Tañada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette….
The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be
given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement

of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not
as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should
be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section
66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the
repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no
longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials
continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position.
On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its
enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the
law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
“Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those
members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso
facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.

HELD:

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough
to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general
subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors
of society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would
encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy
is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to
look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or
unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be
exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict
of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not
precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the
validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable
purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election
process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly
election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect
immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid.
In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make
the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette
or a newspaper of general circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that
the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the
exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends
constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in
this case.

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS, Secretary

Department of Environment and Natural Resources; H. RAMOS, Director, Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R. TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC
(PHILIPPINES) INC.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that
participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or
on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of
land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later
repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like
WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its
whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is
owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer
and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The
latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider
and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or
agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulmentof
the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the
protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA between the
government and WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit
the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the
exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the
State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or
utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equityinvestment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete
control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary
rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance
in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance.
The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary
feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to
avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule
that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly,
such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA
7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the
phrase ―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent
provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the
mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors
to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed
beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with
nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the
constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalizationrequirement for corporations or associations engaged
in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them
as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional
or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to
merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to
explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the
contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing,
technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP
beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the
benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the
vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 PHIL 217

FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements of land
acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The parties
stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years., and in such case,
mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would execute a deed of sale if
it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax on the land. After a year, it turned out
that she was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a verbal agreement whereby she conveyed to the
latter the possession of the land on the condition that they would not collect the interest of the loan, would
attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, & would introduce
improvement thereof.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract clearly
entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. The contract of antichresis, being a real
encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because he was unaware
of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume
that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the
prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised
upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance
may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In
accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not
violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits
are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of
section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.

ELEGADO V. COURT OF TAX APPEALS (1.18)

FACTS:
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national, formerly resident of the
Philippines, died in Oregon, USA. As certain shares of stock are left in the Philippines, his son Ward
Graham filed an estate tax return. Meanwhile, Ward Graham, designated executor, appointed
Ildefonso Elegado as his attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines. On the
basis of such estate tax return, respondent Commissioner assessed the decedent’s estate in the
amount of P96, 509.35. The assessment was protested to by the law firm of Bump, Yang and
Walker on behalf of the estate. The protest was denied by the Commissioner. Elegado as an
ancillary administrator filed a second estate tax return. The Commissioner imposed an assessment
on the estate in the amount of P72, 948.87 based on the second estate tax return which was
protested to by the Agrava Law Office on behalf of the estate. While the
protest was pending, the petitioner filed a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of
P96, 509.35. He said that this liability had not yet been paid although the assessment had long
become final and executory. Petitioner contended that the first assessment is not binding on
him because it was based on a return filed for by lawyers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the first assessment is binding on petitioner

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that Elegado’s contention is flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when
he argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on
which it was based were not familiar with Philippine tax laws and procedure. If our own lawyers and
taxpayers cannot claim similar preferences, it follows that foreigners cannot be any less
bound by laws in our country. It is to note that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second
assessment of P72, 948.87, the Commissioner made it clear that “the aforesaid amount is considered
provisional only based on the estate tax return filed subject to investigation by this Office for final
determination of the correct estate tax due from the estate. Any amount that may be found due after
said investigation will be assessed and collected later.” It is illogical to suggest that a provisional
assessment can supersede an earlier assessment which had clearly become final and executory.
 GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell
14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow,
Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s
employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment
of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
2. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of
action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from
the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail
themselves cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the
law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence;
and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the
case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner
does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
2. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only
under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the
course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are
deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals,
however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had
the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already
had.
ORION SAVINGS BANK v. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, GR No. 205487, 2014-11-12
Facts:
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with
Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking lot at Cityland Pioneer,
Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang
(Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and
Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:
That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;
That the mortgage in favor of Orion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated
February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
That the alleged Dacion en Pago was never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;
That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged
Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;
That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and
That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the titles.
Issues:
Orion's petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:
The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses;
Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner's duplicate copies of the CCTs;
Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits any conveyance or
encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and
Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
Ruling:
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this
position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-
settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and... arguments not brought to the attention of the
trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court.[20] To
consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fair play, justice, and due... process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to
lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by Philippine
law while issues pertaining to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed by South Korean law,
provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership
of property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea"[29] to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This... certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of
the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required
under Section 24 of Rule 132
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption
comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Principles:
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or
state where it is located. The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property its immobility.
Immovables are part of the... country and so closely connected to it that all rights over them have their
natural center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as
the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to
another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or... lost. This general principle includes all rules
governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.

Ortigas & Co. v. CA (G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000)

FACTS:
Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan with several
restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for residential purposes, among others, until
December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC (now MMDA) reclassifying the area as
commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased the subject lot from Hermoso and built a single storey
building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint which
sought the demolition of the constructed car sales company to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and
conditions of the Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.

HELD:
Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any standing contract.
Hence, petition is denied.

RATIO:
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or
vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police power to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover,
statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, the Supreme Court already upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power
measure.
 Atienza v Judge Brillantes A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Complainant: Lupo Almodiel Atienza

Respondent: Francisco F. Brillantes Jr., MTC Judge Branch 28, Manila

FACTS:

This case is a complaint against Judge Brillantes for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety. Judge Brillantes became a lawyer in 1963. He married Zenaida Ongkiko in 1965, albeit
without marriage license. In December 4, 1991, he married Yolanda De Castro in civil rights in Los
Angeles, California.
In the same month, complainant Lupo Atienza with whom Yolanda De Castro has two children, saw
Judge Brillantes sleeping in his house in No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro
Manila. Said house was purchased by him in 1987. Upon inquiry, the houseboy told him that De
Castro has been cohabiting with Judge Brillantes.
Judge Brillantes asserts that Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him since his first
marriage was in 1965 and therefore not covered by the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent marriage can be conducted even without a judicial declaration of nullity
of the previous marriage.

Ruling:

No. Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted without a judicial declaration of
nullity of the previous void marriage shall make the subsequent marriage void ab initio. Article 256 of
the Family Code provides for the retroactivity of the Family Code provided that it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As a general rule, no
vested right may arise from procedural laws. Article 40 is a rule of procedure, hence it has no vested
right and therefore cannot be violative of rights vested in other laws. Therefore, it has retroactive
effect and is thus applicable to respondent's marriage to Ongkiko in 1965.
Dismissed from service.

ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO Case Digest

ESPIRITU VS CIPRIANO

FACTS:
For resolution is the problem of whether RA No. 6126 may be held applicable to the case at
bar. For convenience we reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in question:
“Section 1 – no lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another’s dwelling is located shall,
during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed between the
lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not exceed 300php a
month.
Section 6- This At shall take effect upon its approval.
 Approved June 17, 1970

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6126 will have retroactive effect at the case at bara

Held:
It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is
covered by the aforecited law. We rule, otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the
increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, while the law in question took
effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals had been
effected.
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may. Therefore given
retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being remedial,
the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction therefore is in
order. Article 4 of the civil code ordains that law shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided and that where the law is clear. Our duty is equally plain. The law being a temporary
measure designed to meet a temporary situation, it has limited period of operation as in fact it was so
worded in clear and unequivocal language that “no lessor of a dwelling unit or land shall during the
period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor
and lessee prior to the approval of this act.
Hence the provision against the increase in monthly rental was effective only from March
1970 up to March 1971. Outside and beyond that period the law did not by the express mandate of
the Act itself, operate. The said law did not, by express terms, purport to give retroactive effect.
We therefore rule that R.A. No. 6126 is not applicable at the case at bar. As the language of
the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it plainly says.

Aruego Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, A. Aruego

G.R. No. 112193, March 13, 1996

FACTS:

On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcementof successional rights was
filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn Aruego
represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of Jose
Aruego, who died on March 30, 1982. Their claim there is open and continuous possession of status of
illegitimate children of Jose who had an amorous relationship with their mother Luz Fabian until the
time of his death. The court declared that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter of
the deceased with Luz Fabian while Evelyn is not. AntoniaAruego was declared entitled to a share
equal to 1/2 portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego. Petitioners, on the other hand,
submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction
over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article
175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action
for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the “open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child,” must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without
any exception, otherwise the action will be barred by prescription.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Family Code may be given a retroactive effect so as to deprive private respondent
of her right to institute the case for compulsory recognition

RULING:
No. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition
and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be
governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The
present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application
will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the
Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the
Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred,
notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since
private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general rule provided
under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by
the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209,
also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.

G.R. No. L-18566 September 30, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM and ESTER
MIRA BREHM,petitioners-appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Pitt Vasquez for petitioners-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

Facts: Brehm is temporary assigned in Subic Bay as a U.S Navy. He married Ester Mira on October
9, 1958. On January 28, 1959 they filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court (JDRC) for the adoption of the child named Elizabeth Mira which is a daughter of Ester Mira
with the other man. The court notice that Brehm testified his residence in the Philippines was merely
temporary same being effective only for the purpose of his tour of duty with the U.S Navy, thus
disqualifying him from making an adoption under Art. 335 (4) New Civil Code that the court has no
jurisdiction over him. But they said that Art. 335 is not applicable because the adoption under par. 3,
Art. 338 of the Civil Code which expressly authorized the adoption of a step-child by a step-father that
he will be intend to reside in the Philippines after his tour of duty with the U.S Naval Force.

Issue: Whether or not Brehm, not being permanent resident of the Philippines is qualified to adopt
Elizabeth Mira?

Ruling: No, because the adoption under par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code of the Philippines, which states
—The following may be adopted:

(1) The natural child by the natural father

(2) Other legitimate children, by the father or mother

(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.

Hence, the above article was connected with Art.335 (4) of the New Civil Code of the Philippines;
Sec.2, Rule 100;Rules of Court: “Non-resident alien”, that the court has no jurisdiction over him
since he previously testified his residence in the Philippines was merely temporary same being
effective only for the purpose of his tour of duty with the U.S and it is therefore, mandatory, because it
contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that the act
required shall not be done otherwise than designated. Therefore, Art.5 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines is applicable on this case because it states that “Acts executed against the provisions
of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.”

JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMELEC, GR No. 120295, 1996-06-28

Facts:
Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the
995 elections.
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition... with the Comelec... praying that Frivaldo "be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of
the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled
Comelec promulgated a Resolution... granting the petition
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after... elections.
So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date.
Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of
Votes... showing the following votes
Juan G. Frivaldo
73,440
RaulR.Lee
53,304
Lee filed... a (supplemental) petition... raying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of
Sorsogon.
Accordingly... at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995,... Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,... praying for the annulment of... proclamation of Lee
and for his own proclamation.
He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he... took his oath of allegiance as a
citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted."
As such... there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor
Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution... holding that Lee, "not having
garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo,... "having garnered the highest number of votes, and... having reacquired
his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 725
(is... qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"... e further contends that assuming the
assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30,
1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on
the date of his election,... if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed,"
Issues:
Issues in G.R. No. 123755
The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure
his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor
Consolidated Issues
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it
be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
3. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar
to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
Ruling:
validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case.
All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his application
on August 17,1994.
ased on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be
deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated--i.e., his Filipino citizenship
restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is... likewise deemed validated
as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of
his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government
Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local... position?"
We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for
governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote... that he "had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship--long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his
Filipino citizenship."
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has... to be threshed out again and again, as the
occasion demands."
Principles:
TEODORA L. VDA. De Miranda and others, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. Feliciano IMPERIAL IMPERIAL AND JUANA, defendants-appellees.
GR No. L-49090 February 28, 1947

FACTS:
Defendants Feliciano and Juana Imperial barrowed from plaintiff Miranda the amount of P1,000; that in
consideration of this debt and to guarantee payment they executed verbal antichresis in favor of the latter. In an
action filed by Miranda against Imperial, the lower court in deciding based its finding in the judgment delivered
by the Court of Appeals in the case of Santa Rosa vs. Noble. Obtaining a negative judgment, appellant has
brought the present appeal claiming that the court erred in applying the case of Santa Rosa vs. Noble alleging
that cases decided by the court of appeals does not constitute precedent and hence may not be applied in
deciding cases.

ISSUE: Whether the decisions of the Court of Appeals constitute precedents.

HELD: Only the decisions of Supreme Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in the
jurisdiction. However, this does not prevent that a conclusion or pronouncement of the Court of Appeals which
covers a point of law still undecided in our jurisprudence may serve as juridical guide to the inferior courts, and
that such conclusion or pronouncement be raised as a doctrine if, after it has been subjected to test in the
crucible of analysis and revision, this Supreme Court should find that it has merits and qualities sufficient for its
consecration as a rule of jurisprudence.

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79

G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S.D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZA, plaintiffs-appellees
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:

 On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real,
Ermita, Manila, Philippines, when a delivery wagon belonging to William Van Buskirk, came
along the street in the opposite direction at a great speed, and run over to carromata severely
wounding Carmen Ong with a serious cut upon her head.
 Van Buskirk presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery
wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and
reliable cochero;
 That upon the delivery of some forage, the defendant’s cochero tied the driving lines of the
horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside the wagon to unload
the forage.
 While unloading the forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and
made some other noise, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they
ran away. The driver was thrown out from the wagon and was unable to stop the horses
resulting to a collision with the carromata.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave
judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the 17th day October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is
before us on an appeal from that judgment.

ISSUE

 Whether or Not the defendant be liable for the negligence of his cochero?

HOLDING

 No. The Court of appeals ruled in favor of the defendant. This is because the occurrence that
transpired therein was an accident resulted from an ordinary acts of life. The prima facie case
was already destroyed from the start when the defendant presented his evidence to the court
by employing all the diligence of his cochero proving that the latter was not a negligent.
Hence, it proves that the defendant is not liable for any accusations.

RULINGS

 It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case. The act of defendant’s driver in leaving the
horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts that the performance of
which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in
by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be of
themselves unreasonable or imprudent. In fact, the very reason why they have been permitted
by society is that they are beneficial rather than prejudicial.
 It is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time
of the accident. Those conditions showing of themselves that the defendant’s cochero was not
negligent in the management of the horse.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO".
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME “SYCIP, SALAZAR,
FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.”
July 30, 1979

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975 and
by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they
be allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed
away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception
is practiced through this use. They also contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; there is no custom or usage in the
Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.
 Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the partners who
already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no
practice should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from
their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make
a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially
ride on that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. … It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business
or of holding property.” Thus, it has been stated that “the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

Eligio Estanislao, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, REMEDIOS ESTANISLAO, EMILIO and LEOCADIO
SANTIAGO
FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondents are brothers and sisters who are co-owners of certain lots at the corner of
Annapolis and Aurora Blvd., Quezon City which were then being leased to the Shell Company of the Philippines
Limited (SHELL). They agreed to open and operate a gas station thereat to be known as Estanislao Shell Service
Station with an initial investment of P15,000.00 to be taken from the advance rentals due to them from SHELL
for the occupancy of the said lots owned in common by them.

On May 26, 1966, the parties herein entered into an Additional Agreement with a proviso that said agreement
cancels and supersedes the original agreement executed by the co-owners.

For sometime, the petitioner submitted financial statements regarding the operation of the business to private
respondents, but thereafter petitioner failed to render subsequent accounting.

A demand was made on petitioner:

• to render an accounting of the profits;
• to execute a public document embodying all the provisions of the partnership agreement;
• to pay the plaintiffs their lawful shares and participation in the net profits of the business.

ISSUE:
IS A PARTNERSHIP a FORMED WHERE MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY BIND THEMSELVES TO
CONTRIBUTE MONEY TO A COMMON FUND WITH THE INTENTION OF DIVIDING THE PROFITS
AMONG THEMSELVES?
 HELD:
YES. The Joint Affidavit of April 11, 1966 (Exhibit A), clearly stipulated by the members of the same family
that the P15,000.00 advance rental due to them from SHELL shall augment their "capital investment" in the
operation of the gasoline station.

other evidence in the record:

⁃ Petitioner submitted to private respondents periodic accounting of the business.
⁃ Petitioner gave a written authority to private respondent Remedios Estanislao, his sister, to examine and audit
the books of their "common business" (aming negosyo).

⁃ Respondent Remedios assisted in the running of the business.