148. ANDRES VS STA. LUCIA REALTY DEVELOPMENT INC. (G.R. No.

201405, August 24, 2015)

FACTS:

Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against respondent before the RTC.
They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for more than 50 years of three parcels of
unregistered agricultural land in Pag-asa, Binangonan, Rizal with a total area of more or less 10,500 square
meters. A few years back, however, respondent acquired the lands surrounding the subject property,
developed the same into a residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis East, and built a
concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were denied access from subject
property to the nearest public road and vice versa. They thus prayed for a right-of-way within Binangonan
Metropolis East in order for them to have access to Col. Guido Street, a public road. In its Answer,
respondent denied knowledge of any property adjoining its subdivision owned by petitioners and Liza.
Nevertheless, it pointed out that petitioners and Liza failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the
existence of the requisites for the grant of an easement of right-of-way.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent.

RULING:
No. Not all may demand for an easement of right-of-way. Under the law, an easement of right-of-way
may only be demanded by the owner of an immovable property or by any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use the same Here, petitioners argue that they are entitled to demand an easement
of right-ofway from respondent because they are the owners of the subject property intended to be the
dominant estate. They contend that they have already acquired ownership of the subject property
through ordinary acquisitive prescription. Sifting through petitioners' allegations, it appears that the
subject property is an unregistered public agricultural land. Thus, being a land of the public domain,
petitioners, in order to validly claim acquisition thereof through prescription, must first be able to show
that the State has - expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued
by the President that the subject property is no longer retained for public service or the development of
the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an
express declaration by the State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and hence, not
susceptible to acquisition by virtue of prescription. In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case,
petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject property based on prescription necessarily crumbles.
Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent for lack of personality.

149. REPUBLIC VS CORTEZ, SR. (G.R. No. 197472, September 7, 2015)

Principles:

An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper object of
possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect one's alleged right of possession over
the same.

FACTS:
 Respondent Rev. Cortez, Sr., a missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian and charitable
activities, established an orphanage and school in Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in
peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island. President
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military purposes a parcel of the public domain situated
in Palaui Island. More than two decades later President Ramos declared Palaui Island and the surrounding
waters situated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve. Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Rogelio C.
Biñas in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command. Rev. Cortez and his men
were constrained to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with the RTC
seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to restore to him possession and to not disturb
the same, and further, for the said preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent. The petition was
granted. However, the same pertained to five hectares (subject area) only, not to the whole 50 hectares
claimed to have been occupied by Rev. Cortez because the last 38 years cannot reasonably be determined
or accurately identified the land area. Even so, Rev. Cortez failed to present in evidence the application
for patent allegedly filed by him showing that he applied for patent on the entire 50 hectares of land which
he possessed or occupied for a long period of time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction

RULING:

No. An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper object of
possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect one's alleged right of possession over
the same. “Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected
and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.” Thus, it is
necessary that the Court initially determine whether the right asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists. As
earlier stressed, it is necessary that such right must have been established by him with absolute certainty.
Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he,
nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a claim is not part of the public
domain and therefore can be the proper object of possession. In this case, there is no such proof showing
that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez
started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it
cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil
Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez’s claimed right of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession
of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no matter how long, cannot produce
any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place. In view of
the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the
subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.

150. MACALINO, JR. ET AL. VS PIS-AN (G.R. NO. 204056, June 1, 2016)

FACTS:
 Emeterio Jumento was the owner of half portion of Lot 3154 consisting of 469 square meters,
while his children, Hospicio and Severina, own the other half in equal shares. When Hospicio and Severina
died single and without issue, Emeterio as their sole heir inherited the whole lot. Apparently, the City of
Dumaguete built in the 1950's a barangay road which cut across said lot. As a result, Lot 3154 was divided
into three portions. Sometime in the 1970's, Artemio, a grandson-in-law of Emeterio, commissioned a
Geodetic Engineer to survey Lot 3154 so that taxes would be assessed only on the portions of the subject
property which remained as private property. Accordingly, Engr. Ridad came up with a sketch plan where
the three portions of Lot 3154 were denominated as Lot 3154-A, Lot 3154-B, and Lot 3154-C. On May 3,
1995, Artemio and the other heirs of Emeterio executed an Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate and
Absolute Sale adjudicating among themselves Lot 3154 and selling a 207-square meter portion of the
same to the spouses Wilfredo and Judith Sillero (spouses Sillero). The document, did not, however,
identify the portion being sold as Lot No. 3154-A. The spouses Sillero, immediately after the sale, fenced
Lot No. 3154A and built a house thereon. Not long after, they sold Lot 3154-A to petitioner Gil Macalino,
Jr. by virtue of a Deed of Sale. A few years later or on January 18, 2005, Gil, joined by his children and their
respective spouses filed against Artemio a Complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the RTC. Gil
contends that the deed of sale covers not only Lot 3154-A but also Lot 3154-C.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the deed of sale executed between Spouses Sillero and Gil Macalino covers
not only Lot 3154-A but also Lot 3154-C

(2) Whether or not the remedy of Quieting of Title is available to the petitioners

RULING:

(1) No. The deed of sale covers only Lot 3154-A. Although the Absolute Sale did not specifically
indicate that Artemio and his co-heirs were conveying to the spouses Sillero Lot 3154-A, there should be
no question that the sale was only specific to Lot 3154-A since none other than the parties to the said
transaction acknowledged this. At any rate, the testimonial evidence presented by Arteinio sufficiently
supports the conclusion that what was sold to the spouses Sillero was indeed Lot 3154-A only. Since what
the spouses Sillero bought from Artemio and his co-heirs was Lot 3154-A, it logically follows that what
they sold to Gil was the same and exact property.

After a1l “no one can give what one does not have.” Moreover, what Gil occupied after the sale
was Lot 3154-A only.

(2) No. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
uncertainty with respect to title to real property. "In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper,
it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is
the subject-matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest, there is no cloud to be
prevented or removed." Petitioners anchored their Complaint on their alleged legal title over Lot 3154-C
which as above-discussed, they do not have. Hence, the action for quieting of title is unavailable to
petitioners.
 151. NAGA CENTRUM VS SPOUSES ORZALES (G.R. NO. 203576, September 14, 2016)

FACTS:

Respondents own a house and lot situated at No. 28-B Valentin Street, Sabang, Naga City which
is surrounded, by property owned by others. One of which is by the property of the petitioner. The
respondents alleged that when they acquired their property in 1965, their access to the public highway
(Valentin Street) was through Rizal Street, which forms part of a property now owned by the petitioner.
But when the squatters inhabiting said place were evicted, the petitioner caused Rizal Street to be closed
by enclosing its property with a concrete fence. This prompted the respondents to ask for a permanent
right of way through the intervention of the court after the petitioner refused their offer to buy the
portion where the proposed right of way is sought to be established. The petitioner, however, alleged
that there is an existing passageway leading to Valentin Street along Lot 1503 of Cad-290 which is available
to the respondents and that the property of the respondents became isolated due to their own acts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent has the right to demand a right of way

RULING:

Yes. The respondent has the right to demand right of way. To be entitled to an easement of right
of way, the following requisites should be met: 1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables
belonging to other persons, and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; 2. Payment of proper
indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable; 3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its
owner's acts; and 4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest. Respondents may not be blamed for the isolation they are now
suffering. By its very location, their property is isolated, and this is not their fault. Suffice it to say further
that the Court agrees with the findings of the lower courts that the closure of Rizal Street by the petitioner
caused their property to be isolated.

Significantly, respondents have been using Rizal Street for so long; petitioner knew of this, and it
even granted access to respondents. At the very least, respondents have been using Rizal Street for 23
years. While petitioner may have allowed access by the informal settlers to Rizal Street through tolerance,
the same cannot be said of respondents; they are not informal settlers on petitioner's land. Petitioner
thus acknowledged respondents' right to use Rizal Street. For this reason, it is guilty of gross and evident
malice and bad faith when, even while Civil Case No. 2004-0036 was pending, it deliberately blocked
respondents' access to Rizal Street by constructing a building thereon, dumping filling materials and junk
on the main gate of respondents' home, and converting portions of the road into an auto repair shop and
parking space, making it difficult and inconvenient, if not humiliating, for respondents to traverse the path
to and from their home. Petitioner's action betrays a perverse and deliberate intention to hurt and punish
respondents for legally demanding a right of way which it nevertheless knew was forthcoming, and which,
considering the size of its land, it may give without the least prejudice to its own rights.

152. SIY VS TOMLIN (G.R. No. 205998, April 24, 2017)

 FACTS: Petitioner William Anghian Siy filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer for Replevin against respondent Alvin Tomlin. Petitioner
alleged that he is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover. In 2010, he entrusted the said vehicle to Ong,
a businessman who owned a second-hand car sales showroom, after the latter claimed that he had a
prospective buyer. Ong failed to remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle.
Petitioner later learned that the vehicle was being transferred to respondent. On August 17, 2011,
respondent filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the Writ of Replevin, dismiss the Complaint, and
turn over the vehicle to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the possession of the car

RULING: No. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the
owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant,
who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same. From petitioner's own account,
he constituted and appointed Ong as his agent to sell the vehicle. In return, Ong accepted the agency and
was able to sell the subject vehicle to a certain Chua, and petitioner thus ceased to be the owner thereof.
Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his ownership, petitioner lost his right of
possession over the vehicle. On the contrary, respondent, who obtained the vehicle from Chua and
registered the transfer with the Land Transportation Office, is the rightful owner thereof, and as such he
is entitled to its possession.

153. GUYAMIN VS FLORES (G.R. No. 202189, April 25, 2017)

FACTS: In 2006, respondents Flores filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against
petitioners Guyamin. Respondents alleged in their Complaint that they are the registered owners of a
984-square meter lot in General Trias, Cavite covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and that petitioners
are their relatives who for many years have been occupying the subject property by mere tolerance of
respondents' predecessors and parents, the original owners of the same. Petitioners have been reminded
to vacate the premises because respondents have decided to sell the property. Petitioners still failed to
vacate after respondents made several attempts to settle the matter through conciliation.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners should vacate the property

RULING: Yes. With the clear realization that they are settling on land that they do not own,
occupants of registered private lands by mere tolerance of the owners should always expect that one day,
they would have to vacate the same. Their time is merely borrowed; they have no right to the property
whatsoever, and their presence is merely tolerated and under the good graces of the owners. The Court
must give respondents the justice they deserve. As owners of the subject property who have been
deprived of the use thereof for so many years owing to petitioners' continued occupation, and after all
these years of giving unconditionally to the petitioners who are their relatives, respondents must now
enjoy the fruits of their ownership.

153. GUYAMIN v. FLORES G.R. No. 202189 | April 25, 2017 Ownership

DOCTRINE: Occupants by mere tolerance must vacate upon the demand of the registered owner.
 FACTS: • Flores is the registered owner of a parcel of land occupied by Guyamin. • Guyamin
occupied the property by mere tolerance and liberality of Flores.

• Despite demand, Guyamin refused to vacate the property. This prompted Flores to file a
complaint for recovery of possession for said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guyamin should vacate the property

HELD: Yes, as occupants by mere tolerance of the owner, Guyamin has no right to the property
whatsoever, and his presence is merely tolerated and under the good graces of the owners. Gayumin is
bound by an implied promise to vacate the premises upon demand.

154. PUDADERA v. MAGALLANES G.R. No. 170073 | 18 October 2010

DOCTRINE: In case of a double sale of immovables, ownership shall belong to "(1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good
faith presents the oldest title.

FACTS:

• Lazaro was the owner of a parcel of land, Lot 11-E, covered by TCT.

• Lazaro sold a 400 sq. m. portion of Lot 11-E to Magallanes under a Contract To Sale

• Upon full payment of the monthly installments, Lazaro executed a "Deed of Definite Sale" in
favor of Magallanes. o Thereafter, Magallanes had the lot fenced and had a nipa hut constructed thereon.

• The other portions of Lot 11-E were, likewise, sold by Lazaro to several buyers

• Lazaro executed a "Partition Agreement" in favor of Magallanes and the aforesaid buyers
delineating the portions to be owned by each buyer. o Under this agreement, Magallanes and Mario
Gonzales were assigned an 800 sq. m. portion of Lot 11-E, with each owning 400 sq. m. thereof,
denominated as Lot No. 11-E-8 in a Subdivision Plan which was approved by the Director of Lands.

• Lazaro refused to turn over the mother title to the aforesaid buyers, thus, preventing them from
titling in their names the subdivided portions thereof.

• Magallanes, along with the other buyers, filed an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds.

• Magallanes and Gonzales filed a motion to surrender title.

• Lazaro sold Lot 11-E-8, i.e., the lot previously assigned to Magallanes and Mario Gonzales under
the aforesaid "Partition Agreement," to Spouses Natividad. o A new title was issued in the name of
Spouses Natividad.
 • Magallanes filing a complaint for specific performance, injunction and damages against Spouses
Natividad.

• The civil case filed by Magallanes was later dismissed by the trial court for lack of jurisdiction

• Spouses Natividad sold the subject lot to Pudadera

• Magallanes caused the construction of two houses of strong materials on the subject lot.

• Pudadera filed an action for forcible entry against Magallanes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pudadera has a better right to the lot

HELD: No, following Art 1544 NCC, in case of a double sale of immovables, ownership shall belong
to: (1) The first registrant in good faith (2) The first possessor in good faith (3) The buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title

• The law requires that the second buyer must have acquired and registered the immovable
property in good faith. In order for the second buyer to displace the first buyer, the following must be
shown: "(1) the second buyer must show that he acted in good faith (i.e., in ignorance of the first sale and
of the first buyer’s rights) from the time of acquisition until title is transferred to him by registration or
failing registration, by delivery of possession; and (2) the second buyer must show continuing good faith
and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract ripens into full ownership through
prior registration as provided by law.

• In the case at bar, both the trial court and CA found that petitioners were not buyers and
registrants in good faith owing to the fact that Magallanes constructed a fence and small hut on the
subject lot and has been in actual physical possession since 1979.

• Hence, petitioners were aware or should have been aware of Magallanes’ prior physical
possession and claim of ownership over the subject lot when they visited the lot on several occasions prior
to the sale thereof.

155. COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN v. NANOL G.R. No. 176791 | 14 November 2012

DOCTRINE: In case of a builder in good faith, the seller (the owner of the land) has two options
under Article 448: (1) He may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the
builder in good faith) the necessary and useful; or (2) He may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is
considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.

FACTS:
 • Respondent-spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner
Communities Cagayan, Inc., whereby the latter agreed to sell to respondent-spouses a house and Lots.

• Respondent­spouses availed of petitioner’s in­house financing16 thus, undertaking to pay the

loan over four years

• Respondent Arsenio demolished the original house and constructed a three-story house
allegedly valued at P3.5 million, more or less.

• Respondents defaulted which prompted petitioner to file a case for unlawful detainer.

• Respondent spouses’ demands for the reimbursement of the improvements made which
petitioner denies alleging that the respondents were builders in bad faith.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents is entitled to reimbursement of the improvements made

HELD: Yes, the presumption remains that the respondents are builders in good faith.

• Article 448 of the Civil Code applies when the builder believes that he is the owner of the land
or that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that, at least, he has a claim of title thereto.

• The seller (the owner of the land) has two options under Article 448: (1) He may appropriate
the improvements for himself after reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and
useful expenses; or (2) He may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that
of the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.

156. CHUNG JR. V MANDRAGON G.R. No. 179754 | 21 November 2012 Ownership

DOCTRINE: • In a case for quieting of title, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least
an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity
or efficacy.

FACTS:

• Petitioners and respondents are children of Rafael from his first and second wife respectively.

• The subject land in this case was owned by the second wife of Rafael, as reflected in the TCT.

• One of the respondents sold the subject land to third persons.

• By reason thereof, petitioner filed a case for quieting of title raising as issue the authority of
respondent to dispose the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner possess the required title to file a case for quieting of title.
 HELD: No, the property is clearly owned by the second wife of Rafael and hence they have no
equitable title over the property.

• In a case for quieting of title are fairly simple, the plaintiff need to prove only two things, namely:
(1) The plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) That the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on
his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.

• Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over
the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.

157. REPUBLIC v. AFP RSBS G.R. No. 180463 | 16 January 2013

DOCTRINE: The failure of a party to avail of the proper remedy to acquire or perfect one’s title to
land cannot justify a resort to other remedies which are otherwise improper and do not provide for the
full opportunity to prove his title, but instead require him to concede it before availment.

FACTS:

• Lots X, Y-1, and Y-2 were reserved for recreation and health purposes by virtue of Proclamation
No. 168 but it was later on amended to remove Lots Y-1 and Y-2 lots from reservation and declared them
open for disposition to qualified applicants.

• The heirs of Kusop (Kusop) applied for issuances of individual miscellaneous sales patents over
the whole of Lot X which was approved.

• The titles were issued in the names of Kusop but were simultaneously conveyed to AFP-RSBS.

• The Republic instituted a complaint for reversion, cancellation and annulment of the AFP-RSBS
titles on the thesis that they were issued over a public park which is classified as inalienable and non-
disposable public land.

• Kusop argued that they acquired vested interests over Lot X before Proc. 168 having occupied
the same for more than 30 years.

ISSUE: Whether or not the “vested rights” of the heirs of Kusop over Lot X can prevail against
government ownership of public land under the Regalian doctrine
 HELD: No. Respondents-intervenors did not question Proc. 2273, precisely because they were the
beneficiaries thereof; nor did they object to the retention of Lot X as part of the park reserve. Instead, in
1997, they applied for, and were granted, sales patents over Lot X.

• Evidently, the sales patents over Lot X are null and void, for at the time the sales patents were
applied for and granted, the land had lost its alienable and disposable character. It was set aside and was
being utilized for a public purpose, that is, as a recreational park.

• Kusop no longer had any right to Lot X — not by acquisitive prescription, and certainly not by
sales patent. In fact, their act of applying for the issuance of miscellaneous sales patents operates as an
express acknowledgment that the State, and not respondents-intervenors, is the owner of Lot X.

• It is erroneous to suppose that respondents-intervenors possessed title to Lot X when they

applied for miscellaneous sales patents, for the premise of such grant or privilege is precisely that the
State is the owner of the land, and that the applicant acknowledges this and surrenders to State
ownership.

158. MANANQUIL v. MOICO G.R. No. 180076 | 21 November 2012

Quieting of Title to or Interest in and Removal or Prevention of Cloud over Title or Interest in Real
Property

DOCTRINE: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff
must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action.

FACTS:

• Lots 18 & 19 formed part of the land previously expropriated by the NHA.

• Lot 18 was awarded to Spouses Mananquil under a Conditional Contract to Sell while Lot 19 was
sold to Prescilla.

• When the spouses died, the Mananquil heirs (brothers and sisters of the husband Mananquil)
executed an extrajudicial settlement and adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 & 19 in favor of Dianita.
They took possession and leased them out to third parties.

• Eulegio and two others (claiming to be the surviving heirs of the spouses) executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Moico.

• Moico evicted the Mananquil tenants and demolished the structure they built on Lots 18 & 19.

• The Mananquils instituted a civil case for quieting of title

 ISSUE: Whether or not the Mananquils had legal or equitable title over the lots for their action to
prosper

HELD: No, petitioners failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed the husband in his
rights under the NHA program/project.

• They failed to present any title, award, grant, document or certification from the NHA or proper
government agency which would show that the spouses Mananquil have become the registered
owners/beneficiaries/awardees of Lots 18 and 19, or that petitioners are qualified successors or
beneficiaries taking over Iluminardo's rights after his death.

• An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The
competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not
only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect
and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But for an action
to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) The plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; (2)
The deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

159. MODESTO PALALI v. JULIET AWISAN G.R. No. 158385 | 12 February 2010

DOCTRINE: One claiming to be in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession of a land in

the concept of an owner must be able to prove his claim through substantial evidence.

FACTS:

• Respondent filed an action to quiet title over a portion of a 6 hectare property against the
petitioner, claiming that petitioner is encroaching upon the said 6 hectare property which she owns.
Respondent prays that she be declared the rightful owner of the encroached property, using as basis the
following: o She inherited the property from her father who had declared the same in his taxes. o
Additionally, she also claims that her father introduced several improvements over the lot proving his
continued possession over the subject property.

• Petitioner, on the other hand, claims a superior right over the property. Petitioner stated that
he and his ancestors and predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
possession over the subject property in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. They introduced
several improvements over the lot, and planted vegetation therein, which was backed by testimonies
from neighbors.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has a better right over the subject property
 HELD: Yes, the petitioner was able to substantiate his claim of open, continuous, notorious,
exclusive possession over the subject property in the concept of an owner through him and his
predecessors-in interest.

• First, respondent’s presentation of tax declarations cannot overcome the evidence presented
by the petitioner who adequately proved his open, continuous possession over the property supported
by the testimonies of long-time residents/neighbors.

• Second, the ocular inspection of the trial court found that the improvements mentioned by
respondent were not found on the subject property, while those mentioned by petitioner were present.
Thus, the petitioner has a better right to the property.

160. OLEGARIO v. MARI G.R. No. 147951 | 14 December 2009

Possession

DOCTRINE: Possession, to constitute the foundation of acquisitive prescription, must be

possession under a claim of title or must be adverse.

FACTS:

• As early as 1916 Juan Mari (father of respondent) declared his ownership over a parcel of land
in Nancasalan, Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession by delineating the limits with a bamboo
fence, planted fruit bearing trees and bamboos and constructed a 2 story house.

• After a survey was made, and a tax declaration specified the property as residential land with
an area of 897 sqm. By virtue of a deed of sale it was transferred to respondent, Pedro Mari (Mari).

• Wenceslao Olegario (husband of Magdalena Fernandez and father of petitioner Arsenio

Olegario) filed a new tax declaration, for a 50 sqm parcel of land in the same property.

• In May 14, 1961, Wenceslao executed a "Deed of Quit-Claim of Unregistered Property in favor
of Arsenio Olegario. Transferring the 50 sqm property to him. Wenceslao then disputed Mari’s claim over
the land.

• Mari filed with DENR regional office in Pangasinan a protest against petitioners because of their
encroachment into the disputed property. The office decided in favor of respondent and found that he is
the owner.

• Arsenio caused an amendment of his tax declaration of the 50 sqm property, increasing the area
of the lot to 341-sqm.

• After discovering the amendments of Arsenio, respondent filed a complaint with RTC of
Lingayen, Pangasinan for Recovery of Possession and Annulment of Tax Declaration.

o Mari alleged that Juan Mari, and subsequently his successor, was deprived by the
Olegarios of the possession of portions of subject realty which Mari owned. • Olegario
asserts that they have been in possession of the disputed lots since 1948 or for more than 30
yrs already. Hence they acquired ownership by virtue of prescription.
 • Mari asserts that petitioner can only claim ownership over 50 sqm and not 341
sqm.

ISSUE: Whether the Olegarios have acquired the property through claim of title/adverse
possession?

HELD: No, the ownership of Juan Mari (respondent’s father) clearly shows that he was in the
possession of the lot in the concept of owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916 when he declared the
lot for tax purposes, planted trees and bamboos, constructed a 2 story house and bamboo fence.
Compared to petitioner when they entered the disputed lot much later, in 1965.

• According to Article 538 of the Civil Code, respondent is the preferred possessor since 1916.
Despite the Olegarios occupying the lots for 25 years, they cannot acquire ownership because there was
no evidence the disputed lots were transferred to them by their predecessors.

• Hence, the Olegarios cannot acquire the lots by ordinary prescription of 10 yrs. and ownership
cannot be acquired by mere occupation. The Olegarios were only tolerated by the owner and no matter
how long they were tolerated it cannot start the prescriptive period. Material possession of land is not
adverse possession and it’s insufficient to vest title.

161. REGALADO v. DE LA PENA G.R. No. 202448 | 13 December 2017

DOCTRINE: In an action to recover possession of property, the assessed value of the subject
property is jurisdictional.

FACTS:

• Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime (all surnamed De La Pena) are the
registered owners of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares.

• Regalado, without knowledge and consent of the De La Penas, entered, took possession of, and
planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent.

• They filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the property with the RTC against Regalado.

• Regalado moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the assessed values of
the subject properties were not alleged.

ISSUE: Whether or not an allegation as to the assessed value of the property is necessary for an
action to recover possession of property
 HELD: Yes, in this case, the RTC took cognizance of the complaint only on the presumption that
the assessed values of the properties exceed Php 20,000.

• However, jurisdiction is conferred by law, it cannot be presumed nor implied. In the absence of
any allegation as to the assessed value of the subject properties, it cannot be determined which court has
exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint.

• MeTC, MTC, or MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value does not exceed Php 20,000
(or Php 50,000 in Metro Manila). If it exceeds such value, RTC has jurisdiction.

162. HIPOLITO, JR. v. CINCO G.R. No. 174143 | 28 November 2011

DOCTRINE: The mere fact that the building is considered as a nuisance under the Civil Code does
not deprive the Building Official the authority to order its condemnation and demolition.

FACTS:

• Edeltrudis Hipolity y Marciano (Edeltrudis) entered into a lease agreement with Francisco Villena
(Villena) over a parcel of land located at San Andres Bukind, Manila for 20 years. Edeltrudis was obliged
to build an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing house in the property.

• After 13 years, the heir of Edeltrudis, Spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito (Sps.
Hipolito), and the heirs of Villena were informed that the property was acquired by Atty. Carlos D. Cinco
(Cinco) via a deed of sale.

• Cinco then filed with the OBO a verified request for structural inspection of the structures in the
lot. The Office of the Building Official eventually declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and
recommended their demolition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Building Official could order the condemnation and demolition of the
buildings even though the building falls under the concept of a nuisance under the Civil Code

HELD: Yes, the Building Official has authority.The fact that the buildings in question could also
constitute nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude the Building Official form issuing the assailed
Demolition Order.

• As provided by P.D. No. 1096, the authority of the Building Official to order the repair, vacation
or demolition, as the case may be, is without prejudice to further action that may be undertaken under
the relevant provisions of the Civil Code.
 163. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. JUMAMOY G.R. No. 168164 | 3 August 2011

DOCTRINE: The 10-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust applies when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property.

FACTS:

• In an earlier case for reconveyance, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the exclusion of 2.5
hectares of property from the coverage of an OCT registered in the name of Pace. It was established that
the said lot was owned by the predecessor of Jumamoy, hence, should be reconveyed in favor respondent
Jumamoy.

• However, the RTC decision could not be annotated on the OCT of Pace. o It was found that the
OCT had already been cancelled by reason of an unpaid mortgage executed by Pace with the PNB, and
that TCT had already been issued in favor of PNB.

• Jumamoy filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale, Reconveyance
and Damages against PNB and Pace. He argued that: o Pace could not validly mortgage the entire Lot to
PNB as a portion thereof consisting of 2.5 hectares belongs to him; and o PNB is not an innocent
mortgagee or purchaser for value since it had been notified that the said lot was subject to litigation.

• The PNB, on the other hand, contends that Jumamoy’s action for reconveyance had already
prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jumamoy’s action for reconveyance had prescribed

HELD: No, an action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in 10 years as it is an
obligation created by law, to be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

• This rule, however, applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in
possession of the property.

• In this case, it has been established that Jumamoy is in actual possession of the property, hence,
the action for reconveyance is imprescriptible.

• If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.