CASES: Stare Decisis
disorder.
TING v Velez – Ting
Fact:
-Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and
respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen)
first met in 1972 while they were classmates
in medical school.
- The couple begot six (6) children
- On October 21, 1993, after being married for
more than 18 years to petitioner
- Carmen filed a verified petition before the
RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code. She claimed that
Benjamin suffered from psychological
incapacity even at the time of the celebration
of their marriage, which, however, only
became manifest thereafter.
- Carmen’s complaint, she already aware of
the habit of petitioner of his drinking and
gambling habit before their marriage,
moreover, petitioner is become angry and
violent when he is induced w/ alcohol, thus
affecting his profession as an
anesthesiologist.
- Carmen also said that petitioner
deliberately refuse to give financial support
to their family, thus neglecting his obligation
as a father and husband.
- Petitioner, Benjamin denied being
psychologically incapacitated, thus he
maintained that he is a responsible and
respectable person. On his behalf, as a
member of a social club, wherein he used to
drink and gamble only for that social reason.
He denied being violent and the alleged of
failure to support his family
- petitioner presented a psychiatrist, Dr.
Onate, proving his psychological incapacity,
being Benjamin's compulsive drinking,
compulsive gambling and physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that
petitioner suffers from a personality
- Thus, on Jan 9, 1998, the RTC rendered its
Decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.
- CA, reversed RTC’s decision, It faulted the
trial court's finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that
Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated
at the time he married Carmen since Dr.
Oñate's conclusion was based only on
theories and not on established fact.
- CA’s basis or guidelines of there decision
were, Santos v. Court of Appeals and in Rep. of
the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
- Subsequently, Carmen file a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that
the Molina guidelines should not be applied
to this case since the Molina decision was
promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or
more than five years after she had filed her
petition with the RTC.
- Molina ruling could not be made to apply
retroactively, as it would run counter to the
principle of stare decisis.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA violated the rule on stare
decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
Ruling:
-NO. The principle of stare decisis enjoins
adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final
decisions.
It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument. Basically, it is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issues, necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction,
the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the
Civil Code.
- Two strains of stare decisis have been
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known
as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty
of lower courts to apply the decisions of the
higher courts to cases involving the same
facts he second, known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must follow
its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly
observes that vertical stare decisis has been
viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a
policy, imposing choice but not a command.
Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts
set in stone in our Constitution.
2 horizontal stare decisis:
Constitutional stare decisis involves
judicial interpretations of the Constitution
while statutory stare decisis involves
interpretations of statutes.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule
for an ensemble of reasons, viz.:
(1) it legitimizes judicial institutions;
(2) it promotes judicial economy; and,
(3) it allows for predictability.
Courts refuse to be bound by the stare
decisis rule where
(1) its application perpetuates illegitimate
and unconstitutional holdings;
(2) it cannot accommodate changing social
and political understandings;
(3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of
Congress; and,
(4) activist judges can dictate the policy for
future courts while judges that respect stare
decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
respondent's argument that the doctrinal
guidelines prescribed
in Santos and Molina should not be applied
retroactively for being contrary to the
principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The
same argument was also raised but was
struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again
in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we
explained that the interpretation or
construction of a law by courts constitutes a
part of the law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court is overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith, in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non
respicit."
Caboabas v Pepsi – Cola
Facts:
-Respondent Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. (PCPPI) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacturing,
bottling and distribution of soft drink
products, which operates plants all over the
country, one of which is the Tanauan Plant
in Tanauan, Leyte.
-In 1999, PCPPI’s Tanauan Plant allegedly
incurred business losses in the total amount
of Twenty-Nine Million One Hundred Sixty-
Seven Thousand and Three Hundred Ninety
(P29,167,390.00) Pesos
- In order to avert further losses, PCPPI
implemented a company-wide retrenchment
program denominated as Corporate-wide
Rightsizing Program (CRP) from 1999 to
2000, and retrenched forty-seven (47)
employees of its Tanauan Plant on July 31,
1999.
*NOTE: retrenchment - as an activity to
legally terminate any employment contract
with the employee by offering a
compensation package*

-subsequently, after this event, twenty-seven
(27) of said employees led by Anecito Molon
(Molon, et al.), filed complaints for illegal
dismissal before the NLRC against PCPPI.
-in line to this, same event that happened in
the case of Molon et al. that on January 15,
2000, petitioners, who are permanent and
regular employees of the Tanauan Plant,
received their respective letters, informing
them of the cessation of their employment on
February 15, 2000, pursuant to PCPPI's CRP
- petitioners alleged that PCPPI was not
facing serious financial losses because after
their termination, they also alleged that they
regularized employees and rehire another 47
as their replacement, furthermore, according
to the petitioners, the program was just to
prevent their labor union from becoming a
certified bargaining agent of PCPPI's rank-
and-file employees.
-Labor arbiter ruling: finding the dismissal of
petitioners as illegal, thus Pepsi appealed to
NLRC
-NLRC ruling: rendered a decision nullifying
the LA’s decision and dismissing the
complaints for illegal dismissal and that the
PCPPI’s program is a valid exercise of
management prerogatives. In addition,
NLRC ordered to pay complainants there
separation benefits and other benefits that
shall be paid to them. Dissatisfied,
complainant filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA .
-CA ruling: denies the petition and agreed
with NLRC ruling.
ISSUE:
W/N the doctrine of stare decisis applies in
this case as the previous case ruled on the
validity of the same retrenchment program.
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is well
entrenched in Article 8 of the New Civil
Code which states that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
pertain to the dismissal of the complaints for
illegal dismissal filed by Molon, et al., the 27
former co-employees of petitioners in PCPPI.
On the issue of whether the retrenchment of
the petitioners' former co-employees was in
accord with law, the Court ruled that PCPPI
had validly implemented its retrenchment
program.
-Guided by the jurisprudence on stare
decisis, the remaining question is whether
the factual circumstances of this present case
are substantially the same as the Pepsi-Cola
Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon case.
-There is no dispute that the issues, subject
matters and causes of action between the
parties in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
v. Molon
-the present case are identical, namely, the
validity of PCPPI's retrenchment program,
and the legality of its employees'
termination. There is also substantial
identity of parties because there is a
community of interest between the parties in
the first case and the parties in the second
case, even if the latter was not impleaded in
the first case.
-they are petitioners' former co-employees
and co-union members of LEPCEU-ALU
who were also terminated pursuant to the
PCPPI's retrenchment program. only
difference between the two cases is the date
of the employees' termination.
Brotherhood Guardian Inc. v COMELEC
Facts:
COMELEC removed Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the
party-list system through its Resolution No.
8679, in accordance with Section 6 (8) of
Republic Act No. 7941, also known as the
Party-List System Act. RA No. 7941
provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or
Cancellation of Registration.
– The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested
party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on
any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the
last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of
the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has
registered.[Emphasis
supplied.]
-PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No.
8679, but likewise sought, through its
pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its
petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization under the Party-List System
Act. Among other arguments
-PGBI also asserted in their arguments that
MINERO v. Comelec cannot apply in the
instant controversy for two reasons
(a) the factual milieu of the cited case is
removed from PGBI’s;
(b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded
the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and
the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution
No. 8679 were not.
- Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in
point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the
votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in
the 2004 elections.
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be
heard or to seek the reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of - the essence
of due process; this is clear from Resolution
No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely
affected parties the opportunity to file their
opposition.
- As regards the alternative relief of
application for accreditation, the COMELEC
found the motion to have been filed out of
time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for
accreditation provided in Resolution 8646.
The motion was obviously filed months after
the deadline.
ISSUE:
(a)whether there is legal basis for delisting
PGBI; and
(b) whether PGBI's right to due process was
violated.
RULING:
No. according to Our Minero ruling is an
erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA
7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI's
delisting from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-
list system.
The word “OR” is a disjunctive term
indicating disassociation and independence
of one thing from the other things
enumerated. With this, the law provides for
two separate reasons for delisting.
exception to the application of the principle
of stare decisis.
-As our discussion above shows, the most
compelling reason to
abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an
erroneous application of the law - an
application that the principle of stability or
predictability of decisions alone cannot
sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to
the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general.
Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an
erroneous ruling. Thus, we now
abandon Minero and strike it out from our
ruling case law.
-We are aware that PGBI's situation - a party
list group or organization that failed to
garner 2% in a prior election and
immediately thereafter did not participate in
the preceding election - is something that is
not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From
this perspective, it may be an unintended
gap in the law and as such is a matter for
Congress to address. We cannot and do not
address matters over which full
discretionary authority is given by the
Constitution to the legislature; to do so will
offend the principle of separation of powers.
If a gap indeed exists, then the present case
should bring this concern to the legislature's
notice.
Hui v. Rodriguez
Facts:
-After obtaining a visa at the Philippine
Embassy in Singapore, petitioner, a
"Taiwanese citizen,"
-On November 15, 1998, he was arrested by
several policemen, who subsequently turned
him over to the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), after finding him guilty
of possessing a tampered passport earlier
canceled by Taiwanese authorities, ordered
his summary deportation.
-December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before
the RTC of Manila a Petition for Habeas
Corpus on the ground that his detention was
illegal
*Note: literally meaning to “produce the
body”—is an order issued by a court of law
to a prison warden or law enforcement
agency holding an individual in custody to
deliver that prisoner to the court so a judge
can decide whether that prisoner had been
lawfully imprisoned and, if not, whether
they should be released from custody.*
-January 7, 1999, After the said petition, the
trial court subsequently grants his petition
and ordering his release from custody.
- January 11, 1999, Respondents, Rodriguez,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which
was denied by trial court.
-thus, leading the Respondents to file a
"Notice of Appeal from the judgment of the
Honorable Court in the above-stated case,
which was received by the Bureau on
February 11, 1999 and RTC on February 16,
1999
-Petitioner filed an "Opposition," claiming
that the Notice had been filed beyond the 48-
hour reglementary period for filing appeals
in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the
pre-1997 Rules of Court.
-February 18, 1999, the RTC rejected
petitioner's contention and granted due
course to the Notice of Appeal.
-Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to CA, arguing this time
that the Notice should be rejected because it
had referred not to the RTC Decision but to
the January 29, 1999 Order denying
reconsideration.
-The Court denied the petition since the
reglementary period for ordinary appeal,
which is 15 days, also applies to the filing of
an appeal from a judgment regarding habeas
corpus. Thus, the issue regarding the
reglemantary period has become final.
Issue:
w/n Sec.18 Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of
Court, has been replaced by the Sec. 3 Rule
41 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ruling:
Reglementary Period for Appealing
Habeas Corpus Cases
No. Petitioner contends that the Notice of
Appeal was late because respondents filed it
only on February 16, 1999, five days after
they had received the Order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration on February 11,
1999. reglementary period for filing an
appeal is 48 hours, as prescribed in Section
18 of Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court,
-because the foregoing provision was
omitted from and thereby repealed by the
1997 Revised Rules of Court, which
completely replaced Rules 1 to 71.
-The omission shows the intention of the
rule-making body, which is to abrogate the
said provisions which were not produced by
older laws.
-reglementary period for filing an appeal in
a habeas corpus case is now similar to that in
ordinary civil actions, according to Section 3,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court. “The
appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from…”
-the appeal was seasonably filed within the
15-day reglementary period.
Stare Decisis
-Petitioner, however, insisted that the
application of Sec. 18, which requires an 48-
hour period must be maintained under the
said doctrine.
-It should be stressed that stare
decisis presupposes that the facts of the
precedent and the case to which it is applied
are substantially the same. In this case, there
is one crucial difference
-Accordingly, stare decisis cannot compel this
Court to apply to the present case the alleged
precedents decided during the regime of the
pre-1997 Rules.
-But because that provision had already been
repealed when the facts under present
consideration occurred, the Court can no
longer rely on those cases.
Statutes as curative.
Knights of Rizal V DMCI Homes
Facts:
-DMCI Project Developers, Inc. (DMCI-
PDI) acquired a 7,716.60-square meter lot in
the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue,
Ermita, the lot was earmarked for the
construction of DMCI-PDI's Torre de Manila
condominium project.
-After having completed all the necessary
permits and DMCI already started
constructing the said project. However, the
City Council of Manila ordered Resolution
No. 121 to temporarily suspend the Building
Permit of DMCI-PDI, since it will rise at the
back of the monument and clearly dwarf the
said monument of rizal. With due respect to
the said statue.
- City Legal Officer Renato G. Dela Cruz
stated that there is "no legal justification for
the temporary suspension of the Building
Permit issued in favor of [DMCI-PDI]" since
the construction "lies outside the Luneta
Park" and is "simply too far to be a repulsive
distraction or have an objectionable effect on
the artistic and historical significance"
-He also pointed has been officially declared
as an anthropological or archeological area.
- DMCI-PDI sought the opinion of the
National Historical Commission of the
Philippines (NHCP) on the matter
- According to the NHCP maintained that
the Torre de Manila project site is outside the
boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to the public order" or that it brings harm, danger,
rear of the Rizal Monument, and thus, or hazard to the community.
cannot possibly obstruct the frontal view of
the National Monument.
-According to the KOR "[t]he despoliation of
the sight view of the Rizal Monument is a
situation that 'annoys or offends the senses'
of every Filipino who honors the memory of
the National Hero Jose Rizal.
-They also contended that
NHCP's Guidelines on Monuments Honoring
National Heroes, Illustrious Filipinos and Other
Personages, which state that historic
monuments should assert a visual
"dominance" over its surroundings.
Issue:
W/N Can the Court issue a writ of
mandamus against the officials of the City of
Manila to stop the construction of DMCI-
PDI's Torre de Manila project?
Ruling:
No. There is no law prohibiting the
construction of the Torre de Manila outside
the Rizal Park.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service
Commission,[53] the Court held that "what is
not expressly or impliedly prohibited by
law may be done, except when the act is
contrary to morals, customs and public
order."
- Without this principle, the rights, freedoms,
and civil liberties of citizens can be
arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon
by the shifting passions of those who can
shout the loudest, or those who can gather
the biggest crowd or the most number of
Internet trolls.
- The Court has allowed or upheld actions
that were not expressly prohibited by
statutes when it determined that these acts
were not contrary to morals, customs, and
public order. Hence there is no rising of
allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila
project is "contrary to morals, customs, and