REGIME INTEREST VS NATIONAL INTEREST: Implications of the Domestic Ethnic Chinese Votes in the Malaysia-PRC Foreign Policy Decision-making Process Soon Thean Bee Introduction Before establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) ‘on 31 May 1974, Malaysia had maintained a hostile posture towards the PRC for 17 years. Existing studies essentially inspected Malaysia's attitude transformation in ‘bo ways: from the international relations aspect (Zhao 2005; Saravanamuttu 2010), and through a combination of extemal dynamics and domestic factors (Baginda 2002; Baginda 2016; Liow 2009; Kulik 2013). These scholarly analyses implicitly relate Malaysia's transformed posture towards China to Malaysian national interest. Although Abdul Razak Baginda (2002; 2016) mentions that the development of domestic polities certainly impacted the timing of the rapprochement, he does not further elaborate on the extent to which domestic polities influenced national interest in this matter. While this paper does not plan to dismiss the importance of national interest in the making of the Malaysia-PRC relations, it will attempt to cary the weight of the ruling political party's political interest, or regime interest and the national interest in the decision-making process.’ | contend that the ruling political party has positioned their regime interest ahead the national interest in this matter. The Poliheuristic (PH) theory, a two-stage decision-making process, will be applied to explain this claim. "neaime interes refers to the dei ofan panto secre ts owen he wate72 ‘Soon Poliheuristic Theory ‘The Poliheuristic (PH) theory was introduced by Alex Mintz, who argued that domestic polities is “the essence of decision” in foreign policy because decision- makers have to seek the people's approval for their political survival (Mintz and Geva 1997; Mintz 2004). Unlike prevailing theories discussing the foreign policy decision- making process in a linear way, PH theory asserts that the process undergoes two stages. In the first stage, decision-makers follow a non-compensatory principle in ‘order to eradicate alternatives that do not adhere to their political interest (Mintz 1993). Even though the eliminated proposals include options that would maximize the national interest of the state, those proposals will be abolished instantly. In the second stage, decision-makers apply a utilty-like or lexicographic strategy to select the option that will maximize the national interest from the remaining altermatives in the first stage (Mintz and Geva 1997). In short, the process of decision-making involves the act of abolishing and selecting. PH theory also reminds us that the foreign policy decision-making process always occurs in a nonholistic manner. As itis impossible to gather every single piece Of detailed information for evaluation and consideration before a decision is made, decision-makers are forced to make up their minds by comparing the pros and cons of every alternative, or appraising them upon certain criterion. The goal of the decision-makers and the influence of situational factors would affect the decision- making outcome (Mintz and Geva 1997), External Factors On the eve of the Federation of Malaya's independence’, the People's Republic of China (PRC) announced its recognition of the newborn country and was looking. forward to establishing diplomatic relations with i. Both PRC Chairman Mao Zedong. and Premier Chou Enlai delivered congratulatory telegrams to the Yang dé-Pertuan Agong (Supreme head of state) Tuanku Abdul Rahman of Negeri Sembilan and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya (Singapore Standard 1957). Yet, the Tunku decisively refused the proposal to establish diplomatic relations with China. In fact, the Tunku had decided not to formalize official relations with China as early as March, 1957. The Tunku resented the forceful attempts of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to form 2 communist country in Malaya. Thus, he was unable to make peace tye Federation changed is ame co Males afte abl and Sarawak the Former ish Gown Clones mene withRegime Interest vs National Interest 73 with the PRC, a country that had provided MCP with strategic advice and moral Support (Site Chew Jit Poh 1957) Malaya’s hostility towards the PRC encountered a subtle shift at the end of the 1960s, In 19 July 1967, the British declared its military withdrawal from the east of the Suez Canal by the mid-1970s (Straits Times 1967b). Malaysia and Singapore were among the colonies that would undergo British withdrawal. Six months after this announcement, the British announced that they aimed to complete their withdrawal by 1971 (Straits Times 1968¢). Ismail Abdul Rahman, the former foreign minister suggested chat Malaysia should adopt a non-alignment principle in its foreign policy for the sake of national security. He believed this non-alignment posture would prevent Malaysia from falling into contention between the United States and the Soviet Union (Kuik 2013), The Tunku seemed to agree with Ismail's proposal. He affirmed his stance in the Parliament by saying that Malaysia would only formalize diplomatic relations with any communist country, including the PRC, when these countries were no longer a threat to Malaysia. Countries which hhad direct or indirect agents in Malaysia before and after independence seeking to overthrow the existing government were defined as threats (Straits Times 19683; Straits Times 1968b). This statement explicitly pointed the finger at the PRC who ‘was the MCP's main sponsor. It seemed that Malaysia would only formalize offi relations with the PRC ifthe latter terminated its support of the MCP. This explains why Malaysia established formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1967 (Straits Times 1967a), Romania in 1969 (Ambasada Romaniei in Malaysia n.<.), Poland in 1971 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia n.d.), and North Korea in 1973 (Strats Times 1973a), but never with the PRC when the Tunku served as the Prime Minister of Malaysia, twas only when Abdul Razak Hussein succeeded the Tunku as prime mi ‘on 23 September 1970 that Malaysia began to show an interest in establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC. In his first policy statement, Razak unambiguously mentioned that the neutralization of the Southeast Asia Nations needed the guarantee from the United States, the Soviet Union and the PRC (Nanyang Siang Pau 1970). This speech somehow implied that Razak had the intention to seek a rapprochement with the PRC. Before official negotiations took place, Malaysia and the PRC had been interacting unofficially for more than two years, It began with the Chinese Red Cross donating US$200,000 to the Malaysian Red Cross in 1971, of which Razak was president. In return, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, the chairman of the Malaysian Chamber of Commerce as well as a close friend of Razak, led a delegation of 70 people to China later that year (Asia ‘Magazine 1974). When Razaleigh recalled this trip 40 years later, he described it asT4 ‘Soon occurring “under the pretext of leading a trade delegation to talk to Premier Zhou Enlai” of the possibilities of normalizing the relations between the two ‘countries (The Star 2014). After Razaleigh’s visit to the PRC, both countries worked ‘on bettering their ties through trade, cultural exchanges, and sports activities. In June 1973, Kuala Lumpur and Beijing finally began official negotiations as to the ‘establishment of formal relations in New York (Strate Times 1973b). During this negotiation process, Chen Man Hin, a Member of Parliament from the opposition Democratic Action Party, demanded that Razak revealed if there was a hidden agenda behind the ongoing talks. He expressed the concern that Razak would imitate Nixon “by announcing the opening of ties with China on the eve of the general election." Obviously, Chen suspiciously feared that Razak would exploit official ties with the PRC to benefit his political party, namely the Barisan Nasional (BN) in coming general election, Razak denied the accusation. He claimed that the decision to normalize relations with China was based! on national interests rather than BN's interest (Strails Times 1973¢) Nevertheless, two BN members related a different side to the story 32 years later. They are Michael Chen Wing Sum, the former vice president of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), who was responsible for laying the groundwork in the ‘establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the PRC; and Ahmad Abdullah Badawi, former Prime Minster of Malaysia (2003-2008). In an interview with Abdul Razak Baginda, a well-known scholars and strategist, they both disclosed that ‘the normalization of relations with China was in fact a foreign policy designed by BN political elites to win the election. These elites agreed that the fourth general ‘lection had to be held sometime in 1974. Therefore, ties with the PRC had to be ‘established before the election and announced during Razak’s first official visit to PRC, They supposed that the Malaysian Chinese who regarded China as their “imagined” motherland would be flattered by the rapprochement between Malaysia ‘and the PRC, and thus vote for BN (Baginda 2016) Other than the testimonies of Michael Chen and Badawi, there is another indirect proof of BN’s exploitation of foreign policy for the maintenance of its regime interest lies in the record of the offical negotiation process between Malaysia and the PRC. The talks were initiated in June 1973 and concluded in April 1974 (Liu 2011), ‘The issues on which both Kuala Lumpur and Beijing sought consensus during their talks were all related to national interest. Beijing required Kuala Lumpur to "naar Non th 37 Peet fhe ied Ss ved the PCF ebay 2110 8 1972, He was the at resin ted Cie since the Chinese Communist ay (CP took oe the cOUREY a 199 (Te New York Tes 19728 He won secon preseal em by alan inthe US present cent eld 9 month ate He bine 52 lec votes and McGovern, the Democrat cnt ony tated 17h Ne York Tie 1720, a esol (ON) snow in Engin he National Froat-Fr the sake of consistency BY wil be wed iRegime Interest vs National Interest 75 acknowledge the PRC as the sole legal government of China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Kuala Lumpur had no objection to this. On its part, Kuala Lumpur demanded that Being ceased its support of the MCP and revoke the citizenship of the 200,000 Chinese who were living in Malaysia but not Malaysian citizens. (Saravanamuttu 1981), Beijing decisively refused to countenance Malaysia's proposal. In October 1973, the negotiations reached a deadlock (The Age 1973; Washingion Post 1973). When the talks resumed! later, Razak announced that Kuala Lumpur would not insist upon the PRC's total non-interference in ethnic Chinese activities in Malaysia (Associated Press 1973) ‘When the Malaysian and PRC representatives finally closed their talks at the end of April 1974, the outcome of the negotiation was not really beneficial to Malaysia's national interest or internal security. Beijing had only verbally assured Malaysia that it would reduce its support to the MCP from the state-to-party level to.a party-to-party evel, although it agreed in joint communique that it would nat interfere Malaysia's domestic affairs. This promise was in fact meaningless because the PRC was (and stills) run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The degree ‘of PRC or CCP support for the MCP would make no theoretical difference. Beijing also sidestepped the issue of Chinese citizenship by insisting that it would allow the Chinese people in Malaysia to decide their own destiny, Le. the ethnic Chinese n Malaysia could choose whether they wanted to be Malaysian Chinese or remain, ‘a PRC Chinese. A rational state actor would have continued to negotiate with the PRC representatives and refused to agree to these terms. However, Malaysia did not demur. This implied that the BN had a hidden agenda, as suggested by Michael Chen and Badawi One puzzling thing needs to be clarified inthe normalization of Malaysia-PRC diplomatic relations. winning the next general election (regime interest) was the BN government's sole reason for establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, why did it bother to talk the PRC out of supporting tie MCP and revoking the China citizenship of the Chinese living in Malaysia? On the other hand, if the establishment of diplomatic ties with the PRC was entirely in the spirit of national interest as Razak asserted in Parliament, why did he agree to end negotiations before Malaysia achieved its ultimate goal? tt would appear that establishment of diplomatic ties with the PRC was motivated by both regime interest and national interest, wth the former being of greater importance to the BN government. Domestic Influence “The fourth general election was Abdul Razak’s first election after he became Prime16 ‘Soon Minister of Malaysia and the president of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). The election was vital to Razak as his legitimacy as the leader of the country and UMNO depended on its outcome. Razak still has a vivid recollection of the reasons causing the Tunku, his predecessor, to leave office in 1970. The Tunku's UMNO comrades forced him to step down because he failed to secure the Alliance Party’ a two-thirds parliamentary majority in the 1969 general election; an ‘occurrence that led to the eruption of the May 13 Incident a few days later (Shome 2002, 85-87). Race was the root cause of these two episodes. The concept of a “Malaysian Malaysia", advocated by Lee Kuan Yew. the leader of People's Action Party (PAP) in the 1964 election irritated the Malays who deemed themselves to be the masters of Malaysia, The Malay dread of the Chinese did not recede after the 1964 election, not id it diminish when Singapore (with its large ethnic Chinese population) separated from Malaysia later that same year. Despite the sharp decline in the number of Chinese following the separation, which was from 42.2% to 35.7% of the total population (Yang, 1982), Malay wariness of them grew when the Chinese called for ‘Mandarin to be one of the official languages of Malaysia in the National Language Act in 1967; Malay misgivings about the Chinese were heightened after the MCP, which most of its members were Chinese accelerated a series of armed struggle at the ‘Malaysia-Thailand border starting 1967 aiming to “liberate” Malaysia in 1975 (Yang 1982). The Tunku kept his distance from the dispute, as he lacked the words to ‘express himself. Moreover, the Tunku was a firm believer in racial equality and so ‘were most of the members in the Alliance Party. Due to decades of tensions between the Malays and Chinese, the Alliance avoided voicing their support for racial equality in public so as not to infuriate the extremist Malays in the country Vasil 1972) However, the Tunku's silence only made matters worse. The Chinese were increasingly worried that they would lose their rights in Malaysia. Malaysian Chinese ies intensified when the MCA failed to have Mandarin included as one of the country’s official languages in the 1967 National Language Act (Ratnam and Milne 1970). In the meantime, Malays held the opinion that the Tunku was too soft on the Chinese, and became convinced that the Tunku might have compromised their economic welfare by favoring the ethnic Chinese. The opposition parties further ‘exaggerated the resentment between the Malays and Chinese, and between the people and government in their public speeches (Ismail 2006), Alliance leaders were too arrogant to take into account the full impact of the 5 Te lnc rey ws the pron of Nef anak ered ew pla pares nto healing cation and tangs ts name to aan Naina (Non 1973, the rg coaltion wa ow the lance Pry rete The Alle Puy compised te poll pats: Ute Mol Nan Onanisson (UMNO), Mlysan Chinese Assocation HCA and hls den Congres M0,Regime Interest vs National Interest 77 ‘opposition’s vocal hate speech. They strongly (and perhaps, naively) believed that the people were satisfied withthe way in which they ran the country and that the people would not be provoked by malicious statements into turning ther backs on the Alliance (Baginda 2016). Unfortunately, the reality was very different for the Alliance. While the Alliance won the general election on 10 May 1969, they accomplished the task with a serious setback, The Alliance had lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament forthe first time, and its support rate had dropped from 58.5% in the 1964 election to 49.1% (Straits Times 1969). IF it was not for sgerymandering, the Alliance might have lost power. Three days later, the tragic ethnic clash of the May 13 Incident erupted, involving mainly the Malays and Chinese ‘The National Operations Council, government working committee headed by Razak, took control ofthe country temporarily to restore order. According to a report released by the National Operations Council, there were hundreds of casualties with 196 dead (143 Chinese, 25 Malays, 13 Indian, and 15 from other races) and 429 injured (270 Chinese, 127 Malays, 26 Indian and 16 from other races). The same report also revealed three reasons for this outbreak of sectarian violence: wealth distribution inequality between the poor Malays and the wealthy Chinese, Malay anger over the Chinese intention o establish a “Malaysian Malaysia’, and the MCP conspiracy to sabotage the democratic system in Malaysia (National Operations Council 1965). (On observing that the Tunku’s selfimposed distance from racial controversy was disadvantageous co the Alliance Party and himself, Razak implemented a series of racial policies as soon as he was sworn into office. To regain Malay trust, he led Parliament to amend the Constitution to guarantee “Malay Supremacy". To entrench Malay pre-eminence in Malaysia, a Sedition Act was enacted, making it illegalto question the special status of the Malay rulers, the Malays, Islam, and the Malay language as the country’s official language. A 20-year New Economy Policy was also introduced in 1971 to eradicate poverty forall Malaysians and restrcture the national economy. While New Economy Policy ostensibly aimed to improve the economic status and quality of life for all Malaysians, it only seemed to benefit the Malays and the indigenous people when it was implemented. The Chinese and other non-Malay ethnic groups were neglected. Unsurprisingly, the New Economic Aecording the Mab Consutin ft 119, Masa ize hve eee inthe letra on one o Pepulton of alan 1970 was aprxiatel 48 millon Fhe 466 milan wee Maly 5,313} ion were {ipsa 10 ston Belong wether etnies 59 Se Fede Hovey and az 1978 aa Department of Satis 1576 Tha the porn ofthe voters based om the ty dos ot aa est he oun fhe popuaon preci78 ‘Soon Policy angered and alienated the ethnic Chinese (Faaland, Parkinson and Saniman. 1991). However, an examination of the overall population structure shows that BN ‘would be unable to recapture the two-thirds majority in Parliament by simply relying ‘on the Malay votes. While Malay voters constituted 57.9% of total voters, it was still fa from the numbers BN needed to regain its parliamentary majority. Thus, Chinese voters, composing 34.5%, were essential (Crouch, 1996). Razak needed a plan that would regain Chinese support without incurring the wrath of the Malays. Thus, ng diplomatic relations with the PRC seemed to be the most convenient Malaysia's two-stage Process in establishing Diplomatic Ties with the PRC Decision-makers essentially have more than one alternative to choose, before they make their decision, In the case of establishing official ties with the PRC, Kuala Lumpur had at least five alternatives from which to choose and eliminate before the upcoming general election. They were: Option A: Establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, ithe PRC agrees to give up its support ofthe MCP and revoke the citizenship of the Chinese who have yet to apply forthe Malaysian citizenship. Option B: Establish diplomatic relations withthe PRC, ifthe PRC accepts one of ‘the requirements mentioned in Option A. Option C: Establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, ifthe PRC decides to make certain concessions in both the requirements mentioned in 0 Option: Establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, ifthe PRC agrees to make concessions in any of the requirements mentioned in Option A OptionE: Establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, despite the PRC disagreeing with all requirements mentioned in Option A According to PH theory, decision-makers will select the option that best forwards their political interest: in other words, decision-makers will place thei personal political interest before the national interest. Therefore, before making up their minds, decision-makers will have to deters regime interest, national interest or both. There were only two options that carried ‘only one interest: Option A and Option E. Option A was based on pure national interest, while Option E was based on regime interest. Option B, Option C and 1e whether each option servesRegime Interest vs National Interest 79 Option D met both regime interest and national interest (Table 1). Table 1: Attribution of Alternatives under Time Constraints “Aeuibation Alternative Regime interest | _NatinalIntret Option S " Option 1 1 onion * oS Opin E 1 Ne ‘Sources Arranged by author ‘Among the alternatives, Option A and Option E will be eliminated in the first stage of the decision-making process. Option A seems to be the most perfect choice of all the other alternatives because it both fulfils Malaysia's national interest of Malaysia and raises the status of the BN government to the highest level for successfully eradicating the decades-old perception of the PRC as threat. Yet, this is an option that would affect the national policy of the PRC. I¢ would also be time consuming to convince the PRC representatives of that option. With the next election looming, BN did not have much time with which to negotiate. Since the BN desperately needed to establish official relations with the PRC to gain ethnic Chinese votes in next election, it could not afford the time. Therefore, Option A would be climinated in the first stage of decision-making, (On the other hand, Option E seems to be the most convenient alternative. ‘The PRC would be very delighted to establish official ties with Malaysia without making any promise or concession to Malaysia. However, if Kuala Lumpur did not use the normalization of relations as leverage in its attempt to get Beijing to cease its support of the MCP and resolve the citizenship issue of the Chinese in Malaysi the BN government might not have another bargaining chip. Furthermore, if the BN government did not try their best to exact some gains from PRC, the Malays ‘would be suspicious of the government's motives. They might suspect Razak to be pro-Chinese, as they did to the Tunku. This choice would not benefit the BN during, the election either. Consequently, Option E would be cast out along with Option A. in the first stage of decision-making.80 ‘Soon Options B, C and D then proceeded to the second stage of decision-making, where an option maximizing national interest would have to be chosen. Among these three options, Option C was the best: The MCP. supported by the PRC, was the main threat to Malaysian stability; and the citizenship of the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia was something that the BN government fretted over. It would be in the best national interest of Malaysia if the BN government could get the PRC to make some kind of concession in both requirements. Options B and D were not as promising as Option €. By examining Kuala Lumpue's decision-making in the normalization of relations ‘with the PRC through PH theory, we now have a clear picture as to how the decision was made. Conclusion ‘The decision of the British government to withdraw its military from the east of Suez Canal in 1967 was the key reason to Malaysia to alter its foreign policy from ‘a pro-western stance to a non-alignment posture. Such adjustment subsequently contributed to the establishing of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1974, Yet, the normalization ostensibly did not benefit Malaysia at all. The PRC declined to relinquish its support to the MCP nor revoke the citizenship of the 200,000 Chinese who were living in Malaysia but not yet become Malaysian citizens. These were two mattersthat the Malaysia government deemed as vital to its national security. AS a rational state actor, Malaysia should have suspended the normalization and continued to negotiate with the PRC until the later proposed a better offer, Abdul Razak Baginda (2016) commented that the decision of Malaysia to establish official relation ties under such conditions wasonly gained“prestige and credibility for its boldness in acting decisively and being the first in ASEAN to normalize relations with Beijing,” he continued, “perhaps the largest gains came in the domestic realm.” The achievement that Abdul Razak Baginda refers to supposedly was the episode that the ruling ‘government won the general election by a landslide that held 83 days after the diplomatic ties with the PRC was established. Indeed, the Malaysia government did not completely sacrifice Malaysia's national interest while normalizing the relations with the PRC. We should not ‘overlook the fact that the government successfully had the PRC promised not to interfere Malaysia's domestic affairs. Besides, the government also had the PRC agreed to forbid the Chinese in Malaysia to hold both Malaysia and ChinaRegime Interest vs National Interest 81 citizenship in the same time. Still, Malaysia governmenthastily terminated its negotiation with the PRC before it could reach out a better dealwas also an undeniable fact. The act of Malaysia could be explained by the Poliheuristic theory, theory that asserted domestic polities was central to foreign policy decision: making. According to the theory, decision makers strive to protect the national interest although their regime interest are placed on top of the national interest ‘when a foreign policy is made. 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