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Facts:: Metropolitan Transportation Service V. Jose Ma. Paredes
Facts:: Metropolitan Transportation Service V. Jose Ma. Paredes
Facts:: Metropolitan Transportation Service V. Jose Ma. Paredes
STATE IMMUNITY
79 Phil. 819
Ponente: HILADO, J.
Facts:
Facts: On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation was abolished by
Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration
was created. Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National
Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No.
2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948. The Philippine Airlines, Inc.
countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation,
which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics
Administration. The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National
Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief
and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the
complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the
operators and maintainers of said airport and, further, that the third party defendant
would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable
rentals for the use of their lands.”. The Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that as the agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and
not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being
sued.
In the case at bar, These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration
has the power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the
power to transact private business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued on its
behalf. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is
essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the
promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public. Thus, the Civil
Aeronautics is suable
3. Philrock v. Board of Liquidators 180 SCRA 171 (1989)
Petitioner: Philippine Rock Industries
Respondent: Board of Liquidators
Ponente: Gariño-Aquino
Facts: PHILROCK filed in the RTC of Manila a complaint against the Board of Liquidators, as liquidator
of the defunct REPACOM, for: (1) the replacement of the defective rock pulverizing machinery
purchased from REPACOM, or, as alternative, to refund the purchase at 31% of its contract price; (2)
reparation for losses incurred due to the increased expenses of maintaining the plant at Php5,000 a
month and Php4,000 per day as unrealized profits and exemplary damages; and (3) Php50,000
attorney fees plus expenses and costs of the suit.
The RTC decided in favor of PHILROCK. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the State, filed a notice of
appeal on the ground that the payment for damages are public funds, hence, exempt from attachment
and execution. Nevertheless, the RTC judge issued a Writ of Execution. Subsequently the Board of
Liquidators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals where the Court of
Appeals set aside the Writ of Execution by the RTC. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Liquidators, as a government agency without juridical capacity,
may be sued and held liable as litigators of REPACOM.
Ruling:
No. The Board of Liquidators is a government agency, created under E.O. 372 to administer the assets
and pay the liabilities of the defunct REPACOM, thus it has no juridical personality, separate and
distinct from the government, and therefore, as a general rule, suing it is akin to suing the State. The
State enjoys immunity from suit except when it conducts business through a government-owned and
controlled corporation or a non-corporate agency set up primarily for a business purpose, and even
then, the State may not be liable for damages since the purse of the State, or the disbursement of
public funds is in the discretion of the Legislature. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate specific objectives, as appropriated by law. Although the liability of REPACOM has been
ascertained, the State is at liberty to determine for itself how to satisfy such liability. Funds should be
appropriated by the Legislature for the specific purpose of satisfying the judgement in favor of
PHILROCK before said judgement may be paid.
FACTS: Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The claim
of ownership by Feliciano was derived from deed of sale of the property traced
from informacion posesoria. However, the said property was subject of Proclamation
No. 90 by President Magsaysay for resettlement purposes.The Proclamation contained
the reservation clause” subject to private rights, if any there be. “Feliciano asserts that
the subject property must be excluded from the coverage of the resettlement project.
The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of non-suability of the State.
HELD#1: YES.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The
plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court
just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit
for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an
action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only
such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a
governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the
State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that
the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use
of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.There is no such showing in the
instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.
Oct. 25 2006
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a
people’s initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
“incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Group’s petition.
Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC
did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at
the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and
misleading” which renders the initiative void.
The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and
“revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution
may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735
Petition is dismissed.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue of
whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly,
violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus subject to judicial review.
The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but they
are both subject to the Constitution.
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as
such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention
which shall have two delegates from each representative district. On June 17,
1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by
providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least
two delegates from each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res
Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented
Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a),
and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of
Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and
set the parameters of such convention?
HELD:
SEC. 4 Ratification