SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117857. February 2, 2001.]

LUIS S. WONG , petitioner, vs . COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.

Atty. Agapito P. Pagayanan and Tañada Vivo & Tan for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of
calendars. He had a history of unremitted collections, which he duly acknowledged in a
con rmation receipt he co-signed with his wife for LPI. Hence, petitioner's costumers were
required to issue postdated checks before LPI would accept their purchase orders. Wong
issued 6 postdated checks all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn payable to the order
of LPI. The checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers
who failed to issue postdated checks. However, following company policy, LPI refused to
accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the checks to the
payment of petitioner's unremitted collections for 1984. Before maturity of the checks,
petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the checks and promised to replace them
within 30 days. He failed to honor his words and upon deposit of LPI, the checks were
returned for the reason of "account closed." After being noti ed, petitioner still failed to
make arrangement for payments. He was charged with three counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 under three separate informations, all cases were ra ed to the same trial court.
Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. After trial, the court issued its decision nding
the accused guilty on all charges and was sentenced to serve an imprisonment of four
months on each of the charge. He was also ordered to pay the amount due plus interest
and trial costs. Petitioner appealed his case to the Court of Appeals, which a rmed his
conviction. Hence, this appeal. CTacSE

According to the Supreme Court the issue on whether the check was issued as
guarantee or as payment for the petitioner's unremitted collections was a factual issue,
which had been settled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Although Manuel
Limtong, owner of the LPI, was the sole witness for the prosecution, his testimony was
found su cient to prove all the elements of the offense charged. Despite petitioner's
insistent plea of innocence, the Court found no error in the Court of Appeal's a rmance of
his conviction for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. However, pursuant to policy
guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner
should be modi ed to a ne not less than but not more than double the amount of the
checks that were dishonored.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF B.P. BLG. 22; WHEN COMMITTED. — There

are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and issuing a check to
apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that the check is not su ciently
funded; and (2) by having su cient funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of
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 issue but failing to keep su cient funds therein or credit with said bank to cover the full
amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90)
days.
2. ID.; ID.; MERE ACT OF ISSUING A WORTHLESS CHECK IS MALUM
PROHIBITUM; RATIONALE. — In cases elevated from the Court of Appeals, our review is
con ned to alleged errors of law. Its ndings of fact are generally conclusive. Absent any
showing that the ndings by the respondent court are entirely devoid of any substantiation
on record, the same must stand. The lack of accounting between the parties is not the
issue in this case. As repeatedly held, this Court is not a trier of facts. Moreover, in
Llamado v. Court of Appeals, we held that "[t]o determine the reason for which checks are
issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring
about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is
malum prohibitum." Nothing herein persuades us to hold otherwise.
3. ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS THEREOF, CONSTRUED. — The elements of B.P. Blg. 22
under the rst situation, pertinent to the present case, are: "(1) The making, drawing and
issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The knowledge of the maker,
drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insu ciency of funds or credit
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment." An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of
the maker or drawer of the check of the insu ciency of his funds in or credit with the bank
to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind di cult to
establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where
payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insu cient funds in or credit
with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check." To
mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such
presumption shall not arise if within ve (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of
dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank
or pays the holder the amount of the check. Rather, the clear import of the law is to
establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insu ciency of funds under the
following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the check, and (2) the
dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full
within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be deposited within ninety
(90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of
lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge
petitioner from his duty to maintain su cient funds in the account within a reasonable
time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, "a check must be
presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be
discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay." By current
banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180 days.
Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check.
Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the presumption of knowledge of
insu ciency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could still be proven by direct or
circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private respondent did not deposit the
checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he would issue new checks. Upon his
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 failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the checks were
dishonored, petitioner was duly noti ed of such fact but failed to make arrangements for
full payment within ve (5) banking days thereof. There is, on record, su cient evidence
that petitioner had knowledge of the insu ciency of his funds in or credit with the drawee
bank at the time of issuance of the checks.

DECISION

QUISUMBING , J : p

For review on certiorari is the decision dated October 28, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CR 11856 1 which a rmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 17, convicting petitioner on three (3) counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(the Bouncing Checks Law) violations and sentencing him to imprisonment of four (4)
months for each count, and to pay private respondent the amounts of P5,500.00,
P6,410.00 and P3,375.00, respectively, corresponding to the value of the checks involved,
with the legal rate of interest from the time of ling of the criminal charges, as well as to
pay the costs.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Wong was an agent of Limtong Press Inc. (LPI), a manufacturer of
calendars. LPI would print sample calendars, then give them to agents to present to
customers. The agents would get the purchase orders of customers and forward them to
LPI. After printing the calendars, LPI would ship the calendars directly to the customers.
Thereafter, the agents would come around to collect the payments. Petitioner, however,
had a history of unremitted collections, which he duly acknowledged in a con rmation
receipt he co-signed with his wife. 2 Hence, petitioner's customers were required to issue
postdated checks before LPI would accept their purchase orders.
In early December 1985, Wong issued six (6) postdated checks totaling P18,025.00,
all dated December 30, 1985 and drawn payable to the order of LPI, as follows:
(1) Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) Check No. 660143464-C for P6,410.00
(Exh. "B");
(2) ABC Check No. 660143460-C for P 540.00 (Exh. "C");

(3) ABC Check No. PA660143451-C for P5,500.00 (Exh. "D");

(4) ABC Check No. PA660143465-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "E");

(5) ABC Check No. PA660143463-C for P3,375.00 (Exh. "F");

(6) ABC Check No. PA660143452-C for P1,100.00 (Exh. "G").

These checks were initially intended to guarantee the calendar orders of customers
who failed to issue post-dated checks. However, following company policy, LPI refused to
accept the checks as guarantees. Instead, the parties agreed to apply the checks to the
payment of petitioner's unremitted collections for 1984 amounting to P18,077.07. 3 LPI
waived the P52.07 difference.
Before the maturity of the checks, petitioner prevailed upon LPI not to deposit the
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 checks and promised to replace them within 30 days. However, petitioner reneged on his
promise. Hence, on June 5, 1986, LPI deposited the checks with Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC). The checks were returned for the reason "account closed." The
dishonor of the checks was evidenced by the RCBC return slip.
On June 20, 1986, complainant through counsel noti ed the petitioner of the
dishonor. Petitioner failed to make arrangements for payment within five (5) banking days.
On November 6, 1987, petitioner was charged with three (3) counts of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 4 under three separate Informations for the three checks amounting to
P5,500.00, P3,375.00, and P6,410.00. 5
The Information in Criminal Case No. CBU-12055 reads as follows: 6
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1985 and for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time of issue of the check
she/he does not have su cient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, with deliberate intent, with
intent of gain and of causing damage, did then and there issue, make or draw
Allied Banking Corporation Check No. 660143451 dated 12-30-85 in the amount
of P5,500.00 payable to Manuel T. Limtong which check was issued in payment
of an obligation of said accused, but when the said check was presented with
said bank, the same was dishonored for reason 'ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despite
notice and demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused
failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of said Manuel T. Limtong in the amount of P5,500.00
Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.

Petitioner was similarly charged in Criminal Case No. 12057 for ABC Check No.
660143463 in the amount of P3,375.00, and in Criminal Case No. 12058 for ABC Check
No. 660143464 for P6,410.00. Both cases were raffled to the same trial court.
Upon arraignment, Wong pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Manuel T. Limtong, general manager of LPI, testi ed on behalf of the company.
Limtong averred that he refused to accept the personal checks of petitioner since it was
against company policy to accept personal checks from agents. Hence, he and petitioner
simply agreed to use the checks to pay petitioner's unremitted collections to LPI.
According to Limtong, a few days before maturity of the checks, Wong requested him to
defer the deposit of said checks for lack of funds. Wong promised to replace them within
thirty days, but failed to do so. Hence, upon advice of counsel, he deposited the checks
which were subsequently returned on the ground of "account closed."
The version of the defense is that petitioner issued the six (6) checks to guarantee
the 1985 calendar bookings of his customers. According to petitioner, he issued the
checks not as payment for any obligation, but to guarantee the orders of his customers. In
fact, the face value of the six (6) postdated checks tallied with the total amount of the
calendar orders of the six (6) customers of the accused, namely, Golden Friendship
Supermarket, Inc. (P6,410.00), New Society Rice and Corn Mill (P5,500.00), Cuesta
Enterprises (P540.00), Pelrico Marketing (P1,100.00), New Asia Restaurant (P3,375.00),
and New China Restaurant (P1,100.00). Although these customers had already paid their
respective orders, petitioner claimed LPI did not return the said checks to him.
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 On August 30, 1990, the trial court issued its decision, disposing as follows: 7 CTHaSD

"Wherefore, premises considered, this Court nds the accused Luis S.

Wong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violations of Section 1
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in THREE (3) Counts and is hereby sentenced to
serve an imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS for each count; to pay Private
Complainant Manuel T. Limtong the sums of Five Thousand Five Hundred
(P5,500.00) Pesos, Six Thousand Four Hundred Ten (P6,410.00) Pesos and Three
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Five (P3,375.00) Pesos corresponding to the
amounts indicated in Allied Banking Checks Nos. 660143451, 66[0]143464 and
660143463 all issued on December 30, 1985 together with the legal rate of
interest from the time of the ling of the criminal charges in Court and pay the
costs." 8

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. On October 28, 1994, it
affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. 9
Hence, the present petition. 1 0 Petitioner raises the following questions of law 1 1 —
May a complainant successfully prosecute a case under BP 22 — if there is
no more consideration or price or value — ever the binding tie that it is in contracts
in general and in negotiable instruments in particular — behind the checks? — if
even before he deposits the checks, he has ceased to be a holder for value
because the purchase orders (PO's) guaranteed by the checks were already paid?

Given the fact that the checks lost their reason for being, as above stated,
is it not then the duty of complainant — knowing he is no longer a holder for value
— to return the checks and not to deposit them ever? Upon what legal basis then
may such a holder deposit them and get paid twice?
Is petitioner, as the drawer of the guarantee checks which lost their reason
for being, still bound under BP 22 to maintain his account long after 90 days from
maturity of the checks?

May the prosecution apply the prima facie presumption of "knowledge of

lack of funds" against the drawer if the checks were belatedly deposited by the
complainant 157 days after maturity, or will it be then necessary for the
prosecution to show actual proof of "lack of funds" during the 90-day term?

Petitioner insists that the checks were issued as guarantees for the 1985 purchase
orders (PO's) of his customers. He contends that private respondent is not a "holder for
value" considering that the checks were deposited by private respondent after the
customers already paid their orders. Instead of depositing the checks, private respondent
should have returned the checks to him. Petitioner further assails the credibility of
complainant considering that his answers to cross-examination questions included: "I
cannot recall, anymore" and "We have no more record."
In his Comment, 1 2 the Solicitor General concedes that the checks might have been
initially intended by petitioner to guarantee payments due from customers, but upon the
refusal of LPI to accept said personal checks per company policy, the parties had agreed
that the checks would be used to pay off petitioner's unremitted collections. Petitioner's
contention that he did not demand the return of the checks because he trusted LPI's good
faith is contrary to human nature and sound business practice, according to the Solicitor
General.

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 The issue as to whether the checks were issued merely as guarantee or for payment
of petitioner's unremitted collections is a factual issue involving as it does the credibility of
witnesses. Said factual issue has been settled by the trial court and Court of Appeals.
Although initially intended to be used as guarantee for the purchase orders of customers,
they found the checks were eventually used to settle the remaining obligations of
petitioner with LPI. Although Manuel Limtong was the sole witness for the prosecution, his
testimony was found sufficient to prove all the elements of the offense charged. 1 3 We nd
no cogent reason to depart from ndings of both the trial and appellate courts. In cases
elevated from the Court of Appeals, our review is con ned to alleged errors of law. Its
ndings of fact are generally conclusive. Absent any showing that the ndings by the
respondent court are entirely devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must stand.
1 4 The lack of accounting between the parties is not the issue in this case. As repeatedly
held, this Court is not a trier of facts. 1 5 Moreover, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 1 6 we
held that "[t]o determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability
and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade
and in banking communities. So what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check
and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum." Nothing herein
persuades us to hold otherwise.
The only issue for our resolution now is whether or not the prosecution was able to
establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense penalized under B.P.
Blg. 22.
There are two (2) ways of violating B.P. Blg. 22: (1) by making or drawing and
issuing a check to apply on account or for value knowing at the time of issue that the
check is not su ciently funded; and (2) by having su cient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to keep su cient funds therein or credit with
said bank to cover the full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank within
a period of ninety (90) days. 1 7
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 under the rst situation, pertinent to the present case,
are: 1 8
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have su cient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insu ciency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."

Petitioner contends that the rst element does not exist because the checks were
not issued to apply for account or for value. He attempts to distinguish his situation from
the usual "cut-and-dried" B.P. 22 case by claiming that the checks were issued as
guarantee and the obligations they were supposed to guarantee were already paid. This
awed argument has no factual basis, the RTC and CA having both ruled that the checks
were in payment for unremitted collections, and not as guarantee. Likewise, the argument
has no legal basis, for what B.P. Blg. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and
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 not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. 1 9
As to the second element, B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the
second element prima facie exists when the rst and third elements of the offense are
present. 2 0 Thus, the maker's knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the check for
insufficiency of funds. 2 1
Petitioner avers that since the complainant deposited the checks on June 5, 1986,
or 157 days after the December 30, 1985 maturity date, the presumption of knowledge of
lack of funds under Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 should not apply to him. He further claims that
he should not be expected to keep his bank account active and funded beyond the ninety-
day period.
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides:
Evidence of knowledge of insu cient funds . — The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insu cient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
such insu ciency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by
the drawee of such check within ve (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or

drawer of the check of the insu ciency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the
check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind di cult to establish, the
statute itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the
check "is refused by the drawee because of insu cient funds in or credit with such bank
when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check." To mitigate the
harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall
not arise if within ve (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or
drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the
amount of the check. 2 2
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, nowhere in said provision does the law require a
maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days. Rather, the clear import of
the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insu ciency of
funds under the following conditions (1) presentment within 90 days from date of the
check, and (2) the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make arrangements
for payment in full within 5 banking days after notice thereof. That the check must be
deposited within ninety (90) days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie
presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise. It is not an element of the offense.
Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain su cient funds in the
account within a reasonable time thereof. Under Section 186 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, "a check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after
its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss
caused by the delay." By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than
six (6) months, 2 3 or 180 days. Private respondent herein deposited the checks 157 days
after the date of the check. Hence said checks cannot be considered stale. Only the
presumption of knowledge of insu ciency of funds was lost, but such knowledge could
still be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. As found by the trial court, private
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 respondent did not deposit the checks because of the reassurance of petitioner that he
would issue new checks. Upon his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said
checks. After the checks were dishonored, petitioner was duly noti ed of such fact but
failed to make arrangements for full payment within ve (5) banking days thereof. There is,
on record, su cient evidence that petitioner had knowledge of the insu ciency of his
funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issuance of the checks. And despite
petitioner's insistent plea of innocence, we nd no error in the respondent court's
affirmance of his conviction by the trial court for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law.
However, pursuant to the policy guidelines in Administrative Circular No. 12-2000,
which took effect on November 21, 2000, the penalty imposed on petitioner should now be
modi ed to a ne of not less than but not more than double the amount of the checks that
were dishonored.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Luis S. Wong is found liable for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 but the penalty imposed on him is hereby MODIFIED
so that the sentence of imprisonment is deleted. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay a FINE of
(1) P6,750.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in Criminal Case No.
CBU-12057, (2) P12,820.00, equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in
Criminal Case No. CBU-12058, and (3) P11,000.00, equivalent to double the amount of the
check involved in Criminal Case No. CBU-12055, with subsidiary imprisonment 2 4 in case
of insolvency to pay the aforesaid nes. Finally, as civil indemnity, petitioner is also ordered
to pay to LPI the face value of said checks totaling P18,025.00 with legal interest thereon
from the time of filing the criminal charges in court, as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, concurred in by Justices Ricardo P.
Galvez and Eugenio S. Labitoria.
2. Records, p. 119.
3. Id. at 130.
4. Otherwise known as "An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check
without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes,"
5. As to the three (3) remaining checks, petitioner was also charged with violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 3 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25078-
R, 25079-R, and 28440-R. The MTC convicted petitioner but on appeal, the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 14, acquitted him for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
6. Records, p. 89.
7. Rollo, pp. 185-199.
8. Id. at 198-199.
9. Id. at 88-108.
10. Id. at 11-86.
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 11. Id. at 17.
12. Id. at 290-321.
13. Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744, 749 (1998).
14. Bunag Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 440, 447-448 (1992); Morales vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al., 197 SCRA 391, 401(1991).
15. Aleria v. Melez, 298 SCRA 611, 618 (1998).
16. 270 SCRA 423, 431 (1997).
17. Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22.
18. Lim v. People, G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000, p. 7.
19. Dichaves v. Apalit, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1274, June 8, 2000, p. 6.
20. Sycip Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 125059, March 17, 2000, p. 8.
21. Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 657, 661 (1998).
22. Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323, 330-331 (1986).
23. Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126670, December 2, 1999, p. 9.
24. Lim v. People, G.R No. 130038, September 18, 2000, p. 11.

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