CASES (PReLIM)
Whether the rules and regulations
Calalang vs. Williams G.R. No.
47800 December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo Calalang
Respondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.
Ponente: Laurel, J:
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private
citizen and a taxpayer of Manila filed a petition
for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.
It is alleged in the petition that the
National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of
July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the
Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from
passing along Rosario Street extending from
Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30 Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30
pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue
extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for
a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.
The Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to
the Director of Public Works with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions
of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which
authorizes said Director with the approval from
the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communication to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director
recommended to the Secretary the approval of
the recommendations made by the Chairman of
the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works
approved the recommendations on August 10,
1940.
The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation.
As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles
are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers
in the places above mentioned to the detriment
not only of their owners but of the riding public
as well.
Issue:
1.
promulgated by the respondents pursuant to
the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO.
548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged
the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?
2. Whether the rules and regulations
complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the
people?
Held:
1. No. The promulgation of the Act aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and
welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the
public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom
of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be
subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental
aims of the government, the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing which should not be made to prevail
over authority because society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the
fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.
2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on
the time-honored principles of salus populi est
suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and
of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent
with the fundamental and paramount objective of
the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about “the
greatest good to the greatest number.”
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS
AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE
EXPORTERS vs Torres
FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres
issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991
temporarily suspending the recruitment by
private employment agencies of “Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”. As a
result of the department order DOLE, through
the POEA took over the business of deploying
Hong Kong bound workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization
of private employment and recruitment agencies
duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to
engage in the business of obtaining overseas
employment for Filipino land-based workers filed
a petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned order and to prohibit
implementation.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not respondents acted with
grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars;
2. whether or not the assailed DOLE and
POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution,
are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. whether or not the requirements of
publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not
complied with.
HELD:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their
authority and did not commit grave abuse of
discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC)
clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and
regulate recruitment and placement activities, to
wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of
Labor shall have the power to restrict and
regulate the recruitment and placement activities
of all agencies within the coverage of this title
[Regulation of Recruitment and Placement
Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue
orders and promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out the objectives and implement the
provisions of this title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is
constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing
complexities of the modern society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are
however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason
is the lack of proper publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Registrar as
required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise
provided;
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The
Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration and
enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall
become effective fifteen (15) days after
announcement of their adoption in newspapers
of general circulation;
and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with
the University of the Philippines Law Center,
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted
by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-
making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall
become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing as above provided unless a different
date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in
cases of imminent danger to public health,
safety and welfare, the existence of which must
be expressed in a statement accompanying the
rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to
persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter
2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Prohibition granted.
JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of
Appeals
FACTS:
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991,
Cory banned the deployment of performing
artists to Japan and other destinations. This was
relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which
later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and
train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In
pursuant to the proposal POEA and the
secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to
realize the plan which included an Artist’s
Record Book which a performing artist must
acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The
Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines
assailed the validity of the said regulation as it
violated the right to travel, abridge existing
contracts and rights and deprives artists of their
individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the
cause of Federation of Entertainment Talent
Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP). The
lower court ruled in favor of Entertainment
Industry Advisory Council (EIAC).
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is
valid
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The
regulation is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power concerns government enactments
which precisely interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare
or the common good. As the assailed
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it
follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its
Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, does not
enhance the public welfare or was exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of
Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of
Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and
absolute ban against the deployment of
performing artists to “high risk” destinations, a
measure which would only drive recruitment
further underground, the new scheme at the
very least rationalizes the method of screening
performing artists by requiring reasonable
educational and artistic skills from them and
limits deployment to only those individuals
adequately prepared for the unpredictable
demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least
lessens the room for exploitation by
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Florendo v. Enrile
Adm. Matter No. P-92-695, 7 December 1994
Facts: The complainant was the plaintiff in an
ejectment case upon which a decision was
rendered, ordering the defendants to vacate the
premises and to surrender the possession
thereof to the complainant.
The writ was assigned to the respondent for
implementation. However, due to defendant’s
refusal of the defendants to vacate the
premises, a writ of demolition was issued.
For the service and implementation of the writ of
the demolition, the respondent, a Deputy Sheriff
of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Cabanatuan City, asked and received from the
complainant and her the lawyer the total sum of
P5,200.00 purportedly as sheriff’s fee. The
respondent did not execute the writ of demolition
despite the receipt of the said amount. Since
nothing was done by the respondent,
complainant thus files for respondent’s dismissal
from service.
In defense, respondent admitted that he
collected the said sheriff’s fee but he denied
that he did not implement the writ of
execution and the writ of demolition. He
further claimed that he was threatened by the
defendants that if he would enforce the writ of
demolition, something would happen, i.e.
“magkamatayan muna”.
Mr. Vicencio, Clerk of Court IV and Ex-Officio
Sheriff, informed Judge Mauricio that the threat
on the respondent’s life was real and requested
that a new deputy sheriff be assigned to enforce
the writ. Judge Mauricio sent a formal request to
the presiding judge of the case, asking that
Deputy Sheriff Pineda be assigned.

Executive Judge Ballutay of the RTC, to whom
the case was referred to, recommended that in
addition to the suspension for one (1) year
without pay and to return the P5,200.00, a
suspension without pay for six (6) months be
imposed upon the respondent.
The Office of the Court Administrator ordered
that respondent be imposed a fine equivalent to
his one (1) month salary payable within ten (10)
days upon notice, taking into account that (a) he
was not totally remiss in his duties but also
exerted efforts to execute the writs; (b) he even
went to the extent of approaching the City Mayor
for relocation of the defendants; and (c)
complainant herself is in conformity to the
dismissal of the complaint; and (2) to return the
total amount of P5,200.00 to the complainant
without interest, with a stern warning that the
repetition of similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
Issue: Is the recommended penalty by Judge
Ballutay of the Office of the Court
Administrator adequate?
Held: No.
Both are, more so that of the latter, grossly
inadequate in the light of the gravity of the
administrative offenses committed by the
respondent. Moreover, the former’s
recommendation of an additional penalty of
suspension for six months on account of the
"stubborn attitude of the respondent of not
engaging the services of counsel to facilitate the
early termination of the investigation" is
improper.
The records disclose that Judge Ballutay was
very accommodating to the parties. No less than
fifteen scheduled hearings were cancelled or
postponed and despite admonitions that he
would proceed with the hearing regardless of the
absence of counsel, he never did. Thus, Judge
Ballutay is not entirely without blame for the
delay in the termination of the investigation of
this case.
The Court also did not give weight to the
circumstances relied upon by the Office of the
Court Administrator to mitigate the respondent’s
liability. As hereinafter noted, he is guilty of
grave misconduct, gross dishonesty, serious
dereliction or neglect of duty, gross inefficiency
or incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
The respondent never denied that he received
the sum of P5,200.00 from the complainant in
connection with the writ of demolition. He did not
issue any official receipt for the amount
received. At the time the writ of demolition was
placed on his hands for implementation, the
basic amount that the complainant had to pay
was only P8.00 pursuant to paragraph (g),
Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. This
was later increased to P100.00 per this Court’s
en banc resolution of 4 September 1990.
However, the approval of the court thereof is
needed and upon such approval, the amount
shall be deposited by the interested party with
the clerk of court and ex-officio sheriff, who shall
disburse the same to the deputy sheriff assigned
to effect the process, subject to liquidation within
the same period for rendering a return of the
process. Any unspent amount shall be refunded
to the party making the deposit. A full report
shall be submitted by the deputy sheriff
assigned with his return. In the instant case, the
respondent did not make any report on the
amount he received from the complainant nor
did he issue an official receipt therefor. It is then
obvious that he asked for the amount not as
lawful fees alone but as a consideration for the
performance of his duty. Any portion of the
P5,200.00 then in excess of the lawful fees
allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful
exaction which makes the respondent liable for
grave misconduct and gross dishonesty.
The records further disclose that the
respondent’s returns of service dated 25 July
1990 and 24 September 1990 were filed by him
only on 29 May 1991 and 6 June 1991. Either
the respondent correctly dated the returns, in
which case there was a deliberate and
unreasonable delay in their filing with the court,
or he antedated them to make it appear that he
prepared it well within the period provided for by
the Rules of Court. Section 11 of Rule 39 thereof
provides that a writ of execution should be
returned at any time not less than ten days nor
more than sixty days after its receipt by the
sheriff who must set forth in writing on its back
the whole of his proceedings by virtue thereof
and file it with the clerk or judge to be preserved
with the other papers in the case. As the court
personnel primarily responsible for the speedy
and efficient service of all court processes and
writs originating from his court, it was the
respondent’s duty to immediately implement the
writ of demolition.
The respondent’s explanation that he was not
able to implement the writ of demolition because
he was threatened with death by the defendants
is unacceptable. If that were true, he should
have either reported it to the MTCC and
requested the assistance of other sheriffs or
law enforcement authorities, or filed the
appropriate criminal complaint against the
defendants who had threatened him. Instead
of doing so, he filed his returns only after several
months had lapsed. For such nonfeasance and
misfeasance, the respondent is guilty of serious
dereliction or neglect of duty, gross inefficiency
or incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.
WHEREFORE, for grave misconduct, gross
dishonesty, serious dereliction or neglect of
duty, gross incompetence or inefficiency,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service, respondent is ordered
DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch of service of the government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor, et al.
G.R. No. 128509, 22 August 2006
Facts: Petitioner Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo
handling service operator, authorized by the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to provide and
render arrastre and stevedoring services at the
Municipal Port of Hilongos, Leyte, and on all
vessels berthed thereat, from September 1992
to September 1993.
In December 1993, pending final consideration
of petitioner’s application for renewal with the
PPA Office, Manila, the PPA through its Port
Manager Salvador L. Reyna of the Tacloban
Port Management Office issued a 90-day
holdover authority to petitioner. Stated
therein was the proviso that notwithstanding the
90day period aforementioned, the authority shall
be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier
permit/contract for cargo handling services is
granted or sooner withdrawn or cancelled for
cause pursuant to PPA Administrative Order No.
1081. Meanwhile, petitioner filed with
respondent mayor an application for the renewal
of its business permits, which, in turn, was
denied. Petitioner thus filed for a petition for
mandamus with preliminary injunction, and
enjoined respondent mayor to issue the
business license sought.
On the other hand, the respondent mayor
averred that the remedy of mandamus does not
lie as the issuance of the permit sought is not
a ministerial function, but one that requires
sound judgment and discretion. In denying
petitioners application, respondent mayor
invoked Municipal Resolution No. 9327, passed
by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, Leyte
which prohibits any party which likewise
operates shipping lines plying the route of Cebu
to Hilongos and vice versa, from engaging in
arrastre and stevedoring services at the port of
Hilongos.
Issue: Is respondent mayor’s issuance of the
permit a discretionary duty?
Held: Yes.
It can be deduced from Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of
the Local Government Code that the limits in the
exercise of the power of a municipal mayor to
issue licenses and permits, and suspend or
revoke the same can be contained in a law or
ordinance The said section is pursuant to
Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general
welfare clause, which encapsulates the
delegated police power to local government
units. Thus, under the LGC, the municipal mayor
has the power to issue licenses and permits and
suspend or revoke the same for any violation of
the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or
ordinance.
The pursuit of its duty under the police power
necessarily entails exercise of official discretion
in order for any local officials to ascertain which
will better serve their constituents who elected
them into office. Full discretion must necessarily
be granted them to perform their functions and it
will not be sound logic to simply make them
perform purely ministerial functions. And when
the discharge of an official duty requires the
exercise of official discretion or judgment, it is
never a ministerial one.
Furthermore, where the only power given to a
municipal corporation or official is to issue
license, as in Section 444 of the Local
Government Code, it is clearly regulatory in
nature rather than a revenue raising one.
Conclusively, regulation being the object of the
power to issue license and permits the exercise
of discretion by the issuing authority becomes
an inescapable prerogative. This could be the
very same reason why business permits and
licenses are renewed almost annually in order
that the licensing officials in carrying out their
functions could examine and evaluate availing
circumstances and conditions and with the
exercise of discretion determine whether to
grant or deny the application or, to revoke a
license or permit already issued. It should also
be understood that a municipal license is not a
property such that it is revocable when public
interest so requires.
However, the fact that there only was the
Resolution No. 93-27, and no ordinance nor
law, petitioner’s cause still cannot prosper
because the proper action is certiorari to
determine whether grave of abuse of
discretion had been committed, and not
mandamus.
ADASA V. ABALOS
G.R. No. 168617, 19 February 2007
Facts: Respondent alleged that petitioner,
through deceit, received and encashed two
checks issued in the name of respondent
without respondent’s knowledge and consent
and that despite repeated demands by the latter,
petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds
of the checks.
Petitioner admitted that she received and
encased the two checks issued in favor of the
respondent but alleged that it was a Bebie
Correa who received the two checks and the
same left the country after misappropriating the
proceeds of the checks.
The Office of the City Prosecutor found probable
cause against petitioner and ordered the filing of
two informations for Estafa Through
Falsification of Commercial Document by a
Private Individual.
During her arraignment in one criminal case,
petitioner entered an unconditional plea of not
guilty. Dissatisfied with the finding of the Office
of the City Prosecutor, petitioner filed a Petition
for review before the DOJ. The DOJ reversed
and set aside the resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor and directed the said office to
withdraw the information against petitioner.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the DOJ should have dismissed the
Petition for Review since Section 7 of DOJ
Circular No. 70 mandates that when an
accused has already been arraigned and
aggrieved party files for Petition for Review
before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice
cannot take cognizance of the petition or
even give due course thereto, but deny it
outright.
The DOJ denied the MR, opining that the SOJ is
not preclude from accommodating any appeal
taken to him even where the accused has
already been arraigned in court. This is due to
the permissive language "may" utilized in
Section 12 whereby the Secretary has the
discretion to entertain an appealed resolution
notwithstanding the fact that the accused has
been arraigned.
Issue: Can the DOJ give due course to
petitioner’s Petition for Review despite its having
been filed after the latter had already been
arraigned?
Held: No.
Section 7 specifically applies to a situation on
what the DOJ must do when confronted with an
appeal or a Petition for Review that is either
clearly without merit, manifestly intended to
delay, or filed after an accused has already been
arraigned, i.e., he may dismiss it outright if it is
patently without merit or manifestly intended to
delay, or if it was filed after the accused has
already been arraigned, the Secretary shall not
give it due course. On the other hand, Section
12 applies generally to the disposition of an
appeal. Further, the said section states that the
Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition for
Review when, among others, the accused had
already been arraigned when the appeal was
taken.
Section 7 and Section 12 are neither
contradictory nor irreconcilable. Section 7
pertains to the action on the petition that the
DOJ must take, while Section 12 enumerates
the options the DOJ has with regard to the
disposition of a Petition for Review or of an
appeal.
Thus, when an accused has already been
arraigned, the DOJ must not give the appeal or
Petition for Review due course and must dismiss
the same. This is bolstered by the fact that
arraignment of the accused prior to the filing of
the appeal or Petition for Review is set forth as
one of the grounds for its dismissal. Therefore,
in such instance, the DOJ, noting that the
arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of
an appeal or Petition for Review is a ground for
dismissal under Section 12, must go back to
Section 7 and act upon as mandated therein.
In other words, the DOJ must not give due
course to, and must necessarily dismiss, the
appeal.
Republic vs. Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines. Inc.
G.R. No. L-26862 March 30, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, filed a complaint against
defendant-appellee, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS
LINES, INC., which sought the invalidation of
the payment made by the latter for the
registration of its motor vehicles in the form
of negotiable backpay certificate of
indebtedness, alleging that that the defendant
was a mere assignee of such negotiable
instrument and not the backpay holder itself.
The defendant alleged that what it did was in
accordance with law, both the Treasurer of the
Philippines and the General Auditing Office
having signified their conformity to such a mode
of payment.
The National Treasurer approved the
acceptance of negotiable certificates of
indebtedness in payment of registration fees of
motor vehicles with the view that such
certificates ‘should be accorded with the same
confidence by other governmental
instrumentalities as other evidences of public
debt.
The registration fee which defendant-
appellee had to pay was imposed by Section
8 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law. The
conclusion is difficult to resist therefore that the
Motor Vehicle Act requires the payment not of a
tax but of a registration fee under the police
power. Hence the inapplicability of the section
relied upon by defendant-appellee under the
Back Pay Law. It is not held liable for a tax but
for a registration fee. It therefore cannot make
use of a backpay certificate to meet such an
obligation.
Issue:
WoN the acceptance of payment is
binding on the part of plaintiff (government).
Held: No
The government is not bound by the
mistaken interpretation arrived by the
national treasurer and the auditor general.
The Government is never estopped by mistake
or error on the part of its agents.
While the question here is one of the
collection of a regulatory fee under the police
power, there is nothing to stand in the way of the
collection of the registration fees from
defendant-appelle.
3. The Republic of the Philippines, in its brief, likewise
assigned as error the failure of the lower court to hold
that estoppel does not lie against the government for
mistakes committed by its agents. As could be
discerned from an excerpt of the decision earlier
referred to, the lower court was impressed by the fact
that the national treasurer to whom it correctly
referred as being vested with the function of
administering the backpay law did in a communication
to the Motor Vehicles Office approve the acceptance
of negotiable certificate of indebtedness in payment of
registration fees, a view with which the Auditor
General was in concurrence. The appealed decision
likewise noted: "By the testimonies of Pedro Flores,
the then Registrar of the Motor Vehicles Office of
Baguio City and Casiano Catbagan, the Cashier of
the Bureau of Public Highways in the same city,
defendant bus firm has undisputedly shown that, after
the said certificates of indebtedness were properly
indorsed in favor of the Motor Vehicles Office of
Baguio City and accepted by the Bureau of Public
Highways on May 29, 1959, it was duly and properly
issued official receipts ... acknowledging full payment
of its registration fees for the second installment of
1959 of its 238 vehicles, and that the Bureau of Public
Highways, thru its collecting and disbursing officer,
was validly and regularly authorized to receive such
payment." 17
Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then
Solicitor General, conclude that the government was
bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the
national treasurer and the auditor general. It would
consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law.
Estoppel does not lie. Such a principle dates back to
Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of Lands, 18 a 1919
decision. Insofar as the taxing power is concerned,
Pineda v. Court of First Instance, a 1929 decision,
speaks categorically: "The Government is never
 estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.
It follows that, in so far as this record shows, the
petitioners have not made it appear that the additional
tax claimed by the Collector is not in fact due and
collectible. The assessment of the tax by the Collector
creates, it must be remembered, a charge that is at
least prima facie valid." 19 That principle has since
been subsequently followed.
20
While the question
here is one of the collection of a regulatory fee under
the police power, reliance on the above course of
decisions is not inappropriate. There is nothing to
stand in the way, therefore, of the collection of the
registration fees from defendant-appellee.
Ruperto vs. Torres No. L-8785 February 25,
1957 (unreported case)
100 Phil 1098
Cornelito S. Ruperto, as Assistant Fiscal to the City of
Manila. Petitioner and appellee, vs. Hon. Luis P.
Torres, as Chairman, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya,
Hon. Pompeyo Diaz and Hon. Pilar Hidalgo Lim,
as members of the Integrity Board, respectively
and Conrado Teodoro Sr., respondents and
appellants.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila holding that the supplementary report
and recommendation of the Integrity Board
recommending the removal of the petitioner
herein, is null and void, and so is Administrative
Order No. 171 of the President, removing
petitioner herein from office. Ordering that
petitioner be reinstated to his former position as
assistant city fiscal of Manila and that all salaries
due him from the date of his dismissal until his
reinstatement be paid to him.
Judgment reversed, case dismissed with costs
against petiotner-appellee. Labrador, J. ponente.
Carmelo vs. Ramos
G.R. No. L-17778 November 30, 1962
Facts:
Mayor of Manila issued an executive
order creating a committee "to investigate the
anomalies involving the license inspectors and
other personnel of the License Inspection
Division of the Office of the City Treasurer
and of the License and Permits Division. Mr.
Jesus L. Carmelo was chairman of the said
committee.
The committee issued subpoenas to
Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a
bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him
to appear in connection with an administrative
case against Crisanta Estanislao but that
Ramos, on whom the subpoenas were duly
served, refused to appear.
Petitioner filed a petition to declare
Ramos in contempt. The court dismissed the
petition and held that there is no law
empowering committees created by municipal
mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that
witnesses testify under oath.
Issue:
WoN Camelo (committee) has the
power to subpoena witnesses to appear before it
and to ask for their punishment in case of
refusal.
Held: No
The rule of Contempt (Rules of Court)
applies only to inferior and superior courts and
does not comprehend contempt committed
against administrative officials or bodies like the
one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly
considered and expressly defined as contempt
of court.
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides as
follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. —
When authority to take testimony or evidence is
conferred upon an administrative officer or upon
any nonjudicial person, committee, or other
body, such authority shall be understood to
comprehend the right to administer oaths and
summons witnesses and shall include authority
to require the production of documents under
a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject
in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of
a similar character.
Saving the provisions of section one hundred
and two of this Act, any one who, without lawful
excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued
under the authority of the preceding paragraph
or who, appearing before any individual or body
exercising the power therein defined, refuses to
make oath, give testimony, or produce
documents for inspection, when thereunto
lawfully required, shall be subject to discipline as
in case of contempt of court and upon
application of the individual or body exercising
the power in question shall be dealt with by the
judge of first instance having jurisdiction of the
case in the manner provided by law.
However, one who invokes this
provision of the law must first show that he has
"authority to take testimony or evidence" before
he can apply to the courts for the punishment of
hostile witnesses. There is nothing said in the
executive order of the Mayor creating the
committee about such a grant of power. All that
the order gives to this body is the power to
investigate anomalies involving certain city
employees.
G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971
PABLO CATURA and LUZ
SALVADOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
and CELESTINO TABANIAG, et
al., respondents.
FACTS
- A complaint was lodged against Catura and
Salvador, the President and Treasurer,
respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration Employees Association, a
legitimate labor organization.
- The principal complainants are respondent
Tabaniag as well as other employees
constituting more than ten percent of the entire
membership of such labor organization.
- It was charged that during the tenure of office
of petitioners, they were responsible for
"unauthorized disbursement of union funds".
- Complainants filed a case with the DOLE.
- Associate Judge Salvador of the CIR required
and directed Catura and Salvador to deliver and
deposit to the Court all the said Association's
book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books,
union funds, receipts, vouchers and other
documents related to the finances of the said
labor union at the hearing.
- There was a motion for reconsideration by
petitioners on the ground that they were not
heard before such order was issued, which
moreover in their opinion was beyond the power
of the CIR. With Associate Judge Paredes
dissenting, the order was sustained in a
resolution by the Court en banc.
ISSUE: WON the CIR had the power to issue
such Order. YES.
RULING:
- Paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of Section 17 of the
Industrial Peace Act provide:
"The members shall be entitled to full and
detailed reports from their officers and
representatives of all financial transactions as
provided in the constitution and by-laws of the
organization." ... "The books of accounts and
other records of the financial activities of a
legitimate labor organization shall be open to
inspection by any officer or member thereof."
- All that the challenged order did was to require
petitioners, as President and Treasurer of the
labor organization, to "deliver and deposit" with
respondent Court all of its book of accounts,
bank accounts, pass books, union funds,
receipts, vouchers and other documents related
to its finances at the hearing of the petition
- On its face, it cannot be said that such a
requirement is beyond the statutory power
conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific
provisions of law allegedly violated may not be
effectively complied with. The authority to
investigate might be rendered futile.
- To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to
investigate, to be conscientious and rational at
the very least, requires an inquiry into existing
facts and conditions. The documents required to
be produced constitutes evidence of the most
solid character as to whether or not there was a
failure to comply with the mandates of the law.
- It is not for this Court to whittle down the
authority conferred on administrative agencies to
assure the effective administration of a statute,
in this case intended to protect the rights of
union members against its officers.
- The matter was properly within its cognizance
and the means necessary to give it force and
effectiveness should be deemed implied unless
the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary.
No such showing has been made; no such
showing can be made. To repeat, there should
be no question about the correctness of the
order herein challenged.
- Nor is the validity of the order in question to be
impugned by the allegation that there was a
denial of procedural due process. If the books
and records were the private property of
petitioners, perhaps the allegation of the
absence of due process would not be entirely
lacking in plausibility. Such is not the case
however.
- The pertinent section of the Industrial Peace
Act makes clear that such books of accounts
and other records of the financial activities are
open to inspection by any member of a labor
organization.
- For the court to require their submission at the
hearing of the petition is, as above noted,
beyond question, and no useful purpose would
be served by first hearing petitioners before an
order to that effect can be issued. Moreover,
since as was shown in the very brief of
petitioners, there was a motion for
reconsideration, the absence of any hearing,
even if on the assumption purely for argument's
sake that there was such a requirement, has
been cured.
- What the law prohibits is not the absence of
previous notice, but the absolute absence
thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.
- The hearing on a motion for reconsideration
meets the strict requirement of due process.
EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975
FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul
and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the
Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated
July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled
"Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D.
Bagatsing, etc
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under
Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the President of the Philippines created the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under
Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the
following functions and responsibilities:
· To investigate all activities
involving or affecting immoral practices, graft
and corruptions, smuggling (physical or
technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all
other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to
submit proper recommendations to the
President of the Philippines.
· To investigate cases of graft and
corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos.
1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence
to establish prima facie, acts of graft and
acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
· To receive and evaluate, and to
conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn
complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior
of any public official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the
appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions,
the President vested in the Agency all the
powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to
summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony
or evidence relevant to the investigation.
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico
Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency,
issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas,
then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila,
a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him
"to be and appear as witness at the Office of the
PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and
there to declare and testify in a certain
investigation pending therein."
ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its
officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas
in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life
blood of the administrative process is the flow of
fact, the gathering, the organization and the
analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful
for all administrative functions, not only for rule
making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for
determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific
than illuminating obscure areas to find out what
if anything should be done. An administrative
agency may be authorized to make
investigations, not only in proceedings of a
legislative or judicial nature, but also in
proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain
information upon which future action of a
legislative or judicial nature may be taken and
may require the attendance of witnesses in
proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It
may conduct general inquiries into evils calling
for correction, and to report findings to
appropriate bodies and make recommendations
for actions.
We recognize that in the case before Us,
petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power
from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an
effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon
witness, administer oaths, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation" with the authority
"to require the production of documents under a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in
all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of
a similar character." Such subpoena power
operates in extenso to all the functions of the
Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-
paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by
nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents
would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions
enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e),
and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another
with the principal aim of meeting the very
purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is
to forestall and erode nefarious activities and
anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the
subpoena power of the Agency is confined to
mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions
would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency
in its investigatory functions under sub-
paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the
enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4,
para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what
function should the subpoena power be
exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart
from the established rule that forbids
differentiation when the law itself makes none.
There is no doubt that the fact-finding
investigations being conducted by the Agency
upon sworn statements implicating certain public
officials of the City Government of Manila in
anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's
sphere of authority and that the information
sought to be .
PEOPLE vs. MACEREN
79 SCRA 450, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18,
1977
Facts:
The respondents were charged with violating
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which
penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries.
This was promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the
old Fisheries Law and the law creating the
Fisheries Commission. The municipal court
quashed the complaint and held that the law
does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence
the executive and judicial departments cannot
consider the same.On appeal, the CFI affirmed
the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the administrative order penalizin
g electro fishing is valid.
Ruling: NO.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing the
administrative order. The old Fisheries Law
does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking
body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal
provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law.The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive
official the power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense.It can authorize the
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the
penalty provided for in the law itself.Where the
legislature has delegated to executive or
administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express
legislative purpose, the rules of administrative
officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority
granting statute, do not represent a valid precise
of the rule-making power but constitute an
attempt by an administrative body to legislate
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-
making powers because the lawmaking body
finds it impracticable, if not impossible,to
anticipate and provide for the multifarious and
complex situations that may be encountered in
enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the defects and
purposes of the law and that it should conform to
the standards that the law
prescribes.Administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the
law itself cannot be extended.
The rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it his been enacted.
The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned.
SMART v NTC [G.R. No. 151908. August 12,
2003]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
· Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory
powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
 promulgating rules and regulations on the billing
of telecommunications services.
· On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a
Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone
service (CMTS) operators which contained
measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the
incidence of stealing of cellular phone units.
· This was followed by another Memorandum
dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public
telecommunications entities
· Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and
Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the
National Telecommunications Commission an
action for declaration of nullity of the
memoranda. The complaint was docketed at the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.
They alleged that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the
prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction
belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry
under the Consumer Act of the Philippines
· Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom,
Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Complaint-in-Intervention.
· The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the NTC from implementing
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and the
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.
· In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-
defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on
the ground of petitioners’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
· The trial court dismissed NTC’s motion to
dismiss for lack of merit. The plaintiffs
application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction was hereby granted.
· Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court
of Appeals. A decision granted the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction
to hear the case
· The rules and regulations that administrative
agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency.
It is required that the regulation be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law, and be not
in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by law.
It may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute
it is administering or which created it, or which
are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and
an administrative order, the former must prevail.
· Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is
to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial
power when it performs in a judicial manner an
act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive
or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying
out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature.
· In questioning the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle applies only where the act
of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function,
and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only
where the administrative agency exercises its
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Where
what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its
quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE
FILIPINAS vs. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
MORELAND, J.:
· This is an appeal from, or a petition for review
of, an order of the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners of the Philippine Islands,
requiring the petitioner to file a detailed report of
its finances and operations in the form set forth
in the petition.
· The Board of Public Utility Commissioners
issued and caused to be served on petitioner an
order to show cause why petitioner should not
be required to present detailed annual reports
respecting its finances and operations
respecting the vessels owned and operated by it
· After a hearing the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners dictated an order in the following
terms: "The respondent is therefore ordered to
present annually on or before March first of each
year a detailed report of finances and operations
of such vessels as are operated by it as a
common carrier within the Philippine Islands, in
the form and containing the matters indicated in
the model of annual report which accompanied
the order to show cause herein."
· On its return to the order to show cause
before the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
the petitioner denied the authority of the board to
require the report asked for on the ground that
the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by
said board as authority for such requirement
was, if construed as conferring such power,
invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt
on the part of the Legislature to delegate
legislative power to the board.
· The section of Act No. 2307 under which the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners relies for
its authority, so far as pertinent to the case at
hand, reads as follows:
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after
hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to
require every public utility as herein defined:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To furnish annually a detailed report of
finances and operations, in such form and
containing such matters as the Board may from
time to time by order prescribe.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is valid
delegation of legislative power
HELD: No
· It is clear that a statute which authorizes a
Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require
detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the
nature of the report, the contents thereof, the
general lines which it shall follow, the principle
upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other
matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion
of the board, is not expressing its own will or the
will of the State with respect to the public utilities
to which it refers. Such a provision does not
declare, or set out, or indicate what information
the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it
needs in order to impose correct and just
taxation, supervision or control, or the facts
which the State must have in order to deal justly
and equitably with such public utilities and to
require them to deal justly and equitably with the
State. The Legislature seems simply to have
authorized the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners to require what information the
board wants. It would seem that the
Legislature, by the provision in question,
delegated to the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners all of its powers over a given
subject-matter in a manner almost absolute,
and without laying down a rule or even
making a suggestion by which that power is
to be directed, guided or applied.
· In the case at bar the provision complained of
does not law "down the general rules of action
under which the commission shall proceed." nor
does it itself prescribe in detail what those
reports shall contain. Practically everything is
left to the judgment and discretion of the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners,
which is unrestrained as to when it shall act,
why it shall act, how it shall act, to what
extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.
· We believe that the Legislature, by the
provision in question, has abdicated its
powers and functions in favor of the Board
of Public Utility Commissioners with respect
to the matters therein referred to, and that
such Act is in violation of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902. We believe that the
Legislature, by the provision referred to, has
not asked for the information which the State
wants but has authorized and board to
obtain the information which the board
wants.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
v JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of
First Instance of Manila
LAUREL, J.:
· Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine
and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff and the
offended party, and the respondent herein
Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in
the criminal case entitled "The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et
al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and G.R. No. 41200 of this
court. Respondent herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is
the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard
the application of the defendant Mariano Cu
 Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal
case.
· The information in the aforesaid criminal case
was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila on October 15, 1931. The Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered a judgment of
conviction sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu
Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from
four years and two months of prision
correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to
pay the costs and with reservation of civil action
to the offended party, the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon appeal,
the court modified the sentence to an
indeterminate penalty of from five years and six
months of prision correccional to seven years,
six months and twenty-seven days of prision
mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other
respects.
· The instant proceedings have to do with the
application for probation filed by the herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November
27, 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason
presiding, referred the application for probation
of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same June 18,
1937. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance of
Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera
presiding, set the petition for hearing on April 5,
1937.
· The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an
opposition to the granting of probation to the
herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The
private prosecution also filed an opposition on
April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that
Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been
repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the
Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section
1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the
reason that its applicability is not uniform
throughout the Islands and because section 11
of the said Act endows the provincial boards
with the power to make said law effective or
otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their
respective provinces. The private prosecution
also filed a supplementary opposition on April
19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI,
Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the
opposition of the private prosecution except with
respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
· On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge
Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution
concluding that the herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of
the crime of which he stands convicted by this
court in G.R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's
petition for probation.
ISSUE: Whether or not said Act 4221 is
unconstitutional.
HELD: Yes, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared
unconstitutional
· The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is
challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That
said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power
of the Executive; (2) that it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power and (3) that it
denies the equal protection of the laws.
· While the Probation Law does not encroach
upon the pardoning power of the executive and
is not for that reason void, does section 11
thereof constitute, as contended, an undue
delegation of legislative power?
· The rule, however, which forbids the
delegation of legislative power is not absolute
and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. The case
before us does not fall under any of the
exceptions hereinabove mentioned.
· The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in
section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office.
· In testing whether a statute constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it
left the hands of the legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of any other appointee
or delegate of the legislature.
In the United States vs. Ang Tang Ho, this court
adhered to the foregoing rule when it held an act
of the legislature void in so far as it undertook to
authorize the Governor-General, in his
discretion, to issue a proclamation fixing the
price of rice and to make the sale of it in
violation of the proclamation a crime. The
general rule, however, is limited by another rule
that to a certain extent matters of detail may be
 left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be
adopted or promulgated by executive officers
and administrative boards.

· For the purpose of Probation Act, the

provincial boards may be regarded as
administrative bodies endowed with power to
determine when the Act should take effect in
their respective provinces. They are the agents
or delegates of the legislature in this respect.
· The provincial boards of the various provinces
are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or
not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of
the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its
province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of
a probation officer. The plain language of the Act
is not susceptible of any other interpretation.
This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of
legislative power to the provincial boards.