2013 / Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Concerns of AALCO Member States 17

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Concerns of

AALCO Member States: An Overview
Hassan Soleimani

Abstract

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the multilateral treaty regulating the

international trade in conventional arms, was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly on April 2, 2013. The AALCO Member
States, concerned as they were with the unaccountable sale of weapons
that kill thousands of people every year, took an active part in the
process of negotiation leading up to the adoption of the international
arms trade treaty. Towards this objective they worked in tandem with
the rest of the international community in their pursuit to produce a
draft treaty which could be called effective, balanced and
comprehensive. However, far from being a balanced draft, the Arms
Trade Treaty lacked consensus among the delegations- the minimum to
foster a consciousness among individual member states to undertake
their responsibilities under the Treaty.
This article seeks to review different aspects of the conclusion of the
ATT, referring to the negotiations of the draft leading up to the
adoption of ATT. It endeavors to introduce the adopted Arms Trade
Treaty, and refers to the arguments and concerns of the AALCO
members’ states during the course of negotiation and after their vote in
General Assembly. Finally, the conclusion would highlight the key
findings of the Article.

1. Introduction
Arms control has been a subject of constant concern to the AALCO
member states. So, they vigorously contributed in the process of
negotiation of treaties on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. With
no history of available literature on trade in conventional weapon, the
AALCO members’ states with an objective to regulate the global arms trade
actively participated in the process of negotiation of an international arms


Dr. Hassan Soleimani, Deputy Secretary-General, AALCO and Assistant Professor of
International Law at Damghan Islamic Azad University, Islamic Republic of Iran. The
views expressed in this article are personal and do not represent the Organization that
he works for. He can be contacted at: hsoliemani @hotmail.com.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2385436

18 AALCO Journal of International Law / Vol. 2, Issue 1

trade treaty. They made serious efforts to produce a comprehensive and

balanced draft treaty during the course of negotiation from 2007 and in
both July 2012 Diplomatic Conference and the second United Nations
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty which was held in New York from 18
to 28 March 2013.

The majority of the AALCO members’ states believed that the Arms
Trade Treaty should be effective, balanced and comprehensive with highest
standards. They emphasized that the draft treaty should not be riddled
with loopholes and leaving millions of people at the mercy of irresponsible
arms deals. Therefore, finally the ATT was adopted through passing a
resolution in the UN General Assembly on 2ndApril 2013 by negative and
abstaining votes of twenty six countries1of which sixteen of them were
AALCO members’ states.2
In the light of the foregoing situation, this article would try to elaborate
different aspects of the Arms Trade Treaty. Primarily reference would be
made to the historical background of the negotiation of the draft ATT. Part
III, would endeavor to introduce the adopted Arms Trade Treaty. Part IV
would refer to the arguments/concerns of the AALCO members’ states as
expressed during the course of negotiation and at the time of their voting
in the General Assembly. Finally, the conclusion would highlight the key
findings of the Article.

2. Background of ATT
There has been a history of international efforts to regulate global trade
in nuclear, chemical and biological arms. The process started decades ago.
However, it did not result in the conclusion of an international code of
conduct for the trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, when the

1 The non AALCO members States who gave Abstain vote to the Resolution adopted the
Arms Trade Treaty was Angola, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Fiji, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Nicaragua, Russian Federation and Swaziland. See, Sixty-
seventh General Assembly Plenary http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/
ga11354.doc.htm (last visited May 29, 2013.
2 The AALCO member States which abstained from voting were: Bahrain, China, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Kuwait Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and
Yemen, and negative votes, Syria, North Korea and Iran. See, Sixty-seventh General
Assembly Plenary http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/ga11354.doc.htm (last
visited July 29, 2013).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2385436

2013 / Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Concerns of AALCO Member States 19

worldwide trade in conventional arms is worth billions of dollars every

year,3bustled to the adoption of a non-legally binding program of action at
the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in 2001.4
In 2006 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 61/89 under the
title of “Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: establishing common
international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional
arms”.5 The Resolution requested the UN Secretary General “to seek the
views of Member States on the feasibility, scope and draft parameters for a
comprehensive, legally binding instrument establishing common
international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional
arms, and to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its
sixty-second session”.6
The Resolution also requested the Secretary-General to appoint a
group of governmental experts based on equitable geographical
distribution which would provide a report on “the feasibility, scope and
draft parameters for a comprehensive, legally binding instrument
establishing common international standards for the import, export and
transfer of conventional arms”,7 and submit their report to General
Assembly in 2008 for consideration at its sixty-third session.

Accordingly, on 28 September 2007, the UN Secretary General

appointed a Group of Governmental Experts from twenty eight countries. 8

3 Academy Briefing No. 2 “The Draft Arms Trade Treaty” Geneva Academy of
International Humanitarian Law and Human, October 2012, available at:
http://www.geneva-academy.ch/academy-publications/academy-briefings
4 See the Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects New York, 9-20 July 2001. Available at
http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/N0150720.pdf (Last visited May 29,
2013).
5 The UN General Assembly Resolution 61/89 adopted in 2006. Available at
http://www.unrcpd.org.np/pdf/2006%20UN%20General%20Assembly%20Resolutio
n.pdf (last visited May 29, 2013. The United States voted against this Resolution.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 The member of the expert group were from Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa,
Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States.
20 AALCO Journal of International Law / Vol. 2, Issue 1

The expert group had six sessions and in January 2010, the General
Assembly of the United Nations decided by a resolution9 to convene a
United Nation Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in 2012 “to elaborate
a legally binding instrument on” the transfer of conventional arms.
However, the Diplomatic Conference of July 2012 on the ATT failed to
reach an agreement, for the reason that many participating countries
found the draft text weak, devious, and laden with dangerous loopholes,
which could fundamentally undermine its aims and only legitimize existing
practices of illicit arms deals.
The second and final Diplomatic Conference on the ATT, which was
held in March 2013, was an opportunity for UN members to plug the
loopholes and weaknesses of the ATT’s text. However, the differences
among the participating delegations in the conference did not allow them
to reach a consensus.10 Consequently, the ATT was adopted by putting it to
vote in the General Assembly on 2 April 2013.11

3. The Arms Trade Treaty

The Arms Trade Treaty includes a Preamble and 28 articles. Its
Preamble recapitulates the purposes and principles and some articles of
the Charter of the United Nations. It also mentions some principles of
international law including: principle of self-defense, the settlement of
international disputes, refraining in their international relations from the
threat or use of force, Non-intervention, and respect for international
humanitarian law.12Throughout the course of negotiation, the treaty’s
preamble was met with severe criticism for not being comprehensive and
reflective of their demands.
Establishing highest possible international standards for regulating the
international trade in conventional arms, and prevent and eradicate the

9 The UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/64/48 adopted in 2010. Available at

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/48 (last visited May
30, 2013).
10 For more information and the documents of the Diplomatic Conference on the ATT in
March 2013, see http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/documents/(last visited May
30, 2013).
11 For more information in this regard see http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/(last
visited May 30, 2013).
12 See the Preamble of the Arms Trade Treaty.
2013 / Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Concerns of AALCO Member States 21

illicit trade in conventional arms is the object of the Treaty which is

reflected in its article1. ATT shall apply to all conventional arms including
battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, Large-caliber artillery systems,
combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile
launchers, and small arms and light weapons.13 The treaty obliges its
member states to establish and maintain a national control system to
regulate the export of arms, ammunition launched or delivered by the
conventional arms14 and export of parts and components where the export
is in a form that provides the capability to assemble the conventional
arms.15
ATT prohibits transfer of any conventional arms covered under its
provisions where the transfer of those arms would violate its obligations
under the United Nations Security Council measure or may violate its
obligations under international agreements to which it is a party, or where
it has information that the arms or items would be used for genocide,
crimes against humanity, serious breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 or for attacks against civilians.16 One of the most serious crimes is the
crime of aggression, which despite the requests of many delegations during
the course of negotiation is not reflected in this article.
Articles 7 and 8 of the ATT relate to the right and obligation of the
exporter and importer arms states. Under article 7, the exporting State has
right to- prior to the authorization of the export of conventional arms-
assess the bearing that the conventional arms have on peace and security,
and to ascertain that they are not to be used in contravention of
international humanitarian law, international human rights law, or the
international arrangements on terrorism and transnational organized
crimes- to which it is a Party. Under this article power has been given to
the exporting State to evaluate the impact of trading of arms on
international humanitarian law, international human rights law and other
international conventions. Although, the exporting State being a political
entity, can at any time, motivated by political reasons, could deny and thus

13 See Article 2 of the ATT.

14 See Article 3, ibid.
15 See Article 4, ibid.
16 See Article 6, ibid.
22 AALCO Journal of International Law / Vol. 2, Issue 1

violate certain rights of the importing State, such as the right to acquire
arms for self-defense.

Under article 9, the States which are parties to the treaty have an
obligation to regulate the transit or trans-shipment under their jurisdiction
of conventional arms according to the relevant international law. They also
have obligation to regulate under their national laws trade of arms taking
place under their jurisdiction for conventional arms.17 The states party to
the treaty intricate in the transfer of conventional arms also have
obligation to take the measure to prevent their diversion.18They should also
maintain national records of their issuance of export authorizations and
report annually authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional
arms to the Secretariat.19
Matters of enforcement, international cooperation, international
assistance, conference of states parties, secretariat, dispute settlement,
amendment, signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession,
entry into force, provisional application, duration and withdrawal,
reservations, relationship with other international agreements and
depositary authentic texts are reflected in articles 14 to 28 of the treaty.

4. The Concerns of AALCO Member States

During the course of negotiations at the first and second UN
Diplomatic Conference on the ATT in 2012 and 2013, and at the meeting of
the General Assembly for adoption of the treaty on 2 April 2013, the
AALCO Members States echoed their concerns regarding the loopholes and
weaknesses of the ATT’s text. Although the crime of aggression has been
forbidden under international law, the ATT’s text has no explicit mention
of the prohibition of sale of arms, to the countries who commit aggression.
On this, one of the AALCO Member States submitted that contrary to one
of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations to defeat the acts of
aggression, “the current draft ignores the legitimate demand by a large
number of States to prohibit the transfer of arms to those who commit
aggression.” The delegation also raised its doubts on “reduction of human

17 See Article 10, ibid,

18 See article 11, ibid.
19 See Article 12 and 13.
2013 / Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Concerns of AALCO Member States 23

suffering by turning a blind eye to the crime of aggression that may cost the
lives of thousands of innocent people?”20One Arab AALCO member state,
speaking on behalf of the Arab Group in the conference, lamented that
Arab demands had not been reflected in the text, astounded by the fact that
‘foreign occupation’ was not mentioned in the principle section of the
treaty.21
The AALCO Member States also expressed concerns that ATT’s text had
overlooked the right of self-determination, which is enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”),22 and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).23 While the both ICCPR and the
ICESCR, which are the cornerstones of the modern international human
rights regime, refer to Self-Determination as a human right in their
common Article 1, this principle was completely ignored in the ATT’s text.
They were also concerned regarding non-consideration of the request and
demands of many States for the inclusion of the inherent right of States of
self-defense-including the right to acquire conventional weapons to defend
against aggression and preserve their territorial integrity.24
Another important criticism of the AALCO Member States was
imposition of unequal obligations on the exporting States and the
importing States. They expressed their concerns that while the rights of
arms exporting States is completely preserved in the ATT, the right of
importing States to acquire and import arms for their security has been
ignored, and that these states run the risk of being subjected to
discretionary judgment and subjective assessment by the exporting States.
In this regard one of the AALCO Member States said that we “desire for the
treaty to impose a fair balance of responsibilities on exporting and
importing states”. The delegation also said that we “cannot accept that the
Treaty be used as an instrument in the hands of exporting states to take

20 See Islamic Republic of Iran Statement.

21 See Kuwait Statement on behalf of the Arab Group States.
22 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966,
993 UNTS 3 (entered into force on 3 January 1976).
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171
(entered into force on 23 March 1976).
24 See Islamic Republic of Iran Statement.
24 AALCO Journal of International Law / Vol. 2, Issue 1

unilateral force majeure measures against importing states parties without

consequences.”25 Some of the AALCO member-states, who voted in favour
of the treaty in General Assembly, also voiced their concerns over the
unequal obligations in the treaty on arms exporters and importers states.26

5. Conclusion

The conclusion of the Arms Trade Treaty is an important step; it is the

first international treaty to regulate the trade in Small Arms. However, the
manner in which it has been adopted, which was unlike some of the
previous arms conventions, posed some serious questions. The resolution
61/89 which was adopted in 2006 by UN General Assembly provided a
golden opportunity for the international community to negotiate and adopt
a comprehensive, legally binding instrument which is conscious in
establishing common international standards for the import, export and
transfer of conventional arms. Nevertheless, the treaty was adopted by
putting it to a vote in the General Assembly because of lack of consensus
among the delegations. Many AALCO member states reckon that the draft
text of treaty which was a result of the negotiations is full of serious
weaknesses and loopholes that would fundamentally undermine its aims
and only legalize existing practices of irresponsible arms dealer. They also
believed that their demands have not been reflected in treaty, and that in
the current form, the treaty does not provide enough responsibility and
limits in the international arms transfers.

25 See India's Explanation of Vote given by Ambassador Sujata Mehta, Permanent Representative of India
to the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva during the UNGA Session on the Arms Trade Treaty,
available at: http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/21502/ Indias+
Explanation+of+Vote+by+Ambassador+Sujata+ Mehta+Permanent+Representative+
of+ India+to+the+Conference+of+Disarmament+in+Geneva+during+ the+ UNGA+
Session+on+the+Arms+Trade+Treaty/.(last visited July 30, 2013).
26 See the Pakistan Statement after voting, available at: http://www.thehindu.com/
news/international/un-passes-historic-arms-trade-treaty/ article4574044.ece (last
visited July 30, 2013).