CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC. vs.

BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 148208 (446 SCRA 299)
December 15, 2004

FACTS:
July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition against respondent, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last paragraph in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
According to Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation studies and
wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bank Sentrals human
resource development program. Provided that the Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible
with the principles provided for under RA No 6758 (Salary Standardization Act). Provided, however, that compensation
and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under Salary Grade 19(Ran-and-File) and below shall be in accordance
with the rates prescribed under RA No 6758. The petitioner concluded that this proviso discriminate the rank-and-file
Petitioner also alleged that 7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of
Government Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) – LBP, RA No 8282 (1997) – SSS, RA
No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA No 8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No 8763 (2000) – HGC, and RA No 9302
(2004) – PDIC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”

HELD:
The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.
The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its classification between the
rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinction that made real
differences between the 2 classes.
However, the subsequent enactments of laws by the other GFIs constitute significant changes in circumstance that
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last paragraph of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653.
This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The
classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair
on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make
unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.
The policy determination argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the
officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other
GFIs who are similarly situated.
Moreover, the issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress inconsistent
and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws” includes the
prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under identical/analogous circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY AND PEDRO BALUBAL
Gr no. 169596 (519 SCRA 432 )
March 28, 2007

Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in the business of providing public transportation. One of
its buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, crashed into the radio room of respondent
Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC). PNCC‘s Sofronio Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic
control and security department of the South Luzon tollway, investigated the incident. The bus was turned over to the
Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own investigation. Because of lack of adequate space, traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera
requested that the bus be towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound. According to him, it is for mere safekeeping pursuant
to an order from police authorities. Superlines made several requests for the release of the bus but Balubal refused due to
his reason that there is no order from police authorities. Instead, Balubal demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a collateral
with the same value for the reconstruction of the damaged radio room.

Superlines filed a replevin suit (recovery of personal property) with damages against PNCC and Balubal before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Superlines to pay PNCC an amount of P40, 320.00,
representing actual damages to the radio room. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and concluded that the
case should have been brought against the police authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper

HELD:

No. Contrary to PNCC‘s contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of which is whether the owner of a
personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint. In a
complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession
of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains
the same.

It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only if the property is
lawfully seized. In the case at bar, Superline’s ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC, consideration of whether
PNCC has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. The bus was towed by the PNCC on the request of Lopera in violation
of constitutional right against unreasonable seizures. The seizure and impounding of Superlines‘s bus, on Lopera‘s request,
were unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.

Furthermore, as for the claim for damages, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it cannot pass upon the same without
impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police
authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to PNCC for safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected
between them and PNCC. Superlines or the trial court motu proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties
Lopera and any other responsible police officers.
PEOPLE VS. GONZALES
GR No. 121877 (365 SCRA 17)
September 12, 2001

On December 23, 1993, the provincial prosecutor of Iloilo charged appellant with illegal transport of ten kilos (10
kg) of marijuana leaves and fruiting tops. She pleaded not guilty in the arraignment.
According to the narration of PO1 Pedroso, on August 29, 1993, Chief of Police of Dueas, Iloilo received
information describing particularly a woman who would transport marijuana thru black traveling bag and would be riding
a trisikad.
The next day, PO1 Pedroso’s team passed by a woman who fitted the description. After asking necessary
question, they bought appellant together with Lamera(the trisikad driver) and the traveling bag to the police station
believing that the situation matched with the tipped information. She was detained after PNP found out that the bag really
contained marijuana.
The prosecution presented 2 witnesses, PO1 Pedroso and Angela Baldevieso, a forensic chemist who promulgated
the necessary documents that the object is indeed marijuana. In addition to it, the object, the documents and the traveling
bag was also presented.
The appellant denied her involvement on the drug transport and claimed her own story contradicting the narration
of PO1 Pedroso. Lamera also testified in favor of appellant. But, the RTC disbelieve the defense and convicted appellant.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the testimonies of prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient to prove appellant guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Whether or not appellant warrantless arrest legal, thereby making the bricks of marijuana leaves allegedly
seized from her inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:
1. Yes.
When credibility is in issue, this court generally defers to the findings of the trial court considering that it is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observe their manner and
deportment during the trial. Its findings on the credibility of witnesses will be sustained by appellant courts unless
the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. In this case, it appears plain that the appellant
failed to point to any fact or circumstance overlooked or ignored by the trial court to cast doubt on the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses sufficiently. The positive testimony of the policeman outweighs appellant negative
testimony. Especially that defense witness Lamera flip-flopped in his testimony. His testimony contradicts his
first sworn statement. Moreover, appellant failed to present other and more credible witnesses to support her own
as well as Lameras’ testimony.

2. No.
Basic is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent
judicial authority. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. But, there are certain legal and judicial exceptions. Moreover, a lawful arrest without a warrant may
be made by peace officer or a private person under exceptional circumstances such as, when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In this case,
the trial court found and held that appellant was caught in flagrante carrying marijuana leaves and fruiting tops of
the time of her arrest. Her arrest and search of her traveling bag fall under a warrantless search incident to lawful
arrest.
Rizal Alih et. al., vs Castro
GR No L-69401 (151 SCRA 279)
June 23, 1987

Facts:
A group of more than 200 Philippine marines and home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners
(Rizal Alih et. al.) in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The people inside the compound resisted
the invasion and a crossfire between the Philippine marines and the petitioner occurred, resulting in number of casualties.
The petitioners surrendered the next morning and 16 occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested
and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and confiscated several M16 rifles, M14 rifle, rifle
grenades and rounds of ammunition.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose
was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge
their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing being violative of their right against self-incrimination. Petitioner
argued that the arms and ammunition were taken without a search warrant as required by law under Sec. 3 of the 1973
Constitution, and it be declared inadmissible in relation to Sec 4 (2) of the 1973 Constitution.

Respondent justified their act on the ground that they were acting under superior orders and that the measures was
necessary due to the aggravation of peace and order problem in their place.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the confiscated items shall be considered admissible.

2. Whether or not the finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-test is protected by the constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

Ruling:
1. No. Superior orders cannot countermand the Constitution. There is no excuse for the constitutional shortcuts done by
the military. Also, the aggravation of peace and order problem in their place does not excuse the non-observance of the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure (Art III Sec. 2, 1973 Philippine Constitution).The arrest
does not fall also under the warrantless arrest provided for by Rule 113 Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, all the
firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound having been the “fruit of the poisonous tree” are inadmissible
in evidence in any proceedings against petitioners. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia
egis).

2. No, the acts are not covered by the protection against self-incrimination, for it only applies to testimonial compulsion.
As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”