ALTAVAS vs CA (extension of time granted for the filing of the record on

appeal does not also carry with it an extension for the filing of the notice of
appeal and appeal bond)

FACTS: CFI Capiz handed down a decision in Cadastral Case covering a lot of
the Capiz Cadastre. Petitioner against whom said decision was rendered
received a copy thereof on October 11, 1957. Twenty-five (25) days
thereafter, or on November 5 of the same year, petitioner filed MR and MNT,
praying that the decision be set aside for it is contrary to law and is not
supported by sufficient evidence. Motion was denied by the trial court in an
order dated January 11, 1958, notice of which was received by petitioner on
January 15. On January 13, she filed a "Petition Ex Parte for Extension of
Time to Perfect The Appeal." The following day, the trial court granted thirty
(30) days from that day, January 14, within which petitioner may submit her
record on appeal.

On February 1, 1958, twelve (12) days after January 20 when the original
reglementary period to appeal had expired, petitioner filed notice of appeal
and appeal bond, and on February 8, that is, five days before the expiration
of the thirty days extension, petitioner filed against the approval of the
record on appeal, the trial court, on March 1, 1958, dismissed the appeal on
the ground that the appeal bond and the notice of appeal were filed out of
time. Motion to reconsider that order of dismissal had been denied.
Whereupon, the petitioner filed with the CA an action for mandamus praying
that CFI be ordered to approve, certify and transmit to it the record on
appeal. Failing to obtain such relief from the appeals court, the petitioner
has brought the case to us for review. After going over the record, we are
persuaded that the petitioner has not made out a good case for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus. library

There is no question that the petitioner was given an additional thirty (30)
days within which to submit her record on appeal.

Petitioner contends that the order above-quoted extended also the filing of
the notice of appeal and the appeal bond. Petitioner's main argument is that
her petition dated January 13, 1958 prayed for an extension of time not
merely to submit the record on appeal but to perfect her appeal, which
includes the filing of the notice of appeal and appeal bond. The contention is
devoid of merit. The language used in the order is plain and unequivocal. It
cannot be construed in the manner suggested by petitioner. If the trial court
really intended to extend also the period for the filing of the notice of appeal
and appeal bond, it could have easily stated so in its order, or simply, the
order would have granted "an additional 30 days to perfect the appeal." In
fact, the said court clearly explained the meaning of its order of extension as
being limited to the filing of the record on appeal when on March 1, 1958, it
issued an order dismissing the appeal for the untimely filing of the notice of
appeal and appeal bond. Presumably, the reason of the trial court in
granting an extension only for the filing of the record on appeal is that the
petition for extension was predicated solely on the ground "that the record of
the case is very voluminous and the Record on Appeal will probably consist
of 50 typewritten pages more or less so that it would need much time to
prepare, finish and file the Record on Appeal and furthermore due to
pressure of work her counsel cannot attend exclusively in the preparation of
said Record on Appeal." Rules of court prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.

IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON

A. DATUMANONG

FACTS: Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, District Engineer of Mountain

Province, DPWH CAR, filed a petition to cite the former Secretary
Datumanong DPWH in contempt of court. OMB Task Force on Public Works
and Highways filed with OMB an administrative complaint for dishonesty,
falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the
service against petitioner Tel-Equen and several others, relative to the
anomalous payment of P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge components owned
by the government. The Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman found respondents guilty of dishonesty, falsification of
public documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and ordered their dismissal from the service with accessory
penalties. MR denied, 3 petitions were filed before this Court which were
consolidated and referred to CA in light of the ruling in Fabian v.
Desierto where appeals from decisions of the OMB in administrative cases
should be referred to the appellate court under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.

CA affirmed with modification the decision of the Admin Adjudication Bureau

of OMB finding petitioner and two co-accused guilty as charged and
dismissed them from the service while the other two respondents were
exonerated from administrative liability for lack of evidence. Petitioner,
together with his two co-accused, appealed CA. Datumanong issued the
assailed MO.

Petitioner contends that in issuing the MO despite knowledge of the

pendency of G.R. No. 144694, Datumanong committed a contumacious act,
a gross and blatant display of abuse of discretion and an unlawful
interference with the proceedings before the Court. Petition lacks merit.

The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him
accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a
means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the
proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from callous
misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply
with court orders. This contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must
be exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end
in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of
the court, not for retaliation or vindication.

RULING: The issuance of MO by Secretary Datumanong was not a

contumacious conduct tending, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness,
bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is not so in the
case at bar. If it were otherwise, petitioner should have been dismissed
immediately after the Administrative Adjudication Bureau OMB. It was only
after CA affirming the dismissal that Secretary Datumanong issued the
memorandum and after ascertaining that no injunction or restraining order
was issued by the Court.

At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or a result of

confusion considering the different rules regarding execution of decisions
pending appeal.

Decisions of the CSC under the Administrative Code of 1987 are

immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent
laws under which the decisions were rendered mandate them to be
so.14 Thus, "where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of
the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final and executory pending appeal,
the law expressly so provides." 15 Otherwise, execution of decisions takes
place only when they become final and executory, like decisions rendered by
OMB. Findings of fact of OMB when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's salary shall
be final and unappealable. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of OMB may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."

It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed upon
petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one year, is not among those
listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. Section 27
states that all provisionary orders of OMB are immediately effective and
executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office
imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more
than one month's salary is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim
"inclusio[n] unius est exclusio alterius" finds application. The express
mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The
clear import of these statements taken together is that all other
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties
that are not enumerated in the said Section 27 are not final,
unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed,
such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate
implementation of the decision. This finds support in the Rules of
Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that "(I)n all other
cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless MR or petition
for certiorari shall have been filed by him as prescribed in Sec 27 of RA
6770." A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law.
Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public
censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary
shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the respondent therein
has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from
receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these
other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after
the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or,
an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate
tribunal becomes final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly
categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in respect to which
execution shall issue as a matter of right. In other words, the fact that
the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its
decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments
as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.

Petitioner was charged administratively before the OMB. Accordingly, the

provisions of the Ombudsman Act and its Rules of Procedure should apply in
his case. Secretary Datumanong cannot be held in contempt of court for
issuing the MO in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in issuing it.

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is

absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the
decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed to CA on a verified Petition for
Review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case
the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases

shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced
and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a
ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are
deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the
retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of
any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise
therefrom.

In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he
is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover,
in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an
office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
 PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC., v. SPOUSES GEORGE M. DAI

Spouses George and Divina Dai, (Spouses Dai) obtained a loan from PCI Leasing and
Finance, Inc., (PCI) for the sum of P3,352,892 payable in monthly installments of
P152,265 for the financing of a vessel-fishing boat. To secure the payment of the loan,
Spouses Dai executed a chattel mortgage over the vessel in favor of PCI Leasing.

Both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage provided that, in case of failure to
pay the installments or interest due thereon, the entire amount remaining unpaid shall
immediately become due and payable. Spouses Dai failed to pay the second and
third installments. This prompted PCI a complaint of replevin before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). In their Answer, Spouses Dai claimed that, the possession of the vessel
including its registration certificate had been surrendered to PCI before the filing of the
complaint. Spouses Dai thus prayed for the award of damages and attorney‘s fees by way
of Counterclaim.

The RTC of Cebu resolved both issues but did not award any damages for both parties.
No appeal was filed by either parties making the decision final and executory. After
more than a year, PCI filed another complaint for deficiency judgement and/or
collection of sum of money before the Cebu RTC. In its complaint PCI alleged that there
is still a deficiency of P961,000.00 as of January of 1995 and prayed for other damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PCI LEASING INC. can still file a claim for deficiency of payment
after a previous decision of the same facts and evidence has already been decided

HELD:

For res jusdicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order
must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4)
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and cause of action.

Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional

relief. It may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of
personal chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during the
pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily possessory in
nature and generally determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin is
so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and partly in personam — in
rem insofar as the recovery of specific property is concerned, and in personam as
regards to damages involved. As an “action in rem,” the gist of the replevin action is the
right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal property by reason of his
being the owner or of his having a special interest therein.

PCI after realizing the amount of P2,000,000.00 from the proceeds of the foreclosure
sale, could have prayed for a deficiency judgment in the same action as in fact it pursued
its claim for attorney’s fees and liquidated damages therein, which claim was however,
dismissed by the trial court. PCI, however, did not press any demand for such deficiency
judgment in said case and instead filed this present suit for deficiency judgment long
after the trial court rendered judgment in the earlier case. It cannot, however, evade the
application of res judicata by varying the form of its action herein since the causes
of action in the first case and in the present suit are clearly identical.
AURORA B. GO, Petitioner, vs. ELMER SUNBANUN,* GEORGIE S.
TAN, DORIS SUNBANUN and RICHARD SUNBANUN, Respondents.

FACTS: Respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora, her husband Yiu
Wai Sang, and Yiu-Go Employment Agency for breach of warranty in the fire
insurance policies that the respondents made involving the property rented by
petitioner.

The RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay
moral damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.

Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration on the last day to file her appeal. The
court in its April 27, 2004 Order denied said motion.

Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial with a day left to file her appeal.
Explaining that Aurora has been busy campaigning for the local elections as she
was running for the position of town mayor in Calubian, Leyte and that he and
his client have yet to discuss the pros and cons of appealing the case, Atty. Ycong
sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by filing an extension of 15 days
to file Aurora’s notice of appeal. The RTC denied the notice of appeal thereafter
filed.

For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition, the Court of

Appeals (CA) dismissed the certiorari petition filed by petitioner. The CA
dismissed the petition for being procedurally flawed, viz: the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is signed by only one
petitioner without a Special Power of Attorney/Secretary’s Certificate authorizing
her to represent the two (2) other petitioners; the Affidavit of Service shows that
respondents were personally served copies of the petition but lacks explanation
why service of the petition with this Court was not done personally; counsel for
petitioners failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers; certified true copies of
the assailed decision dated January 26, 2004 attached to the petition is a mere
photocopy of a certified true copy; the copies of pleadings and other relevant
documents referred to in the petition which would support the allegations therein
are not attached.

ISSUE: May the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA be

relaxed in the interest of justice?

When a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of litigants for the furtherance of the
administration of justice, it shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as
equity delights in equality.

For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed
the certiorari petition filed by herein petitioner Aurora Go (Aurora), prompting her to file before us this
petition for review on certiorari. Aurora now calls for liberality in the application of the procedural
rules in the hope that she would eventually be given a chance to be heard by the CA after the trial
court denied her prayer for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to
regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution.

JAIME TAN, JR., Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in question
in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. the same contracting parties entered
into another agreement whereunder Tan given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the
property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.

Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of
instrument. Alleged that, while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of
absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.

It appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed cases cannot be
promptly enforced because of undue administrative delay in the remand of the records to the court of
origin, aggravated at times by misplacement or misdelivery of said records. The Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court has drafted proposals including a provision which can
remedy the procedural impasse created by said contingencies.

Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the revised rules on Civil Procedure, and to provide a
solution to the aforestated problems, the Court Resolved to approve and promulgate the following
section thereof on execution of judgments, amending Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon expiration of the
period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may forthwith be applied for
in the lower court from which the action originated, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting
therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or the final order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

"1. The term 'final order' is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on the issue of
appealability or on the issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an order is "final" if it disposes
of the action, as distinguished from an interlocutory order which leaves something to be done in the
trial court with respect to the merits of the case. For purposes of binding effect or whether it can be
subject of execution, an order is 'final' or executory after the lapse of the reglementary period to
appeal and no appeal has been perfected.

However, by force of extended usage the phrase 'final and executory judgment' is sometimes used
and tolerated, although the use of 'executory' alone would suffice.

The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits certain
exceptions. The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending
proceedings would impair vested rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so would not be feasible or would
work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending actions if to do so would
involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts."

CHIA VS REPUBLIC

FACTS: Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he
arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina,
with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, as amended. TC granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The
State, however, through OSG, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed
to state all his former place of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4)
has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.4

Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Emphasis added).

Petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7,
C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document
which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits
that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate
of Residence containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such
publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication
effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give
investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the
applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in
any community where he may have lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This
provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's
argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On
this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. 1âw phi 1.nêt

SASAN vs NLRC
FACTS:

Sasan et al are employed by Helpmate, Inc (HI), a janitorial and messengerial service
provider, and assigned to E PCI Bank in Gorordo Branch, Cebu City. Their services were
cut off when EPCI decided to bid out the janitorial and messengerial jobs to two other
service providers. Sasan et al then filed an action for illegal dismissal alleging that they
are regular employees of PCI, and HI has no authority to dismiss them.

After submission of legal positions to the Labor Arbiter, it concluded that HI is engaged
in labor on contracting as it operates without substantial capital as required by the
Labor Code, declaring PCI as the principal employer and awarding money claims to the
employees for their illegal dismissal.

PCI and Hi appealed the LA's decision to the NLRC and submitted for the first time
photocopy of documents proving that they have sufficient capital to operate as an
independent contractor. The NLRC modified the LA's decision taking into consideration
the documentary evidence submitted by HI.

On charges of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that the complaint for illegal dismissal
was prematurely filed, further, deleted the award of backwages and separation pay, but
affirmed the award of 13th month pay and attorneys' fee.

The petitioners appeal to CA, which affirmed the NLRC's decision. Further, appealed to
the SC, hence, this petition.

Sasan et al are employed by Helpmate, Inc (HI), a janitorial and messengerial service
provider, and assigned to E PCI Bank in Gorordo Branch, Cebu City. Their services were
cut off when EPCI decided to bid out the janitorial and messengerial jobs to two other
service providers. Sasan et al then filed an action for illegal dismissal alleging that they
are regular employees of PCI, and HI has no authority to dismiss them.

After submission of legal positions to the Labor Arbiter, it concluded that HI is engaged
in labor on contracting as it operates without substantial capital as required by the
Labor Code, declaring PCI as the principal employer and awarding money claims to the
employees for their illegal dismissal.

PCI and Hi appealed the LA's decision to the NLRC and submitted for the first time
photocopy of documents proving that they have sufficient capital to operate as an
independent contractor. The NLRC modified the LA's decision taking into consideration
the documentary evidence submitted by HI.

On charges of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that the complaint for illegal dismissal
was prematurely filed, further, deleted the award of backwages and separation pay, but
affirmed the award of 13th month pay and attorneys' fee.

The petitioners appeal to CA, which affirmed the NLRC's decision. Further, appealed to
the SC, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the NLRC is allowed to received evidence and give merit with the same
introduced for the first time during appeal?

HELD:

The submission of new evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its new Rules of
Procedure. Rules of evidence prevailing in in courts of law or equity are not controlling
in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice.

The court further ruled that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the
termination of the Contract of Service between HI and EPCI , the petitioners cannot
insist to continue work for the latter. Their pull-out from EPCI did not constitute illegal
dismissal.

WON the NLRC is allowed to received evidence and give merit with the same introduced
for the first time during appeal?

The submission of new evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its new Rules of
Procedure. Rules of evidence prevailing in in courts of law or equity are not controlling
in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice.

The court further ruled that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the
termination of the Contract of Service between HI and EPCI , the petitioners cannot
insist to continue work for the latter. Their pull-out from EPCI did not constitute illegal
dismissal.

MENDOZA
Private complainants accused Alingasa of selling the confirmation certificates, supposed to be issued by the
LTO free of charge. This scheme allegedly existed upon Mendoza’s assumption in office as Regional Director
of LTO Cebu.
This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is not an absolute one. Despite the respect given to
administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on
record and reverse the administrative agency’s findings if not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, when
the findings of fact by the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies (like the Office of the
Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman) are not adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be
binding upon the courts.14Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay
applicability of the rule on exclusion of hearsay evidence. The first class, i.e., the fact that the statement
was made, is not covered by the hearsay rule, while the second class, i.e., the truth of the facts asserted in
the statement, is covered by the hearsay rule.