Administrative case is a case between state authority on the one side and a person from the

other. Administrative cases are governed by Administrative procedure and differs comparing to civil
procedure. Procedures of administrative cases differ depending on the type of national legal system.

Administrative Offense. ... The illegality of an administrative offense consists of a person's committing
an action that is prohibited by law or failing to do what is prescribed by law, and doing so intentionally
or through negligence; this circumstance creates the guilt.

Jurisdiction of administrative cases for our public-school teachers today

By

Toni Umali, Esq.

June 21, 2015

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A PUBLIC-SCHOOL teacher asked me recently where should an administrative case against a public-
school teacher be filed?
 I said, “Based on law and jurisprudence—the
Department of Education [DepEd], the Civil Service Commission [CSC] and the Professional Regulation
Commission [PRC] have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases involving public-school
teachers.” I then quickly added, “However, there are other cases that affirmed that the Office of the
Ombudsman also has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.”

For our readers, especially our public-school teachers facing an administrative case, I strongly suggest
that you read the following decided cases to fully understand this question of jurisdiction of
administrative cases for our public-school teachers: Rene Puse v. Ligaya Puse, G.R. No. 183678, March
15, 2010; Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte and the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168670, April 13,
2007; Melecio Alcala vs. Jovencio Villar, G.R. No. 156063, November 18, 2003; Martin Emin v. CSC
Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002; and Armand Fabella vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 110379, November 28, 1997 (a must read for all our teachers).

The landmark case of Fabella arose sometime on September 17, 1990, when then-Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary Isidro Cariño issued a return-to-work order to all public-
school teachers who had participated in walkouts and strikes on various dates during the period
September 26, 1990, to October 18, 1990.

The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th-month differentials, clothing allowances
and passage of a debt-cap bill in Congress, among other things. On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño
filed administrative cases against several public-school teachers of the Mandaluyong High School. The
charge sheets required our public-school teachers to explain in writing why they should not be punished
for having taken part in the mass action in violation of the following civil-service laws and regulations:
grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil-Service Law and rules on reasonable
office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and absence without leave (AWOL). At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered all of them to be placed
under preventive suspension.

In Fabella, however, the issue is not whether the public-school teachers engaged in any prohibited
activity, which may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of
administrative proceedings. This case revolves around the question of due process of law, not on the
right of government workers to strike. The issue is not whether our public-school teachers may be
punished for engaging in a prohibited action, but whether, in the course of the investigation of the
alleged proscribed activity, their right to due process has been violated. In short, before they can be
investigated and meted out any penalty, due process must first be observed.
After enumerating the requirements provided by law (particularly Republic Act (RA) 4670, otherwise
known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers—the primary law that governs the conduct of
investigation in administrative cases filed against public-school teachers) and existing rules issued by
DECS at that time (now the DepEd), the Supreme Court (SC) resolved to affirm the findings of the Court
of Appeals (CA) and ordered the unqualified reinstatement of our public-school teachers and the
payment to them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their benefit
during the entire duration of their suspension or dismissal.

Thus, the SC affirmed the CA’s ruling that the public-school teachers’ dismissal was effected without any
formal investigation, or while there was a semblance of investigation conducted by the DECS, its
intention to dismiss the public-school teachers was already manifest when it adopted a procedure
where it shifted the burden of proof to the public-school teachers, instead of the DECS proving its case
against the public-school teachers. The SC then emphasized that it will never countenance a denial of
the fundamental right to due process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system.

In the landmark cases of Emin v. De Leon and Alcala v. Villar, the principle of estoppel by laches was
applied to bar a petitioner/public-school teacher from impugning CSCs (in Emin) and Ombudsman’s
(in Alcala) jurisdiction over an administrative case.

The opposite happened in Ombudsman v. Estandarte, where the public-school teacher respondent
consistently protested the referral of the case back to the Ombudsman, and demanded that the same
be remanded to the DECS. She refused to participate in the proceedings before the Ombudsman
precisely because she believed that jurisdiction was already vested on the DECS Region VI. Here
in Ombudsman v. Estandarte, the SC ruled that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance
of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. When the complainants filed their formal
complaint with then-DECS (Region VI), jurisdiction was vested on the latter. It cannot now be transferred
to petitioner upon the instance of the complainants, even with the acquiescence of the DECS and
petitioner.

The author’s answer as to the concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public-school
teachers as above stated is clearly elucidated in the SC decided case of Rene Puse v. Ligaya Puse (which
I also discussed generally in our last column).

In Puse v. Puse, it was ruled that an administrative case against a public-school teacher may be filed
before the Board of Professional Teachers (BPT)-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC, which have concurrent
jurisdiction over administrative cases, such as for immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. The
SC then explained that concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or
subject matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals.

When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive, unless it be proved that another
body, is likewise, vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter.

The authority to hear and decide administrative cases by the BPT-PRC, the DepEd and the CSC comes
from (RA) 7836, Rep. Act No. 4670 and Presidential Decree (PD) 807, respectively. The SC mentioned
Section 23 of RA 7836 as the basis for this authority. Here, the Board is given the power, after due notice
and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a professional teacher for causes
enumerated therein (and one of the causes enumerated is immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable
conduct).

Thus, the SC said that, if a complaint is filed under RA 7836, the jurisdiction to hear the same falls with
the BPT-PRC.

However, Puse also stated that if the complaint against a public-school teacher is filed with the DepEd,
then, under Section 9 of RA 4670, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public-school teachers is
lodged with the investigating committee created pursuant to said section, now being implemented by
Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order 33, Series of 1999, also known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. A
complaint filed under RA 4670 shall be heard by the investigating committee which is under the DepEd,
as emphasized by the SC. (Please see also DepEd Order no. 49, series of 2006, or the Revised Rules of
Procedure of DepEd on Administrative Cases).

The Supreme Court then explained in Puse that as to the CSC, under PO 807, also known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines, particularly Sections 9(j) and 37(a) thereof, the CSC has the power to
hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal.

As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise and discipline
all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or -controlled corporations
with original charters. Consequently, if civil-service rules and regulations are violated, complaints for
said violations may be filed with the CSC.

However, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction over the case and which had the authority to
proceed and decide the case, to the exclusion of the others. Thus, if an administrative case is filed with
the DepEd against a public-school teacher first (or initially with another agency, like Ombudsman the
CSC but was immediately referred to the Deped without the former hearing the case and the latter
actively investigating the case in accordance with the DepEd rules on administrative proceedings), then
the DepEd acquired jurisdiction over the administrative case and it has the sole authority to proceed and
decide the case to the exclusion of the Ombudsman and the CSC.

This column should not be taken as a legal advice applicable to any case, as each case is unique and
should be construed in light of the attending circumstances surrounding such particular case.

Lawyer Toni Umali is the current assistant secretary for Legal and Legislative Affairs of the Department
of Education (DepEd). He is licensed to practice law not only in the Philippines, but also in the state of
California and some federal courts in the US after passing the California State Bar Examinations in 2004.
He has served as a legal consultant to several legislators and local chief executives. As education
assistant secretary, he was instrumental in the passage of the K to 12 law and the issuance of its
implementing rules and regulations. He is also the alternate spokesman of the DepEd.
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