BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

12 SCRA 648
Facts:
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note for his
bride-to-be, stating that they have to postpone the wedding because his mother opposes it and that
he’s leaving the convair that day. The following day, September 3, Velez sent a telegram stating that
nothing has changed and assured the plaintiff that he will be back soon. Thereafter Velez did not
appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner,
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

Defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial
and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, ordered the parties and their
attorneys to appear before it "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at
an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is
contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action
for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a
promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong.

Issue:

Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. (YES)

Ruling:

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

It must not be overlooked that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued.
Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared.
A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received.

Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned
in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not
be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is
that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The
argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly
acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner."

This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
ADORACION CAROLINO (SPOUSE AND IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED JEREMIAS A.
CAROLINO), Petitioner, v. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); BRIG. GEN. FERNANDO ZABAT, AS CHIEF OF THE AFP
FINANCE CENTER; COMMO. REYNALDO BASILIO, AS CHIEF OF THE AFP-GHQ
MANAGEMENT AND FISCAL OFFICE; AND COMMO. EMILIO MARAYAG, PENSION AND
GRATUITY OFFICER, PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER, AFP FINANCE
CENTER, Respondent.

G.R. No. 189649, April 20, 2015

FACTS:

Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's husband, retired from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
with the rank of Colonel under General Order No. 1208 dated November 29, 1976, pursuant to the
provisions of Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 340, as amended. He started receiving
his monthly retirement pay in the amount of P18,315.00 in December 1976 until the same was withheld
by respondents in March 2005. On June 3, 2005, Jeremias wrote a letter addressed to the AFP Chief
of Staff asking for the reasons of the withholding of his retirement pay. In a letter reply, Myrna F.
Villaruz, LTC (FS) PA, Pension and Gratuity Officer of the AFP Finance Center, informed Jeremias
that his loss of Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the alpha list of the AFP
Pensioners' Payroll effective March 5, 2005.

The AFP Judge Advocate General opined that under the provisions of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA No.
340, retired military personnel are disqualified from receiving pension benefits once incapable
to render military service as a result of his having sworn allegiance to a foreign country. It was
also mentioned that termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could be done
pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1638 which provides that the name
of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his
retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. It being in consonance with the policy consideration
that all retirement laws inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and
modified accordingly.

RTC FAVORED THE PETITIONER, The RTC found that the issue for resolution is the applicability of
RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638 upon Jeremias' retirement benefits. It found that he retired as a
commissioned officer of the AFP in 1976; thus, RANo. 340 is the law applicable in determining his
entitlement to his retirement benefits and not PD No. 1638 which was issued only in 1979.
Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." PD No. 1638 does not provide for such retroactive application. Also, it could
not have been the intendment of PD No. 1638 to deprive its loyal soldiers of a monthly pension during
their old age especially where, as here, the right had been vested to them through time. RA No. 340
does not provide that the loss of Filipino citizenship would terminate one's retirement benefits;
and that PD No. 1638 does not reduce whatever benefits that any person has already been
receiving under existing law.

Petitioner died. The petition was continued by his wife.

CA FAVORED THE RESPONDENTS, the CA found that while it is true that Jeremias retired in 1976
under the provisions of RA No. 340, as amended, which does not contain any provision anent
cessation or loss of retirement benefits upon acquiring another citizenship, PD No. 1638, which was
signed in 1979, effectively repealed RA No. 340, as amended. Section 27 of PD No. 1638, which
provides that the name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired
list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss, was correctly made applicable to Jeremias'
retirement benefits. Logic dictates that since Jeremias had already renounced his allegiance to
the Philippines, he cannot now be compelled by the State to render active service and to render
compulsory military service when the need arises. The CA found that for the writ of mandamus to
lie, it is essential that Jeremias should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be
the imperative duty of respondents to perform the act required which petitioner failed to show; thus,
mandamus will not lie.

Hence, this petition.

The RA No. 340 clearly shows how a retiree's retirement benefits may be terminated, i.e., when the
retiree refuses to perform active service when called to do so provided that (1) the retiree resides in
the Philippines and (2) is physically fit for service. There is no other requirement found in the law which
would be the reason for the termination of a retiree's retirement benefits. Petitioner's husband was
never called to perform active service and refused to do so, however, his retirement benefit
was terminated. The reason for such termination was his loss of Filipino citizenship based on
Section 27 of PD No. 1638.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PD No. 1638 is applicable upon Jeremias' retirement benefits. (No)

RULING:

Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under
Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless
the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions; that all statutes are to be
construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used;
and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect. These principles also apply
to amendments of statutes.

PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive application, nor the same may
be implied from its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall
take effect upon its approval. As held in Parreno v. COA, there is no question that PD No. 1638, as
amended, applies prospectively. Since PD No. 1638, as amended, is about the new system of
retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who were in the
service at the time of its approval. Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired
before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act
continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment.

Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee,
he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age,
and length of service. Undeniably, petitioner's husband had complied with the conditions of eligibility
to retirement benefits as he was then receiving his retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was
terminated. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause. It is only upon
retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy
a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-
existing law.
Ayog v. Cusi: "A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some
particular person or persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property
legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law".

Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his retirement benefits which must be
respected and cannot be affected by the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which provides that
loss of Filipino citizenship terminates retirement benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations after the
right has vested.

A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioner's legal right to the performance of a particular
act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. The remedy of mandamus lies to compel
the performance of a ministerial duty. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.

The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the RTC was for the payment of
his terminated retirement benefits, which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on
the part of the respondents to pay such claim, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such
payment.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal. This is
because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the
administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility. Here, the question raised is purely legal, i.e.,
what law should be applied in the payment of retirement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there
was no need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial relief can be sought.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 25, 2009 and the Resolution dated
September 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated February 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, is AFFIRMED.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid or effective. (YES)
RULING:
The Court declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect.
The conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes
a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents
with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through
Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
[penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation
in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
 Tanada vs. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986
FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself.
RULING:
The court held that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the
present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did
not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year
after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise
provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature
could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure
to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true
only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law
on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can
begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification
at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others,
and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest
even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
CONCURRING OPINION: J. Feliciano
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a
statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the
Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an
amendatory statute is in fact enacted. Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication
effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.