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Islam and Power
Islam and Power
Asking Why
To what extent are the September 11 attacks in the US symptomatic of more pervasive ideological undercurrents in the Muslim world
today? Obviously, not all social or political frustrations lead to the use of violence. While national liberation movements often resort to
violence, the recent attacks are set apart from such movements. The perpetrators did not seem to be acting on behalf of an ethnic group or
nation. They presented no specific territorial claims or political agenda, and were not keen to claim responsibility for their acts. One can
speculate that the perpetrators' list of grievances included persistent Israeli abuses of Palestinians, near-daily bombings of Iraq and the
presence of American troops in the Gulf, but the fact remains that the attacks were not followed by a list of demands or even a set of
articulated goals. The attacks exhibit a profound sense of frustration and extreme despair, rather than a struggle to achieve clear-cut
objectives.
Some commentators have viewed the underpinnings of the recent attacks as part of a "clash of civilizations" between Western values and
Islamic culture. According to these commentators, the issue is not religious fundamentalism or political Islam, but an essential conflict
between competing visions of morality and ethics. From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that the terrorists do not present concrete
demands, do not have specific territorial objectives and do not rush to take responsibility. The September 11 attacks aimed to strike at the
symbols of Western civilization, and to challenge its perceived hegemony, in the hope of empowering and reinvigorating Islamic civilization.
The "clash of civilizations" approach assumes, in deeply prejudiced fashion, that puritanism and terrorism are somehow authentic
expressions of the predominant values of the Islamic tradition, and hence is a dangerous interpretation of the present moment. But the
common responses to this interpretation, focusing on either the crisis of identity or acute social frustration in the Muslim world, do not
adequately explain the theological positions adopted by radical Islamist groups, or how extreme violence can be legitimated in the modern
age. Further, none of these perspectives engage the classical tradition in Islamic thought regarding the employment of political violence,
and how contemporary Muslims reconstruct the classical tradition. How might the classical or contemporary doctrines of Islamic theology
contribute to the use of terrorism by modern Islamic movements?
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Islamic tradition. The Islamic tradition was reconstructed to fit Third World nationalistic ideologies of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism
rather than the other way around.
While national liberation movements -- such as the Palestinian or Algerian resistance -- resorted to guerrilla or non-conventional warfare,
modern day terrorism of the variety promoted by Osama bin Laden is rooted in a different ideological paradigm. There is little doubt that
organizations such as the Jihad, al-Qaeda, Hizb al-Tahrir and Jama'at al-Muslimin were influenced by national liberation and anti-colonialist
ideologies, but they have anchored themselves in a theology that can be described as puritan, supremacist and thoroughly opportunistic.
This theology is the byproduct of the emergence and eventual dominance of Wahhabism, Salafism and apologetic discourses in modern
Islam.
Wahhabism Ascendant
Nevertheless, Wahhabism survived and, in fact, thrived in contemporary Islam for several reasons. By treating Muslim Ottoman rule as a
foreign occupying power, Wahhabism set a powerful precedent for notions of Arab self-determination and autonomy. In advocating a return
to the pristine and pure origins of Islam, Wahhabism rejected the cumulative weight of historical baggage. This idea was intuitively
liberating for Muslim reformers since it meant the rebirth of ijtihad, or the return to de novo examination and determination of legal issues
unencumbered by the accretions of precedents and inherited doctrines. Most importantly, the discovery and exploitation of oil provided
Saudi Arabia with high liquidity. Especially after 1975, with the sharp rise in oil prices, Saudi Arabia aggressively promoted Wahhabi
thought around the Muslim world. Even a cursory examination of predominant ideas and practices reveals the widespread influence of
Wahhabi thought on the Muslim world today.
But Wahhabism did not spread in the modern Muslim world under its own banner. Even the term "Wahhabism" is considered derogatory by
its adherents, since Wahhabis prefer to see themselves as the representatives of Islamic orthodoxy. To them, Wahhabism is not a school of
thought within Islam, but is Islam. The fact that Wahhabism rejected a label gave it a diffuse quality, making many of its doctrines and
methodologies eminently transferable. Wahhabi thought exercised its greatest influence not under its own label, but under the rubric of
Salafism. In their literature, Wahhabi clerics have consistently described themselves as Salafis, and not Wahhabis.
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pragmatic and infested both creeds (especially in the 1980s and 1990s) with a kind of supremacist thinking that prevails until today.
Endnotes
[1] Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the
Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries," Journal of Islamic Law and Society 22/1 (1994).
[2] Khaled Abou El Fadl, "The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry into Classical Sources," The Muslim World 89 (1999).
[3] Muhammad Amin Ibn 'Abidin, Hashiyat Radd al-Muhtar, vol. VI (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi, 1966), p. 413; Ahmad al-Sawi, Hashiyat al-
Sawi 'ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn, vol. III (Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi, n.d.), pp. 307-308. See also Ahmad Dallal, "The Origins and
Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850," Journal of the American Oriental Society 113/3 (1993).
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