Emily Zhang

HONORS 230G

November 17, 2019

The Impact of American Public Opinion on the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bombs

Introduction

Throughout history, a nation’s public has proven the power they hold over politicians’

major decisions. From starting revolutions to overthrow a government they are unhappy with to

affecting a choice simply with their opinion. In the case of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, James F. Byrnes, the Secretary of State under President Truman, was famously

quoted to have said that accepting Japanese terms or softening unconditional surrender terms

would lead to the “crucifixion of the President”. Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War under

Truman, also mentioned in his article in the Harper’s magazine that one could not look at fellow

Americans knowing that the bombs could have saved American lives. While political leaders in

the years leading up to the end of the war believed that the American public would be outraged

knowing the possibilities held in the bombs, in fact there was much more debate centering

around whether unconditional surrender should be pursued or terms of be modified.

Pre-War Isolationism

As the second world war loomed over Europe, America was still reeling from the impact

of the so called “Great War”, the “war to end all wars”. In the 1930s, “the combination of the
Great Depression and the memory of tragic losses in World War I contributed to pushing American

public opinion and policy toward isolationism” (Office of the Historian), the pain caused by such

recent memories discouraged Americans from wanting to spend more lives on international issues

that seemingly did not concern the United States. On the other hand, what concerned people the

most was their own country’s economic woes. As Franklin D. Roosevelt became the 32nd President of

the United States, his first task was to face the Great Depression. Even during the Spanish civil war

in late 1936, “unemployment and economy in government ranked as the 'most vital issues before the

American people today'” (Smith, 58). There simply was no time to look at European affairs that

appeared to be so far away.

The start of the second world war in 1939 “did not suddenly diffuse popular desire to avoid

international entanglements” (Office of the Historian), in fact “ninety percent of Americans hoped

the United States would stay out of the war” (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum).

Americans so strongly believed that intervention in the first European war was fruitless that from

1935 to 1939, “Congress passed five different Neutrality Acts that forbade American involvement in

foreign conflicts” (Leuchtenburg). There was a slight shift in American neutrality as Hitler started

making his moves, quickly occupying the majority of mainland Europe and setting his eyes on

Britain. “FDR re-asserted American neutrality, noting, however, that he could not "ask that every

American remain neutral in thought as well””, pushing the United States to support Great Britain

“with all aid “short of war”” (Leuchtenburg). Despite America’s strongest ally falling victim to Hitler’s

conquest, the American public’s neutrality remained strong.

Shift in Opinion After Pearl Harbor

As the war situation steadily declined in Europe, American public opinion slowly shifted.

According to the Gallup Poll, 93% of Americans voted against declaring war on Germany after Hitler

invaded western Europe in May, 1940. After the fall of France to Nazi Germany in July of 1940, and

with Great Britain as the only major power remaining, still only 35% voted to help the American ally,
due to the risk of entering the war. It was only in September of 1941, when an American destroyer is

attacked by a U-boat that the majority, 64%, voted to help Britain (United States Holocaust

Memorial Museum). However, even then it seemed that intervening in the European war was still a

topic of debate.

It was only after the attack on Pearl Harbor that American public opinion truly changed. The

attack was devastating. Being the first attack on US soil brought a true sense of shock, especially to

Americans who thought the war would remain in Europe, never expecting an attack to come from

Japan. Additionally, 2, 335 military personnel and 68 civilians were killed along with 1,246 wounded,

both military and civilian compared to the mere 55 Japanese casualties (Pearl Harbor Visitor’s

Bureau) a staggering ratio of 66 to 1. This attack, on December 7, 1941, “ended the debate over

American intervention in both the Pacific and European theaters of World War II” (The National

WWII Museum) and “only days after the United States entered World War II, no mainstream

isolationist movement remained”, and with the declaration of war from Nazi Germany three days

after the attack on Pearl Harbor, “President Roosevelt was able then to portray war against both

Japan and Germany as defensive measures against Axis powers who declared war on the United

States first” (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum). American public opinion did a near

complete 180 degrees, it was no longer a war about helping allies who were falling to Germany,

it was now a war of revenge caused by an attack on the mainland. It was a war of defense to

protect world democracy.

Leaders’ Perceptions of Public Opinion

As the war with Japan reaches its climax, American leaders began to discuss ways to end

the war early in order to evade an invasion planned for November 1, 1945. Political leaders at the

time seem to have believed the invasion would have “cost [the US] a million more” to the
300,000 battle casualties, and that “no man… holding in his hands a weapon of such possibilities

accomplishing this purpose [to end the war] and saving those lives, could have failed to use it

and afterwards looked his countrymen in the face (Stimson, 106). The atomic bombs were not

simply a way to end the war, they were a way to save American lives and a way to face the

American people in Stimson’s eyes. Stimson seemed to believe that the public would be

outraged knowing that a million soldiers gave their lives for a useless invasion, however this is

based on the idea that the public wanted to pursue unconditional surrender to its fullest.

The phrase “unconditional surrender” was first used by President Roosevelt in the

Casablanca Conference, January 24, 1943. Since then, it became a central part of the American

war effort, “[becoming] deeply embedded in American public opinion, creating a powerful

momentum against any compromise” (Pyle, 24-26). Especially after stories of Japanese war

crimes all over Asia reached the ears of the public, “American opinion came to overwhelming

support of his policy” (Pyle, 26). The phrase came to represent America’s strength in world

politics, the power to free oppressed nations and establish democracies in the like of American

values.

As Truman became President after the death of FDR, he was faced with what seemed to

be overwhelming support for “a popular, albeit vague, idea” (Long). The unconditional surrender

policy rarely clearly stated the effects of surrender on Japan, and “was primarily a battle cry

meant "to concentrate the attention of public opinion upon the winning of the war"” (Pearlman,

3). Due to this vague approach concentrating on convincing the American public, it is possible

that Japan was also confused about what exactly “unconditional surrender” meant.

Then came the problem of Japan offering their own conditions. The Big Six, Japan’s

Supreme War Council, was looking to negotiate their own conditions, yet James Byrnes believed
that “accepting Japan's condition would lead to "the crucifixion of the President,"… Byrnes

framed the question in raw political terms” (Hasegawa, 220), once again returning to the

common held belief that the American public was vehemently against altering the vague

unconditional surrender terms.

Furthermore, there is also Truman’s own personal views on the issue. Since Pearl Harbor

is what ultimately brought the US into the war, “Truman was motivated by more than a desire to

satisfy the American public; he felt a strong need to bring Japan to its knees or, to put it more

bluntly, to exact revenge” (Hasegawa, 234). The public swooped in to support declaring war

because of the shock brought upon them by Japan’s attack, and it seemed Truman wanted

revenge for the victims of Pearl Harbor, despite there only being 3,646 casualties compared to

the yet unknown number of atomic bomb victims but with an overconservative of 225,000

(Yamazaki).

I. Pro unconditional surrender

a. Racing the Enemy
i. Pg 113: Dooman from the State Department argued against including
retention of the emperor system on the grounds that it would not be supported
by American public opinion.
b. Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb
i. Pg 15: “But whatever the U.S. military thought about modifying the slogan, the
public had a strong opinion of its own. From late February through June, polls
that went directly to the White House, when not printed on the front page of the
Washington Post, repeatedly stated that only 10 to 18 percent of Americans
approved "working out peace terms" with Japan. The idea of governing through
the present dynasty had support from only 3 percent of the public. Another 33
percent wanted to execute Hirohito, 11 percent wanted imprisonment, 9 percent
wanted him banished, and 17 percent wanted him tried. Appropriate punishment,
presumably, would be determined by the court. “
ii. Pg 16: “When Truman met the JCS and the service secretaries in June 1945, he
said that "he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change
public opinion" about unconditional surrender.”
II. Softening unconditional surrender terms
a. Racing the Enemy
 i. Pg 222-223: “Whereas the New York Times and the New York Herald
Tribune generally supported harsh terms against the emperor, the Washington
Post and the Boston Globe advocated soft peace.”
b. Rhetoric, Public Opinion, and Policy in the American Debate over the Japanese
Emperor during World War II
i. Pg 443: “Though policymakers reacted to their perceptions of domestic opinion
in shaping and altering emperor policy, these perceptions were at times
incomplete, resulting from only a partial view of a public debate that had grown
quite complex between 1942 and 1945.”
c. Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb
i. Pg 15: “One can imagine how public opinion struck Harry Truman, who took of-
fice at a most inauspicious time. Editorials in the Post were about the only thing
in Washington that publicly challenged unconditional surrender.”
III. Post-war compassion
a. Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb
i. Pg 24: “Historians have pondered how quickly the public 's hatred for Hirohito
vanished after surrender.”

Bibliography
Frank, Richard B. Downfall. New York: Random House, 1999.

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the Enemy. 2005.

Leuchtenburg, William E. Franklin D. Roosevelt: Foreign Affairs. n.d. 17 November 2019.

<https://millercenter.org/president/fdroosevelt/foreign-affairs>.

Long, Doug. Hiroshima: Was it Necessary? 1995-2000. 27 October 2019. <http://www.doug-

long.com/hirosh2.htm>.

Office of the Historian. American Isolationism in the 1930s. n.d. 5 November 2019.
<https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/american-isolationism>.

Pearl Harbor Visitor's Bureau. How many people died at Pearl Harbor during the attack? n.d. 17
November 2019. <https://visitpearlharbor.org/faqs/how-many-people-died-at-pearl-harbor-
during-the-attack/>.

Pearlman, Michael D. "Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb." Combat Studies
Institute (1944). 9 October 2019.

Pyle, Kenneth B. "Hiroshima and the Historians: History as Relative Truth." Asia-Pacific Review 22.2
(2015): 14-17. 16 September 2019.

Smith, Geoffrey S. "Isolationism, the Devil, and the Advent of the Second World War: Variations on a
Theme." The International History Review 4.1 (1982). 17 November 2019.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/40105793#metadata_info_tab_contents>.
Stimson, Henry L. "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb." Harper's Magazine 194.1161 (1947): 97-107.
20 September 2019.

The National WWII Museum. The Great Debate. n.d. 17 November 2019.
<https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/great-debate>.

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. The United States: Isolation-Intervention. n.d. 5 November
2019. <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-united-states-isolation-
intervention>.

Yamazaki, James. Hiroshima and Nagasaki Death Toll. 10 October 2007. 17 November 2019.
<http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/cab/200708230009.html>.