G.R. No. 200749; G.R. No.

208725
CECILIO ABENION vs PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM

It bears emphasis that an execution pending appeal is deemed an exception to the

general rule, which allows an execution as a matter of right only in any of the following
instances: (a) when the judgment has become final and executory; (b) when the
judgment debtor has renounced or waived his right of appeal; (c) when the period for
appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or (d) when, having been filed,
the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the
court of origin.

In now declaring that the execution pending appeal was unsupported by sufficient
grounds, the Court restates the rule that the trial court's discretion in allowing execution
pending appeal must be strictly construed.105 Its grant must be firmly grounded on the
existence of "good reasons," which consist of compelling circumstances that justify
immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. "The circumstances must be
superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party
secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending
appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and
inequity."106

The sufficiency of "good reasons" depends upon the circumstances of the case and the
parties thereto. Conditions that are personal to one party, for example, may be
insufficient to justify an execution pending appeal that would affect all parties to the
case and the property that is the subject thereof. Thus, in Florendo, et al. v. Paramount
Insurance Corp.,107 the Court ruled that the execution pending appeal, which was
supposedly justified by the old age and life-threatening ailments of merely one of
several parties to the case, was unsupported by special reasons. As the Court
sustained the CA's reversal of the execution, it explained:

The Florendos point out that Rosario is already in her old age and suffers from life
threatening ailments. But the trial court has allowed execution pending· appeal for all of
the Florendos, not just for Rosario whose share in the subject lands had not been
established. No claim is made that the rest of the Florendos are old and ailing.
Consequently, the execution pending appeal was indiscreet and too sweeping. All the
lands could be sold for ₱42 million, the value mentioned in the petition, and distributed
to all the Florendos for their enjoyment with no sufficient assurance that they all will and
can return such sum in case the CA reverses, as it has in fact done, the RTC decision.
Moreover, it is unclear how much of the proceeds of the sale of the lands Rosario
needed for her old age.108

The execution pending appeal, however, could not be justified by conditions that applied
only to a mere few claimants. Jurisprudence precludes an execution pending appeal
that is, as in this case, too sweeping and unfounded by the required urgency and
compelling reasons that can justify it.

G.R. No. 167976 (2010)

FLORENDO vs PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORP.

As such exception, the court’s discretion in allowing it must be strictly construed and
firmly grounded on the existence of good reasons. "Good reasons," it has been held,
consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment
becomes illusory. The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or
damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of the
judgment.20 Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an
instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity.21

The Florendos point out that Rosario is already in her old age and suffers from life
threatening ailments. But the trial court has allowed execution pending appeal for all of
the Florendos, not just for Rosario whose share in the subject lands had not been
established. No claim is made that the rest of the Florendos are old and ailing.
Consequently, the execution pending appeal was indiscreet and too sweeping. All the
lands could be sold for ₱42 million, the value mentioned in the petition, and distributed
to all the Florendos for their enjoyment with no sufficient assurance that they all will and
can return such sum in case the CA reverses, as it has in fact done, the RTC decision.
Moreover, it is unclear how much of the proceeds of the sale of the lands Rosario
needed for her old age.

The RTC also justified the execution pending appeal on respondent Paramount’s
delaying tactics and the possibility that it could become insolvent during the appeal. But
these justifications are purely speculative.

G.R. No. 84979 (1989)

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE vs CA

We cannot, however, sanction the execution pending appeal which was authorized in
this case. The order for advance execution must be struck down for lack of the requisite
good reasons therefor. It is already settled that the mere filing of a bond does not
warrant execution pending appeal. To consider the mere filing of a bond a good reason
would precisely make immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the
rule rather than the exception. 26

G.R. No. 165585 (2013)

GSIS vs Prudential
Good reasons call for the attendance of compelling circumstances warranting
immediate execution for fear that favorable judgment may yield to an empty victory. In
this regard, the Rules do not categorically and strictly define what constitutes "good
reason," and hence, its presence or absence must be determined in view of the peculiar
circumstances of each case. As a guide, jurisprudence dictates that the "good reason"
yardstick imports a superior circumstance that will outweigh injury or damage to the
adverse party.83 Corollarily, the requirement of "good reason" does not necessarily
entail unassailable and flawless basis but at the very least, an invocation thereof must
be premised on solid footing.84

In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, granted PGAI’s motion for execution
pending appeal on the ground that the impending sanctions against it by foreign
underwriters/reinsurers constitute good reasons therefor. It must, however, be observed
that PGAI has not proffered any evidence to substantiate its claim, as it merely
presented bare allegations thereon. It is hornbook doctrine that mere allegations do not
constitute proof. As held in Real v. Belo,85 "it is basic in the rule of evidence that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere
allegations are not evidence."86 Hence, without any sufficient basis to support the
existence of its alleged "good reasons," it cannot be said that the second requisite to
allow an execution pending appeal exists. To reiterate, the requirement of "good
reasons" must be premised on solid footing so as to ensure that the "superior
circumstance" which would impel immediate execution is not merely contrived or based
on speculation. This, however, PGAI failed to demonstrate in the present case. In fine,
the Court therefore holds that the CA’s affirmance of the RTC’s February 14, 2002
Order authorizing execution pending appeal, as well as the February 19, 2002
issuances related thereto, was improper.
G.R. No. L-9775 (1957)
City of Bacolod vs Enriquez

It should also be noted that, in authorizing execution before appeal, the said section 2 of
Rule 39 requires that such execution be allowed only "upon good reasons to be stated
in the special order." This requirement is important and must not be overlooked for, as
Chief Justice Moran says, "if the judgment is executed and, on appeal, the same is
reversed, although there are provisions for restitution, oftentimes damages may arise
which cannot be fully compensated. Accordingly, execution should be granted only
when these considerations are clearly outweighed by superior circumstances
demanding urgency, and the above provision requires a statement of those
circumstances as a security for their existence." (1 Moran on the Rules of Court, 1952
ed., p. 794, citing Aguilos vs. Barrios, et al., 72 Phil. 285.) The respondent Judge states
in his order as a justification for allowing execution that the appeal in this case is
untenable and, inferentially, that it is resorted to only for purposes of delay. But this is
prejudging the appeal now before us, and the assertion that it is intended merely as a
means of delay appears to be deduced only from the belief that the appeal is untenable.
And then there is the consideration that the reinstatement of the respondent policeman
pending resolution of the appeal taken against the judgment in their favor means the
ouster of those now occupying their positions before their right to continue holding the
same has been finally determined in the appeal that is now before this Court. Lastly, if
the respondent policeman are now reinstated and paid their back salaries from city
funds and then the appeal in the main case is decided against them, the city stands to
suffer irreparable injury because it is hardly to be expected that the said policemen shall
be able to make restitution.