landed i n t o a 20-knot headwind; assuming i d e n t i c a l
r a t e s of d e c e l e r a t i o n i n b o t h c a s e s , a t a i l w i n d l a n d i n g would ex-
t e n d ground t r a v e l by a f a c t o r o f n e a r l y two. However, wind direc-
t i o n and v e l o c i t y become decisive f a c t o r s o n l y when t i m e and c i r -
cumstances pose no o v e r r i d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A c o n t r o l l e d touch-
down i n l e s s - t h a n - i d e a l t e r r a i n i s p r e f e r a b l e t o the chance o f
losing control i n an attempt t o reach an a i r p o r t .
T h e proper a i r c r a f t c o n f i g u r a t i o n always i n c l u d e s t h e u s e
o f f l a p s , i f a v a i l a b l e , s i n c e t h e y lower t h e touchdown speed. The
best p o s i t i o n o f a r e t r a c t a b l e l a n d i n g g e a r i s s u b j e c t t o q u e s t i o n ,
except i n c a s e o f a d i t c h i n g when it d e f i n i t e l y ' s h o u l d be retracted.
The a d v i c e t o c r a s h - l a n d w i t h t h e gear extended i n o f f - a i r p o r t
l a n d i n g s should be weighed agaimst i t s p o s s i b l e consequences, a s
shown by a c t u a l a c c i d e n t e x p e r i e n c e i n one j e t t r a n s p o r t . The
s u b j e c t f l i g h t manual recommends t h a t the l a n d i n g g e a r b e extended
f o r crash l a n d i n g s s i n c e it a b s o r b s c o n s i d e r a b l e energy. I t goes
on t o s a y t h a t , even if the g e a r i s c a r r i e d away, t h e i n t e g r i t y
o f t h e f u e l - c o n t a i n i n g p o r t i o n o f the wings w i l l n o t be a f f e c t e d .
One a b o r t e d takeoff i n t h i s model a i r c r a f t r e s u l t e d i n a n
e x t e n s i v e p o s t - c r a s h f i r e when a n extended l a n d i n g g e a r was sheared
o f f i n a d i t c h i n the runway o v e r r u n a r e a . The f u e l s p i l l a g e w a s

241
a t t r i b u t e d t o d i s r u p t i o n of an i n t e g r a l f u e l t a n k when t h e main
l a n d i n g g e a r s u p p o r t i n g s t r u c t u r e was t o r n away. The impact
f o r c e s on the main f u s e l a g e and t h e occupants w e r e minor.
A s i m i l a r a i r c r a f t made an extremely ha
down on f l a t t e r r a i n d u r i n g a n attempted go
c o n d i t i o n s . Almost a l l occupants s u s t a i n e d r m o f deceler-
a t i v e i n j u r i e s ; 14 o f them w e r e immobilized
by r e s c u e p e r s o n n e l . T h e f a c t t h a t there
and no c a t a s t r o p h i c p o s t - c r a s h f i r e - c a n
t h e r e t r a c t e d p o s i t i o n of t h e landing gear
The l a t t e r mishap p r o v i d e s some i n t e r e s t i n g i n s i g h t i n the
p r e f e r r e d manner o f touchdown i n a c o n t r o l l e d c r a s h - l a n d i n g . For
obvious r e a s o n s , t h e v e r t i c a l speed i s reduced t o z e r o immediately
upon ground c o n t a c t i f a gear-up l a n d i n g i s made. Except f o r com-
p r e s s i o n and deformation of the f u s e l a g e bottom, there w i l l be no
c u s h i o n i n g e f f e c t . This means t h a t t h e p i l o t should a t t e m p t t o
m a i n t a i n enough c o n t r o l l a b i l i t y t o reduce the r a t e of s i n k t o
p r a c t i c a l l y z e r o a t touchdown. If he r e a c h e s t h e selected touch-
down a r e a a t excessive forward speed, and f i e l d l e n g t h i s c r i t i c a l ,
he should c o n s i d e r f o r c i n g t h e a i r c r a f t o n t o t h e ground d e s p i t e
t h e higher-than-normal speed. T h i s a d v i c e does n o t a p p l y t o
d i t c h i n g s which should always be executed a t t h e lowest p o s s i b l e
speed, b u t without s t a l l i n g .
A commonly overlooked f a c t o r i n t h e emergency s e c t i o n o f f l i g h t
manuals i s t h e manner i n w h i c h t h e c r e w c a n r e d u c e t h e g r e a t e s t
hazard of a n o t h e r w i s e s u r v i v a b l e a c c i d e n t : a p o s t - c r a s h f i r e .
The s e r i o u s n e s s of f u e l s p i l l a g e depends on t h e q u a n t i t y i n -
volved and t h e l o c a t i o n . I n t h e c a s e o f wing-mounted e n g i n e s
there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t one o r more e n g i n e s w i l l be t o r n away
even d u r i n g a w e l l executed gear-up l a n d i n g on s u i t a b l e t e r r a i n .
I f the n a t u r e of t h e o b s t a c l e s makes major wing damage unavoidable,
it is p r e f e r a b l e t o have t h i s occur symmetrically and simultaneous-
l y , t h a t i s , e q u a l s e c t i o n s of outboard wing p a n e l s should be
severed a t t h e same t i m e . T h i s h e l p s t o m a i n t a i n t h e desired i m -
p a c t heading and keeps the f u s e l a g e from s l i d i n g sideways i n t o
obstacles.
S t a t i s t i c a l l y , J e t - A t y p e f u e l s ( k e r o s e n e ) seem t o have a
s a f e t y advantage o v e r the m o r e v o l a t i l e B-type f u e l s . T h i s a p p l i e s
t o i n f l i g h t incidents (including lightning strikes) a s w e l l a s
ground mishaps. T h i s advantage is l o s t when impact c o n d i t i o n s
c a u s e s p r a y i n g ( m i s t i n g ) of f u e l .
The most obvious and b e n e f i c i a l step toward t h e r e d u c t i o n o f
i g n i t i o n s o u r c e s , i s t h e immediate shutdown o f a l l engines a s soon
a s it is a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e y c a n no longer p r e v e n t a ground mishap
o r c o n t r i b u t e t o c o n t r o l over the s t o p p i n g p r o c e s s . T h i s s t e p
should be t a k e n any t i m e t h e a i r c r a f t ' s expected ground t r a j e c t o r y
w i l l i n v o l v e o t h e r t h a n runway s u r f a c e . T h e t i m e between shutdown
and t h e damage p r o c e s s may be s u f f i c i e n t t o c o o l t h e h o t s e c t i o n
t u r b i n e engines below t h e i g n i t i o n p o i n t o f s p i l l e d flammables.
rthermore, t h i s a c t i o n p r e c l u d e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n t i n u e d
engine o p e r a t i o n when f u s e l a g e damage d i s r u p t s c o n t r o l from t h e
cockpit
Another s o u r c e of i g n i t i o n i s t h e e l e c t r i c a l system. However,
is system should n o t be d e a c t i v a t e d u n t i l i t s services a r e no
l o n g e r needed f o r a i r c r a f t c o n t r o l , i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n , and o t h e r
v i t a l functions

242
 A s soon a s t i m e p e r m i t s a f t e r a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c i d e n t , c a b i n
c r e w and passengers should g e t a message from t h e c o c k p i t a s s u r i n g
t h e m t h a t t h e f l i g h t c r e w i s a t l e a s t aware o f whatever unusual
e v e n t o c c u r r e d . Following t h a t announcement, t h e c a b i n c r e w s h o u l d
be k e p t informed of any development t h a t may r e q u i r e a n unscheduled
o r emergency l a n d i n g . T h i s a d d i t i o n a l knowledge give's t h e c a b i n
c r e w t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p l a n , c o o r d i n a t e , and implement passenger
p r e p a r a t i o n i n a t i m e l y and effective manner.
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n touched o n l y on t h e f i r s t requirement f o r
c r a s h s u r v i v a l : a d e c e l e r a t i o n p r o c e s s t h a t h e l p s i n s u r e impact
s u r v i v a l by l e a v i n g t h e o c c u p i a b l e p o r t i o n o f t h e f u s e l a g e a s much
a s p o s s i b l e i n t a c t . The second requirement, t i m e l y e v a c u a t i o n ,
f a l l s beyond t h e scope of t h i s paper.
CONCLUSIONS

The need t o be reminded of our v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o emergency

s i t u a t i o n s h a s a p a r a l l e l i n o u r need t o s u f f e r b o o s t e r s h o t s t o
m a i n t a i n immunity a g a i n s t c e r t a i n d i s e a s e s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t o o
o f t e n w e expect t o m a i n t a i n h m u n i t y by keeping t r a c k o n l y of .
t h o s e emergencies t h a t r e s u l t e d i n widely-publicized a c c i d e n t s .
These a r e j u s t t h e v i s i b l e t i p o f a n i c e b e r g o f l e a r n i n g e x p e r i -
ences i n the form of numerous d a i l y i n c i d e n t s t h a t occur without
ill e f f e c t s . I n most c a s e s i t i s t h e t o l e r a n c e b u i l t i n t o t h e
system, o r t h e competence of an a l e r t c r e w , t h a t t a k e s t h e s t i n g
o u t of p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s . I n some c a s e s it i s t h e random t i m i n g
of t h e e v e n t t h a t makes it harmless. However, p r a c t i c a l l y a l l c a s e s
demonstrate t h e f a l l i b i l i t y o r i n g e n u i t y o f t h e human element
throughout t h e a v i a t i o n sysFem.
T h e overused e x p r e s s i o n t h a t w e ' d better l e a r n from t h e
mistakes of o t h e r s s i n c e w e won't l i v e long enouqh t o make t h e m
a l l o u r s e l v e s i s s t i l l a s v a l i d a s the f i r s t t i m e it was used. For
a p i l o t t h i s means t h a t he derives more p e r s o n a l s e c u r i t y ' f r o m a
p u b l i c a t i o n t h a t exposes h i m t o t h e i m p e r f e c t i o n s i n h i s o p e r a t i o n a l
environment t h a n from one t h a t t e l l s h i m how t o i n v e s t h i s money.
Some o f the o u t s t a n d i n g s a f e t y p u b l i c a t i o n s t h a t use t h i s concept
a r e : " B r i t i s h Airways A i r S a f e t y R e v i e w " and PanAmerican's "Cross-
check. '*
I n a d d i t i o n t o u s i n g our l i f e l i k e s i m u l a t o r s t o p r e p a r e
p i l o t s t o jump t h e customary hoops a s p a r t o f t h e i r r e c u r r i n g cer-
t i f i c a t i o n p r o c e s s , w e should encourage the programming of r e a l -
world o r d e a l s i n t o t h e m . A one-time, u n a n t i c i p a t e d exposure t o
i n c i d e n t s such a s a n iced-up P i t o t - s t a t i c system, o r t o t a l l o s s of
e l e c t r i c a l power, would make a p i l o t more r e s p o n s i v e t o a c t u a l
problems i n these a r e a s . T h i s t y p e of t r a i n i n g promotes e n l i g h t e n -
ed decision-making i n unusual s i t u a t i o n s w i t h o u t downplaying t h e
c o n s t r a i n t s of s t a n d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s .
By g i v i n g emergency awareness t h e level o f r e a l i s m and
r e s p e c t a b i l i t y it demands, w e a l s o encourage t h e world-wide s h a r i n g
o f e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t should form t h e basis of o u r preparedness f o r
uncommon c h a l l e n g e s .

243
The key t o t h e silccess of t h i s NASA/Industrg lu'orkishcp on R e s c u r r e ifanagement
on t5e F l i g h t Deck is t h e m a l l working groups th::t a i 1 c o n f e r e n c e p a r t i c i -
p a n t s h a i ~heen e s s i g n e d to. Each of t h e i n v i t e d p r e s e n t z t i s n s was s z l e c t s i
t o p r o v i d e you with some t o o l s t o work v i t h - - i 4 e a concepts and approhcilp:;.
It is t h e applfc-c'iion of t h e s e t o o l s , thrnugh t h o d i s c u s s i o n s and d a l i b c r a -
t i o n s of t h e wgrking groups, which w i l l produce new i d e a s , new concepts aiid
new approaches as w e l l as i d e n t i f y c u r r e n t approaches vhich should be e o n t i n -
ued o r expanded. Because o f t h e c e n t r a l importance of t h e working group con-
c e p t , we have g i v e n c a r e f u l c o i i s i d e r a t i o n t o developing workable, p r o d u c t i v e
o b j e c t i v e s and approaches f o r t h e s e working groups, and t o t h e i r s t r u c t u r e a d
composition. The i a f o r m a t i o n below was assembled t o a s s i s t t h e working group
chairmen, t h e NASA A s s i s t a n t and t h e i n d i v i d u a l members of t h e working g r o x p s
i n o r g a n i z i n g t h e i r a t t a c k on t h e i r a s s i g n e d problem.

OB J E CT I V C z

The o b j e c t i v e of each working group is t o g e n e r a t e a report containing the

foll.owing information:

1 . What are t h e s p e c i f i c r e s o u r c e management s k i l l s , behavior and

p r o f i c i e n c i e s which should b e developed i n f l i g h t deck crewmembers?

2. A t which p o i n t i n an airman's career i s i t most appropriate to

i n c o r p o r a t e r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g ?

3 . What are t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e techniques for conducting this

t r a iriing ?

The f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n i s intended t o amplify each of t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s .

The o b j e c t i v e r e g a r d i n g s p e c i f i c s k i l l s , b e h a v i o r and p r o f i c i e n c i e s i s c e n t r a l
t o t h e whole concept of r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g . The u l t i m a t e s u c c e s s
of any t r a i n i n g program i s l a r g e l y dependent upon t h e development of d e t z i l e d ,
p r e c i s e s p e c i f i c a z i o i i s d e s c r i b i n g t h e d e s i r e d ecd product. Furthermore, these
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s w i l l , i n l a r g e p a r t , determine t5e c o n t e n t and s t r u c t u r e of t h e
t r a i n i n g program, and w i l l a l s o form t h e b a s i s f o r s p e c i f y i n g c r i t e r i a which
c a n b e used i n a s s e s s i n g a i r n a n performance.

Some p o s s i b i l i t i e s have been suggested i n t h e formal p r e s e n t a t i o n s . Exanples

inc.l.ude: ( I ) The C a p t a i n must i n s u r e p o s i t i v e d e l e g a t i o n of v a r i o u s d u t i e s
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s d u r i n g a l l f l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s ; ( 2 ) A l l crewmml~ers must
immediately inform t h e i r f e l l o w crewmembers of any s i g n i f i c m t q u e s t i o n o r
doubt about t h e c o n t e n t o r meaning of c l e a r a n c e s , i n s t r u c t i o n s o r o t h e r in-
f o r m a t i o n r e l e v a n t t o tho, conduct of the f l i g h t ; ( 3 ) The C a p t a i n Rust e s t a b -
l i s h c l e a r and open l i n e s of communication between a l l flight deck
crewmembers. These are g i s e n h e r e as examples only-- i t is up t o t h e indi;ridu-
a1 working groups t o determine whether t!iese are a p p r o p r i a t e t r a i n i n g objcc-
t i v e s , and t o develop o t h e r s as necessary.

I n some ways, t h e q u e s t i o n about t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e phase of a n airman's

c a r e e r i n which t o g i v e r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g nay be misleading, be-
c a u s e i t i m p l i e s t h a t r e s c u r c e management t r a i n i n g Piould be given a t o n l y orie
point. It seems f a r more l i k e l y t h a t elements of r e s o u r c e management traintr.;
might be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o e x i s t i n g phases cf aircrew t r a i n i n g . In cthcr

245
words, r a t h e r than d e f i n i n 2 a r ? s o u
d e l i b e r a t i o n s as working groups rrmy res
e f f e c t t h a t elcrrents of s c s o u r c e manag

rent Lrainin

F i n a l l y , f o r ea
d i s c u s si o n s t h e
t h e simulator, p a r t i c u l a r l y
r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n
b l e t o v a r i o u s eleinents of

c o n s i d e r which eleinents of t h i s t r a i n i n g d g h t b e conducted i n classrooms,

s m a l l group d i s c u s s i o n s , a s p a r t of an a u d i o - v i s u a l t r a i n i u g package, o r
through o t h e r approaches, i n c l u d i n g t h i n g s l i k e S a f e t y Awareness programs,
and F l i g h t O p e r a t i o n s and S a f e t y p u b l i c a t i o n s .

There are two o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t o keep i n mind when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e "How"

of r e s o u r c e management t r a i n i n g : Economics and R e g u l a t i o n s . With regard t o
t h e former, you are i n t h e unique p o s i t i o n o f being a b l e t o assess t h e poten-
t i a l economic impact of your recommendations, and w e need n o t say more. With
r e g a r d t o the l a t t e r , b7e do have r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from FAA F l i g h t Standards
p r e s e n t who are i n a unique p o s i t i o n t o d i s c u s s c u r r e n t and f u t u r e r e g u l a t o r y
considerations. P l e a s e c a l l upon t h e FAA people f o r h e l p and guidance on t h i s
matter.

PROCEDURES

Each working group h a s an a s s i g n e d chairman from t h e t n d u s t r y , and a NASA As-

s i s t a n t who w i l l sEme m u l t i p l e f u n c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g h o s t , r e s o u r c e person,
t e c h n i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c a d v i s o r , and r e c o r d i n g s e c r e t a r y . Operating pr3-
c e d u r e s have been l e f t t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e working group chairmen.

Working group assignments w e r e made by NASA on t h e b a s i s of several con-

s i d e r a t i o n s . P l e a s e n o t e t h a t e l t h o u g h w e have a s s i g n e d one of three specific
areas ( S e l e c t i o n and I n i t i a l T r a i n i n g , T r a n s i t i o n arid Upgrade T r a i n i n g , and
R e c u r r e n t T r a i n i n g and L i n e O p e r a t i o n s ) t o each 1lorkin.g Group, we do n o t ire311
t o s t r i c t l y l i m i t t h e scope af any one group's discussion t o t h e assigned
area. I n s t e a d , c o n s i d e r t h e a s s i g n e d area t o be an i n d i c a t i o n of the primary
area of c o n s i d e r a t i o n . If you wish t o make recommendations i n any o t h e r
areas, you c e r t a i n l y may do so a f t e r a t h ugh development of t h e primary

ts, along w i t h meeting room

g Group Assignment S h e e t e your r e g i s t r a t i o n

o t have i n d i v i d u a i n g group as-

r y chairman, and

246
 c o n s i s t of t h r e e two-person tea:' one KASA person, and one of the t h r e e nnn-
i i i d u s t r y speakers. The rton-:iAS:;. team nembers a r e Drs. Eolm:in and Helmreicit,
arid Mr. Garvey. The XASA r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a r e D r s . B i l l i n g s and Tanner, and
Wr. Elurphy. These teams w i l l c i r c u l a t e among t h e working g o u p s , and s h s u i d
b e cousidered as r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e t o a s s i s t yoclr d e l i b e r a t i o n s i n t h e i r
p a r t i c u l a r areas of e x p e r t i s e . ??gain, it is up t o ach Fkrking grolrp t o
determine how i t wants t o make u s e of these "mobile" resources.

You should a l s o c o n s i d e r each of t h e i n d u s t r y speakers as being 2 v a i l a b l e t o

a s s i s t on any given problem. Althcugh t h e s e s p e a k e r s hzve been assigned to
s p e c i f i c working groups, t h e working group chairmen w i l l t e m p o r a r i l y r e i e a s e
t.hese i n d i v i d u a l s upon r e q u e s t from a n o t h e r group.

Also n o t e t h a t we have o t h e r r e s o u r c e s a-Jailable should you need them: FAR

P a r t 61 and 121; t h e A i r m e 3 ' s Information Kanual; some ASRS r e p o r t s , and
s e l e c t e d a i r c r a f t a c c i d e n t r e p o r t s . Your NASA A s s i s t a n t w i l l be a b l e t o lo-
c a t e t h i s material should you d e s i r e i t .

WORKTNG GROUP REPORT FORIUT

It is t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of your NASA A s s i s t a n t t o h e l p t h e Chairman draEt t h e

Working Group Report which w i l l be submitted t o t h e g e n e r a l assembly. To e=-
s u r e a uniform format, we ask t h a t t h e s e r e p o r t s f o l l o w t h e format silggested
e below.

Ea.ch r e p o r t should c o n s i s t of t h r e e major s e c t i o n s : (1) a n I n t r o d u c t i o n ; ( 2 )

Recommendations; and ( 3 ) a Summary. The I n t r o d u c t i o n should c o n s i s t of a
maximum of two pages which should d e s c r i b e g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s of t h e npproach
t a k e n t o t h e a s s i g n e d i s s u e by t h e working group, and o t h e r material of a gen-
eral i n t r o d u c t o r y n a t u r e .

The Recommendations s e c t i o n i s t h e h e a r t of t h e r e p o r t . This s e c t i o n should

b e q u i t e s p e c i f i c . Each recommendation should c o n s i s t of at l e a s t two, and i n
some cases, t h r e e , p a r t s : (1) T r a i n i n g O b j e c t i v e s ; ( 2 ) T r a i n i n g Approach; and,
i f a p p r o p r i a t e , ( 3 ) Research I s s u e s . The T r a i n i n g O b j e c t i v e s s h o u l d be s t a t e d
i n s p e c i f i c terms, and t h e T r a i n i n g Approach should c o n s i d e r t h e d u a l i s s u e s
of How t o t r a i n t o t h e s t a t e d o b j e c t i v e s , and When i n an airman's career t h i s
t r a i n i n g should be conducted ( o r i n t o which e x i s t i n g t r a i n i n g program o r phase
t h e recommended t r a i n i n g should be i n c o r p o r a t e d ) .

Whenever t h e r e are Research I s s u e s i d e n t i f i e d i n connection with any s p e c i F i c

recoamendation, t h e s e should b e s t a t e d , along w i t h some s t a t e m e n t about t h e
relative p r i o r i t y of each r e s e a r c h i s s u e .

The Summary s e c t i o n should be l i m i t e d t o a maximum of two pages, and should

a t t e m p t t o summarize t h e r e s u l t s of t h e group's d i s c u s s i o n . Any major areas
of disagreement, m i n o r i t y opinions and o t h e r similar i n f o r m a t i o n should b e
placed here.

Renember t h a t each r e p o r t must be s u c c i n c t . We r e a l i z e t h a t , i n some cases,

t h i s is going t o p r e c l u d e f u l l d i s c u s s i o n of t h e i s s u e s . There w i l l be an op-
p o r t u n i t y t o amplify and c l a r i f y t h e s e p o i n t s during t h e p a n e l d i s c - i s s i o n and
g e n e r a l d i s c u s s i o n Thursday afternoon. Furthermore, an o p p o r t u n i t y t o f u r t h e r
develop t h e s e i s s u e s w i l l be given during the p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e Workshop
Procedings. A D r a f t of t h e Proceedings w i l l b e c i r c u l a t e d t o t h e Working
Group Chairmen who w i l l be a b l e to e d i t , modify, expand o r d e l e t e s e c t i o n s of
t h e Norking Group r e p o r t s .

247
1 Report No. I 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
NASA CP-2120 I I
4. T i t k and Subtitle 1 5. Report Date
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ON THE FLIGHT DECK"

7. Authorts)
3 6. Performing Organization Code

8. Performing Organization Report No.

Edited by George E. Cooper, Maurice D. White,
and John K. Lauber A-8062
10. Work Unit No.
9 Performing Organization Name and Address 505-35-31
Ames Research Center, NASA 11. Contract or Grant No.
Moffett Field, Calif. 94035
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
Conference Publicatio
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 14. Sponsoring Agency Code
Washington, D.C. 20546

Pilot selection
Cockpit management
Crew coordination

'For sale by the National Technical Information Service, Springfield. Virginia 221 61

U.S.GP0:1980-689-106/8898