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A History of Carvakas
A History of Carvakas
A History of Carvakas
We may note here some of the features that have come to be associated with
this school. There is the rejection of the efficacy of Vedic sacrificial ritual and
ascetic practises, combined with a contemptuous attitude directed towards the
Vedic priesthood. There is also a tacit acknowledgement of the "Eat, drink and
be merry, for tomorrow we may die" philosophy that has been associated with
the C•rv•ka system. It is noticeable that only three Vedas are mentioned,
which we may assume to mean the Rig, Yajur and S•ma Vedas. The exclusion of
the Atharvaveda from the text is curious, given that by the 14th century it had
become part of the Vedic corpus in Samhit• recension. The reason for this could
be that the text or oral tradition that M•dhava based his account on was
composed before the Atharvaveda was accepted as •ruti. It is generally accepted
that the ancient Indian tradition in general speaks of only three Vedas, and that
the Atharvaveda occupies a rather ambivalent position in the Veda. There may
be a different explanation to be placed on the exclusion, in this text, of the
Atharvaveda (and its possible relationship to Lok•yata) in Chapter 2.
M•dhava gives in his account an exposition of the philosophical tenets of the C
•rv•kas. These are as follows:
1. Metaphysics- "In this school the four elements, earth, etc., are the
original principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body,
[5]
intelligence is produced."
2. Ethics- "The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual
pleasures."[6]
3. Epistemology- "Therefore the soul is only the body distinguished
by intelligence, since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the
body, as such cannot be proved, since this school holds that perception is
the only source of knowledge and does not allow inference, etc."[7]
4. Causality- "From this it follows that fate, etc., do not exist, since
these can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say, if you do
not thus allow adrishta,[8] the various phenomena of the world become
destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept this objection as valid, since
these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent
nature of things."[9]
We shall deal with the origins and development of these tenets, and whether
1. Lok•yata
Early in the Sarvadar•anasamgraha we find this interesting quotation:
The mass of men, in accordance with the •astras of
policy and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the
only ends of man, and denying the existence of any object
belonging to a future world, are found to follow only the
doctrine of C•rv•ka. Hence another name for that school is
Lok•yata - a name well accordant with the thing
signified.[10]
The use of the phrase "The mass of men" is curious. Does M•dhava really mean
to suggest here that the majority of the Indian populace were adherents of a
system that denied the validity of the concept of rebirth, a central theme in
Indian thought from the post-Vedic period onwards?
The word Lok•yata is a compound term, a combination of loka (the material
world) and ayatah (that which was prevalent in or amongst).[11] Rhys Davids
says, "Lok•yata is explained by Wilson as ‘the system of atheistical philosophy
taught by C•rv•ka’, and by the Petersburg Dictionary as ‘Materialism’."[12] He
also quotes from a Buddhist text: "Buddhaghosa in our passage has: Lok•yatam
vuccati vitanda v•da-sattham: ‘the Lok•yata is a text-book of the Vitandas
(Sophists)’."[13] This quotation of Rhys Davids' own interpretation gives another
meaning to Lok•yata:
…about 500 BC the word Lok•yata was used in a
complimentary way as the name of a branch of Br•hmin
learning, and probably meant Nature-lore - wise sayings,
riddles and rhymes, and theories handed down by tradition
as to cosmogony, the elements, the stars, the weather, the
scraps of astronomy, of elementary physics, even of
anatomy, and knowledge of the nature of precious stones,
and of birds and of beasts and of plants. To be a master of
such lore was then considered to by no means unbecoming
to a learned Br•hmin, though it ranked, of course, below
his other studies… The amount then existing of such lore
was too small to make a fair proficiency in it incompatible
with other knowledge. As the amount of it grew larger, and
Rhys Davids is quite correct in stating that the study of Lok•yata was at one
time not incompatible with Br•hmanical learning. In the Artha••stra, composed
sometime around 300 BCE,[15] we find this reference:
…1.The branches of learning are: Logic, the three Vedas
(tray•), agriculture, cattle-raising and trade (collectively
called v•rt•) and the technique of ruling (dandan•ti)…3. For,
logic is only a branch of Vedic lore…10. Logic-based
philosopy (anv•kshik•) (is represented by the following
three): S•mkhya, Yoga and Lok•yata…12. Logic is ever
accepted to be the lamp of all branches of learning, the
means for all kinds of activities and the basis of all virtues
(dharmas).[16]
Against this, we have a text from a much later date that depicts the C•rv•kas in
a distinctly different manner. Gunaratna (c. 15th century CE) is here
commentating on the Saddar•anasamuccaya of Haribhadra, a Jain philosopher (c.
8th century CE):[17]
First, the characteristics (svar•pa) of the N•stikas[18] are
being stated. The N•stikas are a kind of people, including
Brahmins and ending with the low-born, who carry human
skulls, smear their bodies with ashes and practise yoga.
They do not admit the self, virtue (punya), vice (p•pa)
and the like. They speak of the world as consisting of only
four forms of matter. Some sections of the C•rv•kas,
considering •k••a as the fifth form of matter, declare that
the world consists of five forms of matter.
In their view, consciousness is produced from these
forms of matter, like the power of intoxication. Living
beings are like water-bubbles. The self is nothing but the
body as characterised by consciousness. They take
spirituous drinks and meat and also copulate with those
unfit to be sexually approached (agamy•) like the mother,
etc. Every year, on a particular day, they assemble and
copulate randomly with women. They do not consider
2. Brihaspati
An alternative appellation for the Lok•yata system is B•rhaspatya, a
straightforward term that means, "those who follow Brihaspati." Most scholars
are agreed that this Brihaspati was the founder of the Lok•yata system, though
there is a question as to the historicity of this person. The tradition associated
with Lok•yata suggests that Brihaspati also provided it with its original s•tras,
but in the absence of a clearly substantiated B•rhaspatya text, this claim is not
sustainable. We do have at our disposal far more material on the mythic
The mention of the destruction of the Asuras is odd, because we find in the
Rigveda that Asura is interchangeable with the word Deva (i.e., god or deity).[27]
But between the composition of the hymns of the Rig-Veda and the
Upanishads, the application or meaning of epithets undergoes a great deal of
change, and the Asuras are demonised in the latter. Not only that; the focus of
attention in the Upanishads (though not exclusively) is on a quest for the
meaning behind the mythology and ritual formulae of the Vedic hymns.
But what exactly do we mean by Vedic hymns? As we briefly touched on in
the introduction, there is a section of Veda that sits rather uneasily with the rest
of corpus, in that it is not primarily centred on the sacrificial ritualism of the
earliest section of the Rigveda. Brockington says of the Atharvaveda:
The Atharvaveda is, like the Rigveda, a collection of
complete hymns rather than isolated verses, but its general
lack of connection with sacrificial ceremonial led to some
reluctance to accept its authority alongside the other three
Vedas. It takes its title from one of the great priestly
who had followed the traditions of the Atharvaveda, at least until the
harmonising of all these trends in the final redaction of the Vedic corpus. Could
the rituals associated with the fourth Veda have been the knowledge imparted
by Brihaspati to the Asuras?[32] And if so, did this knowledge have any bearing
on the development and doctrines of Lok•yata?
There is another aspect of Brihaspati that requires mention. In 1921, Dr. F.W
Thomas translated and published "The Brihaspati S•tra."[33] This document is a
work devoted to the art of statesmanship and the ordinances of correct
government, bearing a close resemblance to the Artha••stra, and exhibits no
clear affiliation to any particular school of philosophy. However there are
several indications that the text draws upon Lok•yata traditions, e.g., "…5.
Universally the Lok•yata system of doctrine is alone to be followed at the time
of acquiring gain; 6. Only the K•p•lika as regards attainment of pleasure;…"[34]
Here we see Brihaspati connected with a system advocating the pursuit of artha
and k•ma, in conjunction with the attainment and consolidation of political
power. Set against this, we have an episode in the Mah•bh•rata that can be
interpreted as casting a different complexion on the ethics of the C•rv•kas.
3. C•rv•ka
The earliest explicit mention of the name C•rv•ka is not found in any of the
philosophical texts dealing with Lok•yata, but in the Mah•bh•rata. The Epic
deals with the war between the Kur•s and the P•ndavas, and its most important
aspect for later Hindu theology is the separate text incorporated within it, the
Bh•gav•d G•ta. The episode involving C•rv•ka is found in 12. 1. 414 of the Mah
•bh•rata, and it is worth quoting in full:
When the Brahmins were now once again standing
silent, C•rv•ka the R•xasa,[35] in the disguise of a Brahmin,
addressed the King. This friend of Duryodhana, concealed
under the garb of a mendicant with a rosary, a lock of hair
on his crown, and a triple staff, impudent and fearless,
surrounded by all the Brahmins exceeding a thousand in
number, who were anxious to utter their benedictions -
men who practised austerity and self-restraint - this wretch,
wishing evil to the magnanimous P•ndavas, without
saluting those Brahmins, thus addressed the King: "All
these Brahmins, falsely imputing the malediction to me,
themselves exclaim, woe to you, wicked king, the son of
Kunt•? Since you have slaughtered your kinsmen and
elders, death is desirable for you, and not life." Hearing this
speech of the wicked R•xasa the Brahmins were pained and
indignant, being maligned by his words. But they, as well
The origin of the use of the name dogs could have been a form of totemism.
Chattopadhyaya states:
The essence of totemism is as follows. Each clan of
which the tribe is composed associates itself with an animal
(or a plant), which is called its totem. The clansmen regard
themselves as akin to their totem-species and as descended
from it. Thus the people belonging to the dog-clan, for
example, would consider themselves to be dogs and as
descended from the dog.[43]
What is being suggested here is not that the name c•rv•ka itself is totemistic,
rather it relates to a form of ritual that was prevalent in India when the
predominant structure of society was on a tribal basis. We do have this example
from the Taittiriyopanishad :
Bravo! Bravo! Bravo!
I am food! I am food! I am food!
I am an eater of food! I am an eater of food! I am an eater of
food!
I am a maker of verses! I am a maker of verses! I am a
maker of verses!
I am the first-born of the universal order (rita),
Earlier than the gods, in the navel of immortality!
Whoso gives me away, verily, has succoured me!
I who am food eat the eater of food!
I have overcome the whole world!
"I am an eater of food." Could this be a primitive c•rv•ka, and, if so, what
significance does this have for the passage from the Mah•bh•rata?
C•rv•ka's hostility in this episode is directed at the slaying of svaj•nam (one's
own kindred) in the name of dharma. That the war involved fratricide is not
contested, and is indeed the source of the dialogue between Krishna and
Arjuna in the Bh•gav•d G•ta. The passage explicitly notes that the priests
evidently felt shame as a result of C•rv•ka's denunciation of inter-tribal killing.
But whatever qualms they may have held about this were soon dispelled, and C
•rv•ka is killed by them. If c•rv•ka is truly representative of an older form of
tribal ritual, then the death of C•rv•ka in this passage could be interpreted as
marking the disappearance of religious practises that focussed exclusively on
the needs of the immediate tribe. Admittedly, this is pure hypothesis,[47] and
that the C•rv•kas are not viewed by Kautilya in the Artha••stra as opposing
the requirements of the state and society in general (if indeed his reference to
Lok•yata is concomitant with C•rv•ka). However, there is evidence that there
4. Deh•tmav•da
For the C•rv•kas, there was no metaphysical concept of the "Self" as depicted
in the Upanishads, and the karmic law that necessitated the rebirth of this entity
into the next life was nonsensical. The believed that consciousness was the
body endowed with intelligence. M•dhava adds that the C•rv•kas quote from
the Brihad•ranyaka Upanishad ii. 4, 12 to support this assertion,"Out of these
elements (bh•ta) do [all contingent beings] arise and along with them are they
destroyed. After death there is no consciousness (samjn•): this is what I say.
Thus spake Y•jnavalkya."[48] Y•jnavalkya here was presumably acting as p
•rvapakshin,[49] as his true philosophical position was in direct opposition to the
C•rv•ka view. In fact, we can fairly say that that is the case for all the
Upanishadic sages, with the possible exception of Brihaspati in the Maitr•
Upanishad.
These philosophers have one other thing in common: their caste status is either
Br•hmana or Kshatriya. And in many instances we find examples of a reversal
of the functions of these twice-born castes, whereby the Br•hmana becomes the
pupil of the Kshatriya. It could possibly be that what we are witnessing here is
a reflection of the political realities that faced Indian society in the period when
fully-fledged statehood is being carved out between warring tribal factions (as
evidenced, or at least hinted at, in the events of the Mah•bh•rata and possibly
the R•m•yana). The important point is that we do not have at our disposal in
these texts the philosophical speculations of those castes that were outside of
this Br•hmana-Kshatriya hegemony. This is not a simply a question of literacy.
As in all Vedic literature, the Upanishads were taught and expanded upon by
centuries of oral tradition long before transcription, and there is no reason to
believe that the lower castes in Indian society did not have a similar oral
tradition over the same period, or at the least have leaders or teachers who
shaped these traditions.
The most famous of these teachers who rejected the Vedic orthodoxy were of
course the Buddha and Mah•v•ra. There were other thinkers in this period
who are documented in the Buddhist and Jain literature. Makkhali Gos•la[50]
appears to have been quite a formidable influence at the time and his sect, the
•j•vikas, may have at one time been more important than the Jains.[51] There
are others who appear to have been expounding a form of crude
materialism.[52] One such teacher was Ajita Ke•akambala, and we have this
said of his thought:
A second teacher, Ajita Ke•ambala, represented the
following view: "There is no gift in charity, there is no
sacrifice, there are no offerings. There is no fruit and
The are extremely close similarities between this text and the description of Lok
•yata in M•dhava's account, although there are no references in the Buddhist
literature to Ajita Ke•ambala explicitly naming him as a C•rv•ka or a Lok
•yatika. Another notable feature of his teaching is the sense of pessimism that
pervades the text. This is not surprising, as it could be argued that these anti-Br
•hmanical thinkers were as much influenced by the perceived deterioration of
the material culture in which they lived as by their rejection of the hollowness
of the sacrificial cult.
But neither the Buddhists or the Jains reached the conclusion that the only
existent property in the world was matter, as Lok•yata did. The theory of
consciousness that the C•rv•kas developed from this position is referred to as
deh•tmav•da or bh•tacaitanyav•da in the philosophical texts of classical India. In
a Ny•ya[54] text that explicitly mentions the latter, the bh•tacaitanyav•din is
described as "one who admits the consciousness of material elements."[55] In his
commentary on the Brahma-s•tra,[56] •ankara gives this view of deh•tmav•da:
The existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so
on which are the bode of activity can be established (by
inference) only; the inference being based on the difference
between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such
as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz, that
intelligence is observed only where a body is observed
while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists
the possibility that this could have been influential in the development of Lok
•yata, although the C•rv•kas apparently saw no difference between the
products of mind (i.e., intelligence, ego etc.,) and the quality of consciousness
that S•mkhya refers to as purusha.
Deh•tmav•da, in the sense of being a negation of anything outside of the
material elements from which the body was constituted,[61] could also be
construed as being "the cult of the body". The Tantrikas and the adherents of
the Yoga school also emphasised the importance of the body, and bodily
functions, in their systems. But the ultimate goal of their rituals and practises
was similar to the liberation aimed at by S•mkhya. Nevertheless, there are
scholars who see a connection between Lok•yata and Tantrism, i.e., the K•p
•lika sect. Dhakshinranjan Shastri states:
Formerly, this sect flourished in an independent form. In
course of time it became weak, and lost its independence.
Probably the inhuman cruelties, or the dreadfulness of the
sect, brought about its ruin. As k•ma or the enjoyment of
sensual pleasure was the goal of this sect, it came gradually
to be affiliated to the N•stika form of the Lok•yata school,
according to which the summum bonum of human life is
pleasure. Thus the K•p•likas, like the Assassins, became
the solitary historical example of a combination of
materialistic philosophy with cruelty, lust, supernatural
power and systematic crime. Or, it may be that the
followers of orthodox schools, through bitter contempt,
identified the Lok•yatikas with the fierce K•p•likas, as in
previous cases the Vedicists used freely terms of abuse like
"bastard", "incest" and "monster" with regard to the Lok
•yatikas. At the time of the author of Artha••stra, these K•p
•likas were a distinct sect. In Gunaratna's time we find
them identified with the Lok•yatika school which had
already become a hated name in the country.[62]
It must be noted that the evidence connecting Lok•yata with the K•p•likas is
extremely fragmentary, and that we do not possess a definitive chronology for
the development of the latter sect. But Shastri may be right in suggesting that
there was an alternative form of Lok•yata that did not meet with the approval
of other schools of thought.
Chattopadhyaya gives this quotation from the Vinaya Pit•ka:
Now at that time the Chabbagiya Bhikkhus learnt the
Lokayata system.
People murmured, etc., saying "Like those who still enjoy
the pleasures of the world!"
Could these low arts have been some form of magic? If they were, it may be
that some Lok•yatikas still adhered to the forms of ritual that are found in the
Atharvaveda. The use of such rituals by magicians is for attaining power (for
whatever purpose), and is also the aim of Hindu Tantrikas in their sex rituals.
This does open up the (admittedly hypothetical) possibility that the C•rv•kas,
or at least some of them, were connected to the K•p•likas, using the Tantra in
the pursuit of artha and for the fulfilment of k•ma.
5. Svabh•vav•da
The following is an account of Lok•yata epistemology, drawing from
traditional sources, by Surendranath Dasgupta:
…The C•rv•kas admitted the validity only of perception.
There is nothing else but what can be perceived by the five
senses. No inference can be regarded as a valid means of
knowledge, for inference is possible only when the
universal concomitance of the reason (hetus) with the
probandum is known, and such a reason is known to be
existing in the object of the minor term (vy•pti-pak•a-
dharmat•-••li hi lingam gamakam). Such a concomitance must
any object belonging to a future world outside of the one lived in on a daily
basis, that "There is no heaven, no final liberation." The rejection of inference by
the C•rv•kas was not an attempt to stunt and distort the human intellect. They
rejected inferential thinking as a means of establishing the existence of paraloka.
However, in the extant sources this argument is corroborated on only one
occasion. Dasgupta finds this reference to a certain Purandara in Kamala••la's
Panjik•:
Purandara, however, a follower of C•rv•ka (probably of
the seventh century), admits the usefulness of inference in
determining the nature of all worldly things where
perceptual experience is available; but inference cannot be
employed for establishing any dogma regarding the
transcendental world, or life after death or the laws of
Karma which cannot be available to ordinary perceptual
experience. The main reason for upholding such a
distinction between the validity of inference in our practical
life of ordinary experience, and in ascertaining
transcending truths beyond experience, lies in this, that an
inductive generalization [sic] is made by observing a large
number of cases of agreement in presence together with
agreement in absence, and no cases of agreement in
presence can be observed in the transcendent sphere; for
even if such spheres existed they could not be perceived by
the senses.[66]
work that his arguments have not come under the purview
of Brihaspati. As Jayar••i's agnosticism does not hold good
philosophically, so is his claim of originality unfounded
and the sign of pettiness.[69]
The mention of hair-splittings and pettiness is significant, for this could be the
vitand•, fallacious argumentation, that Buddhaghosa accused the C•rv•kas of
engaging in.
But if the C•rv•kas rejected the use of the pram•nas in establishing the existence
of a world outside of our sense-data, then how were they to account for
existence of the empirical world and its causal relations? Lok•yata had no place
for Divine creation in its system, nor did it hold that the world unfolded as an
outward manifestation of Brahman, as taught by the Advaita Vedanta school.
Causality, if the materialists were to maintain a consistent doctrine, must be
due to purely physical processes only and there could be no room for adrishta in
this system. We can quote from M•dhava:
From this, it follows that fate, etc., do not exist, since these
can only be proved by inference. But an opponent will say,
if you do not thus allow adrishta, the various phenomena of
the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot
accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all
be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of
things. Thus it has been said -
The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing and cool the
breeze of morn;
By whom came this variety? From their own nature was it
born.[70]
Gunaratna gives a more precise definition of the doctrine self-origination:
The Svabh•vav•dins argue as follows. Here, it is the
"essential nature" (svabh•va) of a thing that it undergoes
transformation by itself (svatah). All entities are born due to
the influence of svabh•va. Thus for example, from clay, a jar
is produced and not cloth, and from yarn, a cloth is
produced and not the jar, etc. But this production according
to a fixed rule cannot be explained to take place without it
being characterised by such specific svabh•va. Therefore, it
is to be concluded that all this is due to svabh•va. Thus it has
been said: "Who produces sharpness in thorns? (Who
creates) different dispositions in animals and birds? All this
has proceeded from svabh•va. There is no scope for action
according to one's will. What is the use of effort?"[71]
It is possible that the C•rv•kas held the view that the world was caused merely
by accident. We would certainly not be surprised to find that this was the view
of a sceptic such as Jayar••i Bhatta. But the element of chance in the causal
process also opens up the possibility that there is a property outside of our
sense-data that has an influence on events in the physical realm. If the C•rv
•kas accepted yadricch• as the causal axiom, then they would be accepting,
however crude, a form of adrishta into their system. On balance, the C•rv•kas
probably accepted svabh•vav•da. It could be consistent with their materialistic
outlook by virtue of the fact that even if the creation of an entity or object could
not be directly experienced, then it could be inferred (if Purandara's account of
inference is to be accepted) that the object actually present in the world
contained within itself the potentiality for that origination.
For the latter, it could be argued that the C•rv•kas did in fact consistently
argue that they claimed their descent from Brihaspati, who as a Vedic deity
could certainly be seen as authoritative, at least in terms of stature. But the texts
that we have at our disposal that actually quote him as an authority, the
Brihaspati S•tra and the Tattvopaplavasimha, are not considered by scholars to be
truly representative of the Lok•yata school. We should also be wary of reading
too much into the favourable manner in which the Artha••stra viewed Lok
•yata. There is a good deal of evidence that some rulers in India found common
cause with materialism for purely atavistic purposes, and this may have been
the reasoning behind Kautilya's advocacy of the Lok•yata doctrine.[76]
As to possibility of suppression by other groups, we have already noted that
K.B Krishna believed, without presenting any real evidence for this claim, that
the Lok•yata texts were systematically destroyed by the Brahman class. That
there is evidence that there was a certain level of misinterpretation by the C•rv
•ka's opponents is probably not beyond dispute. But that these texts were
systematically destroyed by them is not provable, for we are hardly likely to
come across any written evidence where the opponents actually admit doing it.
There is an alternative hypothesis for the disappearance of their literature.
What we do know is that towards the end of the first millenium CE, atheism in
India was under sustained attack, due to the resurgence of the Brahmanical
tradition, i.e., the Ved•nta and Bhakti (i.e., devotional) movements. Even the
Conclusion
For a text that bears the title, "A History of the C•rv•kas", the most striking
feature of this document is the lack of a precise chronology that we would
normally associate with a historical examination. If I am to be accused of being
rather vague with dates, then it is entirely due to the fact that all histories of
Indian thought must be constantly aware of the problems in assigning absolute
and non-controvertible dates to the key events and the formation of new ideas.
This is particularly relevant in the case of the Vedic and Epic material that I
have used in the argument set out, though I believe I have not deviated too far
from the overall development of philosophical structures in India.
Before I begin to summarise this argument, there is this interesting quotation
from Nirad Chaudhuri:
Hinduism differs fundamentally from Christianity in this,
that for its followers it is not an alternative to the world, but
primarily the means of supporting and improving their
existence in it. Of course, as in all other religions, so in
Hinduism there is belief in another world, in life after
death, and in all the supra-mundane things which form the
staple of every religious system. The Hindus also make a
distinction between this world (iha-loka) and the other world
(para-loka), between things which belong to here (ahika) and
those that belong to there (p•ratrika). They also speak of
salvation (moksha). But the unwordly aims of religion when
put against the worldly have hardly ant weight.
As to the notion of salvation, it is wholly unreal and
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on the rather more salacious aspects of Tantrism. We must also bear in mind
that he is writing some seven centuries after the composition of the
Saddar•anasamuccaya, and that the denigration of the (probably by then extinct)
C•rv•kas may have been a commonplace occurrence.
[22] K.B. Krishna, Studies in Hindu Materialism, Guntur, 1994, p. 40
[23] ibid, p. 33
[24] I will assess the evidence for the absence of Lok•yata texts in Chapter 6.
[25] J. L. Brockington, The Sacred Thread: Hinduism in its continuity and
diversity, Edinburgh, 1981, p.12
[26] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 7
[27] Brockington, op cit, p. 10
[28] ibid, pp. 22-23
[29] ibid, p. 24
[30] Not all presentations of Indian philosophy are as simplistic as this model;
nevertheless, due to the influence of Advaita Ved•nta in modern Indian
thought, this tends to be the general impression given.
[31] I would argue that the use of spells in the context of the Atharvaveda could
be classed as a form of sorcery or witchcraft, which is the distinction I wish to
draw by using the word "magical".
[32] I have made a connection between Brihaspati and the Atharvaveda on the
admittedly slim evidence of the proximity of Brihaspati to the Angirases in the
Rigveda. I have done this because it is highly unlikely that his instruction to the
Asuras was the Lok•yata doctrine in its advanced philosophical form, which
appears to be the view of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya. See Chattopadhyaya,
op cit, pp. 40-42
[33] F.W. Thomas, Brihaspati Sutra: or the Science of Politics According to the
School of Brihaspati, Lahore, 1921.
[34] ibid, p. 11
[35] This should spell "r•kshasa", meaning demon or evil spirit.
[36] Translator's question mark.
[37] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, pp. 358-359
[38] ibid, p. 429
[39] King, op cit, p. 17
[40] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 267
[41] R.C. Zaehner, Hindu Scriptures, London, 1966, p. 85
[42] Chattopadhyaya, op cit, p. 85
[43] ibid, p. 88
[44] ibid, p. 89-91
[45] ibid, p. 83
[46] Zaehner, op cit, p. 144
[47] Some may argue that this is actually pure fantasy, but I am trying to locate
the C•rv•kas in a period when there are very few historical records to work
from, and the general consensus is that the period covered in the Great Epic
does represent a time of massive social upheaval in India where there is, with
the emergence of n•stika sects, a great deal of opposition to the prevailing
norms.
[48] Zaehner, op cit, p. 47
[49] In the Indian philosophical tradition, the p•rvapakshin first expounds the
view of his opponent in order to criticise or refute their position.
[50] The spelling of this name varies in different texts.
[51] Brockington, op cit, p. 80
[52] By materialism here, I mean in the strict ontological meaning of the term,
i.e., the existence of matter only.
[53] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, pp. 479-480
[54] School of logic in classical India.
[55] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 85
[56] ibid, p. 234
[57] ibid, p. 235
[58] Or sometimes rendered as spirit, though obviously not in any "ghostly"
sense.
[59] This is sometimes translated as darkness or inertia.
[60] S•mkhya Karika, verses 56-59
[61] Apart from those C•rv•kas quoted by Gunaratna who included •k••a as a
fifth element.
[62] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 424
[63] Chattopadhyaya, op cit, pp. 39-40. Chattopadhyaya also states here that
"the low arts" was understood by these Buddhists to be some form of sorcery,
which was the view of T. Rhys Davids.
[64] S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy Volume III, Great Britain,
1940, pp. 533-534
[65] Chattopadhyaya, op cit, p. 23
[66] Dasgupta, op cit, p. 536
[67] Chattopadhyaya, ed., op cit, p. 491
[68] ibid, p.505
[69] ibid, p. 516
[70] ibid, p. 253
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