Writ of Habeas Data - Notes and Case Briefs by Siuagan (Partial Notes)

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA – NOTES AND CASE BRIEFS 1
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA – DEFINITION
 The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty, or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting,
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.1
NATURE OF THE WRIT
 The writ of habeas data provides for a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding one’s self (right to informational privacy), particularly in instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
 The writ of habeas data (and the writ of amparo) were promulgated to ensure the
protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security. The rules on these writs were
issued in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.2
 It is an independent and summary remedy that does not entail a finding of any criminal,
civil, or administrative culpability for its issuance. Consequently, if the allegations in the
petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to
the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database
or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.3
 The writ is designed to protect the image, honor, information, and freedom of information
of an individual, and provide for a forum to enforce his right to the truth and informational
privacy.
QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE – SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
An indispensable requirement before the WHD may be granted is that the ACTUAL OR
THREATENED violation of one’s right to privacy in life, liberty, and security must be shown, at least,
by SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
1 Section 1, The Rule on Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).

2 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR
Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA,
CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011).
33 Ibid.
Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

RIGHT TO PRIVACY; RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AS SUBJECT OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
(WHD)
The right to privacy is embodied in several Philippine laws, and its protection is enshrined under
our Constitution.
 1987 Philippine Constitution
The right to Information and Communications Privacy is recognized under Article III, Sec.
3(1), which states:
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
The same constitution also guarantees the freedom of expression and speech under Article
III, Sec. 4, which states:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
Article III Sections 1 and 2 of the 1987 constitution also recognizes every person’s right to
physical privacy, this states the government’s limited ability to search and/or deprive one’s
person, place and things of any unwarranted intrusion to one’s private affairs for any
reason unless legally allowed to do so.
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Article III of
the 1987 Constitution are as follows:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may
be provided by law.

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
 The New Civil Code of the Philippines
The Civil code, under Art. 26 provides punishment as actionable torts of several acts by a
person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place
of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
The right to privacy in communications and correspondence is also enforced under Art.
723 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, however courts may authorize their publication or
dissemination for public good and in the interest of justice.
Art. 723. Letters and other private communications in writing are owned by the person to
whom they are addressed and delivered, but they cannot be published or disseminated
without the consent of the writer or his heirs. However, the court may authorize their
publication or dissemination if the public good or the interest of justice so requires.
 The Revised Penal Code of the Philippines
Art. 229 of the Revised Penal Code provides for punishment for public officers who
discloses private information held by him in confidence due to his position.
Art. 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. — Any public officer who shall reveal any secret
known to him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies
of papers of which he may have charge and which should not be published, shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, perpetual special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos if the revelation of such secrets or the
delivery of such papers shall have caused serious damage to the public interest; otherwise,
the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding 50 pesos shall be imposed.

Art. 280 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the privacy in one’s home and punishes
those who violates one’s right to such privacy
Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. — Any private person who shall enter the dwelling
of another against the latter’s will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another’s
dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the
dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling
for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall
enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while the same are open.
Articles 290 until 292 of the Revised Penal Code also provides for punishment for those
who discloses or illegally obtains information in confidence of another such as a
corporation or private individual:
Art. 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall
be imposed upon any private individual who in order to discover the secrets of another, shall
seize his papers or letters and reveal the contents thereof.
If the offender shall not reveal such secrets, the penalty shall be arresto mayor and a fine
not exceeding 500 pesos
The provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted with the
custody of minors with respect to the papers or letters of the children or minors placed
under their care or study, nor to spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of
them
Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee, or servant who, in
such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets
Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon
the person in charge, employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial
establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the
industry of the latter.

 The Rules of Court (Revised Rules on Evidence)
Rule 130, Sections 24-25 also disqualifies admissibility of evidence for matters containing
privileged information.
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following

persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants;
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by
him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in capacity,
and which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession,
be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional
character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest
belongs;
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be compelled to testify against
his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. (20a)
The right to privacy is also known in jurisprudence and literature as the “right to be let alone”. This
has found jurisprudential recognition. Accordingly, Justice Douglas held: ‘Liberty in the sense must
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if
it is to be a repository of freedom.’ The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom’.
Justice Brandeis stated that this right to be let alone is ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.’
The two most important aspects of the right to privacy are its informational and decisional
aspects. This is found in Solove's characterisation, which quotes from DeCew (1997: 75).

According to DeCew, there are three overlapping ‘clusters of privacy claims’: informational privacy,
accessibility privacy, and expressive privacy.
Informational privacy involves ‘control over information about oneself’. Accessibility privacy is the
limited-access conception: ‘accessibility privacy focuses not merely on information or knowledge
but more centrally on observations and physical proximity. Expressive privacy protects a realm for
expressing one's self-identity or personhood through speech or activity.
Thus, DeCew combines three theories of privacy: (1) control over information; (2) limited access;
and (3) personhood. (Solove, 2002: 1125)
The first of these clusters corresponds to the informational aspect of privacy and the third,
expressive privacy, to the decisional aspect.
In sum, the informational aspect of privacy is concerned with what and how much an agent is
willing to disclose, or let others know, about his or her personal life.
On the other hand, decisional aspect of privacy pertains to one’s right to express his or her
personality and to decide how to live his or her personal life without undue interference from
others. It contemplates decisions that are of an intimate or significant nature, expressive of one's
lifestyle. The Philippine case of Imbong v Ochoa involving reproductive rights, discussed below, is
an excellent example of decisional privacy.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
1. RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, vs. ST.
THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
FACTS
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the
period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about
to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only
in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe
Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets
of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What
is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of
the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact,
viewable by any Facebook user.
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page,
showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action.
Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported
themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing, which advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive
messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail
ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question,
reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school
principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and
verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal
Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their
parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed
a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from
implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as
an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum,
containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to
which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before
they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They, thus,
have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws that
safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls,
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after
viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children
were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital
images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents
through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To
petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and,
thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary
hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and digital images
accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation
of the children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012,
issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file
their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days
from service of the writ.
For their part, STC maintain that the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;
and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy on Facebook.
Thereafter, the RTC eventually dismissed the petition for the issuance of WHD. To the trial court,
petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to
privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court
a quo held that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may
view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs
through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies
and rules on discipline.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of
the Rule on Habeas Data.
ISSUE
Was there an actual or threatened violation of the minor’s right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security, which would necessitate the issuance of the writ of habeas data?
RULING
NONE. There was no actual or threatened violation of the minor’s right to privacy because the
photographs in question were uploaded on Facebook with a default setting of “PUBLIC”, which
consequently made them viewable or accessible to anyone, even without the use of special means
to view them online.
The Supreme Court appreciated the fact that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn
account that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using
their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe
allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is reasonable to
assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends,
or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such were the case, they
cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. ([A] person who places
a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.)
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting
still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way;"
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share" the former’s post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook
friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own

Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at "Friends."
Even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook
friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was
the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients
of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it
was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the
fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor
their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to
Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs
in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. These
are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’
assertion.
2. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR
OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ.
GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, COL.
REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE
PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and
VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents. (G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011)
--
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR
OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS,
BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1st LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA,
ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners, vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
(Read in conjunction with the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data and Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.)
FACTS

Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No.
193160. He is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director
General (PDG.) Jesus A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos,
Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.) Remegio M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) Ryan S.
Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence E. Mina, Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C.
Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are respondents in G.R. No.
191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160.
At the time the events relevant to the present Petitions occurred, former President Arroyo
was the President of the Philippines. PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st
Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) in Region II.
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., when Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel,
Cagayan onboard a tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), four men forcibly
took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes,
one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more persons arrived,
and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the others rode
on the tricycle. He was then brought to a place where there were many soldiers and had a
banner with the word “Bravo” in it. He later learned that such place was the Philippine
Army 17th Infantry Battalion’s camp.
For several days, Noriel was maltreated and mauled by the men who abducted him, who
turned out to be soldiers. He was likewise ordered to confess his membership to the New
People’s Army and to identify the NPA camp. Whenever he failed to answer the men’s
questions, he will be subjected to beating and threatened to be killed.
On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he
had surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and that the soldiers did not shoot him
because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to sign the document, he
received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different
signature to show that he was merely coerced.
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew
the men appearing therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals
on the photos, the soldiers instructed him to write down the name of his school and
organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote something on the paper, making it
appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the document. The
soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing.

Afterwards, the soldiers forced him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not
only receive another beating, but was also electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an
hour.
At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military

operation in the mountains, where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.
In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent.
When they stopped, the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location
of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked him
to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to the
Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him. When the Dr. Ramil
asked him why he had bruises and contusions, Noriel lied and told her that he sustained
them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr. Ramil’s medical certificate
indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and sternum.
Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took
pictures of him while he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in
front of him and again took his photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see
his mother.
Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of
paper stating that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate
to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.
On 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed Noriel to take a bath, and repeatedly
reminded him not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead
that he had surrendered to the military. This was also the day when he reunited with his
mother and brother. His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina.
Rodriguez then heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma that he had surrendered to the military
and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel), informed him that the
men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan. Upon
seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees
took photographs of his bruises.
(As may be culled from Wilma and Rodel’s Sinumpaang Salaysay, Rodriguez, according to
Wilma, hugged and whispered to the latter not to leave him alone. Meanwhile, Rodel
alleged in his statement that Rodriguez likewise whispered to him the words “Kuya, ilabas
mo ako dito, papatayin nila ako.”)
On this same day, a soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for
another two weeks to supposedly prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him.
Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and asked them to become
military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again,
the soldiers reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them
that the latter will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached
home.

Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them
to the CHR office, where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was
neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign
the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his abductors because they had
already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR Toyota
Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed
them.21
The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon
reaching a mall in Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other
soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching
the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st Lt. Matutina alighted and called
Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a cellphone
with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back home.22
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010.
Callagan and two soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video
footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos and videos would serve as
evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely. Despite
Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only
left thirty minutes later.23
On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International

Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical
Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of torture.24
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles,
noticed that several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT),
in the streets and on a jeepney.
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders,
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2
December 2009. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino,
P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan.
These petitions prayed for the following reliefs:
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching
Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses.
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th
Infantry Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez
was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report
on Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshal reports of the 5th

Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the
custody of respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being
used.
On 15 December 2009, the Supreme Court granted the respective writs after finding that
the petition sufficiently alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later
released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. The Court
likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before 22
December 2009 and to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010. Finally, the
Court directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on
the case within 10 days after its submission for decision.
For their part, respondents alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28
May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance and identified as "Ka Pepito" by former
rebels. According to his military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius
P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan Valley.
Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help
the military in exchange for his protection. Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009,
Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an Agent’s Agreement/Contract,
showing his willingness to return to society and become a military asset. Since then, he
acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information. However, he feared
that his NPA comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator.38 Thus, with
his knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any
suspicion about him being a double agent. Hence, the abduction subject of the instant
petition was conducted.
Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan (CHR representatives) filed a Consolidated Return
of the Writ dated 15 January 2010, alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence
in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe turnover to his family and securing their journey
back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16 September 2009, after
Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made
phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies to determine his location. Cruz
was able to speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was in their custody.
This information was transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He, in
turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry
Division.
When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion
at Masin, Alcala, Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt.
Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez had become one of their assets, as evidenced by the
Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the latter’s Contract as Agent. The CHR
officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the soldiers. In any case, Cruz asked
him to raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment. Cruz and
Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his
family, and they were made to sign a certification to this effect. During the signing of the

document, herein CHR officers did not witness any threat, intimidation or force employed
against Rodriguez or his family.
During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was
very much at ease with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina. Neither was
there any force or intimidation when the soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking
of photographs was performed with Wilma’s consent.
On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision:
“WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.
Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa,
PCSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col.
Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S. Matutina, or their replacements in their official posts if
they have already vacated the same, are ORDERED to furnish this Court within five (5) days
from notice of this decision, official or unofficial reports pertaining to petitioner – covering
but not limited to intelligence reports, operation reports and provost marshal reports prior
to, during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry Battalion,
Philippine Army.
The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports in
any transaction or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents are
ORDERED to expunge from the records of the military all documents having any reference
to petitioner.
Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General

Jesus Ame Versoza, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTED to
ensure that no further violation of petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security is
committed against the latter or any member of his family.
The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account

of her presidential immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to
respondents Calog and George Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.
Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is
DENIED.”
Then, respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration. However, before the
Court of Appeals could resolve this Motion, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial
Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 191805), raising the following assignment of errors:
a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection
order.
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of
amparo, which has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation

to petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with
the issuance of the writ, even in the absence of an order preventing respondent from
approaching petitioner."
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
had command responsibility.
On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:
a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a
party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or
actual incumbency.
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less
substantial evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were
violating or threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his
right to privacy. Hence, he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data or to the corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production
order and temporary protection order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparo
and the rule on the writ of habeas data.54
On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt.
Col. Mina, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the
reversal of the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals.55 They alleged that
Rodriguez –
a. Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial
evidence, to establish his claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or
threatening with violation his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to
privacy; hence, he is not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas
data and their corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production order
and temporary protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of
amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
(2) Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of
the presidential immunity from suit.
(3) Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas
data cases.
(4) Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened
by respondents in G.R. No. 191805.
RULING

(1) On whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs
of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
No; they may not be granted in view of the issuance of the writ of amparo in Rodriguez’
favor. This is because, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, interim reliefs are only
available “upon filing of the petition or at any time before final judgment”.
The Supreme Court here held thus:

“We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist
the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being
interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made.
In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once
granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant
petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary
protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from
going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.”
(2) On the matter of whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent
on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit.
No; President Arroyo need not be dropped as a respondent in the amparo and habeas
data proceedings, on the basis of her then presidential immunity from suit. This is
because there is no determination of administrative, criminal, or even civil liability
involved in such proceedings. Also, since Arroyo’s term has already expired (her term of
office was until 30 June 2010), a non-sitting president, like her, does not enjoy immunity
from suit, even though the acts complained of were committed during her tenure or
incumbency4.
The Court held that the amparo proceedings do not determine guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at
least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent
the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of
the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of
4 in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "’incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure" but not beyond’”.

addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty
and security are restored.
Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former
President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez
contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in this case to enable the
courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this regard,
it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals’ rationale for dropping her from the list of
respondents no longer stands since her presidential immunity is limited only to her
incumbency.
(3) On whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas
data cases
Yes; the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases so as to identify those accountable individuals who have the power to effectively
implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue, and ascertain
responsibility and accountability.
The Court held that:
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it

should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be
appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal
liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there
be any. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility
but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the
rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a

preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further
investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities,

the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain
responsibility and accountability, as defined above.
(In addition, it may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis
to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory
that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law
or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the
Constitution.)

(3.1) In view of the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility to amparo

proceedings, can President Arroyo, being the then Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, be held responsible or accountable for extra-judicial killings or
enforced disappearances?
No. This is because Rodriquez failed to establish through substantial evidence that then
President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for his abduction. (The third requisite
for the doctrine of command responsibility to apply is wanting.)
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain:
a. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as

superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. The superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and
c. The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
Applying the foregoing requisites, the Court explained that:
a) The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily

possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the
purview of the [first requisite] command responsibility doctrine;
b) Also, in view of the adoption in our jurisdiction of a more liberal view, the president
may be charged with constructive knowledge (as opposed to “actual knowledge”
required by international tribunals) of a crime or offense that shall be committed,
is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others
within his area of responsibility. This view is even more buttressed by the
promulgation of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the
Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all Government
Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and
other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226)
c) Consequently, a government official (e.g. the president) may be held liable for
neglect of duty pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility if he has
knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has
been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility
and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either
before, during, or immediately after its commission.
In view of the foregoing, the Court ruled that Rodriguez failed to establish the second
and third requisite for the doctrine of command responsibility to apply. Other than
Rodriguez’ averments that Arroyo, through the so-called “Melo Commission” and
“Alston Report”, had knowledge or should have known the climate of forced
disappearances perpetrated against NPA members, these reports were not even
properly quoted or attached to this petition. While the Alston Report allegedly states
that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the

President, the Court do not and will not automatically impute responsibility to former
President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.
More so, there is no piece of evidence that could establish President Arroyo’s
responsibility or accountability for Rodriguez’ abduction. Neither was there even a clear
attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life,
liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.
(4) On whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or
threatened by respondents in G.R. No. 191805 (WON these respondents were
responsible or accountable for what happened to Noriel)
At the outset, the doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down
in this Court’s ruling in Razon, to wit:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced
in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual
rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other
words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of
the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence.5 Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.
IN RELATION TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO –
Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the
contradictory defenses presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence
to his claim that he had been abducted, detained and tortured by soldiers belonging
to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military:
 RODRIGUEZ’ ABDUCTION – After a careful examination of the records of these

cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly found sufficient
evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained
and tortured him until 17 September 2009. Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward account of his
horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured
and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the NPA. His narration
of his suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical surroundings,
personal circumstances and perceived observations. He likewise positively
identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his
5
A reading of this doctrine reveals that in amparo proceedings, admissibility of evidence is not required. What matters is relevancy of all other
evidence to those already adduced.

abduction, detention and torture, and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan
as the CHR representatives who appeared during his release.
More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in

his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 September 2009, wherein he recounted in detail
the circumstances surrounding the victim’s capture.
 RODRIGUEZ’ TORTURE – As regards the allegation of torture, the respective
Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the physical maltreatment
Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th
Infantry Division.
IN RELATION TO THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA –
 The Supreme Court held that the appellate court also properly ruled that aside
from the abduction, detention and torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically
1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right to security when
they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives, to
wit:
In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in
the house of petitioner on September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as
taking videos of the photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the house,
as well as videos of the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt.
Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not merely intend to make proofs of the safe
arrival of petitioner and his family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill
fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by showing them that the sanctity of
their home, from then on, will not be free from the watchful eyes of the military,
permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly innocuous cellphone
video camera. The Court cannot – and will not – condone such act, as it intrudes
into the very core of petitioner’s right to security guaranteed by the fundamental
law.
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan,
there was no substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with
violation, Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security. Despite the dearth of evidence
to show the CHR officers’ responsibility or accountability, this Court nonetheless
emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity to recognize torture or any similar
form of abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights and
investigate violations thereof, should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to
respond effectively to and address human rights violations. The actuations of
respondents unmistakably showed their insufficient competence in facilitating and
ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his ordeal.
THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT A FAIR AND EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AMOUNTED TO A

VIOLATION OF OR THREAT TO RODRIGUEZ’ RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, AND SECURITY

In the instant case, the Supreme Court ruled that the respondent public officials in G.R.
No. 191805 are responsible or accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life,
liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective
official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado,
PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only
conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account
of the events into consideration. Rather, these respondents solely relied on the reports
and narration of the military.
Respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are
accountable, for while they were charged with the investigation of the subject
incident, the investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and one-
sided. The records disclose that the military, in investigating the incident complained
of, depended on the Comprehensive Report of Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by
1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st Infantry Brigade, 5th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the
narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of
the subject incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged abduction
of petitioner.
Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of

Republic Act No. 69756, otherwise known as the "PNP Law", specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the
arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution."
In this case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct the necessary
investigation to unmask the mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and
disappearance. Instead, PDG Verzosa disclaims accountability by merely stating that
petitioner has no cause of action against him. Palpable, however, is the lack of any
effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to effectively and aggressively investigate the
violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security by members of the 17th
Infantry Battalion, 17th Infantry Division, Philippine Army.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the
right to life, liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public
official. Moreover, in the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to
the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance.
Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
6 “Powers and functions. The PNP shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) xxx
(b) Maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety;
(c) Investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution;

In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo that
the right to security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to
ensure the observance of the duty to investigate.
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees
of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and
the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for
human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government
is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights
to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus
to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or
threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
“(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be
assumed by the State as its own legal duty7, not as a step taken by private interests that
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government.”
(Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any

responsibility or accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino,
P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac. Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had
already retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was perpetrated,
while P/SSupt. Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the
National Capital Regional Police Office six months before the subject incident
occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient allegations were maintained against
respondents Calog and Palacpac.)
7 The European Court of Human Rights declared in a case (Kurt v. Turkey) before them that “Article 5 of the European Convention of Human
Rights must be seen (or must be read) as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and
to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.

Writ of Habeas Data - Notes and Case Briefs by Siuagan (Partial Notes)

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Writ of Habeas Data - Notes and Case Briefs by Siuagan (Partial Notes)

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WRIT OF HABEAS DATA – NOTES AND CASE BRIEFS 1

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA – DEFINITION

NATURE OF THE WRIT

QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE – SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

1 Section 1, The Rule on Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

 1987 Philippine Constitution

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

 The New Civil Code of the Philippines

 The Revised Penal Code of the Philippines

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

 The Rules of Court (Revised Rules on Evidence)

Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;

2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;

3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

G.R. No. 193160

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International

These petitions prayed for the following reliefs:

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision:

Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General

The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

The Supreme Court here held thus:

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

The Court held that:

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a

Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities,

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

(3.1) In view of the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility to amparo

a. The existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as

Applying the foregoing requisites, the Court explained that:

a) The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

IN RELATION TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO –

 RODRIGUEZ’ ABDUCTION – After a careful examination of the records of these

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in

THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT A FAIR AND EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AMOUNTED TO A

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

(Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any

Collated by: MARIA KRISTINA D. SIUAGAN, RN

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