Tan v. People carnapped at Robinson’s Galleria’s carpark.
Dimat claims that
J. Pardo, First Division; August 26, 1999
Issue:
W/N Tan can be held guilty for violating the Anti-Fencing law
Facts:
Rosita is engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers
or spare parts for boats. Manuelito was one of her employees
who suddenly left the company. After he left, Rosita noticed
that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts,
such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were
missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that
propellers and stocks valued at P48,000 more or less, were
missing. She contacted the uncle of Manuelito, and thereafter
Manuelito was arrested and admitted to the stealing from
Rosita’s warehouse. He pointed to Tan as the one who bought
the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000. RTC and
CA found Tan guilty of violating the Anti-Fencing Law. In his
defense, Tan denied having bought the stolen spare parts and
that the incident was never reported to the police, therefore
no theft actually happened.
Ruling:
NO. The elements of the crime of fencing are: (1) a crime of
robbery or theft is committed; (2) the accused, who took no
part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any
manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value,
during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should
have known that the thing has been derived from that crime;
and (4) there is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for
himself or for another. There was no sufficient proof of the
unlawful taking of another's property. If given extra-judicially,
the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise,
the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the
person so admitting. Manuelito was not assisted by counsel
when he was extrajudicially confessing. Furthermore, there
was no showing at all that Tan knew or should have known that
the very stolen articles were the ones sold to him. Without
petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he cannot
be guilty of fencing.
Dimat v. People
J. Abad, Third Division; January 25, 2012
Issue:
W/N Dimat could have known that the vehicle he sold was a
carnapped vehicle
Facts:
Sonia bought from Dimat a Nissan Safari bearing plate number
WAH569. The deed of sale indicated that the vehicle’s engine
number was TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-
YO3553. While the police officers were on patrol, they noticed
a Nissan Safari bearing a suspicious plate number. After
stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its
engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis
number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan
Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their
Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been
stolen from its registered owner, Mantequilla. Mantequilla
then affirmed that he owned such car and that it was
he does not know Mantequilla and that he bought the car in
good faith and for value from a certain Tolentino under a deed
of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its
chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Tolentino supposedly
showed him the old certificate of registration and official
receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new
certificate of registration and official receipt already in his
name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists
that Tolentino's failure to deliver the documents should not
prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce
any certificate of registration or official receipt. RTC and CA
convicted him for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ruling:
YES. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense,
but violations of the Anti-Fencing Law are regarded as malum
prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. The
prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have
known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to
Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he
intended to obtain some gain out of his acts. Dimat knew that
the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He
said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of
registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be
true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino
had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make
good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly
confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit
source.
Lim v. People
J. Pardo, En Banc; September 18, 2000
Issue:
W/N Lim should be held guilty for violating BP 22
Facts:
Lim went to Seguan’s store to buy various kinds of jewelry
worth P300,000. She wrote out a check dated August 25, 1990,
payable to "cash" drawn on Metrobank in the amount of
P300,000 and gave the check to Seguan. She then went back to
purchase jewelry again worth P241,668 and issued another
check payable to "cash" dated August 16, 1990 drawn on
Metrobank in the amount of P241,668 and sent the check to
Seguan through Nadera. Upon Seguan’s deposit of the checks,
they were returned with a notice of dishonor as they were
drawn from a closed account. Upon demand, petitioner
promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored
checks. She never did. The RTC and CA convicted her for
violating BP 22 on two counts. Lim argues that she never knew
Seguan and that she issued the two checks and gave them to
Nadera, not to Seguan. She gave the two checks to Nadera
from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a "security
arrangement" or "guarantee" that she would return the
jewelry received if she would not be able to sell them.
Ruling:
YES. The elements of BP 22 are: (1) The making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. Lim never denied
issuing the two checks. The first and last elements of the
offense are admittedly present. To escape liability, she must
prove that the second element was absent, that is, at the time
of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the
bank account were insufficient. She did not prove this.
The gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the
amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment
within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is
malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and
prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the
check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The
terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks
are also irrelevant. Unlike in estafa, under BP 22, one need not
prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation,
or that there was damage. The damage done is to the banking
system.
Wong v. CA
J. Quisumbing, Second Division; February 2, 2001
Issue:
W/N Wong should be held guilty for violating BP 22
Facts:
Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer
of calendars. LPI would print sample calendars, then give them
to agents to present to customers. The agents would get the
purchase orders of customers and forward them to LPI. After
printing the calendars, LPI would ship the calendars directly to
the customers. Thereafter, the agents would come around to
collect the payments. Wong, however, had a history of
unremitted collections, which he duly acknowledged in a
confirmation receipt. Hence, Wong’s customers were required
to issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their
purchase orders. Wong issued 6 postdated checks totaling
P18,025 all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn payable to the
order of LPI. These checks were initially intended to guarantee
the calendar orders of customers who failed to issue post-
dated checks. However, following company policy, LPI refused
to accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed
to apply the checks to the payment of petitioner's unremitted
collections for 1984 amounting to P18,077. Before the maturity
of the checks, Wong requested to LPI not to deposit the checks
and promised to replace them within 30 days. However, Wong
reneged on his promise. Thus, the checks were returned upon
LPI’s deposit in RCBC due to the account being closed. LPI
notified Wong of the dishonor, but he failed to make
arrangements for payment within 5 banking days. As a defense,
Wong argued that he issued the 6 checks he issued the checks
not as payment for any obligation, but to guarantee the orders
of his customers. Although these customers had already paid
their respective orders, petitioner claimed LPI did not return
the said checks to him. RTC and CA convicted Wong for
violations of BP 22 on three counts.
Ruling:
YES. There are two ways of violating BP 22: (1) by making or
drawing and issuing a check to apply on account or for value
knowing at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently
funded; and (2) by having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep sufficient
funds therein or credit with said bank to cover the full amount
of the check when presented to the drawee bank within a
period of 90 days. Petitioner contends that the first element
that “the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
for account or for value” does not exist because the checks
were not issued to apply for account or for value. He attempts
to distinguish his situation from the usual cut-and-dried BP 22
case by claiming that the checks were issued as guarantee and
the obligations they were supposed to guarantee were already
paid. This flawed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and
CA having both ruled that the checks were in payment for
unremitted collections, and not as guarantee. Likewise, the
argument has no legal basis, for what BP 22 punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.
Dela Cruz v. People
G.R. No. 163494. August 3, 2016, third division
BP blg 22; Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds (Sec. 2)
Notice of dishonor, requisites
Issue:
WON petitioner should be acquitted due to lack of notice of
dishonor
Facts:
Tan entered into several business transactions with the
petitioner sometime in 1984 to 1985, whereby Tan supplied
and delivered to the petitioner rolls of textile materials. For
every delivery made by Tan, the petitioner issued post-dated
checks made payable to "Cash." When presented for payment,
however, some of the checks issued by the petitioner to Tan
were dishonored by the drawee-bank for being "Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds" or "Account Closed." The replacement
checks later issued by the petitioner were still dishonored upon
presentment for payment. The fourth batch of twenty-three
(23) replacement checks issued by the petitioner to Tan
became the subject of his complaint. With the total amount of
6Million and drawn against FBTC- Family Bank & Trust Co. The
23 checks were still later dishonored by the drawee-bank FBTC
for the reason "Account Closed." Tan informed the petitioner
of the checks' dishonor through a demand letter, but the
amounts thereof remained unsatisfied. 23 informations for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were led in court against the petitioner.
The defense failed to present its evidence after it had sought
several hearing postponements and resettings. RTC issued an
Order that deemed the petitioner to have waived her right to
present evidence and found petitioner guilty of the charges.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing, that she was not
accorded an ample opportunity to dispute the charges against
her. She intended to present a certified public accountant to
prove that she had overpayments with Tan, which then
extinguished the obligations attached to the checks subject of
the criminal cases. The appeal was dismissed by the CA.
Petitioner argued that the CA erred in ruling that the petitioner
received a notice of dishonor of the subject checks. She also
asks the Court to take into consideration the fact that she was
acquitted by the CA in another set of B.P. Blg. 22 cases on the
ground that she has overpaid Tan. Granting that the Court still
declares her guilty of the offense, she asks for an imposition of
ne in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment.
Ruling:
Yes, petitioner should be acquitted due to lack of notice of
dishonor. Essential element of violation of BP blg 22 are:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the
time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment."
Court found that although a notice of dishonor is not an
indispensable requirement in a prosecution for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 as it is not an element of the offense, evidence that a
notice of dishonor has been sent to and received by the
accused is actually sought as a means to prove the second
element. Jurisprudence is replete with cases that underscore
the value of a notice of dishonor in B.P. Blg. 22 cases, and how
the absence of sufficient proof of receipt thereof can be fatal
in the prosecution's case. To support its finding that the
petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds with the
drawee bank, the RTC merely relied on the fact that
replacement checks had been issued, in lieu of those that were
originally issued to pay for the petitioner's obligation with Tan.
The Court finds the conclusion misplaced, considering that the
last batch of replacement checks, which eventually became the
subject of these cases, were precisely intended to address and
preclude any dishonor. Thus, the replacement checks dated
March 30, 1987 were purposely drawn against a different
checking account with FBTC, different from the old checks that
were drawn against another drawee bank. The prosecution
also attempted to prove the petitioner's receipt of a notice of
dishonor by referring to a demand letter, along with a registry
receipt showing that the letter was sent by registered mail, and
the registry return card showing its receipt by a certain Rolando
Villanueva. Given the circumstances and the manner by which
the documents were presented during the trial, the
presumption that could lead to evidence of knowledge of
insufficient funds failed to arise.
The OSG contends that the petitioner's failure to receive a
notice of dishonor could not be raised at this stage. The Court
disagrees. While the question may seemingly present a factual
issue that is beyond the scope of a petition for review on
certiorari, it is in essence a question of law as it concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of
facts. It addresses the question of whether or not the service
and alleged receipt by the petitioner of the notice of dishonor,
as claimed by the prosecution, already satisfies the
requirements of the law. Clearly, the prosecution failed to
establish the presence of all the elements of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. The petitioner is acquitted from the 23 counts of the
offense charged. The failure of the prosecution to prove the
receipt by the petitioner of the requisite written notice of
dishonor and that she was given at least five banking days
within which to settle her account constitutes sufficient ground
for her acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 13, 2003 and
Resolution dated May 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 26337 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Jesusa T. Dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on twenty-three (23) counts on the
ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. She is, nonetheless, ordered to pay complainant Tan
Tiac Chiong, also known as Ernesto Tan, the face value of the
subject checks totaling Six Million Two Hundred Twenty-Six
Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Pesos and 29/100
(P6,226,390.29), with interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of finality of this Decision until full payment.
Ang Higa v. People
G.R. No. 185473. August 17, 2016 , third division
BP blg. 22 Preference of imposition of fine; Not to
decriminalize nor delete penalty of imprisonment:
Issue:
WON the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA,
sentencing the petitioner with imprisonment of one (1) year of
prision correccional for each count of violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
is proper.
Facts:
In April to November 1996 Carullo, manufacturer and seller of
jewelry, delivered numerous pieces of jewelry to the
petitioner, her customer and later became a dealer, for the
latter to sell. The petitioner returned those items that were not
sold, and as security for the payments of those items that were
eventually sold, the petitioner gave Carullo a total of fifty-one
(51) post-dated checks. However, when the subject checks
were deposited on their respective due dates, they were
dishonored on the ground that they were drawn against a
closed account. Carullo notified and sent demand letters to the
petitioner who then asked for time to settle her account by
replacing the subject checks with cash. However, the petitioner
did not make good of her promise so Carullo filed the cases
against her. During the trial, the delivery receipts were
submitted to prove that the subject checks were issued with
valuable consideration in favor of Carullo. Petitioner alleged
that there was lack of consideration and that she already paid
the subject checks. However, she failed to prove her claim
since she was not able to finish her testimony and did not
present any piece of evidence to disprove the evidence against
her. MeTC found her guilty for 51 counts of violation of BP blg
22. She was ordered to pay the P6Million “with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to suffer an imprisonment
of one (1) year of prision correccional, to pay [Carullo] the
amount of P6,450,260.” On appeal, the RTC Decision modified
the MeTC decision, by sentencing the petitioner to suffer
imprisonment of one (1) year of prision correccional for each
count of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and to pay a fine in the total
amount of P6,093,550.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency or non- payment.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
with the RTC, but it was denied for lack of merit. Thereafter,
the petitioner filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court with the CA wc was denied. Petitioner assails the
penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year of prision correccional
for each count of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 or a total of 51 years
imposed upon her.
Ruling:
No. While the Court sustains the conviction of the petitioner, it
is appropriate to modify the penalty of imprisonment that was
imposed since it is out of the range of the penalty prescribed in
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 and in view of Administrative Circular
(A.C.) No. 12-2000. “Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 (An Act Penalizing
the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without
Sufficient Funds for Credit and for Other Purposes) imposes the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but
not more than one (1) year or a ne of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check, which ne shall in
no case exceed P200,000[.00], or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.”
Court held that "it would best serve the ends of criminal justice
if, in fixing the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. [Blg.]
22, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is observed, i.e., that of redeeming valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to
the protection of the social order." The Court explained that
the clear tenor and intention of A.C. No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay
down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. The Court was emphatic in
clarifying that it is not the Court's intention to decriminalize
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 or to delete the alternative penalty of
imprisonment. The rule of preference provided in A.C. No. 12-
2000 does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for
violators of B.P. Blg. 22, neither does it defeat the legislative
intent behind the law.
To reiterate, A.C. No. 12-2000 merely establishes a rule of
preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg.
22, and Section 1 thereof imposes the following alternative
penalties for its violation, to wit: (a) imprisonment of not less
than 30 days but not more than one year; or (b) a ne of not less
than but not more than double the amount of the check which
ne shall in no case exceed P200,000[.00]; or (c) both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. Indeed, the
imposition by the RTC, as af rmed by the CA, of imprisonment
of one year of prision correccional for each count of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 resulting in a total of 51 years is too harsh taking
into consideration the fact that the petitioner is not a recidivist,
and that past transactions show that the petitioner had made
good in her payment
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED . The Decision
dated July 30, 2008 and the Resolution dated November 5,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30242, nding
petitioner Bernadette Ida Ang Higa GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of fty-one (51) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(a) Bernadette Ida Ang Higa is hereby sentenced to a penalty of
six (6) months imprisonment for each count, to be served in
accordance with the limitation prescribed in paragraph (4),
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code;
(b) Bernadette Ida Ang Higa is ORDERED to indemnify Ma. Vicia
Carullo the amount of the checks in their totality, or in the
amount of Six Million Ninety-Three Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P6,093,550.00); and
(c) All the monetary award shall earn interest at the legal rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
Allied Banking corp. v. Ordonez
G.R. No. 82495. December 10, 1990, 2nd d
Obligation to pay irrespective of use of goods covered by
Trust receipt
Issue:
Does the penal provision of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) apply
when the goods covered by a Trust Receipt do not form part of
the finished products which are ultimately sold but are instead,
used up in the operation of the equipment and machineries of
the entrustee-manufacturer?
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) thru its duly authorized
officer, private respondent Alfredo Ching, applied for the
issuance of commercial letters of credit with Allied Banking
corp.’s Makati branch to finance the purchase of 500 M/T
Magtar Branch Dolomites and one (1) Lot High Fired Refractory
Sliding Nozzle Bricks. Petitioner bank issued an irrevocable
letter of credit in favor of Nikko Industry Co., Ltd. by virtue of
which the latter drew four (4) drafts which were accepted by
PBM and duly honored and paid by the petitioner bank. To
secure payment of the amount covered by the drafts, PBM, as
entrustee, thru private respondent Ching, executed four (4)
Trust Receipt Agreements with maturity dates on 19 May, 3
and 24 June 1981 acknowledging petitioner's ownership of the
goods and its (PBM'S) obligation to turn over the proceeds of
the sale of the goods, if sold, or to return the same, if unsold
within the stated period. Out of the said obligation resulted an
overdue amount of P1,475,274.09.Despite repeated demands,
PBM failed and refused to either turn over the proceeds of the
sale of the goods or to return the same.
Petitioner bank filed a criminal complaint against private
respondent for violation of PD 115 before the office of the
Provincial Fiscal. Fiscal found a prima facie case for violation of
PD 115 on four (4) counts and filed the corresponding
information in court. Private respondent appealed the Fiscal's
resolution to the DOJ w/c found that the contention is without
merit as it was agreed by the parties that materials for
manufacture of goods to be ultimately sold are proper objects
of a trust receipt. Thus, respondent's failure to remit to the
complainant proceeds of the sale of the finished products if
sold or the finished products themselves if not sold, at the
maturity dates of the trust receipts, constitutes a violation of
P.D. 115. Private respondent claims PD 115 covers goods which
are ultimately destined for sale and not goods for use in
manufacture. A motion for reconsideration alleged that, as
PBM was under rehabilitation receivership, no criminal liability
can be imputed to herein respondent Ching. MR was denied.
Another MR was filed, where the DOJ ruled that the PD 115
covers goods or components of goods which are ultimately
destined for sale.
Ruling:
Yes. Section 4 of said PD 115 says in part:
"Sec. 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction. — A trust
receipt transaction, within the meaning of this Decree, is any
transaction by and between a person referred to in this Decree
as the entrustee, and another person referred to in this Decree
as the entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds
absolute title or security interests over certain speci ed goods,
documents or instruments, releases the same to the
possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and
delivery to the entruster of a signed document called a 'trust
receipt' wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the
designated goods, documents or instruments in trust for the
entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods,
documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to
the entruster the proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount
owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the
goods, documents or instruments themselves, if they are
unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the
terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt, . . ."
The trust receipts, there is an obligation to repay the
entruster.Their terms are to be interpreted in accordance with
the general rules on contracts, the law being alert in all cases
to prevent fraud on the part of either party to the transaction.
The entrustee binds himself to sell or otherwise dispose of the
entrusted goods with the obligation to turn over to the
entruster the proceeds if sold, or return the goods if unsold or
not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and
conditions speci ed in the trust receipt. A violation of this
undertaking constitutes estafa under Sec. 13, PD 115.
The wording of Sec. 13 covers failure to turn over the proceeds
of the sale of entrusted goods, or to return said goods if unsold
or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
receipts. Private respondent claims that at the time of PBM's
application for the issuance of the LC's, it was not represented
to the petitioner that the items were intended for sale, hence,
there was no deceit resulting in a violation of the trust receipts
which would constitute a criminal liability. Again, we cannot
uphold this contention. The non-payment of the amount
covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the entrustee's
obligation to pay. There is no reason why the law should not
apply to all transactions covered by trust receipts, except those
expressly excluded.
Respondent Ching contends that PBM is not in the business of
selling Magtar Branch Dolomites or High Fired Refractory
Sliding Nozzle Bricks, it is a manufacturer of steel and steel
products. But PBM, as entrustee under the trust receipts has,
under Sec. 9 of PD 115, the following obligations: (a) receive
the proceeds of sale, in trust for the entruster and turn over
the same to the entruster to the extent of the amount owing
to him or as appears on the trust receipt; (b) keep said goods
or proceeds thereof whether in money or whatever form,
separate and capable of identi cation as property of the
entruster; (c) return the goods, documents or instruments in
the event of non-sale, or upon demand of the entruster; and
(d) observe all other terms and conditions of the trust receipt
not contrary to the provisions of said Decree.
The penal provision of PD 115 encompasses any act violative of
an obligation covered by the trust receipt; it is not limited to
transactions in goods which are to be sold (retailed), reshipped,
stored or processed as a component of a product ultimately
sold.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The temporary
restraining order issued on 13 April 1988 restraining the
enforcement of the questioned DOJ resolutions dated 11
January 1988 and 17 February 1988 directing the provincial scal
to move for the dismissal of the criminal case led before the
RTC of Makati, Branch 143 and the withdrawal of IS-No. 84-
3140, is made permanent. Let this case be remanded to said
RTC for disposition in accordance with this decision.
People v. Mateo
G.R. No. 210612. October 9, 2017, 2nd division
Syndicated Estafa (P.D. 1689), elements
Issue:
WON accused is guilty for the violation of PD 1689
Facts:
Herminio, Jr. met a certain Geraldine Alejandro who
introduced herself as the head of the Business Center of MMG
International Holdings Co., Ltd. (MMG). Geraldine was then
soliciting investments and has shown a brochure showcasing
the investments and businesses of the said entity. Convinced
by the representations of Geraldine, Herminio, Jr. invested
P50,000.00 with MMG on April 20, 2002. Subsequently, all the
interests and principal were promptly paid, which induced him
to make a bigger investment. On May 2, 2002, Herminio, Jr. and
his father, Herminio, Sr., made a joint investment of
P200,000.00. Later, Geraldine was also able to convince
Herminio, Jr.'s sister, Melanie, who made an investment of
P50,000.00 with MMG. The private complainants' investments
were covered by a notarized Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), signed by accused-appellant, which stipulated, among
others, that MMG was being represented by its President,
herein accused-appellant, and that the investors will be
earning 2.5% monthly interest income from the capital they
have invested. Subsequently, the complainants received
several post-dated checks covering their investments.
However, when they tried to deposit the checks, their banks
informed them that these were dishonored because MMG's
accounts in the bank from which the checks were drawn were
already closed. The complainants then demanded from the
accused the return of their money, but their demands were
unheeded. The private complainants and other investors went
to the SEC to file a complaint, where they discovered that MMG
was not a registered issuer of securities. The SEC forwarded
their complaint to the City Prosecutor of Makati. Similar cases
for estafa and syndicated estafa, totalling 209, were also filed
against the accused. RTC found accused guilty of the crime
charged. CA in affirming the RTC’s decision held that contrary
to accused-appellant's position, PD 1689 contemplates estafa
as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of
the RPC. The CA also held that all the elements of syndicated
estafa are present in the instant case.
Ruling:
Yes. Elements of syndicated estafa as defined under Section 1
of PD 1689 are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling as de ned
in Articles 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code is committed;
(b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of ve or
more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s),"
or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
In the present case, it is clear that all the elements of
syndicated estafa, are present, considering that: (a) the
incorporators/directors of MMG comprising more than five (5)
people, including herein accused-appellant, made false
pretenses and representations to the investing public — in this
case, the private complainants — regarding a supposed
lucrative investment opportunity with MMG in order to solicit
money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private
complainants invested their hard-earned money into MMG;
and (d) the incorporators/directors of MMG ended up running
away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to
the latter's prejudice.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated July 16,
2012 and Resolution dated July 1, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04001.
Note: RTC’s ruling
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 03-2936, the Court finds the
accused, Ervin Y. Mateo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Syndicated Estafa penalized under Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No.
1689 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment. Likewise, Ervin Y. Mateo is held solidarily liable
with MMG International Holdings Company, Ltd. to pay private
complainant[s] Herminio Alcid, Jr. and Herminio Alcid, Sr.
P206,000.00 as actual damages. aScITE
In Criminal Case No. 03-2987, the Court nds the accused, Ervin
Y. Mateo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Syndicated Estafa penalized under Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689 and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment. Likewise, Ervin Y. Mateo is held solidarily liable
with MMG International Holdings Company, Ltd. to pay private
complainant Melanie Alcid P59,702.61 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
Chua v People
G.R. No. 172193. September 13, 2017, 3 rd division
An Act Providing For A New Anti-Carnapping Law of the
Philippines (R.A. 10883)
Issue:
WON Chua's guilt for robbery and carnapping was established
beyond reasonable doubt?
Facts:
At around 2:50 o'clock in the morning, Teresa, was about to
leave for work. Upon opening the door, she was immediately
pushed inside the house by accused Arnold Lato. Lato was
followed by accused Leonardo Reyes. The two robbers wore
stockings on the head. Arnold tied the hands of Teresa and the
helper with straw. Leonardo went to the master's bedroom
where Reynaldo was sleeping. Reynaldo was stabbed four
times but was able to lock himself in the bathroom. The
accused demanded jewelry and cash that the Ravagos earned
as broker's commission from the sale of a fishpond. Teresa was
able to recognize the face of Arnold when the latter removed
the stocking off his face as he searched for jewelry. Accused
carted off their television sets, cash, etc. The said stolen items
were loaded in a stainless owner type jeep owned by the . The
robbery was immediately reported to the Police Station. The
robbers were later on identified. Chua warned the Ravago’s to
keep quiet about the robbery or else harm would befall their
family.
The jeep was recovered with Jessie Tugas Shop but it was sold
to John Laguidao for P40,000.00. the Ravagos saw the terms of
the sale on a yellow pad which showed the seller to be Celerino
Chua and one Meann. The Betamax, among those stolen from
the Ravagos, was recovered from the same nipa hut where
Chua and his companion stayed. A separate case for Robbery
and carnapping was filed against the accused. Reyes and Lato
remained at large; hence, only Chua was arraigned and tried
for the crimes. During the course of the investigation it was
found that Chua was the one who introduced Reyes and Lato
to their employer, which is contrary to chua’s denial that he
knew the two. It was also found that Chua knew about the
broker’s commission that Ravago received.
RTC convicted Chua for the crimes charged which was upheld
by the CA. Chua submits that the CA committed reversible
errors in finding the existence of a conspiracy between him and
the two other accused despite the failure of the State to
establish his actual participation in the commission of the
crimes charged;… and in holding him guilty as a principal in the
commission of the crimes charged even assuming that he had
sold the motor vehicle of the victims and that the betamax
machine had been found in his place.
Ruling:
Yes, despite Chua’s physical absence from the scene of the
crime, he was liable as a principal by inducement, and also for
the violence committed by Lato and Reyes during the
execution of the crimes. Carnapping committed with violence
or intimidation of persons was established beyond reasonable
doubt; hence, Chua's proper penalty should be higher.
Carnapping is defined as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things." Under Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6539, the penalty for carnapping committed
without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things is imprisonment of not less than 14 years and eight
months and not more than 17 years and four months; if
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things, the penalty is imprisonment of
not less than 17 years and four months and not more than 30
years.
The taking of the motor vehicle (owner-type jeep) belonging to
the Ravagos by Lato and Reyes constituted carnapping. But it
was clear error for the lower courts to punish Chua with the
penalty for carnapping committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things. Even if the
robbers took the motor vehicle after consummating the
robbery in the course of the execution of which one of them
stabbed Ravago four times, the taking of the motor vehicle in
order to carry the stolen articles out was still attended by the
same violence and intimidation of the owner and his wife, as
well as of the rest of their household. As such, the correct
imposable penalty is imprisonment of not less than 17 years
and four months and not more than 30 years. Accordingly, the
indeterminate sentence is imprisonment for 18 years, as
minimum, to 22 years, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on
certiorari; AFFIRMS in all respects the decision promulgated on
October 20, 2005, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to
wit:
1) Petitioner CELERINO CHUA ALIAS SUNTAY is punished in
Criminal Case No. 397-M-94, for carnapping, with the
indeterminate sentence of 18 years, as minimum, to 22 years,
as maximum; and
(2) The actual damages of P200,000.00 shall earn legal interest
of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision
until full satisfaction.
(F) Robbery with homicide and carnapping
People v Carino y Gocong
G.R. No. 232624. July 9, 2018|Reyes Jr
Doctrine:
Elements of robbery with homicide namely,
(i) "the taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons;
(ii) the property taken belongs to another;
(iii) the taking is [with] animo lucrandi; and
(iv) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion
thereof, homicide is committed."
The elements of carnapping are:
(i) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to
another;
(ii) the taking is without the consent of the owner or
by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or by using force upon things; and
(iii) the taking is done with intent to gain.
Facts:
Leonardo Advincula was driving taxi and traversing through
East Avenue, Quezon City, when he was flagged down by
Cariño in front of the Social Security System building. Cariño
asked Advincula to take him to Ortigas. Upon arriving at
Ortigas, Cariño asked Advincula to stop along the corner of
Julia Vargas and Meralco Avenue. While parked thereat, a
silver Nissan Sentra arrived. Cariño alighted and approached
the Nissan Sentra. Upon returning to the taxi, Cariño asked
Advincula to follow the Nissan Sentra. After driving for a short
distance, the Nissan Sentra entered Gate 1 of the Corinthian
Gardens Subdivision in Quezon City. The guard was informed
by victim Mirko Moeller that the passenger of the taxi was his
visitor. The security guard identified the passenger of the taxi
as Carino, who he pointed in open court. At around 7:30 a.m.
of August 29, 2002, Nena Taro, the housemaid of Moeller
arrived at the latter's home. Taro noticed that the main gate
and the door of the house were unlocked. Upon entering the
house, she was surprised to see dried blood on the wall beside
the light switch. She walked to the backdoor leading to the
swimming pool to look for Moeller. There, she was horrified to
see him lying face down in front of the swimming pool. Shocked
by what she had seen, she rushed out of the house to ask for
help. Moments later, the security guards and the police
arrived. The police officers arrested accused-appellants in
Bagaquin, Baguio City. They were tipped off by an informant
about the whereabouts of the said accused-appellants. During
the arrest, the police recovered a camera, video camera, and
charger from the accused-appellants. The police also tracked
down the stolen Nissan Sentra in Isabela, after Cariño pointed
to its location. Cariño also surrendered the keys of the Nissan
Sentra. The Medico-Legal Officer, testified that the victim's
cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage, as a result of
traumatic injuries in the head.
RTC rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants for the
crimes of robbery with homicide, and carnapping. CA affirmed
RTC with modification as to the amount of damages for the
crime of robbery with homicide. As to the crime of carnapping,
CA pointed out that the information failed to indicate that the
victim was killed in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof Thus, there being no
causal connection between the carnapping and killing, the
accused-appellant should be meted with lesser sentence.
Hence, this appeal.
Pertinent provisions:
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution proved the guilt of the
accused-appellants for the crimes of Robbery with Homicide,
and Carnapping?
Held:
YES. Robbery with Homicide:
The phrase "by reason of the robbery," covers a situation
where the killing of the person is committed either before or
after the taking of personal property. It is imperative to
establish that "the intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery." Remarkably, homicide is said to be committed by
reason of, or on the occasion of robbery if for instance, it was
committed: (i) "to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the
culprit; (ii) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot;
(iii) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or
(iv) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime."
Thus, a conviction for robbery with homicide requires certitude
that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.
Consequently, once it has been established with certainty that
a person was killed on the occasion of the robbery, the accused
may be convicted of robbery with homicide. It is equally
important to note that a conviction for robbery with homicide
need not be proven solely through direct evidence of the
malefactor's culpability. Rather, the offender's guilt may
likewise be proven through circumstantial evidence, as long as
the following requisites are present: (i) there must be more
than one circumstance; (ii) the inference must be based on
proven facts; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances
produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused.
In this case, the Security guard testified that he saw Moeller
accompanied my Carino. The taxi driver confirmed that Carino
was his passenger and testified that he dropped Carino at the
house of Moeller. Taro, the victim's housemaid, found the
latter at the backyard of his home, lifeless. A dumbbell was
found near the body of the victim. The Medico-Legal Report
showed that Moeller died due to intra-cranial hemorrhage,
which was caused by a blow inflicted using a hard and blunt
object. During their arrest, Cariño and Aquino were caught in
possession of a camera, video camera and charger. SPO4
Jeresano testified that the accused-appellants admitted that
the Nissan Sentra belonged to Moeller.Aquino even
surrendered the keys of the Nissan Sentra to the police.
Carnapping:
The taking of the motor vehicle is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he
has no opportunity to dispose of the same. The intent to gain
or the animus lucrandi , being an internal act, is presumed
from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. 56 56 Notably,
"actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the
intent to gain." Likewise, the term gain is not limited to a
pecuniary benefit, but also includes the benefit which in any
other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken
without the owner's consent already constitutes gain.
In the case at bar, the prosecution proved the existence of all
the elements of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt. The
Nissan Sentra, which was owned by Moeller, was stolen by the
accused-appellants from the victim's house, and brought to
Isabela. To eradicate all traces of its previous ownership, the
accused-appellants even changed the vehicle's plate number.
However, despite their attempt to conceal their crime, the
police discovered that the retrieved vehicle bore the same
engine and chassis number as the victim's stolen vehicle.
Likewise, the police found the stolen vehicle in Isabela, no less
from the information supplanted by Cariño himself. Certainly,
Cariño's knowledge about the vehicle's exact location shows
his complicity in its taking. Added to this, Cariño was in
possession of the car keys, which he surrendered to the police.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Decision dated September 14, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06217, convicting
accused-appellants Renato Cariño y Gocong and Alvin Aquino
y Ragam of the crimes of Robbery with Homicide, and
Carnapping, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In
Criminal Case No. Q-02111947 for Robbery with Homicide, the
accused-appellants are ordered to pay exemplary damages
worth Php75,000.00 to the heirs of victim Mirko Moeller. All
the amounts due shall earn a legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this ruling until the full
satisfaction thereof. The assailed decision is armed in all other
respects.
Anti-Arson (b)Simple arson distinguished from destructive
arson; intent to kill or conceal
People v Cacho
G.R. No. 218425. September 27, 2017|Tijam
Doctrine:
Facts:
PO2 Emelito Salen and SPO4 Onofre Tavas of the Rodriguez
Police Station received a report from a certain Willy Cacho
about a fire in Sitio Catmon, Brgy. San Rafael, Rodriguez, Rizal.
PO2 Salen and SPO4 Tavas, who were accompanied by
members of the Bureau of Fire Protection. Upon arriving in
Sitio Catmon, the police officers saw a burned house, which
was owned by a certain Boy who was later identified as Mario
Balbao. Upon investigation, they discovered a burned body of
a headless man underneath an iron sheet. Willy Cacho
informed the police officers that it was his brother, accused-
appellant, who killed Boy. Accused-appellant's wife likewise
told the police officers that her husband was a patient of the
National Center for Mental Health and has a recurring mental
illness. The police officers went to the house of [accused-
appellant] where they saw a shallow pit measuring 1 foot in
diameter and 5 inches deep with a steel peg standing at the
center, which they believed was used to burn a head because
there were traces of ash and a human skull on top of the heap
of charcoal. The police officers then saw accused-appellant in
his backyard. Upon introducing themselves as police officers,
accused-appellant acted strangely and exhibited signs of
mental illness. According to SPO4 Tavas, accused-appellant
admitted killing Boy and burning the latter's house but did not
say why he did it. When they tried to arrest him, accused-
appellant became wild. The police officers sought help from
other people to subdue accused-appellant and to place him
inside the mobile car. Accused-appellant was then brought to
the prosecutors office for inquest proceedings. After the
inquest, accused-appellant was brought to the National Center
for Mental Health for confinement. An information was filed
charging accused-appellant of the crimes of Murder and
Destructive Arson.
RTC found accused guilty of the crimes of Murder and
Destructive Arson. CA affirmed RTC. Hence, this petition.
Pertinent provisions:
Issue:
Whether or not, the lower courts erred in convicting accused
of the crimes of murder and arson?
Held:
NO. In order to determine whether the crime committed is
arson only, or murder, or arson and homicide or murder, as the
case may be, the main objective of the accused is to be
examined. If the main objective is the burning of the building
or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed. If, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a
particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when re
is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime
committed is murder only. Lastly, if the objective is, likewise,
to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but re is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing,
then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed —
homicide/murder and arson.
In this case, aside from the fact that accused-appellant already
admitted to the commission of the crime of destructive arson
due to his plea of insanity, which as We discussed above was
not successfully proven, the prosecution was able to
sufficiently prove that the accused-appellant burned the house
of the victim in order to hide or conceal the commission of the
crime. It was established that accused-appellant first beheaded
the victim before setting the latter's house on fire. Therefore,
two separate crimes were committed by the accused-
appellant, homicide and arson.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July
1, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06123 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
When committed by a syndicate
People v Sota
G.R. No. 203121. November 29, 2017|Martires
Doctrine:
Facts:
Jocelyn woke up and found that her father, Artemio, was no
longer by her side. She peeped through a hole in the wall of
their house, which was located in Zamboanga del Norte, and
saw Sota and Gadjadli outside with three other persons. The
moon was bright, thus, she was able to identify Sota and
Gadjadli, who were close friends of Artemio and whose lands
adjoined Artemio's land. Sota acted as the leader of the group
while Gadjadli carried a pistol. The group was demanding food
from Artemio who was willing to comply on condition that he
would hand the food through an opening in the wall, being
afraid to open the door because he might be harmed. The
group lighted a torch made up of coconut leaves and started to
burn the house but Artemio was able to put out the fire.
Artemio pleaded for them not to burn his house and repeated
his request that he would wrap the food and hand it to them
through the opening in the wall. The group demanded that
Artemio open the door; otherwise, they would burn the house.
When Artemio refused to comply insisting that he would hand
them the food through the opening in the wall, the group red
at the house, with Gadjadli firing the first shot at Artemio. At
that instance, Jocelyn jumped out of the window to escape and
then ran away. When she looked back, she saw their house
burning while Artemio, who ran down the house, was red at by
the group. Jocelyn proceeded to Eusebio's house, which was 15
meters away from theirs, and told Eusebio, her brother, what
happened to their father; but Eusebio did nothing about it
because he was shivering in fear. Abelardo, a son of Artemio,
who lived nearby, did not try to rescue Artemio when he saw
that his father's house was burning because he was prevailed
upon by his wife not to leave. The following day, Jocelyn,
together with her brothers and sisters, found Artemio's body
with stab and gunshot wounds. Jocelyn was brought to the
police station at the Municipality of Labason where she
executed her affidavit. Abelardo reported Artemio's death to
the Barangay Captain and the police detachment, and
thereafter executed his affidavit. The house and everything
inside it, which had a total value of P30,000.00, were totally
burned.
RTC convicted accused of the crime of murder and arson. CA
affirmed RTC with modification as to the penalties and
damages. Hence, this petition.
Pertinent provisions: See Section 8 and 9 of R110
Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 provides that the penalty of
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if
the property burned is an inhabited house or dwelling, while
Section 4 thereof states that the maximum of the penalty shall
be imposed if arson was attended by the following special
aggravating circumstances:
1. If committed with intent to gain;
2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property
burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate.
The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is planned or
carried out
Issue:
Whether or not, special aggravating circumstance that arson
was committed by a syndicate should have been appreciated
in this case?
Held:
YES. The information pertinently states that the'above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another and with intent to destroy property and
moved by hatred or resentment, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously set on fire the residential house of
one ARTEMIO EBA, causing to be totally burned including his
belongings." 70 70 The information clearly informs the accused
that they, i.e., Sota, Gadjadli, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard
Doe, were being charged for having set on re Artemio's house.
The allegation that there were five accused conspiring to burn
Artemio's house undoubtedly qualifies the crime as having
been committed by a syndicate.
In this case, the aggravating circumstance that the crime was
committed by a syndicate was confirmed by the fact that the
accused-appellants and three other unidentified persons
carried a torch and assembled outside Artemio's house making
threats to burn it. The well-coordinated movements of the
group fortified their joint purpose and design, and community
of interest in burning Artemio's house. The group started to
burn the house of Artemio when he refused to open his door
in order to hand them food. It was fortunate that Artemio was
able to put out the fire from the torch; but after the group had
fired on the house of Artemio, they set fire to his house and
thereafter ran after him to shoot him. Noteworthy, in their
respective decisions, both the RTC and the CA ruled that there
were five persons who killed Artemio and burned his house
down
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.
People v Dolendo
G.R. No. 223098. June 3, 2019|Lazaro-Javier
Doctrine:
Facts:
Complainant Deolina Perocho testified that on September 18,
1996, around 4 o'clock in the afternoon while she and her
children, Ivy (one-year-old), Isalyn (three years old), and Janice
(five years old) were eating in their house at Sitio Kapatagan,
Barangay Capsay, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate,
she heard appellant shouting "Leonardo, I am already here!"
Leonardo Perocho, Sr. (Leonardo Sr.) was Deolina's husband.
She also saw appellant Nestor Dolendo y Fediles alias "Etoy"
holding a gun. She and her children immediately ran upstairs
and called for help. But since their house was far from their
neighbors, no one came to help. She saw appellant gather
dried coconut leaves and set their porch on fire. She and her
three children jumped from the rear window and hid in a grassy
area. After a while, they heard her six-year-old son Leonardo
Jr. crying. She then realized she had totally forgotten about
Leonardo Jr. who was asleep when the house fire began. By the
time they came out from their hiding place, the house had
been completely burned and Leonardo Jr. had died. Appellant
and her husband were not in good terms as they had a previous
altercation. Leonardo Sr. had since avoided appellant. Jessie
Perocho, Deolina's 18-year-old son testified that he was
working at a nearby farm when the incident took place. He saw
appellant light a torch made of coconut leaves and use it to set
their house on fire. He got so scared he could not do anything
to stop appellant. The post-mortem Medical Report on
Leonardo, Jr found that the death was due to massive burned.

RTC found appellant guilty of arson with homicide. CA affirmed

with modification. Instead of arson with homicide, it found
appellant guilty of simple arson.
Pertinent provisions:
Issue:
Whether or not, accused is guilty of arson?
Held:
YES. Arson requires the following elements: (1) a fire was set
intentionally; and (2) the accused was identified as the person
who caused it. The corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the
bare fact of the fire and that it was intentionally caused.

In this case, both Deolina and Jessie Perocho recounted in

detail their harrowing experience as a family in the cruel hands
of appellant when he burned down their dwelling, killing six-
year-old Leonardo Jr. as a result. Deolina and three of her
children had to jump out of the window to escape the fire and
hide in a grassy area. It was appellant whom they saw setting
their dwelling on fire after he proudly announced his arrival to
the head of the family Leonardo Sr. who was not around at that
time. The trial court gave full credence to the positive
testimony of both Deolina and Jessie Perocho on that it was
indeed appellant who set their dwelling on fire, killing six year-
old Leonardo Jr. as a result. The credible testimonies of these
eyewitnesses are sufficient to prove the corpus delicti and
support a conviction for arson against appellant.
Disposition:
Accordingly, the appeal is DENIED, and the Decision dated
March 18, 2015, AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION