Bliss Development Corp vs.
Diaz ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal, in view of the
application of the doctrine of immutability of judgment in the decision of the court
in G.R. No. 133113? NO
FACTS:
HELD:
1. Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) is the registered owner of a Lot
in Diliman, Quezon City. 10/19/1984: it entered into and executed a
Deed of Sale over the said property in favor of Spouses Emiliano and
Leonila Melgazo (Sps. Melgazo), both of whom are now deceased.
2. Nacua sent a letter to BDC, saying that Sps. Melgazo transferred to him
their rights over the property. He further expressed willingness to pay
the outstanding obligations of Sps. Melgazo to BDC.
 Before the property was fully paid, Nacua sold his rights to
Garcia. Later, Garcia transferred her rights to Reyes. Reyes
then transferred her rights Tapay, who then later sold his rights
to herein respondent Montano Diaz (Diaz)
3. Diaz then paid BDC the amortizations due on the property and BDC
issued a permit to occupy the property in favor of Diaz. Diaz then
introduced improvements on the property.
4. 04/07/1994: BDC executed a Contract to Sell in favor of Diaz. However.
BDC informed Diaz that Arreza was claiming that the heirs of Sps.
Melgazo sold to him the rights over the property. BDC then placed
Diaz’s account in “inactive status.”
5. 03/27/1996: To resolve the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz,
BDC filed a complaint for Interpleader against them.
6. RTC: Arreza had a better right over the property. This decision became
final and executory.
7. NOTE: There was a prior case against Arreza for reimbursement
claims. Diaz vs. Arreza
 Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing res judicata, arguing that
the claim of Diaz is a compulsory counterclaim that should have
been pleaded in the Interpleader case.
 When the issue reached in the SC (G.R. 133113), it ruled that
the claim as against Arreza is barred by res judicata. The Court
upheld the argument that the claim is in the nature of a
compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the case against Arreza was
dismissed.
8. 08/27/1996: Diaz filed the present complaint (PRESENT CLAIM) for
sum of money against BDC.
 Diaz argued that BDC and Tapay’s representations led him to
believe that he had a good title over the property, but due to
the court’s ruling in the interpleader case, he was
constrained to transfer the property to Arreza. (RTC
DENIED)
 CA: Reversed RTC; BDC should pay Diaz; Diaz is a buyer
in good faith
 The Court ruled in G.R. No. 133113 that the claim against Arreza is
barred by res judicata because of a prior Interpleader case between
Arreza and Diaz. The claim for reimbursement should have been
alleged and proved in the prior case, and failure to do so bars any future
action on such claims.
 In cases involving res adjudicata, the parties and the causes of action
are identical or substantially the same in the prior as well as the
subsequent action. The judgment in the first action is conclusive as to
every matter offered and received therein and as to any other matter
admissible therein and which might have been offered for that purpose,
hence said judgment is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the
same cause.
 The bar extends to questions necessarily involved in an issue, and
necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment,
although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto,
and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and
were not actually or formally presented. Said prior judgment is
conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same
subject matter, and on the same cause of action, not only as to matters
which were decided in the first action, but also as to every other matter
which the parties could have properly set up in the prior suit.
 In this case, the essential elements of res judicata are not present.
o First, the interpleader case was between Arreza and Diaz.
While it was BDC that initiated the interpleader case, the
opposing parties in that prior case is, in fact, Arreza and Diaz.
o Second, the issues resolved in the interpleader case revolved
around the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, and not
whatever claim either of them may have against BDC. Thus,
there is no identity of parties, nor identity of subject matter,
between the interpleader case and the one at bar.
Arambulo v. Nolasco
G.R. No. 189420
March 26, 2014
Ponente: Perez
Facts:
1) Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A. Dela Cruz, along with their
mother Rosita vda. De Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza
A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo, Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo
and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco are co-owners of a 233sq.m. Land in Tondo,
Manila.
2) When their mother died, she was succeeded by her husband, Genero
Nolasco and their children.
3) On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-
owners, except for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their respective shares to
the properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one or more co-owners shall
withhold their consent to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the
courts may afford adequate relief.
4) Respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for being premature.
Respondents averred that they were not aware of the intention of petitioners to
sell the properties they co–owned because they were not called to participate
in any negotiations regarding the disposition of the property.
5) RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondents to give their
consent to sale.
Respondents filed a notice of appeal to the CA. CA reversed the RTC
ISSUE: WON respondents, as co–owners, can be compelled by the court to
give their consent to the sale of their shares in the co–owned properties?
HELD: NO
REASONING:
Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co–owners
with full ownership of their parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by the
petitioners of their parts shall not affect the full ownership by the respondents
of the part that belongs to them. Their part which petitioners will sell shall be
that which may be apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of
the co–ownership. With the full ownership of the respondents remaining
unaffected by petitioners’ sale of their parts, the nature of the property, as co–
owned, likewise stays.
Since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co–owner without the consent of the other co–owners is
not null and void. However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property.To be a co–
owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of
the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial
conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment,
or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties
be obtained.
Petitioners who project themselves as prejudiced co–owners may bring
a suit for partition, which is one of the modes of extinguishing co–ownership.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co–owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co–ownership, and that each co–owner may demand at any time
partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Article 498 of the Civil Code states that whenever the thing
is essentially indivisible and the co–owners cannot agree that it be allotted to
one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (a) when the right to partition the
property is invoked by any of the co–owners but because of the nature of the
property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests
of the co–owners, and (b) the co–owners are not in agreement as to who among
them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co–owners.This is the result obviously aimed at by
petitioners at the outset. As already shown, this cannot be done while the co–
ownership exists.
Case Digest: Alolina vs. Flores G.R. No.
198774 I April 04, 2016
FACTS:
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land.
Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In
1980, he added a second floor to the structure. He also extended his
two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on
both floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three
(3) on the ground floor and another three (3) on the second floor.
On the other hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired
through prescription counting from the time when the owner of the
dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from
blocking the view of a window located within the dominant estate.
Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal
prohibition upon the respondents prior to their construction in 1994;
Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view through
prescription.

In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie)

Flores constructed their house/sari sari store on the vacant
municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall
of Alolino's house. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3)
inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows
and the exit door. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of
the light and ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his
ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door of his
house.

Respondents on their part argued that they had occupied their lot
where they constructed their house in 1955, long before the plaintiff
purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only
has himself to blame because he constructed his house up to the very
boundary of his lot without observing the required setback. Finally,
they emphasized that the wall of their house facing Alolino's does not
violate the latter's alleged easement of light and view because it has
no window.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Alolino has acquired easement of light and view;
and (2) whether or not Alolino has acquired an easement of right of
way.

DECISION:
Alolino does not have an easement of light and view or an easement
of right of way over the respondents' property or the barrio road it
stands on. Articles 649-657 governs legal easements of right of way.
None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with
respect to the barrio road where the respondents' house stands on.
 Philippine National Bank, Petitioner, vs.
Spouses Bernard and Cresencia Maranon, Respondents
G.R. No. 189316, July 01, 2013

Facts: The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The antecedent events being the Spouses Maranon, owner of a piece
of real property, erected with a building occupied by various tenants. Said
subject property was among the properties mortgaged by spouses Montealegre
to PNB as a security for a loan. Spouses Montealegre, through a falsified Deed
of Sale, acquired title to the property and used the property’s title which was
purportedly registered in the name of Emelie Montealegre. However, due to
failure to pay the loan, said property was foreclosed by PNB, and upon auction,
was thereafter acquired by the same bank, PNB. Spouses Maranon filed before
the RTC a complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and Damages
against spouses Montealegre. Judgment of RTC was rendered in favour of
spouses Maranon, and also stipulated that the Real Estate Mortgage lien of PNB
shall stay and be respected. Such decision prompted PNB to also seek for
entitlement to the fruits of the property such as rentals paid by the tenants.

Issue: Whether or not is PNB entitled to fruits of the disputed property.

Ruling: No. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property
producing it by right of accession. The rightful recipient of the disputed rent in
this case should be thus the owner of the lot at the time the rent accrued. It is
beyond question that spouses Maranon never lost ownership over the subject
lot, and that technically, there is no juridical tie created by a valid mortgage
contract that binds PNB to the subject lot because the mortgagors Montealegre
were not the true owners. PNB’s lien as a mortgagee in good faith pertains to
the subject lot alone and not on the erected building which was not foreclosed
and still remained to be a property of Maranon. Thus, PNB’s claim for the rents
paid by the tenants has no basis.
G.R. No. 171937, November 25, 2013
Calanasan v. Spouses Dolorito
Brion, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Cerila J. Calanasan, took care of her orphan niece,
respondent Evelyn C. Dolorita, since childhood. In 1982, when Evelyn
was already married to respondent Virgilio Dolorita, the petitioner
donated to Evelyn a parcel of land which had earlier been mortgaged for
Pl5,000.00. The donation was conditional: Evelyn must redeem the land
and the petitioner was entitled to possess and enjoy the property as long
as she lived. Evelyn signified her acceptance of the donation and its
terms in the same deed. Soon thereafter, Evelyn redeemed the property,
had the title of the land transferred to her name, and granted the
petitioner usufructuary rights over the donated land. On August 15,
2002, the petitioner, assisted by her sister Teodora J. Calanasan,
complained with the RTC that Evelyn had committed acts of ingratitude
against her. She prayed that her donation in favor of her niece be
revoked under Art. 765 of the NCC which provides for the revocation of
donation by reason of ingratitude.
and Article 765 of the NCC finds no application with respect to the
onerous portion of the donation.
Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by
the donee, a donation exists, and the legal provisions on donation apply.
Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the provisions on donation to
the gratuitous portion, the petitioner may not dissolve the donation. She
has no factual and legal basis for its revocation, as aptly established by
the RTC. First, the ungrateful acts were committed not by the donee; it
was her husband who committed them. Second, the ungrateful acts
were perpetrated not against the donor; it was the petitioner's sister who
received the alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place the
case out of the purview of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.

In their answer, the respondents denied the commission of any act of

ingratitude. The petitioner died while the case was pending with the
RTC. Her sisters, Teodora and Dolores J. Calanasan, substituted for
her. After the petitioner had rested her case, the respondents filed a
demurrer to evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner may dissolve the donation

HELD:

No.

Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the

rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the
present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the
burden imposed."

The SC agree with the CA that since the donation imposed on the donee
the burden of redeeming the property for P15,000.00, the donation was
onerous. As an endowment for a valuable consideration, it partakes of
the nature of an ordinary contract; hence, the rules of contract will govern
QUINTOS Vs. NICOLAS
(DIGEST)
DOCTRINES:
Art. 494 is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with
prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
FACTS:
Petitioners and respondents are siblings. Their parents,
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of
the subject property, a 281 sq. m. parcel of land situated
in Camiling, Tarlac. By 1999, both Bienvenido and
Escolastica had already passed away, leaving to their 10
children ownership over the subject property.
RTC – Camiling, Tarlac – Subsequently, sometime in
2002, respondent siblings brought an action for
partition against petitioners. In an Order, the trial court
dismissed the case for failure of the parties, as well as
their counsels, to appear despite due notice. As neither
set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial court
became final.
Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent siblings
instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property
in favor of the ten (10) siblings. Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their
7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents, the
spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario.
RTC – Camiling, Tarlac – (same court and branch as above) petitioners filed a
complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents. Petitioners
claim that their parents distributed the subject property to the 3 of them and
they did not participate in the Adjudication above. The respondents
countered the allegations and by way of counterclaim, asks for the partition
of the property. The RTC dismissed the complaint, no evidence that the
parents bequeathed to them the subject property. Thus, respondents are
entitled to their 7/10th shares and the subsequent sale to Spouses Candelario
is valid.
Court of Appeals- petitioners appealed with the additional argument that the
partition should no longer be allowed since it is already barred by res
judicata, respondent siblings having already filed a case for partition that was
dismissed with finality. CA denied the appeal.
ISSUES:
[1] WON all the elements of res judicata are
present (YES)
[2] WON the respondents’ counterclaim for partition is
already barred by res judicata (NO)
RATIO:
[1] All the elements of res judicata are present
(a) The formal judgment or order must be final;
Respondents admit that they filed an action for
partition which the RTC dismissed. Respondents
likewise admitted that since they no longer appealed
the dismissal, the ruling attained finality.
(b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that
is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case.
Under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court a complaint may be dismissed due
to the plaintiff’s fault:
(a) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in
chief on the complaint
(b) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or
(c) if he fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the court.
The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication
on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing
of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal.
In the case at bar, the Order does not in any language say that the dismissal is
without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the dismissal be on the
merits is present.It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; and
(c) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
of subject matter and of cause of action.
It cannot be disputed that the subject property in first case and in the
present controversy are one and the same, and that in both cases,
respondents raise the same action for partition.
And although respondent spouses Candelario were not party-litigants in the
earlier case for partition, there is identity of parties not only when the parties
in the case are the same, but also between those in privity with them, such as
between their successors-in-interest
[2]
However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3
of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-
owner to ask for partition at any time,provided that there
is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet.
Under Article 494 of the Civil Code: No co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Under Article 496 on the other hand: Partition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of
Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3
and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the
Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise
would diminish the substantive right of a co-owner
through the promulgation of procedural rules.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory
provisions, we hold that Art. 494 is an exception to
Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that
even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute
is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall
be deemed to be without prejudice.
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will
never be barred by res judicata. There can still be res
judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties
and the same subject matter once the respective shares
of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a
competent court with jurisdiction or if the court determines
that partition is improper for co-ownership does not or no
longer exists.

LOCSIN V. HIZON G.R. No.
204369 September 17, 2014
Mirror Doctrine, Innocent
Purchaser for Value
NOVEMBER 27, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner Locsin was the registered owner of a lot covered by TCT No.
235094. In 1992, she filed an ejectment case against one Billy Aceron
(Aceron) to recover possession over the land in issue. Eventually, the
two entered into a compromise agreement, which the MTC approved.
Locsin later went to the US without knowing whether Aceron has
complied with his part of the bargain under the compromise agreement.
In spite of her absence, however, she continued to pay the real property
taxes on the subject lot.
In 1994, after discovering that her copy of TCT No. 235094 was
missing, Locsin filed a petition for administrative reconstruction in
order to secure a new one.
However, she discovered that one Marylou Bolos had TCT No. RT-
97467 cancelled and then secured a new one in her favor by registering
a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Locsin.
Bolos later sold the subject lot to Bernardo Hizon, but it was titled
under Carlos Hizon’s name. Carlos is Bernardo’s son. Later, Bernardo,
claiming to be the owner of the property, filed a Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the court-approved
compromise agreement. Furthermore, the property was already
occupied and was, in fact, up for sale.
Locsin, sent Carlos a letter requesting the return of the property since
her signature in the purported deed of sale in favor of Bolos was a
forgery. Carlos denied Locsin’s request, claiming that he was unaware
of any defect or flaw in Bolos’ title and he is, thus, an innocent
purchaser for value and good faith.
Locsin learned that Carlos had already sold the property for PhP 1.5
million to his sister and her husband (spouses Guevara), who had a new
certificate of title issued in their names. The spouses Guevara then
immediately mortgaged the said property to secure a PhP 2.5 million
loan/credit facility with Damar Credit Corporation (DCC).
Locsin filed an action for reconveyance, annulment of TCT No. N-
237083, the cancellation of the mortgage lien annotated thereon, and
damages, against Bolos, Bernardo, Carlos, the Sps. Guevara, DCC, and
the Register of Deeds, Quezon City. The charges against DCC,
however, were dropped on joint motion of the parties. This is in view of
the cancellation of the mortgage for failure of the spouses Guevara to
avail of the loan/credit facility DCC extended in their favor.
The RTC dismissed the complaint.
The CA ruled that it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that Locsin
failed to prove that her signature was forged.
The CA, however, affirmed the RTC’s finding that respondents are
innocent purchasers for value.
The CA ruled that Locsin can no longer recover the subject lot. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Carlos and Spouses Guerrero are innocent purchasers
for value.

RULING:
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest
in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or
before receiving any notice of another person’s claim.
As such, a defective title–– or one the procurement of which is tainted
with fraud and misrepresentation––may be the source of a completely
legal and valid title, provided that the buyer is an innocent third person
who, in good faith, relied on the correctness of the certificate of title, or
an innocent purchaser for value.
Complementing this is the mirror doctrine which echoes the doctrinal
rule that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on
the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and is in no way
obliged to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the
property.
The recognized exceptions to this rule are stated as follows:
[A] person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring
further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the
lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in
litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said
certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be
denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good
faith and, hence, does not merit the protection of the law.
Thus, in Domingo Realty, Inc. v. CA, we emphasized the need for
prospective parties to a contract involving titled lands to exercise the
diligence of a reasonably prudent person in ensuring the legality of the
title, and the accuracy of the metes and bounds of the lot embraced
therein, by undertaking precautionary measures, such as:
1. Verifying the origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title
with the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Land Registration
Authority;
2. Engaging the services of a competent and reliable geodetic engineer
to verify the boundary,metes, and bounds of the lot subject of said title
based on the technical description in the said title and the approved
survey plan in the Land Management Bureau;
3. Conducting an actual ocular inspection of the lot;
4. Inquiring from the owners and possessors of adjoining lots with
respect to the true and legal ownership of the lot in question;
5. Putting up of signs that said lot is being purchased, leased, or
encumbered; and
6. Undertaking such other measures to make the general public aware
that said lot will be subject to alienation, lease, or encumbrance by the
parties.
In the case at bar, Bolos’ certificate of title was concededly free from
liens and encumbrances on its face. However, the failure of Carlos and
the spouses Guevara to exercise the necessary level of caution in light
of the factual milieu surrounding the sequence of transfers from Bolos
to respondents bars the application of the mirror doctrine and inspires
the Court’s concurrence with petitioner’s proposition.
CALIMOSO V. ROULLO GR NO. 198594
Heirs of Bienvenido Tanyag V. Gabriel October 28, 1998 over the subject land in the name of respondent’s heirs of
Jose Gabriel was null and void from the beginning.
Facts:
On the other hand, respondents asserted that petitioners have no
Subject of controversy are two adjacent parcels of land located at Ruhale,
cause of action against them for they have not established their ownership
Barangay Calzada, Municipality of Taguig. The first parcel (“Lot 1”) with an area
over the subject property covered by a Torrens title in respondents’
of 686 square meters was originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel, while
name. They further argued that OCT No. 1035 had become unassailable one
the second parcel (“Lot 2”) consisting of 147 square meters was originally
year after its issuance and petitioners failed to establish that it was irregularly
declared in the name of Agueda Dinguinbayan. For several years, these lands
or unlawfully procured.
lined with bamboo plants remained undeveloped and uninhabited.
Issue:
Petitioners claimed that Lot 1 was owned by Benita Gabriel, sister of Jose
Gabriel, as part of her inheritance as declared by her in a 1944 notarized Who has a better right over the subject property?
instrument (“Affidavit of Sale”) whereby she sold the said property to spouses
Ruling:
Gabriel Sulit and Cornelia Sanga.
From 1969 until the filing of this complaint by the petitioners in March
Lot 1 allegedly came into the possession of Benita Gabriel’s own
2000, the latter have been in continuous, public and adverse possession of the
daughter, Florencia Gabriel Sulit, when her father-in-law Gabriel Sulit gave it
subject land for 31 years. Having possessed the property for the period and in
to her as part of inheritance of his son, Eliseo Sulit who was Florencia’s
the character required by law as sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
husband. Florencia Sulit sold the same lot to Bienvenido S. Tanyag, father of
prescription, petitioners have indeed acquired ownership over the subject
petitioners, as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale dated October 14,
property. Such right cannot be defeated by respondents’ acts of declaring
1964. Petitioners then took possession of the property, paid the real estate
again the property for tax purposes in 1979 and obtaining a Torrens certificate
taxes due on the land and declared the same for tax purposes issued in 1969
of title in their name in 1998.
in the name of Bienvenido’s wife, Araceli C. Tanyag.
Under Article 434 of the Civil Code, to successfully maintain an action
As to Lot 2, petitioners averred that it was sold by Agueda
to recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better
Dinguinbayan to Araceli Tanyag under Deed of Sale executed on October 22,
right to it must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed;
1968. Thereupon, petitioners took possession of said property and declared
and second, his title thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion
the same for tax purposes. Petitioners claimed to have continuously, publicly,
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
notoriously and adversely occupied both Lots 1 and 2 through their caretaker
property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by describing the
Juana Quinones; they fenced the premises and introduced improvements on
location, area and boundaries thereof. In this case, petitioners failed to
the land.
identify Lot 2 by providing evidence of the metes and bounds thereof, so that
Sometime in 1979, Jose Gabriel, father of respondents, secured in his the same may be compared with the technical description contained in OCT
name Lot 1 indicating therein an increased area of 1,763 square meters. No. 1035, which would have shown whether Lot 2 consisting of 147 square
meters was erroneously included in respondents’ title. The testimony of
On March 20, 2000, petitioners instituted a civil case alleging that
Agueda Dinguinbayan’s son would not suffice because said witness merely
respondents never occupied the whole 686 square meters of Lot 1 and
stated the boundary owners as indicated in the 1966 and 1967 tax declarations
fraudulently caused the inclusion of Lot 2 in such that Lot 1 consisting of 686
of his mother. On his part, Arturo Tayag claimed that he had the lots surveyed
square meters originally declared in the name of Jose Gabriel was increased to
in the 1970s in preparation for the consolidation of the two parcels. However,
1,763 square meters. They contended that the issuance of OCT No. 1035 on
no such plan was presented in court.
HEIRS OF DELFIN v. HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, GR No. 187633,
2016-04-04
Facts:
On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin)[5] and
Maria Tappa (Spouses Tappa) filed a complaint[6] for Quieting of
Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages (Complaint) against
respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud),[7] Henry Calabazaron
(Calabazaron), and Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng).[8] The property
subject of the complaint is a parcel of land identified as Lot No.
3341, Pls-793 with an area of 21,879 square meters, located in
Kongcong, Cabbo, Peñablanca, Cagayan (Lot No. 3341).[9]
In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the
registered owners of Lot No. 3341, having been issued
OCT No. P-69103... r 18, 199
September 18, 1992,... Delfin allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from
his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that
both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious,
exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial
In their Answer,[12] respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and
Malupeng claimed that the original owner of Lot No. 3341 was
Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo and Irene.
Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene
by operation of law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the
property.
Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit... stated that
Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It further stated that one-half
(1/2) of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole
property was declared as his, only for taxation purposes.
Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the
sale made to each of them. They continued to occupy them despite
several demands to vacate from Spouses Tappa.
Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed
through force and intimidation.[23] Bacud and Malupeng denied this
allegation.[24]
The R
TC... that there was no document in the hands of respondents as
strong and persuasive as the title in the name of the Spouses
Tappa that will support respondents' claim of ownersh... ip
Respondents appealed to the CA
They alleged that Spouses Tappa committed fraud because they
were not in possession of the lot since 1963, which possession was
required for an applicant for a free patent under the law.
respondents argued that the complaint should be dismissed
because both extinctive and acquisitive prescription have already
set in.
They also argued that the action for quieting of title had already
prescribed since the possession of Bacud and Malupeng started in
1963, which fact was allegedly admitted by Spouses Tappa in their
complaint.[40] Thus, Spouses Tappa had only until 1993 to file a
complaint, which they failed to do.
Ail respondents claimed that from the start of their possession, they
(1) have paid real taxes on the lot, (2) have planted crops, and (3)
have continued to possess the lot in the concept of owners.[41]...
respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa failed to prove their right
over the subject lot because they cannot rely on the certificate of
title issued to them on September 18, 1992 by virtue of a free patent
The CA set aside the decision of the RTC.
uled in favor of respondents and explained that their possession
over Lot No. 3341 already ripened into ownership through
acquisitive prescription.
A noted that Spouses Tappa acknowledged in their complaint that
they have not been in possession of the lot, and that respondents
have been continuously occupying portions of it since 1963.
first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not have a legal
or an equitable title to or an interest in the property. The CA
explained that the free patent granted to Spouses Tappa produced
no legal effect because Lot No. 3341 was a private land,... while
Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent over the property,
and were able to register it under the Torrens system, they have not
become its owners.
"[r]egistration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership over A cloud... ment (deed, or contract) or record or claim or
immovable property—it does not create title nor vest one but it encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparendy valid or
simply confirms a title already vested, rendering it forever effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
indefeasible." or unenforceable, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by
extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title
Issues:
1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid,
Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses Tappa's complaint for ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or extinguished (or
quieting of title against respondents;[56]Whether the CA erred in not terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA correctly
finding that Spouses Tappa's certificate of title cannot be collaterally found that Spouses Tappa's claim of force and intimidation m the
attacked in this case;[57] andWhether the CA erred in finding that execution of the 1963 Affidavit was "unsubstantiated
respondents have acquired the property through acquisitive
prescription.[58]
Ruling:
We affirm the decision of the CA.
for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites
must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.[61]Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites
We agree with the CA that at the time of the application for free
patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become private land by virtue of
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession by
respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the
coverage of the Public Land Act,[62] which governs public patent
applications.
Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in
1963, Bacud and Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No.
3341 and planted crops on the property, while Calabazaron did the
same on another portion of the lot in the 1970's.[71] The complaint
stated further that since 1963, the respondents "continuously
occupied portion of the subject land."[7
Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of
respondents' possession of the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341.
They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by respondents
in their complaint filed in 1999.
REPUBLIC v. REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, GR No. 197472, 2015-
09-07
Facts:
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary
by vocation engaged in humanitarian and charitable activities,
established an orphanage and school in Punta Verde
, Palaui Island
He claimed that since 1962, he has been in... peaceful possession
of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui
Island... which he, with the help of Aetas and other people under his
care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to
support his... charitable, humanitarian and missionary works.
On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military purposes a parcel of the
public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, 2,000
hectares of the southern half portion of the Palaui Island were
withdrawn from sale or... settlement and reserved for the use of the
Philippine Navy, subject, however, to private rights if there be any.
More than two decades later or on August 16, 1994, President Fidel
V. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 447 declaring Palaui Island and
the surrounding waters... as marine reserve. Again subject to any
private rights, the entire Palaui
Island consisting of an aggregate area of 7,415.48 hectares was
accordingly reserved as a marine protected area.
On June 13,2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction[5] against Rogelio C. Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command
According to him, some members of the Philippine Navy, upon
orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the
said 50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15, 2000,
they commanded him and his men, through the use of force... and
intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance from
the Office of the Philippine Naval Command, he was met with
sarcastic remarks and threatened with drastic military action if they
do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained to
leave the area.
the RTC issued an Order[8] dated February 21, 2002 granting the...
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. However,
the same pertained to five hectares (subject area) only, not to the
whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev. Cortez,
viz.:
It should be noted that the claim of [Rev. Cortez] covers an area of
50 hectares more or less located at the western portion of Palaui
Island which is within the Naval reservation. [Rev. Cortez] presented
what he called as a survey map (Exh. "H") indicating the... location
of the area claimed by the Church of the Living God and/or Rev.
Claudio Cortez with an approximate area of 50 hectares identified
as Exh. "H-4". However, the Survey Map allegedly prepared by [a]
DENR personnel is only a sketch map[,] not a survey map as
claimed by [Rev.
Cortez]. Likewise, the exact boundaries of the area [are] not
specifically indicated.
For this reason, there is merit to the contention of [Biñas] that [Rev.
Cortez]' claim to the 50 hectares of land identified as Exh. ["]H-4" is
unclear and ambiguous. It is a settled jurisprudence that mandatory
injunction is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be...
extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot
afford an adequate and commensurate remedy in damages. The
right must be clear, the injury impending or threatened, so as to be
averted only by the protecting preventive process of injunction.
Admittedly, the documentary exhibits of [Rev. Cortez] tended only to
show that [he] has a pending application of patent with the DENR.
Even so, [Rev. Cortez] failed to present in evidence the application
for patent allegedly filed by [him] showing that he applied for patent
on... the entire 50 hectares of land which he possessed or occupied
for a long period of time. Under the circumstances, therefore, the
title of petitioner to the 50 hectares of land in Palaui Island remains
unclear and doubtful, and [is] seriously disputed by the government.
More significantly, at the time that Proc. No. 201 was issued on May
22, 1967, [Rev. Cortez] has not perfected his right over the 50
hectares of land nor acquired any vested right thereto considering
that he only occupied the land as alleged by him in 1962 or barely
five (5)... years before the issuance of the Presidential
Proclamation. Proclamation No. 201 had the effect of removing
Palaui Island from the alienable or disposable portion of the public
domain and therefore the island, as of the date of [the] Issuance [of
the proclamation], has ceased to... be disposable public land.
However, the court is not unmindful that [Rev. Cortez] has lawfully
possessed and occupied at least five (5) hectares of land situated at
the western portion of the Palaui Island identified as Exh "H-4".
During the hearing, Cmdr. Rogelio Biñas admitted that when he was
assigned... as Commanding Officer in December 1999, he went to
Palaui Island and [saw only] two (2) baluga families tilling the land
consisting of five (5) hectares. Therefore, it cannot be seriously
disputed that [Rev. Cortez] and his baluga tribesmen cleared five (5)
hectares of land for... planting and cultivation since 1962 on the
western portion identified as Exhibit "H-4". The Philippine Navy also
admitted that they have no objection to settlers of the land prior to
the Presidential Proclamation and [Rev. Cortez] had been identified
as one of the early settlers... of the area before the Presidential
Proclamation. The DENR also acknowledged that [Rev. Cortez] has
filed an application for patent on the western area and that he must
be allowed to pursue his claim.
Although the court is not persuaded by the argument of [Rev.
Cortez] that he has already acquired vested rights over the area
claimed by him, the court must recognize that [Rev. Cortez] may
have acquired some propriety rights over the area considering the
directive of the DENR... to allow [Rev. Cortez] to pursue his
application for patent. However, the court wants to make clear that
the application for patent by [Rev. Cortez] should be limited to an
area not to exceed five (5) hectares situated at the western portion
of x x x Palaui Island identified in... the sketch map as Exh. "H-4."
This area appears to be the portion where [Rev. Cortez] has clearly
established his right or title by reason of his long possession and
occupation of the land.
On July 3, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision[11] making the
injunction final and permanent. In so ruling, the said court made
reference to the Indigenous Peoples' [Fight] Act (EPRA) as follows:
The Indigenous [Peoples' Right] Act should be given effect in this
case. The affected community belongs to the group of indigenous
people which are protected by the State of their rights to continue in
their possession of the lands they have been tilling since time
immemorial.
No subsequent passage of law or presidential decrees can alienate
them from the land they are tilling.[12]
In its Decision[17] dated June 29, 2011, the CA upheld the RTC's
issuance of a final injunction
Issues:
whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory
injunction.
Ruling:
We grant the Petition.
while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession,
he, nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he
has a claim is not part of the public domain and therefore can be the
proper object of possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State.
Hence, "[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly under private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of... the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons."[45] To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a
positive act of the government, such as presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an... administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute
declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be
established.[46]
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion
of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when
Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same. Hence, it must be
considered as still inalienable public domain.
The same goes true even if Proclamation No. 201 and Proclamation
No. 447 were made subject to private rights.
As there has been no showing that the subject parcels of land had
been segregated from the military reservation, the respondents had
to prove that the subject properties were alienable or disposable
land of the public domain prior to its withdrawal from sale and...
settlement and reservation for military purposes under Presidential
Proclamation No. 265.
Without first determining the nature and character of the land, all
other requirements such as length and nature of possession and
occupation over such land do not come into play. The required
length of possession does not operate when the land is part of the
public... domain.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortez failed to
conclusively establish his claimed right over the subject portion of
Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a final
injunction.
Principles:
An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not
be the proper object of possession. Hence, injunction cannot be
issued in order to protect one's alleged right of possession over the
same.
CASE DIGEST: REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,v. EMMANUEL C.
CORTEZ,Respondent.
FACTS: Respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed
with the RTC an applicationfor judicial confirmation of title
over a parcel of land located at Barangay (Poblacion) Aguho,
P. Herrera Street, Pateros, Metro Manila. In support of his
application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following
documents: (1) tax declarations for various years from 1966
until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the
annotation that the property is classified as alienable and
disposable; (3) technical description of the property, with a
certification issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance
certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of estate conveying
the subject property to Cortez; and (6) escritura de particion
extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject
property to Felicisima Cotas Cortez mother.
As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of
General Default and Cortez was allowed to present his
evidence ex-parte.
Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a portion of
Lot No. 2697, which was declared for taxation purposes in
the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot No. 2697 was
inherited by his mother from her parents in 1946; that, after
his parents died, he and his siblings executed an Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their
deceased parents and one of the properties allocated to him
was the subject property. He alleged that the subject
property had been in the possession of his family since time
immemorial; that the subject parcel of land is not part of the
reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and
disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).
Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has known the family
of Cortez for over sixty (60) years and that Cortez and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
subject property since he came to know them.
The RTC granted Cortez application for registration,
however, The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the
application for registration despite the failure of Cortez to
comply with the requirements for original registration of
title. The petitioner pointed out that, although Cortez
declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in
possession of the subject parcel of land since time
immemorial, no document was ever presented that would
establish his predecessors-in-interests possession of the
same during the period required by law. That petitioner
claimed that Cortez assertion that he and his predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, adverse, and continuous
possession of the subject property for more than thirty (30)
years does not constitute well-neigh incontrovertible
evidence required in land registration cases; that it is a mere
claim, which should not have been given weight by the RTC.
The CA found that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of
the subject property for more than 30 years, which, under
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529,
sufficed to convert it to private property. Hence, the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in affirming the grant of the
application for registration?
HELD: The Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with the
legal requirements for the registration of the subject
property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to public land
acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073. "Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529],
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish
first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."
In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the
notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of
the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical
correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of
the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands subject for
registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original
registration of lands acquired by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws. "As Section 14(2) [of P.D. No.
1529] categorically provides, only private properties may be
acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421
of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for
public use, public service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private."
***
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of
the State may be acquired by private persons through
prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which
states that "all things which are within the commerce of man
are susceptible to prescription," and that property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription."
The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive
prescription would only begin to run from the time that the
State officially declares that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the
development of national wealth.
Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that are
considered patrimonial may be acquired by prescription
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive
prescription could commence, the property sought to be
registered must not only be classified as alienable and
disposable; it must also be declared by the State that it is no
longer intended for public use, public service or the
development of the national wealth. Thus, absent an express
declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of
public dominion.
The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration from
the state attesting to the patrimonial character of the subject
property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription
has begun to run against the State, much less that he has
acquired title to the subject property by virtue thereof. It is
of no moment that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the subject property for 57 years
at the time he applied for the registration of title thereto. lt
is not the notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession
and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land
for the mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial.