LEGAL RESEARCH

STARE DECISES

Enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the supreme court in its
decisions. It was based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided,
it should be deemed settle and closed to futher argument.

It encourage the private settlement of disputes becouse it discourages individuals from forum
and judge shopping.promotes effeciency becouse it disposes of the need to litigate every issue and
discourages a rush of litigation whenever there is a change in court personnel.

Promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judial decesions,and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judial process

It is not an inexorable command but a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision.

SUPREME COURT

Abandoning stare decises must be based on strong and compelling reasons: otherwise, the
predictability which is expected from its decision would be immeasurably affected, and the public’s
confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncement diminished. Stare decises can the courts be
justified in the setting aside the same.

The court maybe guided but it is not controlled by precedent.” thus , the court, especially with a
new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-
examination.

Illustrative example

CASE

Bowers v. Hardwick, legal case, decided on June 30, 1986, in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld (5–4) a Georgia state
law banning sodomy. The ruling was overturned by the court 17 years later in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which struck down a Texas
state law that had criminalized homosexual sex between consenting adults.

The case arose on August 3, 1982, when a police officer who had been admitted to the home of Michael Hardwick in Atlanta witnessed
him and a male companion in a bedroom engaging in sex. The officer had been executing a warrant for Hardwick’s arrest for failing to
appear in court on a charge of public drinking (it was later determined that the warrant was invalid because Hardwick had already paid
the $50 fine). The officer promptly arrested both men for violating Georgia’s antisodomy statute.

Although the district attorney decided not to prosecute Hardwick or his companion, Hardwick filed suit in federal district court against
the Atlanta police commissioner and Georgia’s attorney general, Michael J. Bowers, alleging that the antisodomy law placed Hardwick,
a noncelibate homosexual, in imminent danger of arrest and that it violated his constitutional right to privacy. Hardwick also argued
that the law and his arrest had had a chilling effect on the relationship of a pseudonymous heterosexual married couple (the law
applied to heterosexual as well as homosexual sodomy), John and Mary Doe, and that it violated the couple’s right to privacy in their
marital relations, which the Supreme Court had recognized in Griswold v. State of Connecticut (1965). The district court dismissed
the suit, in part on the basis of the Supreme Court’s summary (without comment) affirmance (1976) of Doe v. Commonwealth’s
Attorney for the City of Richmond (1975), in which a district court in Virginia had upheld a state law prohibiting sodomy. The Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit reversed the Georgia district court’s decision, holding that the antisodomy statute violated Hardwick’s right
to privacy under the Ninth Amendment (which protects fundamental rights not enumerated in the first eight amendments) and under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (which prohibits the states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”). It further held that the Supreme Court’s affirmance of Doe was not controlling, because it had
been undermined by later decisions of the court. It remanded the case for retrial, instructing the district court to apply strict scrutiny
(the most demanding form of judicial review), which would have required Bowers to demonstrate that the antisodomy law served a
compelling state interest and that it was the most narrowly tailored means of achieving that end. Rather than go through a second trial,
however, Bowers filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was granted on November 4, 1985, in view of conflicting

decisions in similar cases by other appellate courts. Oral arguments were held on March 31, 1986 .

Hardwick was charge with violating the georgia statute criminalizing sodomy by commiting that
act with another adult male in the bedroom of his home.after a preliminary hearing ,the district
attorny decided not to present the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed.

Hardwick brougt suit in the federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the state insofar
as it criminalized consensual sodomy.

CASE

LAWRENCE ET AL. v. TEXAS

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, FOURTEENTH DISTRICT

No. 02-102. Argued March 26, 2003-Decided June 26, 2003

Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered petitioner Lawrence's apartment and
saw him and another adult man, petitioner Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and
convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain
intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that the statute was not unconstitutional under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court considered Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, controlling on that point.

Held: The Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due
Process Clause. pp. 564-579.

(a) Resolution of this case depends on whether petitioners were free as adults to engage in private conduct in the exercise of their
liberty under the Due Process Clause. For this inquiry the Court deems it necessary to reconsider its Bowers holding.
The Bowers Court's initial substantive statement-"The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy ... ," 478 U. S., at 190-discloses the Court's failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at
stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it said that marriage is just about the right to have sexual intercourse. Although
the laws involved in Bowers and here purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act, their penalties and purposes have
more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places,
the home. They seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons
the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons. Pp. 564-567.

[559]

(b) Having misapprehended the liberty claim presented to it, the Bowers Court stated that proscriptions against sodomy have ancient
roots. 478 U. S., at 192. It should be noted, however, that there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter. Early American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit
nonprocreative sexual activity more generally, whether between men and women or men and men. Moreover, early sodomy laws seem
not to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private. Instead, sodomy prosecutions often involved predatory acts
against those who could not or did not consent: relations between men and minor girls or boys, between adults involving force,
between adults implicating disparity in status, or between men and animals. The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual
sodomy upon which Bowers placed such reliance is as consistent with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with an
established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character. Far from possessing "ancient roots," ibid., American
laws targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the 20th century. Even now, only nine States have singled out
samesex relations for criminal prosecution. Thus, the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority
opinion and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger there indicated. They are not without doubt and, at the very least, are
overstated. The Bowers Court was, of course, making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral, but this Court's obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate its own moral code, Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 850. The Nation's laws and traditions in the past half century are most
relevant here. They show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 857. Pp. 567-573.

(c) Bowers' deficiencies became even more apparent in the years following its announcement. The 25 States with laws prohibiting the
conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct. In those States,
including Texas, that still proscribe sodomy (whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct), there is a pattern of nonenforcement with
respect to consenting adults acting in private. Casey, supra, at 851-which confirmed that the Due Process Clause protects personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education-and Romer v. Evans, 517
U. S. 620, 624-which struck down class-based legislation directed at homosexuals-cast Bow-

[560]

ers' holding into even more doubt. The stigma the Texas criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. Although the offense is but a
minor misdemeanor, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of the persons charged, including notation of
convictions on their records and on job application forms, and registration as sex offenders under state law. Where a case's foundations
have sustained serious erosion, criticism from other sources is of greater significance. In the United States, criticism of Bowers has
been substantial and continuing, disapproving of its reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical assumptions. And, to the
extent Bowers relied on values shared with a wider civilization, the case's reasoning and holding have been rejected by the European
Court of Human Rights, and that other nations have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual
adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command. Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828. Bowers' holding has not induced detrimental reliance of the sort that could counsel against overturning it
once there are compelling reasons to do so. Casey, supra, at 855—856. Bowers causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and
after it contradict its central holding. Pp. 573—577.

(d) Bowers' rationale does not withstand careful analysis. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that (1) the
fact a State's governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice, and (2) individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to
produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by due process. That analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls
here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is hereby overruled. This case does not involve minors,
persons who might be injured or coerced, those who might not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or prostitution. It does involve
two adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. Petitioners' right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in private conduct without government intervention. Casey, supra, at
847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual's personal and private life.
Pp. 577-579.

ISSUE

1. Whether petitioners’ criminal convictions under the texas “homosexual conduct” law -which
criminalized sexual intimacy by same sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex
couples-violate the fourteeth amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws,

2. Whether petitioners criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in tyhe homo
violate their vital interest in liberty and privacy protected by the due process claouse of the
fourtheenth amendment,

3. Whether bowers v. hardwick, should be overruled,

Over the course of the last decades , states with same sex prohibitions have moved toward abolishing
them. In the case of lawrence, noted bowers assertion that anti-sodomy laws reflected values shared
with a wider civilization, but reasoning and holding in bowers have been rejected elsewhwre, said the
court. The court was emphatic about it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and is now overulled.

The same issue was raised and resolved by the supreme court in 1957, Gerona v. Secretary of
Education,
Gerona, et. al vs. Secretary of Education
106 Phil 2
Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS:

RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rule Department Order (DO) No. 8 says that the
anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while the
ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge. Gerona’s children attending the Buenavista Community
School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief.
They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They consider the flag to be an image in the context of what is prohibited in their religion and because of
this they were expelled from the school. Gerona wrote to Secretary of Education that their children be exempt from the law and just be
allowed to remain silent and stand at attention. Secretary of Education denied the petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was
petitioned and issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO No. 8 is valid or constitutional.

HELD:

YES. DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a
certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of
national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete
separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.
After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a
religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for
there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects
or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with
reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the
petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute
they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to
obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow
citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the
regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of
sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession
of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary
of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag
ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion
and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline,
including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to
participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

There is no hard and fast rule on how quickly a supreme court decision can be reversed . in makati v.
commission on election, the supre court in a close 8-7 decision penned by justice antonio carpio,
upheld a commision on election resolution declaring homer saquilayan as the duly-elected mayor of
imus, cavite. A month later justices martin villarama, jr. And jose perez, change their votes and sided
with the dissenters. In the later rulling the supreme court reversed its earlier decision. Justice carpio
wrote a dessenting opinion concurred in five of his colleagues.

Sometimes, a doctrine may be abandoned becouse congress amended the pertinent law that was the
basis of a supreme court decision. a doctrine which has been followed for years, no matter how
sound it may be, if found to be contrary to law, must be abandoned “ becouse the principle of stare
decisis does not and should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law.

Example

Prior to the amendments of the prisidential decree no. 1866,( CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL
POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES" ) when
homecide or murder was committed with
the use of an unlicensed firearms, such use of such firearm was considerd as an aggrevating
circumstances. After amendments of the law, the supreme court had no choice but to violation of the
presidential decree no. 1866 is now an offence distinct from murder.

THE SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS

CASE

DE MESA v. PEPSI COLA PRODUCTS PHILIPPINES

467 SCRA 433 (2005)

Quisimbing, J. / alo

SUBJECT MATTER: Reasoning by Analogy > Stare Decisis

CASE SUMMARY:

Petitioners sued Pepsi Cola for specific performance and damages resulting from the latter’s refusal to honor and pay the

former for “winning” the Number Fever Draw. Respondent claimed that there was a mistake in the announcement of the

winning number. Prior to the filing of the present case, similar cases (Mendoza and Rodrigo cases) had been already filed

and was later on decided during the pendency of the present case. The Mendoza and Rodrigo cases were dismissed by the

RTC and CA for lack of merit. Similarly, the RTC dismissed the present case based on the principle of stare decisis.

However, petitioners appealed, saying that stare decisis does not apply to the present case because of the lack of identity

between parties. The SC disagreed, holding that stare decisis applies and there was nothing left to be argued. Petition

denied.

DOCTRINES:

v When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle

and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis simply means that for the

sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially

the same, even though the parties may be different.

FACTS:

v Petitioners are holders of soft drink bottle caps bearing the number “349,” allegedly a winning combination in a

contest sponsored by respondents Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (PCPPI) and PEPSICO, Inc. (PI).

v Respondent PCPPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the production, bottling, and distribution of carbonated

drinks, while respondent PI is a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines and is the major

stockholder of PCPPI.

v D.G. Consultores, a Mexican consulting firm that handled similar promotions in other countries, was tasked to

randomly preselect the winning numbers and send to respondents a list of the 60 winning numbers with their

corresponding security codes. The process of selecting the winning numbers was implemented with the approval of

the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).

v On May 25, 1992, respondents announced “349” as the winning number for the May 26 draw. Later the same night,

Quintin Gomez, Jr., then PCPPI’s Marketing Services Manager called DTI Director Madarang informing her that

due to some security code problems a mistake had been made in the announcement of number “349” as the winning

number.

v Numerous holders of the supposedly winning “349” crowns were not honored and paid by respondents, which led

these rejected crown holders to file separate complaints for specific performance and damages.

v In the Mendoza case, the RTC dismissed the complaint filed against herein respondents for specific performance and

damages in connection with the Number Fever fiasco. 9 Mendoza appealed to the Court of Appeals, in CAG.R. CV

No. 53860, which was dismissed for lack of merit.

v In the Rodrigo case, the RTC likewise dismissed the complaint against herein respondents for specific performance

and damages arising from the said promotion.

v Prior to the resolution of the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, herein petitioners filed with the RTC, on December 11,

2000, a motion for leave 16 to (1) adopt the previous testimonial and documentary evidence in the Mendoza and

Rodrigo cases; or (2) archive the case until final resolution of the said two cases, which were then pending with the
Court of Appeals. The RTC granted the said motion on January 8, 2001 and the case was accordingly archived.

v The Rodrigo case became final and executory on February 5, 2002 in view of our denial of therein petitioners’

petition for review on certiorari and motion for reconsideration.

v Hence, on February 20, 2002, herein respondents filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss the complaints filed by

petitioners herein invoking the principle of stare decisis. The RTC, in its assailed Order, granted the motion to

dismiss.

v Petitioners contend that res judicata does not apply as there is no identity of parties to begin with. Moreover, they

argue that stare decisis is not a hard and fast rule.

v Respondents counter that the RTC correctly dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of res judicata.

Respondents contend that, like the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases, the civil cases filed by petitioners arose from the

conduct of respondents’ “Number Fever” promotion.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the present case is barred by this Court’s ruling in the Mendoza and Rodrigo cases (YES)

HOLDING:

1. YES. The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere 22 is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the

Philippines. It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already established in a final decision

of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The

doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed

settled and closed to further argument.

In the instant case, the legal rights and relations of the parties, the facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the

issues, and the evidence are exactly the same as those in the decided cases of Mendoza and Rodrigo, supra. Hence,

nothing is left to be argued .

the court ruled that while the parties involved in the case are different, the court observed that the
legal rights and relation of the parties, the fact, the applicable laws, the causes of action, issues, and
the evidence are exactly the same in the three cases when it dismissed the third complaint on the
basis of its previous dismissal of two complains involving the same issues, the coust was already
bound by the finality of the said judgments.

In the case of Villena v. Spouses Chavez defined the rule of stare decisis as that wherein a conclusion
reached in one case should be applied to those that follws if the fact are substantially the saaame,
even though the parties may be differnt.

Villena

vs

Spouses Chavez

G.R. No. 148126. November 10, 2003

Facts:

This is a petitioned case that was already decided by the Court of Appeals (CA), this case was said to be stare decisis which mean”…that
a judgment reached in one case should be applied to successive ones in which the facts are substantially identical, even though the
parties may be different. Like cases ought to be decided alike.”
According to the facts of the CA the respondents owned four parcels of land subdivided into several blocks. By mere permission of the
respondents the petitioners have occupied and erected their homes, the respondent allowed it but they should, in consideration pay in
certain amount as equity

The petitioners failed to pay the equity from the respondent so the respondent in return wrote them a letter that they need to vacate
the premises in a span of 30 days, but in regards to that the petioners refused to vacate and remove their houses.

The petitioners said that the respondent does not have power to institute such orders from the conflicted properties because the
equities that they must pay is in accordance of National Home Mortgage Finance Corp.(NHMFC) They also claim that they paid already
the said equity however they were not given any receipts and copy of their contract

The petitioners also claim that they are qualified beneficiaries under the RA no. 7279 known as the Urban Development and Housing Act
and adding that they were builder of good faith

CA ruled that the petitioners entered with an agreement of equity with the respondent , so in return they must pay amortization or
they will face eviction.

Issue:

Whether or not, the decision of the CA needed to be redefine by the SC.

Rulling:

It is ruled that in the findings they the petitioners were in binding contract with the respondent in regarding with paying their equity
and by not paying it they has lost their right to occupy.

The CA rulling in this case is informative and straight to the point. The petition to review was granted, the decision of the CA was
overturned and the decision of the RTC and MTC was reinstated

The supreme court held that the case at bar was similar to a case previously settled by the court of
appeals. In both cases, there was a exixting agreement that determined the nature of the parties
relationship. Thus the supreme court rules that the proper action was not unlawful detainer but
rescission of contract or specific performance. The court declared that the earlier ruling should be
applied to the instant case, by way of stare decises. Stare decisis is entitled to respect becouse
stability in jurisprudence is desirable.

RES JUDICATA

Res judicata literally means “ a matter adjudged: a thing judicially acted upon or decided : a
thing or matter settled by judgement “ the doctrine establishes the rule that an existing final
judgenent or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the right of the parties or
their privies in all other action or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.

The doctrine of res judicata is implicated when there is an attemp to litigate issue anew
despite the fact that these have already been settled in a case involving the same parties.

Material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were
there admitted or judicially determined and conclusively settled by judgement
rendered therein.. such facts or question become res judecataand may not
again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their
privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action,
whether the subsequent action involves the same or a different form of
proceeding, or whether the second action is upon the same or a different couse
of action subject matter, claim or demand, as the earlier action. In such cases, it
is also immaterial that the two action are based on differnt grouds, or tried on
different theories, or instituted for differnt purposes, and seek differnt relief.
The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiam of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and
founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. A contrary doctrine would
subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gartification of
the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and
happiness.

Requisites for the res judicata to be apply

1) The former judgement or order must be final:

2) The judgement or order must be on the merits,
3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties , and
4) There must be between the first and the second actions identity of parties, of subject matter
and of couse of action.

Requisite is sometimes called elements of res judicata

1. Identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interst in both actions
2. Identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts:
3. The identity in the two particulars in such that any judgement which may be rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration

Note:

Res judicata is only applies to judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of
administrative power, it also limited the latter to proceeding purely administrative in nature. When
the administrative proceedings take on an adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata certainly
applies. In certain cases , res judicata can be disregarded by the court if its rigid application would
involve the sacrifies of justice to technicality

RES JUDICATA VS. LITIS PENDENTIA

Res judicata is defferent from Litis pendentia is a ground for the dismissal of a civil action which arises
where two actions are pending for the dismissal of civil action which arises where two actions are
pending between the same parties for the same couse of action, so that one of them becomes
unnecessary and vaxatious. It exist in the two actions; substancial identity in the causes of action ad in
the reliefs sought by the parties ; and identity between the two actions should be such that the
judgement that may be renderd in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in other.

RES JUDICATA VS. STARE DECISES

Res judicata is different from stare decises. The focal poin of res judicata is for the judgement. The
focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine of created. The principle states that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different . thus where the same questions
relating to the same event have been bput forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a conpetent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-
litigate the same issue.