G.R. No.
157472 September 28, 2007 However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court filed by SSGT. Jose M. Pacoy1 (petitioner) seeking to annul and
set aside the Orders dated October 25, 2002 2 and December 18,
20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in
Criminal Case No. 02-42.
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC
against petitioner committed as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of
Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer
2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon
2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which
caused his instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in
disregard of his rank.4
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted
by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide.
Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8,
2002.5
judge issued another Order,6 likewise dated September 12, 2002,
directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to
Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as
having qualified the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by
crossing out the word "Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder"
in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The
accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original
Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the
victim’s name from "Escuita" to "Escueta."7
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and
trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel
for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in
double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been
terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of
the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended
Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea
of not guilty.8
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to
Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant
Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in
the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned
before a competent court, and the case was terminated without his
express consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated
without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information
for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied
the Motion to Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or
conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be
sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the
defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never
acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide
was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not
terminate the same; that the Information for Homicide was patently
insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken
thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of
"disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for
Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the
respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and
partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from
Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and
existing jurisprudence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent, which constitutes a ground to quash the information
for murder; and that to try him again for the same offense constitutes
double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's
conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a
generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the
imposition of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the
amendment and/or correction ordered by the respondent judge was
substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already
been arraigned and he would be placed in double jeopardy.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied
the Motion to Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby
DENIED while the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge
shall continue hearing this case. Further, the Order dated October 25,
2002 is reconsidered and the original information charging the crime
of homicide stands.13
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found
that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows
that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic mitigating 14 circumstance
which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to
murder.
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the
following grounds:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN
ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION
FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE
MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND
VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE
WHICH WAS ALREADY TERMINATED.15
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to
the charge of Homicide, the public respondent ordered the
amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder because of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank,"
which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure; that the public respondent’s ruling that "disregard
of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the
killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph
3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of rank is only a
generic aggravating circumstance which serves to affect the penalty
to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the offense into
a more serious crime; that even assuming that disregard of rank is a
qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment
which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion when he denied the Motion to Quash the Information for
Murder, considering that the original Information for Homicide filed
against him was terminated without his express consent; thus,
prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in double
jeopardy.
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted
his Motion for Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion,
since petitioner's prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the
Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of double
jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the
reinstatement of the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of
the Information for Murder, as he would again be placed in double
jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent
judge's Order reinstating the Information to Homicide after
initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein
petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the
fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment
with substitution of Information; that the respondent judge's Order
dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the
Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure; and that amendments do not entail
dismissal or termination of the previous case.
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his
Comment alleging that no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the respondent judge when he denied petitioner's Motion to Quash
the Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in double
jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first Information for homicide
has not yet commenced, and the case was not dismissed or
terminated when the Information was amended.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment
of the charge of Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place
him in double jeopardy, considering that said amendment was without
his express consent; and that such amendment was tantamount to a
termination of the charge of Homicide.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly
improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of
the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial hierarchy of
courts is not an iron-clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule of
hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before
the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.17
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving
the proper legal interpretation of the provisions on amendment and
substitution of information under the Rules of Court. It also involves
the issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights of the
citizens under the Constitution which protects the accused not against
the peril of second punishment but against being tried for the same
offense. These important legal questions and in order to prevent
further delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the policy
of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in amending the Information after
petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the
Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner --
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was
already terminated without his express consent, he cannot anymore
be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same offense.
The petitioner argued that the termination of the information for
Homicide without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal.
Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to
placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of
amendment or substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court, to wit --
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
xxx
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging
the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided
the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may
also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense. - When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that
a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case,
the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution
under Section 14, Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v.
Madayag19 is instructive, viz:
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the
information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to
the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution
of the information may be made before or after the defendant pleads,
but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial
changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial
change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected
without leave of court, but substitution of information must be
with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need
for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the
plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another
preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to
plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense
charged in the original information or to an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original
charge, hence substantial amendments to the information
after the plea has been taken cannot be made over the
objection of the accused, for if the original information would
be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On
the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the
new information involves a different offense which does not
include or is not necessarily included in the original charge,
hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment
under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of
information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where
the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information,
an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the
new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from
that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a
conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the
same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit
or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this
connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa,
an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.20
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide
to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial
amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the
Information shows that the only change made was in the caption of
the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the Information,
with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the
word "Murder." There was no change in the recital of facts constituting
the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the
court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are
exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information
for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to
petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption
and preamble from "Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.21
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal
amendments in cases in which the accused has already pleaded, it is
necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the
accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced
by the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense
under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any
evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information.22 Since the facts alleged in the accusatory
portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the
original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the
prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any possible
prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on
account of rank" qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only
a generic aggravating circumstance,23 we do not find that he
committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment
of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the
charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and
did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy
by the change of the charge from Homicide to Murder; and
subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that
the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the
ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the
defense of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information
or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are
present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first.24
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d)
when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.25
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or
termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same
offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof;
or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.26
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or
terminated his case for homicide without his express consent, which
is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a
definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.27 And
for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have
the effect of acquittal.1âwphi1
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the
trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss
the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the proper
offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again -
-
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made
in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original
complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require
the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense - When it becomes manifest at any time before judgment that
a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be
discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case,
the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only
when the offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved,
i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there
must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new
information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to
a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
information. In this connection, the offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. 28
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the
respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information
and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the
same original information that was amended by merely crossing out
the word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which
showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in ordering that the original Information for
Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of rank does not qualify
the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a violation of his right
against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge
of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier.

We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion.

A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the
respondent judge granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not
on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his realization that
"disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating circumstance which does
not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected
himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The
requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was
neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.29

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave

abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.

SO ORDERED.
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY v. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, GR No.
157472, 2007-09-28
Facts:
Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against
petitioner
Information
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the
Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and... Feloniously shot his commanding officer
2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and
sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot
wounds on his body which caused his instantaneous death.
Aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in
disregard of his rank. On the same day and after the
arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order...
directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating
circumstance of... disregard of rank alleged in the Information
which public respondent registered as having qualified the
crime to Murder.
Prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word
"Homicide" and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the
caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information...
petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder.
Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter
would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his
Homicide case had been... terminated without his express
consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case
Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings
Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion on the ground
of double jeopardy... the subsequent filing of the Information
for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
Respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash... ruled that a
claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute
double jeopardy... that the Information... for Homicide was
patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings
could be taken thereon
Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order
reinstating the Information to Homicide after initially motu
proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein
petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish
the fourth element... of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant
was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent
Issues:
Questions of law involving the proper legal interpretation of
the provisions on amendment and substitution of information
under the Rules of Court
Ruling:
The petition is not meritorious.
Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment
or substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters
his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave... of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights
of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall
dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing
of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with
Rule 119, Section 11, provided the... accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense. - When it becomes manifest at any time
before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of
the offense charged or any other... offense necessarily
included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there
appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court
shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper...
information.
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the
information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers
to the substitution of the information or complaint.
Amendment may involve either formal or substantial
changes, while substitution necessarily involves a substantial
change from the original charge.
Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected
without leave of court, but substitution of information must be
with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed.
Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need
for another preliminary investigation and the retaking of the
plea of the accused; in substitution of information, another
preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to
plead anew to the new information
An amended information refers to the same offense charged
in the original information or to an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the original charge,
hence substantial amendments to the information after the
plea has been taken cannot be made... over the objection of
the accused, for if the original information would be
withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On
the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the
new information involves a different offense which does not
include or is not... necessarily included in the original charge,
hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
The rule is that where the second information involves the
same offense, or an offense which... necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment
of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different
from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the
evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be
sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the
second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the
second offense is an attempt to commit or a... frustration of,
or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in,
the offense charged in the first information.
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from
Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a
substantial amendment or a substitution
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of
the Information shows that the only change made was in the
caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or
preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word
"Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder."... or
change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court... we find
that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from
"Homicide" to "Murder" as purely formal.
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal
amendments in cases in which the accused has already
pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not
prejudice the rights of the accused... test of whether the rights
of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment... of a
complaint or information is whether a defense under the
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made; and when
any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable
to the complaint or information
Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the
amended Information are identical with those of the original
Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the
prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there be any
possible prejudice to... the rights or defense of petitioner
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that
"disrespect on account of rank" qualified the crime to murder,
as the same was only a generic aggravating
circumstance,[23] we do not find that he committed any grave
abuse of discretion in ordering the... amendment of the
Information... since the amendment made was only formal
and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus,
the respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the
Information and not the dismissal of the original Information.
To repeat, it was the same original information that was
amended by merely crossing out the word
"Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which
showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
Petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion in ordering that the original Information for
Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of rank does
not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a
violation of his... right against double jeopardy, as he will be
prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has
already been terminated earlier.
We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no
grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge.
Principles:
A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary when the cases brought before the appellate
courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave... of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the
rights of the accused.
G.R. No. L-32557 October 23, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO C. REYES as Presiding Judge of the Circuit
Criminal Court, Fourth Judicial District, and FRANCISCO
ESTRELLA, respondents.
CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
Petitioner, by way of certiorari, with prayer for preliminary injunction,
questions as alleged grave abuse of discretion, the order 1 dated July
10, 1970, of the respondent Judge, (Hon. Alfredo C. Reyes of the
Circuit Criminal Court, 4th Judicial District, Cabanatuan City) in
Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-170-NE, entitled "The People of the
Philippines versus Francisco Estrella," which denied petitioner's verbal
motion for the amendment of the information in said case, by deleting
the year "1969" as alleged therein, and in lieu thereof to put the year
"1964 ". Respondent Judge anchored his denial of the verbal motion
on, to wit:
After a careful study of both memoranda in support
and against the said motion, this Court finds and so
hold that the amendment to the information cannot be
made without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
accused in the above-entitled case.
WHEREFORE, the motion to amend the information
is hereby denied in accordance with the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Placido
Opemia et al., 98 Phil. 698. ...
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner also assails the order of respondent Court, dated
September 14, 1970, 3 denying its motion for reconsideration 4 of the
July 10, 1970 order.
This court issued a preliminary injunction on September 24, 1970. 5
Pertinent facts of record are:
Sometime in October, an information for qualified theft was filed
against private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, as
Criminal Case No. 6799, in the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, pertinent portion as follows:
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Fiscal accuses
Narciso Mananing, Florentino Alcantara, Francisco
Estrella, and Melecio Guevarra of the crime of
Qualified Theft, committed as follows:
That in the month of August, 1964, in the municipality
of San Jose, province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused Narciso Mananing being the
driver of complainant Maria Ignacio- Francisco,
Florentino Alcantara, repair shop owner where the
truck hereinafter described was found and recovered,
Francisco Estrella, a Philippine Constabulary soldier
stationed at Bulacan, and Melecio Guevarra, all
conspiring together, without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry
away one (1) Bedford truck with Chassis No. 153559,
with Motor No. 2/54/5/6, with Plate No. T-35049,
Series of 1964, to the damage and prejudice of the
owner, Maria Ignacio-Francisco in the amount of
P23,000.00, value of said vehicle. 6
On November 15, 1969, the Acting City Fiscal of San Jose City,
(converted into city) Nueva Ecija, filed an information (Crim. Case No.
CCC-IV-170) with the respondent Court, charging private respondent
Francisco Estrella and three others, with qualified theft, as follows:
 The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Narciso
Mananing Florentino Alcantara, Francisco Estrella,
and Melecio Guevarra of the crime of Qualified Theft,
committed as follows:
That on or about the month of August, 1969 in the
City of San Jose, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused Narciso Mananing being then
the driver of Bedford truck bearing Plate No. T-35049,
Series of 1964, with Chassis No. 153559, and with a
Motor No. 2/54/5/6 owned by Maria Ignacio-
Francisco, conspiring and confederating together with
his co-accused namely: Florentino Alcantara,
Francisco Estrella, and Melecio Guevarra, and with
intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away the said Bedford truck
valued at Twenty Three Thousand Pesos (
P23,000.00) Philippine Currency and dismantled the
same without the consent of the said owner and to her
damage and prejudice of the said sum of
P23,000.00. 7
On January 28, 1970, private respondent Francisco Estrella was
arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty During the arraignment,
respondent-Judge required his clerk to read the information to
Francisco Estrella. The court interpreter was directed to translate the
information into Tagalog for the benefit of the accused. The
prosecution, although represented, made no move to amend the
information, if indeed it was really erroneous. From January 28, 1970,
up to May 21, 1970, the latter date being the scheduled trial of the
case, the prosecution never moved to amend the information. 8
On May 21, 1970 when the prosecution was scheduled to present its
evidence, it verbally moved that it be allowed to amend the
information 9 so as to change the date of the commission of the
offense from "August 1969" to "August 1964." 10 Private respondent
Francisco Estrella, having come to the trial court ready to defend
himself from an offense allegedly committed in "August 1969",
vigorously objected to the verbal motion. 11
Respondent Judge withheld his ruling on the prosecution's motion to
amend, and instead, required the prosecution to present its first
witness, to determine whether the sought amendment in the
information would constitute a change of substance affecting the rights
of the accused or merely of form. 12
Florentino Alcantara, originally a co-accused but discharged as a
prosecution witness, testified that the offense was committed in 1964.
The defense refused to cross-examine witness Alcantara, asked
respondent Court to strike off the testimony of Alcantara because it
referred to an offense not mentioned in the information, and asked for
a ruling by respondent Court on the prosecution's verbal motion to
amend the information. 13
Respondent Judge required the prosecution and the defense to submit
memoranda. The contested order of July 22, 1970, denying the
prosecution's verbal motion to amend information on the ground that
said amendment would prejudice the substantial rights of the accused
was issued by respondent Court. 14
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned
contested order alleged that time was not material ingredient of the
offense of qualified theft and claimed that the case of Placido Opemia,
et al., 98 Phil. 698, relied upon by the trial court for its denial of the
motion to amend information, was not applicable to the case. 15
The respondent Court, denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, in its order of September 14, 1970, 16 stating that the
prosecution's honest mistake in the information filed cannot prevail
over the substantial rights of the accused based on constitutional
provisions. Hence this petition.
The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the respondent
Court abused its discretion when it refused an amendment to the
information filed in Criminal Case No. CCC-IV 170-NE, to change the
date of the alleged commission of the offense from "August 1969" to
"August 1964", on the ground it would constitute an impairment of the
substantial rights of the accused as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Under Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court, the complaint or
information in a criminal case where the accused had been arraigned
and had pleaded, as in this case, may be amended only as to all
matters of form when the same can be done without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the accused.
As to whether or not a sought for amendment of an information to
change the time of the alleged commission of crime from 1969 to 1964
(period of five years) would prejudice the substantial rights of the
accused after his arraignment and plea, this Court ruled in the case
of People vs. Placido Opemia, et al., 98 Phil. 698, that:
In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao
was lost on July 25, 1947, and not on June 18, 1952,
as alleged in the information. The period of almost five
years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long
stretch of time that one cannot help but be led to
believe that another theft different from that
committed by the co-defendants in 1952 was also
perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this impression
the accused, who came to Court prepared to face a
charge of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by
them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden
surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending
to prove a similar offense committed in 1947. The
variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their
constitutional rights to be informed before the trial of
the specific charge against them and deprives them
of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover,
they cannot be convicted of an offense of which they
were not charged.
In the present case, private respondent Francisco Estrella was
investigated for an offense allegedly committed in August of 1964.
Then, he was charged for an offense allegedly committed in August of
1969. He pleaded not guilty to the latter charge. Now petitioner desires
to put him on trial for the alleged 1964 offense. This cannot legally be
done.
The petitioner's argument that the time or date of the commission of
the offense is not a material ingredient of the crime of qualified theft
cannot be given much weight in this case because the disparity of time
between the years 1964 and 1969 is so great as to defy approximation
in the commission of one and the same offense. While it has been held
that except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the
precise time of commission need not be stated in the information, this
Court stated that this does not mean that the prosecuting officer may
be careless about fixing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may
omit the date altogether, or that he may make the allegation so
indefinite as to amount to the same thing. 17 The prosecution is given
the chance to allege an approximation of time of the commission of
the offense and the precise date need not be stated but it does not
mean that it can prove any date remote or far removed from the given
approximate date so as to surprise and prejudice the accused.
What happened in this case is that the petitioner committed a mistake
in the placing of the date of the alleged crime in the information filed.
During the arraignment and plea of private respondent Francisco
Estrella on January 28, 1970, the prosecution had all the chances to
realize and rectify its mistake. It did not do so. The trial of the accused
was set for May 21, 1970. Petitioner therefore, had more than three
months to take steps. Again, it failed to do so. Finally, petitioner
verbally moved to amend the information only at the start of the trial.
To permit petitioner to do so would surprise the accused and prejudice
his substantial rights.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders dated July 10, 1970 and
September 14, 1970, by respondent Judge are hereby AFFIRMED,
the preliminary injunction issued on September 24, 1970 dissolved,
and this petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201572 July 9, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RAEL DELFIN, Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal1 assailing the Decision2 dated 29 April 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160. In the said
Decision, the CA affirmed, with modification, the conviction of herein
appellant Rael Delfin for murder under Article 248(1) of Act No. 3815
or the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The antecedents:
On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a
51-year-old fisherman from Navotas City—was killed after being
gunned down at a store just across his home.
Suspected of killing Emilio was the appellant. On 13 March 2001, the
appellant was formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon.3 The information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction ofthis Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said weapon one EMILIO
ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his chest, thereby inflicting upon the
victim gunshot wound, which caused his immediate death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter
ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of one Joan
Cruz (Joan) and a certain Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez).
Joan is an eyewitness tothe gunning of Emilio. She is also the live-in
partner of the victim. The substance of her testimony is as follows: 5
1. At about 10:45 p.m. of 27 September 2000, Joan was
standing outside Emilio’s house at R. Domingo St., Tangos,
Navotas City. From there, Joan was able to see Emilio talking
over the telephone at a store just across his house. Also at
the store during that time was the appellant who was seated
on a bench to the left of Emilio.
2. Joan then went inside Emilio’s house. Almost immediately
after going inside the house, Joan heard the sound of a
gunshot. Joan rushed outside of the house and saw Emilio
shot in the head and sprawled on the ground. Joan then saw
the appellant, now holding a gun, firing another shot at Emilio.
3. Joan said that she was not aware of any previous
misunderstanding between Emilio and the appellant; neither
did she observe any altercation brewing nor hear any word
spoken between Emilio and appellant prior to the shooting.
Dr. Marquez, on the other hand, is a Philippine National Police
physician who examined post mortemthe corpse of Emilio. He issued
Medico-Legal Report No. M-608-00,6 which revealed that Emilio died
as a consequence of two (2) gunshotwounds: one that penetrated the
left side of his head and another that penetrated his chest. Dr.
Marquez testified to affirm the contents of his report.
The defense, for its part, relied onthe testimonies of the appellant7 and
a certain Rene Villanueva (Rene).8
Appellant offered the alibithat he was fishing on the seas of Bataan on
the date and time of the supposed shooting. According to the
appellant, he left for the seas at about 3:00 p.m. of 27 September 2000
and only returned at around 4:00 a.m. of the next day. Appellant also
testified that he was accompanied on this fishing trip by three (3) other
individuals—one of which was Rene.
Rene initially corroborated on all points the testimony of appellant.
However, Rene later admitted thathe, the appellant and their other
companions actually left for their fishing trip at 3:00 p.m. of 26
September 2000—not the 27th ; and returned to shore at 4:00 p.m. of
27 September 2000—not the 28th . Thus, at the date and time of the
supposed shooting, Rene and the appellant were already in Navotas
City.
On 20 July 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision9 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of murder under Article 248(1)
of the RPC.10 Based on its assessment and evaluation of the evidence
on record, the RTC was convinced that it was the appellant who killed
Emilio and who did so with the use of treachery. Accordingly, the RTC
sentenced the appellant tosuffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand
to pay civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 and another ₱50,000.00 as
consequential damages.
Aggrieved, appellant appealedthe RTC decision with the CA.
On 29 April 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction
of the appellant. The CA, however, deleted the award of ₱50,000.00
consequential damages and replaced it with an award of ₱50,000.00
moral damages.11 Hence, this appeal.
In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the information under
which he was tried and convicted. He specifically points out to the
discrepancy between the date of the commission of the murder as
alleged in the information i.e., "on or about the 27th day of November
2000" and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27
September 2000. Appellant protests that the failure of the information
to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder violated
his right to be properly informed of the charge against him and
consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense
thereon.
Appellant also insists on the credibility of his alibiover and above the
version of the prosecution.
Lastly, appellant questions the appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery against him.
OUR RULING
We deny the appeal.
Variance In the Date of the
Commission of the Murder as Alleged
in the Information and as Established
During the Trial Does Not Invalidate
the Information
We sustain the validity of the information under which the appellant
was tried, and convicted, notwithstanding the variance in the date of
the commission of the crime as alleged inthe information and as
established during the trial.
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like
murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity
or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merelyrequires, for
the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission
be approximated:12
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.– A complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them
shall be included in the complaint or information.
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The
offense may be alleged to have beencommitted on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission. (Emphasis supplied).
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with
exactitude, the allegation in an information of a date of commission
different from the one eventually established during the trial would not,
as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution. 13 In such
cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed
supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial 14 or may even
be corrected by a formal amendment of the information.15
The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in
the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information
and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy
is so greatthat it induces the perception that the information and the
evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In this
event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed
supplanted by the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck
down for being violative of the right of the accused to be informed of
the specific charge against him. Such was this Court’s ruling in the
case of People v. Opemia.16
In Opemia, an information for theft of large cattle committed on 18
June 1952 was filed against four (4) accused. After all of the accused
entered a plea of not guilty and during trial, the prosecution adduced
evidence to the effect that the purported theft was committed in July
of 1947. The prosecution thereafter moved for the amendment of the
information to make it conform to the evidence with respect to the date
of theft. The trial court rejected the motion and instead dismissed the
information altogether. The dispute reaching us in due course, we
sustained the trial court’s dismissal of the information:
The amendment proposed in the present case consists in changing
the date of the commission of the crime charged from June 18, 1952
to July, 1947. In not permitting the amendment the learned trial Judge
said:
"It is a cardinal rule in criminalprocedure that the precise time at which
an offense was committed need not be alleged in the complaint or
information, but it is required that the act be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense
was committed as the information or complaint would permit (Rule
106, section 10). The reason for this rule is obvious. It is to apprise the
accused of the approximate date when the offense charged was
committed in order to enable him to prepare his defense and thus
avoid a surprise. In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao
was lost on July 25, 1947 and not on June 18, 1952 as alleged in the
information. The period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952
covers such a long stretch of time that one cannot help but beled to
believe that another theft different from that committed by the
Defendantsin 1952 was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under this
impression the accused, who came to court prepared to face a charge
of theft of large cattle allegedly committed by them in 1952, were
certainly caught by sudden surprise upon being confronted by
evidence tending to prove a similar offense committed in 1947. The
variance is certainly unfair tothem, for it violates their constitutional
right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them
and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover,
they cannot be convicted of an offense with which they are not
charged.
"It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the
Defendanthas entered his plea, the information or complaint may be
amended only as to all matters of form when the same can be done
without prejudice tothe rights of the Defendant(Rule 196, section 13).
An amendment that would change the date of the commission of the
offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form. The
difference in date could not be attributed to a clerical error, because
the possibility of such an error is ruled out by the fact that the
difference is not only in the year, but also in the month and in the last
two digits of the year.It is apparent that the proposed amendment
concerns with material facts constituting the offense, and
consequently it would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
Defendants."
His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the
amendment as referring to substance and not merely to form. But even
supposing it to be the contrary, its allowance, after the Defendantshad
pleaded, was discretionary with the court and would be proper only if
it would not prejudice their rights. We are not prepare to say that the
court did not make good use of that discretion in disallowing the
amendment, considering that the variance sought to be introduced
thereby would appear to be really unfair to the Defendants, for as
clearly explained by the court "it violates their constitutional right to be
informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and
deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves."17 (Emphasis
supplied).
In this case, however, we find applicable, not the exception in Opemia,
but the general rule.
Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe
that there is no mistaking that both the information and the evidence
of the prosecution but pertain to one and the same offense i.e., the
murder of Emilio. We find implausible the likelihood that the accused
may have been caught off-guard or surprised by the introduction of
evidence pointing to commission of the murder on 27 September
2000, considering that all documentary attachments to the information
(such as the Resolution18 of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Malabon-Navotas sub-station and the Sworn Statement19 of Joan) all
referred to the murder as having been committed on that date. Indeed,
appellant never objected to such evidence during the trial and was
even able to concoct an intelligent alibiin direct refutation thereof.
What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the
inaccurate allegation in the information is simply the product of a mere
clerical error. This is obvious from the fact that, while all its supporting
documents point to the murder ashaving been committed on the 27th
of September2000, the information’s mistake is limited only to the
month when the crime was committed.20 Such an error is evidently not
fatal; it is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
Hence, we sustain the information for murder, under which the
appellant was tried and convicted, as valid.
Appellant’s Defense of Alibi
Unavailing; Appellant Properly
Convicted of Murder
We also find unavailing the appellant’s insistence on the credibility of
his alibi.1avvphi1 On this point, we quote with approval the following
discourse of the CA, which we find to be consistent with time-honored
jurisprudence:21
Time and again, it has been stressed that the factual findings of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of their probative weightis given high respect, if not
conclusive effect, unless it is ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood,
or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which,
if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.22
As correctly found by the trial court, the testimony of prosecution
witness, Joan, was clear, candid, straightforward, positive and
credible, as against the denial and alibi of the [appellant]. She
positively identified the [appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime. x x
x.
It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single eye-witness, if
positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a
charge of murder.23 Considering that Joan’s account of how the
[appellant] killed [Emilio] was clear, credible, and positive, there is,
thus, no compelling reason to disturb the trial court’s reliance on her
testimony.
As to the [appellant’s] defense ofdenial and alibi, the same are
unavailing and worthless in the face of the positive identification by the
prosecution’s witness x x x.
x x x. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be proven
that the [accused] was at some other place at the time the crime was
committed and that it was physicallyimpossible for him to be at the
locus criminisat the time [the offense was committed].24 x x x.
At bench, the [appellant] has not shown the impossibility of his WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 August
committing the crime as even, Rene, the witness who was supposed 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160 is hereby
to corroborate his alibi, admitted that theywent back home at 4:00 AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the amount
o’clock in the morning of September 27, 2000 and were already at of civil indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; (2) that
Navotas City at the time the incident occurred. Thus, it was certainly the amount of moral damages is increased from ₱50,000.00 to
possible for him to be present at the crime scene despite his ₱75,000.00; and (3) that the appellant must pay, in addition to civil
allegations to the contrary. Hence, based on all the foregoing indemnity and moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of
evidence, he is, without a doubt, the perpetrator of the crime. ₱30,000.00. The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of
Anent the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery six percent ( 6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully
against the appellant, we find it to befully justified by the evidence on paid.
record. Again, we approve of the CA’s observations on this matter:
SO ORDERED.
Concededly, the [appellant’s] attack on the unarmed [Emilio] was
sudden, unprovoked, unexpected and deliberate. Before the attack
was made, [Emilio] was merely conversing with another on the phone.
He was undoubtedly in no position and without any means to defend
himself. By all indications, [Emilio] was left with no opportunity to
evade the gunshots, to defend himself, or to retaliate. For this reason,
the [RTC] correctly appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify
the offense as Murder.25

All in all, we find no error inthe conviction of the appellant.

Recoverable Damages

In line with prevailing jurisprudence,26 we increase the amount of civil

indemnity and moral damages payable by the appellant from
₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.

In addition to the foregoing, we require the appellant to also pay

exemplary damages in the amount ₱30,000.00.27

The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable

by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
G.R. No. 213598
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
MERCELITA1 ARENAS y BONZO @ MERLY, Accused-
Appellant
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated January 22, 2014 of the
2 the Chief of Police (COP) of the Sual Police Station, Sual,
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05533, which
affirmed in toto the Decision dated April 16, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lingayen Pangasinan, Branch 38, in Criminal
Case No. L-8966. The RTC found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11 of Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information3 dated August 9, 2010, the appellant was charged
as follows:
That on or about August 6, 2010 in the evening, in Brgy. Poblacion,
Sual, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully sell two (2) heat-sealed plastic sachets of
Metamphetamine (sic) Hydrochoride (Shabu), a prohibited drug, in
exchange for ₱2,000.00 marked money to PO3 Benedict Julius B.
Rimando, acting as poseur-buyer, and was likewise in possession,
with intent to sell, one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of
methamphetamine Hydrochoride (Shabu) without lawful authority
to possess and sell the same.
Contrary to Art. II, Section 5 of RA 9165.4
Upon her arraignment5 on August 25, 2010, she pleaded not guilty
to the crimes charged. Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Benedict Julius
B. Rimando (PO3 Rimando), PO2 Alex Aficial, Jr. (PO2
Aficial), Police Senior Inspector Myrna Malojo (PSI Malojo ), PO2
Catherine Viray (PO2 Viray), Barangay Kagawad Dioniso S.
Gulen, Police Inspector Ma. Theresa Amor Manuel, and Police
Senior Inspector Leo S. Llamas (PSI Llamas).
The prosecution evidence established that sometime in July 2010,
Pangasinan, PSI Llamas, started conducting a surveillance on the
alleged illegal drug-selling activities of appellant. At 6:00 p.m. of
August 6, 2010, he called on PO3 Rimando, PO2 Aficia1, SPO2
Gulen, POI Viray and SPOl Editha Castro to an emergency
conference and instructed them to conduct a buy-bust operation
on appellant who agreed to deliver the items in front of Las Brisas
Subdivision, along the National Highway in Poblacion Sual,
Pangasinan. During the briefing, the appellant was described as a
woman of about 4 to 5 feet tall and between 45 to 50 years old.
PO3 Rimando was designated as the poseur-buyer and was given
two (2) ₱1000 bills to be used for the operation, which were
photocopied and entered into the police blotter. PO2 Aficial had
earlier coordinated with the PDEA of the intended buy bust.6
At 6:30 p.m., the team walked to the area which was about 150
meters away from their station. PO3 Rimando and PO2 Aficial
stood at the side of the highway beside the subdivision as earlier
instructed by PSI Llamas while the other team members were
positioned strategically. After 5 minutes of waiting, appellant came
near PO3 Rimando who told the former in Ilocano dialect that he
was instructed to pick up the items and asked the appellant
whether she had the items to which the latter answered in the
affirmative. PO3 Rimando then handed appellant the two marked
₱1000.00 bills and the latter gave him the two (2) small plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO3 Rimando
signaled PO2 Aficial, who was two meters away from him, to come
over and they introduced themselves as police officers. PO3
Rimando conducted a routine body search on appellant and he
was able to recover from her the marked money and another small
plastic sachet she was holding in her left hand.7
Appellant was brought to the Sual Police Station where PO3
Rimando marked the two plastic sachets subject of the buy-bust
with "BJB-1" and "BJB-2," and the one plastic sachet recovered
from appellant with "BJB-3." He prepared and signed the
confiscation receipt of the seized items in the presence of a
barangay kagawad, a Department of Justice (DOJ) Prosecutor,
and an ABS-CBN reporter, who all affixed their signatures in the
Confiscation Receipt, as well as the appellant.8 PO2 Viray took
pictures of the seized items, marked money as well as the signing
of the receipt inside the police station.9 PO3 Rimando brought the
seized items as well as the Request for Laboratory
Examination10 prepared by PSI Llamas to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Lingayen, Pangasinan.
PSI Myrna Malojo, a forensic chemist, personally received from
PO3 Rimando the letter request and the seized items.11 The
laboratory results showed a positive result for methamphetamine
hyrochloride or shabu, and having a weight of 0.08 grams, 0.07
grams and 0.05 grams, respectively, which findings were
contained in PSI Malojo’s initial12 and confirmatory13 reports. PSI
Malojo sealed the seized items and placed her own markings
thereon and turned them to the evidence custodian.14 She identified
in court the items she examined as the same items she received
from PO3 Rimando15 and the latter also identified the subject items
as the same items he recovered from the appellant during the buy-
bust operation.16
Appellant denied the charges alleging that at 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. of
August 6, 2010, she was with a certain Mina grilling barbecue at a
video bar in front of Jamaica Sual Subdivision; that after a while,
Mina's boyfriend, PSI Llamas, arrived and talked with Mina. When
PSI Llamas left, Mina asked her to deliver a letter to a certain
Renee who owed her money. Mina called on a tricycle driver who
would bring her to Renee. When she met Renee, she handed her
the letter from Mina and Renee gave her a sealed envelope. Upon
her return to the bar, she gave the envelope to Mina who was
drinking beer with PSI Llamas. She then asked permission to go
home as she would still cook dinner but Mina told her to grill more
barbecues. As she insisted in going home, PSI Llamas placed his
right arm around her neck and called someone on his cellphone.
She tried to remove PSI Llamas' arm around her neck when a
police car arrived and brought her to the police station where she
was forced to say something about the shabu which she had no
knowledge of and she was later detained.17
In rebuttal, PSI Llamas denied knowing Mina and going to the
videoke bar on August 6, 201 O; that he only met the appellant at
the police station and was not the one who arrested her.18 In her
sur-rebuttal, appellant claimed that she had known PSI Llamas for
about 3 weeks prior to her arrest and insisted that he was the one
who arrested her.
On April 16, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision19 finding appellant
guilty of the charged offenses, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and the prosecution having
established to a moial certainty the guilt of accused MERCILITA
ARENAS y BONZO @ ''Merly," this Court hereby renders judgment
as follows:
1. For violation of Section 5, Art. II of RA 9165, this Court hereby
sentences said accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay [a]
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00);
2. For violation of Section 11, Art. II of the same Act, this Court
hereby sentences said Accused to a prison term of Twelve (12)
Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years, and to pay a fine of
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.20
The RTC found that PO3 Rimando, who acted as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, positively identified appellant as the
one who sold and handed him the two plastic sachets of shabu in
the amount of ₱2,000.00 and the same person who received the
marked money from him. It was also proven that during appellant's
arrest, PO3 Rimando recovered one more plastic sachet
of shabu in her possession, and he marked the three plastic
sachets with his initials; and that every link in the chain of custody
of the confiscated plastic sachets was also established. The RTC
found that PO3 Rimando testified in a frank, spontaneous and
straightforward manner and his credibility was not crumpled on
cross examination, and it rejected appellant's defenses of denial
and frame up.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The fallo of its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 3 8 dated 16 April 2012 is AFFIRMED.21
Hence, this appeal filed by appellant. Both appellant and the
Solicitor General manifested that they are adopting their Briefs filed
with the CA.
Appellant is now before us with the same issues raised before the
CA, i.e., that the RTC gravely erred: (1) in giving weight and
credence to the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses; (2) in holding that there was a legitimate buy-bust
operation; (3) in convicting appellant of the crimes charged despite
the failure to prove the elements of the alleged sale of shabu and
the chain of custody and the integrity of the allegedly seized items;
and (4) in convicting appellant under an Information which charges
two offenses in violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.
We find no merit in the appeal.
For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following
elements must be proved: (1) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the thing. What is
material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.22 We find all the elements necessary for appellant's
conviction for illegal sale of shabu clearly established in this case.
PO3 Rimando, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as
the person whom he caught in flagrante delicto selling white
crystalline substance presumed to be shabu in the buy-bust
operation conducted by their police team; that upon appellant's
receipt of the ₱2,000.00 buy-bust money from PO3 Rimando, she
handed to him the two sachets of white crystalline substance which
when tested yielded positive results for shabu. Appellant's delivery
of the shabu to PO3 Rimando and her receipt of the marked money
successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction. The
seized shabu and the marked money were presented as evidence
before the trial court.
Appellant's reliance on the case of People v. Ong23wherein the
Court acquitted the appellants of the charge of illegal sale
of shabu for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of
the crime charged is misplaced. The Court found therein that the
testimony of SPO1 Gonzales, who acted as the poseur-buyer,
showed that he was not privy to the sale transaction which
transpired between the confidential informant, who did not testify,
and the appellant.
Here, while it appeared that it was PSI Llamas who initially dealt
with appellant regarding the sale of shabu, it also appeared that
PSI Llamas had designated PO3 Rimando as his representative in
the sale transaction with appellant. Notably, PO3 Rimando was
instructed by PSI Llamas to wait at the specified area where
appellant would be the first to approach him for the sale
of shabu,24 which established the fact that appellant was already
informed beforehand as to the person she was to deal with
regarding the sale of shabu. Indeed, appellant approached PO3
Rimando who was waiting at the designated area and upon receipt
from him of the payment of ₱2000.00, the former handed to the
latter the two sachets of shabu. The identity of appellant as the
seller, as well as the object and consideration for the sale
transaction, had been proved by the testimony of PO3 Rimando,
the buyer.
We also find appellant guilty of illegal possession of shabu. The
essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous
drugs are: (1) the accused was in p0ssession of the dangerous
drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous
drug.25 What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact
of possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by
presenting the police officer who actually recovered the prohibited
drugs as a witness, being the person who has the direct knowledge
of the possession.26
In the instant case, PO3 Rimando, the person who had direct
knowledge of the seizure and confiscation of the shabu from the
appellant, testified that he was also able to recover another plastic
sachet of shabu which appellant was holding with her left hand,
which testimony was corroborated by PO2 Aficial.27 As it was
proved that appellant had freely and consciously possessed one
(1) plastic sachet of shabu without authority to do so, she can be
found guilty of illegal possession of shabu.
The RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution was able
to establish the chain of custody of the seized shabu from the time
they were recovered from appellant up to the time they were
presented in court. Section l(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,28 which implements the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines chain of
custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer
of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court
as evidence, and the final disposition.
It was established that after PO3 Rimando seized the three plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance from appellant, he
was in possession of the same from confiscation up to the police
station.29 He marked the three plastic sachets at the police station,
which was only 150 meters away from the scene,30 with "BJB-1",
"BJB-2" and "BJB-3."31 He prepared the confiscation receipt in the
presence of a barangay kagawad, a DOJ Prosecutor and an ABS-
CBN Reporter, who all affixed their signatures therein, the
appellant, PO1 Viray and P02 Aficial.32 PO1 Viray then took
photographs of the seized items, the preparation and signing of the
confiscation receipt. PO3 Rimando then brought the request for
laboratory examination prepared by PSI Llamas of the seized items
and personally brought the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination.33
PSI Malojo, the forensic chemist, personally received the said
request and the three small heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance with markings from PO3
Rimando.34 After examining the items, PSI Malojo found them to be
positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, also
known as shabu, which findings were embodied in her Initial
Laboratory Report and eventually, in her Final Chemistry Report.
After her examination, PSI Maloj o sealed the seized items and
placed her own markings thereon, and turned them over to the
evidence custodian for safekeeping.35 During her testimony in
court, PSI Malojo identified the items she examined as the same
items she received from PO3 Rimando. PO3 Rimando also
identified in court the subject items as the same items he recovered
from the possession of appellant during the buy-bust operation.36
We likewise agree with the CA that the alleged inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to minor details
which did not relate to the crimes charged. The inconsistencies
have been sufficiently explained during trial by the witnesses
themselves. We quote with approval what the CA said:
The alleged inconsistencies in the composition of the buy-bust
team, in the identity and/or description of accused-appellant, and
in the markings on the seized items are collateral matters and not
essential elements of the crimes charged. Moreover, a scrutiny of
these purported inconsistencies would show that the same are not
conflicting at all.
Although P02 Viray testified that she was at the office at the time
P03 Rimando and P02 Aficial were conducting the buy-bust
operation, it does not necessarily mean that she was not part of the
buy-bust team. P02 Viray testified that before the conduct of the
buy-bust operation, she was designated by P03 Rimando to be the
official photographer. She was told to take photographs after the
subject operation, a task that she performed when accused-
appellant was brought to the police station. This explains why P03
Rimando included her in his testimony as one of the members of
the buy-bust team.
Similarly the testimony of P02 Aficial that he was with P03 Rimando
during the buy-bust operation is not conflicting with P03 Rimando's
enumeration of the member of the buy-bust team. P02 Aficial was
asked who was with [him] during the buy-bust operation and he
merely answered the question of the counsel for the defense. P02
Aficial was not asked who were the other members of the buy-bust
team. His answer was consistent with P03 Rimando's statement
that when the latter gave the pre-arranged signal, he approached
P03 Rimando and they introduced themselves to accused-
appellant as police officers.
xxxx
As regards the source of the information on the description of
accused-appellant which enabled the poseur-buyer to identify her,
the same is a trivial matter. Whether the information came from
1âw phi1
PSI Llamas or a confidential informant, the fact remains that a
crime was committed by accused-appellant in the presence of the
police officers who were members of the buy-bust team and who
had the duty to immediately arrest her after the consummation of
the transaction. The fact also remains that the description about
the seller matched accused-appellant.x x x
As to the alleged discrepancies in the markings of the seized items,
the same are clearly typographical errors. The transcript of PSI
Malojo's testimony showed that she identified the markings on the
seized plastic sachets as "BJB-1'', "NJN-2" and "BJB-3." However,
the follow-up question of the prosecutor clarified that she was
actually referring to "BJB-1 ", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3", to wit:
Q. I am showing you then Madam Witness three (3) plastic
sachet (sic) will you go over the contain (sic) to the one you are
testifying "BJB-1" to "BJB-3" (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
The universal practice is that exhibits or evidence are marked
chronologically. It is highly unlikely that the second sachet would
be marked "NJN-2" when the first one was marked "BJB-1" and the
third one was marked "BJB-3". Notably, both Confiscation Receipt
and Request for Laboratory Examination showed that the seized
items were marked "BJB-1 ", "BJB-2" and "BJB-3" consistent with
the testimony of P03 Rimando. It should also be noted that in the
computer keyboard, the letters "B" and "N" are beside each other.
Hence, the only logical conclusion for the purported discrepancy is
that the stenographer inadvertently pressed the letter "N" instead
of the letter "B. "37
Anent the matter of the confiscation receipt bearing the date
August 5, 2010 when the buy-bust happened on August 6, 2010,
P03 Rimando explained that he committed an error in placing the
date August 5 which should be August 6.38 Moreover, it was
established by the testimony of Kagawad Gulen that on August 6,
2010, he was called to witness the items confiscated from appellant
and was asked to sit beside P03 Rimando while the latter was
preparing the confiscation receipt.39 Gulen even identified in court
the confiscation receipt where his signature appeared.40
Appellant's contention that the RTC erred in convicting him under
an Information that charged two offenses is not persuasive.
Although the Information in this case charged two offenses which
is a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides that "[a] complaint or
information must charge only one offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses," nonetheless,
Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a
single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are
charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each
offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each
offense."41
Appellant's failure to raise that more than one offense was charged
in the Information in a motion to quash42 before she pleaded to the
same is deemed a waiver.43 As appellant failed to file a motion to
quash the Information, she can be convicted of the crimes charged
in the Information if proven.
We also find no merit in appellant's claim that she cannot be
convicted of illegal possession of illegal drugs as its possession is
absorbed in the charge of illegal sale.
In People v. Lacerna,44We held:
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed
in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended
in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not
covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended
for some future dealings or use by the seller.
Here, it was established that P03 Rimando was able to recover
from appellant's possession another plastic sachet of shabu which
was not the subject of the illegal sale; thus, she could be separately
charged with illegal possession for the same.
We find that the RTC correctly imposed on appellant the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.0045 for the crime of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs.
As to the crime of illegal possession, Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(₱l0,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the
following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
xxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing
quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) ...
(2) ... and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos
(₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if
the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of
opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but
not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and
those similarly designed or newly-introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
Clear from the foregoing, the quantity of the dangerous drugs is
determinative of the penalty to be imposed for the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. We note, however, that the
quantity of shabu found to be in appellant's possession was not
indicated in the Information which is important as the law provides
for the graduation of penalties. We cannot just rely on the quantity
established by the prosecution, which the RTC did in imposing the
penalty, without violating appellant's right to be informed of the
accusation against her. The RTC imposed the minimum penalty
provided by law since the quantity recovered from appellant's
possession was less than 5 grams of shabu; however, it could
have been different if the quantity recovered from appellant was
more than 5 grams where the penalty imposable is imprisonment
of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), or even the maximum
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(₱10,000,000.00), because in this case, the Court could not
impose the penalty provided by law in view of the non-allegation of
the true quantity in the information.
By analogy, in theft cases,46 where the penalty is graduated
according to the value of the thing stolen, we ruled that when the
prosecution failed to establish the amount of property taken by an
independent and reliable estimate, we may fix the value of the
property taken based on attendant circumstances or impose the
minimum penalty. Since it was proved that appellant was in
possession of shabu but the quantity was not specified in the
Information, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on her
should be the minimum penalty corresponding to illegal possession
of less than five grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu which is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300, 000. 00) to Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).47
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of
the imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set
by the law; the maximum period shall not exceed the maximum
period allowed under the law; hence, the imposable penalty should
be within the range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen
(14) years and eight (8) months.
One final note. Public prosecutors are reminded to carefully
prepare the criminal complaint and Information in accordance with
the law so as not to adversely affect the dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 22, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05533 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION only insofar as to the penalty imposable for the
crime of illegal possession so that appellant is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175939 April 3, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The due recognition of the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation through the
criminal complaint or information is decisive of whether his prosecution
for a crime stands or not. The right is not transgressed if the
information sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an
offense that includes the offense established to have been committed
by the accused.
The Case
Chad Manansala y Lagman seeks to reverse the decision
promulgated on July 26, 2006, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA)1 affirmed .with modification his conviction for the illegal
possession and control of 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves in
violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972) that the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo
City had handed down through its decision dated February 1,
2000,2 sentencing him to suffer the penalties of "reclusion perpetua
maximum or imprisonment from thirty (30) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years and to pay the fine of Seven Hundred Fifty
(₱750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment."
Antecedents
The information filed on October 20, 1994 alleged:
That on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of October, 1994, in the
City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully
authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and distributing
more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried leaves placed in
a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are prohibited drugs,
found in his possession and control.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
To substantiate the charge, the Prosecution showed the following.
On October 18, 1994 the Philippine National Police in Olongapo City
(PNP) conducted a test-buy operation against Manansala, a
suspected dealer of marijuana. On the same date, following the test-
buy, the PNP applied for and obtained a search warrant from the RTC,
Branch 72, Olongapo City (Search Warrant No. 8-94) to authorize the
search for and seizure of prohibited drugs in Manansala’s residence
located at No. 55 Johnson Extension, Barangay East Bajac Bajac,
Olongapo City.4 SPO4 Felipe P. Bolina and other elements of the
PNP, accompanied by Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Manalang of
Barangay East Bajac Bajac, conducted the search of Manansala’s
house at around 5:30 a.m. on October 19, 1994. The search yielded
the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information,
which the search team recovered from a wooden box placed inside a
cabinet. Also seized was the amount of ₱655.00 that included the two
marked ₱50.00 bills bearing serial numbers SNKJ812018 and
SNMN426747 used during the test buy.5
All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed
the certification to that effect, along with his father, Jose Manansala,
and Barangay Captain Manalang.6 The certification listed the following
seized articles, to wit: (a) one kilo, more or less, of suspected dried
marijuana leaves; (b) rolling paper; and (c) money amounting to
₱655.00.
SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in
Olongapo City, where they turned over the seized articles to the
evidence custodian, SPO2 Marcelino R. Sapad. At around 8:20 a.m.
of October 20, 1994, the seized articles were submitted to the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga for
qualitative examination.
The PNP Crime Laboratory later issued Technical Report No. D-396-
94,7 to wit:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Spmn "A" – One (1) big transparent plastic bag containing two
(2) rectangular bricks of dried suspected MARIJUANA fruiting
tops having a total weight of seven hundred fifty five (755)
grams.
Spmn "B" – One (1) medium size plastic bag containing dried
suspected MARIJUANA fruiting tops weighing 9.045 grams. x
x x.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of any prohibited and/or regulated
drug in the above-stated specimen. x x x.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated
specimen gave POSITIVE result for MARIJUANA, a
prohibited drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Spmns "A" and "B" – contain MARIJUANA, a prohibited drug.8
Manansala pleaded not guilty on November 22, 1994.9
On January 4, 1995, First Asst. City Prosecutor Mario F. Manalansan
filed a motion for the admission of an amended information, ostensibly
to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs
under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 to illegal possession of
prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law.10 But the RTC did
not act on the motion.
Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the
matters earlier summarized.
In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been
the victim of a frame-up. His version follows.
On October 19, 1994, military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his
house and arrested him without any warrant, and brought him to an
office he referred to simply as S2, then to a club located on Magsaysay
Street in Olongapo City known as Dorris 2. His captors mugged and
then detained him when he refused to admit the sale and possession
of marijuana. They turned down his request to be brought to a hospital
for the treatment of the injuries he thereby sustained. As of the time of
his testimony, he conceded that he could not identify his captors and
whoever had maltreated him, except SPO4 Bolina whom he
recognized in court when the latter testified at the trial. 11
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of
marijuana in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, holding
thus:
The Information to which accused pleaded "not guilty" charges that
accused willfully, unlawfully and knowingly x x x engage in selling,
delivering, giving away to another and distributing x x x falling under
the more embracing term known as "drug pushing". The alleged act of
allegedly knowingly selling or pushing prohibited drugs by the accused
was however, not sufficiently proven. The member of the team who is
alleged to have acted as a poseur-buyer of the illegal stuff from the
accused was not presented as a witness, hence, the testimony of
SPO4 Felipe Bolina, to the effect that during the surveillance
conducted prior to the application of the search warrant, a member of
the team acting as poseur buyer was able to buy marijuana from the
accused, cannot be given weight, being hearsay.
However, the fact that the enforcing team where witness Bolina is a
member, was able to find marijuana leaves in the custody, possession
and control of the accused, in the course of the enforcement of the
search warrant and has been established by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt, without controversion but the denial of the accused,
which like alibi, is the weakest defense, this Court is convinced that
accused is guilty instead of violating Section 8, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act as amended, a crime that is necessarily
included in the crime of drug pushing or dealing, for which the accused
have been charged with. In light of these circumstances, this Court
has no option that to find accused guilty and liable for the crime
proved. Since the date of the commission of the crime as proved is
October 19, 1994, the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, in so far
as the imposable penalty is concerned, will find application.
WHEREFORE, finding accused Chad Manansala y Lagman, GUILTY
of Violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua maximum or imprisonment from
thirty (30) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years and to pay the fine
of Seven Hundred Fifty (₱750,000.00) Thousand Pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.12
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appeal, the CA reviewed the conviction upon the
following issues, namely:
1. That the conviction, being anchored on evidence procured
by virtue of an invalid warrant, was erroneous;
2. That the RTC erred in convicting the accused for illegal
possession of prohibited drug on the misplaced and
inaccurate theory that the offense in violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6425 was necessarily included in the offense
in violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425; and
3. That the RTC overlooked, misinterpreted, misapplied and
misrepresented facts and evidences of substance and
importance that, if weighed, assayed and considered were
enough to acquit the accused.13
On July 26, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, affirming
the conviction subject to modification, viz:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of seven hundred fifty
thousand pesos (₱750,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment.
Accordingly, the prohibited drugs confiscated from the appellant are
hereby ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) through the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.14
Hence, this appeal, in which Manansala reiterates the errors he
already assigned before the CA.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The information alleged that "on or about the nineteenth (19th) day of
October, 1994, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being lawfully authorized did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another
and distributing more or less 750 grams or 3/4 kilo of marijuana dried
leaves placed in a small wooden box inside the cabinet, which are
prohibited drugs, found in his possession and control."
The crime thereby charged was a violation of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,15 which
provides:
Section 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug,
or shall act as a broker in any such transactions.
Arraigned under such information, Manansala pleaded not guilty to it.
But instead of finding him guilty of the crime charged after trial, the
RTC convicted him for a violation of Section 8, of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which states:
Section 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any
prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
On appeal, Manansala assigned as one of the reversible errors
committed by the RTC that the trial court had erred in convicting him
for illegal possession of prohibited drugs on the misplaced and
inaccurate theory that the offense of illegal possession of marijuana in
violation of Section 8 was necessarily included in the offense of illegal
sale of marijuana in violation of Section 4.
The CA disagreed with Manansala, however, and held that his
conviction for the illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section
8 under the information that had alleged the illegal sale of marijuana
under Section 4 was proper, giving its reasons as follows:
xxxx
Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a
prohibited drug, is the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit
drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.
The element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to
sustain a conviction. In the case before Us, the trial court correctly held
that the prosecution failed to establish, much less adduce proof, that
accused-appellant was indeed guilty of the offense of illegal sale of
marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in possession of
the same.
While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may
be had under the present circumstances, the established
principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale
thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in
possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not
covered by or included in the sale and which are probably
intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In the case
before Us, it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of
marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were the same
prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. In this light,
We find that the court a quo committed no reversible error in
convicting the accused-appellant of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of
marijuana penalized under Section 4 of RA 6425 necessarily
includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As borne by
the records, it has been sufficiently proven beyond any doubt that the
lawful search conducted at the house of the accused yielded a total of
764.045 grams marijuana dried leaves as verified by the PNP
Forensic Chemist. Thus, on the face of the positive testimony of the
prosecution witness and the presentation of the corpus delicti, it is
indubitable that a crime had in fact been committed and that accused-
appellant was the author of the same.16
xxxx
To properly resolve the appeal, therefore, it is necessary to determine
whether the conviction of Manansala for a violation of Section 8, which
the information did not allege, instead of for a violation of Section 4,
which the information alleged, was not in violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation brought
against him.
For sure, there have been many occasions in which the Court has
found an accused charged with the illegal sale of marijuana in violation
of Section 4 guilty instead of the illegal possession of marijuana in
violation of Section 8. In the oft-cited case of People v. Lacerna,17 the
Court held as prevailing the doctrine that the illegal sale of marijuana
absorbs the illegal possession of marijuana, except if the seller was
also apprehended in the illegal possession of another quantity of
marijuana not covered by or not included in the illegal sale, and the
other quantity of marijuana was probably intended for some future
dealings or use by the accused. The premise used in Lacerna was that
the illegal possession, being an element of the illegal sale, was
necessarily included in the illegal sale. The Court observed thusly:
In People vs. Manzano, the Court identified the elements of illegal sale
of prohibited drugs, as follows: (1) the accused sold and delivered a
prohibited drug to another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and
delivered was a dangerous drug. Although it did not expressly state it,
the Court stressed delivery, which implies prior possession of the
prohibited drugs. Sale of a prohibited drug can never be proven
without seizure and identification of the prohibited drug, affirming that
possession is a condition sine qua non.
It being established that illegal possession is an element of and is
necessarily included in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court
will thus determine appellant’s culpability under Section 8.
From the penal provision under consideration and from the cases
adjudicated, the elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are
as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the prohibited drug.18
In all the convictions premised on the situation described in Lacerna,
however, the involvement of a single object in both the illegal sale as
the crime charged and the illegal possession as the crime proved is
indispensable, such that only the prohibited drugs alleged in the
information to be the subject of the illegal sale is considered
competent evidence to support the conviction of the accused for the
illegal possession. As such, the illegal possession is either deemed
absorbed by or is considered a necessary element of the illegal sale.
On the other hand, any other illegal substance found in the possession
of the accused that is not part of the subject of the illegal sale should
be prosecuted under a distinct and separate information charging
illegal possession; otherwise, the fundamental right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
would be flagrantly violated.
It is true that there was an error in the information’s statement of the
facts essential to properly describe the offense being charged against
Manansala as that of illegal possession of marijuana; and that the
error became known to the Prosecution, leading Prosecutor
Manalansan to himself file the motion for the admission of the
amended information dated January 3, 1995.19 In the motion,
Prosecutor Manalansan manifested that the information as filed
charged a violation of Section 4; and that during the preliminary
investigation, he had concluded that Manansala should have been
charged with a violation of Section 8 instead of a violation of Section
4 as far as the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves seized from his
possession during the implementation of Search Warrant No. 8-94
was concerned. The distinct and separate nature of the 750 grams of
marijuana leaves from the quantity of marijuana worth ₱100.00 that
was the object of the test buy became all the more evident in
Prosecutor Manalansan’s letter dated December 28, 1994 addressed
to City Prosecutor Prudencio B. Jalandoni.20
There, Prosecutor Manalansan stated that the 750 grams of marijuana
dried leaves had been seized from the possession Manansala on
October 19, 1994 by virtue of the search warrant, while the attributed
illegal sale of marijuana had happened on October 18, 1994 during
the test buy conducted to support the application of the search
warrant. The letter specifically stated:
 xxxx
3. The two incidents, the sale on 18 October 1994 and the
seizure on 19 October 1994 are separate incidents giving rise
to two distinct offenses;
4. We cannot assume that the accused was engaged in the
"sale of prohibited drugs" on 19 October 1994 because he
was engaged in it before.1âwphi1 There is no evidence to
show that the accused was engaged in the sale,
administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
drugs as provided under Section 4;
5. The two (2) ₱50.00 bills are not enough to prove that the
accused was engaged in selling the 750 grams of marijuana
leaves. They can prove the sale on 18 October 1994 but
cannot qualify his possession of the 750 grams of the drugs.
offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged.22 According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court
(1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarily
includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on July
26, 2006; and ORDERS accused CHAD MANANSALA y
LAGMAN to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

xxxx

Nonetheless, the conviction of Manansala stands.

The CA correctly declared that the illegal possession of marijuana was

"a crime that is necessarily included in the crime of drug pushing or
dealing, for which the accused have been charged with." The right of
Manansala to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him enunciated in Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution21 was not violated simply because the information had
precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and
distributing more or less 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves.
Thereby, he was being sufficiently given notice that he was also to be
held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of dried
marijuana leaves. As Lacerna and similar rulings have explained, the
crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished under Section
4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession
of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or
absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there
is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the
Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the
accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second
prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case
No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for
certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the
arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment
until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of
this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the
RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to
maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803,
narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain
S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without
reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the
MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing. 6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence
sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his
appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not
a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A.
2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not
to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision
forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the
merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding
that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g.
homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case
No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor
General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent
judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by
counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his
standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366;
and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in
S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding
petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or
violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph
of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in
Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review
a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process
Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v.
Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an
appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited
drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of
death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of
Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing
becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of
a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under
Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused
within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to
surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed,
the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert
the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why
he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" 12 at the MeTC is belied by the
records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the
MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with
the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer
arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained
unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not disputed
that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on
the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367
involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting
that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not." 15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The
text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less
grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted
a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted
in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon
any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some
wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than
those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case
the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that
which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper
to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the
Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case
the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases
in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings
relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence"
and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either
or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial
courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-
offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart
from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of
our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we
already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of
the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of
analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to
intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct
offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance
of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and
merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief,
etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a
mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized
is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies,
operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the
negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime,
but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state
that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction
to hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its
jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional
crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in
quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day
penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated, 21 stands on solid conceptual
foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller 22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of
committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided
Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by
holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and
not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-
Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising
from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes
and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-
crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a
related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one
resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon
which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-
offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
"damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against
the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which
the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then,
whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is,
whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences
alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in
the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en
banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en
banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva 29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court
en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by
the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968
by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and
People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division,
per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection
under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution
for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same
act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again
for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and
the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended
to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line
of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v.
Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed
the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical
injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon
which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the
post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any
rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano. 37 There,
we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to
property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and
less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same
act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied
on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in
the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940.
However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968),
this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again
for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as
a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one
person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and
the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace
(now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier
stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape
the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits
that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double
jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in
Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property
through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed
that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide
and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where
the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and
physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular
collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in
refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to
petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused,
who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence."
Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the
latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied
relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and
dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with
approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v.
Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and
dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double
jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga
and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot,
Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising
from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No.
88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the
peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one
of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the
passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed
against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the
charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga
moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the
case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he
had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless
imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision
had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga
had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such
remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon
motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion
to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed
by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the
case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution
for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954,
the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless
driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’
After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court
῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging
the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The
amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy,
the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal
Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence
charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double
jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which
proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in
the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second
charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x
x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention
of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view
of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of
which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court. 43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga
(and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its
application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case,
on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the
accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence.
In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts
of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor
General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain
considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We
find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the
Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present
case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there
is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability
of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the
views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero,
etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the
MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on
complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and
(2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the
most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a
felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as
one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to
combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles
1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs
the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the
complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not
falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in
multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be
prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single
quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the
consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following
the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of
which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by
grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave
felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other
hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the
first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act
No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the
most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its
medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
"complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one
of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are
penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not
deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately
from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single
prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one
charge, regardless of their number or severity, 51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose, 52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical
injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted
in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to
property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also
physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another
for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under
Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in
this field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow
the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into
separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-
crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception
under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences
of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13,
Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in
the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of
all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately
penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct
concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and
applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying
it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual
distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal
code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365.
It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2)
an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This is why,
way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that
double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries
through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense
could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave
felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in
the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical SO ORDERED.
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and
the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the
appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense. 54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting

of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the
resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a
single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In
imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be
no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be
filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can
re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or
light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this
ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2

February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,